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BROWNELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. TOM WE SHUNG. No. 43. Argued November 13, 1956. Decided December 17, 1956. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and Isabelle R. Cappello. Andrew Reiner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jack Wasserman. David Carliner entered an appearance for respondent. MR. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48 (1955), we held that an alien, ordered deported by the Attorney General under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, might test the legality of such order in a declaratory judgment action brought under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. The sole question to be determined here is whether the legality of an exclusion order entered under the relevant provisions of the same 1952 Act must be challenged by habeas corpus, or whether it may also be reviewed by an action for declaratory judgment under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court of Appeals held the latter to be an appropriate remedy. 97 U. S. App. D. C. 25, 227 F. 2d 40. We granted certiorari, 351 U. S. 905, because of the importance of the question in the administration of the immigration law. We conclude that either remedy is available in seeking review of such orders. This makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon other questions raised by the parties. Shung, a Chinese alien, presented himself at San Francisco on November 28, 1947, claiming admission to the United States under the provisions of the War Brides Act of December 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 659, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 232. He testified under oath that he was the blood son of an American citizen who served in the United States armed forces during World War II. In January 1948 and again in February 1949, Boards of Special Inquiry held Shung inadmissible on the ground that he had not established the alleged relationship. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Shung first sought judicial review of this order by a declaratory judgment action instituted before the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. His complaint was dismissed on the ground that the order was valid. Tom We Shung v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 507, aff’d sub nom. Tom We Shung v. Brownell, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 207 F. 2d 132. We vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction, 346 U. S. 906, on the authority of Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229 (1953), which held that habeas corpus was the only available remedy for testing deportation orders under the Immigration Act of 1917. After the passage of the 1952 Act, Shung filed this suit seeking review of his exclusion by a declaratory judgment action. He asserts that our ruling in Pedreiro permitting deportation orders under the 1952 Act to be challenged by declaratory action requires a similar result as to exclusion orders. However, the Government contends that the Pedreiro rule does not apply in exclusion cases because of the basic differences between those actions and deportation cases. The Government also urges that the language, statutory structure, and legislative history of the 1952 Act support its contention. I. At the outset the Government contends that constitutionally an alien seeking initial admission into the United States is in a different position from that of a resident alien against whom deportation proceedings are instituted. This, it contends, precludes general judicial review. Shung admits these substantive differences but counters that such a distinction should be without significance when all that is involved is the form of judicial action available, not the scope of review. We do not believe that the constitutional status of the parties requires that the form of judicial action be strait-jacketed. Nor should the fact that in one action the burden is on the alien while in the other it must be met by the Government afford basis for discrimination. Admittedly, excluded aliens may test the order of their exclusion by habeas corpus. Citizenship claimants who hold “certificates of identity” are required by § 360 (c) of the 1952 Act to test the validity of their exclusion by habeas corpus only. Respondent here neither claims citizenship nor did he hold a certificate of identity, and § 360 (c) has no bearing on this case. For a habeas corpus proceeding the alien must be detained or at the least be in technical custody, as the Government puts it. On the other hand, ■ a declaratory judgment action requires no such basis and the odium of arrest and detention is not present. It does not follow that the absence of this condition would enlarge the permissible scope of review traditionally permitted in exclusion cases. The substantive law governing such actions would remain the rule of decision on the merits but the form of action would be by declaratory judgment rather than habeas corpus. We conclude that unless the 1952 Act is to the contrary, exclusion orders may be challenged either by habeas corpus or by declaratory judgment action. II. The Government insists that Congress has limited such challenges to habeas corpus actions by certain language in the 1952 Act. It argues that the finality clause of the Act with respect to exclusion limits judicial review to habeas corpus only. The gist of that clause as to deportation cases is that “the decision of the Attorney General shall be final,” while in exclusion proceedings “the decision of a special inquiry officer [is] final unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney General.” The Government reasons that the latter clause limits review to administrative appeal to the Attorney General and that no other form of review was intended, aside from habeas corpus, to test the alien’s exclusion. It points to exceptions that even withhold administrative review in certain classes of cases as bolstering its position. It is true that subsections (b) and (d) of § 236 of the 1952 Act deny any administrative appeal on temporary exclusion in security cases as well as in those where the alien suffers a medical affliction of certain types. But to darken the meaning of the word “final” as used by Congress by giving it chameleonic characteristics is to indulge in choplogic. In fact, the regulations of the Attorney General seem to give “final” the same connotation with respect to deportation as does the Act with respect to exclusion. See 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.61 (e). Furthermore, as we pointed out in Pedreiro, such a “cutting off” of judicial review “would run counter to § 10 and § 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act.” 349 U. S., at 51. “Exemptions from the . . . Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed,” Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 310 (1955), and unless made by clear language or supersedure the expanded mode of review granted by that Act cannot be modified. We therefore conclude that the finality provision of the 1952 Act in regard to exclusion refers only to administrative finality. III. The Government also points to certain testimony at hearings on the bill, as well as statements made on the floor in debate at the time of passage of the 1952 Act, as supporting its position. We believe, however, that Senate Report No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., and the statement of the managers on the part of the House which accompanied the Conference Report, reflect the intention of the Congress in this regard. The Senate Report, after reciting that a provision limiting “judicial review only through the writ of habeas corpus” had been stricken from the bill, stated that such action was not intended to “expand [the scope of] judicial review in .immigration cases beyond that under existing law.” (Emphasis supplied.) The House managers reported that after careful consideration of “the problem of judicial review” they were satisfied that the “procedures provided in the bill . . . remain within the framework and the pattern of the Administrative Procedure Act. The safeguard of judicial procedure is afforded the alien in both exclusion and deportation proceedings.” We believe that our interpretation of the Act is in full accord with these significant reports made by those sponsoring and managing the legislation on the floor of each house of the Congress. It may be that habeas corpus is a far more expeditious remedy than that of declaratory judgment, as the experience of Shung may indicate. But that fact may be weighed by the alien against the necessity of arrest and detention after which he may make his choice of the form of action he wishes to use in challenging his exclusion. In either case, the scope of the review is that of existing law. Affirmed. Since Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892), this Court lias held that in exclusion cases involving initial entry “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred, by Congress, are due process of law.” At p. 660. Nevertheless, due process has been held in cases similar in facts to the one here involved to include a fair hearing as well as conformity to statutory grounds. On the other hand, “It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.” Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953). Section 360 (c), 66 Stat. 273, 8 U. S. C. § 1503, provides in part: “A person who has been issued a certificate of identity under the provisions of subsection (b), and while in possession thereof, may apply for admission to the United States at any port of entry, and shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission to the United States. A final determination by the Attorney General that any such person is not entitled to admission to the United States shall be subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise.” We do not suggest, of course, that an alien who has never presented himself at the borders of this country may avail himself of the declaratory judgment action by bringing the action from abroad. Section 236 (c), 66 Stat. 200, 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (c): “(c) Except as provided in subsections (b) or (d), in every case where an alien is excluded from admission into the United States, under this Act or any other law or treaty now existing or hereafter made, the decision of a special inquiry officer shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney General.” Section 242 (b), 66 Stat. 210, 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b) provides in part: “In any case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall be final. . . “Exclusion procedures In both S. 3455 and S. 716, the predecessor bills, it was provided that administrative determinations of fact and the exercise of administrative discretion should not be subject to judicial review and that the determinations of law should be subject to judicial review only through the writ of habeas corpus. This language is omitted from the instant bill. The omission of the language is not intended to grant any review of determinations made by consular officers, nor to expand judicial review in immigration cases beyond that under existing law.” At p. 28. “(2) Having extensively considered the problem, of judicial review, the conferees are satisfied that procedures provided in the bill, adapted to the necessities of national security and the protection of economic and social welfare of the citizens of this country, remain within the framework and the pattern of the Administrative Procedure Act. The safeguard of judicial procedure is afforded the alien in both exclusion and deportation proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied.) H. R. Rep. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 127. The original complaint in the former action was filed January 19, 1950.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 6 ]	sc_adminaction
NADER v. ALLEGHENY AIRLINES, INC. No. 75-455. Argued March 24, 1976 Decided June 7, 1976 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 308. Reuben B. Robertson III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Alan B. Morrison. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Frank F. Roberson and William A. Bradford, Jr. Donald C. Comlish and Robert Glosser filed a brief for the Air Transport Association of America as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we address the question whether a common-law tort action based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by an air carrier subject to regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) must be stayed pending reference to the Board for determination whether the practice is “deceptive” within the meaning of § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 769, 49 U. S. C. § 1381. We hold that under the circumstances of this case a stay pending reference is inappropriate. I The facts are not contested. Petitioner agreed to make several appearances in Connecticut on April 28, 1972, in support of the fundraising efforts of the Connecticut Citizen Action Group (CCAG), a nonprofit public interest organization. His two principal appearances were to be at a noon rally in Hartford and a later address at the Storrs campus of the University of Connecticut. On April 25, petitioner reserved a seat on respondent’s flight 864 for April 28. The flight was scheduled to leave Washington, D. C., at 10:15 a. m. and to arrive in Hartford at 11:15 a. m. Petitioner’s ticket was purchased from a travel agency on the morning of the flight. It indicated, by the standard “OK” notation, that the reservation was confirmed. Petitioner arrived at the boarding and check-in area approximately five minutes before the scheduled departure time. He was informed that all seats on the flight were occupied and that he, like several other passengers who had arrived shortly before him, could not be accommodated. Explaining that he had to arrive in Hartford in time for the noon rally, petitioner asked respondent’s agent to determine whether any standby passengers had been allowed to board by mistake or whether anyone already on board would voluntarily give up his or her seat. Both requests were refused. In accordance with respondent’s practice, petitioner was offered alternative transportation by air taxi to Philadelphia, where connections could be made with an Allegheny flight scheduled to arrive in Hartford at 12:15 p. m. Fearing that the Philadelphia connection, which allowed only 10 minutes between planes, was too close, petitioner rejected this offer and elected to fly to Boston, where he was met by a CCAG staff member who drove him to Storrs. Both parties agree that petitioner’s reservation was not honored because respondent had accepted more reservations for flight 864 than it could in fact accommodate. One hour prior to the flight, 107 reservations had been confirmed for the 100 seats actually available. Such overbooking is a common industry practice, designed to ensure that each flight leaves with as few empty seats as possible despite the large number of “no-shows” — reservation-holding passengers who do not appear at flight time. By the use of statistical studies of no-show patterns on specific flights, the airlines attempt to predict the appropriate number of reservations necessary to fill each flight. In this way, they attempt to ensure the most efficient use of aircraft while preserving a flexible booking system that permits passengers to cancel and change reservations without notice or penalty. At times the practice of overbooking results in oversales, which occur when more reservation-holding passengers than can be accommodated actually appear to board the flight. When this occurs, some passengers must be denied boarding (“bumped”)- The chance that any particular passenger will be bumped is so negligible that few prospective passengers aware of the possibility would give it a second thought. In April 1972, the month in which petitioner’s reservation was dishonored, 6.7 confirmed passengers per 10,000 enplanements were denied boarding on domestic flights. For all domestic airlines, oversales resulted in bumping an average of 5.4 passengers per 10,000 enplanements in 1972, and 4.6 per 10,000 enplanements in 1973. In domestic operations respondent oversold 6.3 seats per 10,000 enplanements in 1972 and 4.5 seats per 10,000 enplanements in 1973. Thus, based on the 1972 experience of all domestic airlines, there was only slightly more than one chance in 2,000 that any particular passenger would be bumped on a given flight. Nevertheless, the total number of confirmed ticket holders denied seats is quite substantial, numbering over 82,000 passengers in 1972 and about 76,000 in 1973. Board regulations require each airline to establish priority rules for boarding passengers and to offer “denied boarding compensation” to bumped passengers. These “liquidated damages” are equal to the value of the passenger’s ticket with a $25 minimum and a $200 maximum. 14 CFR §250.5 (1975). Passengers are free to reject the compensation offered in favor of a common - law suit for damages suffered as a result of the bumping. Petitioner refused the tender of denied boarding compensation ($32.41 in his case) and, with CCAG, filed this suit for compensatory and punitive damages. His suit did not seek compensation for the bumping per se but asserted two other bases of liability: a common-law action based on fraudulent misrepresentation arising from respondent’s alleged failure to inform petitioner in advance of its deliberate overbooking practices, and a statutory action under § 404 (b) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1374 (b), arising from respondent’s alleged failure to afford petitioner the boarding priority specified in its rules filed with the Board under 14 CFR § 250.3 (1975). The District Court entered a judgment for petitioner on both claims, awarding him a total of $10 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. Judgment also was entered for CCAG on its misrepresentation claim, with an award of $51 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 167 U. S. App. D. C. 350, 512 F. 2d 527 (1975). A number of its rulings were not presented to this Court in the petition for certiorari. The award of damages to CCAG was reversed on the ground that the organization was too “remote from the transaction” to fall “within the class of persons who may recover.” Id., at 372, 512 F. 2d, at 549. The merits of petitioner’s statutory claim were remanded for further findings. The award of punitive damages to petitioner on the statutory claim was reversed on the ground that respondent’s conduct contained no “elements of intentional wrongdoing or conscious disregard for” petitioner’s rights. Id., at 373, 512 F. 2d, at 550. The question of punitive damages for the common-law claim was remanded for further findings on respondent’s good faith. In particular, the trial court was to consider “whether Allegheny reasonably believed that its policies were completely lawful and in fact carried the approval of the Board.” Id., at 374, 512 F. 2d, at 551. None of these rulings was presented to this Court in the petition for certiorari. The only issue before us concerns the Court of Appeals’ disposition on the merits of petitioner’s claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. Although the court rejected respondent’s argument that the existence of the Board’s cease-and-desist power under § 411 of the Act eliminates all private remedies for common-law torts arising from unfair or deceptive practices by regulated carriers, it held that a determination by the Board that a practice is not deceptive within the meaning of § 411 would, as a matter of law, preclude a common-law tort action seeking damages for injuries caused by that practice. Therefore, the court held that the Board must be allowed to determine in the first instance whether the challenged practice (in this case, the alleged failure to disclose the practice of overbooking) falls within the ambit of § 411. The court took judicial notice that a rulemaking proceeding concerning possible changes in reservation practices in response to the 1973-1974 fuel crisis was already underway and that a challenge to the carriers’ overbooking practices had been raised by an intervenor in that proceeding. The District Court was instructed to stay further action on petitioner’s misrepresentation claim pending the outcome of the rulemaking proceeding. The Court of Appeals characterized its holding as “but another application of the principles of primary jurisdiction, a doctrine whose purpose is the coordination of the workings of agency and court.” 167 U. S. App. D. C., at 367, 512 F. 2d, at 544. II The question before us, then, is whether the Board must be given an opportunity to determine whether respondent’s alleged failure to disclose its practice of deliberate overbooking is a deceptive practice under § 411 before petitioner’s common-law action is allowed to proceed. The decision of the Court of Appeals requires the District Court to stay the action brought by petitioner in order to give the Board an opportunity to resolve the question. If the Board were to find that there had been no violation of § 411, respondent would be immunized from common-law liability. A Section 1106 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1506, provides that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.” The Court of Appeals found that “although the saving clause of section 1106 purports to speak in absolute terms it cannot be read so literally.” 167 U. S. App. D. C., at 367, 512 F. 2d, at 544. In reaching this conclusion, it relied on Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907). In that case, the Court, despite the existence of a saving clause virtually identical to § 1106, refused to permit a state-court common-law action challenging a published carrier rate as “unjust and unreasonable.” The Court conceded that a common-law right, even absent a saving clause, is not to be abrogated “unless it be found that the preexisting right is so repugnant to the statute that the survival of such right would in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other words, render its provisions nugatory.” 204 U. S., at 437. But the Court found that the continuance of private damages actions attacking the reasonableness of rates subject to the regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission would destroy the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was to eliminate discrimination by requiring uniform rates. The saving clause, the Court found, “cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a common law right, the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.” Id., at 446. In this case, unlike Abilene, we are not faced with an irreconcilable conflict between the statutory scheme and the persistence of common-law remedies. In Abilene the carrier, if subject to both agency and court sanctions, would be put in an untenable position when the agency and a court disagreed on the reasonableness of a rate. The carrier could not abide by the rate filed with the Commission, as required by statute, and also comply with a court's determination that the rate was excessive. The conflict between the court’s common-law authority and the agency’s ratemaking power was direct and unambiguous. The court in the present case, in contrast, is not called upon to substitute its judgment for the agency’s on the reasonableness of a rate — or, indeed, on the reasonableness of any carrier practice. There is no Board requirement that air carriers engage in overbooking or that they fail to disclose that they do so. And any impact on rates that may result from the imposition of tort liability or from practices adopted by a carrier to avoid such liability would be merely incidental. Under the circumstances, the common-law action and the statute are not “absolutely inconsistent” and may coexist, as contemplated by § 1106. B Section 411 of the Act allows the Board, where “it considers that such action... would be in the interest of the public,” “upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent,” to “investigate and determine whether any air carrier... has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition....” Practices determined to be in violation of this section “shall” be the subject of a cease-and-desist order. The Court of Appeals concluded — and respondent does not challenge the conclusion here — that this section does not totally preclude petitioner’s common-law tort action. But the Court of Appeals also held, relying on the nature of the airline industry as “a regulated system of limited competition,” American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U. S. 79, 84 (1956), aiid the Board’s duty to promote “adequate, economical, and efficient service,” § 102 (c) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1302 (c), “at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service,” § 1002 (e)-(2) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1482 (e) (2), that the Board has the power in a § 411 proceeding to approve practices that might otherwise be considered deceptive and thus to immunize carriers from common-law liability. 167 U. S. App. D. C., at 366, 512 F. 2d, at 543. We cannot agree. No power to immunize can be derived from the language of § 411. And where Congress has sought to confer such power it has done SO' expressly, as in § 414 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1384, which relieves those affected by certain designated orders (not including orders issued under § 411) “from the operations of the 'antitrust laws.’ ” When faced with an exemptive provision similar to § 414 in United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 284 U. S. 474 (1932), this Court dismissed an antitrust action because initial consideration by the agency had not been sought. The Court pointed out that the Act in question was “restrictive in its operation upon some of the activities of common carriers..., and permissive in respect of others.” Id., at 485. See also Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570 (1952). Section 411, in contrast, is purely restrictive. It contemplates the elimination of “unfair or deceptive practices” that impair the public interest. Its role has been described in American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., supra, at 85: “ ‘Unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition/ as used in § 411, are broader concepts than the common-law idea of unfair competition.... The section is concerned not with punishment of wrongdoing or protection of injured competitors, but rather with protection of the public interest.” As such, § 411 provides an injunctive remedy for vindication of the public interest to supplement the compensatory common-law remedies for private parties preserved by § 1106. Thus, a violation of § 411, contrary to the Court of Appeals5 conclusion, is not coextensive with a breach of duty under the common law. We note that the Board’s jurisdiction to initiate an investigation under § 411 is expressly premised on a finding that the “public interest” is involved. The Board “may not employ its powers to vindicate private rights.” 351 U. S., at 83. Indeed, individual consumers are not even entitled to initiate proceedings under § 411, a circumstance that indicates that Congress did not intend to require private litigants to obtain a § 411 determination before they could proceed with the common-law remedies preserved by § 1106. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 406 (1970). Section 411 is both broader and narrower than the remedies available at common law. A cease-and-desist order may issue under § 411 merely on the Board’s conclusion, after an investigation determined to be in the public interest, that a carrier is engaged in an “unfair or deceptive practice.” No findings that the practice was intentionally deceptive or fraudulent or that it in fact has caused injury to an individual are necessary. American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., supra, at 86. On the other hand, a Board decision that a cease-and-desist order is inappropriate does not represent approval of the practice under investigation. It may merely represent the Board’s conclusion that the serious prohibitory sanction of a cease-and-desist order is inappropriate, that a more flexible approach is necessary. A wrong may be of the sort that calls for compensation to an injured individual without requiring the extreme remedy of a cease-and-desist order. Indeed, the Board, in dealing with the problem of overbooking by air carriers, has declined to issue cease-and-desist orders, despite the determination by an examiner in one case that a § 411 violation had occurred. Instead, the Board has elected to establish boarding priorities and to ensure that passengers will be compensated' for being bumped either by a liquidated sum under Board regulations or by resort to a suit for compensatory damages at common law. In sum, § 411 confers upon the Board a new and powerful weapon against unfair and deceptive practices that injure the public. But it does not represent the only, or best, response to all challenged carrier actions that result in private wrongs. C The doctrine of primary jurisdiction “is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.” United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 63 (1956). Even when common-law rights and remedies survive and the agency in question lacks the power to confer immunity from common-law liability, it may be appropriate to refer specific issues to an agency for initial determination where that procedure would secure “[ujniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency” or where “the limited functions of review by the judiciary [would be] more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.” Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S., at 574-575. See also United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, at 64. The doctrine has been applied, for example, when an action otherwise within the jurisdiction of the court raises a question of the validity of a rate or practice included in a tariff filed with an agency, e. g., Danna v. Air France, 463 F. 2d 407 (CA2 1972); Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U. S. 411, 417-418 (1959), particularly when the issue involves technical questions of fact uniquely within the expertise and experience of an agency — such as matters turning on an assessment of industry conditions, e. g., United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, at 66-67. In this case, however, considerations of uniformity in regulation and of technical expertise do not call for prior reference ;to the Board. Petitioner seeks damages for respondent’s failure to disclose its overbooking practices. He makes no challenge to any provision in the tariff, and indeed there is no tariff provision or Board regulation applicable to disclosure practices. Petitioner also makes no challenge, comparable to those made in Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., supra, and Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.. 2d 939 (CA2 1951), to limitations on common-law damages imposed through exculpatory clauses included in a tariff. Referral of the misrepresentation issue to the Board cannot be justified by the interest in informing the court’s ultimate decision with “the expert and specialized knowledge,” United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, at 64, of the Board. The action brought by petitioner does not turn on a determination of the reasonableness of a challenged practice — a determination that could be facilitated by an informed evaluation of the economics or technology of the regulated industry. The standards to be applied in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are within the conventional competence of the courts, and the judgment of a technically expert body is not likely to be helpful in the application of these standards to the facts of this case. We are particularly aware that, even where the wrong sought to be redressed is not misrepresentation but bumping itself, which has been the subject of Board consideration and for which compensation is provided in carrier tariffs, the Board has contemplated that there may be individual adjudications by courts in common-law suits brought at the option of the passenger. The present regulations dealing with the problems of overbooking and oversales were promulgated by the Board in 1967. They provide for denied boarding compensation to bumped passengers and require each carrier to establish priority rules for seating passengers and to file reports of passengers who could not be accommodated. The order instituting these regulations contemplates that the bumped passenger will have a choice between accepting denied boarding compensation as “liquidated damages for all damages incurred... as a result of the carrier’s failure to provide the passenger with confirmed reserved space,” or pursuing his or her common-law remedies. The Board specifically provided for a 30-day period before the specified compensation need be accepted so that the passenger will not be forced to make a decision before “the consequences of denied boarding have occurred and are known.” After evaluating the consequences, passengers may choose as an alternative “to pursue their remedy under the common law.” III We conclude that petitioner’s tort action should not be stayed pending reference to the Board and accordingly the decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue is reversed. The Court of Appeals did not address the question whether petitioner had introduced sufficient evidence to sustain his claim. We remand the case for consideration of that question and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Brief for Civil Aeronautics Board as Amicus Curiae filed in Court of Appeals, App. B, p. 58. Id., at 50 Id., at 51. On any given flight, of course, the chance that a passenger will be bumped may be higher or lower than the overall average. Id., at 50. Section 404 (b) provides: “No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.” Section 411 provides in full: “The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent, if it considers that such action by it would be in the interest of the public, investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale thereof. If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in such unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition, it shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition.” The rulemaking proceedings were initiated in January 1974. Emergency Reservation Practices Investigation, 39 Fed. Reg. 823 (1974) (CAB Order 73-12-93, EDR-260). An opinion and an order were issued on April 13, 1976. Emergency Reservation Practices Investigation (CAB Order 76-4-55). The Board concluded that the questions raised by the Court of Appeals in this case were "outside the scope of [the] investigation.” Id., at 7. It specifically noted that “the question of whether intentional overbooking, in general, or nondisclosure of such practice, in particular, is a deceptive trade practice” was not at issue. Id., at 8. In April 1976 the Board announced a proposed rulemaking proceeding with respect to deliberate overbooking and oversales. Priority Rules, Denied-Boarding Compensation Tariffs and Reports of Unaccommodated Passengers: Reexamination of thé Board’s Policies Concerning Deliberate Overbooking and Oversales, 41 Fed. Reg. 16478 (1976) (CAB Order EDR-296). The Board has decided to re-evaluate existing practices in light of a recent "trend toward a higher rate of oversales” and in fight of the fact that oversales “continue to be a significant cause of [consumer] complaints.” Ibid. Among the options to be considered is a requirement that the practice of deliberate overbooking, if allowed to continue, be disclosed to customers. Id., at 16479. The Court later described the saving clause discussed in Abilene as follows: “That proviso was added at the end of the statute, — not to nullify other parts of the Act, or to defeat rights or remedies given by preceding sections, — but to preserve all existing rights which were not inconsistent with those created by the statute. It was also intended to preserve existing remedies, such as those by which a shipper could, in a state court, recover for damages to property while in the hands of the interstate carrier; damages caused by delay in shipment; damages caused by failure to comply with its common law duties and the like.” Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U. S. 121, 129-130 (1915). Cf. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 25-26 (1929); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 158 U. S. App. D. C. 207, 212, 485 F. 2d 986, 991 (1973) (both opinions discuss § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45, which this Court, in American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U. S., at 82, described as the model for §411). In the late 1950’s, § 411 investigations were initiated against two carriers charged with deliberate overbooking. One of these investigations was terminated on the ground that the record showed no deliberate overbooking by the carrier. Eastern Air Lines Overbooking Enforcement Proceeding, 30 C. A. B. 862 (1960). The other was terminated, after a finding by the examiner of a §411 violation, in favor of an industrywide investigation. National Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 31 C. A. B. 390 (1960). See nn. 15-18 and accompanying text, infra. In 1965, the Board proposed a rule requiring carriers to notify individual passengers of overbooked conditions 12 hours prior to the scheduled departure time. Passenger Priorities and Overbooked Flights: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 30 Fed. Reg. 13236 (1965) (CAB Order EDR-95). This proposal subsequently was abandoned after industry opposition on the ground that it was excessively rigid and unworkable. Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs, And Reports of Unaccommodated Passengers: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 32 Fed. Reg. 459, 460-461 (1967) (CAB Order EDR-109). The Board’s abandonment of this proposal cannot be read as blanket approval of failure to make a public disclosure of overbooking practices. The cost of an individual notification program in terms of expense, public relations, and passenger confusion could be prohibitive. But alternative means of disclosure may be significantly less disruptive. Petitioner suggests, for example, that carrier overbooking practices be included in tariffs, which are required to be available for public inspection. And the Board has approved an innovative approach suggested by Eastern Air Lines, which provides for a system of limited overbooking in which passengers subject to possible denial of boarding are advised at the outset of their status. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 147 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 455 F. 2d 1340 (1971) (aff’g CAB Order 71-6-120). For example, if respondent’s overbooking practices were detailed in its tariff and therefore available to the public, a court presented with a claim of misrepresentation based on failure to disclose need not make prior reference to the Board, as it should if presented with a suit challenging the reasonableness of practices detailed in a tariff. Rather, the court could, applying settled principles of tort law, determine that the tariff provided sufficient notice to the party who brought the suit — as, indeed, petitioner suggests it would. Reply Brief for Petitioner 3-4, n. 3. Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs and Reports of Unaccommodated Passengers, 32 Fed. Reg. 11939 (1967) (CAB Order ER-503). See 14 CFR §250.1 et seq. (1975). CAB Order ER-503, supra, 32 Fed. Reg. 11943. Id., at 11942. Foreign Air Carriers: Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs and Reports of Unaccommodated Passengers, 38 Fed. Reg. 15083, 15084 (1973) (CAB Order EDR-248) (amending existing regulations to include foreign air carriers). See also testimony of Jerome F. Huisentruit, assistant general counsel for the Air Transport Association of America and respondent’s witness on Board jurisdiction, App. 72-73. The contemplation that common-law remedies will continue to exist is in conformance with longstanding Board policy dating back at least to the Board’s approval in 1962 of an industry agreement covering trunk carriers and calling for ticketing time limits and reservation charges in combination with a	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 11 ]	sc_adminaction
