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sc_adminaction_is | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.
SPANO v. NEW YORK.
No. 582.
Argued April 27, 1959.
Decided June 22, 1959.
Herbert S. Siegal argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Rita D. Schechter.
Irving Anolik argued the cause for Respondent. With him on the brief were Daniel V. Sullivan and Walter E. Dillon.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the -opinion of the Court.
This is another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether a confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth' Amendment. As in all such cases, we are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and’its interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. Because of the delicate nature of the- constitutional determination which we must make, we cannot escape' the responsibility of making our own examination of the record. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587.
The State’s evidence reveals the following: Petitioner Vincent Joseph Spano is a derivative citizen of this country, having been born in Messina, Italy. He was 25 years old at the time of the shooting in question and had graduated from junior high school. He had a record of regular employment. The shooting took place on January 22,1957.
On that day, petitioner was drinking in a bar. The decedent, a former professional boxer weighing almost 200 pounds who had fought in Madison Square Garden, took some of petitioner’s money from the bar. Petitioner followed him out of the bar to recover it. A fight ensued, with the decedent knocking petitioner down and then kicking him in the head three or four times. Shock from the force of these blows caused petitioner to vomit. After •the bartender applied some ice to his head, petitioner left the bar, walked to his apartment; secured a gun, and walked eight or nine blocks to a candy store where, the decedent was frequently to be found. He entered the store in which decedent, three friends of decedent, at least two of whom were ex-convicts, and a. boy who was supervising the store were present. He fired five shots, two of which entered the decedent’s body, causing his death. The boy was the only eyewitness; the three friends of decedent did not see the person who.fired the shot. Petitioner then disappeared for the next week or so.
On February 1, 1957, the.Bronx County Grand Jury returned an indictment for first-degree murder against petitioner'. Accordingly, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest, commanding that he be forthwith brought beforé the court to answer the indictment, or, if the court had adjourned for the term, that he be delivered into the custody of the Sheriff of Bronx County..See N. Y. Code. Crim. Proc. § 301.
On February 3, 1957, petitioner called one Gaspar Bruno,.a close friend of 8 or 10 years’ standing who had attended school with him. Bruno was a fledgling police officer, having at that time not yet finished attending police academy. According to Bruno’s testimony, petitioner told;him “that he took a terrific beating, that the deceased hurt
Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
A. No
B. Yes
Answer: |
sc_decisiondirection | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
SUNAL v. LARGE, SUPERINTENDENT, FEDERAL PRISON CAMP.
NO. 535.
Argued April 1, 1947.
Decided June 23, 1947.
No. 535.
No. 840.
Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner in No. 840 and respondent in No. 535. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Washington and Robert S. Erdahl. Frederick Bernays Wiener was also on the brief in No. 840.
Hayden C. Covington argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent in No. 840 and petitioner in No. 535.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Sunal and Kulick registered under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 57 Stat. 597, 50 U. S. C. App. § 301, et seq. Each is a Jehovah’s Witness and each claimed the exemption granted by Congress to regular or duly ordained ministers of religion. § 5 (d). The local boards, after proceedings unnecessary to relate here, denied the claimed exemptions and classified these registrants as I-A. They exhausted their administrative remedies but were unable to effect a change in their classifications. Thereafter they were ordered to report for induction — Sunal on October 25, 1944, Kulick on November 9, 1944. Each reported but refused to submit to induction. Each was thereupon indicted, tried and convicted under § 11 of the Act for refusing to submit to induction
Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspecifiable
Answer: |
sc_casedisposition | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
PARKLANE HOSIERY CO., INC., et al. v. SHORE
No. 77-1305.
Argued October 30, 1978
Decided January 9, 1979
Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, White, Marshall, BlackmuN, Powell, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. RehNquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 337.
Jack B. Levitt argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Irving Parker, Joseph N. Salomon, and Robert N. Cooperman.
Samuel K. Rosen argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
iSolicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, Stephen M. Shapiro, Harvey L. Pitt, Paul Gonson, and Michael K. Wolen- sky filed a brief for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Joel D. Joseph filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a party who has had issues of fact adjudicated adversely to it in an equitable action may be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action brought against it by a new party.
The respondent brought this stockholder’s class action against the petitioners in a Federal District Court. The complaint alleged that the petitioners, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. (Parklane), and 13 of its officers, directors, and stockholders, had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger. The proxy statement, according to the complaint, had violated §§ 14 (a), 10 (b), and 20 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, 891, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C.. §§ 78n (a), 78j (b), and 78t (a), as well as various rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The complaint sought damages, rescission of the merger, and recovery of costs.
Before this action came to trial, the SEC filed suit against the same defendants in the Federal District Court, alleging that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in the respondent’s complaint. Injunctive relief was requested. After a 4-day trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this judgment. 558 F. 2d 1083.
The respondent in the present case then moved for partial summary judgment against the petitioners, asserting that the petitioners were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues that had been resolved against them in the action brought by the SEC. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that such an application of collateral estoppel would deny the petitioners their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a non jury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact. 565 F. 2d 815.
Question: What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed (includes modified)
C. reversed
D. reversed and remanded
E. vacated and remanded
F. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part
G. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to or from a lower court
K. no disposition
Answer: |
songer_genresp1 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.
NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES, INC., a Corporation, Appellant, v. The CITY OF ABERDEEN, SOUTH DAKOTA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
No. 18355.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Dec. 7, 1966.
J. B. Shultz, of Woods Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls, S. D., for appellant and filed printed brief.
Chester A. Groseclose, Jr., of Voas, Richardson & Groseclose, Aberdeen, S. D., for appellee and filed printed brief.
Before MATTHES and LAY, Circuit Judges and HARPER, District Judge.
MATTHES, Circuit Judge.
This controversy presents the question whether the City of Aberdeen, South Dakota (Aberdeen) is entitled to indemnity from North Central Airlines, Inc. (North Central) for the amount expended by Aberdeen as third-party defendant in connection with its defense of a personal injury law suit. The district court, Honorable Axel J. Beck presiding, found in favor of Aberdeen, Wiseman v. North Central Airlines, Inc.,
Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_authoritydecision | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
LYNCH, MAYOR OF PAWTUCKET, et al. v. DONNELLY et al.
No. 82-1256.
Argued October 4, 1983
Decided March 5, 1984
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 687. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 694. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 726.
William F. McMahon argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Richard P. McMahon and Spencer W. Viner.
Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Bator, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kuhl, and Kathryn A. Oberly.
Amato A. DeLuca argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Sandra A. Blanding, Burt Neubome, E. Richard Larson, and Norman Dorsen.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Coalition for Religious Liberty et al. by James J. Knicely and John W. Whitehead; for the Legal Foundation of America by David Crump; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Nicholas E. Calió.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Jewish Committee et al. by Samuel Rabinove; and for the Anti-Defamation League of B’
Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
A. judicial review (national level)
B. judicial review (state level)
C. Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
D. statutory construction
E. interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
F. diversity jurisdiction
G. federal common law
Answer: |
songer_initiate | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
UNITED STATES ex rel. EMANUEL v. JAEGER, U. S. Marshal.
No. 175.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Feb. 10, 1941.
Max Shlivek, of New York City (Shlivek & Brin and Saul S. Brin, all of New York City, on the brief), for relator-appellant.
Nathan Weidenbaum, of New York City (Benjamin F. Steinberg, of New York City, on the brief), for respondent-appellee.
Before SWAN, CHASE, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
CLARK, Circuit Judge.
The relator herein is the president and sole stockholder of Martin Clothes, Inc., which in the fall of 1937 filed a petition in the court below for reorganization under the then § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207. Proceedings in connection with that reorganization and involving one Frank Raskin have now led to the judgment of commitment for contempt against the relator, from which he seeks relief on this writ of habeas corpus. Raskin was not originally, and seemingly never formally, a party to the reorganization proceedings; his interest arises, initially at least, by virtue of a written agreement made November 24, 1937, between him and the relator, whereby he agreed to furnish the necessary cash to consummate the reorganization. Relator’s commitment was occasioned by his failure to comply with an order of the bankruptcy court that he refund to Raskin the money advanced by the latter and pay certain expenses in connection therewith. He attacks this order as beyond the jurisdiction of the court in bankruptcy.
The agreement of November 24, 1937, provided that Raskin was to deposit $2,500 with the clerk of court to provide a 30 per cent cash payment to creditors as soon as a plan of reorganization to that effect should be accepted and confirmed; that relator’s stock, to be held in escrow until confirmation of the plan, should then be delivered to Raskin to hold until relator had reimbursed him, and thereafter to be returned to relator; and that until Raskin was paid, relator should work for the business at a fair and reasonable salary. After it was made, Raskin made the required deposit with the clerk, though only $1,500 was his own money, since $1,000 was supplied by relator’s father-in-law, Feldman. Thereafter the plan of reorganization was modified to substitute for the 30 per cent cash settlement with creditors a combined cash and note settlement of 20 and 10 per cent respectively, with notes of 5 per cent each of the debtor, endorsed by relator, relator’s wife, and Feldman, payable March 20 and April 20, 1938, respectively. The creditors accepted the amended plan and the court confirmed it on February 3, 1938. In its order of confirmation, the court directed the clerk to pay to the debtor the money theretofore deposited “for the purpose of debtor making distribution and payments to creditors under said Amended Plan of Reorganization and under this order.” Relator asserts, and it is not challenged, that debtor, upon receipt of the deposit, distributed it to the creditors as ordered, delivered the notes as required and paid them when they came due, and paid priority claims, as well as administration expenses, in full in accordance with the plan.
On February 15, 1938, Raskin applied to the district court for a resettlement of the confirmation order, on the grounds that he had not been served with a copy of the proposed order, and that the changes in the plan, described above, had been made without his consent. The court referred his application to a special master to hear and report. After extensive hearings the master reported, and the court on December 6, 1938, made an order, which went quite beyond a mere resettlement of the confirmation order. In this order the debtor was directed to pay to Raskin $1,500, representing the sum advanced by him, $125 representing
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
LOCAL NO. 370, BAKERY, CONFECTIONERY AND TOBACCO WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO and James E. Ray, Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COTTON BROS. BAKING CO., INC., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 81-3188.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 9, 1982.
Ernest R. Malone, Jr., New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellant.
Daniel E. Broussard, Jr., Alexandria, La., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before BROWN, GEE and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This suit originated with a grievance filed by James E. Ray, a member of Local No. 370, Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International Union of America, AFL-CIO (Union), against his employer, Cotton Brothers Baking Co., Inc. (Cotton Brothers). Mr. Ray, who had a history of tardiness and absenteeism, experienced automobile problems on the morning of March 4, 1979, which made it difficult to get to work. Later that day, Ray was fired, and subsequently he filed a grievance. The collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Cotton Brothers provided for arbitration of such disputes, and, after a hearing, the arbitrator found (i) that Cotton Brothers had not properly and objectively investigated the incident, and (ii) that Ray’s failure to report to work after his car broke down did not constitute just cause to fire him. On the basis of these findings, Ray’s reinstatement with back pay was ordered. Cotton Brothers refused to comply with the order, and this action was brought by the Union and Ray to enforce the arbitrator’s decision. Finding no errors in the arbitration proceedings or award, the District Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Ray and the Union. We affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the case in a light most favorable to the opposing party, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. U. S. v. R & D One Stop Records, Inc., 661 F.2d 433, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1981). In its order dated July 28,1980, the District Court found no dispute as to the labor agreement providing for arbitration, the arbitrator’s reinstatement of Ray, and Cotton Brothers’ refusal to comply with the award. Citing the Steelworkers trilogy, the District Court held that an arbitrator’s decision under a labor agreement must be enforced except under unusual circumstances. Because it was unable to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Union and Ray. We are in full agreement that summary judgment was proper in this instance. “The courts... have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim.” United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403, 1407 (1960).
In an earlier ruling, dated April 29, 1980, the District Court granted the Union’s motion to strike Cotton Brothers’ affirmative defenses and counterclaim on the basis of Louisiana’s three month statute of limitations. La.Rev.Stat. 9:4213. We need not reach this issue in light of the District Court’s later ruling, on the merits, that the bargained-for arbitrator’s decision was supportable and binding. The trial judge’s approach to and analysis of this case, when he finally ruled on the merits and granted a summary judgment, was not based upon the earlier order striking the defenses and counterclaim.
Finally, Cotton Brothers urges on appeal that the District Court should not have awarded attorney fees to the Union and Ray. “The District Court has authority to award attorney’s fees where it determines that a party has without justification refused to abide by the award of an arbitrator.” United Steelworkers v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998, 95
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_two_issues | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine whether there are two issues in the case. By issue we mean the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Eduard VON DER HEYDT, Libertas, S. A., and Ratio, S. A., Appellants, v. William P. ROGERS, Attorney General of the United States, and Ivy Baker Priest, Treasurer of the United States, Appellees.
No. 13855.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 31, 1957.
Decided Jan. 2, 1958.
Mr. Isadore G. Aik, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Sidney S. Sachs, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Myron C. Baum, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Mr. George B. Sear Is, Attorney, Department of Justice, was on the brief, for appellees. Mr. Irwin A. Seibel, Attorney, Department of Justice, also entered an appearance for appellees.
Before Edgeeton, Chief Judge, and Bastían and Burger, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The District Court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss appellant’s complaint for failure to produce documents and records for which an order to produce had been made. Before ruling on the motion, the District Court heard testimony for nine days and received numerous exhibits, all presumably bearing on the issues of materiality of the records sought, the possession and control of these records by appellant, appellant’s actions constituting refusal to produce, and so forth. The District Court made no findings other than its order of dismissal which it characterized as containing findings. However, on the record before us, consisting of a Joint Appendix of 942 pages digesting pertinent parts of a record of over 1500 pages, all covering substantial issues, we are unable to afford an adequate appellate review without specific findings in relation to the several issues of the case in order that we may know the basis of the District Court’s decision.
Appellant also urges that the statement of the trial judge shows error in assigning the burden of proof. The ¡burden of showing materiality of the .information and ability to produce it rests on the one seeking discovery. At .a point the burden of going forward with the evidence may shift to the party asserted to be in possession or control. Absent specific findings to be reviewed in the light of the evidence, we cannot •make an adequate assessment of this issue and our disposition of this appeal will afford opportunity for dealing with this.
As to the claim that the District Court -erred in denying appellant’s cross motion for discovery, we find no abuse of discretion.
Remanded with instructions.
. “All documents which were called for by the Court’s order not having been produced, and the plaintiffs not having satisfactorily shown to the Court that such documents do not exist, and the plaintiffs not having satisfactorily explained to the Court why they have not been produced; and the pattern of the conduct of the plaintiffs’ duly authorized representatives, but not including present counsel, clearly showing an unwillingness on their part to make a full disclosure to the defendants; and the plaintiffs’ answers to the defendants’ interrogatory No. 23 being too vague and wholly insufficient since the ■answers furnish no details as to any specific documents, I find that the discovery order of this Court of February '9, 1956, has not, in good faith been complied with.”
Question: Are there two issues in the case?
A. no
B. yes
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
NEAL v. UNITED STATES
No. 11177.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
April 3, 1939.
WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Harry S. Swensen, of Minneapolis, Minn. (Eugene A. Rerat and John Ott, both of Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief), for appellant.
Victor E. Anderson, U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn. (Linus J. Hammond, Asst. U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn., on the brief), for the United States.
Before STONE, WOODROUGH, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
THOMAS, Circuit Judge.
The appellant William Squire Neal, hereinafter called defendant, was indicted, tried and convicted in the court below upon both counts of an indictment containing two counts, and he appeals.
The first count of the indictment charged defendant with being an accessory after the fact to a felony committed by John L. Neal; and the second count charged misprision of the same felony committed by John L. Neal. The defendant was sentenced to serve in a penitentiary for two years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently and not consecutively.
Before trial the defendant interposed a demurrer to count one of the indictment, which was overruled. At the close of.the evidence he moved for a directed verdict upon both counts on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to support a verdict of guilty, which motion was overruled.
On this appeal the defendant urges that the trial court erred (1) in overruling his demurrer to count one of the indictment, (2) in overruling his motion for a directed verdict on both counts, (3) in the admission of certain evidence over his objection, (4) in permitting misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury, and (5) in giving certain instructions to the jury.
Since the sentences run concurrently,.if the defendant was properly convicted upon either count of the indictment, there can not be a reversal even if there were reversible error on the trial of one of the counts. The defendant in that situation is not prejudiced by the sentence on the count in which the conviction is tainted with error. Roberts v. United States, 8 Cir., 96 F.2d 39, 40; Little v. United States, 8 Cir., 93 F.2d 401, 409; Taran v. United States, 8 Cir., 88 F.2d 54, 59; Mad-delin v. United States, 7 Cir., 46 F.2d 266; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392. 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700, 50 A.L.R. 989.
The alleged error most seriously pressed upon our attention, and the one involving the greatest difficulty, relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction upon cither count. If this assignment of error be
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_treat | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
Nannie Carr HARRIS, Incompetent, and Robert A. Eubanks, Guardian, Appellee, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Appellant.
No. 72-1343.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 5, 1972.
Decided May 4, 1973.
William L. Goldman, Atty., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice (Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mayer Rothwacks and William A. Friedlander, Attys., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, on brief), for appellant.
James H. Johnson, III, Chapel Hill, N. C. (Haywood, Denny & Miller, Chapel Hill, N. C., on brief), for appellee.
Before BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WINTER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from a decision of the United States Tax Court, 56 T.C. 1165.
In the spring of 1962, Robert A. Eu-banks, the duly qualified guardian of taxpayer, Nannie Carr Harris, an incompetent, negotiated with one Robert I. Lipton for the sale of certain improved real estate owned by taxpayer in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. On May 18, 1962, Eubanks, as such guardian, and Lipton executed a contract providing for the sale of the property, subject to the required approval of the Superior Court of Orange County, North Carolina. One Thousand Dollars was to be paid upon securing the necessary judicial approval and the balance on or before August 1, 1962.
Pursuant to the contract and the pertinent North Carolina statutes, Eubanks filed a petition with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Orange County on May 21, 1962, seeking authority to sell the property for $156,500, alleging as grounds therefor the low net income from the property, the insufficiency of the income to provide the support needed by taxpayer and to satisfy certain debts owed by her. On the same day, the Superior Court ordered (1) that Eu-banks offer the property to Lipton for $156,500, (2) that Eubanks file a report of the offer, and (3) that the sale be confirmed after ten days if no objections or upset bids were filed. Also on May 21, 1962, Eubanks made the offer and filed the report as ordered, and Lipton made the $1,000 down payment called for in the contract. The petition, court order and report filed May 21 did not deal with the disposition of sale proceeds.
It appears that sometime between May 21, 1962, and June 1, 1962, during the 10-day period before the sale could be confirmed, Eubanks was advised that a reduction in income tax could be effected if the purchase price were payable in installments. On June 1, 1962, he filed a supplemental petition, seeking approval of an arrangement whereby Lipton would pay $46,500 upon delivery of the deed and would deposit the balance of $110,000 with First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Durham, North Carolina, as escrow agent, with instructions to the agent to pay $27,500 plus interest to the guardian on January 2 of each of the following four years. In addition to this supplemental petition, Eubanks’ attorney sent a letter to the Clerk in which he approximated the tax savings if the receipts from the sale of the property were reported over a period of five years. By order entered June 1
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_dissent | 2 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the number of judges who dissented from the majority (either with or without opinion). Judges who dissented in part and concurred in part are counted as dissenting.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 16175.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
March 26, 1969.
Lee C. Shaw, Walter P. Loomis, Jr., Chicago, 111., George G. Gallantz, New York City, for petitioner.
Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Richard S. Rodin, Warren M. Davison, Attys., N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before CASTLE, Chief Judge, MAJOR and HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judges, and KILEY, SWYGERT, FAIRCHILD, CUMMINGS and KERNER, Circuit Judges,
KILEY, Circuit Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board found that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company violated Sections 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, which had been certified to represent a unit of employees. The Board ordered the Company to bargain with the Union. The Company petitioned this court to review and set aside the Board’s order, and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. A panel of this court, in an opinion (one judge dissenting) issued August 8, 1968, set aside the Board’s order. Subsequently, this court granted the Board’s petition for rehearing en banc. We now enforce the Board’s order.
Petitioner is a multi-state insurance company. All of its business decisions, such as job benefits, holidays, overtime, sick leave, recruitment and salary ranges are made at its home office in Blooming-ton, Illinois. Petitioner is divided into twenty-one regions across the country. The Northeastern Region, pertinent to this ease, comprises New York, New Jersey, and the New England states, and its headquarters is at Wayne, New Jersey. It is headed by a regional vice-president assisted by two deputy regional vice-presidents. The vice-president directs all operations in the region, including recruitment, interviewing job applicants, promotions, and salaries.
The Northeastern Region is divided into four divisions, including two automobile insurance divisions, one covering New York and the other New Jersey and New England. A division manager, who is responsible for overseeing the claim processing operations of the company, heads each division. He also makes salary and employment recommendations to the regional vice-president.
The New York automobile division is divided into four districts, each headed by a division claims superintendent, who is in charge of about five offices and supervises about thirty-five adjusters. The responsibilities of a divisional claims superintendent include: supervising the instruction of claims personnel under his jurisdiction; training the claims supervisory personnel; examining claims files; recommending company action concerning promotion, salary changes, hiring, and disciplinary action; interviewing and initially screening applicants for claims agent jobs; administering the over-all day to day claims handling within his jurisdiction; and visiting the claims field offices.
The proceedings before us began with a representation petition filed by the Union. The Company moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of inappropriateness of the unit. The Board rejected both the Union’s contention that the smallest appropriate unit was a single claims office, and the Company’s contention that the smallest appropriate unit was the Northeastern Region, or, alternatively, the New York State unit. The Board designated “the divisional unit of employees supervised by a divisional superintendent” as the smallest appropriate unit.
Thereafter the Board conducted representational elections in two claims districts in New York. In the unit before us, the Union won the election and was certified as the bargaining representative.
The Union then requested the Company to bargain. The Company refused on the ground that the unit found by the Board was inappropriate. The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain. The General Counsel issued a complaint, and the Company’s response admitted the refusal to bargain, reasserting the inappropriateness of the unit. The Board granted the General Counsel’s “Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings,” over the Company’s objection that it was entitled to a further hearing on the appropriate unit and issued the order which is now before this court.
The Company contends that the order should be set aside because the unit determination is unreasonable and the Board’s refusal to hold the further hearing requested by the Company violated Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board has a wide discretion in designating appropriate
Question: What is the number of judges who dissented from the majority?
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
Arlene B. SINGER, et al., Appellants, v. SHANNON & LUCHS COMPANY, et al.
No. 87-7053.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
March 3, 1989.
Before ROBINSON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, Senior District Judge.
Of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
Opinion PER CURIAM.
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellants’ Petition for Rehearing it is
ORDERED, by the court, that the petition is denied, as is more fully set forth in the opinion of the Court filed herein this date.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-appellants, Arlene B. Singer and Joel D. Joseph, have petitioned for rehearing of our order granting Shannon & Luchs’s motion for attorneys’ fees. Their objection is that Shannon & Luchs’s motion was filed nearly a year after our unpublished judgment in its favor and was therefore in violation of Fed.R.App.P. 39’s requirement that a bill of costs thereunder be filed within 14 days of entry of judgment. We write briefly to explain that our order was based upon Fed.R.App.P. 38 and that, under its terms and in the absence of any rule of this court to the contrary, there is no time limit for motions under Rule 38 other than the principles of laches.
Rule 38 states in its entirety:
If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.
Plainly its language imposes no time limit on the filing of a bill of costs. Indeed, some courts regard the interest in discouraging frivolous appeals as so compelling that no motion is necessary, and they award Rule 38 costs sua sponte. See, e.g., Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1200-03 (7th Cir.1987).
Other circuit courts have held that while the term “costs” in Rule 39 excludes attorneys’ fees, the reference in Rule 38 to “just damages and single or double costs” comprises them. See, e.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 64 (3rd Cir.1986); District No. 8, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Clearing, 807 F.2d 618, 623 (7th Cir.1986); Nagy v. Jostens, Inc., 787 F.2d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1986); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir.1986); Triola v. Department of Transportation, 769 F.2d 760, 762 (Fed.Cir.1985) (citing Moir v. Department of Treasury, 754 F.2d 341 (Fed.Cir.1985), a Rule 38 case).
There is a dictum to the contrary in Montgomery & Associates, Inc. v. CFTC, 816 F.2d 783, 784 (D.C.Cir.1987), but it provides no basis for rejecting the views of our sister circuits. The case concerned a fees motion under 7 U.S.C. § 18(e)
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_2-3-2 | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "civil rights - voting rights, race discrimination, sex discrimination".
Daniel K. MAYERS et al., Appellants v. Peter S. RIDLEY et al.
No. 71-1418.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Reconsidered March 1, 1972.
Decided June 30, 1972.
Mr. Michael J. Waggoner, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Jack B. Owens and Ralph J. Temple, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Ted. D. Kuemmerling, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, with whom Messrs. C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for appellees.
On Reconsideration En Banc
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, and WRIGHT, McGOWAN, TAMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKIN-NON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, en banc.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants, a group of District of Columbia residents representing the class of homeowners whose property is burdened by racial covenants, instituted this suit to enjoin the Recorder of Deeds from accepting such covenants for filing in the future and to require the Recorder to affix a sticker on each existing liber volume stating that restrictive covenants found therein are null and void. They also asked for an injunction preventing the Recorder from providing copies of instruments on file unless a similar notice is attached to the copies. The District Court dismissed their complaint, 330 F.Supp. 447 (1971), and a three-judge panel of this court affirmed that judgment. On reconsideration en banc of the judgment of the District Court we now reverse.
Reversed and remanded.
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "civil rights - voting rights, race discrimination, sex discrimination"?
A. voting rights - reapportionment & districting
B. participation rights - rights of candidates or groups to fully participate in the political process; access to ballot
C. voting rights - other (includes race discrimination in voting)
D. desegregation of schools
E. other desegregation
F. employment race discrimination - alleged by minority
G. other race discrimination - alleged by minority
H. employment: race discrimination - alleged by caucasin (or opposition to affirmative action plan which benefits minority)
I. other reverse race discrimination claims
J. employment: sex discrimination - alleged by woman
K. pregnancy discrimination
L. other sex discrimination - alleged by woman
M. employment: sex discrimination - alleged by man (or opposition to affirmative action plan which benefits women)
N. other sex discrimination - alleged by man
O. suits raising 42 USC 1983 claims based on race or sex discrimination
Answer: |
songer_fedlaw | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the interpretation of federal statute, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pierluigi MANCINI, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 85-8838.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Oct. 20, 1986.
Mary S. Donovan, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.
William L. McKinnon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before JOHNSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and GARZA, Senior Circuit Judge.