UPJOHN CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 79-886. Argued November 5, 1980 Decided January 13, 1981 RehNquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAN, StewaRt, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and SteveNS, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which Burger, C. J., joined. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 402. Daniel M. Gribbon argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Stuart A. Smith, and Robert E. Lindsay Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Leonard S. Janofsky, Leon Jaworski, and Keith A. Jones for the American Bar Association; by Thomas G. Lilly, Alfred F. Belcuore, Paul F. Rothstein, and Ronald L. Carlson for the Federal Bar Association; by Erwin N. Griswold for the American College of Trial Lawyers et al.; by Stanley T. Kaleczyc and J. Bruce Brown for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and by Lewis A. Kaplan, James N. Benedict, Brian D. Forrow, John G. Koeltl, Standish Forde Medina, Jr., Renee J. Roberts, and Marvin Wexler for the Committee on Federal Courts et al. William W. Becker filed a brief for the New England Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to address important questions concerning the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context and the applicability of the work-product doctrine in proceedings to enforce tax summonses. 445 U. S. 925. With respect to the privilege question the parties and various amici have described our task as one of choosing between two “tests” which have gained adherents in the courts of appeals. We are acutely aware, however, that we sit to decide concrete cases and not abstract propositions of law. We decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to do so. We can and do, however, conclude that the attorney-client privilege protects the communications involved in this case from compelled disclosure and that the work-product doctrine does apply in tax summons enforcement proceedings. I Petitioner Upjohn Co. manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals here and abroad. In January 1976 independent accountants conducting an audit of one of Upjohn’s foreign subsidiaries discovered that the subsidiary made payments to or for the benefit of foreign government officials in order to secure government business. The accountants so informed petitioner Mr. Gerard Thomas, Upjohn’s Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel. Thomas is a member of the Michigan and New York Bars, and has been Upjohn’s General Counsel for 20 years. He consulted with outside counsel and R. T. Parfet, Jr., Upjohn’s Chairman of the Board. It was decided that the company would conduct an internal investigation of what were termed “questionable payments.” As part of this investigation the attorneys prepared a letter containing a questionnaire which was sent to “All Foreign General and Area Managers” over the Chairman’s signature. The letter began by noting recent disclosures that several American companies made “possibly illegal” payments to foreign government officials and emphasized that the management needed full information concerning any such payments made by Upjohn. The letter indicated that the Chairman had asked Thomas, identified as “the company’s General Counsel,” “to conduct an investigation for the purpose of determining the nature and magnitude of any payments made by the Upjohn Company or any of its subsidiaries to any employee or official of a foreign government.” The questionnaire sought detailed information concerning such payments. Managers were instructed to treat the investigation as “highly confidential” and not to discuss it with anyone other than Upjohn employees who might be helpful in providing the requested information. Responses were to be sent directly to Thomas. Thomas and outside counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire and some 33 other Upjohn officers or employees as part of the investigation. On March 26, 1976, the company voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 8-K disclosing certain questionable payments. A copy of the report was simultaneously submitted to the Internal Revenue Service, which immediately began an investigation to determine the tax consequences of the payments. Special agents conducting the investigation were given lists by Upjohn of all those interviewed and all who had responded to the questionnaire. On November 23, 1976, the Service issued a summons pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602 demanding production of: “All files relative to the investigation conducted under the supervision of Gerard Thomas to identify payments to employees of foreign governments and any political contributions made by the Upjohn Company or any of its affiliates since January 1, 1971 and to determine whether any funds of the Upjohn Company had been improperly accounted for on the corporate books during the same period. “The records should include but not be limited to written questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company’s foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews conducted in the United States and abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn Company and its subsidiaries.” App. 17a-18a. The company declined to produce the documents specified in the second paragraph on the grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and constituted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of litigation. On August 31, 1977, the United States filed a petition seeking enforcement of the summons under 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 (b) and 7604 (a) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. That court adopted the recommendation of a Magistrate who concluded that the summons should be enforced. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which rejected the Magistrate’s finding of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, 600 F. 2d 1223, 1227, n. 12, but agreed that the privilege did not apply “[t]o the extent that the communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn’s actions in response to legal advice... for the simple reason that the communications were not the 'client’s.’ ” Id., at 1225. The court reasoned that accepting petitioners’ claim for a broader application of the privilege would encourage upper-echelon management to ignore unpleasant facts and create too broad a “zone of silence.” Noting that Upjohn’s counsel had interviewed officials such as the Chairman and President, the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court so that a determination of who was within the “control group” could be made. In a concluding footnote the court stated that the work-product doctrine “is not applicable to administrative summonses issued under 26 U. S. C. § 7602.” Id., at 1228, n. 13. II Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that “the privilege of a witness... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience.” The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client. As we stated last Term in Trammel v. United States, 445 U. S. 40, 51 (1980): “The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.” And in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 403 (1976), we recognized the purpose of the privilege to be “to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.” This rationale for the privilege has long been recognized by the Court, see Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464, 470 (1888) (privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”). Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a corporation, which in theory is an artificial creature of the law, and not an individual; but this Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation, United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 236 U. S. 318, 336 (1915), and the Government does not contest the general proposition. The Court of Appeals, however, considered the application of the privilege in the corporate context to present a “different problem,” since the client was an inanimate entity and “only the senior management, guiding and integrating the several operations,... can be said to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole.” 600 F. 2d, at 1226. The first case to articulate the so-called “control group test” adopted by the court below, Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (ED Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F. 2d 742 (CA3 1962), cert. denied, 372 U. S. 943 (1963), reflected a similar conceptual approach: “Keeping in mind that the question is, Is it the corporation which is seeking the lawyer’s advice when the asserted privileged communication is made?, the most satisfactory solution, I think, is that if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney,... then, in effect, he is {or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.” (Emphasis supplied.) Such a view, we think, overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice. See Trammel, supra, at 51; Fisher, supra, at 403. The first step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts with an eye to the legally relevant. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1: “A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.” See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 511 (1947). In the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person who acts on the lawyer’s advice are one and the same. In the corporate context, however, it will frequently be employees beyond the control group as defined by the court below — “officers and agents... responsible for directing [the company’s] actions in response to legal advice” — who will possess the information needed by the corporation’s lawyers. Middle-level — and indeed lower-level — employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties. This fact was noted in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F. 2d 596 (CA8 1978) (en banc): “In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information relevant to a legal problem from middle management or non-management personnel as well as from top executives. The attorney dealing with a complex legal problem ‘is thus faced with a “Hobson’s choice”. If he interviews employees not having “the very highest authority”, their communications to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews only those employees with “the very highest authority”, he may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what happened.’ ” Id., at 603-609 (quoting Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 873, 876 (1971)). The control group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation. The attorney’s advice will also frequently be more significant to noncontrol group members than to those who officially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the client corporation’s policy. See, e. g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (SC 1974) (“After the lawyer forms his or her opinion, it is of no immediate benefit to the Chairman of the Board or the President. It must be given to the corporate personnel who will apply it”). The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the court below not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law. In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, “constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law,” Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. Law. 901, 913 (1969), particularly since compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter, see, e. g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 440-441 (1978) (“the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct”). The test adopted by the court below is difficult to apply in practice, though no abstractly formulated and unvarying “test” will necessarily enable courts to decide questions such as this with mathematical precision. But if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all. The very terms of the test adopted by the court below suggest the unpredictability of its application. The test restricts the availability of the privilege to those officers who play a “substantial role” in deciding and directing a corporation’s legal response. Disparate decisions in cases applying this test illustrate its unpredictability. Compare, e. g., Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F. R. D. 308, 315-316 (ND Okla. 1967), aff’d in part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F. 2d 686 (CA10 1968) (control group includes managers and assistant managers of patent division and research and development department), with Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F. R. D. 82, 83-85 (ED Pa. 1969), aff’d, 478 F. 2d 1398 (CA3 1973) (control group includes only division and corporate vice presidents, and not two directors of research and vice president for production and research). The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to counsel for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel. As the Magistrate found, “Mr. Thomas consulted with the Chairman of the Board and outside counsel and thereafter conducted a factual investigation to determine the nature and extent of the questionable payments and to.beSnM position to give legal advice to the company, with, respect to the payments.” (Emphasis supplied.) 78-1 USTC ¶ 9277, pp. 83,598, 83,599. Information, not available from upper-echelon management, was needed to supply a basis for legal advice concerning compliance with securities and tax laws, foreign laws, currency regulations, duties to shareholders, and potential litigation in each of these areas. The communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees’ corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware that' they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice. The questionnaire identified Thomas as “the company’s General Counsel” and referred in its opening sentence to the possible illegality of payments such as the ones on which information was sought. App. 40a. A statement of policy accompanying the questionnaire clearly indicated the legal implications of the investigation. The policy statement was issued “in order that there be no uncertainty in the future as to the policy with respect to the practices which are the subject of this investigation.” It began “Upjohn will comply with all laws and regulations,” and stated that commissions or payments “will not be used as a subterfuge for bribes or illegal payments” and that all payments must be “proper and legal.” Any future agreements with foreign distributors or agents were to be approved “by a company attorney” and any questions concerning the policy were to be referred “to the company’s General Counsel.” Id., at 165a-166a. This statement was issued to Upjohn employees worldwide, so that even those interviewees not receiving a questionnaire were aware of the legal implications of the interviews. Pursuant to explicit instructions from the Chairman of the Board, the communications were considered “highly confidential” when made, id., at 39a, 43a, and have been kept confidential by the company. Consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege, these communications must be protected against compelled disclosure. The Court of Appeals declined to extend the attorney-client privilege beyond the limits of the control group test for fear that doing so would entail severe burdens on discovery and create a broad “zone of silence” over corporate affairs. Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications such as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never taken place. The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney: “[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (ED Pa. 1962). See also Diversified Industries, 572 F. 2d, at 611; State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 580, 150 N. W. 2d 387, 399 (1967) (“the courts have noted that a party cannot conceal a fact merely by revealing it to his lawyer”). Here the Government was free to question the employees who communicated with Thomas and outside counsel. Upjohn has provided the IRS with a list of such employees, and the IRS has already interviewed some 25 of them. While it would probably be more convenient for the Government to secure the results of petitioner’s internal investigation by simply subpoenaing the questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner’s attorneys, such considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client privilege. As Justice Jackson noted in his concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S., at 516: “Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions... on wits borrowed from the adversary.” Needless to say, we decide only the case before us, and do not undertake to draft a set of rules which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas. Any such approach would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (1974) (“the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship... should be determined on a case-by-case basis”); Trammel, 445 U. S., at 47; United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 367 (1980). While such a “case-by-case” basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the Rules. At the same time we conclude that the narrow “control group test” sanctioned by the Court of Appeals in this case cannot, consistent with “the principles of the common law as... interpreted... in the light of reason and experience,” Fed. Rule Evid. 501, govern the development of the law in this area. Ill Our decision that the communications by Upjohn employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege disposes of the case so far as the responses to the questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to interview questions are concerned. The summons reaches further, however, and Thomas has testified that his notes and memoranda of interviews go beyond recording responses to his questions. App. 27a-28a, 91a-93a. To the extent that the material subject to the summons is not protected by the attorney-client privilege as disclosing communications between an employee and counsel, we must reach the ruling by the Court of Appeals that the work-product doctrine does not apply to summonses issued under 26 U. S. C. § 7602. The Government concedes, wisely, that the Court of Appeals erred and that the work-product doctrine does apply to IRS summonses. Brief for Respondents 16, 48. This doctrine was announced by the Court over 30 years ago in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947). In that case the Court rejected “an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party’s counsel in the course of his legal duties.” Id., at 510. The Court noted that “it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy” and reasoned that if discovery of the material sought were permitted “much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.” Id., at 511. The “strong public policy” underlying the work-product doctrine was reaffirmed recently in United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 236-240 (1975), and has been substantially incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). As we stated last Term, the obligation imposed by a tax summons remains “subject to the traditional privileges and limitations.” United States v. Euge, 444 U. S. 707, 714 (1980). Nothing in the language of the IRS summons provisions or their legislative history suggests an intent on the part of Congress to preclude application of the work-product doctrine. Rule 26 (b)(3) codifies the work-product doctrine, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are made applicable to summons enforcement proceedings by Rule 81 (a)(3). See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 528 (1971). While conceding the applicability of the work-product doctrine, the Government asserts that it has made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome its protections. The Magistrate apparently so found, 78-1 USTC ¶ 9277, p. 83,605. The Government relies on the following language in Hickman: “We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney’s file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case, discovery may properly be had.... And production might be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty.” 329 U. S., at 511. The Government stresses that interviewees are scattered across the globe and that Upjohn has forbidden its employees to answer questions it considers irrelevant. The above-quoted language from Hickman, however, did not apply to “oral statements made by witnesses... whether presently in the form of [the attorney’s] mental impressions or memoranda.” Id., at 512. As to such material the Court did “not believe that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case so as to justify production.... If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these matters, petitioner’s case is not of that type.” Id., at 512-513. See also Nobles, supra, at 252-253 (White, J., concurring). Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney’s mental processes, 329 U. S., at 513 (“what he saw fit to write down regarding witnesses’ remarks”); id., at 516-517 (“the statement would be his [the attorney’s] language, permeated with his inferences”) (Jackson, J., concurring). Rule 26 accords special protection to work product revealing the attorney’s mental processes. The Rule permits disclosure of documents and tangible things constituting attorney work product upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. This was the standard applied by the Magistrate, 78-1 USTC ¶ 9277, p. 83,604. Rule 26 goes on, however, to state that “[i]n ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” Although this language does not specifically refer to memoranda based on oral statements of witnesses, the Hickman court stressed the danger that compelled disclosure of such memoranda would reveal the attorney’s mental processes. It is clear that this is the sort of material the draftsmen of the Rule had in mind as deserving special protection. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment to Rules, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 442 (“The subdivision... goes on to protect against disclosure the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories... of an attorney or other representative of a party. The Hickman opinion drew special attention to the need for protecting an attorney against discovery of memoranda prepared from recollection of oral interviews. The courts have steadfastly safeguarded against disclosure of lawyers’ mental impressions and legal theories...”). Based on the foregoing, some courts have concluded that no showing of necessity can overcome protection of work product which is based on oral statements from witnesses. See, e. g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F. 2d 840, 848 (CA8 1973) (personal recollections, notes, and memoranda pertaining to conversation with witnesses); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (ED Pa. 1976) (notes of conversation with witness “are so much a product of the lawyer's thinking and so little probative of the witness’s actual words that they are absolutely protected from disclosure”). Those courts declining to adopt an absolute rule have nonetheless recognized that such material is entitled to special protection. See, e. g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F. 2d 1224, 1231 (CA3 1979) (“special considerations... must shape any ruling on the discoverability of interview memoranda... ; such documents will be discoverable only in a rare situation’ ”); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F. 2d 504, 511-512 (CA2 1979). We do not decide the issue at this time. It is clear that the Magistrate applied the wrong standard when he concluded that the Government had made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the protections of the work-product doctrine. The Magistrate applied the “substantial need” and “without undue hardship” standard articulated in the first part of Rule 26 (b)(3). The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, however, are work product based on oral statements. If they reveal communications, they are, in this case, protected by the attorney-client privilege. To the extent they do not reveal communications, they reveal the attorneys’ mental processes in evaluating the communications. As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. While we are not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is always protected by the work-product rule, we think a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means than was made by the Government or applied by the Magistrate in this case would be necessary to compel disclosure. Since the Court of Appeals thought that the work-product protection was never applicable in an enforcement proceeding such as this, and since the Magistrate whose recommendations the District Court adopted applied too lenient a standard of protection, we think the best procedure with respect to this aspect of the case would be to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and remand the case to it for such further proceedings in connection with the work-product claim as are consistent with this opinion. Accordingly, the judgment of the	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
Wesley W. HARRIS, et al., appellants v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, et al. No. 14-232. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Dec. 8, 2015. Decided April 20, 2016. Mark F. Hearne, II, Washington, DC, for Appellants. Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Appellee Arizona Secretary of State Michele Reagan. Paul M. Smith, Washington, DC, for Appellee Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Sarah E. Harrington for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting appellee Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Mark F. (Thor) Hearne, II, Stephen S. Davis, Arent Fox LLP, Washington, DC, Stephen G. Larson, Robert C. O'Brien, Hugh Hewitt, Steven A. Haskins, Arent Fox LLP, Los Angeles, CA, David J. Cantelme, Cantelme & Brown PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Appellants. Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, John R. Lopez IV, Solicitor General, Phoenix, AZ, Dalton Lamar Oldham, Jr., Dalton L Oldham LLC, Columbia, SC, E. Mark Braden, Richard B. Raile, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, Jason Torchinsky, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky PLLC, Warrenton, VA, for Appellee Arizona Secretary of State. Mary R. O'Grady, Joseph Roth, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, AZ, Joseph A. Kanefield, Ballard Spahr LLP, Phoenix, AZ, Paul M. Smith, Jessica Ring Amunson, Emily L. Chapuis, Zachary C. Schauf, Alex Trepp, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellee Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants, a group of Arizona voters, challenge a redistricting plan for the State's legislature on the ground that the plan's districts are insufficiently equal in population. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Because the maximum population deviation between the largest and the smallest district is less than 10%, the appellants cannot simply rely upon the numbers to show that the plan violates the Constitution. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983). Nor have appellants adequately supported their contentions with other evidence. We consequently affirm a 3-judge Federal District Court decision upholding the plan. I In 2000, Arizona voters, using the initiative process, amended the Arizona Constitution to provide for an independent redistricting commission. See Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2677, 7192 L.Ed.2d 704 (2015) (upholding the amendment as consistent with federal constitutional and statutory law). Each decade, the Arizona Commission on Appellate Court Appointments creates three slates of individuals: one slate of 10 Republicans, one slate of 10 Democrats, and one slate of 5 individuals not affiliated with any political party. The majority and minority leader of the Arizona Legislature each select one Redistricting Commission member from the first two lists. These four selected individuals in turn choose one member from the third, nonpartisan list. See Ariz. Const., Art. IV, pt. 2, §§ 1 (5)-(8). Thus, the membership of the Commission consists of two Republicans, two Democrats, and one independent. After each decennial census, the Commission redraws Arizona's 30 legislative districts. The first step in the process is to create "districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state." § 1 (14). It then adjusts the grid to "the extent practicable" in order to take into account the need for population equality; to maintain geographic compactness and continuity; to show respect for "communities of interest"; to follow locality boundaries; and to use "visible geographic features" and "undivided ... tracts." §§ 1 (14)(B)-(E). The Commission will "favo[r]" political "competitive[ness]" as long as its efforts to do so "create no significant detriment to the other goals." Id., § 1 (14)(F). Finally, it must adjust boundaries "as necessary" to comply with the Federal Constitution and with the federal Voting Rights Act. § 1 (14)(A). After the 2010 census, the legislative leadership selected the Commission's two Republican and two Democratic members, who in turn selected an independent member, Colleen Mathis. Mathis was then elected chairwoman. The Commission hired two counsel, one of whom they thought of as leaning Democrat and one as leaning Republican. It also hired consultants, including mapping specialists, a statistician, and a Voting Rights Act specialist. With the help of its staff, it drew an initial plan, based upon the gridlike map, with district boundaries that produced a maximum population deviation (calculated as the difference between the most populated and least populated district) of 4.07%. After changing several boundaries, including those of Districts 8, 24, and 26, the Commission adopted a revised plan by a vote of 3 to 2, with the two Republican members voting against it. In late April 2012, the Department of Justice approved the plan as consistent with the Voting Rights Act. The next day, appellants filed this lawsuit, primarily claiming that the plan's population variations were inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. A 3-judge Federal District Court heard the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (providing for the convention of such a court whenever an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of apportionment of legislative districts). After a 5-day bench trial, the court, by a vote of 2 to 1, entered judgment for the Commission. The majority found that "the population deviations were primarily a result of good-faith efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act ... even though partisanship played some role." 993 F.Supp.2d 1042, 1046 (Ariz.2014). Appellants sought direct review in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction on June 30, 2015, and we now affirm. II A The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires States to "make an honest and good faith effort to construct [legislative] districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable." Reynolds, 377 U.S., at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362. The Constitution, however, does not demand mathematical perfection. In determining what is "practicable," we have recognized that the Constitution permits deviation when it is justified by "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy." Id ., at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362. In related contexts, we have made clear that in addition to the "traditional districting principles such as compactness [and] contiguity," Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993), those legitimate considerations can include a state interest in maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973), or the competitive balance among political parties, Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973). In cases decided before Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013), Members of the Court expressed the view that compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act is also a legitimate state consideration that can justify some deviation from perfect equality of population. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 518, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined in relevant part by ROBERTS, C.J., THOMAS & ALITO, JJ.); id., at 475, n. 12, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined in relevant part by BREYER, J.); id ., at 485 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by GINSBURG, J.); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (plurality opinion) (listing examples of traditional redistricting criteria, including "compliance with requirements of the [Voting Rights Act]"). It was proper for the Commission to proceed on that basis here. We have further made clear that "minor deviations from mathematical equality" do not, by themselves, "make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State." Gaffney, supra, at 745, 93 S.Ct. 2321. We have defined as "minor deviations" those in "an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10%." Brown, 462 U.S., at 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690. And we have refused to require States to justify deviations of 9.9%, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), and 8%, Gaffney, 412 U.S., at 751, 93 S.Ct. 2321. See also Fund for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 506 U.S. 1017, 113 S.Ct. 650, 121 L.Ed.2d 577 (1992) (summarily affirming a District Court's finding that there was no prima facie case where the maximum population deviation was 9.43%). In sum, in a case like this one, those attacking a state-approved plan must show that it is more probable than not that a deviation of less than 10% reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors rather than the "legitimate considerations" to which we have referred in Reynolds and later cases. Given the inherent difficulty of measuring and comparing factors that may legitimately account for small deviations from strict mathematical equality, we believe that attacks on deviations under 10% will succeed only rarely, in unusual cases. And we are not surprised that the appellants have failed to meet their burden here. B Appellants' basic claim is that deviations in their apportionment plan from absolute equality of population reflect the Commission's political efforts to help the Democratic Party. We believe that appellants failed to prove this claim because, as the district court concluded, the deviations predominantly reflected Commission efforts to achieve compliance with the federal Voting Rights Act, not to secure political advantage for one party. Appellants failed to show to the contrary. And the record bears out this conclusion. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (explaining that a district court's factual finding as to whether discrimination occurred will not be set aside by an appellate court unless clearly erroneous). The Voting Rights Act, among other things, forbids the use of new reapportionment plans that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478, 117 S.Ct. 1491, 137 L.Ed.2d 730 (1997). A plan leads to impermissible retrogression when, compared to the plan currently in effect (typically called a "benchmark plan"), the new plan diminishes the number of districts in which minority groups can "elect their preferred candidates of choice" (often called "ability-to-elect" districts). See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b). A State can obtain legal assurance that it has satisfied the non-retrogression requirement if it submits its proposed plan to the Federal Department of Justice, and the Department does not object to the plan within 60 days. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.9, 51.52(b) (2015). While Shelby County struck down the § 4(b) coverage formula, that decision came after the maps in this case were drawn. The record in this case shows that the gridlike map that emerged after the first step of the redistricting process had a maximum population deviation from absolute equality of districts of 4.07%. After consulting with their Voting Rights Act expert, their mapping consultant, and their statisticians, all five Commissioners agreed that they must try to obtain Justice Department Voting Rights Act "preclearance" and that the former benchmark plan contained 10 ability-to-elect districts. They consequently set a goal of 10 such districts for the new plan. They then went through an iterative process, involving further consultation, to adjust the plan's initial boundaries in order to enhance minority voting strength. In October 2011 (by a vote of 4 to 1), they tentatively approved a draft plan with adjusted boundaries. They believed it met their goal of 10 ability-to-elect districts. And they published the plan for public comment. In the meantime, however, the Commission received a report from one of its statisticians suggesting that the Department of Justice might not agree that the new proposed plan contained 10 ability-to-elect districts. It was difficult to know for certain because the Justice Department did not tell States how many ability-to-elect districts it believed were present in a benchmark plan, and neither did it typically explain precisely and specifically how it would calculate the number that exist in a newly submitted plan. See 76 Fed.Reg. 7470-7471 (2011). At the same time, the ability-to-elect analysis was complex, involving more than simply adding up census figures. The Department of Justice instead conducted a "functional analysis of the electoral behavior within the particular ... election district," id., at 7471, and so might, for example, count as ability-to-elect districts "crossover" districts in which white voters combine their votes with minorities, see Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13-14, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009). Its calculations might take into account group voting patterns, electoral participation, election history, and voter turnout. See 76 Fed.Reg., 7471. The upshot was not random decision-making but the process did create an inevitable degree of uncertainty. And that uncertainty could lead a redistricting commission, as it led Arizona's, to make serious efforts to make certain that the districts it believed were ability-to-elect districts did in fact meet the criteria that the Department might reasonably apply. Cf. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1273, 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015) ("The law cannot insist that a state legislature, when redistricting, determine precisely what percent minority population § 5 demands [because] the standards of § 5 are complex.... [To do so would] lay a trap for an unwary legislature, condemning its redistricting plan as either ... unconstitutional racial gerrymandering [or] ... retrogressive under § 5"). As a result of the statistician's report, the Commission became concerned about certain of its proposed boundaries. One of the Commission's counsel advised that it would be "prudent to stay the course in terms of the ten districts that are in the draft map and look to ... strengthen them if there is a way to strengthen them." 993 F.Supp.2d, at 1058 (internal quotation marks omitted). Subsequently, the Commission adopted several changes to the boundaries of Districts 24 and 26. It reduced the populations of those districts, thereby increasing the percentage of Hispanic voters in each. The Commission approved these changes unanimously. Changes in the boundaries of District 8, however, proved more controversial. District 8 leaned Republican. A Democrat-appointed Commissioner asked the mapping specialist to look into modifications that might make District 8 politically more competitive. The specialist returned with a draft that shifted the boundary line between District 8 and District 11 so as to keep several communities with high minority populations together in District 8. The two Republican-appointed Commissioners objected that doing so would favor Democrats by "hyperpacking" Republicans into other districts; they added that the Commission should either favor political competitiveness throughout the State or not at all. Id., at 1059 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Democrat-appointed proponent of the change replied that District 8 had historically provided minority groups a good opportunity to elect their candidate of choice-an opportunity that the changes would preserve. The Voting Rights Act specialist then said that by slightly increasing District 8's minority population, the Commission might be able to claim an 11th ability-to-elect district; and that fact would "unquestionably enhance the submission and enhance chances for preclearance." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission's counsel then added that having another possible ability-to-elect district could be helpful because District 26 was not as strong an ability-to-elect district as the others. See ibid . Only then, after the counsel and consultants argued for District 8 changes for the sake of Voting Rights Act preclearance, did Chairwoman Mathis support those changes. On that basis, the Commission ultimately approved the changes to District 8 by a vote of 3 to 2 (with the two Republican-appointed commissioners dissenting). The total population deviation among districts in this final map was 8.8%. While the Commission ultimately concluded that District 8 was not a true ability-to-elect district, the State's submission to the Department of Justice cited the changes to District 8 in support of the argument for preclearance. On April 26, 2012, the Department of Justice precleared the submitted plan. On the basis of the facts that we have summarized, the District Court majority found that "the population deviations were primarily a result of good-faith efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act ... even though partisanship played some role." 993 F.Supp.2d, at 1046. This conclusion was well supported in the record. And as a result, appellants have not shown that it is more probable than not that illegitimate considerations were the predominant motivation behind the plan's deviations from mathematically equal district populations-deviations that were under 10%. Consequently, they have failed to show that the Commission's plan violates the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted in Reynolds and subsequent cases. C The appellants make three additional arguments. First, they support their claim that the plan reflects unreasonable use of partisan considerations by pointing to the fact that almost all the Democratic-leaning districts are somewhat underpopulated and almost all the Republican-leaning districts are somewhat overpopulated. That is likely true. See 993 F.Supp.2d, at 1049 (providing a chart with percentage deviation figures by district). But that fact may well reflect the tendency of minority populations in Arizona in 2010 to vote disproportionately for Democrats. If so, the variations are explained by the Commission's efforts to maintain at least 10 ability-to-elect districts. The Commission may have relied on data from its statisticians and Voting Rights Act expert to create districts tailored to achieve preclearance in which minority voters were a larger percentage of the district population. That might have necessitated moving other voters out of those districts, thereby leaving them slightly underpopulated. The appellants point to nothing in the record to suggest the contrary. Second, the appellants point to Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 124 S.Ct. 2806, 159 L.Ed.2d 831 (2004), in which we summarily affirmed a district court's judgment that Georgia's reapportionment of representatives to state legislative districts violated the Equal Protection Clause, even though the total population deviation was less than 10%. In Cox, however, unlike the present case, the district court found that those attacking the plan had shown that it was more probable than not that the use of illegitimate factors significantly explained deviations from numerical equality among districts. The district court produced many examples showing that population deviation as well as the shape of many districts "did not result from any attempt to create districts that were compact or contiguous, or to keep counties whole, or to preserve the cores of prior districts." Id ., at 949, 124 S.Ct. 2806. No legitimate purposes could explain them. It is appellants' inability to show that the present plan's deviations and boundary shapes result from the predominance of similarly illegitimate factors that makes Cox inapposite here. Even assuming, without deciding, that partisanship is an illegitimate redistricting factor, appellants have not carried their burden. Third, appellants point to Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013), in which this Court held unconstitutional sections of the Voting Rights Act that are relevant to this case. Appellants contend that, as a result of that holding, Arizona's attempt to comply with the Act could not have been a legitimate state interest. The Court decided Shelby County, however, in 2013. Arizona created the plan at issue here in 2010. At the time, Arizona was subject to the Voting Rights Act, and we have never suggested the contrary. * * * For these reasons the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES et al. v. UNITED STATES SMELTING REFINING & MINING CO. et al. No. 173. Argued February 13-14, 1950. — Decided March 27, 1950. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. argued the cause for the United States, appellant. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Bergson and J. Roger Wollenberg. Edward Dumbauld was also of counsel. Allen Crenshaw argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellant. With him on the brief was Daniel W. Knowlton. Charles A. Horsky argued the cause for the United States Smelting Refining & Mining Co., appellee. With him on the brief was Paul B. Cannon. Otis J. Gibson argued the cause and was on the brief for the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., appellee. Elmer B. Collins argued the cause and was on the brief for the Union Pacific Railroad Co., appellee. John F. Finerty argued the cause and was on the brief for the American Smelting & Refining Co., appellee. The cause was submitted on briefs by Clinton D. Vernon, Attorney General, for intervenors State of Utah et al.; Walter R. McDonald for intervenor Public Utilities Commission of Colorado; Stanley T. Wallbank for intervenor Colorado Mining Association; and S. J. Quinney for intervenor Utah Mining Association, appellees. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission instituted the proceedings leading to the orders here involved as its Seventy-fifth and Seventy-sixth Supplemental Reports to Ex parte 10/+, Practices of Carriers Affecting Operating Revenues or Expenses, Part II, Terminal Services, 209 I. C. C. 11. The proceedings concerned the switching and spotting services rendered by appellee-carriers at the Garfield and Murray, Utah, and Leadville, Colorado, plants of the American Smelting Company, and the Mid-vale, Utah, plant of the United States Smelting Company. Extensive hearings were held in these supplemental proceedings for the purpose of determining the respective points at which the carriers’ line-haul transportation service ended and the extent of the service the carriers might render in the discharge of their obligation to deliver the freight at these four plants. It will not be necessary to detail the physical characteristics of each of the plants involved here. Each has a receiving yard or interchange tracks upon which incoming and outgoing freight is switched. Beyond the interchange tracks switching services are numerous and extensive within the plants. The Garfield plant may be described as indicative of the situation at all the plants. There, frozen ore is handled in six distinct movements. A large amount of intraplant switching is done by the carriers. To perform these switching services.at Garfield requires three train-crew shifts daily. In one twelvemonth period at this plant, 22,982 carloads of inbound and 6,960 carloads of outbound freight were handled. On October 14, 1946, the Commission entered its first orders in these proceedings, enjoining appellee-carriers from performing switching and spotting service in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. On petition to the District Court, a statutory three-judge court sitting, the orders were held unlawful. The court was of the opinion that each of the Commission’s orders was based on the premise that the line-haul rates did not cover the intraplant services, and held that such a finding was not supported by the evidence. In addition, the court found that the Commission had not “presumed to exercise the authority which is intended to be conferred under Ex Parte 104 in that the order made is not specifically based upon that authority.” The matter was remanded to the Commission “for such action as it may find justifiable in the premises,” and the Commission was “temporarily enjoined from requiring its formal order to be carried into force and effect . . . .” The Commission on remand reopened the case but took no more evidence. It restated the ground for its action and entered cease and desist orders against the carriers. On petition of the appellees, the District Court again held the orders unlawful and permanently enjoined their enforcement. It is from this judgment that the Commission and the United States have appealed. The Commission undertook its general investigation, Ex parte 104, in the interest of establishing a uniform and equal service for shippers. The Commission concluded that carrier obligation for transportation service ends customarily when delivery is made at a convenient point on the siding inside or outside a consignee’s plant. This delivery is such as may be accomplished in one continuous movement without “interruption” occasioned for the convenience of the industry, and is only the equivalent of team track or simple placement switching. In the Commission’s view as developed in Ex parte 104, such a convenient delivery point marks the beginning and end of what is termed “line-haul” transportation, and is the extent of the service which may be performed under the line-haul rate. The Commission’s authority to determine the point where transportation duty ends and industry convenience begins was upheld by this Court in United States v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U. S. 402. We have repeatedly sustained the Commission in its application of Ex parte 104 principles to particular plants where it has prohibited the performance of services beyond the point fixed under a line-haul rate. In issuing cease and desist orders in these cases the Commission has acted pursuant to its duty to enforce § 6 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which section prohibits departure from filed tariffs and the rendering of preferential services. As stated, the purpose of these proceedings before the Commission was to determine the beginning and end of line-haul service at appellee-smelters’ plants. The next question was whether the service rendered by the carriers conformed to the services delimited by the Commission. Thus the Commission, in its proceedings after remand, was not concerned with the question of whether reasonable rates were in force, as it explained in its second report in the American Smelting Company case: “The question of the reasonableness of published rates or of charges that are or may be fixed for performing industrial services can be decided only in a proceeding brought, or investigation instituted, under different provisions of the act. It is our purpose to make it entirely clear here that our order herein is based solely upon our findings herein, which in turn are based solely upon the principles and authority established with the approval of the Supreme. Court in our original and supplemental reports in Ex Parte No. 104, Part II, and that said order is not based in whole or in part upon any conclusions or findings in connection with tariff provisions or testimony as to whether the published rates are reasonable and do or do not include compensation for switching within the plant areas. We hereby repudiate any reference or conclusion to the contrary conveyed by our discussion or evidence relative to such questions and the conclusions based thereon in our prior supplemental report herein.” 270 I. C. C. at 362. With that clear and distinct statement of what it was doing and what it was not doing, the Commission made its findings of fact which appear in the margin. The essential part of the findings is that line-haul began and ended at the interchange tracks, known as “assembly yard” at Midvale, the plant of United States Smelting, and the “plant yard” at Garfield, “hold tracks” at Murray, and “flat yard” at Leadville, the plants of American Smelting; that all services beyond these points were excess services not required of the carrier as part of its line-haul carriage; and that the performance of services beyond these points without compensatory charges results in preferential service in violation of § 6 (7). That the Commission is authorized to establish the point where line-haul service begins and ends is not to be doubted. The question, in reviewing the Commission’s determination of the convenient points at which line-haul or carrier transportation service begins and ends, is whether such determination is supported by substantial evidence, as this Court said in United States v. Wabash R. Co., 321 U. S. 403, 408: “In sustaining the Commission’s findings in these proceedings, as in related cases, this Court has held that the point in time and space at which the carrier’s transportation service ends is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission and not the courts, and that its findings on that question will not be disturbed by the courts if supported by evidence.” In the instant case there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings that the convenient points for the beginning and end of line-haul were at the interchange tracks, more specifically characterized above. The Commission had before it the extensive record of the basic proceeding, which the District Court did not have, together with the instant supplemental proceedings. The Commission’s findings were based in part on the testimony of its experts who had made personal surveys and observations of switching and car movements at these plants. It is apparent from the record that extensive intraplant services were performed on instructions of and for the convenience of the appellee-smelters. When a car is followed through its intraplant movements on a map, it is demonstrated that extensive services were performed in excess of those which were established as the permissible limit of line-haul in Ex parte 104- The Commission’s designation of the convenient delivery points at each of these plants must be sustained. The contention of appellees is that there are now in effect tariffs that compensate for line-haul and plant services. These tariffs will be separately discussed below. Appellees urge that the carriers cannot be guilty of violating § 6 (7) when they are fully compensated for carrier services in line-haul and plant services beyond that, since the smelters do not then receive a preferential service not accorded to shippers generally. The corollary of this contention is that to require payment for the plant services in addition to the line-haul rates, in accordance with the Commission’s orders, would be to require the smelters to pay twice for the services. This Court has emphasized that the preference involved in these proceedings is based upon an application of the standards derived from Ex parte 104 to the unique conditions at particular plants, a preference necessarily resulting when a service is rendered “in excess of that which the carriers are obliged to perform by their tariffs.” United States v. Wabash R. Co., supra, 412, 413. In Corn Products Refining Co. v. United States, 331 U. S. 790, this Court affirmed per curiam a decision upholding the exclusion, on grounds of irrelevancy, of evidence pertaining to the custom and practice of carriers in making delivery to other shippers. If custom may not be used to interpret “line-haul” after demarcation of transportation and industry service by the Commission, we think it follows that a carrier definition written into filed tariffs does not make impotent the Commission’s authority to define the point. A tariff, effective June 25,1938, is considered applicable only to the Midvale, Garfield, and Murray plants. By this tariff the “line-haul rate includes movement of loaded cars to track scales and subsequent delivery to any designated track within the plant which can be accomplished by one uninterrupted movement . . . from the road-haul point of delivery to the switching line.” 266 I. C. C. at 353-354. There are additional charges for other services in the plants. If the Commission has the authority to fix the point at which line-haul begins and ends, and we have held that it has, and it designates Point X, obviously the carriers cannot by tariff fix line-haul at Point Y, a further point, and even add one subsequent movement. That would deprive the Commission of its right to determine the point. In the Commission’s judgment, which is supported by the evidence, delivery to Point X is the equivalent of team track and simple placement service — the service other shippers receive under a line-haul rate. For the carriers to give the appellee-smelters service to Point Y plus 1 is to accord them service different from that given other shippers under Ex parte 104 and supplemental proceedings. By the orders in the instant cases, line-haul is translated, as it were, into the tariffs as beginning and ending where the Commission fixed it and not where the appellee-carriers fixed it by tariff. Thereafter, the charge for line-haul must be to the interchange tracks and not to the point fixed in the tariff. Transportation to the latter point at the line-haul rate would be preferential and would violate § 6 (7). The tariff which is considered by appellee-carriers as applicable only to the Leadville plant is set forth in the margin. It may be noted that this tariff does not provide, as does the 1938 tariff applicable to the other plants, that the line-haul rate includes the intraplant services. Further, the “movement” specified in delivery of a line-haul shipment includes not just one, as provided by the 1938 tariff, but several switching operations which the Commission has classified as “interrupted” terminal switching services, performed for the convenience of the industry only. The Commission has fixed the point at which line-haul or transportation service ends as the “flat yard” at Leadville and finds there are services performed beyond this point. These industry services must be so compensated for, and may not be wrapped up in delivery of a line-haul shipment. “Since the Commission finds that the carriers’ service of transportation is complete upon delivery to the industries’ interchange tracks, and that spotting within the plants is not included in the service for which the line-haul rates were fixed, there is power to enjoin the performance of that additional service or the making of an allowance to the industry which performs it.” United States v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U. S. 402, 408. Obviously the plant services at Leadville are different from those at Midvale, Garfield, and Murray under the 1938 tariff, which only emphasizes the wisdom of Congress in empowering the Commission to fix the point where line-haul begins and ends with a view to giving all shippers equivalent service. The Commission has standardized such service as team track or simple placement switching. What we now hold is that the Commission has the power to fix the point at which line-haul or carrier service begins and ends. This is necessary because the need for switching varies from plant to plant; indeed, some plants may need no intraplant switching service. Thus, unless the Commission can fix the beginning and ending point of the line-haul, some shippers would pay an identical line-haul rate for less service than that required by other industrial plants. See Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 305 U. S. 507, 526. A different point fixed by the carrier in its tariff gives service in excess of that accorded shippers generally as established in Ex parte 104, and therefore amounts to an unlawful preferential service. As to the argument that to require the carriers to conform to the Commission’s orders would require the appellee-smelters to pay twice for their service, the short answer is that appellees misconceive the scope of this proceeding, which is solely to define what is embraced in line-haul transportation. We accept the admonition of the Commission in its second report, quoted supra, and reiterated in its brief, that it was not here concerned, and made no finding, as to whether the charge made for the service was or was not compensatory. We think that the Commission has authority to exclude rate questions from this proceeding. If the carriers so wish, they may file a new tariff to conform their charges to the services indicated in the Commission’s order. 49 U. S. C. § 6 (1) and (3). If the carrier makes a double or unreasonable charge, the industry may be heard upon the reasonableness of the rate. 49 U. S. C. §§ 9, 13, 15. Finally it is contended that the District Court judgment should be affirmed because there was no appeal from the judgment and mandate when the case was sent back to the Commission, the court having found that there was no evidence to sustain a Commission finding that the line-haul rates were not compensatory for the services rendered. Appellees argue that that decision became the law of the case. The rule of the law of the case is a rule of practice, based upon sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444; Insurance Group v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 329 U. S. 607, 612. It is not applicable here because when the case was first remanded, nothing was finally decided. The whole proceeding thereafter was in fieri. The Commission had a right on reconsideration to make a new record. Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364, 374-75. When finally decided, all questions were still open and could be presented. The fact that an appeal could have been taken from the first order of the District Court was not because it was a final adjudication but because a temporary injunction had been granted in order to maintain the status quo. This was an interlocutory order that was appeal-able because Congress, notwithstanding its interlocutory character, had made it appealable. 28 U. S. C. § 1253. The appellants might have appealed, but they were not bound to. We think that it requires a final judgment to sustain the application of the rule of the law of the case just as it does for the kindred rule of res judicata. Compare United States v. Wallace Co., 336 U. S. 793, 800-801. And although the latter is a uniform rule, the “law of the case” is only a discretionary rule of practice. It is not controlling here. See Southern R. Co. v. Clift, 260 U. S. 316, 319. Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Jackson dissents. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The plants are described in detail by the Commission in its reports, 263 I. C. C. 749, 266 I. C. C. 476, 270 I. C. C. 385; 263 I. C. C. 719, 2661. C. C. 349, 2701. C. C. 359. Corn Products Refining Co. v. United States, 331 U. S. 790; Hanna Furnace Corp. v. United States, 323 U. S. 667; United States v. Wabash R. Co., 321 U. S. 403; United States v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 304 U. S. 166; A. O. Smith Corp. v. United States, 301 U. S. 669; Goodman Lumber Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 669. “No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this chapter, shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or property, as defined in this chapter, unless the rates, fares, and charges upon which the same are transported by said carrier have been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in connection therewith, between the points named in such tariffs than the rates, fares, and charges which are specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time; nor shall any carrier refund or remit in any manner or by any device any portion of the rates, fares, and charges so specified, nor extend to any shipper or person any privileges or facilities in the transportation of passengers or property, except such as are specified in such tariffs.” 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 6 (7). The following were the findings of fact relating to the Garfield, Murray and Leadville plants of American Smelting. The findings with respect to the Midvale plant of United States Smelting were substantially identical. “(1) That it is the duty and obligation of the smelters to obtain and certify to the carriers the values of ores for the purpose of ascertaining freight charges, and that the carriers are not under any obligation or duty to perform any switching or other services for the purpose of ascertaining, or assisting the smelters in ascertaining, such values. “(2) That the ‘plant yard’ at the Garfield plant, the ‘hold tracks’ at the Murray plant, and the ‘flat yard’ at the Leadville plant, hereinafter referred to collectively as the ‘convenient points’ as described in the prior supplemental reports herein, are reasonably convenient points for the delivery and receipt of carload traffic moving to and from the plants of the American Smelting & Refining Company. “(3) That the several respondents serving said plants move loaded and empty freight cars from said convenient points to points within the plant areas, from such points within the plant areas to the convenient points, and between points within the plant areas. “(4) That the said services rendered within the plant areas to and from the convenient points are in excess of those rendered shippers generally in the receipt and delivery of traffic on team tracks or industrial sidings or spurs. “(5) That the said services rendered between points within the plant areas are in excess of those rendered shippers generally in the receipt and delivery of traffic on team tracks or industrial sidings or spurs. “(6) That the services from and to the convenient points and between points within the plant areas are not and cannot be performed in a continuous movement without interruption or interference at respondents’ operating convenience because of the disabilities of the plants, including the manner in which the industrial operations are conducted, all as explained in the prior supplemental reports. “(7) That the said services rendered between the convenient points and points in the plant areas and between points within the plant areas are in excess of those performed in simple switching and team-track delivery and are industrial or plant services which respondents are not obligated to and should not perform at the line-haul rates. “(8) That the common-carrier transportation which respondents are obligated to perform begins and ends at the convenient points, and that all services beyond those points in the plant areas are industrial or plant services for which respondents should make reasonably compensatory charges. “(9) That the performance by respondents without reasonably compensatory charges in addition to the line-haul rates of the described services within the plant areas beyond the convenient points at any and all of the said plants results in the American Smelting & Refining Company receiving a preferential service not accorded shippers generally and results in the refunding or remitting of a portion of the rates and charges collected in violation of section 6 (7) of the act.” Id., at 367-368. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Hoboken Manufacturers’ R. Co., 320 U. S. 368, 378; United States v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 304 U. S. 156, 158; United States v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U. S. 402, 408, 409. An “uninterrupted movement” is defined in the tariff as "one continuous movement of switching locomotive and crew without interruption, resulting from orders from, or requirements of, the smelter.” This tariff is almost identical with that which was applicable to all of the plants in 1920. The smelters, we are informed, pay the 1938 tariff under protest, and insist upon the 1920 tariff. “Delivery op Line-Haul Carload Shipment Destined to Smelter at Leadville, Colo. “Delivery of a line-haul carload shipment destined to smelter at Leadville, Colo., will include movement within smelter plant over track scales, to and from thaw-house, to and from a smelter sampler or to and from a combination sampler and concentrator to a designated unloading point indicated by the sampling company.”	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 65 ]	sc_adminaction
DONALDSON, fka SWEET v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 65. Argued November 19, 1970 Decided January 25, 1971 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,. in which Burger, C. J., and Black, Harlan, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 536. Brennan, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 536.. Robert E. Meldman argued the 'cause for 'petitioner. With him on the briefs was Louis L. Meldman: Lawrence G. Wallace argued the cause for the United States et al. On the brief were Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney ■ General Walters; Deputy Solicitor General Springer, Samuel Huntington, Joseph M. Howard, and John P. Burke. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. We are here concerned with problems arising in connection with the issuance, and judicial enforcement of an internal revenue'summons directed to someone other than the individual taxpayer. Kevin L. Donaldson, formerly known as Merton H. Sweet, apparently was once employed by, or was a performer for, Acme Circus Operating Co., Inc., dba Clyde Beatty-Cole Bros. Circus. Mr. Donaldson (sometimes.referred to herein as the “taxpayer”) is an individual whose income tax returns for the calendar years 1964-1967, inclusive, are under investigation by the Internal Revenue Service. On September 12 and 13) 1968, Special Agent John P. Grady, purportedly acting under the authority of § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 7602, issued and served separate summonses to Acme and to Joseph J. Mercurio, Acme’s accountant, commanding their appearance before Grady on September 23 and 24 “to give testimony relating to the tax liability” of Donaldson and to produce certain of Acme’s records having to do with the taxpayer. The records specified were “applications for employment and/or any other records containing background data including' Social Security number furnished you by” the taxpayer; all contracts between the taxpayer and.. Acme and between him “and the various organizations sponsoring performances of the circus... during... 1964 through 1967, inclusive”.; Forms 1099 and W-2 issued to the taxpayer; a schedule of the payments made to the taxpayer by the sponsoring organizations; checks and vouchers relating to payments to the taxpayer by Acme; expense vouchers submitted by the taxpayer; records containing information as to the identification of each sponsoring organization; and “correspondence or other records relating to the foré-going or to any other financial transactions between Acme” and the taxpayer during 1964-1967, inclusive. Shortly prior to the issuance of these, summonses, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, upon petitions filed by the taxpayer, issued temporary restraining orders, and then, as to Mercurio, a preliminary injunction, restraining Mercurio and Acme from complying with Grady’s requests or with any subsequent summons directing the production of the records “until such time as an order of a court of competent jurisdiction has been issued requiring such compliance.” On November 25,-1968, the United States and Agent Grady, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 (b) and 7604 (a), filed petitions with the same federal court for the judicial enforcement of the summonses directed to Mercurio and to Acme. The petitions were supported by affidavits of Grady and of Special Agent Bruce B. Miller. Each affidavit was to the effect that the affiant was conducting or assisting in- the conduct of “an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining the correct income tax liability” of the taxpayer for the years 1964-1967, inclusive, and that it was “necessary” to examine the records and to take the testimony requested in order- to ascertain the taxpayer’s correct income tax liability for those years. In response to the ensuing orders to show cause, the taxpayer, purportedly pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a)(2), filed motions to intervene in the enforcement proceedings; He accompanied éach motion with a proposed answer' In the answer he alleged that Special Agents Grady ■ and Miller were guilty of bad faith in asserting that they were conducting an investigation to ascertain the taxpayer’s correct income tax liability for the years in question; that the two agents were assigned to Intelligence Divisions of the Service; that they were investigating the taxpayer “for the express and sole purpose of obtaining evidence concerning any violations of the criminal statutes applicable to the tax-laws of the United States”; and that, as a consequence, the summonses were not issued for any purpose ydthin the scope of § 7602. It was also asserted, although apparently it is not now urged here, that the requests in' the summonses were overly broad' and “without a showing of particularized relevancy,” and that the taxpayer, under the Constitution, “is entitled to be secure in his personal papers and personal effects from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Mercurio and Acme, on their part, also filed responses to the orders to show cause. Each alleged that “were it not for” the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order theretofore; entered, “the Respondent would have complied with the summons.” The orders to show, cause were returnable before Judge Lieb. After.the submission of memoranda and argument, but without the introduction of testimony, the court denied the motions to intervene and ordered Mer-curio and Acme to appear before Grady and to produce the records requested. The court then consolidated the two cases for purposes of appeal and granted stays pending appeal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Mercurio, 418 F. 2d 1213 (CA5 1969). Certiorari was granted, 397 U. S. 933 (1970), because the case appeared to raise important questions relating to the administration and enforcement of the revenue laws, and because the courts of appeals have differed in their reading of Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964). I Despite the contrary intimations in the motions to intervene, there is now no constitutional issue in the case. The taxpayer on oral argument so conceded. In any event, that question appears to have been settled long ago when the Court upheld, against Fourth Amendment challenge, an internal revenue summons issued under the Revenue Act of 1921 and directed to a third-party bank. First Nat. Bank v. United States, 267 U. S. 576 (1925), aff’g 295 F. 142, 143 (SD Ala. 1924). See also United States v. First Nat. Bank, 274 F. Supp. 283, 284 (ED Ky. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Justice v. United States, 390 U. S. 199 (1968), and United States v. Shlom, 420 F. 2d 263, 266 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1074 (1970). II We emphasize initially, as did Judge Tuttle in his opinion for the Court of Appeals, 418 F. 2d,.at 1214, that what is sought here by the Internal Revenue Service from Mercurio and from Acme is the production of Acme’s records and not the records of the taxpayer. Further, as Judge Tuttle also emphasized, this is not a case where a summons has been issued to the taxpayer himself seeking access to his books and information from his mouth. Neither is it a case where the summons is directed at the taxpayer’s records in the hands of his attorney or his accountant, with the attendant questions of privilege, or even in the. hands of anyone with whom the taxpayer has a confidential relationship of any kind.. Each of the summonses here, we repeat, was directed to a third person with respect to whom no established legal privilege, such as that of attorney and client, exists, and had to do with records in which the taxpayer has no proprietary interest of any kind, which are owned by the third person, which are in his hands-, and which relate to the third person’s business transactions with the taxpayer. Ill Mr. Justice Clark, in Part II of his opinion for a unanimous Court in Reisman, 375 U. S., at 445-446, reviewed the statutory structure that Congress has provided for the issuance and enforcement of an internal revenue summons. It will perhaps be rewarding for us to outline that structure once again. Section 7601 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7601, directs the Secretary or his delegate “to the extent he deems it practicable” to cause Treasury Department officers or employees “to proceed... and inquire after and concerning” all persons “who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax.” The section thus flatly imposes upon the Secretary the duty to canvass and to inquire. This is an old statute. It has roots in the first of the modern general income tax acts, namely, the Tariff Act of October-'3, 1913, §11, ¶1, 38 Stat. 178, and prior to that, in § 3172, as amended, of the Revised Statutes of 1874. Section 7602 authorizes the Secretary or his delegate for “the purpose of ascertaining the ¡correctness of any return... determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax... or collecting any such liability... [t]o summon the person liable for tax... or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax... or any other per-, son the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear...■ and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry....” Section 7603 provides for service of the' summons. There is no provision for personal enforcement of the summons by the Secretary or his delegate. If enforcement is desired, he must proceed under § 7402 (b), or its sister and essentially identical statúte, § 7604 (a), see n. 3,.supra, each of which grants the district courts of the United States jurisdiction “by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production.” Then, as Mr. Justice Clark pointed out, 375 U. S., at 446: “Any enforcement action under this section [§ 7402 (b)] would be an adversary proceeding affording a judicial determination of the challenges to the summons and giving complete protection to the witness. In such a proceeding only a refusal to comply with an order of the district judge subjects the witness to contempt proceedings.” Finally, § 7605 (a) provides that the time and place of the examination “shall be such... as may be fixed by the Secretary or his delegate and as are reasonable under the circumstances” and, with respect to a § 7602 summons, that “the date fixed for appearance... shall not be less than 10 days from the date of the summons.” Thus the summons is administratively issued but its enforcement is only by federal court authority in “an adversary proceeding” affording the opportunity for challenge and “complete protection to the witness.” IV Reisman was an action, instituted by attorneys for a husband and wife, for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and an accounting firm which had been working on the taxpayer-couple’s financial records at their request. The Commissioner had issued summonses to the accounting firm for the production of work papers and correspondence. It was contended that the enforced production of the papers was an unlawful appropriation of the attorneys’ work product and trial preparation. The Court concluded that the petitioner-attorneys possessed an adequate remedy at law and; that the complaint, therefore, was subject to dismissal. In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the employment of the accounting firm by the attorneys “to.assist them in connection with certain civil and criminal tax proceedings arising from the alleged tax liability of the” taxpayers; that the products of the joint work of the accountants and the attorneys “were kept separate in the accounting firm’s files and labeled as the property of” the attorneys; that at the time of the service of the summonses “there were four civil tax cases pending in the Tax Court contesting alleged deficiencies” and, in addition, “a criminal investigation of Mr. Bromley on the tax matters was in progress.” The Court noted that the petitioners made no claim that § 7602 “suffers any constitutional infirmity on • its face” and that the Government conceded that “a witness. or any interested party may attack the summons before the hearing officer.” The Court agreed. It went on to observe that-, “in tax enforcement proceedings the hearing officer has no power of enforcement or right to levy any sanctions”; and that “in any of these procedures before either the district judge or United States Commissioner, the witness may challenge the summons on any- appropriate ground.” Among such grounds the Court included “the ■ defenses that the material is sought for the'-improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution” or the defense that it is protected by the attorney-client privilege. It went on to say, “In -addition, third parties might intervene to protect their interests, or in the event the taxpayer is not a party to the summons before the hearing officer, he, too, may intervene” and that this “would be true whether the contempt,be of a civil or criminal nature.” Finally, it said that there would be no difference should the witness indicate “that he would voluntarily turn the papers over.” Ten months later the Court decided United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), and its companion case, Ryan v. United States, 379 U. S. 61 (1964). These concerned, respectively, internal revenue summonses issued to the' president of a corporate taxpayer and to an individual' taxpayer with respect to re-examinatipns and tax years for which assessments would be barred except for fraud. The Court was primarily concerned with the standards the Internal Revenue Service must meet in order to obtain judicial enforcement of -its orders. It held that probable cause to' suspect fraud was not required under the statutes and that the Commissioner need show only “that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not' already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed... Again it was emphasized that at the adversary hearing to which the taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is ordered, he may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. It was also stated that the burden of showing an abuse of the court’s process is on the taxpayer. y With all this as background, our central inquiry here is as to Donaldson’s right to intervene in the summons proceedings. Donaldson had obtained preliminary relief (in the form of a temporary restraining order and, as to Mercurio, in the form of the succeeding preliminary injunction as well) in his' self-instituted actions to restrain Mercurio’s and Acme’s, voluntary compliance with Grady’s request. But when the enforcement proceedings were instituted - by the United States and Grady, the taxpayer was not successful either as to intervention or as to relief by way of restraint. In his motion to intervene, and here (but apparently not at. oral argument in the Court of Appeals, see 418 F. 2d, at 1215), Donaldson would take comfort from the provisions of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a) (2). He asserts that, within the rule’s literal language,- he possesses “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is'the subject of the [enforcement] action and he is so situated that' the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,” and that his interest is not adequately represented by the parties (Mercurio and Acme) to the enforcement proceedings. He would buttress this approach by reliance upon the reference to both § 7604 (a) and the Civil Rules in n. 18 in Powell, 379 U. S., at 58, and by reliance upon language appearing in Reisman, 375 U. S., at 445. In our • view, however, the taxpayer’s, argument goes too far in its reading of Rule 24 (a) (2) and of the quotations from Powell and from Reisman. The Civil Rules, of course, do have an' application to a summons proceeding. Rule 81 (a)(3) expressly so provides. But the Civil Rules are not inflexible in this application. Rule 81 (a)(3) goes on specifically to recognize that a district court, by local rule or by order, may limit the application of the rules in a summons proceeding. See 7 J. Moore, Federal Practicé, ¶ 81.06 [1], p. 4442 (2d ed. 1970). This feature was recognized as purposeful by the Advisory Committee when the pertinent language was added to Rule 81 (a) (3) in 1946. Id., at ¶ 81.01 [6], p. 4413 (2d ed. 1970). The post-Poiue.il cases, too, are clearly and consistently to the effect that the footnote in Powell was not intended to impair a summary enforcement proceeding so long as the rights of the party summoned aré protected and an adversary hearing, if requested, is made available. United States v. Gajewski, 419 F. 2d 1088, 1090-1092 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1040 (1970); Venn v. United States, 400 F. 2d 207, 212 n. 12 (CA5 1968); McGarry’s, Inc. v. Bose, 344 F. 2d 416, 418 (CA1 1965). We agree with that conclusion. Similarly, the Reisman language set forth iñ n. 10, supra, does not guarantee intervention for the taxpayer. Certainly it recites that the proposed witness “or any interested party” may attack the summons before the hearing officer, as well as before' the District Court in any ensuing enforcement proceeding, and -certainly it recites that the party summoned and one “affected by a disclosure may appear or intervene” before the court. But this language, as well as subsequent comments in Reisman, is permissive only and is not mandatory. The language recognizes that the District Court, upon the customary showing, may allow the taxpayer to intervene. Two instances where intervention is appropriate were specified, namely, where “the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution” or where “it is protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Thus, the Court recognized that intervention by a taxpayer in an enforcement proceeding might well be allowed when the circumstances are proper. But the Court did not there pronounce, even when confronted with a situation concerning an attorney’s work product, that the taxpayer possesses an absolute right to intervene in any internal revenue summons proceeding. The usual process of balancing opposing equities is called for. We, thus, are not in agreement with the holdings or implications in United States v. Benford, 406 F. 2d 1192, 1194 (CA7 1969); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F. 2d 931 (CA3 1969); and Justice v. United States, 365 F. 2d 312, 314 (CA6 1966), to the effect that, under Reisman, a taxpayer may intervene as of right simply because it is his tax liability that is the subject of the summons. Instead, we agree with the opposing conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit here, 418 F. 2d, at 1218, and in In re Cole, 342 F. 2d 5, 7-8 (CA2), cert. denied, 381 U. S. 950 (1965), and O’Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F. 2d 43, 44 (CA1), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 969 (1966). VI We turn, then, to Donaldson’s particular situation. The material sought, as has been.noted, consists only, of Acme’s routine business records in which the taxpayer has ho proprietary interest of any kind, which are not the work product of his attorney or accountant, and which enjoy no established attorney-client or other privilege. Donaldson’s only interest — and of course it looms large in his eyes — lies in the fact that those records presumably contain details of Acme-to-Donaldson payments possessing significance for federal income tax purposes. This asserted interest, however, is nothing more than a desire by Donaldson to counter and overcome Mer-curio’s and Acme’s willingness, under summons, to comply and to produce records. The nature of the “interest” urged by the taxpayer is apparent from the fact that the material in question (once we assume its relevance) would not be subject to suppression if the Government obtained it by other routine means, such as by Acme’s independent and voluntary disclosure prior to summons, or by way of identifiable deductions in Acme’s own income, tax returns, or through Mercurio’s appearance as a trial witness, or by subpoena of the records for trial. This interest cannot be the kind contemplated by Rule 24 (a) (2) when it speaks in general terms of “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action.” What is obviously meant there is a significantly protectable interest. And the taxpayer, to the extent'that he has such a protectable interest, as, for example, by way of privilege, or to the extent he may claim abuse of process, may always assert that interest or that claim in due course at its proper place in any subsequent trial. Cf. United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 (1966). We therefore hold that the taxpayer’s interest is not enough and is not of sufficient magnitude for us to conclude that he is to be allowed to intervene. Were we to hold otherwise, as he would have us do, we would unwar-rantedly cast doubt upon and stultify the Service’s every investigatory move. VII This conclusion could dispose of the case, for our main concern here is with the taxpayer’s asserted right to intervene in the particular enforcement proceedings. Donaldson, however, strenuously urges, in addition, that an internal revenue summons proceeding may not be utilized at all in aid of an investigation that has the potentiality of resulting in a recommendation that a criminal prosecution be instituted against the taxpayer. He argues that a summons so used is invalid and unenforceable because it is outside the scope of § 7602. The Government naturally argues the contrary. The argument centers in the above-mentioned dictum in Reisman, 375 U. S., at 449: “[T]he witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. 2d 767, 772-773, as well as that it is protected' by the attorney-client privilege....” We note initially that, despite the dictum, the courts of appeals in opinions issued since Reismftn was decided, appear uniformly to approve the use of a summons in an investigation that is likely to lead. to civil liability as well, as to criminal prosecution. The use of a summons also has been approved; even where it is alleged that its purpose is to uncover crime, if no criminal prosecution as yet has been instituted. On the other hand, it has been said, usually citing Reisman, that where the sole objective of the investigation is to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, the purpose is not a legiti-'mate one and enforcement may be denied. This, of course, would likely be the case where a criminal prosecution has been instituted and is pending at the time of issuance of the summons. It is precisely the latter situation — where the sole object of the investigation is to gather data for criminal prosecution — that is the subject of the Reisman dictum. This is evident from the fact that the dictum itself embraces the citation of Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. 2d 767, 772-773 (CA9 1956), an opinion in which, at the pages cited, the Ninth Circuit very carefully distinguished United States v. O’Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (Mass. 1953), a case where the taxpayer already was under indictment. The Reisman dictum is to be read in the light of its citation of Boren, and of Boren’s own citation of O’Connor; when so read, the dictum comes into proper focus as applicable to the situation of a pending criminal charge or, at most, of an investigation solely for criminal purposes. Any other holding, of course, would thwart and defeat the appropriate investigatory powers that the Congress has placed in “the Secretary or his delegate.” When Grady’s summonses were issued to Mercurio and to Acme, Donaldson was not under indictment and, indeed, no recommendation had been made for his prosecution. That he might be indicted and prosecuted was only a possibility, no more and.no less in his case than in the case of any other taxpayer whose income tax return is undergoing audit. Prosecution will necessarily depend on the result of that audit and on what the examination and investigation reveal. We bear in mind that the Internal Revenue Service is organized to carry out the broad responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury under § 7801 (a) of the 1954 Code for the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws. See Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions, § 1112 et seq., 35 Fed. Reg. 2417 et seq. (1970). We further bear in mind that the Service has district offices, each with an audit division and a criminal division; that the Audit Division’s program emphasizes the civil aspects of enforcement but un-braces “participation with special agents of the Intelligence Division iii the conduct of tax fraud investigations,” § 1118.4; that the Intelligence Division enforces the criminal statutes affecting income and certain other taxes and develops information concerning alleged criminal violations, § 1118.6; that each assistant regional commissioner for. intelligence develops programs for the investigation of alleged tax frauds and “certain other civil' and alleged criminal violations of tax laws”.and “approves or disapproves recommendations for prosecution,” § 1114. (10) ; and that recommendations for. prosecution are processed through the office of regional counsel and by that office to the Department of Justice, § 1116 (3). This demonstrates that the special agent may well conduct his investigation jointly with an agent from the Audit Division; that their combined efforts are directed to both civil and criminal infractions; and' that any decision to recommend prosecution comes only after the investigation is complete or is sufficiently far along to support appropriate conclusions. The fact that a full-scale tax fraud investigation is being made does not. necessarily mean that prosecution ensues when tax liability becomes' apparent. Congress clearly has authorized the use of the summons in investigating what may prove tó be criminal conduct. The regulations are- positive. Treas. Regs. § 301.7602-1 (.c) (4), 26 CFR ■ § 301.7602-1 (c) (4). The underlying statutes are just as authoritative. Section 6659 (a) (2) of the Code defines the term “tax” as used in the Code and, hence, in the authorizing § 7602, to include any addition or penalty. Section 7602 contains no restriction; further, it has its ascertainable roots in the 1939 Code’s § 3614 and, also, § 3615 (a)-'(c), which, by its very language and by its proximity to § 3616 and § 3654, appears to authorize the use of the summons for investigation into criminal conduct. There is no statutory suggestion for -any meaningful line of distinction, for civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the point of a special agent’s appearance. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1, 4 (1968). To draw a line where a special agent appears would require the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to forgo either the úse of the summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refuse to draw that line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal law. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 11 (1970). We hold that under § 7602 an internal revenue summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Affirmed. Mr., Justice Brennan, believing that under the facts of this case petitioner has established no right to intervene, concurs in the result. The record does not specifically support the fact of. Donaldson’s employment by, or performance for, Acme. In thé context of the case, however, this is implied and, obviously, the investigation is directed to the ascertainment of the fact. “§ 7602. Examination of books and witnesses “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax... or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his 'delegate is authorized— “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; “(2) To summon the person liable for tax... or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for.tax... or any other person the Secretary or his delegate' may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place- named in the summons and- to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony,- under oath, as may be relevant' or material to such inquiry; and. “ (3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” “§ 7402. Jurisdiction of district courts “(b) To enforce summons. — If any person is summoned under the.' internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or ■	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 et al. v. FRASER, a minor, et al. No. 84-1667. Argued March 3, 1986 Decided July 7, 1986 BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 687. Blackmun, J., concurred in the result. Marshall, J., post, p. 690, and Stevens, J., post, p. 691, filed dissenting opinions. William A. Coats argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Clifford D. Foster, Jr. Jeffrey T. Haley argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Charles S. Sims. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Robert V. Zener; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Find-ley, and George Nicholson; and for the Texas Council of School Attorneys by Jean F. Powers and David Crump. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Booksellers Association et al. by Ronald Coles; for the Freedom to Read Foundation by James A. Klenk; for the National Education Association by Michael D. Simpson; and for the Student Press Law Center by J. Marc Abrams. Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August W. Steinhilber, and Thomas A. Shannon filed a brief for the National School Boards Association as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether the First Amendment prevents a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly. I A On April 26, 1983, respondent Matthew N. Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in Pierce County, Washington, delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office. Approximately 600 high school students, many of whom were 14-year-olds, attended the assembly. Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to the study hall. The assembly was part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-government. Students who elected not to attend the assembly were required to report to study hall. During the entire speech, Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Two of Fraser’s teachers, with whom he discussed the contents of his speech in advance, informed him that the speech was “inappropriate and that he probably should not deliver it,” App. 30, and that his delivery of the speech might have “severe consequences.” Id., at 61. During Fraser’s delivery of the speech, a school counselor observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent’s speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that on the day following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class. Id., at 41-44. A Bethel High School disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene language in the school provides: “Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal called Fraser into her office and notified him that the school considered his speech to have been a violation of this rule. Fraser was presented with copies of five letters submitted by teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was given a chance to explain his conduct, and he admitted to having given the speech described and that he deliberately used sexual innuendo in the speech. Fraser was then informed that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker at the school’s commencement exercises. Fraser sought review of this disciplinary action through the School District’s grievance procedures. The hearing officer determined that the speech given by respondent was “indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of many of the students and faculty in attendance at the assembly.” The examiner determined that the speech fell within the ordinary meaning of “obscene,” as used in the disruptive-conduct rule, and affirmed the discipline in its entirety. Fraser served two days of his suspension, and was allowed to return to school on the third day. B Respondent, by his father as guardian ad litem, then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Respondent alleged a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court held that the school’s sanctions violated respondent’s right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the school’s disruptive-conduct rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal of respondent’s name from the graduation speaker’s list violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the disciplinary rule makes no mention of such removal as a possible sanction. The District Court awarded respondent $278 in damages, $12,750 in litigation costs and attorney’s fees, and enjoined the School District from preventing respondent from speaking at the commencement ceremonies. Respondent, who had been elected graduation speaker by a -write-in vote of his classmates, delivered a speech at the commencement ceremonies on June 8, 1983. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, 755 F. 2d 1356 (1985), holding that respondent’s speech was indistinguishable from the protest armband in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). The court explicitly rejected the School District’s argument that the speech, unlike the passive conduct of wearing a black armband, had a disruptive effect on the educational process. The Court of Appeals also rejected the School District’s argument that it had an interest in protecting an essentially captive audience of minors from lewd and indecent language in a setting sponsored by the school, reasoning that the School District’s “unbridled discretion” to determine what discourse is “decent” would “increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public schools.” 755 F. 2d, at 1363. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the School District’s argument that, incident to its responsibility for the school curriculum, it had the power to control the language used to express ideas during a school-sponsored activity. We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 814 (1985). We reverse. I — I I — I This Court acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., supra, that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Id., at 506. The Court of Appeals read that case as precluding any discipline of Fraser for indecent speech and lewd conduct in the school assembly. That court appears to have proceeded on the theory that the use of lewd and obscene speech in order to make what the speaker considered to be a point in a nominating speech for a fellow student was essentially the same as the wearing of an armband in Tinker as a form of protest or the expression of a political position. The marked distinction between the political “message” of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent’s speech in this case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals. In upholding the students’ right to engage in a nondisruptive, passive expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note that the case did “not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students.” Id., at 508. It is against this background that we turn to consider the level of First Amendment protection accorded to Fraser’s utterances and actions before an official high school assembly attended by 600 students. I — i I — I h-H The role and purpose of the American public school system were well described by two historians, who stated: “[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.” C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the United States 228 (1968). In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76-77 (1979), we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of public education as the “inculcation of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.” These fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these “fundamental values” must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences. In our Nation’s legislative halls, where some of the most vigorous political debates in our society are carried on, there are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other participants in the debate. The Manual of Parliamentary Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the House of Representatives to govern the proceedings in that body, prohibits the use of “impertinent” speech during debate and likewise provides that “[n]o person is to use indecent language against the proceedings of the House.” Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice §§359, 360, reprinted in Manual and Rules of House of Representatives, H. R. Doc. No. 97-271, pp. 158-159 (1982); see id., at 111, n. a (Jefferson’s Manual governs the House in all cases to which it applies). The Rules of Debate applicable in the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to order for imputing improper motives to another Senator or for referring offensively to any state. See Senate Procedure, S. Doc. No. 97-2, Rule XIX, pp. 568-569, 588-591 (1981). Senators have been censured for abusive language directed at other Senators. See Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1793 to 1972, S. Doc. No. 92-7, pp. 95-98 (1972) (Sens. McLaurin and Tillman); id., at 152-153 (Sen. McCarthy). Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate? The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse. A sharply divided Court upheld the right to express an antidraft viewpoint in a public place, albeit in terms highly offensive to most citizens. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school. In New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 340-342 (1985), we reaffirmed that the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. As cogently expressed by Judge Newman, “the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.” Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School Dist., 607 F. 2d 1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) (opinion concurring in result). Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed, the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the “work of the schools.” Tinker, 393 U. S., at 508; see Ambach v. Norwick, supra. The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers — and indeed the older students — demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models. The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy. The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students — indeed to any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students. See App. 77-81. The speech could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some students were reported as bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked. This Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), this Court upheld a New York statute banning the sale of sexually oriented material to minors, even though the material in question was entitled to First Amendment protection with respect to adults. And in addressing the question whether the First Amendment places any limit on the authority of public schools to remove books from a public school library, all Members of the Court, otherwise sharply divided, acknowledged that the school board has the authority to remove books that are vulgar. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 871-872 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 879-881 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in judgment); id., at 918-920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). These cases recognize the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children — especially in a captive audience — from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech. We have also recognized an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), we dealt with the power of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate a radio broadcast described as “indecent but not obscene.” There the Court reviewed an administrative condemnation of the radio broadcast of a self-styled “humorist” who described his own performance as being in “the words you couldn’t say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say ever.” Id., at 729; see also id., at 751-755 (Appendix to opinion of the Court). The Commission concluded that “certain words depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, [and] noted that they 'were broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience.’” The Commission issued an order declaring that the radio station was guilty of broadcasting indecent language in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1464. 438 U. S., at 732. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commission’s determination, and we reversed, reinstating the Commission’s citation of the station. We concluded that the broadcast was properly considered “obscene, indecent, or profane” within the meaning of the statute. The plurality opinion went on to reject the radio station’s assertion of a First Amendment right to broadcast vulgarity: “These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: ‘[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S., at 572.” Id., at 746. We hold that petitioner School District acted entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech. Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political viewpoint. The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students. Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the “fundamental values” of public school education. Justice Black, dissenting in Tinker, made a point that is especially relevant in this case: “I wish therefore, ... to disclaim any purpose ... to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public school students.” 393 U. S., at 526. IV Respondent contends that the circumstances of his suspension violated due process because he had no way of knowing that the delivery of the speech in question would subject him to disciplinary sanctions. This argument is wholly without merit. We have recognized that “maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.” New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 340. Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 161 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Two days’ suspension from school does not rise to the level of a penal sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process protections applicable to a criminal prosecution. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). The school disciplinary rule proscribing “obscene” language and the prespeech admonitions of teachers gave adequate warning to Fraser that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Reversed. Justice Blackmun concurs in the result. Petitioners also challenge the ruling of the District Court that the removal of Fraser’s name from the ballot for graduation speaker violated his due process rights because that sanction was not indicated as a potential punishment in the school’s disciplinary rules. We agree with the Court of Appeals that this issue has become moot, since the graduation ceremony has long since passed and Fraser was permitted to speak in accordance with the District Court’s injunction. No part of the damages award was based upon the removal of Fraser’s name from the list, since damages were based upon the loss of two days’ schooling.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO., EXECUTOR v. UNITED STATES. No. 637. Argued March 20, 1967. Decided May 22, 1967. Milton I. Baldinger argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Donald J. Fendrick. Richard C. Pugh argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin, Robert N. Anderson and Albert J. Beveridge III. Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether a bequest in trust providing for the monthly payment to decedent’s widow of a fixed amount can qualify for the estate tax marital deduction under § 2056 (b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 2056 (b)(5). That section allows a marital deduction from a decedent’s adjusted gross estate of up to one-half the value of the estate in respect to specified interests which pass to the surviving spouse. Among the interests which qualify is one in which the surviving spouse “is entitled for life to . . . all the income from a specific portion [of the trust property], payable annually or at more frequent intervals, with power in the surviving spouse to appoint . . . such specific portion . ...” At the date of decedent’s death, the value of the trust corpus created by his will was $69,246. The will provided that his widow should receive $300 per month until decedent’s youngest child reached 18, and $350 per month thereafter. If the trust income were insufficient, corpus could be invaded to make the specified payments; if income exceeded the monthly amount, it was to be accumulated. The widow was given power to appoint the entire corpus by will. On decedent’s estate tax return, his executor reported an adjusted gross estate of $199,760. The executor claimed the maximum marital deduction of one-half the gross estate, $99,875, on the ground that qualified interests passing to the wife exceeded that amount. The value of the property which passed to the widow outright was $41,751. To this the executor added the full value of the trust, $69,246. The Commissioner, however, determined that the trust did not qualify for the marital deduction because the widow’s right to the income of the trust was not expressed as a “fractional or percentile share” of the total trust income, as the Treasury Regulation, § 20.2056 (b)-5 (c), requires. Accordingly, the Commissioner reduced the amount of the allowable deduction to $41,751. The resulting deficiency in estate tax was paid, a claim for refund was disallowed, the executor sued in District Court for refund, and the District Judge gave summary judgment for the executor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, with three judges dissenting. Because of an acknowledged conflict between the decision of the Third Circuit in this case and that of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Citizens National Bank of Evansville, 359 F. 2d 817, petition for certiorari pending, No. 488, October Term, 1966, we granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 967. We reverse. The basis for the Commissioner’s disallowance lay in Treasury Regulation § 20.2056 (b)-5 (c). This inters pretative Regulation purports to define “specific portion” as it is used in §2056 (b)(5) of the Code: “A partial interest in property is not treated as a specific portion of the entire interest unless the rights of the surviving spouse in income . . . constitute a fractional or percentile share of a property interest . . . .” The Regulation specifically provides that “if the annual income of the spouse is limited to a specific sum . . . the interest is not a deductible interest.” If this Regulation properly implements the Code, the trust in this case plainly fails to qualify for the marital deduction. We hold, however, that in the context of this case the Regulation improperly restricts the scope of the congressionally granted deduction. In the District Court, the executor initially claimed that the entire trust qualified for the marital deduction simply because, at the time of trial, the corpus had not yet produced an income in excess of $300 per month, and that the widow was therefore entitled “to all the income from the entire interest.” The District Court rejected this contention, observing that the income from the corpus could exceed $300 per month, and in that event the excess would have to be accumulated. The executor’s alternative claim, which the District Court accepted, was that the “specific portion” of the trust corpus whose income would amount to $300 per month could be computed, and a deduction allowed for that amount. Resolution of the question in this case, whether a qualifying “specific portion” can be computed from the monthly stipend specified in a decedent’s will, is essentially a matter of discovering the intent of Congress. The general history of the marital deduction is well known. See United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118, 128 (1963). The deduction was enacted in 1948, and the underlying purpose was to equalize the incidence of the estate tax in community property and common-law jurisdictions. Under a community property system a surviving spouse takes outright ownership of half of the community property, which therefore is not ificluded in the deceased spouse’s estate. The marital deduction allows transfer of up to one-half of noncommunity property to the surviving spouse free of the estate tax. Congress, however, allowed the deduction even when the interest transferred is less than the outright ownership which community property affords. In “recognition of one of the customary modes of transfer of property in common-law States,” the 1948 statute provided that a bequest in trust, with the surviving spouse “entitled for life to all the income from the corpus of the trust, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, with power . . . to appoint the entire corpus” would qualify for the deduction. The 1948 legislation required that the bequest in trust entitle the surviving spouse to “all the income” from the trust corpus, and grant a power to appoint the “entire corpus.” These requirements were held by several lower courts to disqualify for the deduction a single trust in which the surviving spouse was granted a right to receive half (for example) of the income and to appoint half of the corpus. Since there was no good reason to require a testator to create two separate trusts — one for his wife, the other for his children, for example — Congress in 1954 revised the marital deduction provision of the statute to allow the deduction where a decedent gives his surviving spouse “all the income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific portion thereof” and a power to “appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion.” The House Report on this change states that “The bill makes it clear that ... a right to income plus a general power of appointment over only an undivided part of the property will qualify that part of the property for the marital deduction.” The Senate Report contains identical language. There is no indication in the legislative history of the change from which one could conclude that Congress — in using the words “all the income from a specific portion” in the statute, or the equivalent words “a right to income . . . over ... an undivided part” in the committee reports — intended that the deduction afforded would be defeated merely because the “specific portion” or the “undivided part” was not expressed by the testator in terms of a “fractional or percentile share” of the whole corpus. Congress’ intent to afford a liberal “estate-splitting” possibility to married couples, where the deductible half of the decedent’s estate would ultimately — if not consumed — be taxable in the estate of the survivor, is unmistakable. Indeed, in § 93 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1668, Congress made “The more realistic rules of the 1954 Code” apply retroactively to the original enactment of the marital deduction in 1948, and opened the statute of- limitations to allow refunds or credits for overpayments. Plainly such a provision should not be construed so as to impose unwarranted restrictions upon the availability of the deduction. Yet the Government insists that even where there are well-established principles for computing the principal required to produce the monthly stipend provided for in a trust, a “specific portion” cannot be determined in that way. The “specific portion” must, the Government urges, be expressed in the trust as a fractional or percentile share of the total corpus. The spouse of a testator whose will provides for a specific monthly stipend is deprived of any benefit from the marital deduction, according to the Government’s view. But we can find no warrant for that narrow view, in common sense or in the statute and its history. The Government puts most of its reliance upon a phrase which occurred once in the legislative history of the 1948 enactment. The Senate Report stated that the marital deduction would be available “where the surviving spouse, by reason of her [sic] right to the income and a power of appointment, is the virtual owner of the property.” The Government’s argument is that the deduction was intended only in cases where the equivalent of the outright ownership of a community property State was granted, and that this is what the Senate Report meant by the words “virtual owner.” Actually, however, the words were not used in that context at all. The section of the Report from which those words derive deals with the rule that, with minor exceptions, the marital deduction does not apply where any person other than the surviving spouse has any power over the income or corpus of the trust. It is in this sense that the Report described the surviving spouse as a “virtual owner.” Hence, the Government’s argument that only a grant of the income from a fractional or percentile share subjects the surviving spouse to the vagaries and fluctuations of the economic performance of the corpus in the way an outright owner would be, is simply irrelevant. There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended the deduction to be available only in such a situation, nor is there any apparent connection between the purposes of the deduction and such a limitation on its availability. Compare Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F. 2d 544, 550-551 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1962). Obviously Congress did not intend the deduction to be available only with respect to interests equivalent to outright ownership, or trusts would not have been permitted to qualify at all. The Court of Appeals advanced a somewhat different argument in support of the Government’s conclusion. Without relying upon the validity of the Regulation, the Court of Appeals maintained that a “specific portion” can be found only where there is an acceptable method of computing it, and that no such method is available in a case of the present sort. The Court of Appeals noted that the computation must produce the “ratio between the maximum monthly income [producible by the whole corpus] and the monthly stipend [provided for in the trust].” 363 F. 2d 476, 484. The following example was given: “If the investment factors involved were constant and it could be determined that the maximum income that could be produced from the corpus in a month was, for example, $500 then the relationship between the $300 monthly stipend and the $500 maximum income would define 'specific portion’ for marital deduction purposes, i. e.: “$300 being % of $500 then % of $69,245.85 would be the 'specific portion’ of the trust corpus from which the surviving spouse would be entitled to the entire income of $300 monthly under maximum production circumstances. “Though in reality it might take the entire corpus to produce the monthly stipend, or even the necessity to invade corpus might be present, nevertheless ... it could be said, after computing the theoretical maximum income, that the surviving spouse’s income interest of $300 monthly represented the investment of % of the corpus. ‘Specific portion’ would then be accurately defined for marital deduction purposes.” (Italics in original.) 363 F. 2d, at 484, n. 17. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that the computation could not be made because “[t]he market conditions for purposes of investment are unknown” and, therefore, there are no constant investment factors to use in computing the maximum possible monthly income of the whole corpus. 363 F. 2d, at 484. It is with this latter conclusion that we disagree. To be sure, perfect prediction of realistic future rates of return is not possible. However, the use of projected rates of return in the administration of the federal tax laws is hardly an innovation. Cf. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F. 2d 544, 551, n. 7 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1962). It should not be a difficult matter to settle on a rate of return available to a trustee under reasonable investment conditions, which could be used to compute the “specific portion” of the corpus whose income is equal to the monthly stipend provided for in the trust. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in Gelb, supra, “the use of actuarial tables for dealing with estate tax problems has been so widespread and of such long standing that we cannot assume Congress would have balked at it here; the United States is in business with enough different taxpayers so that the law of averages has ample opportunity to work.” 298 F. 2d, at 551-552. The Government concedes, as it must, that application of a projected rate of return to determine the “specific portion” of the trust corpus whose income is equal to the monthly stipend allotted will not result in any of the combined marital estate escaping ultimate taxation in either the decedent’s or the surviving spouse’s estate. The Government argues, however, that if analogous actuarial methods were used to compute as a fixed dollar amount the “specific portion” as to which a qualifying power of appointment is given, where the power in fact granted extends to the whole corpus but the corpus is subject to measurable invasions for the benefit, for example, of a child, the result, in some cases, would be to enable substantial avoidance of estate tax. Whether, properly viewed, the Government’s claim holds true, and, if so, what effect that should have upon the qualification of such a trust, is a difficult matter. Needless to say, nothing we hold in this opinion has reference to that quite different problem, which is not before us. Cf. Gelb v. Commissioner, supra. The District Court used an annuity-valuation approach to compute the “specific portion.” This was incorrect. The question, as the Court of Appeals recognized, is to determine the amount of the corpus required to produce the fixed monthly stipend, not to compute the present value of the right to monthly payments over an actuarially computed life expectancy. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. The section reads, in full: “(5) Life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse.— In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each ease the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no power in any other person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than the surviving spouse— “(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall, for purposes of subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and “(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), be considered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse. “This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion thereof, whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and in all events.” The trustee was also given discretion to invade up to $1,500 of corpus in the event of the widow’s illness or financial emergency. The relevant part of the will is as follows: “ITEM 6. I give, devise and bequeath one-half (%) of all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, whatsoever and wheresoever the same be, both real and personal, to which I may be entitled, or which I may have power to dispose of at the time of my death, unto my Trustee hereinafter named and designated, to have and to hold the same in trust, nevertheless, as hereinafter provided. “(a) I direct my Trustee to pay out of the said income and corpus of the said estate unto my wife, Beatrice O. Young, the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month for and during the period until my youngest child reaches the age of eighteen years, and thereafter I direct my Trustee to pay to my wife, Beatrice O. Young, the sum of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month for and during the rest of her natural life. “(b) If my wife survives me, she shall have the power, exercisable by Will, to appoint to her estate, or to others, any or all of the principal remaining at the time of her death. If my wife fails to appoint the entire principal to her estate or to others as above authorized, then upon her death (or if she predeceases me, then upon my death) any principal remaining at that time shall be paid over to my children on the same terms and conditions as under Item 7 of this my Will.” In the Citizens National Bank ease, decedent directed the trustee to pay the surviving wife $200 per month for the two years following his death, and thereafter $300 per month; the widow was the sole beneficiary. The District Director disallowed that part of the executor-bank’s claim to an estate tax marital deduction based upon the trust, and the bank sued for a refund. The District Court held in favor of the bank, and computed the allowable deduction by capitalizing the $200 monthly stipend at an assumed 3%% rate of return. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the present case is also in apparent conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F. 2d 544 (1962) (Friendly, J.). The surviving widow in Gelb was entitled to all the income from the trust. The trustees (of which the wife was one) were empowered to invade corpus up to $5,000 per year for the education and support of testator’s youngest daughter, the payments to be made to the wife. The Court of Appeals held that the present worth of the maximum amount payable to the daughter could be computed actuarially, taking into account the joint expectancy of the widow and daughter, and could then be deducted from the total trust corpus to arrive at the “specific portion” as to which the widow was given a power of appointment. The Court of Appeals observed that “Congress spoke of a ‘specific portion,’ not of a ‘fractional or percentile share ...,’” 298 F. 2d, at 550-551, and disapproved the Regulation “insofar as it would limit a ‘specific portion’ to ‘a fractional or percentile share.’ ” 298 F. 2d, at 551. The relevant part of the Regulation is as follows: ■'(e) Definition of ‘specific portion.’ A partial interest in property is not treated as a specific portion of the entire interest unless the rights of the surviving spouse in income and as to the power constitute a fractional or percentile share of a property interest so that such interest or share in the surviving spouse reflects its proportionate share of the increment or decline in the whole of the property interest to which the income rights and the power relate. Thus, if the right of the spouse to income and the power extend to one-half or a specified percentage of the property, or the equivalent, the interest is considered as a specific portion. On the other hand, if the annual income of the spouse is limited to a specific sum, or if she has a power to appoint only a specific sum out of a larger fund, the interest is not a deductible interest.” Because the marital deduction is computed as of the date of the deceased spouse’s death, Jackson v. United States, 376 U. S. 503, 508 (1964), the parties are agreed that the monthly stipend to be considered is $300 per month, not $350 per month. S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), p. 28. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 812 (e) (1) (F), as added by § 361 of the Revenue Act of 1948, c. 168, 62 Stat. 118. See, e. g., Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 237 F. 2d 345 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 1024 (1957); Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F. 2d 401 (C. A. 10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 878 (1956). See also S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., (1958), pp. 240-241. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), p. 92. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), p. 125. To be sure, the two reports do give an example of the simplest kind of trust covered by the change: “For example, if the decedent in his will provided for the creation of a trust under the terms of which the income from one-half of the trust property is payable to this surviving spouse with uncontrolled power in the spouse to appoint such one-half of the trust property by will, such interest will qualify . . . .” Reports, supra, nn. 9 and 10, at A319, 475, respectively. Obviously this example was not intended to limit the meaning of the new language. S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), p. 107. S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1948), p. 16. Cf. Note, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 468, 470-472 (1967). An estimated realistic rate of return which a trustee could be expected to obtain under reasonable investment conditions must be used — absent specific restrictions upon the trustee’s investment powers — in order to isolate that “part of the corpus which in [all] . . . reasonable event [s]” will produce no more than the monthly stipend, to paraphrase the court below. 363 F. 2d, at 483.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF MICHIGAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 89. Argued March 6-7, 1957. Decided April 22, 1957. Ellsworth C. Alvord and Raymond H. Berry argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were A. H. Moorman and Lincoln Arnold. John N. Stull argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, I. Henry Kutz and Joseph F. Goetten. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1945, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue revoked his 1984 and 1938 rulings exempting the petitioner from federal income taxes, and retroactively applied the revocation to 1943 and 1944. The Commissioner also determined that prepaid membership dues received by the petitioner should be taken into income in the year received, rejecting the petitioner’s method of reporting as income only that part of the dues as was recorded on petitioner’s books as earned in the tax year. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determinations, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. This Court granted certiorari. The Commissioner had determined in 1934 that the petitioner was a “club” entitled to exemption under provisions of the internal revenue laws corresponding to § 101 (9) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, notifying the petitioner that “. . . future returns, under the provisions of section 101 (9) . . . will not be required so long as there is no change in your organization, your purposes or methods of doing business.” In 1938, the Commissioner confirmed this ruling in a letter stating: “. . . as it appears that there has been no change in your form of organization or activities which would affect your status the previous ruling of the Bureau holding you to be exempt from filing returns of income is affirmed . . . .” Accordingly the petitioner did not pay federal taxes from 1933 to 1945. The Commissioner revoked these rulings in 1945, however, and directed the petitioner to file returns for 1943 and subsequent years. Pursuant to this direction, the petitioner filed, under protest, corporate income and excess profits tax returns for 1943, 1944 and 1945. The Commissioner’s earlier rulings were grounded upon an erroneous interpretation of the term “club” in § 101 (9) and thus were based upon a mistake of law. It is conceded that in 1943 and 1944 petitioner was not, in fact or in law, a “club” entitled to exemption within the meaning of § 101 (9), and also that petitioner is subject to taxation for 1945 and subsequent years. It is nevertheless contended that the Commissioner had no power to apply the revocation retroactively to 1943 and 1944, and that, in any event, the assessment of taxes against petitioner for 1943 and 1944 was barred by the statute of limitations. The petitioner argues that, in light of the 1934 and 1938 rulings, the Commissioner was equitably estopped from applying the revocation retroactively. This argument is without merit. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law. The decision in Stockstrom v. Commis sioner, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 286, 190 F. 2d 283, to the extent that it holds to the contrary, is disapproved. Petitioner’s reliance on H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F. 2d 831, and Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F. 2d 178, is misplaced because those cases did not involve correction of an erroneous ruling of law. Reliance on Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F. 2d 589, is also misplaced because there the court recognized the power in the Commissioner to correct a mistake of law, but held that in the circumstances of the case the Commissioner had exceeded the bounds of the discretion vested in him under § 3791 (b) of the 1939 Code. The Commissioner’s action may not be disturbed unless, in the circumstances of this case, the Commissioner abused the discretion vested in him by § 3791 (b) of the 1939 Code. That section provides: “Retroactivity op Regulations or Rulings.— The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury Decision, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.” The petitioner contends that this section forbids the Commissioner taking retroactive action. On the contrary, it is clear from the language of the section and its legislative history that Congress thereby confirmed the authority of the Commissioner to correct any ruling, regulation or Treasury decision retroactively, but empowered him, in his discretion, to limit retroactive application to the extent necessary to avoid inequitable results. The petitioner, citing Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 306 U. S. 110, argues that resort by the Commissioner to § 3791 (b) was precluded in this case because the repeated re-enactments of § 101 (9) gave the force of law to the provision of the Treasury regulations relating to that section. These regulations provided that when an organization had established its right to exemption it need not thereafter make a return of income or any further showing with respect to its status unless it changed the character of its operations or the purpose for which it was originally created. Helvering v. Reynolds Co. is inapplicable to this case. As stated by the Tax Court: “The regulations involved there [Helvering v. Reynolds Co.] . . . purported to determine what did or did not constitute gain or loss. The regulations here ... in nowise purported to determine whether any organization was or was not exempt.” These regulations did not provide the exemption or interpret § 101 (9), but merely specified the necessary information required to be filed in order that the Commissioner might rule whether or not the taxpayer was entitled to exemption. This is thus not a case of . . administrative construction embodied in the regulation [s] . . .” which, by repeated re-enactment of § 101 (9), “. . . Congress must be taken to have approved . . . and thereby to have given . . . the force of law.” Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 306 U. S., at 114, 115. We must, then, determine whether the retroactive action of the Commissioner was an abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case. The action was the consequence of the reconsideration by the Commissioner, in 1943, of the correctness of the prior rulings exempting automobile clubs, initiated by a General Counsel Memorandum interpreting § 101 (9) to be inapplicable to such organizations. The Commissioner adopted the General Counsel’s interpretation and proceeded to apply it, effective from 1943, indiscriminately to automobile clubs. We thus find no basis for disagreeing with the conclusion, reached by both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, that the Commissioner, having dealt with petitioner upon the same basis as other automobile clubs, did not abuse his discretion. Nor did the two-year delay in proceeding with the petitioner’s case, in these circumstances, vitiate the Commissioner’s action. The petitioner’s contention that the statute of limitations barred the assessment of deficiencies for 1943 and 1944 is also without merit. Its returns for those years were not filed until October 22, 1945. Within three years, on August 25, 1948, the petitioner and the Commissioner signed consents extending the period to June 30,1949. The period was later extended to June 20,1950. Notice of deficiencies was mailed to petitioner on February 20, 1950. The assessments were therefore within time under §§ 275 (a) and 276 (b) unless, as the petitioner asserts, the statute of limitations began to run from the dates when, if there was a duty to file, the statute required filing. The petitioner argues that because its omission to file on March 15, 1944, and March 15, 1945, was induced by the Commissioner’s 1934 and 1938 rulings, it is only equitable to interpret the statute of limitations as running from those dates in the circumstances of this case. But the express condition prescribed by the Congress was that the statute was to run against the United States from the date of the actual filing of the return, and no action of the Commissioner can change or modify the conditions under which the United States consents to the running of the statute of limitations against it. In Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U. S. 245, 249, this Court held: “Under the established general rule a statute of limitation runs against the United States only when they assent and upon the conditions prescribed. Here assent that the statute might begin to run was conditioned upon the presentation of a return duly sworn to. No officer had power to substitute something else for the thing specified. . . .” It is also argued that the Form 990 returns filed by the petitioner in compliance with § 54 (f) of the 1939 Code, as amended, constituted the filing of returns for the purposes of § 275 (a). But the Form 990 returns are merely information returns in furtherance of a congressional program to secure information useful in a determination whether legislation should be enacted to subject to taxation certain tax-exempt corporations competing with taxable corporations. Those returns lack the data necessary for the computation and assessment of deficiencies and are not therefore tax returns within the contemplation of § 275 (a). Cf. Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U. S. 219. The final issue argued concerns the treatment of membership dues and arises because such dues are paid in advance for one year. The dues upon collection are deposited in a general bank account and are not segregated from general funds but are available and are used for general corporate purposes. For bookkeeping purposes, however, the dues upon receipt are credited to an account carried as a liability account and designated “Unearned Membership Dues.” During the first month of membership and each of the following eleven months one-twelfth of the amount paid is credited to an account designated “Membership Income.” This method of accounting was followed by petitioner from 1934. The income from such dues reported by petitioner in each of its tax returns for 1943 through 1947 was the amount credited in the year to the “Membership Income” account. The Commissioner determined that the petitioner received the prepaid dues under a claim of right, without restriction as to their disposition, and therefore the entire amount received in each year should be reported as income. The Commissioner relies upon North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 424, where this Court said: “If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, . . . [it] has received income which . . . [it] is required to return . . . .” The petitioner does not deny that it has the unrestricted use of the dues income in the year of receipt, but contends that its accrual method of accounting clearly reflects its income, and that the Commissioner is therefore bound to accept its method of reporting membership dues. We do not agree. Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 required that “ [t] he net income shall be computed ... in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books . . . but ... if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. . . .” The pro rata allocation of the membership dues in monthly amounts is purely artificial and bears no relation to the services which petitioner may in fact be called upon to render for the member. Section 41 vests the Commissioner with discretion to determine whether the petitioner’s method of accounting clearly reflects income. We cannot say, in the circumstances here, that the discretionary action of the Commissioner, sustained by both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, exceeded permissible limits. See Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 204-205. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 20 T. C. 1033. 230 F. 2d 585. 352 U. S. 817. Section 101 (9) provided as follows: “The following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter— “(9) Clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder . . . .” 53 Stat. 33, 26 U. S. C. (1934 ed., Supp. V) § 101 (9). The earlier statute sections were identical to the 1939 section. 52 Stat. 480 (1938); 49 Stat. 1673 (1936); 48 Stat. 700 (1934); 47 Stat. 193 (1932). The letter of revocation stated that in order to qualify as á club under § 101 (9), the “. . . organization should be so composed and its activities be such that fellowship among the members plays a material part in the life of the organization . . . .” It was then stated that the previous rulings were revoked because “[t]he evidence submitted shows that fellowship does not constitute a material part of the life of . . . [petitioner’s] organization and that . . . [petitioner’s] principal activity is the rendering of commercial services to . . . [its] members.” Petitioner renders various services for its members. Among these are emergency road service when a car is disabled; furnishing maps, road and other travel information; and publishing a monthly magazine containing news of travel and of laws pertaining to the use of automobiles. Keystone Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 402; Schafer v. Helvering, 65 App. D. C. 292, 83 F. 2d 317, aff’d, 299 U. S. 171; John M. Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 49 F. 2d 254; Southern Maryland Agricultural Fair Assn. v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 549; Yokohama Ki-Ito Kwaisha, Ltd., 5 B. T. A. 1248; see also, Chattanooga Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551 (by implication); Warren Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551 (by implication); Smyth v. California State Auto. Assn., 175 F. 2d 752 (by implication); Automobile Club of St. Paul v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 1152 (by implication). 53 Stat. 467, 26 U. S. C. § 3791 (b). H. R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 38; S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 48. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 101-1 (1934); Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 101-1 (1936); Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.101-1 (1939). 20 T. C., at 1041. G. C. M. 23688, 1943 Cum. Bull. 283. See, e. g., Chattanooga Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551; Warren Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551; Keystone Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 402; Smyth v. California State Auto. Assn., 175 F. 2d 752; Automobile Club of St. Paul v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 1152. Section 275 (a) provides as follows: “Except as provided in section 276— “(a) General Rule. — The amount of income taxes imposed by this chapter shall be assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period.” 53 Stat. 86, 26 ü. S. C. § 275 (a). Section 276 (b) provides as follows: “(b) Waiver. — Where before the expiration of the time prescribed in section 275 for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner and the taxpayer have consented in writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon.” 53 Stat. 87, 26 ü. S. C. §276 (b). The 1943 tax return was due on March 15, 1944. The 1944 tax return was due on March 15, 1945. To the extent that the decision in Balkan Nat. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 101 F. 2d 75, is to the contrary, it is disapproved. 53 Stat. 28, as amended, 58 Stat. 36, 26 U. S. C. § 54 (f). H. R. Rep. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25; S. Rep. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 21. 53 Stat. 24, 26 U. S. C. § 41. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F. 2d 697, and Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F. 2d 722, are distinguishable on their facts. In Beacon, performance of the subscription, in most instances, was, in part, necessarily deferred until the publication dates after the tax year. In Schuessler, performance of the service agreement required the taxpayer to furnish services at specified times in years subsequent to the tax year. In this case, substantially all services are performed only upon a member’s demand and the taxpayer’s performance was not related to fixed dates after the tax year. We express no opinion upon the correctness of the decisions in Beacon or Schuessler.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
LAKE COUNTRY ESTATES, INC., et al. v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY et al. No. 77-1327. Argued December 4, 1978 Decided March 5, 1979 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in which Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined in part. Brennan, J., post, p. 406, and Marshall, J., post, p. 406, filed opinions dissenting in part. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in Part I of which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 408. John J. Bartko argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Gary H. Moore, James B. Lewis, John 8. Burd, and Joseph M. Lynn. Kenneth C. Rollston argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et al. E. Clement Shute, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of California. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Leonard M. Sperry, Jr., Deputy Attorney General. Robert Frank List, Attorney General, and James H. Thompson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for respondent State of Nevada. Reginald Littrell filed a brief for respondents Henry et al. Me. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, an entity created by Compact between California and Nevada, is entitled to the immunity that the Eleventh Amendment provides to the compacting States themselves. 436 U. S. 943. The case also presents the question whether the individual members of the Agency’s governing body are entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages claims when acting in a legislative capacity. Lake Tahoe, a unique mountain lake, is located partly in California and partly in Nevada. The Lake Tahoe Basin, an area comprising 500 square miles, is a popular resort area that has grown rapidly in recent years. In 1968, the States of California and Nevada agreed to create a single agency to coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its natural resources. As required by the Constitution, in 1969 Congress gave its consent to the Compact, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) was organized. The Compact authorized TRPA to adopt and to enforce a regional plan for land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, and public services. Petitioners own property in the Lake Tahoe Basin. In 1973, they filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that TRPA, the individual members of its governing body, and its executive officer had adopted a land-use ordinance and general plan, and engaged in other conduct, that destroyed the economic value of petitioners’ property. Petitioners alleged that respondents had thereby taken their property without due process of law and without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. They sought monetary and equitable relief. Petitioners advanced alternative theories to support their federal claim. First, they asserted that the alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments gave rise to an implied cause of action, comparable to the claim based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, and that jurisdiction could be predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Second, they claimed that respondents had acted under color of state law and therefore their cause of action was authorized by 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and jurisdiction was provided by 28 U. S. C. § 1343. The District Court dismissed the complaint. Although it concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for “inverse condemnation,” it held that such an action could not be brought against TRPA because that agency did not have the authority to condemn property. The court also held that the individual defendants were immune from liability for the exercise of the discretionary functions alleged in the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of TRPA, but reinstated the complaint against the individual respondents. 566 F. 2d 1353. Addressing first the questions of cause of action and jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' claims based on §§ 1983 and 1343. The court held that congressional approval had transformed the Compact between the States into federal law. As a result, the respondents were acting pursuant to federal authority, rather than under color of state law, and §§ 1983 and 1343 could not be invoked to provide a cause of action and federal jurisdiction. But the court accepted petitioners’ alternative argument: It held that they had alleged a deprivation of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that an implied remedy comparable to that upheld in Bivens, supra, was available, and that federal jurisdiction was provided by § 1331. Having found a cause of action and a basis for federal jurisdiction, the court turned to the immunity questions. Although the point had not been argued, the Court of Appeals decided that the Eleventh Amendment immunized TRPA from suit in a federal court. With respect to the individual respondents, the Court of Appeals held that absolute immunity should be afforded for conduct of a legislative character and qualified immunity for executive action. Since the record did not adequately disclose whether the challenged conduct was legislative or executive, the court remanded for a hearing. Petitioners ask this Court to hold that TRPA is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the individual respondents are not entitled to absolute immunity when acting in a legislative capacity. Because none of the respondents filed a cross-petition for certiorari, we have no occasion to review the Court of Appeals’ additional holding that a violation of the Due Process Clause was adequately alleged. For purposes of our decision, we assume the sufficiency of those allegations. I Before addressing the immunity issues, we must consider whether petitioners properly invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court. While respondents did not cross petition for certiorari, they now argue that the Bivens rationale does not apply to a claim based on the deprivation of property rather than liberty, and therefore the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional analysis was defective. We do not normally address any issues other than those fairly comprised within the questions presented by the petition for certiorari and any cross-petitions. An exception to this rule is the question of jurisdiction: even if not raised by the parties, we cannot ignore the absence of federal jurisdiction. In this case, however, respondents’ attack on the Court of Appeals’ Bivens holding fails to support dismissal for want of jurisdiction for two reasons. First, respondents’ “jurisdictional” arguments are not squarely directed at jurisdiction itself, but rather at the existence of a remedy for the alleged violation of their federal rights. Faced with a similar claim in Mt. Healthy Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, we found that the cause-of-action argument was “not of the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own motion.” Id., at 279. Since the petitioners in Mt. Healthy had “failed to preserve the issue whether the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted,” id., at 281, the Court simply assumed, without deciding, that the suit could properly be brought. Second, even if the lack of a cause of action were considered a jurisdictional defect in a suit brought under § 1331, we may not dismiss for that reason if the record discloses that federal jurisdiction does in fact exist. In this case, we need not even reach the Bivens question to conclude that there is both a cause of action and federal jurisdiction. Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals alleging deprivations of their constitutional rights by action taken “under color of state law.” The Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the requirement of federal approval of the interstate Compact foreclosed the possibility that the conduct of TRPA and its officers could be found to be “under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983. The Compact had its genesis in the actions of the compacting States, and it remains part of the statutory law of both States. The actual implementation of TRPA, after federal approval was obtained, depended upon the appointment of governing members and executives by the two States and their subdivisions and upon mandatory financing secured, by the terms of the Compact, from the counties. In discharging their duties as officials of TRPA, the state and county appointees necessarily have also served the interests of the political units that appointed them. The federal involvement, by contrast, is limited to the appointment of one nonvoting member to the governing board. While congressional consent to the original Compact was required, the States may confer additional powers and duties on TRPA without further congressional action. And each State retains an absolute right to withdraw from the Compact. Even if it were not well settled that § 1983 must be given a liberal construction, these facts adequately characterize the alleged actions of the respondents as “under color of state law” within the meaning of that statute. Federal jurisdiction therefore rests on § 1343, and there is no need to address the question whether there is an implied remedy for violation of the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment. II The Court of Appeals held that California and Nevada had delegated authority ordinarily residing in each of those States to TRPA. Because “the bi-state Authority serves as an agency of the participant states, exercising a specially aggregated slice of state power,” the court concluded “that the TRPA is protected by sovereign immunity, preserved for the states by the Eleventh Amendment.” 566 F. 2d, at 1359-1360. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals would extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to every bistate agency unless that immunity were expressly waived. TRPA argues that the propriety of this result is evidenced by the special constitutional requirement of congressional approval of any interstate compact. Any agency that is so important that it could not even be created by the States without a special Act of Congress should receive the same immunity that is accorded to the States themselves. We cannot accept such an expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment. By its terms, the protection afforded by that Amendment is only available to “one of the United States.” It is true, of course, that some agencies exercising state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself. But the Court has consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a “slice of state power.” If an interstate compact discloses that the compacting States created an agency comparable to a county or municipality, which has no Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Amendment should not be construed to immunize such an entity. Unless there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose, there would appear to be no justification for reading additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment. California and Nevada have both filed briefs in this Court disclaiming any intent to confer immunity on TRPA. They point to provisions of their Compact that indicate that TRPA is to be regarded as a political subdivision rather than an arm of the State. Thus TRPA is described in Art. Ill (a) as a “separate legal entity” and in Art. VI (a) as a “political subdivision.” Under the terms of the Compact, 6 of the 10 governing members of TRPA are appointed by counties and cities, and only 4 by the 2 States.' Funding under the Compact must be provided by the counties, not the States. Finally, instead of the state treasury being directly responsible for judgments against TRPA, Art. VII (f) expressly provides that obligations of TRPA shall not be binding on either State. The regulation of land use is traditionally a function performed by local governments. Concern with the proper performance of that function in the bistate area was a primary motivation for the creation of TRPA itself, and gave rise to the specific controversy at issue in this litigation. Moreover, while TRPA, like cities, towns, and counties, was originally created by the States, its authority to make rules within its jurisdiction is not subject to veto at the state level. Indeed, that TRPA is not in fact an arm of the State subject to its control is perhaps most forcefully demonstrated by the fact that California has resorted to litigation in an unsuccessful attempt to impose its will on TRPA. The intentions of Nevada and California, the terms of the Compact, and the actual operation of TRPA make clear that nothing short of an absolute rule, such as that implicit in the holding of the Court of Appeals, would allow TRPA to claim the sovereign immunity provided by the Constitution to Nevada and California. Because the Eleventh Amendment prescribes no such rule, we hold that TRPA is subject to “the judicial power of the United States” within the meaning of that Amendment. Ill We turn, finally, to petitioners’ challenge to the Court of Appeals’ holding that the individual respondents are absolutely immune from federal damages liability for actions taken in their legislative capacities. The immunity of legislators from civil suit for what they do or say as legislators has its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th- and 17th-century England; such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation’s founders. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, this Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting § 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, could not have intended “to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Governments here.” 341 U. S., at 376. It therefore held that state legislators are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for actions “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” 341 U. S., at 376. Petitioners do not challenge the validity of the holding in Tenney, or of the decisions recognizing the absolute immunity of federal legislators. Rather, their claim is that absolute immunity should be limited to the federal and state levels, and should not extend to individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level. In support of this proposed distinction, petitioners argue that the source of immunity for state legislators is found in constitutional provisions, such as the Speech or Debate Clause, which have no application to a body such as TRPA. In addition, they point out that because state legislatures have effective means of disciplining their members that TRPA does not have, the threat of possible personal liability is necessary to deter lawless conduct by the governing members of TRPA. We find these arguments unpersuasive. The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution is no more applicable to the members of state legislatures than to the members of TRPA. The States are, of course, free to adopt similar clauses in their own constitutions, and many have in fact done so. These clauses reflect the central importance attached to legislative freedom in our Nation. But the absolute immunity for state legislators recognized in Tenney reflected the Court’s interpretation of federal law; the decision did not depend on the presence of a speech or debate clause in the constitution of any State, or on any particular set of state rules or procedures available to discipline erring legislators. Rather, the rule of that case recognizes the need for immunity to protect the “public good.” As Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out: “Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130, that it was not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned.” 341 U. S., at 377. This reasoning is equally applicable to federal, state, and regional legislators. Whatever potential damages liability regional legislators may face as a matter of state law, we hold that petitioners’ federal claims do not encompass the recovery of damages from the members of TUPA acting in a legislative capacity. Like the Court of Appeals, we are unable to determine from the record the extent to which petitioners seek to impose liability upon the individual respondents for the performance of their legislative duties. We agree, however, that to the extent the evidence discloses that these individuals were acting in a capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they are entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages liability. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. It is so ordered. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The Senate Report on the Compact describes the lake and its background as follows: “Lake Tahoe, a High Sierra Mountain lake, is famed for its scenic beauty and pristine clarity. Of recent geologic origin, the 190-square-mile lake bore little evidence of even natural aging processes when it was discovered by John Fremont in 1844. Because of its size, its 1,645-foot depth and its physical features, Lake Tahoe was able to resist pollution even when human activity began accelerating as a result of settlement and early logging operations. Even by 1962 its waters were still so transparent that a metal disc 20 centimeters in diameter reportedly could be seen at a depth of 136 feet and a light transmittance to a depth of nearly 500 feet as detected with hydrophotometer. “Only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable quality— Crater Lake in Oregon, which is protected as part of the Crater Lake National Park, and Lake Baikal in the Soviet Union. Only Lake Tahoe, however, is so readily accessible from large metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to urban development.” S. Rep. No. 91-510, pp. 3-4 (1969). Article I, § 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, 83 Stat. 360, Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. §§66800-66801 (West Supp. 1977), Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 277.190-277.230 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Compact). Compact, Arts. Y and VI. The States of California and Nevada and the county of El Dorado were originally named as defendants but either were not properly served or have been dismissed as parties. The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the general federal-question jurisdiction statute, provides in part: “The district courts shall' have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States, any agency, thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.” Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343 provides in part: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: “(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” See 2 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain §6.21 (rev. 3d ed. 1976). The issue we do not address is clearly stated in the following footnote to the Court of Appeals opinion: "Under the strict standard of pleading called for by Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 . . . (1935), none of the complaints in any of the cases on appeal would withstand a motion to dismiss. They lack specific factual allegations which, if proved, would rebut the presumption of constitutionality that the Pacific States Court accorded acts of administrative and legislative bodies. "Although Pacific States has never been explicitly overruled, we do not believe that it represents the present state of the law because it was decided two years before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We find no precedent in the Ninth Circuit applying Pacific States to an analogous case since the Rules took effect. “In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 . . . (1957), the Supreme Court explained the modern philosophy of pleading: “ '[A] 11 the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim” that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. . . . The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.’ “Id., at 47-48,... (citations omitted). “Thus a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 12.08 (1975). “The allegations of ‘taking,’ even though phrased in terms of inverse condemnation, are sufficient to show that appellants complained that the TRPA exercised its police powers improperly, and that they relied on the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 566 F. 2d, at 1359 n. 9. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 380 (White, J.); United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 229. The fact that the Compact at issue here required congressional consent to be effective clearly does not itself mean that action taken pursuant to it does not qualify as being “under color of state law.” This Court has, in the past, accepted that state regulations are properly considered “state law” even though they required federal approval prior to their implementation. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397; King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309. See n. 4, supra. Compact, Arts. Ill (a), VII (a). § 3, 83 Stat. 369. Section 6, 83 Stat. 369, also reserves to Congress the right to require TRPA to furnish information and data that it considers appropriate. Section 1983 originated as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. In introducing that Act in Congress, Representative Shellabarger pointed out: “This act is remedial and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed . . . the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459. See Mt. Healthy Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 717-721; Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530; Compact, Art. VIII (b). Compact, Art. Ill (a). In addition, 10 of the 17 members of the Advisory Planning Commission established by the Compact are to be associated with local agencies, 4 others are to be residents of the region, and only 1 is from state government. Compact, Art. Ill (h). Compact, Art. VII (a). See California v. TRPA, 516 F. 2d 215 (CA9 1975). Because of our disposition of this question, we need not address petitioners’ argument that, even assuming that TRPA might be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, such protection was affirmatively waived by the compacting States. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372-375; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 239 n. 4; Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1200 (1977) (legislative immunity “enjoys a unique historical position”). See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. In support of these arguments, petitioners invoke decisions of the Courts of Appeals denying absolute immunity to subordinate officials such as county supervisors and members of a park district board. Williams v. Anderson, 562 F. 2d 1081, 1101 (CA8 1977) (school board members); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F. 2d 1090, 1101 (CA5 1975) (county supervisors); Curry v. Gillette, 461 F. 2d 1003, 1005 (CA6 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Marsh v. Curry, 409 U. S. 1042 (alderman); Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222, 231 (CA7 1961) (members of park district board and village board of trustees); Nelson v. Knox, 256 F. 2d 312, 314-315 (CA6 1958) (city commissioners); Cobb v. Malden, 202 F. 2d 701, 706-707 (CA1 1953) (McGruder, C. J., concurring) (city councilmen). Respondents, on the other hand, contend that in most, if not all, of the cases in which absolute immunity has been denied, the individuals were not in fact acting in a legislative capacity. We need not resolve this dispute. Whether individuals performing legislative functions at the purely local level, as opposed to the regional level, should be afforded absolute immunity from federal damages claims is a question not presented in this case. Article I, § 6, of the United States Constitution provides in part that “for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.” See Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 375. There is no allegation in this complaint that any members of TRPA’s governing board profited personally from the performance of any legislative act. App. 8-12. If the respondents have enacted unconstitutional legislation, there is no reason why relief against TRPA itself should not adequately vindicate petitioners’ interests. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658. This holding is supported by the analysis in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, which recognized absolute immunity for individuals performing judicial and prosecutorial functions within the Department of Agriculture. In that ease, we rejected the argument that absolute immunity should be denied because the individuals were employed in the Executive Branch, reasoning that “[j]udges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities.” Id., at 511. This reasoning also applies to legislators.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 64 ]	sc_adminaction
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. PERINI NORTH RIVER ASSOCIATES et al. No. 81-897. Argued October 4, 1982 Decided January 11, 1983 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 325. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 325. Richard G. Wilkins argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., Donald S. Shire, Kerry L. Adams, Mark C. Walters, and Joshua T. Gillelan II. Martin Krutzel argued the cause for respondents Perini North River Associates et al. With him on the brief for respondents Perini North River Associates et al. was Richard A. Cooper. David MacRae Wagner filed a brief for Raymond Churchill, respondent under this Court’s Rule 19.6. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. §901 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V) (hereinafter LHWCA or Act). Before 1972, LHWCA coverage extended only to injuries sustained on the actual “navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).” 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426. As part of its 1972 Amendments of the Act, Congress expanded the “navigable waters” situs to include certain adjoining land areas, § 3(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 33 U. S. C. § 903(a). At the same time, Congress added a status requirement that employees covered by the Act must be “engaged in maritime employment” within the meaning of §2(3) of the Act. We granted certiorari in this case, 455 U. S. 937 (1982), to consider whether a marine construction worker, who was injured while performing his job upon actual navigable waters, and who would have been covered by the Act before 1972, is “engaged in maritime employment” and thus covered by the amended Act. We hold that the worker is “engaged in maritime employment” for purposes of coverage under the amended LHWCA. Accordingly, we reverse the decision below. I The facts are not in dispute. Respondent Perini North River Associates (Perini) contracted to build the foundation of a sewage treatment plant that extends approximately 700 feet over the Hudson River between 135th and 145th Streets in Manhattan. The project required that Perini place large, hollow circular pipes called caissons in the river, down to embedded rock, fill the caissons with concrete, connect the caissons together above the water with concrete beams, and place precast concrete slabs on the beams. The caissons were delivered by rail to the shore, where they were loaded onto supply barges and towed across the river to await unloading and installation. The injured worker, Raymond Churchill, was an employee of Perini in charge of all work performed on a cargo barge used to unload caissons and other materials from the supply barges and to set caissons in position for insertion into the embedded rock. Churchill was on the deck of the cargo barge giving directions to a crane operator engaged in unloading a caisson from a supply barge when a line used to keep the caissons in position snapped and struck Churchill. He sustained injuries to his head, leg, and thumb. Churchill filed a claim for compensation under the LHWCA. Perini denied that Churchill was covered by the Act, and after a formal hearing pursuant to § 19 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §919 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), an Administrative Law Judge determined that Churchill was not “engaged in maritime employment” under § 2(3) of the Act because his job lacked “some relationship to navigation and commerce on navigable waters.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. Churchill and the Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (Director), appealed to the Benefits Review Board, pursuant to § 21(b)(3) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(3). The Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s denial of coverage, on the theory that marine construction workers involved in building facilities not ultimately used in navigation or commerce upon navigable waters are not engaged in “maritime employment.” 12 BRBS 929, 933 (1980). One Board Member dissented, arguing that “all injuries sustained in the course of employment by employees over ‘navigable waters’ as that term was defined prior to the 1972 Amendments, are covered under the [amended] Act.” Id., at 935. Churchill then sought review of the Board’s decision in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, under § 21(c) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921(c). The Director participated as respondent, and filed a brief in support of Churchill’s position. The Second Circuit denied Churchill’s petition, relying on its decision in Fusco v. Perini North River Associates, 622 F. 2d 1111 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1131 (1981). According to the Second Circuit, Churchill was not in “maritime employment” because his employment lacked a “‘significant relationship to navigation or to commerce on navigable waters.’” Churchill v. Perini North River Associates, 652 F. 2d 255, 256, n. 1 (1981). The Director now seeks review of the Second Circuit denial of Churchill’s petition. The Director agrees with the position taken by the dissenting member of the Benefits Review Board: the LHWCA does not require that an employee show that his employment possesses a “significant relationship to navigation or to commerce,” where, as here, the employee is injured while working upon the actual navigable waters in the course of his employment, and would have been covered under the pre-1972 LHWCA. J-H Before we consider whether Churchill is covered by the Act, we must address Perinfs threshold contention that the Director does not have standing to seek review of the decision below. According to Perini, the Director’s only interest in this case is in furthering a different interpretation of the Act than the one rendered by the Administrative Law Judge, the Benefits Review Board, and the Court of Appeals. Perini’s claim ignores the procedural posture in which this case comes before the Court. That posture makes it unnecessary for us to consider whether the Director, as the agency official “responsible for the administration and enforcement” of the Act, has standing as an aggrieved party to seek review of the decision below. The Director is not alone in arguing that Churchill is covered under the LHWCA. Churchill, the injured employee, is before the Court as well. He has filed a brief in support of the Director's request for a writ of certiorari, and a brief addressing the merits of his claim, in which he presents the same arguments presented by the Director. But, for some reason that is not entirely clear, Churchill has not elected to seek review as a petitioner, and by virtue of the Rules of this Court, he is considered a party respondent. It is in this procedural context that Perini’s challenge to Art. Ill standing must be considered. Perini concedes that the Director was a proper party respondent before the Court of Appeals in this litigation. As party respondent below, the Director is entitled under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1) to petition for a writ of certiorari. Although the Director has statutory authority to seek review in this Court, he may not have Art. Ill standing to argue the merits of Churchill’s claim because the Director’s presence does not guarantee the existence of a justiciable controversy with respect to the merits of Churchill’s coverage under the LHWCA. However, the Director’s petition makes Churchill an automatic respondent under our Rule 19.6, and in that capacity, Churchill “may seek reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on any ground urged in that court.” O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773, 783-784, n. 14 (1980). The Director’s petition, filed under 28 U. S. C. §1254(1), brings Churchill before this Court, and there is no doubt that Churchill, as the injured employee, has a sufficient interest in this question to give him standing to urge our consideration of the merits of the Second Circuit decision. The constitutional dimension of standing theory requires, at the very least, that there be an “actual injury redressable by the court.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 39 (1976). This requirement is meant “to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action,” as well as to assure “an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). The presence of Churchill as a party respondent arguing for his coverage under the Act assures that an admittedly justiciable controversy is now before the Court. h-i The question of Churchill’s coverage is an issue of statutory construction and legislative intent. For reasons that we explain below, there is no doubt that Churchill, as a marine construction worker injured upon actual navigable waters in the course of his employment upon those waters, would have been covered by the LHWCA before Congress amended it in 1972. In deciding whether Congress intended to restrict the scope of coverage by adding the § 2(3) status requirement, we must consider the scope of coverage under the pre-1972 Act and our cases construing the relevant portions of that Act. We must then focus on the legislative history and purposes of the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA to determine their effect on pre-existing coverage. A Beginning with our decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917), we held that there were certain circumstances in which States could not, consistently with Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution, provide compensation to injured maritime workers. If the employment of an injured worker was determined to have no “direct relation” to navigation or commerce, and “the application of local law [would not] materially affect” the uniformity of maritime law, then the employment would be characterized as “maritime but local,” and the State could provide a compensation remedy. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 477 (1922). See also Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 242 (1921). If the employment could not be characterized as “maritime but local,” then the injured employee would be left without a compensation remedy. After several unsuccessful attempts to permit state compensation remedies to apply to injured maritime workers whose employment was not local, Congress passed the LHWCA in 1927, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424. Under the original statutory scheme, a worker had to satisfy five primary conditions in order to be covered under the Act. First, the worker had to satisfy the “negative” definition of “employee” contained in § 2(3) of the 1927 Act in that he could not be a “master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.” Id., at 1425. Second, the worker had to suffer an “injury” defined by § 2(2) as “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment... Ibid. Third, the worker had to be employed by a statutory “employer,” defined by § 2(4) as “an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).” Ibid. Fourth, the worker had to meet a “situs” requirement contained in § 3(a) of the Act that limited coverage to workers whose “disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).” Id., at 1426. Fifth, §3(a) precluded federal compensation unless “recovery for the disability or death through workmen’s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.” Ibid. Federal compensation under the LHWCA did not initially extend to all maritime employees injured on the navigable waters in the course of their employment. As mentioned, §3(a) of the 1927 Act permitted federal compensation only if compensation “may not validly be provided by State law.” Ibid. This language was interpreted to exclude from LHWCA coverage those employees whose employment was “maritime but local.” See, e. g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). Application of the “maritime but local” doctrine required case-by-case determinations, and a worker was often required to make a perilous jurisdictional “guess” as to which of two mutually exclusive compensation schemes was applicable to cover his injury. Employers faced uncertainty as to whether their contributions to a state insurance fund would be sufficient to protect them from liability. In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249 (1942), this Court recognized that despite its many cases involving the “maritime but local” doctrine, it had “been unable to give any-guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state power in advance of litigation... Id., at 253. Employees and employers alike were thrust on “[t]he horns of [a] jurisdictional dilemma.” Id., at 255. Dams involved an employee who was injured while dismantling a bridge from a standing position on a barge. We upheld the application of the state compensation law in Davis not because the employee was engaged in “maritime but local” employment, but because we viewed the case as in a “twilight zone” of concurrent jurisdiction where LHWCA coverage was available and where the applicability of state law was difficult to determine. We held that doubt concerning the applicability of state compensation Acts was to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the state remedy. Relying in part on Davis, the Court in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U. S. 114 (1962), created further overlap between federal and state coverage for injured maritime workers. In Calbeck, we held that the LHWCA was “designed to ensure that a compensation remedy existed for all injuries sustained by employees [of statutory employers] on navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty as to the source, state or federal, of that remedy.” Id., at 124. Our examination in Calbeck of the “complete legislative history” of the 1927 LHWCA revealed that Congress did not intend to incorporate the “maritime but local” doctrine in the Act. Id., at 120. “Congress used the phrase ‘if recovery... may not validly be provided by State law’ in a sense consistent with the delineation of coverage as reaching injuries occurring on navigable waters.” Id., at 126. Before 1972, there was little litigation concerning whether an employee was “in maritime employment” for purposes of being the employee of a statutory employer: “Workers who are not seamen but who nevertheless suffer injury on navigable waters are no doubt (or so the courts have been willing to assume) engaged in ‘maritime employment.’” G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 428 (2d ed. 1975) (Gilmore & Black). One case in which we did discuss the maritime employment requirement was Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U. S. 244 (1941). In Parker, the injured worker, hired as a janitor, was drowned while riding in one of his employer’s motorboats keeping lookout for hidden objects under the water. When the employee's beneficiary sought LHWCA compensation, the employer argued that the employment was “ ‘so local in character’ ” that the State could validly have provided a remedy, and the § 3(a) language (“if recovery... may not validly be provided by State law”) precluded federal relief. Id., at 246. A unanimous Court rejected the employer’s argument, and held that the employee was engaged in maritime employment and that LHWCA coverage extended to an employee injured on the navigable waters in the course of his employment, without any further inquiry whether the injured worker’s employment had a direct relation to navigation or commerce. In abolishing the “jurisdictional dilemma” created by the “maritime but local” doctrine, Calbeck relied heavily on Parker, see 370 U. S., at 127-128. It becomes clear from this discussion that the 1927 Act, as interpreted by Parker, Davis, and Calbeck, provided coverage to those employees of statutory “employers,” injured while working upon navigable waters in the course of their employment. Indeed, the consistent interpretation given to the LHWCA before 1972 by the Director, the Deputy Commissioners, the courts, and the commentators was that (except for those workers specifically excepted in the statute), any worker injured upon navigable waters in the course of employment was “covered... without any inquiry into what he was doing (or supposed to be doing) at the time of his injury.” Gilmore & Black, at 429-430. As a marine construction worker required to work upon navigable waters, and injured while performing his duties on navigable waters, there can be no doubt that Churchill would have been covered under the 1927 LHWCA. B In its “first significant effort to reform the 1927 Act and the judicial gloss that had been attached to it,” Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249, 261 (1977). The purposes of the 1972 Amendments were to raise the amount of compensation available under the LHWCA, to extend coverage of the Act to include certain contiguous land areas, to eliminate the longshoremen’s strict-liability seaworthiness remedy against shipowners, to eliminate shipowner’s claims for indemnification from stevedores, and to promulgate certain administrative reforms. See S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 1 (1972) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). For purposes of the present inquiry, the important changes effected by the 1972 Amendments concerned the definition of “employee” in § 2(3), 33 U. S. C. § 902(3), and the description of coverage in § 3(a), 33 U. S. C. § 903(a). These amended sections provide: “The term ‘employee’ means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net. ” § 2(3), 33 U. S. C. §902(3). “Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)... §3(a), as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 903(a). “The 1972 Amendments thus changed what had been essentially only a ‘situs’ test of eligibility for compensation to one looking to both the ‘situs’ of the injury and the ‘status’ of the injured.” Northeast Marine Terminal Co., supra, at 264-265. In expanding the covered situs in §3(a), Congress also removed the requirement, present in § 3(a) of the 1927 Act, that federal compensation would be available only if recovery “may not validly be provided by State law.” The definition of “injury” remained the same, and the definition of “employer” was changed to reflect the new definition of “employee” in §2(3). The Director and Churchill claim that when Congress added the status requirement in §3(a), providing that a covered employee must be “engaged in maritime employment,” it intended to restrict or define the scope of the increased coverage provided by the expanded situs provision in §3(a), but that Congress had no intention to exclude from coverage workers, like Churchill, who were injured upon actual navigable waters, i. e., navigable waters as previously defined, in the course of their employment upon those waters. According to Perini, Congress intended to overrule legislatively this Court’s decision in Calbeck, and the status requirement was added to ensure that both the landward coverage and seaward coverage would depend on the nature of the employee’s duties at the time he was injured. Perini’s theory, adopted by the court below, is that all coverage under the amended LHWCA requires employment having a “significant relationship to navigation or to commerce on navigable waters.” Perini argues further that Churchill cannot meet the status test because he was injured while working on the construction of a foundation for a sewage treatment plant — an activity not typically associated with navigation or commerce on navigable waters. We agree with the Director and Churchill. We are unable to find any congressional intent to withdraw coverage of the LHWCA from those workers injured on navigable waters in the course of their employment, and who would have been covered by the Act before 1972. As we have long held, “[t]his Act must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.” Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328, 333 (1953). See also Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 414 (1932); Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 432 U. S., at 268. It is necessary to consider the context in which the 1972 Amendments were passed, especially as that context relates directly to the coverage changes that were effected. Despite the fact that Calbeck extended protection of the LHWCA to all employees injured upon navigable waters in the course of their employment, LHWCA coverage still stopped at the water’s edge — a line of demarcation established by Jensen. In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212 (1969), we held that the LHWCA did not extend to longshoremen whose injuries occurred on the pier attached to the land. We recognized that there was much to be said for the uniform treatment of longshoremen irrespective of whether they were performing their duties upon the navigable waters (in which case they would be covered under Calbeck), or whether they were performing those same duties on a pier. We concluded, however, that although Congress could exercise its authority to cover land-based maritime activity, “[t]he invitation to move that [Jensen] line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this Court.” 396 U. S., at 224. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U. S. 202, 216 (1971). “Congress responded with the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972.” P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U. S. 69, 73 (1979). The 1972 Amendments were enacted after Committees in both the House and Senate prepared full Reports that summarized the general purposes of the legislation and contained an analysis of the changes proposed for each section. See S. Rep., supra; H. R. Rep., supra. These legislative Reports indicate clearly that Congress intended to “extend coverage to protect additional workers.” S. Rep., at 1 (emphasis added). Although the legislative history surrounding the addition of the status requirement is not as clear as that concerning the reasons for the extended situs, it is clear that “with the definition of ‘navigable waters’ expanded by the 1972 Amendments to include such a large geographical area, it became necessary to describe affirmatively the class of workers Congress desired to compensate.” Northeast Marine Terminal Co., supra, at 264. This necessity gave rise to the status requirement: “The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity.” S. Rep., at 13; H. R. Rep., at 11. This comment indicates that Congress intended the status requirement to define the scope of the extended landward coverage. There is nothing in these comments, or anywhere else in the legislative Reports, to suggest, as Perini claims, that Congress intended the status language to require that an employee injured upon the navigable waters in the course of his employment had to show that his employment possessed a direct (or substantial) relation to navigation or commerce in order to be covered. Congress was concerned with injuries on land, and assumed that injuries occurring on the actual navigable waters were covered, and would remain covered. In discussing the added status requirement, the Senate Report states explicitly that the “maritime employment” requirement in § 3(a) was not meant to “exclude other employees traditionally covered.” S. Rep., at 16. We may presume “that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law,” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979), and that their use of “employees traditionally covered” was intended to refer to those employees included in the scope of coverage under Parker, Davis, and Calbeck, Other aspects of the statutory scheme support our understanding of the “maritime employment” status requirement. Congress removed from § 3(a) the requirement that, as a prerequisite to federal coverage, there can be no valid recovery under state law. As we noted in our discussion in Part III-A, supra, the continued use of the “maritime but local” doctrine occurred after passage of the 1927 Act because the original coverage section contained this requirement that Congress explicitly deleted in 1972. Surely, if Congress wished to repeal Calbeck and other cases legislatively, it would do so by clear language and not by removing from the statute the exact phrase that Calbeck found was responsible for continued emphasis on the “maritime but local” doctrine. Congressional intent to adhere to Calbeck is also indicated by the fact that the legislative Reports clearly identified those decisions that Congress wished to overrule by the 1972 Amendments. As mentioned above, the 1972 Amendments had other purposes apart from an expansion of coverage to shoreside areas. Two other purposes involved the elimination of a strict-liability unseaworthiness remedy against a vessel owner afforded to longshoremen by Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946), and an indemnity claim against the stevedore by the vessel owner afforded by Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124 (1956). The legislative Reports explicitly identified these decisions as intended to be overruled legislatively by the 1972 Amendments. See S. Rep., at 8-12; H. R. Rep., at 4-8. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that Congress would have intended to return to the “jurisdictional monstrosity” that Calbeck sought to lay to rest without at least some indication of its intent to do so. In considering the scope of the status test as applied to land-based employees in Northeast Marine Terminal Co., we rejected the “point of rest” theory proposed by the employer, under which landward coverage under the 1972 Amendments would include only the portion of the unloading process that takes place before longshoremen place the cargo onto the dock. We reasoned that the “point of rest” concept is “[a] theory that nowhere appears in the Act, that was never mentioned by Congress during the legislative process, that does not comport with Congress’ intent, and that restricts the coverage of a remedial Act designed to extend coverage....” The absence of the concept, “claimed to be so well known in the industry is both conspicuous and telling.” 432 U. S., at 278-279, 275. In the same sense, the absence of even the slightest congressional allusion to the “maritime but local” doctrine, a concept that plagued maritime compensation law for over 40 years and that would have the effect of restricting coverage in the face of congressional intent not to “exclude other employees traditionally covered,” is equally conspicuous and telling. Finally, we note that our conclusion concerning the continued coverage of employees injured on actual navigable waters in the course of their employment is consistent with, and supported by, our recent decision in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U. S. 715 (1980). In Sun Ship, the issue before the Court was whether extended shoreside coverage under the 1972 Amendments had the effect of displacing concurrent state remedies for landward injuries. After a review of the development of the “maritime but local” doctrine, and review of certain portions of the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments, we concluded that those Amendments were not intended to resurrect the dilemma, created by mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction, that Calbeck and Davis eliminated. Our reasoning was based, in part, on the removal by Congress of the language in the 1927 Act that made federal compensation available if recovery could not validly be provided by state law: “[T]he deletion of that language in 1972 — if it indicates anything — may logically only imply acquiescence in Calbec[k]....” 447 U. S., at 721. Sun Ship held	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 10 ]	sc_adminaction
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. TEXACO INC. et al. No. 24. Argued November 13, 1968. Decided December 16, 1968. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Lawrence G. Wallace, James Mel. Henderson, and Alvin L. Berman. Milton Handler and Edgar E. Barton argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief were Stanley D. Robinson and Macdonald Flinn. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether the FTC was warranted in finding that it was an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45, for respondent Texaco to undertake to induce its service station dealers to purchase Goodrich tires, batteries, and accessories (hereafter referred to as TBA) in return for a commission paid by Goodrich to Texaco. In three related proceedings instituted in 1961, the Commission challenged the sales-commission method of distributing TBA and in each case named as a respondent a major oil company and a major tire manufacturer. After extensive hearings, the Commission concluded that each of the arrangements constituted an unfair method of competition and ordered each tire company and each oil company to refrain from entering into any such commission arrangements. In one of these cases, Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U. S. 357 (1965), this Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sustaining the Commission's order against Atlantic Refining Company and the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. In a second case, Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F. 2d 470, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1002, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, following this Court’s decision in Atlantic, sustained the Commission’s order against the Shell Oil Company and the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. In contrast to the decisions of these two Courts of Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the Commission’s order in this, the third of the three cases, involving respondents Goodrich and Texaco. 118 U. S. App. D. C. 366, 336 F. 2d 754 (1964). The Commission petitioned this Court for review and, one week following our Atlantic decision, we granted certiorari and remanded for further consideration in light of that opinion. 381 U. S. 739 (1965). The Commission, on remand, reaffirmed its conclusion that the Texaco-Goodrich arrangement, like that involved in the other two cases, violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit again reversed, this time holding that the Commission had failed to establish that Texaco had exercised its dominant economic power over its dealers or that the Texaco-Goodrich arrangement had an adverse effect on competition. 127 ü. S. App. D. C. 349, 383 F. 2d 942. We granted certiorari to determine whether the court below had correctly applied the principles of our Atlantic decision. 390 U. S. 979. Congress enacted § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to combat in their incipiency trade practices that exhibit a strong potential for stifling competition. In large measure the task of defining “unfair methods of competition” was left to the Commission. The legislative history shows that Congress concluded that the best check on unfair competition would be “an administrative body of practical men . . . who will be able to apply the rule enacted by Congress to particular business situations, so as to eradicate evils with the least risk of interfering with legitimate business operations.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 19. Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U. S. 357, 367. While the ultimate responsibility for the construction of this statute rests with the courts, we have held on many occasions that the determinations of the Commission, an expert body charged with the practical application of the statute, are entitled to great weight. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U. S. 392, 396 (1953); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 720 (1948). This is especially true here, where the Commission has had occasion in three related proceedings to study and assess the effects on competition of the sales-commission arrangement for marketing TBA. With this in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. The Commission and the respondents agree that the Texaco-Goodrich arrangement for marketing TBA will fall under the rationale of our Atlantic decision if the Commission was correct in its three ultimate conclusions (1) that Texaco has dominant economic power over its dealers; (2) that Texaco exercises that power over its dealers in fulfilling its agreement to promote and sponsor Goodrich products; and (3) that anticompetitive effects result from the exercise of that power. That Texaco holds dominant economic power over its dealers is clearly shown by the record in this case. In fact, respondents do not contest the conclusion of the Court of Appeals below and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Shell that such power is “inherent in the structure and economics of the petroleum distribution system.” 127 U. S. App. D. C. 349, 353, 383 F. 2d 942, 946; 360 F. 2d 470, 481 (C. A. 5th Cir.). Nearly 40% of the Texaco dealers lease their stations from Texaco. These dealers typically hold a one-year lease on their stations, and these leases are subject to termination at the end of any year on 10 days’ notice. At any time during the year a man’s lease on his service station may be immediately terminated by Texaco without advance notice if in Texaco’s judgment any of the “housekeeping” provisions of the lease, relating to the use and appearance of the station, are not fulfilled. The contract under which Texaco dealers receive their vital supply of gasoline and other petroleum products also runs from year to year and is terminable on 30 days’ notice under Texaco’s standard form contract. The average dealer is a man of limited means who has what is for him a sizable investment in his station. He stands to lose much if he incurs the ill will of Texaco. As Judge Wisdom wrote in Shell, “A man operating a gas station is bound to be overawed by the great corporation that is his supplier, his banker, and his landlord.” 360 F. 2d 470, 487. It is against the background of this dominant economic power over the dealers that the sales-commission arrangement must be viewed. The Texaco-Goodrich agreement provides that Goodrich will pay Texaco a commission of 10% on all purchases by Texaco retail service station dealers of Goodrich TBA. In return, Texaco agrees to “promote the sale of Goodrich products” to Texaco dealers. During the five-year period studied by the Commission (1952-1956) $245,000,000 of the Goodrich and Firestone TBA sponsored by Texaco was purchased by Texaco dealers, for which Texaco received almost $22,000,000 in retail and wholesale commissions. Evidence before the Commission showed that Texaco carried out its agreement to promote Goodrich products through constantly reminding its dealers of Texaco’s desire that they stock and sell the sponsored Goodrich TBA. Texaco emphasizes the importance of TBA and the recommended brands as early as its initial interview with a prospective dealer and repeats its recommendation through a steady flow of campaign materials utilizing Goodrich products. Texaco salesmen, the primary link between Texaco and the dealers, promote Goodrich products in their day-to-day contact with the Texaco dealers. The evaluation of a dealer’s station by the Texaco salesman is often an important factor in determining whether a dealer’s contract or lease with Texaco will be renewed. Thus the Texaco salesmen, whose favorable opinion is so important to every dealer, are the key men in the promotion of Goodrich products, and on occasion accompany the Goodrich salesmen in their calls on the dealers. Finally, Texaco receives regular reports on the amount of sponsored TBA purchased by each dealer. Respondents contend, however, that these reports are used only for maintaining Texaco’s accounts with Goodrich and not for policing dealer purchases. Respondents urge that the facts of this case are fundamentally different from those involved in Atlantic because of the presence there, and the absence here, of “overt coercive practices” designed to force the dealers to purchase the sponsored brand of TBA. We agree, as the Government concedes, that the evidence in this case regarding coercive practices is considerably less substantial than the evidence presented in Atlantic. The Atlantic record contained direct evidence of dealers threatened with cancellation of their leases, the setting of dealer quotas for purchase of certain amounts of sponsored TBA, the requirement that dealers purchase TBA from single assigned supply points, refusals by Atlantic to honor credit card charges for nonsponsored TBA, and policing of Atlantic dealers by “phantom inspectors.” While the evidence in the present case fails to establish the kind of overt coercive acts shown in Atlantic, we think it clear nonetheless that Texaco’s dominant economic power was used in a manner which tended to foreclose competition in the marketing of TBA. The sales-commission system for marketing TBA is inherently coercive. A service station dealer whose very livelihood depends upon the continuing good favor of a major oil company is constantly aware of the oil company’s desire that he stock and sell the recommended brand of TBA. Through the constant reminder of the Texaco salesman, through demonstration projects and promotional materials, through all of the dealer’s contacts with Texaco, he learns the lesson that Texaco wants him to purchase for his station the brand of TBA which pays Texaco 10% on every retail item the dealer buys. With the dealer’s supply of gasoline, his lease on his station, and his Texaco identification subject to continuing review, we think it flies in the face of common sense to say, as Texaco asserts, that the dealer is “perfectly free” to reject Texaco’s chosen brand of TBA. Equally applicable here is this Court’s judgment in Atlantic that “[i]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that there would have been little point in paying substantial commissions to oil companies were it not for their ability to exert power over their wholesalers and dealers.” 381 U. S., at 376. We are similarly convinced that the Commission was correct in determining that this arrangement has an adverse effect on competition in the marketing of TBA. Service stations play an increasingly important role in the marketing of tires, batteries, and other automotive accessories. With five major companies supplying virtually all of the tires that come with new cars, only in the replacement market can the smaller companies hope to compete. Ideally, each service station dealer would stock the brands of TBA that in his judgment were most favored by customers for price and quality. To the extent that dealers are induced to select the sponsored brand in order to maintain the good favor of the oil company upon which they are dependent, the operation of the competitive market is adversely affected. As we noted in Atlantic, the essential anticompetitive vice of such an arrangement is “the utilization of economic power in one market to curtail competition in another.” 381 U. S. 357, 369. Here the TBA manufacturer has purchased the oil company’s economic power and used it as a partial substitute for competitive merit in gaining a major share of the TBA market. The nonsponsored brands do not compete on the even terms of price and quality competition; they must overcome, in addition, the influence of the dominant oil company that has been paid to induce its dealers to buy the recommended brand. While the success of this arrangement in foreclosing competitors from the TBA market has not matched that of the direct coercion employed by Atlantic, we feel that the anticompetitive tendencies of such a system are clear, and that the Commission was properly fulfilling the task that Congress assigned it in halting this practice in its incipiency. The Commission is not required to show that a practice it condemns has totally eliminated competition in the relevant market. It is enough that the Commission found that the practice in question unfairly burdened competition for a not insignificant volume of commerce. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U. S. 38, 45, n. 4 (1962); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U. S. 357, 371 (1965). The Commission was justified in concluding that more than an insubstantial amount of commerce was involved. Texaco is one of the Nation’s largest petroleum companies. It sells its products to approximately 30,000 service stations, or about 16.5% of all service stations in the United States. The volume of sponsored TBA purchased by Texaco dealers in the five-year period 1952-1956 was $245,000,000, almost five times the amount involved in the Atlantic case. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment below and remand to the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the Commission’s order with the exception of paragraphs five and six of the order against Texaco, the setting aside of which by the Court of Appeals the Government does not contest. Reversed and remanded. The sales-commission arrangement between Texaco and the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company was also the subject of Commission action. Firestone is not a respondent in this action, however, since it is already subject to a final order of the Commission prohibiting its use of a sales-commission plan with any oil company. See Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F. 2d 470, 474 (C. A. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1002. The Commission’s conclusion that under a sales-commission plan, a dealer would not make his choice solely on the basis of competitive merit was bolstered by the testimony of 31 sellers of competing, nonsponsored TBA that they were unable to sell to particular Texaco stations because of the dealers’ concern that Texaco would disapprove of their purchase of nonsponsored products.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 56 ]	sc_adminaction
ORDER OF RAILWAY CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA et al. v. SWAN et al. NO. 63. Argued December 10,11,1946. Decided January 13, 1947. V. C. Shuttleworth argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were H. E. Wilmarth, Everett L. Gordon and Leo J. Hassenauer. Douglas F. Smith argued the cause for Carrier Members of the First and Fourth Divisions et al., respondents. With him on the brief were Kenneth F. Burgess, R. /. Flagman, Bryce L. Hamilton, Burton Mason and John A. Sheean. Anan Raymond argued the cause for the Railroad Yardmasters of America, respondents. With him on the brief was Conrad H. Poppenhusen. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. Our attention here is directed to a determination of which division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over disputes involving railroad yardmasters. The four divisions of the Board and their respective jurisdictions are established by § 3, First (h), of the Railway Labor Act, as amended in 1934. Each division of the Board is composed of an equal number of representatives of carriers and of national labor organizations. The statute authorizes the carriers and the national labor organizations to select their respective representatives and to designate the division on which each such representative shall serve. § 3, First (b) and (c). The jurisdiction of the divisions relates to disputes growing out of “grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions ...” § 3, First (i). Disputes involving employees in certain specifically designated crafts are assigned to each division; the Fourth Division also has a “catch-all” jurisdiction over all disputes not assigned to one of the other three divisions. Appropriate provisions are made for hearings and for the entry of an award, to be followed by an order directed to the carrier if the award be in favor of the petitioner. In the event that the carrier fails to comply with the order, the petitioner or any person for whose benefit the order was made may seek enforcement of the order in a federal district court. §3, First (p). In such suits, “the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated ...” And the court is given power to take such action as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order. See Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 305. Two of the national labor organizations are the Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, petitioners herein. Their membership includes a small portion of the total number of railroad yardmasters in the country, approximately 20% of the total on the basis of the railroad mileage represented. Each of these organizations has one representative on the First Division and each contends that all yardmaster disputes must be heard solely by that division. But that contention is contradicted by the Railroad Yardmasters of America, a national labor organization composed almost entirely of yardmasters and claiming to represent more than 70% of all the yardmasters in the country. That organization, which is an intervenor-respondent herein, has failed to place a representative on any of the four divisions. Along with certain other organizations representing the small balance of yardmasters, it claims that yardmaster disputes lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Fourth Division. Various carriers with representatives on both the First and the Fourth Divisions join in that claim. The result of this controversy is a stalemate so far as yardmaster disputes are concerned. The carrier and the labor members of the First Division are split evenly, the carrier members claiming that the division has no jurisdiction over these matters. The members of the Fourth Division are also evenly divided on the jurisdictional question, the labor members béing of the view that yardmaster disputes are outside that division’s jurisdiction. And since all the parties concede that neither the Second nor the Third Division has jurisdiction, no settlement of these disputes is possible under the present situation. The Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen brought this action under 28 U. S. C. § 400 (1) to obtain a declaratory judgment to the effect that the First Division has sole jurisdiction over yardmaster disputes. Members of the First and Fourth Divisions were made parties defendant; and the Railroad Yardmasters of America, the Great Northern Railway Company and the Southern Pacific Company were allowed to intervene. The District Court, after a hearing, held that yardmaster disputes fall within the “catch-all” jurisdiction of the Fourth Division. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. 152 F. 2d 325. We granted certiorari because the issue raised is one of importance in the orderly administration of the Railway Labor Act. 327 U. S. 776. At the outstart it is important to note that judicial review of this matter is not precluded by the principles set forth in Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, supra, and companion cases, General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323, and General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co., 320 U. S. 338. We are dealing here with something quite different from an administrative determination which Congress has made final and beyond the realm of judicial scrutiny. We are dealing with a jurisdictional frustration on an administrative level, making impossible the issuance of administrative orders which Congress explicitly has opened to review by the courts. Until that basic jurisdictional controversy is settled, the procedure contemplated by § 3 of the Railway Labor Act remains a dead letter so far as yardmasters are concerned and the statutory rights of such persons become atrophied. A declaratory judgment action is therefore appropriate to remove such an administrative stagnation. In other instances, we have left the problem of jurisdiction to be determined in the first instance by the administrative agency. Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U. S. 41. But here both the First and the Fourth Divisions of the Board, due to the evenly-matched membership of railroad and labor representatives, appear hopelessly divided on the jurisdictional issue, making a determination impossible. Judicial guidance at this stage is justified as long as such a condition exists. The issue is primarily one of statutory interpretation. The First Division is given jurisdiction over disputes “involving train- and yard-service employees of carriers; that is, engineers, firemen, hostlers, and outside hostler helpers, conductors, trainmen, and yard-service employees.” The Fourth Division’s jurisdiction extends to disputes “involving employees of carriers directly or indirectly engaged in transportation of passengers or property by water, and all other employees of carriers over which jurisdiction is not given to the first, second, and third divisions.” It is agreed that the only possible category under the First Division into which yardmasters might be placed is “yard-service employees.” But if they cannot be so placed, they must necessarily fall into the “catch-all” jurisdiction of the Fourth Division. The problem thus is to determine what Congress meant when it used the term “yard-service employees.” There is no statutory definition of “yard-service employees.” Nor is the term explained in any of the relevant legislative debates or reports; and it derives no meaning from the statutory policy or framework. Moreover, it is not in common or general usage outside of the railroad world. It is a technical term found only in railroad parlance. Evidence as to the meaning attached to it by those who are familiar with such parlance therefore becomes relevant in determining the meaning of the term as used by Congress. See O’Hara v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 269 U. S. 364, 370-371. The parties, all of whom are well acquainted with railroad terminology, stipulated certain facts. It was agreed that a railroad yard is a system of tracks within defined limits over which movements of engines and cars not authorized by timetable or train order may be made, subject to prescribed signals and rules or special instructions. It was further agreed that the “yard-service employees” or “yardmen” working in a yard perform such functions as switching, making and breaking up trains, moving and storing cars, inspecting cars and freight, repairing cars, maintaining equipment, sending and receiving messages, keeping records and making reports. As to yardmasters, the stipulation stated: “All such yardmen and other employees performing work in a yard are directed and supervised in their work by a yardmaster, with the aid, if necessary, of one or more assistant yardmasters. Yardmasters do not and may not perform the work of yardmen and employees in train and engine service; they may perform some clerical work, if their entire time is not taken up with the direction and supervision of yardmen and other employees working in yards. ... In general, yardmasters run the yards, of which they are in charge, and they are responsible for conditions within the same. Necessarily, they exercise a substantial measure of individual initiative and responsibility.” All of the witnesses who testified at the hearing agreed that yardmasters are functionally different from other employees working in yards due to their supervisory activities and responsibilities. The evidence also indicated that yardmasters have supervision over some who work within the yards but who are not spoken of as “yard-service employees,” such as storekeepers, section men and clerks. On the crucial point, there was substantial agreement among the witnesses that yardmasters are not commonly designated in railroad parlance as “yard-service employees,” that term being reserved for the yardmen described in the stipulation who work under the supervision of the yardmasters. The documentary evidence submitted by the parties tends to bear out this testimony. Thus numerous past awards made by the First and Fourth Divisions speak of yardmasters as distinct from yardmen or yard-service employees. And the Interstate Commerce Commission, in making various classifications of railroad employees, recognizes a clear distinction between yardmasters and those over whom they have supervision. In addition, other documents introduced into the record and sources to which the parties have made reference either show the same distinction or are inconclusive on the matter. The District Court was therefore justified in finding as a fact that railroad usage has never included yardmasters and assistant yardmasters within the meaning of the terms “yard-service employees” or “yardmen.” That court was also correct in concluding that the history of the adjustment of disputes prior to the amendment of the present statute in 1934 affords no assistance in resolving the problem confronting us. As pointed out more fully by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 152 F. 2d at 327-328, disputes involving yardmasters and disputes involving yard-service employees were previously submitted to various adjustment boards, which had been created by agreement, primarily on the basis of membership in signatory labor organizations. Jurisdiction was not then grounded, as it is now, on a craft or job classification irrespective of the labor organization representing the particular employees involved. Hence there was no occasion giving rise to a consistent and unequivocal administrative interpretation of the term “yard-service employees” to include yardmasters — an interpretation which, had it existed, might have shed some light on the adoption of the term by Congress in 1934. Petitioners also urge that the jurisdiction of the First Division over yardmaster disputes is established by the settled administrative action of that division since its creation in 1934. There is a serious question whether the jurisdictional issue now before us was fully considered by the division in many of the cases to which reference is made; certainly none of the awards did more than recite perfunctorily that the division had jurisdiction over the particular dispute. And none of the awards involved the Railroad Yardmasters of America, which has consistently objected to the assumption of jurisdiction by the First Division. But aside from those factors, the present and prolonged administrative deadlock on the jurisdictional issue destroys whatever persuasive effect these prior adjudications by the First Division may have had. The administrative action has become anything but settled. Finally, petitioners point out that Congress has failed to amend § 3, First (h), so as specifically to exclude “yardmasters and other subordinate officers” from the jurisdiction of the First Division, despite the introduction of two bills to that effect in the Senate in 1940 and 1941. These bills were sent to an appropriate committee, but were never reported out. It does not appear whether the bills died because they were thought to be unnecessary or undesirable. No hearings were held; no committee reports were made. Under such circumstances, the failure of Congress to amend the statute is without meaning for purposes of statutory interpretation. We accordingly agree with the two courts below that yardmasters are not “yard-service employees” within the jurisdiction of the First Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Yardmaster disputes fall exclusively within the “catch-all” jurisdiction of the Fourth Division. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter. After the fullest consideration this Court recently held in two cases that jurisdictional disputes between railroad unions subject to the Railway Labor Act are not within judicial competence. Switchmen’s Union v. Board, 320 U. S. 297; General Committee v. M.-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323. The decision in those cases derived from the fact that Congress “had not expressly authorized judicial review” and the history, the setting, and the implications of railway labor controversies counseled against inferring judicial review. Here we have a controversy between two divisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board as to the disputes over which they respectively have jurisdiction. This controversy, however, entails consideration of technical problems in the railroad world and consequences in construing the distribution of authority among the divisions of the Adjustment Board for which judicial review seems no more appropriate than it did to settle jurisdictional conflicts between railroad brotherhoods. Not finding any command in the statute for judicial review of this controversy, it seems to me, therefore, appropriate to leave it to the mediatory resources of the Railway Labor Act. If it be said that thus far deadlock has resulted, it does not follow that it will continue, if the Court keeps hands off. In any event, because mediatory machinery may not be effective is not a sufficient reason for judicial intervention, unless the direction of Congress is much more clear than I find it in the Railway Labor Act. This view is reinforced by the fact that the decision of the Court may be no more than an advisory opinion. My doubts have not commended themselves to the Court, but since I am not alone in entertaining them it seemed to me that they should be expressed. 48 Stat. 1185, 1190-1191; 45 U. S. C. § 153, First (h). A decree was entered in the District Court in 1938 commanding the Fourth Division to hear and determine certain disputes involving yardmasters. That case arose on a petition for mandamus filed by the Railroad Yardmasters of America against the members of the Fourth Division. After issuance of summons, the members of the Fourth Division appeared and filed an answer stating that they were of the opinion that the Fourth Division did have jurisdiction. The decree was then entered with the consent of the parties to the action, but without argument and without the District Court being aware that a public question was involved and that other parties had an interest in the matter. The District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case held that this 1938 decree was not res judicata of the issue now presented in view of the circumstances under which it was entered. Petitioners’ sole witness testified: “Yardmen are usually men who have to do with the making up and breaking up of trains, switching in the yard, and supervising the work of the yardmen, which would include, in my opinion, yardmasters and assistant yardmasters.” But his opinion as to yardmasters in this respect was based upon his understanding of the law, not upon his own use or his knowledge of the use of the term “yard-service employees.” He explained his belief that “every tribunal that has decided a dispute for men engaged in yard service, such as yard engineers, firemen, hostlers, hostler helpers, road conductors, trainmen and yardmen, have also decided cases for yardmasters and assistant yardmasters. Division 1, set up under, by agreement, in 1918, the very first board in existence, did that. The Western Train Service Board, upon which I served, did that, as evidenced by Board decisions submitted here as an exhibit.” This witness also stated that yardmasters “fit more nearly in with the yard service employees than with any other class” — a recognition that yardmasters are different in fact from yard-service employees and that they do not fit precisely within that category. See National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, Award No. 1274 (July 13, 1936), Award No. 1464 (Oct. 7, 1936), Award No. 1603 (Dec. 14, 1936), Award No. 1648 (Jan. 21, 1937), Award No. 1728 (Feb. 11, 1937), Award No. 1896 (April 15, 1937), Award No. 2065 (July 16, 1937), Award No. 2364 (Nov. 12, 1937), Award No. 4466 (Jan. 15, 1940), Award No. 4548 (Feb. 8, 1940), Award No. 4584 (Feb. 20, 1940), Award No. 5816 (June 24, 1941), Award No. 7355 (Oct. 15, 1942); Fourth Division, Award No. 67 (July 25, 1940). See Ex parte No. 72 (Nov. 24, 1920, unreported); Ex parte No. 106, Six-Hour Day Investigation, 190 I. C. C. 750. The forms and classification plan to be used in reporting wage and compensation data of steam railroad employees to the United States Railroad Labor Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission place yardmasters under “Supervisory Skilled Trades and Labor Service,” while those performing yard-service work are placed under “Train and Engine Service.” Thus the method used by the National Railroad Adjustment Board in indexing awards of the First Division does not provide any helpful guide as to the usage of “yard-service employees” in the railroad world. See cases cited in footnote 4, supra. See footnote 2, supra. S. 4375, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.; S. 1660, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. Both bills were introduced by Senator Smith at the request of the American Short Line Railroad Association.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 83 ]	sc_adminaction
Jorge Luna TORRES, Petitioner v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General. No. 14-1096. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Nov. 3, 2015. Decided May 19, 2016. Matthew L. Guadagno, New York, NY, for Petitioner. Elaine J. Goldenberg, for Respondent. Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, CA, Matthew L. Guadagno, New York, NY, for Petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant, Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Rachel P. Kovner, Assistant to the Solicitor, General, Donald E. Keener, Patrick J. Glen, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) imposes certain adverse immigration consequences on an alien convicted of an "aggravated felony." The INA defines that term by listing various crimes, most of which are identified as offenses "described in" specified provisions of the federal criminal code. Immediately following that list, the Act provides that the referenced offenses are aggravated felonies irrespective of whether they are "in violation of Federal[,] State[,]" or foreign law. 108 Stat. 4322, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). In this case, we must decide if a state crime counts as an aggravated felony when it corresponds to a specified federal offense in all ways but one-namely, the state crime lacks the interstate commerce element used in the federal statute to establish legislative jurisdiction (i.e., Congress's power to enact the law). We hold that the absence of such a jurisdictional element is immaterial: A state crime of that kind is an aggravated felony. I The INA makes any alien convicted of an "aggravated felony" after entering the United States deportable. See § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Such an alien is also ineligible for several forms of discretionary relief, including cancellation of removal-an order allowing a deportable alien to remain in the country. See § 1229b(a)(3). And because of his felony, the alien faces expedited removal proceedings. See § 1228(a)(3)(A). The Act defines the term "aggravated felony" by way of a long list of offenses, now codified at § 1101(a)(43). In all, that provision's 21 subparagraphs enumerate some 80 different crimes. In more than half of those subparagraphs, Congress specified the crimes by citing particular federal statutes. According to that common formulation, an offense is an aggravated felony if it is "described in," say, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (relating to child pornography), § 922(g) (relating to unlawful gun possession), or, of particular relevance here, § 844(i) (relating to arson and explosives). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(E), (I). Most of the remaining subparagraphs refer to crimes by their generic labels, stating that an offense is an aggravated felony if, for example, it is "murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor." § 1101(a)(43)(A). Following the entire list of crimes, § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence reads: "The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years." So, putting aside the 15-year curlicue, the penultimate sentence provides that an offense listed in § 1101(a)(43) is an aggravated felony whether in violation of federal, state, or foreign law. Petitioner Jorge Luna Torres, who goes by the name George Luna, immigrated to the United States as a child and has lived here ever since as a lawful permanent resident. In 1999, he pleaded guilty to attempted arson in the third degree, in violation of New York law; he was sentenced to one day in prison and five years of probation. Seven years later, immigration officials discovered his conviction and initiated proceedings to remove him from the country. During those proceedings, Luna applied for cancellation of removal. But the Immigration Judge found him ineligible for that discretionary relief because his arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a-22a. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed, based on a comparison of the federal and New York arson statutes. See id., at 15a-17a. The INA, as just noted, provides that "an offense described in" 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the federal arson and explosives statute, is an aggravated felony. Section 844(i), in turn, makes it a crime to "maliciously damage[ ] or destroy[ ], or attempt[ ] to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building [or] vehicle... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." For its part, the New York law that Luna was convicted under prohibits "intentionally damag[ing]," or attempting to damage, "a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an explosion." N.Y. Penal Law Ann. §§ 110, 150.10 (West 2010). The state law, the Board explained, thus matches the federal statute element-for-element with one exception: The New York law does not require a connection to interstate commerce. According to the Board, that single difference did not matter because the federal statute's commerce element is "jurisdictional"-that is, its function is to establish Congress's power to legislate. See App. to Pet for Cert. 16a-17a. Given that the two laws' substantive (i.e., non-jurisdictional) elements map onto each other, the Board held, the New York arson offense is "described in" 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Luna's petition for review of the Board's ruling. See 764 F.3d 152 (2014). The court's decision added to a Circuit split over whether a state offense is an aggravated felony when it has all the elements of a listed federal crime except one requiring a connection to interstate commerce. We granted certiorari. 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2918, 192 L.Ed.2d 923 (2015). II The issue in this case arises because of the distinctive role interstate commerce elements play in federal criminal law. In our federal system, "Congress cannot punish felonies generally," Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 428, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) ; it may enact only those criminal laws that are connected to one of its constitutionally enumerated powers, such as the authority to regulate interstate commerce. As a result, most federal offenses include, in addition to substantive elements, a jurisdictional one, like the interstate commerce requirement of § 844(i). The substantive elements "primarily define[ ] the behavior that the statute calls a 'violation' of federal law," Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 18, 126 S.Ct. 1264, 164 L.Ed.2d 10 (2006) -or, as the Model Penal Code puts the point, they relate to "the harm or evil" the law seeks to prevent, § 1.13(10). The jurisdictional element, by contrast, ties the substantive offense (here, arson) to one of Congress's constitutional powers (here, its authority over interstate commerce), thus spelling out the warrant for Congress to legislate. See id., at 17-18, 126 S.Ct. 1264 (explaining that Congress intends "such statutory terms as 'affect commerce' or 'in commerce'... as terms of art connecting the congressional exercise of legislative authority with the constitutional provision (here, the Commerce Clause) that grants Congress that authority"). For obvious reasons, state criminal laws do not include the jurisdictional elements common in federal statutes. State legislatures, exercising their plenary police powers, are not limited to Congress's enumerated powers; and so States have no reason to tie their substantive offenses to those grants of authority. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). In particular, state crimes do not contain interstate commerce elements because a State does not need such a jurisdictional hook. Accordingly, even state offenses whose substantive elements match up exactly with a federal law's will part ways with respect to interstate commerce. That slight discrepancy creates the issue here: If a state offense lacks an interstate commerce element but otherwise mirrors one of the federal statutes listed in § 1101(a)(43), does the state crime count as an aggravated felony? Or, alternatively, does the jurisdictional difference reflected in the state and federal laws preclude that result, no matter the laws' substantive correspondence? Both parties begin with the statutory text most directly at issue, disputing when a state offense (here, arson) is "described in" an enumerated federal statute (here, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) ). Luna, armed principally with Black's Law Dictionary, argues that "described in" means "expressed" or "set forth" in-which, he says, requires the state offense to include each one of the federal law's elements. Brief for Petitioner 15-16. The Government, brandishing dictionaries of its own, contends that the statutory phrase has a looser meaning-that "describing entails... not precise replication," but "convey[ance of] an idea or impression" or of a thing's "central features." Brief for Respondent 17. On that view, "described in," as opposed to the more precise "defined in" sometimes found in statutes, denotes that the state offense need only incorporate the federal law's core, substantive elements. But neither of those claims about the bare term "described in" can resolve this case. Like many words, "describe" takes on different meanings in different contexts. Consider two ways in which this Court has used the word. In one case, "describe" conveyed exactness: A contractual provision, we wrote, "describes the subject [matter] with great particularity[,]... giv[ing] the precise number of pounds [of tobacco], the tax for which each pound was liable, and the aggregate of the tax." Ryan v. United States, 19 Wall. 514, 517, 22 L.Ed. 172 (1874). In another case, not: "The disclosure provision is meant," we stated, "to describe the law to consumers in a manner that is concise and comprehensible to the layman-which necessarily means that it will be imprecise." CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 102, 132 S.Ct. 665, 181 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012). So staring at, or even looking up, the words "described in" cannot answer whether a state offense must replicate every last element of a listed federal statute, including its jurisdictional one, to qualify as an aggravated felony. In considering that issue, we must, as usual, "interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context." Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 2267, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014). Here, two contextual considerations decide the matter. The first is § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence, which shows that Congress meant the term "aggravated felony" to capture serious crimes regardless of whether they are prohibited by federal, state, or foreign law. The second is a well-established background principle distinguishing between substantive and jurisdictional elements in federal criminal statutes. We address each factor in turn. A Section 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence, as noted above, provides: "The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years." See supra, at 1623. That sentence (except for the time limit on foreign convictions) declares the source of criminal law irrelevant: The listed offenses count as aggravated felonies regardless of whether they are made illegal by the Federal Government, a State, or a foreign country. That is true of the crimes identified by reference to federal statutes (as here, an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) ), as well as those employing generic labels (for example, murder). As even Luna recognizes, state and foreign analogues of the enumerated federal crimes qualify as aggravated felonies. See Brief for Petitioner 21 (contesting only what properly counts as such an analogue). The whole point of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence is to make clear that a listed offense should lead to swift removal, no matter whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law. Luna's jot-for-jot view of "described in" would substantially undercut that function by excluding from the Act's coverage all state and foreign versions of any enumerated federal offense that (like § 844(i) ) contains an interstate commerce element. Such an element appears in about half of § 1101(a)(43)'s listed statutes-defining, altogether, 27 serious crimes. Yet under Luna's reading, only those federal crimes, and not their state and foreign counterparts, would provide a basis for an alien's removal-because, as explained earlier, only Congress must ever show a link to interstate commerce. See supra, at 1624 - 1625. No state or foreign legislature needs to incorporate a commerce element to establish its jurisdiction, and so none ever does. Accordingly, state and foreign crimes will never precisely replicate a federal statute containing a commerce element. And that means, contrary to § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence, that the term "aggravated felony" would not apply to many of the Act's listed offenses irrespective of whether they are "in violation of Federal[,] State[, or foreign] law"; instead, that term would apply exclusively to the federal variants. Indeed, Luna's view would limit the penultimate sentence's effect in a peculiarly perverse fashion-excluding state and foreign convictions for many of the gravest crimes listed in § 1101(a)(43), while reaching those convictions for less harmful offenses. Consider some of the state and foreign crimes that would not count as aggravated felonies on Luna's reading because the corresponding federal law has a commerce element: most child pornography offenses, including selling a child for the purpose of manufacturing such material, see § 1101(a)(43)(I) ; demanding or receiving a ransom for kidnapping, see § 1101(a)(43)(H) ; and possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, see § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii). Conversely, the term "aggravated felony" in Luna's world would include state and foreign convictions for such comparatively minor offenses as operating an unlawful gambling business, see § 1101(a)(43)(J), and possessing a firearm not identified by a serial number, see § 1101(a)(43)(E)(iii), because Congress chose, for whatever reason, not to use a commerce element when barring that conduct. And similarly, the term would cover any state or foreign conviction for such nonviolent activity as receiving stolen property, see § 1101(a)(43)(G), or forging documents, see § 1101(a)(43)(R), because the INA happens to use generic labels to describe those crimes. This Court has previously refused to construe § 1101(a)(43) so as to produce such "haphazard"-indeed, upside-down-coverage. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 40, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009). We see no reason to follow a different path here: Congress would not have placed an alien convicted by a State of running an illegal casino at greater risk of removal than one found guilty under the same State's law of selling a child. In an attempt to make some sense of his reading, Luna posits that Congress might have believed that crimes having an interstate connection are generally more serious than those lacking one-for example, that interstate child pornography is "worse" than the intrastate variety. Brief for Petitioner 35. But to begin with, that theory cannot explain the set of crazy-quilt results just described: Not even Luna maintains that Congress thought local acts of selling a child, receiving explosives, or demanding a ransom are categorically less serious than, say, operating an unlawful casino or receiving stolen property (whether or not in interstate commerce). And it is scarcely more plausible to view an interstate commerce element in any given offense as separating serious from non-serious conduct: Why, for example, would Congress see an alien who carried out a kidnapping for ransom wholly within a State as materially less dangerous than one who crossed state lines in committing that crime? The essential harm of the crime is the same irrespective of state borders. Luna's argument thus misconceives the function of interstate commerce elements: Rather than distinguishing greater from lesser evils, they serve (as earlier explained) to connect a given substantive offense to one of Congress's enumerated powers. See supra, at 1624 - 1625. And still more fundamentally, Luna's account runs counter to the penultimate sentence's central message: that the national, local, or foreign character of a crime has no bearing on whether it is grave enough to warrant an alien's automatic removal. Luna (and the dissent, see post, at 1637) must therefore fall back on a different defense: that his approach would exclude from the universe of aggravated felonies fewer serious state and foreign offenses than one might think. To make that argument, Luna relies primarily on a part of the Act specifying that the term "aggravated felony" shall include "a crime of violence (as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 16 ] ) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year." § 1101(a)(43)(F) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining "crime of violence" as involving the use of "physical force" against the person or property of another). According to Luna, many state and foreign offenses failing to match the Act's listed federal statutes (for want of an interstate commerce element) would count as crimes of violence and, by that alternative route, trigger automatic removal. A different statutory phrase, or so Luna says, would thus plug the holes opened by his construction of the "described in" provisions. Luna's argument does not reassure us. We agree that state counterparts of some enumerated federal offenses would qualify as aggravated felonies through the "crime of violence" provision. But not nearly all such offenses, and not even the worst ones. Consider again some of the listed offenses described earlier. See supra, at 1628. The "crime of violence" provision would not pick up demanding a ransom for kidnapping. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(a) (defining the crime without any reference to physical force). It would not cover most of the listed child pornography offenses, involving the distribution, receipt, and possession of such materials. It would not reach felon-in-possession laws and other firearms offenses. And indeed, it would not reach arson in the many States defining that crime to include the destruction of one's own property. See Jordison v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1134, 1135 (C.A.9 2007) (holding that a violation of California's arson statute does not count as a crime of violence for that reason); Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29 (Solicitor General agreeing with that interpretation). So under Luna's reading, state and foreign counterparts to a broad swath of listed statutes would remain outside § 1101(a)(43)'s coverage merely because they lack an explicit interstate commerce connection. And for all the reasons discussed above, that result would significantly restrict the penultimate sentence's force and effect, and in an utterly random manner. B Just as important, a settled practice of distinguishing between substantive and jurisdictional elements of federal criminal laws supports reading § 1101(a)(43) to include state analogues lacking an interstate commerce requirement. As already explained, the substantive elements of a federal statute describe the evil Congress seeks to prevent; the jurisdictional element connects the law to one of Congress's enumerated powers, thus establishing legislative authority. See supra, at 1624 - 1625; ALI, Model Penal Code § 1.13(10) (1962). Both kinds of elements must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and because that is so, both may play a real role in a criminal case. But still, they are not created equal for every purpose. To the contrary, courts have often recognized-including when comparing federal and state offenses-that Congress uses substantive and jurisdictional elements for different reasons and does not expect them to receive identical treatment. Consider the law respecting mens rea. In general, courts interpret criminal statutes to require that a defendant possess a mens rea, or guilty mind, as to every element of an offense. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2009-2010, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015). That is so even when the "statute by its terms does not contain" any demand of that kind. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994). In such cases, courts read the statute against a "background rule" that the defendant must know each fact making his conduct illegal. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). Or otherwise said, they infer, absent an express indication to the contrary, that Congress intended such a mental-state requirement. Except when it comes to jurisdictional elements. There, this Court has stated, "the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute." United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 677, n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) ; see United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) ("Jurisdictional language need not contain the same culpability requirement as other elements of the offense"); Model Penal Code § 2.02. So when Congress has said nothing about the mental state pertaining to a jurisdictional element, the default rule flips: Courts assume that Congress wanted such an element to stand outside the otherwise applicable mens rea requirement. In line with that practice, courts have routinely held that a criminal defendant need not know of a federal crime's interstate commerce connection to be found guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Jinian, 725 F.3d 954, 964-966 (C.A.9 2013) ; United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1241 (C.A.7 1996) ; United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 907 (C.A.2 1988). Those courts have recognized, as we do here, that Congress viewed the commerce element as distinct from, and subject to a different rule than, the elements describing the substantive offense. Still more strikingly, courts have distinguished between the two kinds of elements in contexts, similar to this one, in which the judicial task is to compare federal and state offenses. The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13(a), subjects federal enclaves, like military bases, to state criminal laws except when they punish the same conduct as a federal statute. The ACA thus requires courts to decide when a federal and a state law are sufficiently alike that only the federal one will apply. And we have held that, in making that assessment, courts should ignore jurisdictional elements: When the "differences among elements" of the state and federal crimes "reflect jurisdictional, or other technical, considerations" alone, then the state law will have no effect in the area. Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 165, 118 S.Ct. 1135, 140 L.Ed.2d 271 (1998) ; see also id., at 182, 118 S.Ct. 1135 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (agreeing that courts should "look beyond... jurisdictional elements," and focus only on substantive ones, in determining whether "the elements of the two crimes are the same"). In such a case, we reasoned-just as we do now-that Congress meant for the federal jurisdictional element to be set aside. And lower courts have uniformly adopted the same approach when comparing federal and state crimes in order to apply the federal three-strikes statute. That law imposes mandatory life imprisonment on a person convicted on three separate occasions of a "serious violent felony." 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). Sounding very much like the INA, the three-strikes statute defines such a felony to include "a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed, consisting of" specified crimes (e.g., murder, manslaughter, robbery) "as described in" listed federal criminal statutes. § 3559(c)(2)(F). In deciding whether a state crime of conviction thus corresponds to an enumerated federal statute, every court to have faced the issue has ignored the statute's jurisdictional element. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario-Delgado, 198 F.3d 1354, 1357 (C.A.11 1999) (per curiam ); United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 386-387 (C.A.7 1997). Judge Wood, writing for the Seventh Circuit, highlighted the phrase "a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed"-the three-strikes law's version of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence. "It is hard to see why Congress would have used this language," she reasoned, "if it had meant that every detail of the federal offense, including its jurisdictional element [ ], had to be replicated in the state offense." Id., at 386-387. Just so, too, in the INA-whose "aggravated felony" provisions operate against, and rely on, an established legal backdrop distinguishing between jurisdictional and substantive elements. Luna objects to drawing that line on the ground that it is too hard to tell the difference between the two. See Brief for Petitioner 26-28 (discussing, in particular, statutes criminalizing the destruction of federal property and sending threats via the Postal Service). But that contention collides with the judicial experience just described. Courts regularly separate substantive from jurisdictional elements in applying federal criminal statutes' mens rea requirements; so too in implementing other laws that require a comparison of federal and state offenses. And from all we can see, courts perform that task with no real trouble: Luna has not pointed to any divisions between or within Circuits arising from the practice. We do not deny that some tough questions may lurk on the margins-where an element that makes evident Congress's regulatory power also might play a role in defining the behavior Congress thought harmful. But a standard interstate commerce element, of the kind appearing in a great many federal laws, is almost always a simple jurisdictional hook-and courts may as easily acknowledge that fact in enforcing the INA as they have done in other contexts. C Luna makes a final argument opposing our reading of § 1101(a)(43) : If Congress had meant for "ordinary state-law" crimes like arson to count as aggravated felonies, it would have drafted the provision to make that self-evident. Brief for Petitioner 20. Congress, Luna submits, would have used the generic term for those crimes-e.g., "arson"-rather than demanding that the state law of conviction correspond to a listed federal statute. See id., at 20-23. Or else, Luna (and the dissent) suggests, see id., at 24; post, at 1640 - 1641, Congress would have expressly distinguished between substantive and jurisdictional elements, as it did in an unrelated law mandating the pretrial detention of any person convicted of a federal offense "described in [a certain federal statute], or of a State or local offense that would have been an offense described in [that statute] if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed," 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)(A). But as an initial matter, Congress may have had good reason to think that a statutory reference would capture more accurately than a generic label the range of state convictions warranting automatic deportation. The clause of § 1101(a)(43) applying to Luna's case well illustrates the point. By referring to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), that provision incorporates not only the garden-variety arson offenses that a generic "arson" label would cover, but various explosives offenses too. See Brief for Petitioner 23, n. 7 (conceding that had Congress used the term "arson," it would have had to separately identify the explosives crimes encompassed in § 844(i) ). And the elements of generic arson are themselves so uncertain as to pose problems for a court having to decide whether they are present in a given state law. See Poulos, The Metamorphosis of the Law of Arson, 51 Mo. L.Rev. 295, 364, 387-435 (1986) (describing multiple conflicts over what conduct the term "arson" includes). Nor is the clause at issue here unusual in those respects: Section 1101(a)(43) includes many other statutory references that do not convert easily to generic labels. See, e.g., § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) (listing federal statutes defining various firearms offenses). To be sure, Congress used such labels to describe	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 67 ]	sc_adminaction
LASCARIS, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF ONONDAGA COUNTY v. SHIRLEY et al. No. 73-1016. Argued December 18, 1974 Decided March 19, 1975 Alan W. Rubenstein argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With him on the briefs for appellant in No. 73-1095 were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, and Ruth Kessler Toch, Solicitor General. Philip C. Pinsky and John B. LaParo filed a brief for appellant in No. 73-1016. Douglas A. Eldridge argued the cause pro hac vice for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief for appellee Stuck was Isadore Greenberg. Together with No. 73-1095, Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York v. Shirley et al., also on appeal to the same court. Ronald A. Zumbrun filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Elizabeth Palmer, Assistant Attorney General, and John J. Klee, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 73-1095. Per Curiam. After our previous remand, 409 U. S. 1052 (1972), the three-judge District Court held that amended New York Social Services Law § 101-a “engraft[ed] ... a condition on to the Congressionally prescribed initial AFDC eligibility requirements or on to the grounds for discontinuance of benefits.” 365 P. Supp. 818, 821 (1973). That condition, the court held, rendered the amended section invalid because in conflict with the Social Security Act, § 402 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a), insofar as it required recipient cooperation in a paternity or support action against an absent parent as a condition of eligibility for benefits under the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. On June 17, 1974, we noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals of the State and County Commissioners of Social Service, 417 U. S. 943. Since that time, however, on January 4, 1975, Pub. L. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2359, amended § 402 (a) of the Social Security Act expressly to resolve the conflict as to eligibility found by the three-judge District Court to exist between the federal and state laws. Amended §402 (a), like New York’s amended § 101-a, requires the recipient to cooperate to compel the absent parent to contribute to the support of the child. Section 402 (a), as amended, in pertinent part provides: “A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must “(26) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be required— “(B) to cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other payments or property due such applicant or such child and that, if the relative with whom a child is living is found to be ineligible because of failure to comply with the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, any aid for which such child is eligible will be provided in the form of protective payments as described in section 406 (b) (2) (without regard to subpara-graphs (A) through (E) of such section) . . . We affirm the judgment of the three-judge court. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972). In light of the resolution of the conflict by Pub. L. 93-647, we have no occasion to prepare an extended opinion. Affirmed. The Chief Justice, Me. Justice Powell, and Me. Justice Rehnquist dissent. Pub. L. 93-647 provides that § 402 (a), as amended, shall become effective on July 1, 1975. However, President Ford announced when he signed the law that he would propose changes to several sections, including the child-support provisions, during the early months of the 94th Congress, stating: “The second element of this bill involves the collection of child support payments from absent parents. I strongly agree with the objectives of this legislation. “In pursuit of this objective, however, certain provisions of this legislation go too far by injecting the Federal Government into domestic relations. Specifically, provisions for use of the Federal courts, the tax collection procedures of the Internal Revenue Service, and excessive audit requirements are an undesirable and unnecessary intrusion of the Federal Government into domestic relations. They are also an undesirable addition to the worldoad of the Federal courts, the IRS and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Audit Agency. Further, the establishment of a parent locator service in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with access to all Federal records raises serious privacy and administrative issues. I believe that these defects should be corrected in the next Congress, and I will propose legislation to do so.” 11 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, No. 2, Jan. 13, 1975, p. 20.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