Honorable Reynaldo G. Garza, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, appellant Pierluigi Mancini pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Mancini conditioned his plea by preserving the right to appeal from the denial of the motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. FACTS
On April 23, 1985, Mancini arrived at the Atlanta, Georgia airport on a flight from Miami, Florida. Agent Lynn Collier, working with the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), observed Mancini deplane and heard him ask the gate agent for directions to continue his flight to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Agent Collier noted that Mancini had no baggage checks attached to his airline ticket and that the two pieces of hand luggage which he carried were nearly empty.
Because she had overheard which flight Mancini was connecting with, Agent Collier did not maintain surveillance of the defendant but subsequently relocated him in the gate area next to the departure gate for his flight to Pittsburgh. Mancini was nervously looking around the gate area. After a while, Mancini left his seat and went to the public restroom, where Agent Bruce Pickett, who was also working with the DEA, followed him. Although it was not crowded, Mancini walked into the restroom, looked around, and came right back out, not using the facilities. Mancini then went into a bar near the restroom, sat down, and ordered a drink. He looked over his shoulder several times.
At this point, approximately 9:30 a.m., Agent Collier and Agent Pickett approached Mancini in the bar. Both agents were dressed in civilian clothes and displayed neither weapons nor badges. After identifying themselves to Mancini and showing him their identification, the agents asked whether they could examine his airline ticket. Mancini agreed and handed the ticket to Agent Collier. Agent Collier determined that Mancini was traveling from Miami and had no checked baggage. She noted that the ticket was in the name of Joseph George. Agent Collier handed the ticket back to Mancini and, referring to him as “Mr. George,” asked him whether he had any additional identification. Mancini stated that he was traveling for Mr. George and produced a temporary Florida driver’s license in his own name and an employment identification card with his name and photograph on it. Agent Collier examined these items and then returned them to the defendant.
When the police officers first identified themselves, Mancini appeared nervous. As he handed over his ticket, his hands were visibly shaking. As the interview continued, his breathing became affected and he became extremely nervous. During the whole interview, however, the agents maintained a conversational tone of voice.
Agent Collier explained to Mancini that she and Pickett were narcotics officers looking for drugs moving through the airport. She asked Mancini whether he would allow them to search his person and the bags he had with him. Mancini responded, “What happens if I do have drugs?” Agent Collier told Mancini that she was unable to determine the answer to that question and asked him if he would allow the search to be conducted in the bar or in an airline office across the hall. Mancini picked up his bags, paid his bar bill, and followed the agents to the airline office. At no time during the walk from the bar to the airline office did either agent (or a third plainclothed agent in the corridor) touch the defendant. In the airline office, Agent Collier advised Mancini of his right to refuse to permit a search of his person or luggage. Mancini indicated that he did not want his bags searched, but did not object to a “pat-down” search of his person. Agent Pickett searched Manc
Question: Did the interpretation of federal statute by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_crossapp | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there were cross appeals from the decision below to the court of appeals that were consolidated in the present case.
Raymond George MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 87-5342
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Nov. 1, 1988.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Dept, of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, Fla., for respondent-appellee.
Before TJOFLAT, HILL and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
HILL, Circuit Judge:
Raymond George Miller petitions this court for the writ of habeas corpus. A Florida state court convicted Miller of solicitation to commit murder in the first degree. In response to an ad in Soldier of Fortune magazine, Miller wrote and then called a California man named Jerry Baker, explaining that he was obligated to pay his former wife 40% of his military retirement pay, and that he sought a “solution” to his problem. Baker, acting as a government informant, recorded the phone call as a California police officer watched. Baker and Miller met in a Florida motel room, and their conversation again was taped. Miller was arrested on his way out of the motel room.
After his conviction, Miller appealed on the grounds that the tapes of his conversations with Baker should have been suppressed. His conviction was affirmed by a Florida appellate court. Miller then filed a collateral state habeas petition, arguing that his appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise four issues: (1) the vagueness of the Florida solicitation statute under which Miller was convicted; (2) the failure of the trial court to strictly construe the Florida statute so that it would not apply to Miller; (3) the affront to the confrontation clause caused when Miller was denied certain testimony from three witnesses; and (4) the vindictiveness of the court in sentencing Miller. A Florida appellate court examined Miller’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and ruled Miller’s counsel had been effective because on the merits none of the four proposed claims would have been successful.
Miller then filed a federal habeas petition. In his petition, however, Miller raised the four issues directly, rather than through a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The federal court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, noting that the four claims had been dealt with only indirectly by a state court.
Miller again filed in state court, this time alleging the four claims as direct grounds for habeas relief. A state court summarily denied the claims. Miller returned to federal court with the four claims, but again was denied relief because he had failed to exhaust the claims in a Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 proceeding in state court.
When Miller filed under Rule 3.850, a state court held Miller had defaulted on the four claims when he failed to raise them in his initial appeal. Miller again sought federal relief, but the federal court dismissed his claim, citing the state procedural default holding.
Finally Miller brought this federal habe-as petition, turning again to his allegation that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel since his attorney failed to raise the four claims on Miller’s initial appeal. The district court denied the petition after reviewing the nature of the underlying claims. The court cited the original state habeas decision which also had denied the petition after review of the merits of various claims, including the four advanced here. See Miller v. State, 430 So.2d 611 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.1983).
Although this petition represents Miller’s fourth attempt to obtain federal habeas relief, at this point no federal appellate court has examined the merits of Miller’s ineffective assistance claim. Consequently, we will not dismiss the petition for abuse of the writ.
Appellate counsel may be effective and yet not raise claims “reasonably considered to be without merit.” Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 956, 105 S.Ct. 355, 83 L.Ed.2d 291 (1984). “The most direct way to approach this question... is to examine the alleged trial errors... to see if they contain sufficient merit — actual or arguable — that his appellate counsel can be faulted for not having raised them.” Hooks v. Roberts, 480 F.2d 1196, 1197 (5th Cir
Question: Were there cross appeals from the decision below to the court of appeals that were consolidated in the present case?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_genresp2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.
Ralph D. SMITH and Thelma Smith, Appellants, v. ARBAUGH’S RESTAURANT, INC., a body corporate.
No. 23748.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Dec. 14, 1971.
Decided June 30, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 1973.
Mr. Harry W. Goldberg, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Max M. Goldberg and Morris Altman, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Edward C. Donahue, Rockville, Md., with whom Mr. E. Gwinn Miller, Rockville, Md., was on the brief, for ap-pellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT and LE
Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appnonp | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
HOERNER WALDORF PAN AMERICAN BAG CO., INC., Petitioner, v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION, Respondent, Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, Co-Respondent.
No
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_usc1sect | 933 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 26. In case of ties, code the first to be cited. The section number has up to four digits and follows "USC" or "USCA".
JONES v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 9863.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
July 5, 1934.
Frank T. Gladney, of St. Louis, Mo. (Jones, Hocker, Sullivan, Gladney & Reeder, of St. Louis, Mo., on tbe brief), for petitioner.
John MaeC. Hudson, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen. (Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atlv. Gen., and Sewall Key, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before SANBORN and WOODRQUGH, Circuit Judges, and DEWEY, District Judge.
Rehearing denied Oct. 15, 1934.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition to review an order of the United States Board of Tax Appeals redetermining a deficiency in income taxes of the petitioner for the year 1926.
The sole question involved is the amount of taxable income received by the taxpayer from the sale in 1926 of a piece of improved real estate in the city of St. Louis, Mo. The controlling facts, which are undisputed, are briefly as follows:
The petitioner, as trasteo under a declaration of trust, on September 10, 1020, purchased the real estate in question for $76,000', and held it until 1936, when it was sold for $100,000. For the years 1920, 1921, and 1922, no deduction from the gross income of the petitioner for depreciation was claimed or allowed. For the years 1923,.1021, and 1925 the petitioner claimed deductions from gross income because of depreciation, but these claims were disallowed by the Commissioner. At the time the property was sold, the total accumulated allowable depreciation was $13,22.7.50'. In determining the taxable gain from the sale, the peiitioner took the difference between the pnrcha.se price and the sale price of the property; while the Commissioner of Interna) Revenue deducted the amount of depreciation from the purchase priee, which increased the taxable gain by the amount of the depreciation, and this xasulted in the deficiency complained of. The petitioner appealed to the Board, which affirmed the Commissioner.
The question is whether the Commissioner had the right, in determining the taxable gain resulting from the sale, to deduct the allowable but unallowed depreciation of $13,-227.50 from the purchase price of the property.
The Revenue Act of.1926 provides [section 204 (a), c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 14, 26 USCA § 935 (a)] that “the basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale 0 c of property acquired after February 28,.1013, shall be the cost of such property”; and [section 202 (b), (2), c. 27, 44 Stat. 13, 26 USCA § 933 (b) (21)] that “the basis shall be diminished by the amount of the deductions for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion which have since the acquisition of the property been allowable in respect of such property under this title or prior income tax laws. * * t
Article 1561, Treasury Regulations 69', provides, among- other things: “ * * In computing the amount of gain or loss, however, the cost or other basis of the property must be increased by the cost of capita! improvements and betterments made to the property since the basic date, and by carrying charges, such as taxes on unproductive property. fc “ * The cost or other basis of the property must then be decreased by the amount of the deductions for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion which have since the acquisition of the property been allowable in respect of such property, whether or not such deductions were claimed by the taxpayer or formally allowed. M * * ”
That the method pursued by the Commissioner in determining the taxable gain from the sale of the property here in question is justified by the law and the regulations appears long since to have been
Question: What is the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 26? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_1-3-2 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "criminal - state offense".
William Archie MAYFIELD, Jr., Appellee, v. Bill STEED, Acting Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, Appellant.
No. 72-1568.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Feb. 6, 1973.
Oliver L. Adams, Rogers, Ark., on brief for appellant.
John W. Murphy, Fayetteville, Ark., for appellee.
Before HEANEY, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court granting a writ of habeas corpus to William Archie May-field, Jr. (Mayfield). We affirm.
Mayfield was convicted of second degree murder in Arkansas state court by a jury from which all women were admittedly systematically excluded. His conviction was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Judge Eisele, in a soundly reasoned memorandum opinion, held that the systematic exclusion of .women is impermissible under the rationale of Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972), and Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946).
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 8 of the rules of this Court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the basis of its memorandum opinion. Mayfield v. Steed, 345 F.Supp. 806 (E.D.Ark.1972)
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "criminal - state offense"?
A. murder
B. rape
C. arson
D. aggravated assault
E. robbery
F. burglary
G. auto theft
H. larceny (over $50)
I. other violent crimes
J. narcotics
K. alcohol related crimes, prohibition
L. tax fraud
M. firearm violations
N. morals charges (e.g., gambling, prostitution, obscenity)
O. criminal violations of government regulations of business
P. other white collar crime (involving no force or threat of force; e.g., embezzlement, computer fraud,bribery)
Q. other state crimes
R. state offense, but specific crime not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. Hortex Manufacturing Company, Inc., Intervenor. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. HORTEX MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc., Respondent.
Nos. 18839, 18877.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 26, 1965.
Decided Feb. 18, 1965.
Mr. James Graham, New York City, of the bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, for petitioner in No. 18,839. Mr. Jacob Sheinkman, New York City, was on the brief for petitioner in No. 18,839.
Mr. Richard P. Lawlor, Atty., N. L. R. B., of the bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Messrs. Arnold Ord-man, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, and Warren M. Davidson, Atty., N. L. R. B., were on the brief, for respondent in No. 18,839.
Mr. Richard P. Lawlor, Atty., N. L. R. B., with whom Messrs. Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Pre-vost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Warren M. Davison, Atty., N. L. R. B., were on the brief for petitioner in No. 18,877, submitted on the brief.
Mr. John E. Price, Ft. Worth, filed a brief on behalf of intervenor-respondent, Hortex Mfg. Co., Inc., and the cases for Hortex Mfg. Co., were treated as submitted on the brief.
Before Danahee, Bastían and McGowan, Circuit Judges.
McGOWAN, Circuit Judge.
In one of these two appeals, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO (the “Union”) complains in two respects of an order of the National Labor Relations Board. In the other, the Board seeks enforcement of its order as against the objections of the respondent employer, Hortex Manufacturing Company (“Hortex”). The order itself, entered in a proceeding initiated by the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the Union, adopted an Examiner’s report which found Hortex in violation of Section 8(a) (1) by reason of discriminatory discharges of three employees, and of Section 8(a) (3) by reason of such conduct as well as surveillance of union activities and various announcements and threats designed to discourage union affiliation. The order entered by the Board directs Hortex to (i) cease and desist from the anti-union activities found to be forbidden by Sections 8(a) (1) and (3), (ii) reinstate the three discharged employees with back pay, and (iii) post the usual notices
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_casesourcestate | 10 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed.
WHALEN v. UNITED STATES
No. 78-5471.
Argued November 27, 28, 1979
Decided April 16, 1980
Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 695. BlacKmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 696. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 699.
Silas J. Wasserstrom argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William J. Mertens and W. Gary Kohlman.
Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Heymann, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Jerome M. Feit, and Elliott Schulder.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
After a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of rape, and of killing the same victim in the perpetration of rape. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 20 years to life for first-degree murder, and of 15 years to fife for rape. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences. 379 A. 2d 1152. We brought the case here to consider the contention that the imposition of cumulative punishments for the two offenses was contrary to federal statutory and constitutional law. 441 U. S. 904.
I
Under the laws enacted by Congress for the governance of the District of Columbia, rape and killing a human being in the course of any of six specified felonies, including rape, are separate statutory offenses. The latter is a species of first-degree murder, but, as is typical of such “felony murder” offenses, the statute does not require proof of an intent to kill. D. C. Code § 22-2401 (1973). It does require proof of a killing and of the commission or attempted commission of rape or of one of five other specified felonies, in the course of which the killing occurred. Ibid. A conviction of first-degree murder is punishable in the District of Columbia by imprisonment for a term of 20 years to life. § 22-2404. Forcible rape of a female is punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. § 22-2801.
It is the petitioner’s position that his sentence for the offense of rape must be vacated because that offense merged for purposes of punishment with the felony-murder offense, just as, for example, simple assault is ordinarily held to merge into the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. See Waller v. United States, 389 A. 2d 801, 808 (D. C. 1978). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that “the societal interests which Congress sought to protect by enactment [of the two statutes] are separate and distinct,” and that
Question: What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
01. Alabama
02. Alaska
03. American Samoa
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. District of Columbia
11. Federated States of Micronesia
12. Florida
13. Georgia
14. Guam
15. Hawaii
16. Idaho
17. Illinois
18. Indiana
19. Iowa
20. Kansas
21. Kentucky
22. Louisiana
23. Maine
24. Marshall Islands
25. Maryland
26. Massachusetts
27. Michigan
28. Minnesota
29. Mississippi
30. Missouri
31. Montana
32. Nebraska
33. Nevada
34. New Hampshire
35. New Jersey
36. New Mexico
37. New York
38. North Carolina
39. North Dakota
40. Northern Mariana Islands
41. Ohio
42. Oklahoma
43. Oregon
44. Palau
45. Pennsylvania
46. Puerto Rico
47. Rhode Island
48. South Carolina
49. South Dakota
50. Tennessee
51. Texas
52. Utah
53. Vermont
54. Virgin Islands
55. Virginia
56. Washington
57. West Virginia
58. Wisconsin
59. Wyoming
60. United States
61. Interstate Compact
62. Philippines
63. Indian
64. Dakota
Answer: |
songer_genapel1 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed appellant.
VIRGIN ISLANDS HOTEL ASSOCIATION (U.S.), INC., a corporation, Appellant, v. VIRGIN ISLANDS WATER & POWER AUTHORITY.
No. 72-1996.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 19, 1973.
Decided April 12, 1973.
Evelyn N. Cooper, Isherwood & Colianni, Christiansted, St. Croix, V. I., for appellant.
Ronald H. Tonkin, Atty. Gen. of the Virgin Islands, Sidney H. McKenzie, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Thomas, V. I., Wallace L. Duncan, Duncan & Brown, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before VAN DUSEN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and BARLOW, District Judge.
OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge.
This is the second time that these parties, the Virgin Islands Hotel Association (the Hotel Association) and the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (the Authority), are before this court. On the first occasion, in Virgin Islands Hotel Ass’n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 465 F.2d 1272 (3d Cir. 1972), this court upheld with modification an injunction the district court had issued against the Authority. By order of October 3, 1972, the district court vacated that injunction, and the Hotel Association appeals. We affirm the October 1972 order of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
It is necessary only to summarize the facts stated in our earlier opinion and in the first opinion of the district court, reported at 54 F.R.D. 377 (D.V.I.1972).
In the late fall of 1971, the Authority became worried that its revenues would soon fail to provide the coverage over interest required by its outstanding debt instruments, with devastating impact on its ability to procure additional needed financing. On November 10, 1971, it issued a press release indicating its intention to raise electric rates by from about 19% for residential users to about 25% for large power users. Public hearings were held one week later, and on December 3 the Authority put the proposed increases into effect.
The Hotel Association was understandably upset, since its members are classified as “large power” users. It immediately sought an injunction against the rate increase. The district court ruled that the Authority had violated 30 V.I.C. § 105(a) (12) in two ways. First, because the Authority did not have at its disposal information on the cost of providing electricity to its various classes of customers, the Authority had failed “to determine... reasonable rates.” Second, the public hearings held pursuant to this section 105(a) (12) were altogether inadequate. Among other defects, notice to the public was too short to allow adequate preparation time and the reports the Authority relied on were not made available publicly until the first public hearing. The district court, on February 4, 1972, ordered the Authority to rescind the increases, to have made an appropriate study of costs (called a “rate” study), and to hold proper public hearings on the proposed increases. However, to avoid possible disruption, the court stayed this injunction for ten months.
By decision of June 28, 1972, this court, although ruling that the Authority’s determination of rates is
Question: What is the nature of the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_source | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the forum that heard this case immediately before the case came to the court of appeals.
Edward F. WARDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin B. DAVIS and Barbara Davis, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 73-1080.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 11, 1973.
Decided March 19, 1974.
Anthony Zarlengo, Denver, Colo., for def endants-appellants.
John J. Mullins, Jr., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, HILL and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.
HILL, Circuit Judge.
This diversity action involves a contract dispute over sums allegedly due ap-pellee Warde for landscape architectural services performed by him for appellants Barbara and Marvin Davis. The trial court found appellants liable for breach of contract and awarded appellee $13,200 plus interest. Following argument to this court, and after reviewing the entire record, we concluded that the findings of fact were insufficient for a proper review of the case. It was therefore remanded to the trial court for the purpose of making sufficient and adequate findings of fact in compliance with Rule 52, F.R.Civ.P. Adequate findings of fact subsequently were made and the case is now before us for a proper determination.
The facts are simple. Appellants purchased real property in Englewood, Colorado, for the purpose of building a luxurious home. Desiring an aesthetically beautiful landscape to complement their new home, appellants asked Warde to design and supervise the landscape. Warde, a renowned landscape architect living in Beverly Hills, California, accepted the offer, but only on his own terms. These terms were set out in a letter to appellants dated September 19, 1968.
The letter stated that appellants had requested Warde “to design and draw up Landscape Plans and Specifications” for their residence and that said plans were to consist of the following:
1. Landscape Construction Plans showing circular drive and parking area, tennis court and tennis pavilion, future swimming pool, gazebo or equivalent, location of air conditioning compressor, sun bathing area, enclosed play area with recessed trampoline, recessed sandbox and other play equipment. Also incorporated in this Plan will be the location of major trees, garden lighting, outline of planting areas, location and description of any necessary walls, fences, and screens, garden paths, and lawn area and other garden accessories.
2. Landscape planting plans showing location, size, and description of all planting material to be installed.
The letter further stated the landscape plans would cost $1,800 and that “there will be, in addition, a supervision fee of 15% of the total amount spent.” Finally, the letter provided that Warde would be reimbursed for all expenses incurred in traveling to and from the job site from Los Angeles, California. Although reluctant to accept the 15% supervision fee, appellants ultimately relented and agreed to Warde’s terms.
Once the landscape plans were tentatively drawn construction began, and shortly thereafter disagreements between appellants and Warde erupted. Appellants felt that Warde’s landscape plan specifications were too general to be acted upon by contractors. They also felt that Warde was not spending adequate time on the job, but rather was delegating many of his supervisory functions to contractors. Because he was not performing his work as appellants had anticipated, Warde’s services were terminated on November 25, 1969. This lawsuit followed.
At trial appellant Davis testified that Warde spent very little time at the job site. Warde would come out to Engle-wood for one day and then fly back to Los Angeles, leaving all supervisory work to the subcontractors. He further testified that he and his wife placed many calls to Warde requesting him to come out more frequently and give the job closer supervision; but to no avail. He also intimated that Warde’s landscape plan specifications were too vague, as evidenced by the fact that on numerous occasions he or his wife received telephone calls from contractors asking for an explanation of Warde’s
Question: What forum heard this case immediately before the case came to the court of appeals?
A. Federal district court (single judge)
B. 3 judge district court
C. State court
D. Bankruptcy court, referee in bankruptcy, special master
E. Federal magistrate
F. Federal administrative agency
G. Court of Customs & Patent Appeals
H. Court of Claims
I. Court of Military Appeals
J. Tax Court or Tax Board
K. Administrative law judge
L. U.S. Supreme Court (remand)
M. Special DC court (not the US District Court for DC)
N. Earlier appeals court panel
O. Other
P. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appfiduc | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
CAPITOL BUS COMPANY, t/a Trailways of Pennsylvania v. BLUE BIRD COACH LINES, INC., et al. Appeal of BLUE BIRD COACH LINES, INC. and Aetna Casualty and Surety
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_const1 | 3 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited provision of the U.S. Constitution in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no constitutional provisions are cited. If one or more are cited, code the article or amendment to the constitution which is mentioned in the greatest number of headnotes. In case of a tie, code the first mentioned provision of those that are tied. If it is one of the original articles of the constitution, code the number of the article preceeded by two zeros. If it is an amendment to the constitution, code the number of the amendment (zero filled to two places) preceeded by a "1". Examples: 001 = Article 1 of the original constitution, 101 = 1st Amendment, 114 = 14th Amendment.
UNITED STATES v. GALLAGHER.
No. 9990.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 3, 1949.
Resubmitted April 20, 1950.
Decided June 21, 1950.
Harry B. Gallagher, pro se.
Alfred E. Modarelli, U. S. Attorney, Newark, N. J.; Grover C. Richman, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attorney, Camden, N. J.; Stuart B. Rounds, Asst. U. S. Attorney, Trenton, N. J., for appellee.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and MARIS, Goodrich, McLaughlin, kaLODNER and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
The appellant was indicted on May 16, 1941 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on two counts. The first count charged him with transporting in interstate commerce a motor vehicle which he then knew to be stolen. The second count alleged that he received the same automobile moving as interstate commerce, knowing it to have been stolen. On June 25, 1946 appellant, being arrested in the District of New Jersey, stated in writing that he had received a copy of the indictment, that he desired to plead guilty to the charges of the indictment, that he waived trial in the district in which the charges were pending and that he consented to the disposition of the case in the District of New Jersey, subject to the approval of the United States Attorney for each district. The appellant was represented by counsel of his choice and the statement was signed by him and subscribed by his attorney as a witness. The whole procedure was in accordance with Criminal Procedure Rule 20, 18 U.S.C.A.
On July 12, 1946 the appellant pleaded guilty to the indictment in question in the District Court for the District of New Jersey and at the same time pleaded guilty to another indictment involving another crime. He was sentenced on the indictment in question for a term of five years, the execution of the sentence being suspended and the appellant being placed on probation for five years. On May 5, 1947 the appellant was brought before the District Court for the District of New Jersey for violation of his probation. The court terminated the probation and resentenced him to a term of five years which he is presently serving in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia.
On March 31, 1949 the appellant filed in the District Court for the District of New Jersey a paper entitled “Motion in Arrest of Judgment”. The motion was intended by him to be made under Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code Annotated. As grounds for his motion he asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction to accept his plea of guilty and to sentence him upon the indictment because the automobile in question.had not in fact been stolen but rather had been obtained by false pretenses in that it had been obtained by a purchase involving the delivery of a worthless check. The district court denied the motion. From its action in so doing the appellant took the appeal now before us.
Relief under Section 2255 may be granted only where it appears that “the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.” Motions under this section may not be used to review the
Question: What is the most frequently cited provision of the U.S. Constitution in the headnotes to this case? If it is one of the original articles of the constitution, code the number of the article preceeded by two zeros. If it is an amendment to the constitution, code the number of the amendment (zero filled to two places) preceeded by a "1". Examples: 001 = Article 1 of the original constitution, 101 = 1st Amendment, 114 = 14th Amendment.
Answer: |
songer_typeiss | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court. Choose among the following categories. Criminal and prisioner petitions- includes appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence or the validity of continued confinement. Civil - Government - these will include appeals from administrative agencies (e.g., OSHA,FDA), the decisions of administrative law judges, or the decisions of independent regulatory agencies (e.g., NLRB, FCC,SEC). The focus in administrative law is usually on procedural principles that apply to administrative agencies as they affect private interests, primarily through rulemaking and adjudication. Tort actions against the government, including petitions by prisoners which challenge the conditions of their confinement or which seek damages for torts committed by prion officials or by police fit in this category. In addition, this category will include suits over taxes and claims for benefits from government. Diversity of Citizenship - civil cases involving disputes between citizens of different states (remember that businesses have state citizenship). These cases will always involve the application of state or local law. If the case is centrally concerned with the application or interpretation of federal law then it is not a diversity case. Civil Disputes - Private - includes all civil cases that do not fit in any of the above categories. The opposing litigants will be individuals, businesses or groups.
HOUSEHOLD GOODS FORWARDERS TARIFF BUREAU, Petitioner, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents.
No. 91-1350.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 23, 1992.
Decided June 30, 1992.
Alan F. Wohlstetter, with whom Stanley I. Goldman was on the brief, for petitioner.
Michael L. Martin, Atty., I.C.C., with whom James F. Rill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert B. Nicholson, John P. Fonte, and John C. Filippini, Attys., Dept, of Justice, and Robert S. Burk, General Counsel and Craig M. Keats, Associate General Counsel, I.C.C., were on the brief, for respondents. Ellen D. Hanson, Atty., I.C.C., also entered an appearance, for respondents.
Before RUTH BADER GINSBURG, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON.
KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:
The Household Goods Forwarders Tariff Bureau (HGFTB) appeals the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) to revoke its antitrust immunity. Because the Commission applied the correct standard in evaluating the need for an antitrust exemption and because the Commission adequately articulated its reasons for revoking the immunity, we deny HGFTB’s petition for review.
I.
The Household Goods Forwarders Tariff Bureau (HGFTB) is a rate bureau for household goods freight forwarders. A domestic freight forwarder is a common carrier that assembles and consolidates smaller shipments at origin, sorts them for delivery at destination and arranges for a motor or rail carrier to perform the line-haul transportation between the assembly and distribution points. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9). The forwarder “assumes responsibility for the transportation from the place of receipt to the place of destination.” Id. This case concerns “household goods” (HHG) freight forwarders. HHG freight forwarders handle used household goods, unaccompanied baggage and used automobiles. Id. § 10102(12).
As common carriers subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction, HHG freight forwarders must file tariffs with the ICC setting forth their rates and charges. During the nineteen year period preceding the Commission action leading to this appeal, i.e. from 1972-1991, the rates for HHG freight forwarders were set collectively by HGFTB. HGFTB was exempted from the antitrust laws for this purpose. See Household Goods Forwarders Tariff Bureau-Agreement, Section 5a Application No. 106 (ICC Apr. 25, 1972) (1972 Decision).
Another transporter is the “household goods motor carrier.” An HHG motor carrier transports HHGs from place to place. HHG motor carriers have their own authorized rate bureau, the Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau (HGCB), which collectively sets rates. HHG
Question: What is the general category of issues discussed in the opinion of the court?
A. criminal and prisoner petitions
B. civil - government
C. diversity of citizenship
D. civil - private
E. other, not applicable
F. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_capric | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the courts's use or interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard support the government? Note that APA allows courts to overturn agency actions deemed to be arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Overton Park emphasized this is a narrow standard, and one must prove that agency's action is without a rational basis. This also includes the "substantial justification" doctrine. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Donald Bruce MacDOUGALL, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kenneth Wayne GUNN, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Cleveland SANDERS, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Michael Lee HARVEY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Cleveland SANDERS, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kenneth Wayne GUNN, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Donald Bruce MacDOUGALL, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Michael Lee HARVEY, Appellant.
Nos. 83-5249(L), 83-5250, 83-5251, 83-5255, 84-5048, 84-5065, 84-5066 and 84-5070.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 9, 1985.
Decided May 22, 1986.
John K. Zwerling (J. Flowers Mark, Michael S. Lieberman, Zwerling, Mark, Ginsberg and Lieberman, P.C., Alexandria, Va. on brief), J. Edward Bell, Sumter, S.C., William B. Moffitt (Thomas Rawles Jones, Jr., Leora Kusher; Moffitt & Jones, Alexandria, Va., on brief); Larry G. Turner (Thomas W. Kurrus; Turner, Kurrus & Griscti, P.A., Gainesville, Fla., on brief), for appellants.
John F. DePue, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Robert C. Jendron, Asst. U.S. Atty., Henry Dargan McMaster, U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, SPROUSE, Circuit Judge, and BOYLE, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:
Donald Bruce MacDougall, Kenneth Wayne Gunn, Cleveland Sanders and Michael Harvey appeal their convictions resulting from their involvement in a major drug smuggling and distribution conspiracy which operated along the east coast of the United States for several years. Appellants belonged to one of the three major organizations whose activities are relevant to this appeal. The appellants’ organization separately and, on
Question: Did the courts's use or interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard support the government? Note that APA allows courts to overturn agency actions deemed to be arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Overton Park emphasized this is a narrow standard, and one must prove that agency's action is without a rational basis. This also includes the "substantial justification" doctrine.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_appel1_7_5 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).
Leonard N. BEBCHICK and Leonard S. Goodman, Appellants, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA and D. C. Transit System, Inc., Appellees.
No. 15999.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Nov. 30, 1960.
Decided Jan. 12, 1961.
Messrs. Leonard N. Bebchick and Leonard S. Goodman, appellants pro se.
Mr. George F. Donnella, Counsel, Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, with whom Messrs. Chester H. Gray, General Counsel, Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, and Andrew G. Conlyn, Counsel, Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, were on the brief, for appellee Public Utilities Commission of the District' of Columbia.
Mr. Owen J. Malone, Washington, D. C., for appellee D. C. Transit System, Inc. Mr. Harvey M. Spear, New York City, also entered án appearance for ap-pellee D. C. Transit System, Inc.
Before Washington, Danaher and Bastian, Circuit Judges.
WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.
This case involves an appeal from a decision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, relative to rates of bus and streetcar fares charged by appellee D. C. Transit System, Inc. Section 43-705 of the D.C.Code provides that “Any * * * person * * * affected by any final order or decision of the Commission, other than an order fixing or determining the value of the property of a public utility in a proceeding solely for that purpose, may” appeal to the District Court and from that court to this. See Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission, 1951, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 94, 191 F.2d 450. Appellants’ petition of appeal, filed pursuant to this section, was dismissed by the District Court on the ground “that the record certified to the Court contains no evidence to support the
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?
A. not ascertained
B. poor + wards of state
C. presumed poor
D. presumed wealthy
E. clear indication of wealth in opinion
F. other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy
Answer: |
sc_caseorigin | 160 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
212. United States Supreme Court
Answer: |
songer_district | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
Elias SIEGELMAN, individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Eva Siegelman, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CUNARD WHITE STAR Limited, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14, Docket 23054.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Nov. 9, 1954.
Decided Feb. 17, 1955.
Frank, Circuit Judge, dissented.
David Fox, New York City, for appellant.
Lord, Day & Lord, William J. Brennan, New York City, for appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and FRANK and HARLAN, Circuit Judges.
HARLAN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, in his own right and as administrator of his wife’s estate, brings this action to recover for injuries suf-. fered by his wife on the defendant’s vessel, the R.M.S. Queen Elizabeth. The action was begun in a New York state court on December 14, 1951, and removed on diversity grounds to the federal district court for the Southern District of New York on January 3, 1952, the requisite jurisdictional amount being present.
On September 9, 1949, the Compass Travel Bureau, Inc., Cunard’s New York agent, issued to Mr. and Mrs. Elias Siegelman a document describing itself as a “Contract Ticket.” It was a large sheet of light green paper, about 13 inches long and 11 inches wide. On the back were certain notices to passengers, relating to baggage, time of collection of ticket, location of the company’s piers and offices, etc. On the front was printed in black Cunard’s promise to provide specified transportation, in this case from New York to Cherbourg, subject to certain exceptions, and to 22 “terms and conditions,” also printed in black. Printed in red in heavier type was a notice directing the attention of passengers to these “terms and conditions.” Also printed in red, and in capital letters, was a statement that “it is mutually agreed that this contract ticket is issued by the Company and accepted by the passenger on the following terms and conditions.” The paper also contained a space where the departure time, the names of the passengers and of the ship, and other data were typed in. The paper was stated to be non-transferable. In a space provided for the signature of the company, the name of the Compass Travel Bureau was typed. The paper was not signed by either of the passengers.
On September 24, 1949, when the Queen Elizabeth had been at sea four days, Mrs. Siegelman was injured. While she was seated in a dining room chair, she and the chair were overthrown. Her chair was alleged to be the only one in the dining room which was not bolted to the floor. Upon returning to New York, the Siegelmans retained an attorney to prosecute their claim against Cunard. On August 31, 1950, after Cunard’s doctor had examined Mrs. Siegelman, Cunard offered $800, the approximate amount of medical expenses stated to have been incurred by the plaintiff and his wife, in settlement of the claim. This offer was made to the Siegelmans’ lawyer over the telephone by Swaine, a claim agent of Cunard. Noticing that the ticket required suits for bodily injury to be brought within a year of the injury, and that the injury had occurred barely less than a year ago, the lawyer asked Swaine whether it would be necessary to begin suit in order to protect his clients’ rights. Swaine is said to have stated that no suit was necessary, that the filing of an action would be futile in view of the prospect of early settlement, and that Cunard’s offer would stand open.
Subsequently Mrs. Siegelman died. Then, on January 4, 1951, Cunard withdrew its offer, which had not yet been accepted, stating that it could not bo tendered to any one other than the injured party.
On December 14, 1951, this suit was begun, claiming on behalf of the deceased damages for pain and medical expenses, and on behalf of her husband, damages for other medical expenses and for loss of consort. Cunard denied legal responsibility for the accident, and set up as a further defense the plaintiff’s failure
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_lcdisagreement | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.
No. 466.
Argued April 30, May 1, 1957.
Decided May 13, 1957.
Thomas G. Meeker argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, David Ferher and Solomon Freedman.
Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for the Louisiana Public Service Commission, respondent.
J. Raburn Monroe argued the cause for the Louisiana Power & Light Co., respondent. With him on the brief were /. Blanc Monroe and Monte M. Lemann.
Daniel James filed a brief for Middle South Utilities, Inc., respondent.
Per Curiam.
On January 29, 1953, the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to § 11 (b)(1) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (b)(1), issued a notice and order for hearing directed to Middle South Utilities, Inc., and its subsidiary, Louisiana Power & Light Company, upon the matter of “[w]hether Middle South and Louisiana [Power] should be required to take action to dispose of the gas utility assets and non-utility assets of Louisiana [Power] and, if so, what terms and conditions should be imposed in connection therewith.” A copy of that notice and order for hearing was served upon those companies and also upon the Louisiana Public Service Commission by registered mail.
A full hearing was conducted by the S. E. C. at which Middle South and Louisiana Power appeared, adduced evidence, and presented arguments in support of their position that they should be permitted to retain Louisiana Power’s gas properties as an additional integrated public utility system under the proviso to § 11 (b)(1) of the Act. The Louisiana Public Service Commission did not appear in that proceeding. On March 20, 1953, the S. E. C. issued its opinion, findings and order directing Middle South and Louisiana Power to divest themselves of all the non-electric assets of Louisiana Power “in any appropriate manner not in contravention of the applicable provisions of the Act,” which gave them one year for compliance under the provisions of § 11 (c) of the Act, 49 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (c). No petition to review that order was ever filed, and it ceased to be subject to judicial review with the expiration of the 60 days allowed to petition for that purpose by § 24 (a) of the Act, 49 Stat. 834, 15 U. S. C. § 79x (a), on May 19, 1953.
Thereafter, pursuant to § 11 (c) of the Act, the S. E. C. extended the time for compliance with its order to March 20, 1955. On November 10, 1954, Louisiana Power and its newly organized wholly owned subsidiary, Louisiana Gas Service Corp., filed a joint “application-declaration” with the S. E. C., proposing the transfer by Louisiana Power of all its non-electric properties to Louisiana Gas as a step in compliance with the divestment order of March 20, 1953, and expressing the intention of Louisiana Power to effect divestment of the common stock of Louisiana Gas within 18 months from the date the latter might begin operations. Thereupon, the S. E. C. issued a notice advising interested persons, including the Louisiana Public Service Commission, of the filing of the “application-declaration” mentioned, and that they might request a hearing on that proposal. By telegram of December 22, 1954, the Louisiana
Question: Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented?
A. Yes
B. No
Answer: |
songer_erron | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the court's use of the clearly erroneous standard support the government?" That is, a somewhat narrower standard than substantial evidence, or ignoring usual agency standards. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Howell C. WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 78-5649
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 27, 1979.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 12, 1979.
Howell C. Willis, pro se.
Arnaldo N. Cavazos, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before AINSWORTH, CLARK and VANCE, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et at, 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
Howell Willis, a tax protestor, appeals his conviction on two counts of willful failure to supply the Internal Revenue Service with information required by statute or regulation for the tax years 1974 and 1975, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Among his numerous contentions, Willis asserts a right to claim on his income tax returns his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and further urges that both the district judge and the prosecutor made prejudicial comments during his trial which require reversal of his conviction. We reject these and other contentions of appellant and affirm.
In 1974 and 1975, Willis filed IRS income tax Form 1040’s that stated his name, address and social security number and asserted line by line his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The 1974 return reported only that defendant had $15.10 in dividend income and 24<p in interest income while the return for 1975 provided no financial information at all. Willis appended to his tax returns various documents purportedly explaining his failure to supply further data regarding his income and his assertion of the fifth amendment privilege. Evidence at trial showed that Willis earned wages of $19,332 in 1974 and $8,611 in 1975.
Our decisions in United States v. Brown, 5 Cir., 1979, 591 F.2d 307; United States v. Wade, 5 Cir., 1978, 585 F.2d 573, and United States v. Johnson, 5 Cir., 1978, 577 F.2d 1304, conclusively dispose of appellant’s contentions respecting his right to assert his privilege against self-incrimination in lieu of supplying the tax information required by statute.
Even if, as Willis argues, the trial judge and the prosecutor made prejudicial comments, which we do not concede, our review of the record convinces us that, given the incontestable evidence of guilt, these remarks did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. “Because the prejudicial effect, if any, of the comments was slight in relation to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, any impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Greene, 5 Cir., 1978, 578 F.2
Question: Did the court's use of the clearly erroneous standard support the government? That is, a somewhat narrower standard than substantial evidence, or ignoring usual agency standards.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_respond1_1_4 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "other". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
Michael J. MORRISSEY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM MORROW & CO., INC., Bantam Books, Appellees.
No. 82-1213.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Dec. 8, 1983.
Decided July 26, 1984.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 25, 1984.
W. Jeffrey Edwards, Richmond, Va. (D. Alan Rudlin, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Va., Michael J. Morrissey, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellant.
Bruce W. Sanford, Washington, D.C. (Brian S. Harvey, Baker & Hostetler, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellees.
Before HALL, • MURNAGHAN and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges.
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:
Michael J. Morrissey, a practicing attorney, brought this action against William Morrow and Company, Inc. and Bantam Books, Inc., publishers of the book Spooks: The Haunting of America — The Private Use of Secret Agents alleging claims of defamation, invasion of privacy and injurious falsehood. Federal jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) — diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding the action barred by the one year statute of limitations, Va.Code 8.01-248. Plaintiff appeals alleging error of the district judge in (1) refusing to allow additional time for discovery after defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) had been converted to a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56; (2) “ruling on the record then established” that the statute of limitation began to run when the book was generally available to the public; and (3) failing to consider the possible conflict of law problem presented by the plaintiff’s claim of invasion of privacy.
Finding no merit in these exceptions, we affirm.
I
The complaint alleges that Morrissey is an attorney and electrical engineer and that William Morrow published the hardback edition of Spooks and Bantam Books published the paperback edition of the same book. The complaint further alleges that publishing of the “false allegations, malicious statements and innuendo and implications assigning this material in the books has been humiliating and embarrassing to the plaintiff, caused him mental distress and has harmed him in his personal and business relationships and has the potential of causing further harm to him particularly in his profession as a lawyer.” Plaintiff also alleges that he is an attorney admitted to the Bars of Virginia, the District of Columbia and various federal courts including the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
His first action against the present defendants was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on December 1, 1980 with
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "other". What subcategory of business best describes this litigant?
A. medical clinics, health organizations, nursing homes, medical doctors, medical labs, or other private health care facilities
B. private attorney or law firm
C. media - including magazines, newspapers, radio & TV stations and networks, cable TV, news organizations
D. school - for profit private educational enterprise (including business and trade schools)
E. housing, car, or durable goods rental or lease
F. entertainment: amusement parks, race tracks, for profit camps, record companies, movie theaters and producers, ski resorts, hotels, restaurants, etc.
G. information processing
H. consulting
I. security and/or maintenance service
J. other service (including accounting)
K. other (including a business pension fund)
L. unclear
Answer: |
songer_procedur | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the interpretation of federal rule of procedures, judicial doctrine, or case law, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
RED STAR YEAST & PRODUCTS CO. v. LA BUDDE.
No. 5654.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
April 13, 1936.
Benjamin Poss and Joseph P. Brazy, both of Milwaukee, Wis., for appellant.
Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key and Frederic G. Rita, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and B. J. Rusting, U. S. Atty., and L. Hugo Keller, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Milwaukee, Wis., for appellee.
Before EVANS and SPARKS, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.
EVANS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant brought this suit to enjoin appellee, the Collector of Internal Revenue, from attempting to assess and collect excise taxes on yeast by it manufactured and sold, or from imposing a lien for said tax upon its property, ft also asked the court to find and enter a declaratory decree that yeast by it sold was not subject to the tax imposed by section 603 of the Revenue Act of 1932 (26 U.S.C.A. § 1420 et seq. note), which imposes an excise tax upon cosmetics, etc.
. Appellant asserts its belief to be that, unless restrained, appellee will assess the tax and resort to remedies provided by law to enforce its payment, and the amount will he so large that payment can only be made through a liquidation ol its assets.
The court issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, it vacated this order and denied an application for a temporary injunction. The present appeal is from the refusal to grant the temporary injunction.
Appellee’s answer raised the defense presented by section 3224 (26 U.S.C.A. § 1543), which prohibits the bringing of s suit to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax. It also asserted that the Commissioner had ruled that some yeast sold by appellant was subject to a tax under section 603, but no tax had as yet been assessed. It further answered that the purpose for which the yeast, upon which the tax, if assessed, would be levied, was manufactured' and sold by appellant, as declared in the public radio advertisement, was for-cosmetic use. It denied that the tax would be so large as to interfere with the conduct of appellant’s business.
Affidavits were filed in support of the pleadings which dealt with the subject of advertising and the use of yeast for facials. Appellánt argued that many articles, such as lemons, milk, flax, oatmeal, eggs, vinegar, honey, olive oil, etc., were extensively advertised and used to a certain extent, as cosmetics. On the other hand there were copies of advertisements showing that appellant’s yeast was extensively sold for facials. In addition there appears in the record numerous articles extolling the benefits of yeast facials, not marked as advertisements, which were taken from newspapers.
The ruling of the District Court must be sustained on any of several grounds.
(a) In order to justify the issuance of a temporary injunction, there must be a showing of a threatened injury. The injury must be real, not imaginary. 14 R.C.L. page 354. Ordinarily, it must be of irreparable character, for which a money award would be inadequate. In the instant case, the Government has not yet assessed any tax against the taxpayer. Should such a tax be assessed and an attempted enforcement greatly prejudice the appellant in the conduct of its business, pendente lite, the court may again be appealed to. It will always be open to hear any application which may be addressed to it. Temporary injunctions differ in their finality from the final or permanent injunctions. Denial of an application for a temporary injunction does not prevent another application by the same party in the same suit, if new facts warrant it. In a suit for either injunction, however, the party seeking the relief must make a fact showing that the threatened injury is imminent.
It is unnecessary to consider the effect of the statute which permits a court to grant declaratory decrees, because the section, which authorizes suits for a declaratory decree (28 U.S.C.A. § 400), expressly excepts suits involving Federal taxes.
(b) Appellant has not brought its
Question: Did the interpretation of federal rule of procedures, judicial doctrine, or case law by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_respond1_3_2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Your task is to determine which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Edward Corbit HOULE, Appellant.
No. 78-1876.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 13, 1979.
Decided Aug. 17, 1979.
David García, Devils Lake, N. D., for appellant.
James R. Britton, Fargo, N. D., for appellee.
Before LAY, ROSS and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges.
LAY, Circuit Judge.
The sole issue in this case is the question left undecided in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), whether or under what circumstances an officer must obtain a warrant before he may lawfully enter a private place to effect an arrest.
The defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114 of willfully and by means and use of a dangerous weapon, a rifle, forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating and interfering with law enforcement officers of the United States of America while they were engaged in the performance of their official duties. This appeal followed.
The parties do not dispute the facts. In the early morning hours of September 5, 1978, the Bureau of Indian Affairs police department received a complaint that the defendant had threatened to shoot Sandra Houle at her father, Oscar Houle’s residence on the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation at Belcourt, North Dakota. When the investigating officers arrived at the home, Sandra Houle and her father reported that the defendant had been drinking and making threats and was on his way to shoot them. The officers then heard two gun shots which one officer identified as coming from the direction of Edward Houle’s house. They removed Sandra Houle and her two children from the house and took them to the Belcourt police station, arriving there at approximately 2:40 A.M. Shortly before their arrival the police dispatcher received a call from a person who identified himself as Edward Houle. The caller stated that he wanted the officers to leave the area and to come back to talk to him in the morning. He also stated that he had a gun and that he would shoot any officer who came into his yard. The officers decided to delay action until the morning. At approximately 6:40 A.M. they went to the defendant’s house to arrest him. It is undisputed that the officers made no attempt to obtain a warrant for Edward Houle’s arrest during the intervening four hours.
When the officers arrived at the house, they looked through a broken window and saw someone sleeping on a bed about five or six feet from a rifle lying on a chair. One of the officers reached through the broken window and seized the rifle. The others then kicked down the door and entered the home arousing Edward Houle from his sleep and arrested him. At the time of the arrest officers found two spent cartridges on the floor about an inch apart. At trial the defendant objected to the admission into evidence of the rifle, the clip removed from the rifle, and the two spent cartridges.
The trial court overru
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant?
A. cabinet level department
B. courts or legislative
C. agency whose first word is "federal"
D. other agency, beginning with "A" thru "E"
E. other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"
F. other agency, beginning with "O" thru "R"
G. other agency, beginning with "S" thru "Z"
H. Distric of Columbia
I. other, not listed, not able to classify
Answer: |
songer_respond1_3_2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Your task is to determine which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant.
Robert H. RUNGE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Robert H. RUNGE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 121-68, 167-69.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
May 26, 1970.
H. C. Cooper, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Stephen K. Lester, Wichita, Kan., on the brief) for appellant.
Richard E. Oxandale, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert J. Roth, U. S. Atty., on the brief) for appellee.
Before LEWIS, Chief Judge, HILL, Circuit Judge, and LANGLEY, District Judge.
HILL, Circuit Judge.
In this consolidated case, appellant seeks reversal of two judgments which denied motions to vacate under 28 U.S. C. § 2255. The central issue before this court now is whether appellant’s plea of guilty was coerced because of the possibility of a jury-imposed death penalty under the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
The settled rule is that a plea of guilty is void and subject to a § 2255 collateral attack when threats or promises divest it of the character of a voluntary act. When a coerced plea is the issue, all matters bearing on that allegation must be considered. When a case is in this posture, § 2255 requires a hearing on the issue unless the files, records, motions and transcripts conclusively show that appellant’s plea was voluntary; free from threat, promise or other coercion.
Numerous incidents, beginning with the plea and continuing through the second § 2255 motion, impress upon this Court the conclusion that the plea of April 9, 1962, was not in fact coerced by the threat of a jury-imposed death sentence; rather, we believe the coercion argument to be but a belated afterthought.
At arraignment time both Runge and his codefendant were represented by able court appointed counsel who advised each defendant to enter a plea of not guilty. Several days later, however, each defendant withdrew his former plea and pled guilty as charged under the Kidnapping and Dyer Acts. In the course of accepting appellant’s plea, it is apparent from the record that full compliance was had with Rule 11, F.R. Crim.P., 18 U.S.C.A. Furthermore, it is implicit in those proceedings that the court was satisfied that Runge was not encouraged to plead guilty because of the alleged threat inherent in a jury trial.
On April 11, 1968, appellant filed his first § 2255 motion, seeking relief on numerous grounds, including violations of Rules 5(a), (b), (c), 7, 9, 10, 21(b), 40(b), F.R.Crim.P.; violations of the 5th, 6th and 7th Amendments, U.S. Constitution; and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 3238. Nowhere in that motion is there
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant?
A. cabinet level department
B. courts or legislative
C. agency whose first word is "federal"
D. other agency, beginning with "A" thru "E"
E. other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"
F. other agency, beginning with "O" thru "R"
G. other agency, beginning with "S" thru "Z"
H. Distric of Columbia
I. other, not listed, not able to classify
Answer: |
songer_othadmis | E | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile, (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless".
Benjamin W. COREY, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 6046.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 24, 1962.
Decided Sept. 18, 1962.
Russell Morton Brown, Washington, D. C., for appellant on memorandum.
W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Thomas P. O’Connor, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee on motion to dismiss and memorandum.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is a motion by the United States to dismiss, as untimely, defendant-appellant’s appeal from a judgment of conviction entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment of seventy-five offenses of making and presenting for payment to a department of the United States— the Department of the Army — false, fictitious and fraudulent claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. The maximum penalty for each offense is five years imprisonment or a fine of $10,000 or both.
On April 9, 1962, the district court entered a judgment of conviction against the defendant expressly noting that the judgment was entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b). This statute empowers a court for a maximum period of six months to modify a defendant’s sentence without being restricted to sixty days, as provided by Rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. Following the April 9 judgment, defendant was placed in the custody of the Attorney General and committed by him to the United States Penitentiary at Lewis-burg, Pennsylvania.
Thereafter, on July 17, 1962, again pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b), the district court entered an Order On Probation, suspending sentence and placing the defendant on probation for a term of two years.
Defendant took no appeal from the April 9 judgment but has appealed the Order On Probation entered July 17, 1962. The United States Attorney’s position is that the judgment of April 9, 1962, under § 4208(b), was a final appeal-able judgment and that defendant’s right of appeal has been lost by failure to give notice of appeal within ten days thereof.
The defendant contends that under the April'9 judgment “No sentence whatever was pronounced. No punishment was imposed, * * However, the district court expressly noted that it was acting under the provisions of Title 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b). Under this section the statute clearly states that the term of “commitment shall be deemed to be for the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by
Question: Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Yes, but error was harmless
D. Mixed answer
E. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_geniss | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. Consider the following categories: "criminal" (including appeals of conviction, petitions for post conviction relief, habeas corpus petitions, and other prisoner petitions which challenge the validity of the conviction or the sentence), "civil rights" (excluding First Amendment or due process; also excluding claims of denial of rights in criminal proceeding or claims by prisoners that challenge their conviction or their sentence (e.g., habeas corpus petitions are coded under the criminal category); does include civil suits instituted by both prisoners and callable non-prisoners alleging denial of rights by criminal justice officials), "First Amendment", "due process" (claims in civil cases by persons other than prisoners, does not include due process challenges to government economic regulation), "privacy", "labor relations", "economic activity and regulation", and "miscellaneous".
JARVIS et al. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 3121.
. „, „... Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
May 24, 1937.
_ F. J. Carney, of Boston Mass (Wilham H. Lewis, james H Vahey, Charles F. Smith, Daniel A. Lynch William J. Bullion, and Kevin P. Hern, all of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellants.
Charles W. Bartlett, Asst. U. S. Atty.,of Boston, Mass. (Francis J. W. Ford, U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for the United States.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
MORTON, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by the defendants from convictions and sentences on two separate indictments. The first charged use of the mails in a scheme to defraud. It contained ten counts each alleging a separate substantive offense, and an eleventh count alleging a conspiracy to commit the same offense. The appellants, JarVis and Gaines, were convicted on all counts and were sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each of the substantive counts, and to two years’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count, the sentences to run concurrently. Other appellants were convicted only on part of the counts, and concurrent sentences were imposed on such counts. The second indictment was for a conspiracy to violate section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933. (15 U.S. C.A. § 77q). The appellants were also convicted under this indictment and each was sentenced to imprisonment for two years, the sentences to run concurrently with those imposed under'the first indictment. There are 100 assignments of error, 48 in the first case and 52 in the second. This is clearly an unreasonable number and would justify a dismissal of the appeal. Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co., 271 U.S. 131, 132, 46 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed. 870; Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corporation (C.C.A.) 57 F.(2d) 96, 100. However, as for reasons hereafter stated, we find it unneces sary to consider the assignments of error in the second case, and, as substantial sent,ences are involved, we think a dismissal of *lle aPPeal on thls Sround would be t0° ras 1C‘
As to the first indictment: About a dozen errors are assigned on matters of pleading, viz., overruling demurrers and motions to quash, denying specifications or particulars, refusing to hold the indictments were bad for variance and duplicity, and refusing motions for election on the ground that the government’s evidence showed two conspiracies. since the act of 1919 (Jud. Code § 269, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 391) r iri that on appeal the court shall giye judgment witllout regard to technicai errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties, it is only under exceptional circumstances that rulings of this character will give rise to reversible error, See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314. We think the demurrers and motions to quash were properly over
Question: What is the general issue in the case?
A. criminal
B. civil rights
C. First Amendment
D. due process
E. privacy
F. labor relations
G. economic activity and regulation
H. miscellaneous
Answer: |
songer_appbus | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Glen Watson REAMER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 17163.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
June 7, 1963.
T
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_appel1_1_2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".
Raymond J. FUNKHOUSER’S TRUSTS, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 7922.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 5, 1959.
Decided Jan. 14, 1960.
Mannes F. Greenberg, Baltimore, Md. (John W. Cable, III, and John S. Me-Daniel, Jr., Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for petitioners.
Carolyn R. Just, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Melva M. Graney, Attys., Dept, of Justice Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Before SOPER and BOREMAN, Circuit Judges, and R. DORSEY WATKINS, District Judge.
R. DORSEY WATKINS, District Judge:
Question Presented
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Respondent) held that under the terms of certain trusts created by Raymond J. Funkhouser (hereinafter, Petitioner) $3,000 exclusions were not allowable under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C. § 1003, for each gift to such trusts by Petitioner in the years 1948, 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953. The Tax Court affirmed. We agree with the result reached by the Tax Court.
Position of the Parties
Petitioner over the years 1948, 1950, 1951 and 1953 established seventeen separate trusts for his five children and twelve grandchildren. Separate gifts were made to the various trusts in 1948, 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953. As to each gift and each year, the Commissioner determined that no exclusions were allowable, since they were gifts of future interests. Petitioner and the trustees under sixteen of the various trusts contend that a portion of each gift was of a present interest, namely, the gift to each beneficiary of an interest in trust income. Respondent counters that even were this so, there is no method of valuing such interest or right.
The deficiencies claimed relate only to alleged gift tax liability for the years 1952 and 1953. However, the gifts in prior years must be considered, because increases in the taxable amounts of the gifts in prior years will tend to increase the rate of gift tax applicable to 1952 and 1953.
The case was tried in the Tax Court entirely upon stipulations.
The parties are in agreement that if the Tax Court is in error, none of the petitioners is liable for any gift tax. The parties have further agreed upon the extent of liability if the Tax Court is affirmed.
Discussion
The trusts created by Petitioner are irrevocable, and are identical in terms except for designation of the respective beneficiaries. Article Fifth contains the critical provisions, which so far as relevant are as follows:
“1. For a period ending twenty-one (21) years after the death of
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?
A. local
B. neither local nor national
C. national or multi-national
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appel1_1_2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".
MARKOWITZ BROTHERS, INC., a Corporation, and Continental Casualty Co., Appellants, v. FOX-GREENWALD SHEET METAL CO., Inc., a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 20900.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 26, 1968.
Decided June 25, 1968.
Mr. Charles C. Hartman, Jr., Annapolis, Md., with whom Messrs. Kahl K. Spriggs and Mark P. Friedlander, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellants. Messrs. Mark P. Friedlander, Jr., Blaine P. Friedlander, Washington, D. C., Harry P. Friedlander, Marshall H. Brooks, Arlington, Va., and John F. Myers, Washington, D. C., also entered appearances for appellants.
Mr. Fred C. Sacks, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and McGowan and Robinson, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co., Inc., obtained a jury verdict of $103,458.91 in the District Court against Markowitz Brothers, Inc., and Continental Casualty Company for money due on unpaid requisitions resulting from work allegedly performed by Fox-Greenwald under a sub-contract with Markowitz. Marko-witz and Continental, upon this appeal, assert the failure of Fox-Greenwald to establish liability as a substantive matter, as well as error in the conduct of the trial. We leave the jury’s verdict undisturbed.
Under the contractual arrangements formulated for this construction project, Fox-Greenwald submitted requisitions for work completed to Markowitz; Markowitz thereupon. included these amounts in its monthly requisitions to Blake, the prime contractor; and, subsequent to receiving payments of its requisitions from Blake, it paid Fox-Green-wald. Pursuant to this plan, the work and payments proceeded relatively well until December of 1963. In this month, Markowitz, while submitting the full amount of Fox-Greenwald’s requisition in its requisition to Blake, remitted to Fox-Greenwald only part of the amount claimed by it, and failed to pay anything on Fox-Greenwald’s January requisition.
Fox-Greenwald’s effort to collect what it considered due and owing proved unavailing, and it instituted this suit. During an eight-day trial both parties presented an abundance of testimony and exhibits relating to the amount of work satisfactorily performed. After comprehensive closing arguments, the jury was instructed that it had to decide: (1) whether any amount was due Fox-Green-wald for work performed prior to the termination of the contract on February 15, 1964, and (2) if Markowitz had received from Blake money for the benefit of Fox-Greenwald which it had not paid over to the latter.
As we view the case, the primary issue is appellant’s contention that the jury verdict is insupportable because it exceeded the amount that Blake paid Markowitz. Although the presentation of evidence in this- case is marked by considerable confusion
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?
A. local
B. neither local nor national
C. national or multi-national
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_r_fed | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
HARRIS et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 5841.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
April 8, 194
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_respond1_1_4 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "transportation". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
McGLOTHAN v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
No. 9594.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued June 8, 1948.
Decided Sept. 14, 1948.
Owen B. Rhoads, of Philadelphia Pa. (H. Francis De Lone and Barnes, Dechert, Price, Smith & Clark, all of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Donald J. Farage, of Philadelphia, Pa. (B. Nathaniel Richter, and Richter, Lord & Farage, all of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.
KALODNER, Circuit Judge.
This action to recover damages for the death of Edna Hawkins was brought by her representative under the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. A verdict was returned in the amount of $10,000, but the court below granted to the defendant a partial new trial on an issue not pertinent here, and at the same time rejected its arguments for a full new trial or, in the alternative, for judgment in accordance with its motion for directed verdict. 72 F.Supp. 176. This appeal followed the disposition, contrary to the interest of the defendant, of the partial new trial. 74 F.Supp. 808.
The defendant asserts that it is entitled to a retrial of the case because the court below erred in (1) instructing the jury on the evidence with respect to the existence of a reasonably safe footway, and denying the defendant’s request for charge on that issue; (2) excluding evidence relating to the marital status of decedent and her husband; and (3) allowing interest from the date of the judgment entered upon the verdict, rather than from the date of the order following the disposition of the partial new trial.
The issue first raised by the defendant does not encompass the full scope of its alleged liability for. negligence, but rather one phase of the case against it. Accordingly, the necessary statement of the evidence is considerably narrowed.
Edna Hawkins suffered her fatal injuries on December 27, 1944, while in the defendant’s employ as a switch oiler on its tracks in the immediate vicinity of the Girard Avenue-Forty-Fourth Street Bridge, in Philadelphia. Eight tracks, running in an east-west direction, pass under this bridge, some being separated by the concrete bridge supports or abutments, as they were referred to in the court below. A plan, introduced in evidence, assigns names to these tracks, which, for convenience, will be used here, and discloses their relation to each other and to the abutments. Reading from north to south, the plan is as follows: “Jersey,” abutment, “Westward,” “Eastward,” abutment “Cut,” “Departure,” abutment, “No. 2 Freight,” abutment, “Outward Passenger,” and “Inward Passenger.”
A few minutes prior to the accident the decedent was given instructions, at a point east of the east side of the bridge, to oil the “No. 28 switch.” That meant that she was to oil a switch on the “Eastward” track about ten feet
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "transportation". What subcategory of business best describes this litigant?
A. railroad
B. boat, shipping
C. shipping freight, UPS, flying tigers
D. airline
E. truck, armored cars
F. other
G. unclear
Answer: |
songer_genresp1 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.
MELODY MUSIC, INC., Appellant, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee.
No. 18857.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 14, 1965.
Decided April 8, 1965.
Mr. Marcus Cohn, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Paul Dobin and Stanley S. Neustadt, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. John Conlin, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, with whom Messrs. Henry Geller, Gen. Counsel, and Daniel R. Ohlbaum, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, were on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Howard Jay Braun, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and Fahy and Weight, Circuit Judges.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
The Federal Communications Commission refused to renew appellant’s license to operate WGMA, a standard radio broadcast station in Hollywood, Florida. Appellant’s only shareholders, Daniel En-right and
Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_counsel1 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the appellant. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
Leslie Stilman WIGAND, Appellant, v. J. C. TAYLOR, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, Appellee.
No. 6560.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 23, 1960.
Roy Cook, Kansas City, Kan., for appellant.
James C. Waller, Jr., Major, JAGC, Office of Judge Advocate General, Washington, D. C., (Wilbur G. Leonard, U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., and Alden Lowell Doud, First Lieutenant, JAGC, Office of Judge Advocate General, Washington, D. C., with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRATTON, PICKETT and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The petitioner, while on active duty with the United States Army in Germany, was tried and convicted in two courts-martial proceedings in each of which the crime of rape was charged, together with other offenses committed in connection with rape. The two sentences totaled 50 years, which the petitioner is now serving at the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. The trials were reviewed as required by Article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866. In this habeas corpus proceeding it is contended that the failure to consolidate the charges for trial as provided for in Paragraph 30f of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, invalidates the second sentence, and that the prisoner is now entitled to his release. This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court dismissing the petition and remanding the petitioner to the custody of the Warden.
Briefly, the facts are these. On July 22, 1953 the petitioner, with an unknown accomplice, assaulted and raped a German girl near the town of Oberbernbach, Germany. On the 23rd of August, 1953, the petitioner, with two other American soldiers, made a similar attack upon another German girl at Box-burg, Germany. On September 28, 1953, a general court-martial was convened at Goeppingen, Germany to try the petitioner and his confederates for the offense of August 23rd. Upon conviction each of the three defendants was sentenced to 20 years confinement at hard labor. On February 8, 1954 a general court-martial was convened at Augsburg, Germany to try the petitioner for the offenses of July 22nd. Upon conviction he was sentenced to be confined at hard labor for a term of 30 years. No contention is made that the petitioner was not represented by qualified counsel during the two trials or throughout the appellate proceedings which followed his convictions. Likewise, no contention is made that the military tribunals which tried the appellant were improperly constituted or lacked jurisdiction over the offenses charged. We find no merit in the claim that the failure to consolidate the trial of the two offenses violated any fundamental right of the petitioner which is subject to review by a civil court.
As a general rule, a review of a court-martial conviction in a civil court is limited to an inquiry as to whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over the person and the offense charged, and acted within its lawful powers. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 70 S.Ct. 495, 94 L.Ed. 691 ; In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 11 S.Ct. 54, 34 L.Ed. 636; Sutiles v. Davis, 10 Cir., 215 F.2d 760, certiorari denied 348 U.S. 903, 75 S.Ct. 228, 99 L.Ed. 709; Easley v
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the appellant?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_1-3-2 | R | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "criminal - state offense".
Charles PURCILLA and Timothy McLEAN, Appellants, v. William H. BANNAN, Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan, Appellee.
No. 13541.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Nov. 3. 1958.
Flach Douglas, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellants.
Paul Adams, Atty. Gen., Samuel J. Torina, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for appellee.
Before MARTIN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This cause has been heard and considered on appeal by two convicts from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by them.
Having duly considered the briefs and oral arguments and the record in the cause, conclusion has been reached that the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus by the district court was correct, for the reasons stated by United States District Judge Thornton in his carefully prepared and detailed opinion.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "criminal - state offense"?
A. murder
B. rape
C. arson
D. aggravated assault
E. robbery
F. burglary
G. auto theft
H. larceny (over $50)
I. other violent crimes
J. narcotics
K. alcohol related crimes, prohibition
L. tax fraud
M. firearm violations
N. morals charges (e.g., gambling, prostitution, obscenity)
O. criminal violations of government regulations of business
P. other white collar crime (involving no force or threat of force; e.g., embezzlement, computer fraud,bribery)
Q. other state crimes
R. state offense, but specific crime not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_respondent | 028 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_bank_r1 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the first listed respondent is bankrupt. If there is no indication of whether or not the respondent is bankrupt, the respondent is presumed to be not bankrupt.
The UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT BALTIMORE; Andrew R. Burgess, M.D.; Sea Quest Inc., for themselves and all others similarly situated; The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, for themselves and all others similarly situated v. PEAT, MARWICK, MAIN & COMPANY Constance B. Foster, Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as Rehabilitator of The Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Insurance Company, Intervenor (in District Court), The University of Maryland at Baltimore; Andrew R. Burgess, M.D.; Sea Quest, Inc.; and The School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida; and Richard A. Brown, Esq.; and Spiegel & McDiarmid *, Appellants.
No. 91-1889.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued May 4, 1992.
Decided June 22, 1993.
John W. Frazier, IV (argued), John E. Caruso, Richard G. Placey, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, PA, Leonard P. Novello, Claudia L. Taft, Frances J. DiSarro, KPMG Peat Marwick, New York' City, for appellee.
Susan H. Malone, Richard DiSalle, Roger Curran (argued), Rose, Schmidt, Hasley & DiSalle, Pittsburgh, PA, James S. Gkonos, Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., Philadelphia, PA, for intervenor.
Jeffrey R. Babbin, Richard A. Brown, Spencer L.. Kimball, Spiegel & McDiarmid, Washington, DC, Robert S. Kitchenoff, David H. Weinstein (argued), Harold E. Kohn, Kohn, Klein, Nast & Graf, Philadelphia, PA, for appellants.
Before: BECKER, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 12(a).
This case was originally argued before the panel of Judges Becker, Nygaard and Higginbotham on May 4, 1992, and the panel was reconstituted to the panel of Judges Becker, Scirica and Nygaard \ since Judge Higginbotham retired after the alf,'; gued date. \
OPINION OF THE COURT
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
When Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Company went into statutory rehabilitation, it triggered various insolvency proceedings and- suits in state and federal courts, and satellite litigation concerning the conduct of some attorneys in the proceedings. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania dealt primarily with Mutual Fire’s insolvency. While that was progressing, four individually named plaintiffs filed a class action in federal district court against Peat, Marwick, Main & Company, alleging that Peat Marwick performed materially deficient audits of Mutual Fire. The plaintiffs pleaded various causes of action based on state law and a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
The attorneys who instituted this action, Richard Brown and his law firm Spiegel & McDiarmid (the plaintiffs’ attorneys), had participated in Mutual Fire’s rehabilitation proceedings. Since they were bound by various supervisory and confidentiality orders issued by the Commonweálth Court in the insolvency proceedings, and since they may have violated these orders by filing this action, the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania, acting in her capacity as Mutual Fire’s statutory receiver, brought state contempt proceedings against them.
After we revei'sed the district court’s decision to abstain under the Burford abstention doctrine, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions and their attorneys’ motion for injunctive relief against the state contempt proceedings. It then granted Peat Marwick’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs and their attorneys appeal. We will reverse that portion of the district court’s order dismissing the state claims with prejudice and affirm the balance.
I.
In 1986, the Commonwealth Court ordered Mutual Fire into rehabilitation and appointed the Insurance Commissioner as
Question: Is the first listed respondent bankrupt?
A. Yes
B. No
Answer: |
songer_appbus | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leemunth Peter JOHN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 90-5052.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Arg
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_partywinning | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case.
ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC. v. PIPER et al.
No. 79-701.
Argued April 15, 1980
Decided June 23, 1980
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined; in Parts I, II, and IV of which Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., joined; in all but Part II-A and the first sentence of Part IV of which Blackmun, J., joined; and in Part II-B of which Stevens, J., joined. Blackmun, J., post, p. 768, and Stevens, J., post, p. 769, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 771.
Miles Curtiss McKee argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Armin J. Moeller, Jr.
Herschel E. Richard, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, Lutz Alexander Prager, and Raymond R. Baca.
Jack Greenberg and James M. Nabrit III filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether federal courts have statutory or inherent power to tax attorney’s fees directly against counsel who have abused the processes of the courts.
I
In June 1975, two former employees and one unsuccessful job applicant brought a civil rights class action against petitioner Roadway Express, Inc. (Roadway). The complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleged that Roadway’s employment policies discriminated on the basis of race, and asked for equitable relief.
Counsel for the plaintiffs — Robert E. Piper, Jr., Frank E. Brown, Jr., and Bobby Stromile — are the respondents in the present case. In September 1975, respondents served interrogatories on Roadway. Having secured an extension from the District Court, Roadway answered the interrogatories on January 5, 1976, and served its own set of interrogatories at the same time. Thereafter, however, the litigation was stalled by respondents’ uncooperative behavior.
On April 13, 1976, Roadway moved for an order compelling answers to its interrogatories. The motion was set for argument on the morning of April 21, but counsel for the plaintiffs did not appear. They did attend a rescheduled hearing that afternoon, and the Magistrate ordered that the interrogatories be answered by May 24. Respondents ignored that deadline and, in fact, never answered the interrogatories. Roadway also served notice in April that it would take depositions from all three plaintiffs in early May. One of the plaintiffs did not appear on the appointed days, however, and he never was deposed.
The respondents showed no greater respect for the orders of the District Court than for the requests of their adversaries. On April 7, the court instructed counsel for both sides to file briefs evaluating the impact of a recent decision in a related ease. Although respondents’ brief was due within 10 days, nothing arrived for six weeks. On May 19, the District Court gave respondents 10 additional days to file a brief or face dismissal of the action. No brief was ever submitted.
On
Question: Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case?
A. Yes
B. No
Answer: |
sc_casesource | 060 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer: |
songer_state | 56 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the state or territory in which the case was first heard. If the case began in the federal district court, consider the state of that district court. If it is a habeas corpus case, consider the state of the state court that first heard the case. If the case originated in a federal administrative agency, answer "not applicable". Answer with the name of the state, or one of the following territories: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Panama Canal Zone, or "not applicable" or "not determined".
PACKER PUB. CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 14678.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
April 15, 1954.
Charles C. Shafer, Jr., Kansas City, Mo. (Lancie L. Watts, Kansas City, Mo., on the brief; Watts & Shafer, Kansas City, Mo., of counsel), for petitioner.
Harry Marselli, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen. (H. Brian Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and JOHNSEN and COLLET, Circuit Judges.
COLLET, Circuit Judge.
The Packer Publishing Company duly filed its excess profits tax returns for the years 1943, 1944 and 1945. In those returns it did not claim any adjustments under § 711(b) (1) (J) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 711. In due time it made claims for refunds under § 711 for all three years. These claims were allowed in part by the Commissioner by stipulation. The taxpayer did not then nor does it now criticize the stipulated allowance. Thereafter, it filed claims for relief and refunds for each of the three years under § 722 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 722. The Commissioner disallowed the claims under § 722.
Upon petition by the taxpayer to the Tax Court, that court allowed a portion of the claims by decision reported in Packer Publishing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 T.C. 882. The claims based on § 711 having been settled by stipulation between the taxpayer and the Commissioner, neither pleaded the basis for the stipulated allowance in the § 722 proceedings before the Tax Court. The exhibits filed in the Tax Court, made a part of the petition addressed to that court, showed, however, that an allowance had been made under § 711 and the calculations and computations in those exhibits were based upon that stipulated allowance. When the Tax Court granted relief under § 722 it directed that the Commissioner and the taxpayer undertake to make the computation of the amount of refund due and submit the result to the court. This pursuant to the Tax Court’s Rule 50. When the Commissioner and the taxpayer undertook to do so, the Commissioner took the position that the taxpayer could not be entitled to relief under both § 722 and § 711 and, since the court had directed relief under § 722, the Commissioner eliminated from consideration the relief theretofore granted by stipulation under § 711. The taxpayer contended that it was entitled to both. Each submitted to the court, under Rule 50, computations based upon its respective position. The dispute was heard by one judge of that court. The record shows that the judge concluded that the court was without jurisdiction to consider whether the taxpayer was entitled to any relief under § 711 in a proceeding for relief under §
Question: In what state or territory was the case first heard?
01. not
02. Alabama
03. Alaska
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. Florida
11. Georgia
12. Hawaii
13. Idaho
14. Illinois
15. Indiana
16. Iowa
17. Kansas
18. Kentucky
19. Louisiana
20. Maine
21. Maryland
22. Massachussets
23. Michigan
24. Minnesota
25. Mississippi
26. Missouri
27. Montana
28. Nebraska
29. Nevada
30. New
31. New
32. New
33. New
34. North
35. North
36. Ohio
37. Oklahoma
38. Oregon
39. Pennsylvania
40. Rhode
41. South
42. South
43. Tennessee
44. Texas
45. Utah
46. Vermont
47. Virginia
48. Washington
49. West
50. Wisconsin
51. Wyoming
52. Virgin
53. Puerto
54. District
55. Guam
56. not
57. Panama
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 28 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
DAYTONA BEACH RACING AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES DISTRICT, a body politic and corporate under the laws of the State of Florida, and International Speedway Corporation, a Florida Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 78-1634
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 1, 1978.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 17,1978.
Nathan Lewin, James E. Rocap, III, Washington, D. C., Thomas T. Cobb, S. La-Rue Williams, Daytona Beach, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Raymond, Wilson, Conway, Barr & Burrows, William M. Barr, Daytona Beach, Fla., for County of Volusia, James Bailey, Robert D. Summers.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Harold F. X. Purnell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for J. Edward Straughn, Dept. of Revenue, State of Florida.
Before THORNBERRY, GEE and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
In 1955, the Florida legislature exempted from taxation racing and recreational facilities to be acquired or constructed by the plaintiff, Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District. Subsequently, plaintiff, International Speedway Corporation, subleased land from the District and constructed a racing facility. In 1973, the Florida legislature repealed the tax exemption.
The plaintiffs brought suit in United States district court in 1974 alleging that the Florida legislature’s action violated the Impairment of Contract Clause. The district court dismissed the action holding that the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, prohibited relief since the State of Florida provided a “plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” in state court. We affirmed without opinion. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District v. County of Volusia, 512 F.2d 1404 (5 Cir. 1975).
The plaintiffs then amended a pending state suit to include their constitutional claim. The plaintiffs, however, did not offer any evidence to the Florida trial court relating to their constitutional contention. The Florida trial court found for the plaintiffs on state grounds and the defendants appealed. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court and the United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial federal question. Day-tona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District v. County of Volusia, 341 So.2d 498 (Fla.1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 804, 98 S.Ct. 32, 54 L.Ed.2d 61 (1977).
The plaintiffs again brought suit in federal court contending that the Florida Supreme Court improperly rejected their constitutional argument since no evidence was presented on the issue in the Florida trial court. The district court dismissed the action holding that the Supreme Court’s dismissal in the prior action was dispositive on the constitutional claim. We need not consider this argument since it is plain that the Tax Injunction Act of 1937 still bars the federal courts from assuming jurisdiction in this suit. The Act states:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. June 25,1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 932.
28 U.S.C. § 1341.
All that is required is that the state must provide a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in the courts of the state. This Florida has done, and the plaintiffs’ failure to present any evidence and argument to the Florida state court will not make the Florida remedy improper. The plaintiffs cannot fail to take advantage of the state remedy and then litigate in federal court.
The plaintiffs’ first suit was barred because the State of Florida provided a proper remedy for the litigation of their claim, and the plaintiffs’
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_appbus | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
John E. DEMARINIS, Petitioner, v. Raymond J. DONOVAN, Secretary of Labor, Respondent.
No. 83-7489.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_procedur | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the interpretation of federal rule of procedures, judicial doctrine, or case law, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
DE CASTRO v. BOARD OF COM’RS OF SAN JUAN.
No. 3796.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
June 14, 1943.
Hugh R. Francis and Gabriel de la Piaba, both of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for appellant.
F. Fernandez Cuyar and H. Gonzales Blanes, both of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for appellee.
Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
MAGRUDER, Circuit Judge.
On January 4, 1937, the Board of Commissioners of San Juan (the newly elected members of which took office on that day) appointed Carlos M. de Castro, appellant herein, as city manager of the Capital of Puerto Rico. Pursuant to § 22 of Act No. 99, Laws of Puerto Rico (1931) pp. 638-640, the said Board of Commissioners, after hearing upon charges, removed de Castro from office on April 5, 1939. The District Court of San Juan upheld the Board. On appeal the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed the judgment of the district court and directed appellant’s reinstatement. The Supreme Court’s judgment which was rendered June 28, 1940, read as follows: “For the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion, the judgment appealed from, which was rendered by the District Court of San Juan on August 21, 1939, is hereby reversed, and in its stead a new one rendered, annulling Ordinances No. 370, of January 5, 1939, and No. 373, of April 5, 1939, which decreed the suspension.and removal of the city manager, and in consequence thereof, ordering the reinstatement of the petitioner Carlos M. de Castro in his office of city manager, said reinstatement to date hack from January 5, 1939, when the petitioner was suspended from office and pay.” An appeal was duly allowed, and on July 30, 1940, the court below approved a supersedeas bond. This court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on January 10, 1941. Board of Commissioners of San Juan v. De Castro, 1 Cir., 116 F.2d 806. Certiorari was denied on October 13. 1941, 314 U.S. 614, 62 S.Ct. 61, 86 L.Ed. 495.
Shortly after our mandate went down to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico the Board, on October 27, 1941, filed in that court a motion to stay the execution of its judgment of June 28, 1940 (which we had affirmed) insofar as it ordered the reinstatement of appellant, on the ground that meanwhile appellant’s term of office as city manager had expired.
Appellant filed an opposition to this motion, and after a hearing thereon, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on January 14, 1942, entered its judgment, from which the present appeal is taken reading as follows: “For the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion, the motion filed by the Board of Commissioners of San Juan on October 27, 1941, is granted, and in consequence thereof the execution of the judgment of this court of June 28, 1940, is stayed insofar as it decrees the reinstatement of petitioner Dr. Carlos M. de Castro in the office of city manager of the capital because the term for which he was appointed expired in February, 1941.”
If the court below was correct in its conclusion that appellant’s term of office expired at some time subsequent to its judgment of June 28, 1940, ordering appellant’s reinstatement, we think it is manifest that that court had jurisdiction to stay the execution of its judgment insofar as it decreed reinstatement, despite the fact that the said judgment had been affirmed by this court. See Puerto Rican Code of Civil Procedure, § 7, subdivision 8. Appellant urges that the issue as to his tenure of office had become res judicata in his favor, because in his brief before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico at the earlier hearing he had advanced the contention that the city manager holds office during good behavior. But that court in its opinion of June 28
Question: Did the interpretation of federal rule of procedures, judicial doctrine, or case law by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_interven | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether one or more individuals or groups sought to formally intervene in the appeals court consideration of the case.
SOUTHERN MARYLAND HOSPITAL CENTER, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 2, Intervenor for Respondent.
No. 85-2042.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued May 7, 1986.
Decided Sept. 18, 1986.
Warren M. Davison (Leslie Robert Stell-man, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, on brief), for petitioner.
Nancy B. Hunt, N.L.R.B. and Joseph E. Finley, Gen. Counsel, Office and Professional Employees Intern. Union (Rosemary M. Collyer, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Robert E. Allen, Associate Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, Peter Winkler, on brief), for respondent.
Before WIDENER, HALL, and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges.
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:
This case comes before us upon the petition of Southern Maryland Hospital Center to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). The Board has filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order. The Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local No. 2 (OPEIU or the union), the charging party before the Board, has intervened in support of enforcement.
The petitioner is a full-service general hospital located in Clinton, Maryland. The hospital opened in 1977 under the direct control of its Chief Executive Officer and principal stockholder, Dr. Francis Chiara-monte. It employed approximately 1300 persons during the time period relevant to this suit. In the spring of 1981, five labor organizations, including intervenor OPEIU, began what would become a thirteen-month organizational effort at the hospital. The effort culminated on June 11, 1982, with a representation election in which no labor organization won a majority. This case arises from union charges filed January 25, 1982, claiming that the hospital committed a long list of unfair labor practices during the organizational campaign in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1982).
The administrative law judge found numerous violations of § 8(a)(1) and two violations of § 8(a)(1) and (3). The Board affirmed, in substance, all but one of the AU’s findings and conclusions and issued a remedial order. Southern Maryland Hospital Center and Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local No. 2, AFL-CIO, 276 N.L.R.B. 153 (1985). In reviewing these violations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f), we are mindful that we must sustain them and grant enforcement of the order if the findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); NLRB v. Kiawah Island Co., 650 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir.1981). We find that there is substantial evidence in the record as to most of the § 8(a)(1) violations and grant enforcement on that portion of the order. We deny enforcement as to the two claimed § 8(a)(1) and (3) violations and three other claimed § 8(a)(1) violations.
I
THE BONUS ISSUE
The most significant issue arises from the Board’s finding that the hospital violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by “withholding” a year-end bonus in 1981. The Board found that even though the hospital had given just one such
Question: Did one or more individuals or groups seek to formally intervene in the appeals court consideration of the case?
A. no intervenor in case
B. intervenor = appellant
C. intervenor = respondent
D. yes, both appellant & respondent
E. not applicable
Answer: |
songer_appbus | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
William Raiford PARMENTER and George David Lincoln, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 18139.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
June 17
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_constit | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the constitutionality of a law or administrative action, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
Robert B. KING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 83-3516.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued May 2, 1984.
Decided Aug. 30, 1984.
Wellford, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.
Sanford A. Meizlish, Barkan & Neff Co., L.P.A., Lawrence J. Ambrosio, argued, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.
Joseph E. Kane, Linda Tucker, argued, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbus, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.
Before JONES and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and TIMBERS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Of the Second Circuit, by designation.
TIMBERS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Robert B. King commenced this action in the district court pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976 & Supp. Y 1981), to review a final determination of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) which denied his application for disability insurance benefits. The court, John D. Holschuh, District Judge, took on submission cross motions for summary judgment. In an opinion filed May 31, 1983, the court granted the Secretary’s motion, denied appellant’s motion, and affirmed the decision of the Secretary. From the judgment entered thereon, this appeal has been taken. We reverse and remand for an award of benefits.
I.
At the time of filing his application for disability insurance benefits on November 7, 1980, appellant was thirty years of age. He lived in Cambridge, Ohio, with his wife and two children. He had been born in Ohio. He completed his education through the twelfth grade. Since 1968, he had worked at various jobs, including a baker’s assistant, truck driver, grave digger, security guard sergeant, janitor and busboy. His primary work experience had been as a grave digger, in which capacity he had been employed from September 1970 to June 1974; and as a security guard sergeant from June 1977 to October 20, 1980 —just 18 days prior to the filing of his application. The security guard position consisted of filling out reports, supervising other employees, and a substantial amount of standing and walking.
Appellant’s claim of disability is based on his assertion of constant and debilitating back pain in the lumbar sacral region resulting from what various medical doctors have diagnosed as degenerative disc disease. Appellant claims that he first injured his back in 1972 when he fell from a truck while unloading a lawn mower. His back was X-rayed at that time, but he sustained no injury that prevented him from returning to work. He experienced no significant back pain again until June 1974, when he ruptured a disc while digging a grave.
Appellant at that time was hospitalized at Doctor’s Hospital North, in Columbus, Ohio. His treatment at first consisted of myelography, spinal fluid analysis and traction. Eventually, it was determined that his condition required surgery. Dr. Hawes performed a lumbar laminectomy in July 1974. Appellant did not experience much relief from pain after this first operation.
He underwent a second back operation in March 1975, again performed by Dr. Hawes. This operation did relieve some of his pain.
Appellant continued to receive various treatments during the next two years to relieve the pain he still experienced. During this time, he received workmen’s compensation benefits since he was temporarily totally disabled. In June 1977, he commenced work as a Pinkerton security guard.
In July 1978, appellant slipped and fell on wet grass. This accident aggravated his back condition. After receiving treatment, however, he returned to work. He continued to work until October 20, 1980. At that time, the pain became so acute that he could no longer continue to do the standing and walking that his job required. He was hospitalized on October 24,
Question: Did the court's conclusion about the constitutionality of a law or administrative action favor the appellant?
A. Issue not discussed
B. The issue was discussed in the opinion and the resolution of the issue by the court favored the respondent
C. The issue was discussed in the opinion and the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant
D. The resolution of the issue had mixed results for the appellant and respondent
Answer: |
songer_bank_r1 | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the first listed respondent is bankrupt. If there is no indication of whether or not the respondent is bankrupt, the respondent is presumed to be not bankrupt.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis Keith FRIED, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20340.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Jan. 22, 1971.
R. George Crawford, Washington, D. C. (Court-appointed) for defendant-appellant; Carol G. Emerling, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief.
Harry E. Pickering, Asst. U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee; Robert B. Krupansky, U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, on brief.
Before BROOKS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
BROOKS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by defendant-appellant from his jury conviction for bank larceny (18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)) and entering a bank for the purpose of committing a felony (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)). He was indicted with a female accomplice as a result of their scheme to purloin bank funds. Allegedly defendant disguised as a woman entered the bank and went to the teller’s window where his female accomplice worked. He then handed her a passbook from a cancelled account which had robbery instructions in it. The accomplice gave him the money in her cash drawer and following his departure from the bank reported the “robbery.” Defendant’s accomplice was indicted and pled guilty to embezzlement and willful misapplication of bank funds (18 U.S.C. § 656). On this appeal two issues are presented.
First, it is contended that an eyewitness in-court identification of defendant was the result of a pretrial photographic identification which was so impermissi-bly suggestive as to make the in-court identification inadmissible. The pretrial identification was from an array of photographs of women and a picture of defendant which was retouched to make him look like a woman (long hair was added to his picture). Defendant relies upon Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) to support his contention.
However, Simmons is distinguishable on its facts from those of- this case. Here, unlike in Simmons, the eyewitness was thoroughly cross-examined in the presence of the jury as to the circumstances surrounding her viewing of the photographs, and the array of photographs from which the identification was made were shown to the jury. In addition, while in Simmons there was a positive identification of the suspect, in the instant case the eyewitness could only declare that a similarity existed between the defendant and the person she saw at the “robbed” teller’s window. The only reason she gave for even having had taken notice of this individual, under otherwise ordinary circumstances, was that the “woman” had her blouse on backwards. The District Court concluded, and we agree, that there was nothing unnecessarily suggestive about this identification method. See, United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687, 690 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 583, 24 L.Ed.2d 509 (1970). However, even if the method was constitutionally circumspect, there, was other identification evidence which amply corroborated the eyewitness’ testimony (e. g., a positive identification by defendant’s accomplice), and if the pretrial identification method used in this case made admission of the eyewitness’ testimony constitutional error, it was harmless under the standards set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) and Harrington v. United States, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). See also, United States v. De Bose (6th Cir. decided October 27, 1970); United States v. Satterfield, 410
Question: Is the first listed respondent bankrupt?
A. Yes
B. No
Answer: |
songer_counsel2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine the nature of the counsel for the respondent. If name of attorney was given with no other indication of affiliation, assume it is private - unless a government agency was the party
Melvin W. KAHLE, Administrator of the Estate of Moses Joiner, Deceased, Appellant, v. John W. ACTON.
No. 14844.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
Argued Nov. 16, 1964.
Decided Dec. 1, 1964.
James A. Ashton, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Harold Gondelman, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Jacobson & Gondelman and Herbert Jacobson, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARIS, STALEY and GANEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court entered on a directed verdict for the defendant in an action for damages for the death of the plaintiff’s decedent, a pedestrian, who was struck by an automobile being driven by the defendant late at night on the Parkway West, an unlighted limited access highway in the City of Pittsburgh, about eight-tenths of a mile west of the Fort Pitt tunnels. In his charge to the jury the trial judge reviewed the evidence and the applicable principles of Pennsylvania law and reached the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of the defendant. He accordingly directed the verdict on which the judgment appealed from was entered. Our review of the evidence and the law satisfies us that the action of the trial judge was right for the reasons given in his charge, to which we need add nothing.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
Question: What is the nature of the counsel for the respondent?
A. none (pro se)
B. court appointed
C. legal aid or public defender
D. private
E. government - US
F. government - state or local
G. interest group, union, professional group
H. other or not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_usc1sect | 741 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 46. In case of ties, code the first to be cited. The section number has up to four digits and follows "USC" or "USCA".
Melba J. KOHL, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Thomas H. Schlatter, Deceased, Betty E. Doty, Individually and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Edward Doty, Deceased, and Linda Winters, Individually and as Special Administratrix for the Estate of Terry Lee Winters, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America and Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 82-1371, 82-1381.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued March 31, 1983.
Decided July 12, 1983.
See also, 508 F.Supp. 250.
Bernard R. Nevoral, Robert B. Patterson, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants.
David V. Hutchinson, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Before PELL and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, Senior District Judge.
William J. Jameson, Senior District Judge for the District of Montana, is sitting by designation.
PELL, Circuit Judge.
This lawsuit stems from the unfortunate drowning of three fishermen near Lock and Dam 13 (LD13) on the Mississippi River. Plaintiffs filed under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 741-52, claiming that the accident was the result of inadequate warnings posted in and around LD13 and misconduct by dam employees, who allegedly opened the dam gates in an attempt to wash decedents downstream. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found that the warnings posted on LD13 were adequate under the circumstances and held that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation of employee misconduct. The court determined that decedents’ own negligence in fishing near the dam was the sole cause of the accident. Plaintiffs now claim that the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
I. Facts
LD13 spans 1066 feet across the Mississippi River, from Illinois on the east to Iowa on the west. On the eastern portion on LD13 there is an operating lock chamber and an inoperable auxiliary lock. The dam is made up of thirteen movable gates that control the flow of water. The middle gates, numbers 5, 6, and 7, are large, “roller” gates. The gates on either side are smaller, “tainter” gates. The gates are separated by concrete “piers” that extend 40 feet into the river from the gates. Ladder rungs are built into the downstream face of the pier, known as the “piernose.”
Downstream from LD13 there are a series of “baffle blocks” that are built into the concrete foundations in the river. The baffle blocks are designed to prevent erosion by dissipating water energy. The blocks produce varying amounts of surface and subsurface turbulence, depending on factors such as the gate settings and water level. The surface turbulence may be visible as boiling water or white caps, while the subsurface turbulence is not visible to boaters. The dissipation of water energy also produces a phenomenon known as a “break-line.” A breakline is created when the water near the baffle blocks is raised above the level of the water directly in front of the dam, causing the current to flow back to the dam. The water on the downstream side of the breakline continues to flow away from the dam. As there are several sets of baffle blocks there will be several break-lines. The location of the breaklines will vary according to gate settings and water levels, but anyone fishing near the dam will notice that the back-current is carrying fishing lines and debris toward the dam.
Other than the physical design of the dam, the facts were contested. After reviewing the evidence presented by the parties the court made extensive findings of fact. The court found that LD13 is an attractive area for fishing, but is also a hazardous one. Until 1968 the public was advised to stay 300 feet away from the downstream side of the dam. In 1968 the “restricted” area was changed to 100 feet. There was conflicting testimony at trial as to how often fishermen violated the restriction and came within 100 feet of
Question: What is the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 46? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_appbus | 2 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
TELE-CONTROLS, INC. and Audio Systems Co., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD INDUSTRIES, INC., DefendantAppellee.
No. 16220.
United States Court
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_initiate | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
STATE OF MAINE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Robert W. FRI, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 73-1254.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued Oct. 4, 1973.
Decided Nov. 2, 1973.
William D. Appier, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with whom Irving Jaffe, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Peter Mills, U. S. Atty., and Walter H. Fleischer, Atty., Dept, of Justice, were on brief, for defendants-appellants.
Lee M. Schepps, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, MOORE, Senior Circuit Judge, and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge.
Of the Second Circuit sitting by designation.
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge.
For the second time, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appeals from the district court’s interim order of June 29, 1973, requiring him to allot $29,025,000 to Maine in fiscal year 1973 for purposes of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. (Supp. II, 1972) § 1281 et seq. (the “Act”). The order, issued several days before the end of the federal fiscal year, also provides that none of the funds so allotted will be available for obligation until further order of court. We dismissed an earlier appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 483 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1973). Several months having passed without further hearing or action in or by the district court, we are now persuaded that the order was or has become an appeal-able preliminary injunction. Id. p. 440.
Maine brought the present suit after the then acting Administrator of the EPA, at the express direction of the President of the United States, had allptted among the states, for the purposes of the Act, two billion dollars for fiscal 1973 and three billion dollars for fiscal 1974. Section 207 of the Act provides that “[t]here is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subchapter. for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, not to exceed $5,000,000,000, [and] for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, not to exceed $6,000,000,000,... ” Maine contends that the President and the Administrator lack authority to reduce the 1973 and 1974 allotments below the sums authorized to be appropriated, especially since § 205 provides: “Sums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to § 207 for each fiscal year. shall be allotted by the administrator. ” [Emphasis supplied.] The merits of Maine’s claim have yet to be heard. The district court has informed the parties that it will expedite their determination.
The only question before us is the appropriateness of the preliminary order directing, in effect, a “paper allotment” of the disputed funds. Maine sought the interim relief because of its fear that if the Administrator was not ordered to make a formal allotment — essentially a bookkeeping entry — before the end of fiscal 1973 on June 30, 1973, the funds might irretrievably be lost. Thereafter the court held a hearing on July 6, 1973, on the Administrator’s motion to vacate the temporary order. It denied the motion. We are satisfied that the order was issued in substantial compliance with required procedures, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing it.
The Administrator attacks the order on both procedural and substantive grounds. His procedural attack is that the district court’s order, constituting what is by now a preliminary injunction, should be vacated because it was entered without setting out the factual premises and legal conclusions on which it was based, as required by F.R. Civ.P. 52(a). Although the government’s opportunity to present its side before the order issued may have been cramped by the short notice,
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_appfed | 0 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
Gerardeen M. SNYDER as the Executrix of the Succession of Eric Snyder and Charles Keenan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Allen Sam
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_genapel2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.
Francis Edward KLIMAS, Appellant, v. James MABRY, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Corrections, Appellee.
No. 78-1663.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 12, 1979.
Decided May 30, 1979.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 13, 1979.
See 603 F.2d 158.
Richard F. Quiggle, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Neal Kirkpatrick, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee; Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen., and James E. Smedley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., on brief.
Before HEANEY and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, and SCHATZ, District Judge.
ALBERT G. SCHATZ, United States District Judge, for the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
Francis Edward Klimas, an Arkansas state prisoner, appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Klimas contends that the writ should have been granted because his cross-examination of a key prosecution witness at his state trial was impermissibly restricted, and because records of seven Missouri convictions, which were silent as to Klimas’s representation by counsel, were considered by the jury in the enhancement of his sentence under the Arkansas Habitual Criminal Act, Ark. Stat.Ann. § 43-2328. We reverse and remand.
Klimas was convicted of burglary and grand larceny, in violation of Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 41-1003 and 41-3907 (repealed 1976), in Jefferson County Circuit Court on April 23, 1975. After the verdicts of guilty were returned, the second part of the information, charging Klimas with being a habitual criminal under Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2328, was read to the jury. The prosecution then offered into evidence certified copies of records from the Department of Correction, Missouri State Penitentiary, which indicated that Klimas had been previously convicted of seven felonies in Missouri. The defense objected to the introduction of this evidence on the ground that the records were silent as to whether Klimas had been represented by counsel. This objection was overruled. The prosecution also introduced certified copies of records from the Arkansas State Penitentiary, which indicated that Klimas had pled guilty to three burglary-grand larceny transactions, occurring on February 12, 21 and 26 of 1972, for which he received three concurrent, five-year sentences. No objection to the introduction of this evidence was made.
Arguments on the habitual criminal charge were made to the jury by both the prosecution and the defense. The jury was then instructed and sent to deliberate with four verdict forms. The first form provided that if the jury found Klimas guilty of having been convicted of no prior felony offense, his punishment should be fixed at not less than one nor more than twenty-one years for grand
Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_procedur | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the interpretation of federal rule of procedures, judicial doctrine, or case law, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION and Tioga State Bank, Appellants v. Lawrence B. CONNELL, Jr., Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration, et al. INDEPENDENT BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, a corporation, Appellant v. FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, et al. UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Appellant v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF the FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, an agency of the United States, et al.
Nos. 78-1337, 78-1849 and 78-2206.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
April 20, 1979.
Before McGOWAN, TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
PER CURIAM.
These causes came on to be heard on their records on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 463 F.Supp. 342, 447 F.Supp. 296, and they were argued by counsel before this panel.
It appears to the court that the development of fund transfers as now utilized by each type of financial institution involved herein, commercial banks with “Automatic Fund Transfers,” savings and loan associations with “Remote Service Units,” and federal credit unions with “Share Drafts,” in each instance represents the use of a device or technique which was not and is not authorized by the relevant statutes, although permitted by regulations of the respective institutions’ regulatory agencies. Specifically, the transfer from an interest-bearing time deposit (savings) account to a noninterest-bearing demand (checking) account by the Automatic Fund Transfer system, authorized by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 43 Fed.Reg. 20,001 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 217.5(c)(2) and (3)), is that “indirect[ ]... device” prohibited by 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976); the Remote Service Units utilized by many savings and loan associations, pursuant to Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations (12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1978)) which permit the withdrawal of funds from an interest-bearing time deposit account by a device functionally equivalent to a check, are in violation of the prohibition against checking accounts contained in Section 5(b)(1) of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1976)); and the Share Drafts utilized by some federal credit unions, pursuant to National Credit Union Administration regulation (12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (1978)), are the practical equivalent of checks drawn on these interest-bearing time deposits in violation of the provisions of the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-90 (1976).
The history of the development of these modern transfer techniques reveals each type of financial institution securing the permission of its appropriate regulatory agency to install these devices in order to gain a competitive advantage, or at least competitive equality, with financial institutions of a different type in its services offered the public. The net result has been that three separate and distinct types of financial institutions created by Congressional enactment to serve different public needs have now become, or are rapidly becoming, three separate but homogeneous types of financial institutions offering virtually identical services to the public, all without the benefit of Congressional consideration and statutory enactment.
This court is convinced that the methods of transfer authorized by the agency regulations have outpaced the methods and technology of fund transfer authorized by the existing statutes. We are neither empowered to rewrite the language of statutes which may be antiquated in dealing with the most recent technological advances, nor are we empowered to make a policy judgment as to whether the utilization of these new methods of fund transfer is in the overall public interest. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the regulations authorizing such fund transfers as being in violation of statute. We do so with the firm expectation that the Congress will speedily review the overall situation and make such policy judgment as in its wisdom it deems necessary by authorizing in whole or in part the methods of fund transfer involved in this case or any other methods it sees fit to legitimize, or conversely, by declining to alter the language of existing statutes
Question: Did the interpretation of federal rule of procedures, judicial doctrine, or case law by the court favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 28 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Rhoda J. CHASE, Appellant and Charles W. Chase, Elinor R. Chase Jones, Georgia E. Chase Snell and Lawson W. Chase.
No. 13542.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued June 5, 1961.
Decided Sept. 19, 1961.
Raymond Godbersen, Washington, D. C. (William F. Davey, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Eugene M. Haring, Newark, N. J. (McCarter & English, Nicholas Conover English, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Louis Lebowitz, Elizabeth, N. J. (Bassin & Bassin, Elizabeth, N. J., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before MARIS, KALODNER and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
This interpleader suit was instituted by the plaintiff, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, in the District Court for the District of New Jersey to secure an adjudication of the claims of five individuals alleging themselves to be entitled to the proceeds of certain insurance on the life of Lawson W. Chase, deceased, issued under the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2091 et seq. Under the Act and the policy the insurance was payable to the beneficiary designated by the insured, or, if no beneficiary had been designated, to the widow of the insured or, if none, to his children. No person had been designated by the insured as beneficiary. Named as defendants were Rhoda J. Chase, claiming as the widow of the insured, and Charles W. Chase, Elinor R. Chase Jones, Georgia E. Chase Snell and Lawson W. Chase, claiming as his children by a prior marriage. Defendant Rhoda J. Chase had instituted an action against the plaintiff in the District Court for the District of Columbia to recover the insurance proceeds. Upon deposit of the insurance proceeds into the registry of the district court in the present action the plaintiff secured from the court an injunction restraining the further prosecution of the suit in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff is a New York corporation. Defendants Rhoda J. Chase, Charles W. Chase, Elinor R. Chase Jones and Georgia E. Chase Snell are citizens and residents of New Jersey. Defendant Lawson W. Chase is a citizen and resident of California.
The question at issue in the interpleader proceeding was whether defendant Rhoda J. Chase was the widow of the insured. If so, she was entitled to the insurance proceeds but, if not, those proceeds go to the other defendants as children of the insured. Upon consideration of the facts which were stipulated by the parties, together with annexed exhibits and affidavits, the district court found that defendant Rhoda J. Chase was not the widow of the insured and awarded the insurance proceeds to the children. 189 F.Supp. 326. This appeal by defendant Rhoda J. Chase followed.
Preliminarily the appellant asserts that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain this interpleader suit while litigation involving the same subject matter was pending in the District Court for the District of Columbia. This contention is completely devoid of merit. The suit in the District of Columbia was an ordinary civil action brought to recover the insurance proceeds. It was the type of action the further prosecution of which the district court in the present interpleader suit was expressly authorized by law to enjoin. 28 U.S.C. § 2361. The appellant asserts that the District Court for the District of Columbia -could have acquired jurisdiction by counterclaim filed under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., of the interpleader controversy between the appellant and the other defendants to the present lawsuit. We do not agree. For the latter individuals were not amenable to personal service in the District of Columbia, and such personal service upon them in the District would have been a prerequisite to the acquisition by that court of jurisdiction of such a counterclaim under Rule 22. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., j[ 22.04. A counterclaim for interpleader under Rule 22 is to be distinguished in this respect from an original action of interpleader brought under
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 26 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Sandra Baker, Revenue Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 90-55514.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Oct. 5, 1990.
Decided Dec. 12, 1990.
William T. Drescher, Calabasas, Cal., and Kendrick L. Moxon, Bowles & Moxon, Hollywood, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Allen, William A. Whitledge, and Teresa E. McLaughlin, Tax Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Before ALARCON and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and GEORGE, District Judge.
Honorable Lloyd D. George, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
ALARCON, Circuit Judge:
The Church of Scientology of California (Church) appeals from the denial of its request for a preliminary injunction against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The district court concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, was precluded from granting this relief by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421. The Church contends that the record demonstrates that the district court has the jurisdiction to grant equitable relief pursuant to the judicial exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. We disagree and affirm.
I
This case arises from an action filed by the Church against the IRS in which it alleged:
1. Wrongful disclosure of taxpayer information under 26 U.S.C. § 6103 by improperly issuing bank levies and individual assessments.
2. Violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by engaging in unlawful and arbitrary actions against the Church motivated “by an impermissible hostility to the Scientology religion.”
3. Violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by treating the Church and its parishioners differently from other religions.
4. Violation of the due process clause by failing to follow established IRS policy.
5. Violation of the “Taxpayers Bill of Rights” by improperly assessing the bank levies and individual assessments.
The Church presented the following version of the facts in its complaint and supporting declarations: On March 9, 1989 the IRS issued a notice of proposed adjustment of Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxes for the tax years of 1976-1986 based upon a disallowance of the Church’s tax exempt status. On April 7, 1989, the Church filed a protest with the IRS challenging each proposed adjustment. The IRS rejected the protest. A supplemental protest filed on May 22, 1989, was also rejected.
Assessments were made by the IRS in July and August of 1989. Thereafter, the Church entered into discussions with Stanley Kong, IRS Examinations Branch Chief. Kong told the Church that if it made a token payment of the FICA and FUTA taxes for one employee for the period in question and submitted claims for refund and abatement the IRS would forbear attempting to collect the balance of the assessment while such claims were being considered. On September 22, 1989, the Church made payment of the FICA and FUTA taxes for one employee for the period in question and submitted claims for refund and abatement.
On October 23, 1989, Revenue Officer Sandra Baker contacted Church representatives in order to commence collection of the claimed deficiency. The Church alleges that Baker agreed that pursuant to IRS policy P-5-16, as set forth in the Internal Revenue Manual, she would forbear from attempting to collect additional funds while the administrative refund claims were pending. On January 5, 1990, Baker wrote the Church’s counsel and requested a list of the Church’s officers so that the IRS could make assessments for the asserted tax deficiencies directly against the responsible Church officials as authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 6672. The Church informed Baker that it challenged both the legitimacy of the individual assessments, and the appropriateness of any other tax collection activities while its refund claim was under consideration.
On April 4, 1990, Baker served seven notices of levy to selected banks. On April 6,
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
sc_respondent | 076 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
001. attorney general of the United States, or his office
002. specified state board or department of education
003. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
004. state commission, board, committee, or authority
005. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
006. court or judicial district
007. state department or agency
008. governmental employee or job applicant
009. female governmental employee or job applicant
010. minority governmental employee or job applicant
011. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
012. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
013. retired or former governmental employee
014. U.S. House of Representatives
015. interstate compact
016. judge
017. state legislature, house, or committee
018. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
019. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
020. state or U.S. supreme court
021. local school district or board of education
022. U.S. Senate
023. U.S. senator
024. foreign nation or instrumentality
025. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
026. state college or university
027. United States
028. State
029. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
030. advertising business or agency
031. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
032. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
033. airline
034. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
035. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
036. American Medical Association
037. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
038. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
039. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
040. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
041. author, copyright holder
042. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
043. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
044. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
045. water transportation, stevedore
046. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
047. brewery, distillery
048. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
049. construction industry
050. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
051. business, corporation
052. buyer, purchaser
053. cable TV
054. car dealer
055. person convicted of crime
056. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
057. chemical company
058. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
059. religious organization, institution, or person
060. private club or facility
061. coal company or coal mine operator
062. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
063. consumer, consumer organization
064. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
065. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
066. defendant
067. debtor
068. real estate developer
069. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
070. distributor
071. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
072. drug manufacturer
073. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
074. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
075. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
076. electric equipment manufacturer
077. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
078. eleemosynary institution or person
079. environmental organization
080. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
081. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
082. father
083. female employee or job applicant
084. female
085. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
086. fisherman or fishing company
087. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
088. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
089. franchiser
090. franchisee
091. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
092. person who guarantees another's obligations
093. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
094. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
095. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
096. hospital, medical center
097. husband, or ex-husband
098. involuntarily committed mental patient
099. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
100. insurance company, or surety
101. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
102. investor
103. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
104. juvenile
105. government contractor
106. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
107. magazine
108. male
109. medical or Medicaid claimant
110. medical supply or manufacturing co.
111. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
112. minority female employee or job applicant
113. manufacturer
114. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
115. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
116. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
117. mother
118. auto manufacturer
119. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
120. radio and television network, except cable tv
121. nonprofit organization or business
122. nonresident
123. nuclear power plant or facility
124. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
125. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
126. tender offer
127. oil company, or natural gas producer
128. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
129. out of state noncriminal defendant
130. political action committee
131. parent or parents
132. parking lot or service
133. patient of a health professional
134. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
135. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
136. public interest organization
137. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
138. pipe line company
139. package, luggage, container
140. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
141. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
142. indigent defendant
143. private person
144. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
145. professional organization, business, or person
146. probationer, or parolee
147. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
148. public utility
149. publisher, publishing company
150. radio station
151. racial or ethnic minority
152. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
153. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
154. realtor
155. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
156. resident
157. restaurant, food vendor
158. retarded person, or mental incompetent
159. retired or former employee
160. railroad
161. private school, college, or university
162. seller or vendor
163. shipper, including importer and exporter
164. shopping center, mall
165. spouse, or former spouse
166. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
167. retail business or outlet
168. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
169. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
170. tenant or lessee
171. theater, studio
172. forest products, lumber, or logging company
173. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
174. trucking company, or motor carrier
175. television station
176. union member
177. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
178. union, labor organization, or official of
179. veteran
180. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
181. wholesale trade
182. wife, or ex-wife
183. witness, or person under subpoena
184. network
185. slave
186. slave-owner
187. bank of the united states
188. timber company
189. u.s. job applicants or employees
190. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
191. Atomic Energy Commission
192. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
193. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
194. Alien Property Custodian
195. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
196. Board of Immigration Appeals
197. Bureau of Indian Affairs
198. Bonneville Power Administration
199. Benefits Review Board
200. Civil Aeronautics Board
201. Bureau of the Census
202. Central Intelligence Agency
203. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
204. Department or Secretary of Commerce
205. Comptroller of Currency
206. Consumer Product Safety Commission
207. Civil Rights Commission
208. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
209. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
210. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
211. Drug Enforcement Agency
212. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
213. Department or Secretary of Energy
214. Department or Secretary of the Interior
215. Department of Justice or Attorney General
216. Department or Secretary of State
217. Department or Secretary of Transportation
218. Department or Secretary of Education
219. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
220. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
221. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
222. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
223. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
224. Federal Bureau of Prisons
225. Farm Credit Administration
226. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
227. Federal Credit Union Administration
228. Food and Drug Administration
229. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
230. Federal Energy Administration
231. Federal Election Commission
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
233. Federal Housing Administration
234. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
235. Federal Labor Relations Authority
236. Federal Maritime Board
237. Federal Maritime Commission
238. Farmers Home Administration
239. Federal Parole Board
240. Federal Power Commission
241. Federal Railroad Administration
242. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
243. Federal Reserve System
244. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
245. Federal Trade Commission
246. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
247. General Accounting Office
248. Comptroller General
249. General Services Administration
250. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
251. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
252. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
253. Interstate Commerce Commission
254. Indian Claims Commission
255. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
256. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
257. Information Security Oversight Office
258. Department or Secretary of Labor
259. Loyalty Review Board
260. Legal Services Corporation
261. Merit Systems Protection Board
262. Multistate Tax Commission
263. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
264. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
265. National Credit Union Administration
266. National Endowment for the Arts
267. National Enforcement Commission
268. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
269. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
270. National Mediation Board
271. National Railroad Adjustment Board
272. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
273. National Security Agency
274. Office of Economic Opportunity
275. Office of Management and Budget
276. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
277. Office of Personnel Management
278. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
279. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
280. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
281. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
282. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
283. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
284. U.S. Public Health Service
285. Postal Rate Commission
286. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
287. Renegotiation Board
288. Railroad Adjustment Board
289. Railroad Retirement Board
290. Subversive Activities Control Board
291. Small Business Administration
292. Securities and Exchange Commission
293. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
294. Selective Service System
295. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
296. Tennessee Valley Authority
297. United States Forest Service
298. United States Parole Commission
299. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
300. United States Sentencing Commission
301. Veterans' Administration
302. War Production Board
303. Wage Stabilization Board
304. General Land Office of Commissioners
305. Transportation Security Administration
306. Surface Transportation Board
307. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
308. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
309. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
310. Unidentifiable
311. International Entity
Answer: |
songer_appel1_1_3 | E | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to determine what category of business best describes the area of activity of this litigant which is involved in this case.
CONTINENTAL AIR LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Respondent, Western Air Lines, Inc., Hughes Air Corporation, d/b/a Hughes Airwest, United Air Lines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., City of Kansas City, Missouri and Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City, City and County of Denver, Colorado, Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, San Diego Unified Port District, the City of San Diego, San Diego Chamber of Commerce, Interve-nors.
No. 74-1651.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 11, 1975.
Decided Sept. 22, 1975.
Thomas D. Finney, Jr., Washington, D.C., with whom Lee M. Hydeman and James T. Lloyd, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for petitioner.
Glen M. Bendixsen, Associate Gen. Counsel, Civ. Aeronautics Bd., Thomas J. Heye, Gen. Counsel, O. D. Ozment, Deputy Gen. Counsel and David E. Bass, Atty., Civ. Aeronautics Bd., were on the brief for respondent. Robert L. Toomey, Atty., Civ. Aeronautics Bd., also entered an appearance for respondent.
Emory N. Ellis, Jr., Washington, D.C., with whom Gerald P. O’Grady, Los An-geles, Cal., was on the brief for inter-venor Western Air Lines, Inc. Howard L. Culver, Los Angeles, Cal., also entered an appearance for intervenor Western Air Lines, Inc.
William M. Dickson, Chicago, 111., was on the brief for intervenor United Air Lines, Inc., Henry L. Hill, Chicago, 111., also entered an appearance for interve-nor United Air Lines, Inc.
John P. Moore, Atty. Gen. of Colorado and Tedford Dees, Asst. City Atty., Denver, Colo., were on the brief for interve-nors City and County of Denver, Colo, and The Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado.
Aaron A. Wilson, City Atty., Kansas City, Mo., and Nordahl E. Holte, Asst. City Atty., were on the brief for interve-nors City of Kansas City, Missouri and the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City.
Joseph D. Patello, San Diego, Cal., was on the brief for intervenors San Diego Unified Port District, City of San Diego and San Diego Chamber of Commerce.
Richard A. Fitzgerald, San Mateo, Cal., and John W. Simpson, Washington, D.C., entered an appearance for intervenor Hughes Air Corporation, d/b/a Hughes Aiiwest.
Edmund E. Harvey, New York City, entered an appearance for intervenor Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Laurence K. Gustafson and Howard E. Shapiro, Attys., Dept, of Justice, filed a brief on behalf of the United States of America as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Before WRIGHT and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges, and WEIGEL, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(d).
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What category of business best describes the area of activity of this litigant which is involved in this case?
A. agriculture
B. mining
C. construction
D. manufacturing
E. transportation
F. trade
G. financial institution
H. utilities
I. other
J. unclear
Answer: |
songer_search | E | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court below improperly rule for the prosecution on an issue related to an alleged illegal search and seizure?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless". If a civil suit brought by a prisoner or a criminal defendant in another action that alleges a tort based on an illegal search and seizure, also consider the issue to be present in the case.
Gloria CONWAY, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Patricia HARRIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 78-1473.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 25, 1978.
Decided Nov. 13, 1978.
Lawrence G. Albrecht and Thomas P. Donegan, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bruce G. Forrest, Civil Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellees.
Before CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and TONE and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Gloria Conway appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was unlawfully denied assistance and service benefits provided by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4601, et seq. (Uniform Relocation Act or URA).
The facts of this case are not contested. The plaintiff was a tenant in a small apartment building in Waukesha, Wisconsin, and on March 15, 1977, she and other tenants received a 60-day eviction notice from their landlord. On March 30, 1977, the tenants received another letter from another private party, Architektur-80, advising them that this firm had optioned the property on which the tenants’ residences were situated and that financing for the development of a senior citizens’ housing project had been approved. Apparently Architektur-80 and the Wisconsin Housing Finance Agency (HFA) had already signed an agreement, which was later approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), wherein the parties contracted that the new owner would receive Section 8 housing assistance payments following completion of the new housing construction. Some time after the plaintiff moved, the apartment building was taken down and a new 43-unit, Section 8 housing project for the elderly was constructed.
Counsel for plaintiff requested in a May, 1977, letter to the Milwaukee Area Department of Housing and Urban Development that full URA benefits be granted the tenants who were being displaced by construction of the Section 8 project. Shortly thereafter the HUD Milwaukee Area Director responded that persons displaced due to a private Section 8 project were not eligible to receive benefits under the Uniform Relocation Act.
The Section 8 program was established by Congress as part of the omnibus Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, et seq., and was created to
Question: Did the court below improperly rule for the prosecution on an issue related to an alleged illegal search and seizure?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Yes, but error was harmless
D. Mixed answer
E. Issue not discussed
Answer: |
songer_numappel | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack D. BROCKSMITH, Defendants-Appellant.
No. 91-2208.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Nov. 6, 1992.
Decided May 5, 1993.
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied July 15, 1993.
Patrick J. Chesley and Rodger A. Heaton (argued), Asst. U.S. Attys., Office of the U.S. Atty., Springfield, IL, for plaintiff-appellee.
Kenneth A. Kozel (argued), LaSalle, IL, for defendant-appellant.
Before POSNER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, District Judge.
The Honorable Ann Claire Williams, District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge.
Jack D. Brocksmith owned several agencies in Quincy, Illinois, that specialized in selling insurance and annuities to the elderly. Unfortunately for his customers, Brocksmith began playing a shell game with their accounts. Brocksmith would receive premium payments from individuals who wanted to purchase insurance policies. He would delay submitting their insurance applications for six to eight weeks, in the meantime drawing on their money to pay for his personal expenses. If the customers complained that they were not receiving their policies, Brocksmith would say there was a problem with the insurance company; to handle things on that end, he would omit the date on the applications he forwarded, or white-out the real date and replace it with a later one. Eventually, when premiums from other customers came in, he would send their money to the carriers to cover the earlier applications
Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_two_issues | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine whether there are two issues in the case. By issue we mean the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Anthony PANCI, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 16892.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
June 3, 1958
Thomas M. Brahney, Jr., Edw. J. Boyle, Clem H. Sehrt, New Orleans, La., for appellant.
Rene A. Pastorek, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jack C. Benjamin, Asst. U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., M. Hepburn Many, U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and RIVES and CAMERON, Circuit Judges.
HUTCHESON, Chief Judge.
This appeal is from a conviction and sentence imposed upon a verdict of guilty, on two counts charging substantive violations of the narcotic laws, and one count charging a conspiracy to violate them. By it appellant seeks to test whether a conviction, which, as he claims, because of the admission of highly prejudicial hearsay testimony and the denial of the motion to acquit for want of evidence to convict but keeps the promise of due process to the ear while it breaks it to the hope, may stand.
Urging upon us: that extrajudicial inadmissible hearsay statements were erroneously admitted over his objection; that without them the record is devoid of evidence tending to establish his guilt, and the conviction was one of guilt by association, resting entirely on inadmissible hearsay, and supported by no substantial admissible evidence; the defendant thus earnestly concludes his brief:
“This case and the evidence adduced at the trial thereof demonstrates very vividly the abuses which arise when the Government uses a conspiracy count and the evidentiary abuses which are permitted thereunder to seek a conviction. It is cases such as this that has prompted the Supreme Court of the United States to criticize its use and various commentators to deplore the abusive use of the conspiracy charge.
“It is conceivable that a conviction could be or rather should be had in a case such as this where not one witness could be cross-examined as to the statements testified to, as involving the defendant, for each and every one of those statements were hearsay? Is it American justice to sentence a man to the penitentiary, to deprive him of his liberty when not one witness testified that they knew the defendant, that they ever spoke to the defendant, that they ever heard anyone speak to the defendant, or that they saw or, personally of their own knowledge, knew the defendant to have committed a violation of the law? Counsel beHeves, as does every law abiding citizen, that the vicious narcotic traffic should be stamped out and that narcotie violators should be dealt with, harshly but counsel does not concede,, that the sacred and fundamental' principles of a fair and impartial trial, which is guaranteed to every citizen, should be violated even in a narcotic case. Counsel sincerely beHeves that if this case had been anything but a case involving narcotics that a judgment of acquittal would have been granted and, if not, the iury would have returned a verdict °t n°t guilty as to all counts.”
Here, presenting under six numbered specifications, three grounds of error: (1) the denial of his motion for bill of particulars; (2) the admission over objection of prejudicial hearsay testimony; and (3) the refusal to direct a verdict acquittal for want of evidence; appellant urges upon us that the judgment must be reversed with directions to ac-h™1-
Emphasizing that the government did not produce a single witness who could or would testify: that he had spoken to defendant or heard him speak to anyone; that he had purchased, or seen anyone purchase, heroin from him; that he saw him transfer heroin to anyone or have any heroin in his possession; that he saw the defendant in possession of marked and identified money used to purchase heroin or saw him sell or deliver heroin to anyone; appellant insists that it was error to deny his motion for acquittal, In further support of his claim, he points to the undisputed, indeed the admitted fact that the only testimony relied on at the trial as tending to implicate defendant in the crimes charged was the hearsay statements, admitted over defendant’s repeated objections, of the co-defendant Giardina who pleaded guilty and of
Question: Are there two issues in the case?
A. no
B. yes
Answer: |
songer_usc1sect | 2000 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 42. In case of ties, code the first to be cited. The section number has up to four digits and follows "USC" or "USCA".
Luba S. Kowalyszyn De MEDINA, Appellant, v. John E. REINHARDT, Director, United States International Communication Agency, et al. Carolee Brady HARTMAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, et al. Rose Kobylinski and Luba Medina, Appellants, v. John REINHARDT, Director United States International Communication Agency. Toura KEM, Luba Medina and Rose Kobylinski, Appellants, v. John REINHARDT, Director United States International Communication Agency.
Nos. 81-1909 to 81-1911.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 25, 1982.
Decided Aug. 27, 1982.
As Amended Aug. 27, 1982.
Bruce A. Fredrickson, Washington, D. C., for appellants.
Robert E. L. Eaton, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Charles F. C. Ruff, U. S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, Royce C. Lamberth and Kenneth M. Raisler, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Before WRIGHT and WALD, Circuit Judges and ANTHONY J. CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Senior Circuit Judge CELE-BREZZE.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
WALD, Circuit Judge:
These appeals contest the district court’s dismissal of consolidated individual and class sex discrimination claims against the Director of the United States International Communication Agency (“ICA” or “Agency”), formerly the United States Information Agency. Appellants contend that the district court (1) evaluated under inappropriate legal standards the statistical and testimonial evidence of a pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring, (2) failed to make required fact findings on the class promotion discrimination and retaliation claims, (3) improperly dismissed an individual claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and (4) misapplied the requirements for a prima facie showing of discrimination to another individual claim. We find merit in certain of appellants’ objections and therefore remand the class claims and the individual claim of Rose Kobylinski for further consideration. We affirm, however, the district court’s dismissal of Luba Medina’s individual claim.
I. Background
In March 1977, Luba Medina, a former Agency employee, filed an individual claim for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Her complaint alleged that, since 1974, the Agency had refused to rehire her in retaliation for her own prior charges of sex discrimination and her husband’s work on behalf of Agency minority employees. She also claimed that she had personally suffered from the Agency’s discriminatory practices against the foreign-born and women. In late 1977, another job applicant, who had been denied employment by the Agency earlier in the year, filed a Title VII class claim on behalf of female applicants and employees against whom the Agency had discriminated in hiring and promotion. In April 1978, the class was conditionally certified “to include all women who have applied for employment with or are currently employed by the United States Information Agency and who have been or continue to be adversely affected by the discriminatory employment practices of the defendant.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 22. Later that month, an Agency contract employee filed a complaint charging that she had been denied a permanent Agency position on account of sex. In November the three cases were consolidated. In the interim, the district court had permitted Medina and two Agency employees, Josefina Martinez and Rose Kobylinski, to intervene as named plaintiffs and had allowed plaintiffs to supplement the class complaint to include a
Question: What is the number of the section from the title of the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case, that is, title 42? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_5-3 | H | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "privacy".
Kathleen STRANG, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY.
No. 88-5098.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Dec. 2, 1988.
Decided Jan. 10, 1989.
George A. Lehner, for appellant.
Robert E. L. Eaton, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before RUTH BADER GINSBURG and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RUTH BADER GINSBURG.
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
Kathleen Strang is a foreign affairs officer at the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). In June 1985, ACDA security officer Berne M. In-dahl began an internal investigation into allegations that Strang had breached security procedures by improperly storing, transporting, and disclosing classified documents. On the basis of Indahl’s findings and the report of a special security panel, Strang was suspended in December 1986 for six months without pay and deprived of her clearance to view Sensitive Compart-mented Information, or “codeword” documents. Strang has since been restored to her position with Top Secret, but not “codeword,” security clearance.
In this civil action, Strang seeks, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and the Privacy Act, id. § 552a, the following relief: release of nine memoran-da generated during Indahl’s investigation and withheld in their entirety by ACDA; amendment of twelve other allegedly inaccurate memoranda in ACDA’s records; and damages for her suspension and loss of codeword clearance, which she claims are the result of ACDA’s intentional or willful maintenance of inaccurate records. The district court, on February 25, 1988, granted summary judgment to ACDA on all counts and Strang now appeals. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment except as to Strang’s request for the amendment of records concerning her alleged transmission, without proper clearance, of classified information to Japanese officials; we remand that issue for further proceedings in the district court.
I.
Strang first contends that summary judgment was inappropriate because she was not afforded an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. Strang, however, did not state with sufficient particularity to the district court—or, for that matter, to this court—why discovery was necessary. We therefore reject this opening argument.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that a court may deny a motion for summary judgment or order a continuance to permit discovery if the party opposing the motion adequately explains why, at that timepoint, it cannot present by affidavit facts needed to defeat the motion. See, e.g., Londrigan v. FBI, 670 F.2d 1164, 1175 (D.C.Cir. 1981); see generally 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2740, at 530-31 (1983). Strang never offered the requisite explanation. She did state generally that discovery “would be invaluable in this case” and would give her “an opportunity to test and elaborate the affidavit testimony already entered.” Joint
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "privacy"?
A. abortion rights
B. homosexual rights where privacy claim raised
C. contraception and other privacy claims related to marital relations or sexual behavior (not in 501 or 502)
D. suits demanding compensation for violation of privacy rights (e.g., 1983 suits)
E. mandatory testing (for drugs, AIDs, etc)
F. mandatory sterilization
G. right to die or right to refuse medical help
H. other
Answer: |
songer_appel2_1_2 | D | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".
FIGGE AUTO CO., a Co-Partnership, and Greg Figge, Individually, and Lloyd H. Strand, Administrator of the Estate of Cyril R. Figge, Deceased, Appellants, v. David James TAYLOR, by Mrs. Arlene Taylor, His Mother and Next Friend, Appellee.
No. 17393.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Jan. 7, 1964.
Arthur H. Jacobson, Waukon, Iowa, James D. Bristol, Waukon, Iowa, Jacobson & Bristol, Waukon, Iowa, of counsel, for appellants.
Ira J. Melaas, Jr., Decorah, Iowa, Frank R. Miller and Floyd S. Pearson, Decorah, Iowa, Miller, Pearson & Melaas, Decorah, Iowa, for appellee.
Before VOGEL, BLACKMUN and RIDGE, Circuit Judges.
VOGEL, Circuit Judge.
David James Taylor, by his mother and next friend, brought this action against Figge Auto Company, a co-partnership, and Cyril R. Figge and Greg Figge, co-partners, individually, defendants, and Lloyd H. Strand, Administrator of the estate of Cyril R. Figge, deceased, substituted defendant. All parties will be designated here as they were in the court below. Plaintiff sought money damages because of personal injuries sustained by him as the result of an automobile accident. Diversity of citizenship and amount meet federal court jurisdictional requirements.
The case was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict in plaintiff’s favor in the amount of $22,509. Defendants appealed from the judgment based upon the jury verdict. Error is predicated upon:
1. The District Court’s overruling defendants’ motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
2. The District Court’s overruling defendants’ motion to clarify a pre-trial order with reference to $1,509 medical expense and the inclusion of such amount in the jury’s verdict. It is defendants’ contention that because plaintiff was a minor, the right to recover for medical expenses would be owned by his parents and testimony regarding such expense was therefore irrelevant in this action.
The first claim of error is based mainly upon defendants’ contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, that he therefore failed to sustain the burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence (a requirement under the law of Iowa) and, further, that the driver of the defendants’ car was not guilty of negligence. As in practically all tort cases, there are here conflicts in the evidence and disputes between witnesses and parties, from which tangled web it was the duty of the jurors, as the finders of the facts, to ascertain and to declare the truth. This they have done as they saw it. That was their responsibility. This as an appellate court, in ruling upon the correctness of the trial court’s overruling a motion for a directed verdict and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s findings. We must also give to the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn
Question: This question concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?
A. local
B. neither local nor national
C. national or multi-national
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_issue_2 | 41 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
LOEFFLER v. FRANK, POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-1431.
Argued January 11, 1988
Decided June 13, 1988
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, Marshall, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 566. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Lisa S. Van Amburg argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, John F. Daly, and Stephen E. Alpem.
Julius LeVonne Chambers, Gail J. Wright, and Charles Stephen Ralston filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in a suit against the United States Postal Service brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq.
I
Petitioner Theodore J. Loeffler was discharged from his position as a rural letter carrier for the United States Postal Service. Petitioner appealed his termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board and, when his discharge was affirmed there, sought administrative relief from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This, also, was without success. Contending that his discharge resulted from sex discrimination, petitioner subsequently brought this suit against the Postmaster General of the United States in his official capacity, pursuant to § 717 of
Question: What is the issue of the decision?
01. voting
02. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
03. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
04. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
05. desegregation, schools
06. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
07. affirmative action
08. slavery or indenture
09. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
10. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
11. debtors' rights
12. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
13. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
14. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
15. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
16. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
17. Indians, state jurisdiction over
18. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
19. poverty law, constitutional
20. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
21. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
22. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
23. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
24. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
25. military: active duty
26. military: veteran
27. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
28. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
29. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
30. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
31. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
32. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
33. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
34. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
35. indigents: payment of fine
36. indigents: costs or filing fees
37. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
38. indigents: transcript
39. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
40. indigents: miscellaneous
41. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
42. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
Answer: |
songer_district | H | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laszlo SZABO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 85-1686.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
May 12, 1986.
Robert N. Miller, U.S. Atty., and Raymond P. Moore, Asst. U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Richard W. Bryans, Denver, Colo., and Michael F. Morrissey, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellant.
Before McKAY, ANDERSON and TA-CHA, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is therefore submitted without oral argument.
The defendant, Laszlo Szabo, appeals his conviction by a jury on one count of interstate transportation of falsely made checks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982), and one count of conspiracy to commit such offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). He contends his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated when the trial judge allowed a coconspirator to give damaging testimony against the defendant at trial without first holding a hearing to determine if the anticipated testimony bore adequate “indicia of reliability.” We conclude that no error was committed, and affirm.
The disputed testimony in this case was given at trial by Burton Vishno, who admitted to involving the defendant in a scheme to negotiate bogus certified checks. Vish-no testified that he was introduced to the defendant in late 1982 while the latter was in New Haven, Connecticut. Among other things, the two of them discussed financing for a racetrack defendant wanted to establish in Colorado. Vishno told the defendant that he had a source who could provide falsely certified checks for fifty percent of the face value. Defendant requested such a check in the amount of $20,000 and asked that it be made payable to his company, Great American Financial, Inc. Thereafter, Vishno obtained the check from his source, “Tommy” Gamble, and delivered it to defendant at his office in Denver, Colorado, on January 10, 1983. Two days later defendant paid Vishno $6,000. By other testimony, it was established that defendant had deposited the $20,000 to his business account and made use of the funds.
Over the next two weeks, additional parties were introduced into the scheme by defendant. Daniel Powers, Glen Dial and Michael Allred, later charged as co-defendants, and Timothy Watts, (collectively referred to by defendant as his “wrecking crew,” R. Vol.IV, at 26), met with Vishno upon defendant’s initiative. The initial meetings of Dial and Watts with Vishno were in defendant’s presence. Vishno’s first contact with Powers was from a telephone in defendant’s office, in defendant’s presence, and at his instance. Vishno then testified to a number of subsequent meetings with the various individuals at which the unlawful scheme was discussed and substantially pursued. The defendant was present at some, but not all, of the meetings.
To facilitate the expected additional transactions, Vishno’s source, Gamble, and Gamble’s associate, Vincent Edo, came to Denver and established themselves at the hotel where Vishno was staying. At various times during this several day period, and upon the request of each recipient, falsely certified checks were obtained from Gamble by Vishno and delivered as follows: a check for $500,000 to Powers; a check for $300,000 to Allred and Dial; and three checks in the respective amounts of $100,-000, $100,000, and $50,000 to Watts.
Watts, Vishno, Gamble, and Edo then left town. They met again in Philadelphia approximately one week later to divide the proceeds of checks Watts had cashed in Baltimore, Maryland, and were arrested by the F.B.I.
After Vishno had testified to the foregoing, a bench conference was requested by the government. Here, the government advised that it intended to elicit some co-conspirator statements from Vishno for the first time
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_direct1 | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal in suits against management, for union, individual worker, or government in suit against management; in government enforcement of labor laws, for the federal government or the validity of federal regulations; in Executive branch vs union or workers, for executive branch; in worker vs union (non-civil rights), for union; in conflicts between rival union, for union which opposed by management and "not ascertained" if neither union supported by management or if unclear; in injured workers or consumers vs management, against management; in other labor issues, for economic underdog if no civil rights issue is present; for support of person claiming denial of civil rights. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. AUTOMOTIVE LODGE LOCAL 777 and District No. 9, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO.
No. 16459.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
April 22, 1960.
Thomas J. McDermott, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, and Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
PER CURIAM.
Order of National Labor Relations Board enforced, on petition for enforcement and stipulation filed with Board.
Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_habeas | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine whether the case was an appeal of a decision by the district court on a petition for habeas corpus. A state habeas corpus case is one in which a state inmate has petitioned the federal courts.
Nathaniel J. JACOBS, Appellant, v. WARDEN, MARYLAND PENITENTIARY, Appellee.
No. 9564.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 6, 1965.
Decided Oct. 7, 1966.
John H. Ditto, Jr., Baltimore, Md. (Court-assigned counsel), for appellant.
R. Randolph Victor, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Maryland (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on the brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BRYAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.
HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge.
Convicted on a plea of guilty to a charge of armed robbery in a state court, this Maryland prisoner seeks habeas corpus relief upon the ground that his plea was involuntary. The contention depends in large part upon a finding of involuntariness in the confession of a co-defendant which supplied the cause for the arrest, without a warrant, of this appellant, which in turn, it is said, led to his almost spontaneous confession. We affirm the denial of relief.
Jacobs, an employee of a department store, had been filching clothing. Allegedly, he expanded his operation by masterminding an armed robbery. The store was robbed by three men. When one of them, Kelly, was arrested, he signed a confession which, implicated Jacobs as the ringleader. Armed with this information, police officers went to the store and arrested Jacobs. In the presence of the store manager, he did not deny the charge, and, within twenty-five minutes of his arrival at the police station, he admitted his guilt. A few minutes later, he signed a written confession. Later, all participants initialed a joint confession.
Kelly had been arrested without a warrant on the basis of information received from two informants. • The police had not recorded the information they had received and, at the time of the hearing, could not identify the informants beyond general references to their sex. The officers could not vouch for the reliability of those informants.
On that account, the District Court held that there was no probable cause for Kelly’s arrest and that his subsequent confession was the involuntary product of the illegal arrest, though otherwise uncoerced.
Jacobs contends that, since Kelly’s confession has been held involuntary as the technical product of his illegal arrest, it could not furnish probable cause for a belief that Jacobs was a participant in the crime which the officer knew had been committed. He concludes that his arrest must also have been unlawful and his confession the product of the unlawful arrest.
The contention draws the thread too fine. The connection between Kelly’s illegal arrest and his confession is sufficiently close that the latter may be said to be dependent upon the former. The connection between Kelly’s illegal arrest and Jacobs’ confession is far more attenuated. The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine need not be extended to its seedlings.
The District Court found, with abundant justification that Kelly’s confession was truthful and trustworthy. Its invalidation as a basis for Kelly’s conviction, because of the technical defect in Kelly’s arrest, was not found to have infected its apparent reliability. At the time the policemen moved to effect the arrest of Jacobs, they had every reason to believe that Kelly’s confession in its implication of Jacobs was reliable information. Its subsequent suppression as support for Kelly’s conviction because of uncertainty of the sources of information which led to Kelly’s arrest cannot gainsay its reliability, apparent at the time to the officers, which all subsequent events have confirmed. An arrest of one of multiple offenders upon improbable cause, or upon cause which years after the event cannot be documented, may invoke rules of exclusion for the protection of the victim of the illegal arrest, but it does not deprive the victim’s statement of the inherent and apparent reliability it convincingly and undeniably bore then and now.
There is no greater merit in the alternative contention that the confession was the tainted product of Kelly’s.
The victim of an unlawful seizure may be able to object successfully to the use of his confession, when the confession is the direct result of confrontation with the fruits of the seizure. Similarly, the victim of an unlawful search cannot be compelled to produce evidence
Question: Was the case an appeal of a decision by the district court on a petition for habeas corpus?
A. no
B. yes, state habeas corpus (criminal)
C. yes, federal habeas corpus (criminal)
D. yes, federal habeas corpus relating to deportation
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | L | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
KROPP FORGE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR and Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Respondents.
No. 80-2160.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 13, 1981.
Decided Aug. 14, 1981.
Robert D. Moran, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
John A. Bryson, Acting Sol. of Labor, U. S. Dept, of Labor, Washington, D. C., for respondents.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge, and JAMESON, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable William J. Jameson, Senior District Judge of the District of Montana, is sitting by designation.
CUMMINGS, Chief Judge.
Kropp Forge Company has filed a petition to review an order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission holding that Kropp violated 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) because of noncompliance with an occupational safety and health standard, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(3), that provides in full:
“In all cases where the sound levels exceed the values shown herein, a continuing effective hearing conservation program shall be administered.”
The citation against Kropp charged, and after a hearing the Administrative Law Judge (AU) found that noise levels generated by forging hammers at Kropp’s Chicago steel forging plant continuously exceeded 90 decibels and that Kropp’s hearing conservation program lacked six elements necessary to constitute an effective program as required by the above-quoted standard. The AU further found that the violation was “willful-serious” as charged and assessed a penalty of $5000. The Commission declined Kropp’s petition for discretionary review so that the ALJ’s July 2, 1980, opinion became the final order of the Commission on August 7, 1980, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 661(i). We conclude that the standard under which Kropp was cited is unenforceably vague and therefore reverse.
As a preliminary matter, we reject Kropp’s contention that all evidence gathered during two December 1978 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspections should have been suppressed on the ground that it was obtained pursuant to a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Kropp concedes that it granted OSHA permission to enter its premises on these occasions to verify an employee complaint, unrelated to the present charges, concerning excessive exposure to carbon monoxide fumes from fork-lift trucks. At the time of her first visit to the plant, on December 5, 1978, the OSHA compliance officer stated that her inspection would not go beyond the area of the complaint, i. e., the plant’s “KFA Building” where the fork-lift trucks were located. However, after making an initial walk around the building, the compliance officer determined that sampling of noise levels generated by forging hammers located in the KFA Building was also required. Accordingly, the inspection was continued on December 13 and 19, at which times sampling for both carbon monoxide and noise levels was conducted. Kropp argues that its consent was limited specifically to the carbon monoxide investigation so that the noise level samples were taken unlawfully.
The record shows, however, that at all times on December 13, the compliance officer was accompanied by Kropp’s Safety Director and that on December 19, she and a second compliance officer were accompanied by the Safety Director and Kropp’s General Manager. Both men had been informed that noise sampling would be conducted, and they raised
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
songer_initiate | A | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.
W. Willard WIRTZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George TURNER, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14311.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
April 7, 1964.
Charles Donahue, Sol., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., Herman Grant, Regional Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Chicago, Ill., Bessie Margolin, Associate Sol., Robert E. Nagle, Jack H. Weiner, Attys., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Burl F. Nader, Libertyville, Ill., for appellee.
Before DUFFY, CASTLE and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.
DUFFY, Circuit Judge.
This suit was brought by the Secretary of Labor under Section 16(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, pursuant to the written request of Martin Halma, a former employee of defendant. The suit sought to recover $488.20 in unpaid overtime compensation.
At the close of plaintiff’s case, the District Court granted the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict. In explanation of such action, the Court said: “In the light of that record, with the beneficial plaintiff saying on one oecasion that everything was square and then two months later making a claim, and then at the trial saying he doesn’t know how much is owing, I feel that you would be unable to go into the jury room and arrive at any amount. * * * ”
f Previously the Court had asked Mr. Halma several questions:
“The Court: How much money do you say now that Mr. Turner owes you?
“The Witness: What the letter said, your Honor.
“The Court: I say — read the question to the witness.
“(Question read by the reporter.)
“The Witness: I do not know.
“The Court: You don’t know how much money you have coming. That is all. You may step down.”
Defendant is a contract mail carrier for the United States Postoffice Department. During the period covered by this action, April 1, 1960 to July 15, 1961, he employed complainant Halma principally on a regularly scheduled route between McHenry, Illinois and Chicago. At first, Halma was paid a straight weekly salary. Statutory overtime wages were not paid to him for hours worked in excess of forty hours a week until after the period covered by this action.
The evidence presented by the Secretary to establish the number of hours work done by claimant showed that during the period April 1, 1960 to October 28, 1960, the schedule for the ChicagoMcHenry route called for departure from the McHenry postofiice at 6:40 p. m. and arrival at Chicago Suburban Truck Terminal at 9:30 p. m., with intermediate stops being made on the way. This was followed by a return trip leaving Chicago at 2 a. m. and arriving at McHenry at 5 a. m. This schedule was followed daily except Sundays and some holidays.
In following this schedule, claimant testified he would begin his work day with arrival at 5:30 p. m. at a DX Service Station where defendant’s tractor and trailer were kept. After gassing and oiling the tractor, he would drive approximately one and a half miles to McHenry postofiice where he loaded the mail that was to be loaded on the truck. Claimant’s scheduled departure time was 6:40 p. m. After arriving in Chicago, he would await his turn in line and unload the tractor and would then spot the vehicle in back of the postofiice loading dock. He would complete this about 10:05 p. m. He then started to work again at the scheduled time of 2 a. m. the following morning. After arrival at McHenry and unloading the mail, he returned the vehicle to the DX station, usually arriving there about 6 a. m.
There was additional testimony about extra hours worked due to breakdowns of the truck and other delays such as that caused by a dead battery. There was
Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_usc1 | 35 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if no U.S. Code titles are cited. If one or more provisions are cited, code the number of the most frequently cited title.
BROOME et al. v. HARDIE-TYNES MFG. CO.
No. 8451.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 15, 1937.
Edwin P. Corbett and John J. Mahoney, both of Columbus, Ohio, and James R. For-man, of Birmingham, Ala., for appellants.
Forney Johnston and Henry L. Jennings, both of Birmingham, Ala., for ap-pellee.
Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
This suit was for injunction, for accounting, and for damages for infringement of letters patent Nos. 1,306,370 and 1,-603,406 for sluice gates. The claim was that defendant, without leave or license from plaintiffs, and in defiance of the patents, had made and sold, and was making and selling, devices embodying the inventions described in them.
Defendant denied infringement, and put the validity of the patent at issue. The defense on which the case went off was that the only thing being done by the defendant, having any relation whatever to the patents in suit, was the manufacture of emergency gates and accessories for the government of the United States, to be installed at the Mohawk and Bolivar Dams in the state of Ohio, under a contract had with the defendant, and upon specifications and drawings furnished by the United States; and that by section 68, title 35 U.S.C.A. plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy is a suit against the government in the Court of Claims.
The District Judge, of the opinion that the issue this defense presented should be tried first, heard evidence upon and determined it in defendant’s favor. He accordingly dismissed the bill.
Appellants make two points against the decree. The first goes to the procedure employed in disposing of the defense. It affirms that, instead of taking testimony in advance of a trial of the patent claims, on defendant’s plea that plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was in the Court of Claims, the court should have treated it as a plea to the jurisdiction, and denied it on the authority of Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Arma Engineering Co., 271 U.S. 232, 46 S.Ct. 505, 70 L.Ed. 922, holding that the invoked section does not deprive the District Court, as a federal court, of jurisdiction, but only operates as a defense. The argument here is that the defendant set up, and the District Judge gave effect to, the statute as a jurisdictional bar, and that, instead of hearing the cause on the merits, including the issue of exclusive remedy thus raised, the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction in contravention of the practice approved in the Sperry Case.
As applied to what was done here, the argument of appellants finally comes down to this, that the District Court should not have heard testimony on one fundamental defense without at the same time hearing it on all the others.
We think there, can be no merit in this contention. If sustained, it would require the laborious and tedious processes of trying a patent suit, only to dismiss it at the end because plaintiffs’ remedy, lies in some other court. Without regard to what defendant may have called its plea, the District Judge did not determine it as one going to its jurisdiction to hear the cause, but as one going to the right of plaintiffs to the relief they sought. He disposed of it on that basis. As shown in his full findings of fact and conclusions of law, followed by an opinion and final decree, the court took full jurisdiction of the cause, and, having done so, proceeded to try independently of other matters of defense, the fundamental defense that plaintiffs’ sole remedy was in the Court of Claims. Having determined that, because of the statute providing an exclusive remedy in the Court of Claims, plaintiffs were without remedy in the District Court, he dismissed the bill.
The second point searches the substance of the ruling on the plea. It affirms that the alleged infringing devices were in fact made by the defendant, not for the United States, but for the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District, a corporation of Ohio, and that therefore the invoked statute does not apply in letter or in spirit. The argument for this point is based on the proposition that, though the sluice gates were being made and installed under a contract on its face between defendant and
Question: What is the most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | L | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
CITY CHEVROLET COMPANY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 7023.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 6, 1956.
Decided Jan. 11, 1956.
Frederic D. Dassori, Washington, D. C. (Dee R. Bramwell, Washington, D. C., on brief), for petitioner.
C. Guy Tadlock, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (H. Brian Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert N. Anderson and A. F. Prescott, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., on brief), for respondent.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is a petition to review a decision of the Tax Court relating to deductions for the year 1946 on account of personal services rendered taxpayer corporation by officers who with their "wives were its sole stockholders. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the Tax Court and need not be repeated here. Taxpayer contends that the bonus of $30,881.69 paid to each of the officers for the year 1946 in addition to salaries of $12,000 each was reasonable because provided for by a contract under which the officers were to have 50% of the net profits of the corporation in excess of 15% and that this was in effect a continuation of a contract made sometime prior thereto when the stock of the corporation was owned by others. The question is one of fact and we are not prepared to hold that the holding of the Tax Court with regard thereto was clearly wrong. A bonus contract which was reasonable as holding out an incentive to those managing the corporation when its stock was owned by others could well be held unreasonable when the managers themselves became owners of the stock and the question was, not what incentive was needed to call forth their best efforts, but what part of the earnings of the corporation could fairly be paid to them for their services as officers. See University Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1452, affirmed 5 Cir., 199 F.2d 629.
Affirmed.
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
songer_constit | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine whether there was an issue discussed in the opinion of the court about the constitutionality of a law or administrative action, and if so, whether the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry W. COGWELL, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Edward BEY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 72-1671, 72-1672.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 14, 1973.
Decided Oct. 30, 1973.
James D. Montgomery, David Lowell Slader, John Powers Crowley, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.
James R. Thompson, U. S. Atty., William T. Huyck, Gordon B. Nash, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and PELL and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges.
CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Defendants Bey, Cogwell, Fort, Jackson and Pugh appeal their jury convictions for conspiring to make false statements to the Office of Educational Opportunity, to obtain fraudulently monies which were the subject of a poverty program grant, and to defraud the United States through falsification and concealment of material facts. Defendant Jackson also appeals his convictions for knowingly making false statements in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by signing the time and attendance sheets of program trainees with the knowledge that they were neither at the training centers nor at job interviews (9 counts), and for misapplying grant funds by endorsing the names of trainees to stipend checks knowing that they received neither the checks nor the proceeds and causing the fraudulent endorsement of the checks in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2703 (2 counts). Defendant Bey additionally appeals his conviction for knowingly making false statements, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, by signing check receipts with the knowledge that the trainees did not receive the checks or the proceeds (6 counts). Defendant Cog-well further appeals his convictions for knowingly making false statements, unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, by signing the time and attendance sheets of trainees with the knowledge that they were neither at the training centers nor at job interviews (2 counts) and by signing check receipts knowing the trainees neither received the checks nor the proceeds (4 counts). Cogwell also appeals his conviction for misapplying grant funds by endorsing the names of trainees to stipend checks and causing the fraudulent endorsement of them in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2703 (4 counts).
Defendants were participants in a program funded by an Office of Educational Opportunity (hereinafter O.E.O.) grant given in June 1967 to the Woodlawn Organization (hereinafter T. W.O.), a Chicago community organization. The program was designed to utilize existing gang structure and leadership to provide basic educational and vocational skills to gang members. The grant provided that T.W.O. would establish four manpower' training centers, with two of the centers established for the benefit of members of the Black P. Stone Nation gang. The grant specified that center chiefs, instructors, assistant instructors, and staff members would be drawn from the hierarchy of the gangs and would be salaried. To induce participation, the grant provided daily stipends and carfare allowances for trainees. The O.E.O. grant required T. W.O. to maintain detailed records and accounts of the payment of stipends to the individual trainees, and it specified that payment was to be conditioned on verification of the trainees’ attendance at the centers. T.W.O. operationalized this rule by requiring the trainees to sign time and attendance sheets at the centers on arrival and departure at both sessions on each day. The center chief was responsible for collecting these sheets at the end of each week and for returning them to T.W.O. Stipend checks payable -to the trainees and based on the time and attendance sheet data were forwarded to the centers for distribution by the chief and his staff to the trainees each Friday afternoon. Attached to each check was a receipt to be signed by the trainee-payee, collected by
Question: Did the court's conclusion about the constitutionality of a law or administrative action favor the appellant?
A. Issue not discussed
B. The issue was discussed in the opinion and the resolution of the issue by the court favored the respondent
C. The issue was discussed in the opinion and the resolution of the issue by the court favored the appellant
D. The resolution of the issue had mixed results for the appellant and respondent
Answer: |
songer_appel1_3_3 | F | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"". Your task is to determine which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant.
NICHOLAS, Collector of Internal Revenue, v. FIFTEENTH STREET INV. CO.
No. 1796.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 19, 1939.
F. A. Michels, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen (James W. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewal; Key and J. L. Monarch, Sp. Assts. to Atty Gen., and Thomas J. Morrissey, U. S. Atty., and Ivor O. Wingren, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellant.
Horace Phelps, of Denver, Colo. (James D. Benedict and Horace F. Phelps, both of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit instituted by the Fifteenth Street Investment Company, a corporation, hereinafter called the taxpayer, against Ralph Nicholas, Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Colorado, under section 24 (20) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (20), to recover income taxes paid for the years 1932 and 1933. The taxpayer owned a parcel of real estate situated in the City of Denver. In March, 1929, the property was leased to Mountain States Theater Corporation for the succeeding twenty-five years. In August, 1930, the taxpayer completed the construction of a building on such real estate at a cost of $262,500. In addition to the amount thus expended by the taxpayer, the lessee, with the permission of the taxpayer but without obligation to do so, expended $134,164.40 for unseverable and permanent improvements to the building. The title to such improvements was at all times vested in the taxpayer, and no part of the expenditures which the lessee made for them was in lieu of rent. The depreciable life of the building following the agreed determinative period of the lease was sixteen and one-half years. In May, 1933, the lease was prematurely terminated by the default of the lessee, and the exclusive possession of the property was unconditionally surrendered to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer included in its income tax return for the year 1932 the amount of $2,-355 as the aliquot part for one year of the value of the improvements paid for by the lessee and paid the tax thereon. No part of the value of the improvements made by the lessee was included in the return of the taxpayer for the year 1933. On examination of the facts, the Commissioner increased the income of the taxpayer in the sum of $49,106.66 as representing the depreciated value of the improvements made by the lessee remaining after the termination of the lease. A deficiency in taxes was imposed and paid. Claims for refund were submitted and denied. This suit followed. The court determined that the taxpayer did not realize any taxable gain in
Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"". Which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant?
A. Food & Drug Administration
B. General Services Administration
C. Government Accounting Office (GAO)
D. Health Care Financing Administration
E. Immigration & Naturalization Service (includes border patrol)
F. Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
G. Interstate Commerce Commission
H. Merit Systems Protection Board
I. National Credit Union Association
J. National Labor Relations Board
K. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Answer: |
songer_r_fed | 1 | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.
LONG v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 8571.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 23, 1938.
Petition
Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer: |
songer_applfrom | E | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 20, MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA; Natalie Sams and F. Clarence Sams, minors who sue by their parents, Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Sams, and Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Sams, individually; Thomas Buckley, Robert Buckley and John Buckley, minors who sue by their parents, Mr. and Mrs. William A. Buckley, and Mr. and Mrs. William Buckley, individually; Jennifer Parker, a minor who sues by her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Parker, and Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Parker, individually; and the Class of all those School Districts, School Children, Parents and Property Owners in the State of Oklahoma who are Similarly Situated with the above Named Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA; State of Oklahoma ex rel. the Commissioners of the Land Office; Jack Blackwell, the County Treasurer of Oklahoma County; Jim Parkinson, the County Treasurer of Tulsa County; and Oscar Thomas, the County Treasurer of Muskogee County, in their official capacities and representing the class of all County Treasurers of Oklahoma, Defendants-Appellees, and Board of Education of Independent School District 1, Sulphur, Oklahoma, et al., Intervenors-Appellees.
No. 89-68.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
April 14, 1969.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1969.
Tom R. Mason, Muskogee, Okl., and Maurice H. Merrill, Norman, Okl. (Norman & Wheeler and Bonds, Matthews & Mason, Muskogee, Okl., were with them on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bert Barefoot, Jr., Oklahoma City, Okl. (C. J. Engling, Asst. Atty. Gen. for State of Oklahoma, was with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
John A. Claro, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Bert Barefoot, Jr., Edward H. Moler and Barefoot, Moler, Bohanon & Barth, Oklahoma City, Okl., were with him on the brief), for intervenors-appellees other than Independent School Dist. 1 of Tulsa County, Okl.
C. H. Rosenstein, Tulsa, Okl. (Rosenstein, Livingston, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa, Okl., were with him on the brief), for intervenor-appellee Independent School Dist. 1 of Tulsa County, Okl.
Before LEWIS, BREITENSTEIN and HICKEY, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
The claim of the plaintiffs-appellants is that Oklahoma treats them unequally in the distribution of taxes collected for school purposes from utilities operating in more than one county. Jurisdiction is asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) in that plaintiffs are deprived of the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court was requested and denied. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and this appeal followed.
The action was brought by the Board of Education of a Muskogee, Oklahoma, school district and by parents and taxpayers suing in their own behalf and in behalf of their school children. The defendants are the State of Oklahoma and various state and local officials whose duties relate to the collection and distribution of taxes. Several school districts were permitted to intervene on the side of the defendants.
The allegations of the
Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?
A. Trial (either jury or bench trial)
B. Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
C. Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
D. Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
E. Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
F. Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
G. Appeal of post settlement orders
H. Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
I. Not a final judgment: mandamus
J. Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
K. Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
L. Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)
Answer: |
songer_casetyp1_2-3-3 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "civil rights - other civil rights".
Maria DOE and Cruz Doe, individually and on behalf of their minor son Manual Doe, Plaintiffs, and Anna Doe, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al., Defendants, and Catholic Home Bureau, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 590, Docket 82-7505.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Jan. 27, 1983.
Decided June 2, 1983.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 3, 1983.
See 104 S.Ct. 195.
Carolyn Kubitschek, Edward N. Simon, New York City, David J. Lansner, Lansner & Wendt, New York City, Louise Gruner Gans, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant.
Frederick J. Magovern, New York City, for defendant-appellee.
Before OAKES, KEARSE and SLOVI-TER, Circuit Judges.
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Anna Doe’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) against the Catholic Home Bureau (“the Bureau”) comes before this court for the second time. On the first appeal, we reversed the judgment entered on the jury verdict for the defendant Bureau and remanded the case for a new trial because the jury instructions were misleading and because certain evi-dentiary rulings were erroneous. Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1981) (Doe I). After the jury found for plaintiff at the new trial and assessed damages at $225,000, Judge Brieant, the trial judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant Bureau. The judge rejected plaintiff’s argument that she was entitled to the jury verdict under this court’s earlier decision. Instead, the trial court held the evidence was so overwhelming that no reasonable jury could find the Bureau acted with deliberate indifference, the standard used to establish liability under the section 1983 claim at issue. Plaintiff appeals the entry of judgment in favor of the Bureau; we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the jury verdict.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Facts
Because this ease reaches us on appeal from a judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff who “must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn in [her] favor from [the] evidence.” Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1970).
Anna Doe, born in 1961, was two years old when she was placed in foster care along with her sister. The New York City Commissioner of Welfare, their legal custodian, arranged for defendant Catholic Home Bureau to supervise their care beginning January 5, 1964. The Bureau placed the girls with Mr. and Mrs. Senerchia, having previously investigated and certified them as suitable for foster placements. The Bureau placed two additional foster children with them in 1965.
The record contains evidence that Anna was regularly and frequently physically and sexually abused by Mr. Senerchia, her foster father, starting in 1971 when she was about ten or eleven years old. The physical abuse consisted, inter alia, of beating her over her entire body with his hands and with a belt, throwing her down the stairs and even once cutting her with a hunting knife. Beginning at the
Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "civil rights - other civil rights"?
A. alien petitions - (includes disputes over attempts at deportation)
B. indian rights and law
C. juveniles
D. poverty law, rights of indigents (civil)
E. rights of handicapped (includes employment)
F. age discrimination (includes employment)
G. discrimination based on religion or nationality
H. discrimination based on sexual preference federal government (other than categories above)
I. other 14th amendment and civil rights act cases
J. 290 challenge to hiring, firing, promotion decision of federal government (other than categories above)
K. other civil rights
Answer: |
songer_treat | G | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gregory Christopher BAILEY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James Henry BROWN, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Irving Marion MAXWELL, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert Lee MORROW, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Larry Eugene WALLACE, Appellant.
Nos. 73-2374 to 73-2378.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Sept. 30, 1974.
Decided Jan. 31, 1975.
David R. Badger, Charlotte, N. C. (Court-appointed), for appellant in No. 73-2377.
Keith M. Stroud,.Charlotte, N. C. (Court-appointed), for appellant in No. 73-2374.
Donald M. Tepper, New York City (Court-appointed), for appellant in No. 73-2378.
James M. Shannonhouse, Jr., Charlotte, N. C. (Court-appointed), for appellant in No. 73 — 2375.
Peter Goldberger, Third-year law student (Lila Bellar, Charlotte, N. C. (Court-appointed), on brief), for appellant in No. 73-2376.
Michael S. Scofield, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Keith S. Snyder, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee in Nos. 73-2374, 73-2375, 73-2376, 73-2377 and 73-2378.
Before BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WINTER and RUSSELL, Circuit J udges.
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
In three counts, George Christopher Bailey, James Henry Brown, Robert Lee Morrow and Larry Eugene Wallace were charged with the robbery of the Northeast Branch, North Carolina National Bank at Charlotte, North Carolina on July 9, 1973 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, and Irving Marion Maxwell was indicted with them as an aider and abettor, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Tried together, all five were found guilty. Bailey, Brown, Morrow and Wallace were each sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, and Maxwell to 14. They appeal.
With an exception now to be mentioned, no substantive defect in trial is to. be found in any of these cases. The exception is in the sentencing of defendants Bailey, Morrow and Wallace but the findings of their guilt are affirmed. Each of these three, however, was under 22 years of age at the time of conviction and so were eligible for consideration under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005, 5006(e) et seq.
In argument at the bar of this court the United States Attorney called our attention to the circumstance that as to these three defendants before pronouncing sentence the District Court had not made the requisite finding upon whether any of them would benefit from treatment under the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d). For this omission the prosecution confessed error. It moved that these cases be remanded to the District Court to pass such new judgments on the verdicts as it may deem just after resolution of the question of benefit. Dorszynski v. U. S., 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). It will be so ordered.
Another defendant, Brown, was 22 years of age at the
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_direct1 | C | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be for the defendant. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.
CEFALU v. UNITED STATES.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
January 24, 1930.
No. 119.
Robert D. Charlton, of Denver, Colo. (Lewis DeR. Mowry, of Denver, Colo., on. the brief), for appellant.
Ralph L. Carr, U. S. Atty., of Denver, Colo. (Charles E. Works, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for the United States.
Before LEWIS, COTTERAL, and Mc-DERMOTT, Circuit Judges.
COTTERAL, Circuit Judge.
An information was filed against appellant, his wife, and Frank Mazza, charging them with five violations of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA),' at Denver, Colo., in 1928. Mazza was acquitted. Mrs. Cefalu was convicted on all counts- Appellant was acquitted on counts 2 and 3 charging sales, and convicted on count 1 for possession of whisky on August 15, count 4 for a sale of whisky on August 8, and count 5 for maintaining a nuisance on September 11. He assigns error in the denial of a motion to direct a verdiet for insufficiency of the evidence and in giving and refusing instructions to the jury.
The wife of appellant testified that she and Mazza were engaged in the sale of whisky, that they hid their supplies in the country, and did not make the sales at the Cefalu home in Denver. Federal Prohibition Agents testified that they bought whisky from her there on several occasions, but that appellant was present only on August 8; that on that day when she had gone to another room, appellant came from the same room wearing a bath robe, in his bare feet, sat on a piano bench, talked with the officers, and was present when she returned with the whisky and made the sale of it to them. Sales were testified to'by them at the home on July 25 and August 4, and by their account when they were there on August 15, they saw Mrs. Cefalu go from the front part of the house to the kitchen carrying two bottles, break one of them on the sink, and the other contained a small quantity of whisky. The testimony of the appellant is he had nothing to do with the transactions, he did not know of them, or know there was whisky in the house, his wife rented the house, he supported her, paying her bills, and he was absent most of the time engaged in selling macaroni and olive oil to Italians, chiefly in Nebraska. Mrs. Cefalu corroborated his testimony.
This summary, incomplete as it is in many details, suffices for the purpose of determining whether' appellant was entitled to a directed verdict in his favor on the fourth count, charging a sale on August 8th. It seems to us, as it did to the trial judge, it was a question of fact whether appellant was a party to that sale, and it is inconceivable he could have been present as he was at his home and conducted himself as he did there under the circumstances when the sale was made, without having clear knowledge the illicit business was being carried on there and without having a responsible part in it. Otherwise, the transaction called for some expression of surprise or protest from him, but he was acquiescent. There was such apparent understanding and approval of it as to connect him with it, in the way of aiding and counseling his wife, and this was the theory on which the case was submitted to the jury. Section 550, Title 18 U. S. Code (18 USCA § 550). The jury so found, and we think it cannot he said the finding was without support. The cases cited to show the mere presence at-the scene of an offense under different circumstances is not sufficient for conviction, present a different question. The ruling on the motion to direct a verdict on count 4 was therefore correct.
As
Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_casesourcestate | 37 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed.
SCHINE CHAIN THEATRES, INC. et al. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 10.
Argued December 15, 1947.
Decided May 3, 1948.
Bruce Bromley argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Willard S. McKay, Alfred McCor-mack and Richard T. Davis. Harold R. Medina, Arthur Garfield Hays and Osmond K. Fraenkel were also of counsel.
Robert L. Wright argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, Stanley M. Silverberg and Philip Marcus.
Milton Pollack filed a brief for Lawrence J. Carkey et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to No. 64, United States v. Griffith, ante, p. 100, and is here by way of appeal from the District Court. The appellants, who were defendants below, are a parent company, three of its officers and directors, and five of its wholly owned subsidiaries— to whom we refer collectively as Schine. As of May 19, 1942, Schine owned or had a financial interest in a chain.of approximately 148 motion picture theatres located in 76 towns in 6 states, the greater portion being 78 theatres in 41 towns in New York and 36 theatres in 17 towns in Ohio. Of the 76 towns, 60 were closed towns, i. e., places where Schine had the only theatre or all the theatres in town. This chain was acquired beginning in 1920 and is the largest independent theatre circuit in the country. Since 1931 Schine acquired 118 theatres. Since 1928 the closed towns increased by 56. In 1941 there were only three towns in which Schine’s competitors were playing major film products.
The United States sued to prevent and restrain appellants from violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2. The complaint charged that the Schine interests by pooling their entire circuit buying power in the negotiation of films from the distributors so as to combine its closed and open towns got advantages for itself and imposed restrictions on its competitors which otherwise would not have been possible. It charged that the distributors granted certain favors to Schine which were withheld from Schine’s competitors, e. g., giving Schine the first run, refusing at times second runs to Schine’s competitors, charging Schine with lower rentals than it charged others, licensing to Schine films in excess of Schine’s reasonable requirements.
The complaint also charged that Schine had forced or attempted to force competitors out of business and where competitors would not sell out to Schine had threatened to build or had built an opposition theatre, had threatened to deprive or had deprived competitors of a desirable film or run, had cut admission prices, and had engaged in other unfair practices. In these and other ways it was charged that Schine had used its circuit buying power to maintain its monopoly and to restrain
Question: What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
01. Alabama
02. Alaska
03. American Samoa
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. District of Columbia
11. Federated States of Micronesia
12. Florida
13. Georgia
14. Guam
15. Hawaii
16. Idaho
17. Illinois
18. Indiana
19. Iowa
20. Kansas
21. Kentucky
22. Louisiana
23. Maine
24. Marshall Islands
25. Maryland
26. Massachusetts
27. Michigan
28. Minnesota
29. Mississippi
30. Missouri
31. Montana
32. Nebraska
33. Nevada
34. New Hampshire
35. New Jersey
36. New Mexico
37. New York
38. North Carolina
39. North Dakota
40. Northern Mariana Islands
41. Ohio
42. Oklahoma
43. Oregon
44. Palau
45. Pennsylvania
46. Puerto Rico
47. Rhode Island
48. South Carolina
49. South Dakota
50. Tennessee
51. Texas
52. Utah
53. Vermont
54. Virgin Islands
55. Virginia
56. Washington
57. West Virginia
58. Wisconsin
59. Wyoming
60. United States
61. Interstate Compact
62. Philippines
63. Indian
64. Dakota
Answer: |
sc_decisiontype | B | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion.
SMITH v. PENNSYLVANIA.
No. 561.
Decided March 9, 1964.
William T. Coleman, Jr. for petitioner.
Frank P. Lawley, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, for respondent.
Solicitor General Cox filed a memorandum for the United States.
Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Philadelphia Branch, et ah, as amici curiae, in support of the petition.
Per Curiam.
Prior to commencement of petitioner’s trial for assault and battery upon state police officers, he served upon the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation a subpoena duces tecum calling for the production of “[statements of all witnesses, diagrams, sketches and photographs taken in connection with” the FBI’s investigation of the incident which formed the basis for the criminal prosecution. The FBI had made the investigation in response to a complaint filed by petitioner with the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, charging a deprivation of his civil rights by the actions of the police officers whom he allegedly assaulted. An Assistant United States Attorney appeared on the day set for trial and moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that the file contained confidential material subject to a federal privilege of nondisclosure. The subpoena was quashed by the trial court for that reason and for noncompliance with local rules of practice.
Petitioner formally requested the court, both before and after they testified, to issue a subpoena duces tecum for statements taken by the FBI from two witnesses for the prosecution, stating that the statements were needed for purposes of impeachment. The trial court denied the requests because it felt that petitioner would receive the same information from material which the state authorities had promised to make available. Following petitioner’s conviction, the trial court denied his motion for a new trial which was based in part on the failure to issue the requested subpoena, stating that the Federal Government had already indicated that it would not honor such a subpoena. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (412 Pa. 1, 192 A. 2d 671), the court stating, inter alia, that the FBI, not the Commonwealth, had denied petitioner access to the information in question.
In response to an inquiry from this Court, the Solicitor General has indicated that the claim of confidential privilege was concerned solely with the initial broad-based demand for virtually the entire FBI file on the matter and that the Department of Justice was not informed of, and did not refuse to comply with, the subsequent specific requests for statements given by the two witnesses.
We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and remand the case to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for reconsideration of petitioner’s requests in light of the representations of the Solicitor General.
Question: What type of decision did the court make?
A. opinion of the court (orally argued)
B. per curiam (no oral argument)
C. decrees
D. equally divided vote
E. per curiam (orally argued)
F. judgment of the Court (orally argued)
G. seriatim
Answer: |
songer_district | B | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify which district in the state the case came from. If the case did not come from a federal district court, answer "not applicable".
SYSTEMATIC TOOL & MACHINE COMPANY et al., Appellees, v. WALTER KIDDE & COMPANY, INC., Appellant.
No. 76-1660.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 11, 1977.
Decided March 25, 1977.
Gordon D. Coplein, Darby & Darby, New York City, Richard M. Rosenbleeth, William H. Roberts, Blank, Rome, Klaus & Comisky, Philadelphia, Pa., Jacob C. Kellem, Connolly, Bove & Lodge, Wilmington, Del., for appellant.
Alan H. Bernstein, Caesar, Rivise, Bernstein & Cohen, Philadelphia, Pa., for appel-lees.
Before ROSENN and HUNTER, Circuit Judges, and SNYDER, District Judge.
Daniel J. Snyder, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
SNYDER, District Judge:
Systematic Tool and Machine Co., Systematic Products, Inc., and Dominic D’Am-bro, licensees, with Clayton E. Giangiulio, owner of the patent, filed this action for patent infringement. The decision of the district court found valid and infringed Patent No. 3,369,582 (hereinafter “the ’582 patent”) issued February 20, 1968, for a hand-operated tomato-slicing device. Appeal was taken to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(4) giving us jurisdiction over “Judgments in civil actions for patent infringement which are final except for accounting.” Since we find the subject matter of the patent and the prior art relating to this device is obvious, we reverse under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
I. THE PATENT IN SUIT
The patent in suit relates to a commercially successful and efficient tomato slicer. As set forth in Claim 1, the device is characterized by the following features:
1. A pusher to hold the tomato and move it with reference to an array of blades.
2. The blade array lying at an angle less than 40° with respect to the pusher path of movement.
3. The angle of separation between the pusher leading arm and trailing arm being greater than 90°.
4. The angle between the leading arm ■ and the cutting edge of the blades being less than 90°.
5. The trailing arm of the pusher making a small acute angle with reference to the cutting edge of the blades.
The plaintiffs assert that the tough skin and mushy interior of a tomato present a unique problem in slicing since a direct perpendicular contact of the tomato and blade edge tends to bruise or mangle the tomato. Plaintiffs’ claimed invention solved this problem by the various angles between the leading and trailing arms which hold the tomato between the pusher and the angle of the cutting edges of the blades to the pusher. The ’582 patent device pushes the tomato in a straight line through the rack of thin blades at an angle less than 40° with respect to the pusher path of movement. See Figure I.
The original claims filed did not relate the angle of the leading and trailing arms to the physical structure or recite any particular angles for them. The Examiner originally rejected the claims for two reasons: (1) for indefiniteness in not stating relationships between the angles and physical structures, and (2) for obviousness over a combination of prior art slicers with similar structures but having somewhat different angles relating to the blades and pusher. The claims were amended to distinguish the prior art (as underlined by the patentee to make it apparent how the claim differed from the prior art) as follows:
“...an [relatively small acute] angle less than forty (40) degrees with respect to said pusher path of movement, the angle of separation between said pusher leading arm and trailing arm being greater than 90°. the ande between said leading arm and the cutting edge of said blades being less than 90° with the trailing arm of said pusher making a small acute angle with respect to said cutting edge.... whereby said pusher assembly [achieving] achieves a smooth shearing action [by said blades through] with a tomato urged against and through said blades to secure a plurality of thin tomato slices, essentially undamaged, with said tomato holding pocket slots
Question: From which district in the state was this case appealed?
A. Not applicable
B. Eastern
C. Western
D. Central
E. Middle
F. Southern
G. Northern
H. Whole state is one judicial district
I. Not ascertained
Answer: |
songer_respond1_3_2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Your task is to determine which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eugene DOBSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 74-1816.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 20, 1975.
John M. McKnight (Court Appointed— CJA), Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant-appellant.
John L. Bowers, Jr., U. S. Atty., Charles N. Stedman, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and PECK and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Eugene Dobson was tried before a jury in two consolidated cases and convicted of the unlawful possession, forgery and uttering of United States Treasury Social Security checks which had been stolen from the mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 495 and 1708.
On appeal two contentions are made as grounds for reversal: (1) That it was error to allow a Government witness to identify the defendant in the court room when the witness had failed to identify the picture of the defendant from an array of photographs; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
The appeal came on to be considered pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 3(e).
Dobson was identified in the court room by Floyd Ernest Roach, owner of the Floyd Furniture Store at Knoxville, Tennessee, who cashed the stolen check. Mr. Roach testified that Dobson, had been in the store the previous evening looking at a television set. He returned the following day and stayed approximately ten minutes. He purchased a $104.95 television set, paying for it by signing and cashing a cheek which proved to be stolen and receiving $270.15 in change. Mr. Roach stated that he watched Dobson for several minutes while he was waiting outside following the transaction and that Dobson later returned to the store to use the telephone. This witness had a good opportunity to see Dobson and to become familiar with his features. Earlier in his testimony, however, Mr. Roach had selected a photograph of a different person as the one who cashed the check.
In United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 583, 24 L.Ed.2d 509 (1970), this court held that where an eyewitness was unable to pick out a defendant’s picture from an array of photographs, this did not prevent the same witness from making a positive in-court identification. This court said, speaking through Judge Weick:
The fact that eye witnesses to an occurrence cannot make a positive identification of an individual from an examination of photographs of a number of persons, does not necessarily detract from the validity of their in-court identification where they see the individual in person. The weight to be given to their in-eourt identification is for the jury to determine. 412 F.2d at 689.
To like effect see United States v. O’Neal, 496 F.2d
Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)". Which category of federal government agencies and activities best describes this litigant?
A. cabinet level department
B. courts or legislative
C. agency whose first word is "federal"
D. other agency, beginning with "A" thru "E"
E. other agency, beginning with "F" thru "N"
F. other agency, beginning with "O" thru "R"
G. other agency, beginning with "S" thru "Z"
H. Distric of Columbia
I. other, not listed, not able to classify
Answer: |
songer_genresp2 | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business.
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.
MOORE v. SCOTT STAMP & COIN CO., Inc.
No. 41, Docket 21417.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 6, 1949.
Decided Dec. 1, 1949.
Miller, Bretzfelder & Boardman, New York City, for defendant, appellant and appellee; Bertram Boardman, New York City, of counsel.
Thayer & Gilbert, New York City, for plaintiff, appellee and appellant; Phil E. Gilbert, Jr., and Harold A. Segall, New York City, of counsel.
Before L. HAND, SWAN and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Circuit Judge.
These appeals bring up for review a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action to recover the agreed price of Chinese postage stamps purchased by the plaintiff
Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_casesource | 024 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
001. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
002. U.S. Court of International Trade
003. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
004. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
005. U.S. Court of Military Review
006. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
007. U.S. Customs Court
008. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
009. U.S. Tax Court
010. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
011. U.S. Court for China
012. U.S. Consular Courts
013. U.S. Commerce Court
014. Territorial Supreme Court
015. Territorial Appellate Court
016. Territorial Trial Court
017. Emergency Court of Appeals
018. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
019. Bankruptcy Court
020. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
021. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
022. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
023. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
024. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
025. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
026. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
027. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
028. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
029. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
030. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
031. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
032. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
033. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
034. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
035. Alaska U.S. District Court
036. Arizona U.S. District Court
037. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
038. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
039. California Central U.S. District Court
040. California Eastern U.S. District Court
041. California Northern U.S. District Court
042. California Southern U.S. District Court
043. Colorado U.S. District Court
044. Connecticut U.S. District Court
045. Delaware U.S. District Court
046. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
047. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
048. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
049. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
050. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
051. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
052. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
053. Guam U.S. District Court
054. Hawaii U.S. District Court
055. Idaho U.S. District Court
056. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
057. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
058. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
059. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
060. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
061. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
062. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
063. Kansas U.S. District Court
064. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
065. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
066. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
067. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
068. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
069. Maine U.S. District Court
070. Maryland U.S. District Court
071. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
072. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
073. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
074. Minnesota U.S. District Court
075. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
076. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
077. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
078. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
079. Montana U.S. District Court
080. Nebraska U.S. District Court
081. Nevada U.S. District Court
082. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
083. New Jersey U.S. District Court
084. New Mexico U.S. District Court
085. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
086. New York Northern U.S. District Court
087. New York Southern U.S. District Court
088. New York Western U.S. District Court
089. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
090. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
091. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
092. North Dakota U.S. District Court
093. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
094. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
095. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
096. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
097. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
098. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
099. Oregon U.S. District Court
100. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
101. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
102. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
103. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
104. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
105. South Carolina U.S. District Court
106. South Dakota U.S. District Court
107. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
108. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
109. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
110. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
111. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
112. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
113. Texas Western U.S. District Court
114. Utah U.S. District Court
115. Vermont U.S. District Court
116. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
117. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
118. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
119. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
120. Washington Western U.S. District Court
121. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
122. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
123. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
124. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
125. Wyoming U.S. District Court
126. Louisiana U.S. District Court
127. Washington U.S. District Court
128. West Virginia U.S. District Court
129. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
130. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
131. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
132. Alabama U.S. District Court
133. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
134. Georgia U.S. District Court
135. Illinois U.S. District Court
136. Indiana U.S. District Court
137. Iowa U.S. District Court
138. Michigan U.S. District Court
139. Mississippi U.S. District Court
140. Missouri U.S. District Court
141. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
142. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
143. New York U.S. District Court
144. North Carolina U.S. District Court
145. Ohio U.S. District Court
146. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
147. Tennessee U.S. District Court
148. Texas U.S. District Court
149. Virginia U.S. District Court
150. Norfolk U.S. District Court
151. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
152. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
153. New Jersey U.S. District Court
154. California U.S. District Court
155. Florida U.S. District Court
156. Arkansas U.S. District Court
157. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
158. State Supreme Court
159. State Appellate Court
160. State Trial Court
161. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
162. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
163. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
164. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
165. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
166. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
167. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
168. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
169. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
170. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
171. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
172. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
173. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
174. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
175. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
176. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
177. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
178. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
179. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
180. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
181. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
182. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
183. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
184. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
185. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
186. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
187. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
188. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
189. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
190. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
191. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
192. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
193. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
194. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
195. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
196. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
197. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
198. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
199. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
200. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
201. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
202. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
203. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
204. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
205. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
206. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
207. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
208. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
209. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
210. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
211. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer: |
songer_treat | I | What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.
S. W. NOGGLE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 72-1678.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted April 11, 1973.
Decided May 1, 1973.
Harry L. Brovvne, Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner.
M. Namrow, Atty., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before GIBSON, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Petition for Review and Cross-Application for Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board. The Board’s Decision and Order are reported at 199 NLRB No. 107.
The S.W. Noggle Company was found by the NLRB to have committed an unfair labor practice in violation of §§ 8(a). (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3), by threatening to discipline and later by the discharge of Mike Masonbrink. It is the contention of the General Counsel that the employer discharged Mason-brink because he advocated that the employees go out on strike for a new contract.
The Department Store, Package, Grocery, Paper House, Liquor and Meat Drivers, Helpers and Warehousemen, Local No. 955, an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the Union), had represented a unit consisting of the employer’s ware-housemen and drivers for 30 years. On September 30, 1971, the three-year contract between the employer and the Union expired. Negotiations were in progress at the time of the events with which this action is concerned.
Masonbrink was a part-time employee of the Noggle Company from October 1969 to May 1970 when he enlisted in the Coast Guard. He returned from this military service in June 1971. At the end of June, through the efforts of his sister, Vickie Harrison, an order clerk for Noggle, he was rehired on a full time basis. He worked as a truck driver until mid-October when he requested and received a transfer to the warehouse. He worked in the warehouse about six weeks, until his discharge on December 1, 1971.
During the period when he was employed in the warehouse the Trial Examiner found that Masonbrink “was far from being a model employee.” On several occasions he refused to perform his duties as he was instructed to do although he stated that he later would go ahead and do them. He was reported by Bramer, the leadman, to Thomas Turner, the general manager for Noggle, who in turn complained of his conduct to the Union.
Several witnesses testified that they had heard Mansonbrink state that he would like to draw “rocking chair money” which was explained as meaning state unemployment compensation. Ma-sonbrink did not deny this but only stated that he could not remember saying it.
On November 15, at a meeting between the unit employees and several union representatives Masonbrink strongly advocated that the Union strike the company because of its failure to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. Leadman Bramer reported Masonbrink’s position to General Manager Turner. Turner spoke to Vickie Harrison on about November 29, and told her, “Vickie, we’re going to have to do something about Mike. He has the men upset about going out on strike.” When she replied that it was because the company had not negotiated a new contract yet he responded, “I can’t help that. He still has to get his orders out.” The Trial Examiner found that this was
Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer: |
sc_certreason | A | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
MEDELLIN v. TEXAS
ON APPLICATION TO RECALL AND STAY MANDATE AND FOR STAY
No. 06-984 (08A98).
Decided August 5, 2008
Together with No. 08-5573 (08A99), Medellín v. Texas, on application for stay and on petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, and No. 08-5574 (08A99), In re Medellín, on application for stay and on petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner seeks a stay of execution on the theory that either Congress or the Legislature of the State of Texas might determine that actions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should be given controlling weight in determining that a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is grounds for vacating the sentence imposed in this suit. Under settled principles, these possibilities are too remote to justify an order from this Court staying the sentence imposed by the Texas courts. And neither the President nor the Governor of the State of Texas has represented to us that there is any likelihood of congressional or state legislative action.
It is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken under a treaty which (like this one) does not itself have the force and effect of domestic law sufficient to set aside the judgment or the ensuing sentence, and Congress has not progressed beyond the bare introduction of a bill in the four years since the IC J ruling and the four months since our ruling in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491 (2008). This inaction is consistent with the President’s decision in 2005 to withdraw the United States’ accession to jurisdiction of the ICJ with regard to matters arising under the Convention.
The beginning premise for any stay, and indeed for the assumption that Congress or the legislature might seek to intervene in this suit, must be that petitioner’s confession was obtained unlawfully. This is highly unlikely as a matter of domestic or international law. Other arguments seeking to establish that a violation of the Convention constitutes grounds for showing the invalidity of the state-court judgment, for instance because counsel was inadequate, are also insubstantial, for the reasons noted in our previous opinion. Id., at 502, n. 1.
The Department of Justice of the United States is well aware of these proceedings and has not chosen to seek our intervention. Its silence is no surprise: The United States has not wavered in its position that petitioner was not prejudiced by his lack of consular access.
The application to recall and stay the mandate and for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, is denied. The application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, is denied. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
It is so ordered.
Question: What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
A. case did not arise on cert or cert not granted
B. federal court conflict
C. federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question
D. putative conflict
E. conflict between federal court and state court
F. state court conflict
G. federal court confusion or uncertainty
H. state court confusion or uncertainty
I. federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty
J. to resolve important or significant question
K. to resolve question presented
L. no reason given
M. other reason
Answer: |
sc_respondentstate | 55 | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state associated with the respondent. If the respondent is a federal court or federal judge, note the "state" as the United States. The same holds for other federal employees or officials.
TURNER v. MURRAY, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
No. 84-6646.
Argued December 12, 1985
Decided April 30, 1986
White, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, in which Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and IV, in which Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., concurred in the judgment. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 38. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 45. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 45.
J. Lloyd Snook III, by appointment of the Court, 471 U. S. 1134, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
James E. Kulp, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William G. Broaddus, Attorney General, and Robert H. Anderson III, Assistant Attorney General.
Justice White
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and IV, in which Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor join.
Petitioner is a black man sentenced to death for the murder of a white storekeeper. The question presented is whether the trial judge committed reversible error at voir dire by refusing petitioner’s request to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice.
I
On July 12, 1978, petitioner entered a jewelry store in Franklin, Virginia, armed with a sáwed-off shotgun. He demanded that the proprietor, W. Jack Smith, Jr., put jewelry and money from the cash register into some jewelry bags. Smith complied with petitioner’s demand, but triggered a silent alarm, alerting the Police Department. When Alan Bain, a police officer, arrived to inquire about the alarm, petitioner surprised him and forced him to surrender his revolver.
Having learned that Smith had triggered a silent alarm, petitioner became agitated. He fired toward the rear wall of the store and stated that if he saw or heard any more police officers, he was going to start killing those in the store. When a police siren sounded, petitioner walked to where Smith was stationed behind a counter and without warning shot him in the head with Bain’s pistol, wounding Smith and causing him to slump incapacitated to the floor.
Officer Bain attempted to calm petitioner, promising to take him anywhere he wanted to go and asking him not to shoot again. Petitioner angrily replied that he was going to kill Smith for “snitching,” and fired two pistol shots into Smith’s chest, fatally wounding him. As petitioner turned away from shooting Smith, Bain was able to disarm him and place
Question: What state is associated with the respondent?
01. Alabama
02. Alaska
03. American Samoa
04. Arizona
05. Arkansas
06. California
07. Colorado
08. Connecticut
09. Delaware
10. District of Columbia
11. Federated States of Micronesia
12. Florida
13. Georgia
14. Guam
15. Hawaii
16. Idaho
17. Illinois
18. Indiana
19. Iowa
20. Kansas
21. Kentucky
22. Louisiana
23. Maine
24. Marshall Islands
25. Maryland
26. Massachusetts
27. Michigan
28. Minnesota
29. Mississippi
30. Missouri
31. Montana
32. Nebraska
33. Nevada
34. New Hampshire
35. New Jersey
36. New Mexico
37. New York
38. North Carolina
39. North Dakota
40. Northern Mariana Islands
41. Ohio
42. Oklahoma
43. Oregon
44. Palau
45. Pennsylvania
46. Puerto Rico
47. Rhode Island
48. South Carolina
49. South Dakota
50. Tennessee
51. Texas
52. Utah
53. Vermont
54. Virgin Islands
55. Virginia
56. Washington
57. West Virginia
58. Wisconsin
59. Wyoming
60. United States
61. Interstate Compact
62. Philippines
63. Indian
64. Dakota
Answer: |
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