ESTATE OF THORNTON et al. v. CALDOR, INC. No. 83-1158. Argued November 7, 1984 Decided June 26, 1985 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 711. Rehnquist, J., dissented. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioner Estate of Thornton. With him on the briefs were Dennis Rapps, Daniel D. Chazin, and Marc D. Stem. Joseph I. Leiber-man, Attorney General, argued the cause for petitioner-intervenor State of Connecticut urging reversal. With him on the briefs were Elliot F. Gerson, Deputy Attorney General, Henry S. Cohn, Assistant Attorney General, and John Edward Sexton. Paul Gewirtz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Eliot B. Gersten Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Bator, Michael W. McConnell, Brian K. Landsberg, Dennis J. Dimsey, and David L. Slate; for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith by Meyer Eisenberg, Jeffrey P. Sinesky, and Leslie K. Shedlin; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Lee Boothby; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Lawrence R. Velvel and Elaine D. Kaplan; for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation by Bruce N. Cameron; and for the Seventh-Day Adventist Church by Robert W. Nixon. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Michael H. Gottesman, Lawrence S. Gold, and George Kaufmann; for the Connecticut Retail Merchants Association et al. by Jay S. Seigel; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether a state statute that provides employees with the absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I In early 1975, petitioner’s decedent Donald E. Thornton began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New England retail stores; he managed the men’s and boys’ clothing department in respondent’s Waterbury, Connecticut, store. At that time, respondent’s Connecticut stores were closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§53-300 to 53-303 (1958). In 1977, following the state legislature’s revision of the Sunday-closing laws, respondent opened its Connecticut stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the expanded store hours, respondent required its managerial employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton, a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially complied with respondent’s demand and worked a total of 31 Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was transferred to a management position in respondent’s Tor-rington store; he continued to work on Sundays during the first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he invoked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (1985), which provides: “No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee’s refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.” Thornton rejected respondent’s offer either to transfer him to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. In March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his manager’s position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (1985). Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thornton had not been “discharged” within the meaning of the statute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated the sincerity of Thornton’s claim and concluded it was based on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision sustaining Thornton’s grievance. The Board framed the statutory issue as follows: “If a discharge for refusal to work Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant’s Sabbath . . . ,” §53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board held that respondent had violated the statute by “discharging] Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to work . . . [on] Thornton’s . . . Sabbath.” App. 11a, 12a. The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with backpay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. The Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the statute did not offend the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the statute did not have a “clear secular purpose.” Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 793 (1983). By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath as a day off, the statute evinced the “unmistakable purpose . . . [of] allowing] those persons who wish to worship on a particular day the freedom to do so.” Ibid. The court then held that the “primary effect” of the statute was to advance religion because the statute “confers its ‘benefit’ on an explicitly religious basis. Only those employees who designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing.” Id., at 350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute required the State Mediation Board to decide which religious activities may be characterized as an “observance of Sabbath” in order to assess employees’ sincerity, and concluded that this type of inquiry is “exactly the type of ‘comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance’ . . . which creates excessive governmental entanglements between church and state.” Id., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)). We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. 1078 (1984). We affirm. r-H I — I Under the Religion Clauses, government must guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, and must take pains not to compel people to act in the name of any religion. In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause cases, the Court has frequently relied on our holding in Lemon, supra, for guidance, and we do so here. To pass constitutional muster under Lemon a statute must not only have a secular purpose and not foster excessive entanglement of government with religion, its primary effect must not advance or inhibit religion. The Connecticut statute challenged here guarantees every employee, who “states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath,” the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (1985). The State has thus decreed that those who observe a Sabbath any day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must be relieved of the duty to work on that day, no matter what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer or fellow workers. The statute arms Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designate as their Sabbath. In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers and employees an absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee. There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an occupation with a Monday through Friday schedule — a school teacher, for example; the statute provides for no special consideration if a high percentage of an employer’s work force asserts rights to the same Sabbath. Moreover, there is no exception when honoring the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the employer’s compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers. Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as to whether the employer has made reasonable accommodation proposals. This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, so well articulated by Judge Learned Hand: “The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.” Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2 1953). As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental or remote effect of advancing religion. See, e. g., Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). The statute has a primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular religious practice. hH I — I hH We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is Affirmed. Justice Rehnquist dissents. Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton’s estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent’s estate. The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague. State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (Com. Pl. 1976). The legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to remain open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (1985). At the same time, a new provision was added, § 53-303e, which prohibited employment of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n. 3, infra. Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the Court of Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (1976). This decision was limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court did not consider the validity of other provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978, the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet another Sunday-closing law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor’s Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 343 (1979). As had the Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of § 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until challenged in this action. Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with an attorney. See App. 88a-90a. Section 53-308e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sunday-closing laws. Apart from the 6-day week and the Sabbath-observance provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides: “(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to reinstatement to his former or a comparable position. “(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire whether the applicant observes any Sabbath. “(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be fined more than two hundred dollars.” The collective-bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was “contrary [to the employee’s] personal religious convictions.” App. 91a. The Board refused to consider respondent’s constitutional challenge on the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of state law. Id., at 9a-10a. The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. 191 Conn., at 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d, at 792, n. 7. We also granted the State of Connecticut’s motion to intervene as of right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 465 U. S. 1098 (1984). The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn. Bd. Med. & Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 20, 1980), App. 11a-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Med. & Arb. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) (“There is no question that. . . the employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or her sabbath [and that § 58-303e(b) would be violated if] the termination was as a result of the employee’s refusal to work on her sabbath”). Following settled state law, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the Board’s construction of the statute, 191 Conn., at 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d, at 789-790, 794. This construction of the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169 (1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875). Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate a particular weekly day off — typically a weekend day, widely prized as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious, reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of “dues” at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer’s absolute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS et al. v. JACOBS et al. No. 73-1347. Argued December 11, 1974 Decided February 18, 1975 Lila J. Young argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Harold H. Bredell and Lawrence McTurnan. Craig Eldon Pinkus argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Ronald E. Elberger. Per Curiam. This action was brought in the District Court by six named plaintiffs seeking to have declared unconstitutional certain regulations and rules promulgated by the petitioner Board and to have the enforcement of those regulations and rules enjoined, as well as seeking other relief no longer relevant to this case. In the complaint, the named plaintiffs stated that the action was brought as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (a) and (b)(2), and further stated that “[pjlaintiff class members are all high school students attending schools managed, controlled, and maintained by the Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis.” At the time this action was brought, plaintiffs were or had been involved in the publication and distribution of a student newspaper, and they alleged that certain actions taken by petitioner Board or its subordinates, as well as certain of its rules and regulations, interfered or threatened to interfere with the publication and distribution of the newspaper in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs (respondents here) prevailed on the merits of their action in the District Court, 349 F. Supp. 605 (SD Ind. 1972), and the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting in part, affirmed, 490 F. 2d 601 (CA7 1973). Petitioners brought the case to this Court, and we granted certiorari, 417 U. S. 929 (1974). At oral argument, we were informed by counsel for petitioners that all of the named plaintiffs in the action had graduated from the Indianapolis school system; in these circumstances, it seems clear that a case or controversy no longer exists between the named plaintiffs and the petitioners with respect to the validity of the rules at issue. The case is therefore moot unless it was duly certified as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, a controversy still exists between petitioners and the present members of the class, and the issue in controversy is such that it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). Because in our view there was inadequate compliance with the requirements of Rule 23 (c), we have concluded that the case has become moot. The only formal entry made by the District Court below purporting to certify this case as a class action is contained in that court’s “Entry on Motion for Permanent Injunction,” wherein the court “conclude [d] and ordered” that “the remaining named plaintiffs are qualified as proper representatives of the class whose interest they seek to protect.” 349 F. Supp., at 611. No other effort was made to identify the class or to certify the class action as contemplated by Rule 23 (c)(1); nor does the quoted language comply with the requirement of Rule 23 (c)(3) that “[t]he judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision ... (b)(2) . . . shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.” The need for definition of the class purported to be represented by the named plaintiffs is especially important in cases like this one where the litigation is likefy to become moot as to the initially named plaintiffs prior to the exhaustion of appellate review. Because the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified by the District Court, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to order the District Court to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the complaint. So ordered. The named plaintiffs sought expunction from their respective records of certain information and compensatory and punitive damages against petitioners. These prayers for relief were denied by the District Court for failure of proof and no appeal was taken from this decision.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LESTER. No. 376. Argued April 25, 1961. Decided May 22, 1961. C. Guy Tadlock argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Melva M. Graney and Norman H. Wolfe. Louis Mandel argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Leonard J. Lefkort. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole question presented by this suit, in which the Government seeks to recover personal income tax deficiencies, involves the validity of respondent’s deductions from his gross income for the taxable years 1951 and 1952 of the whole of his periodic payments during those years to his divorced wife pursuant to a written agreement entered into by them and approved by the divorce court. The Commissioner claims that language in this agreement providing “[i]n the event that any of the [three] children of the parties hereto shall marry, become emancipated, or die, then the payments herein specified shall ... be reduced in a sum equal to one-sixth of the payments which would thereafter otherwise accrue” sufficiently identifies one-half of the periodic payments as having been “payable for the support” of the taxpayer’s minor children under § 22 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and, therefore, not deductible by him under § 23 (u) of the Code. The Tax Court approved the Commissioner’s disallowance, 32 T. C. 1156, but the Court of Appeals reversed, 279 F. 2d 354, holding that the agreement did not “fix” with requisite clarity any specific amount or portion of the periodic payments as payable for the support of the children and that all sums paid to the wife under the agreement were, therefore, deductible from respondent’s gross income under the alimony provision of § 23 (u). To resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question, we granted certiorari. 364 U. S. 890. We have concluded that the Congress intended that, to come within the exception portion of § 22 (k), the agreement providing for the periodic payments must specifically state the amounts or parts thereof allocable to the support of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Prior to 1942, a taxpayer was generally not entitled to deduct from gross income amounts payable to a former spouse as alimony, Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935), except in situations in which the divorce decree, the settlement agreement and state law operated as a complete discharge of the liability for support. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149 (1940). The hearings, Senate debates and the Report of the Ways and Means Committee of the House all indicate that it was the intention of Congress, in enacting § 22 (k) and § 23 (u) of the Code, to eliminate the uncertain and inconsistent tax consequences resulting from the many variations in state law. “[T]he amendments are designed to remove the uncertainty as to the tax consequences of payments made to a divorced spouse . . . .” S. Rep. No. 673, Pt. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 32. They “will produce uniformity in the treatment of amounts paid . . . regardless of variance in the laws of different States . . . H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72. In addition, Congress realized that the “increased surtax rates would intensify” the hardship on the husband who, in many cases, “would not have sufficient income left after paying alimony to meet his income tax obligations,” H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, and perhaps also that, on the other hand, the wife, generally being in a lower income tax bracket than the husband, could more easily protect herself in the agreement and in the final analysis receive a larger net payment from the husband if he could deduct the gross payment from his income. The first version of § 22 (k) was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1941. The sums going to child support were to be includible in the husband’s gross income only if the amount thereof was “specifically designated as a sum payable for the support of minor children of the spouses.” H. R. 5417, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., § 117. The proposed amendment thus drew a distinction between a case in which the amount for child support was “specifically designated” in the agreement, and one in which there was no such designation. In the latter event, “the whole of such amounts are includible in the income of the wife . . . .” S. Rep. No. 673, Pt. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35. Action on the bill was deferred by the conference committee and hearings on the measure were again held the following year. The subsequent Report of the Senate Finance Committee on § 22 (k) carried forward the term “specifically designated,” used in the 1941 Report (No. 673), with this observation: “If, however, the periodic payments . . . are received by the wife for the support and maintenance of herself and of minor children of the husband without such specific designation of the portion for the support of such children, then the whole of such amounts is includible in the income of the wife as provided' in section 22 (k) . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 86. - As finally enacted in 1942, the Congress used the word “fix” instead of the term “specifically designated,” but the change was explained in the Senate hearings as “a little more streamlined language.” Hearings before Senate Committee on Einance on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 48. As the Office of the Legislative Counsel reported to the Senate Committee: “If an amount is specified in the decree of divorce attributable to the support of minor children, that amount is not income of the wife .... If, however, that amount paid the wife includes the support of children, but no amount is specified for the support of the children, the entire amount §pes into the income of the wife . . . .” Ibid. (Italics supplied.) This language leaves no room for doubt. The agreement must expressly specify or “fix” a sum certain or percentage of the payment for child support before any of the payment is excluded from the wife’s income. The statutory requirement is strict and carefully worded. It does not say that “a sufficiently clear purpose” on the part of the parties is sufficient to shift the tax. It says that the “written instrument” must “fix” that “portion of the payment” which is to go to the support of the children. Otherwise, the wife must pay the tax on the whole payment. We are obliged to enforce this mandate of the Congress. One of the basic precepts of the income tax law is that “[t]he income that is subject to a man’s unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.” Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930). Under the type of agreement here, the wife is free to spend the monies paid under the agreement as she sees fit. “The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it.” Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 118 (1940). Including the entire payments in the wife’s gross income under such circumstances, therefore, comports with the underlying philosophy of the Code. And, as we have frequently stated, the Code must be given “as great an internal symmetry and consistency as its words permit.” United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U. S. 232, 236 (1955). It does not appear that the Congress was concerned with the perhaps restricted uses of unspecified child-support payments permitted the wife by state law when it made those sums includible within the wife’s alimony income. Its concern was with a revenue measure and with the specificity, for income tax purposes, of the amount payable under the terms of the written agreement for support of the children. Therefore, in construing that revenue act, we too are unconcerned with the variant legal obligations, if any, which such an agreement, by construction of its nonspecific provisions under local rules, imposes upon the wife to use a certain portion of the payments solely for the support of the children. The Code merely affords the husband a deduction for any portion of such payment not specifically earmarked in the agreement as payable for the support of the children. As we read § 22 (k), the Congress was in effect giving the husband and wife the power to shift a portion of the tax burden from the wife to the husband by the use of a simple provision in the settlement agreement which fixed the specific portion of the periodic payment made to the wife as payable for the support of the children. Here the agreement does not so specifically provide. On the contrary, it calls merely for the payment of certain monies to the wife for the support of herself and the children. The Commissioner makes much of the fact that the agreement provides that as, if, and when any one of the children married, became emancipated or died the total payment would be reduced by one-sixth, saying that this provision did “fix” one-half (one-sixth multiplied by three, the number of children) of the total payment as payable for the support of the children. However, the agreement also pretermitted the entire payment in the event of the wife's remarriage and it is as consistent to say that this provision had just the opposite effect. It was just such uncertainty in tax consequences that the Congress intended to and, we believe, did eliminate when it said that the child-support payments should be “specifically designated” or, as the section finally directed, “fixed.” It does not say that “a sufficiently clear purpose” on the part of the parties would satisfy. It says that the written instrument must “fix” that amount or “portion of the payment” which is to go to the support of the children. The Commissioner contends that administrative interpretation has been consistently to the contrary. It appears, however, that there was such a contrariety of opinion among the Courts of Appeals that the Commissioner was obliged as late as 1959 to issue a Revenue Ruling which stated that the Service would follow the rationale of Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F. 2d 303 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1957), but that Weil v. Commissioner, 240 F. 2d 584 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1957), would be followed “in cases involving similar facts and circumstances.” Rev. Rul. 59-93, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 22, 23. All of these considerations lead to the conclusion that if there is to be certainty in the tax consequences of such agreements the allocations to child support made therein must be “specifically designated” and not left to determination by inference or conjecture. We believe that the Congress has so demanded in § 22 (k). After all, the parties may for tax purposes act as their best interests dictate, provided, as that section requires, their action be clear and specific. Certainly the Congress has required no more and expects no less. Affirmed. Section 22 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 56 Stat. 816-817, provided in part that “. . . periodic payments . . . received [by the wife] subsequent to [a decree of divorce] ... in discharge of ... a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband under ... a written instrument incident to such divorce . . . shall be includible in the gross income of such wife .... This subsection shall not apply to that part of any such periodic payment which the terms of the . . . written instrument fix, in terms of ... a portion of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of such husband.” (Emphasis added.) Section 23 (u), 56 Stat. 817, stated in pertinent part that there shall be allowed as a deduction “[i]n the case of a husband described in section 22 (k), amounts includible under section 22 (k) in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is made within the husband’s taxable year.” Both Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F. 2d 288 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1959), and Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F. 2d 303 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1957), have arrived at conclusions contrary to those of the court below. Sections 22 (k) and 23 (u) were enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1942 which provided for greatly increased tax revenue to meet the expenses of World War II. H. R. Rep. No. 1203, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 11. The court there approved the rule that “when the settlement agreement, read as a whole, discloses that the parties have earmarked or designated . . . the payments to be made, one part to be payable for alimony, and another part to be payable for the support of children, with sufficient certainty and specificity to readily determine which is which, without reference to contingencies which may never come into being, then the 'part of any periodic payment’ has been fixed 'by the terms of the decree or written instrument’. . . .” 250 F. 2d, at 308. In that case the agreement provided for reductions only in the event the divorced wife remarried. The court stated that “[t]he fortuitous or incidental mention'of a figure in a provision meant to be inoperative, unless some more or less probable future event occurs, will not suffice to shift the tax burden from the wife to the husband.” 240 F. 2d, at 588.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
CITICORP INDUSTRIAL CREDIT, INC. v. BROCK, SECRETARY OF LABOR No. 86-88. Argued April 20, 1987 Decided June 22, 1987 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 40. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, J., joined, post, p. 40. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were George W. Jones, Jr., and A. Bruce Schimberg. Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, George R. Salem, Allen H. Feldman, and Steven J. Mandel. Mark I. Wallach, Thomas A. Cicarella, and Mitchell G. Blair filed a brief for the National Commercial Finance Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. George Kaufmann and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 15(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1068, prohibits “any person” from introducing into interstate commerce goods produced in violation of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the Act. The question in this case is whether § 15(a)(1) applies to holders of collateral obtained pursuant to a security agreement. I In 1983, petitioner entered into a financing agreement with Qualitex Corporation, a clothing manufacturer and the corporate predecessor to Ely Group, Inc., and its subsidiaries Rockford Textile Mills, Inc., and Ely & Walker, Inc. (collectively Ely). Under the terms of the financing arrangement, petitioner agreed to loan up to $11 million to provide working capital for Ely. In return, Ely granted petitioner a security interest in inventory, accounts receivable, and other assets. Petitioner perfected its security interest under applicable state law. The financing agreement imposed various reporting requirements on Ely, including the submission to petitioner of a weekly schedule of inventory, a monthly balance sheet and income statement, and reports of accounts receivable. Petitioner also monitored the collateral upon which it made cash advances through a system of audits and on-site inspections. In the fall of 1984, Ely’s sales began to fall below projections, and the balance on the loan began to increase, reaching over $9.5 million by February 1985. Ely stopped reporting to petitioner in January 1985. On February 8, petitioner stopped advancing funds and demanded payment in full. At the request of Ely’s management, however, petitioner did not immediately foreclose. It gave Ely an opportunity to devise a plan for continuing its operations, but Ely was unable to do so. Petitioner waited until February 19, at which time it took possession of the collateral, including Ely’s inventory of finished goods. Ely’s employees continued to work until February 19, when Ely ceased all operations and closed its manufacturing facilities. Because Ely defaulted on its payroll, the employees did not receive any wages for pay periods between January 27 and February 19. The Department of Labor concluded that the items manufactured during these times were produced in violation of §§6 and 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. §§ 206 and 207, and that under § 15(a)(1), they were “hot goods” that could not be introduced into interstate commerce. Acting on information that petitioner intended to transport these goods in interstate commerce, the Secretary of Labor sought to enjoin shipment. In an action filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, the Secretary moved for a preliminary injunction and sought a temporary restraining order to prohibit Ely and petitioner from placing the goods in interstate commerce. The District Court denied the application for a temporary restraining order but, after a hearing, granted the Secretary’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Donovan v. Rockford Textile Mills, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 215 (1985). The Under Secretary of Labor then filed another complaint against Ely and petitioner, this time in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. This complaint was also accompanied by a motion for a preliminary injunction and application for a temporary restraining order. The District Court granted the temporary restraining order and later granted the Under Secretary’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22 (1985). Both District Courts held that § 15(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person to ship “hot goods” in interstate commerce, prohibited not only Ely but also petitioner from transporting or selling items produced by employees who had not been paid in conformity with §§ 6 and 7 of the FLSA. They found this reading of § 15(a)(1) consistent with congressional intent to exclude from interstate commerce goods produced under substandard labor conditions. 608 F. Supp., at 217; 621 F. Supp., at 25-26. The courts concluded that “ ‘in light of the purposes of the Act, it would be an unjust and harsh result for the creditor to get the benefit of the labor of the employees during the period of time they produced goods and were not paid as provided by the Act; a benefit which the creditor would not have without the employees!’] labor.’” Id., at 26 (quoting 608 F. Supp., at 217). The two cases were consolidated on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting. Brock v. Ely Group, Inc., 788 F. 2d 1200 (1986). Following the plain language of § 15(a)(1), the majority concluded that “any person” as used in that section applies to secured creditors. Id., at 1202-1203. Like the District Courts, it found this result consistent with the purpose of the FLSA: to exclude tainted goods from interstate commerce. Id., at 1203. The Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills Co., 360 F. 2d 730 (1966), which had held § 15(a)(1) inapplicable to secured creditors who take possession of goods produced in violation of the FLSA. 788 F. 2d, at 1204-1205. The Sixth Circuit noted that Congress created only two exceptions to the broad scope of § 15(a)(1), one for common carriers and one for good faith purchasers, id., at 1205, and concluded that “Powell Knitting Mills created an exception for secured creditors that Congress did not and has not deemed appropriate.” Id., at 1206. The dissenting judge would have followed Powell Knitting Mills. He maintained that in enacting the “hot goods” provision, Congress was concerned with violations of the Act occurring in the course of the ongoing production of goods by a solvent manufacturer, not, as here, by an insolvent corporation that has ceased operations. Id., at 1207. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the Circuits. 479 U. S. 929 (1986). We now affirm. II A The FLSA mandates the payment of minimum wage and overtime compensation to covered employees. Section 6(a) provides that every employer, as defined in the Act, “shall pay to each of his employees” wages not less than the specified minimum rate; § 7(a)(1) prohibits employment of any employee in excess of 40 hours per week “unless such employee receives compensation” at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate. Petitioner does not contest the lower courts’ findings that Ely failed to pay its employees at all for several weeks immediately preceding the plant closings. Consequently, we conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the goods produced during this period were manufactured in violation of § 6 and/or § 7 of the FLSA and are “hot goods” for the purposes of § 15(a)(1). See 788 F. 2d, at 1201. Section 15(a)(1) prohibits “any person” from introducing goods produced in violation of § 6 or § 7 of the FLSA into interstate commerce. Section 3(a) defines “person” as “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.” 29 U. S. C. § 203(a). As a corporate entity, petitioner clearly falls within the plain language of the statute. Section 15(a)(1) contains two exemptions to the general prohibition on interstate shipment of “hot goods.” The first, enacted as part of the original FLSA, exempts common carriers from the prohibition on transportation of such goods. The second, added in 1949, exempts a purchaser who acquired the goods for value, without notice of any violation, and “in good faith in reliance on written assurance from the producer that the goods were produced in compliance with the requirements” of the Act. Petitioner does not claim to come within either statutory exemption. Rather, it argues that the exemptions reflect congressional intent to limit application of the “hot goods” provision to culpable parties, and therefore, “innocent” secured creditors should not be subject to the Act. We disagree. Although §§ 6 and 7 only require “employers” to pay minimum wage and overtime, § 15(a)(1) refers to “any person,” not “any employer.” Congress limited other provisions of the FLSA as petitioner suggests, which indicates that its failure to do so in § 15(a)(1) was not inadvertent. That Congress identified only two narrow categories of “innocent” persons who were not subject to the “hot goods” provision suggests that all other persons, innocent or not, are subject to § 15(a)(1). We find no indication that Congress actually considered application of the “hot goods” provision to secured creditors when it enacted the FLSA. By claiming a general exemption for creditors, without any duty to ascertain compliance with the FLSA, petitioner is asking us to put creditors in a better position than good-faith purchasers, for whom Congress specifically added an exemption. In the past, the Court has refused “[t]o extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within [the FLSA’s] terms and spirit.” A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493 (1945). Similarly, where the FLSA provides exemptions “in detail and with particularity,” we have found this to preclude “enlargement by implication.” Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607, 617 (1944). See also Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, 512 (1950); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178, 183-184 (1946). We see no reason to deviate from our traditional approach in this case. B Petitioner urges us to look beyond the plain language of the statute, citing the often-quoted passage from Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892): “[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” According to petitioner, the sole aim of the FLSA was to establish decent wages and hours for American workers. This goal, petitioner claims, is not furthered by application of § 15(a)(1) to creditors who acquire “hot goods” by foreclosure and are not themselves responsible for the minimum wage and overtime violations. However, we conclude that the legislative intent fully supports the result achieved by application of the plain language. While improving working conditions was undoubtedly one of Congress’ concerns, it was certainly not the only aim of the FLSA. In addition to the goal identified by petitioner, the Act’s declaration of policy, contained in §2(a), reflects Congress’ desire to eliminate the competitive advantage enjoyed by goods produced under substandard conditions. 29 U. S. C. § 202(a). This Court has consistently recognized this broad regulatory purpose. “The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly . . . that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce.” United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115 (1941). See also Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290, 296 (1985); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 189 (1968); Rutherford Food Corp v. McComb, 331 U. S. 722, 727 (1947). Application of § 15(a)(1) to secured creditors furthers this goal by excluding tainted goods from interstate commerce. Had the Department of Labor not obtained an injunction in this case, petitioner, as a secured creditor, would have converted several weeks of labor by the debtor’s employees into goods covered by its security interest; the “hot goods” produced by these uncompensated employees would have competed with goods produced in conformity with the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements. Moreover, prohibiting foreclosing creditors from selling “hot goods” also advances the goal identified by petitioner. Secured creditors often monitor closely the operations of employer-borrowers, as petitioner did in this case. They may be in a position to insist on compliance with the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements. As the District Court for the Western District observed: “[I]f foreclosing creditors are free to ship and sell tainted goods across state lines, the temptation to overextend credit to marginal producers is strong, as is the likelihood that such producers will become unable to meet their payrolls. The reason for this is that finance companies and institutions stand to reap financial gain by keeping such producers in business. A holding by this Court that creditors may not ship and sell in interstate commerce goods produced in violation of the Act will not only protect complying manufacturers from the unfair competition of such tainted goods, but, we submit, it will also discourage the type of commercial financing which leads to minimum wage and overtime violations.” 621 F. Supp., at 26 (emphasis added). C A literal application of § 15(a)(1) does not grant employees a priority in “hot goods” superior to that which a secured creditor has under state law. Petitioner’s rights in the collateral as against Ely are unchanged by our holding. Petitioner still owns the goods, subject only to the “hot goods” provision, which prevents it from placing them in interstate commerce. The employees have not acquired a possessory interest in the goods. Indeed, as the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee recognized, the Secretary brought this action “not to compel the foreclosing creditor to pay the statutory wages or to put pressure on the defaulting producer to pay such wages, but to keep tainted goods from entering the channels of interstate commerce.” Id., at 25-26. That petitioner can cure the employer’s violation of the FLSA by paying the employees the statutorily required wages does not give the employees a “lien” on the assets superior to that of a secured creditor. In numerous other statutes, Congress has exercised its authority under the Commerce Clause to exclude from interstate commerce goods which, for a variety of reasons, it considers harmful. Like the FLSA, these regulatory measures bar goods not produced in conformity with specified standards from the channels of commerce. As the District Courts in this case recognized, secured creditors take their security interests subject to the laws of the land. See 621 F. Supp., at 26; 608 F. Supp., at 217. If, for example, the goods at issue in this case were fabrics that failed to meet federal flammability standards and were therefore banned from interstate commerce under the Flammable Fabrics Act, 67 Stat. 111, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1191 et seq., surely petitioner could not argue that it had a right to sell the inventory merely by virtue of its status as a secured creditor. “Hot goods” are not inherently hazardous, but Congress has determined that they are contraband nonetheless. We see no reason for a different result merely because a different form of contraband is involved. Ill We hold that § 15(a)(l)’s broad prohibition on interstate shipment of “hot goods” applies to secured creditors who acquire the goods pursuant to a security agreement. This result is mandated by the plain language of the statute, and it furthers the goal of eliminating the competitive advantage enjoyed by goods produced under substandard labor conditions. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Section 15(a)(1) of the FLSA, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 215(a), provides in relevant part: “(a) [I]t shall be unlawful for any person— “(1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 206 or section 207 of this title, or in violation of any regulation or order of the Secretary issued under section 214 of this title; except that no provision of this chapter shall impose any liability upon any common carrier for the transportation in commerce in the regular course of its business of any goods not produced by such common carrier, and no provision of this chapter shall excuse any common carrier from its obligation to accept any goods for transportation; and except that any such transportation, offer, shipment, delivery, or sale of such goods by a purchaser who acquired them in good faith in reliance on written assurance from the producer that the goods were produced in compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and who acquired such goods for value without notice of any such violation, shall not be deemed unlawful.” The District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted petitioner’s motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The stay permitted the delivery and sale of Ely’s inventory, on the condition that petitioner place the proceeds in a separate interest-bearing account to be used to pay the wages of Ely’s former employees in the event that, on appeal, § 15(a)(1) was held to apply to petitioner. The District Court in the Western District denied a similar motion for a stay, but the Court of Appeals granted a stay on the same conditions. The Court of Appeals subsequently modified its order to permit petitioner to withdraw all but $1.5 million from the account. In Shultz v. Factors, Inc., 65 CCH LC ¶ 32,487 (1971), the Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills Co., 360 F. 2d 730 (1966), but added the requirement “that there be no collusion between the manufacturer and his financier permitting the introduction into the market of goods produced in violation of the Act.” See also Dunlop v. Sportsmaster, Inc., 77 CCH LC ¶ 33,293 (ED Tenn. 1975) (following Powell Knitting Mills). Petitioner appears to suggest that Ely’s failure to pay its employees did not violate the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA because §§ 6 and 7 “address wage rates, rather than the problem of nonpayment due to insolvency.” Brief for Petitioner 16. This ignores the plain language of-the Act, which is not limited to ongoing concerns and makes no exception for employers who are financially or otherwise unable to comply with §§ 6 and 7. The proposition that an employer complies with the FLSA so long as its promised wage rates equal or exceed the statutory minimum, regardless of whether employees actually receive any compensation, would render illusory the Act’s protections. As this case demonstrates, such a rule would also encourage financially unstable employers to obtain labor when their financial condition indicates that they are unlikely to be able to pay for it. Although it found no evidence of collusion between petitioner and Ely, the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee found that petitioner knew that it was funding Ely’s payroll and that when its funding ceased, Ely would be unable to meet its payroll obligations. Ford v. Ely Group, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 22, 23 (1985). For example, § 12(a)’s prohibitions against child labor are enforceable only against “a producer, manufacturer or dealer,” 29 U. S. C. § 212(a). See § 15(a)(4), 29 U. S. C. § 215(a)(4). Under § 16(b), backpay may be sought only from an “employer.” 29 U. S. C. § 216(b). And § 16(a) imposes criminal liability only for willful violations of the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 216(a). Congress’ motive for exempting common carriers does not appear to have been concern for nonculpable parties, as petitioner suggests, but a desire “to prevent a case involving the constitutionality of the act from arising in a suit between a shipper and a common carrier, to which the Government was not a party, inasmuch as the common carrier has no interest in the issue of constitutionality, but only in its obligation to accept goods for transportation.” H. R. Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 14 (1938). Nor does the 1949 amendment to the Act provide support for petitioner’s claim that the “hot goods” provision was never intended to apply to “innocent” secured creditors. To the contrary, the House Report reflects Congress’ understanding that the 1938 law did not exempt innocent purchasers from the “hot goods” provision. “[A] purchaser who ships in commerce goods produced by another person who violated the wage-and-hour provisions of the act in the production of such goods, commits an unlawful act.” H. R. Rep. No. 267, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1949). Had Congress intended the 1938 Act to exempt innocent parties generally, amendment would have been unnecessary. The amendment changed existing law only to the extent it made it “lawful for a purchaser in good faith of goods produced in violation of the act to sell such goods in commerce,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1949), provided he or she obtained assurances “that the goods in question were produced in compliance with the act.” Ibid. Thus, for the first time, Congress gave purchasers a mechanism for protecting themselves from unwitting violations of the Act, for which they would otherwise have been liable. See H. R. Rep. No. 267, supra, at 39. Section 2(a), codified at 29 U. S. C. § 202(a), provides: “The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce ... , of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce” (emphasis added). President Roosevelt’s message to Congress, which served as the inspiration for passage of the Act, makes a similar point: “Goods produced under conditions which do not meet rudimentary standards of decency should be regarded as contraband and ought not to be allowed to pollute the channels of interstate trade.” H. R. Doc. No. 255, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937). See Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, 516 (1950). The President’s message was cited approvingly throughout the legislative history of the 1938 Act. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-7 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 2182, supra, at 5. Despite these expansive indications of legislative purpose, petitioner insists that Congress was concerned about competition only to the extent that competition from “ ‘chiselers’ ” had the effect of driving down wages and working conditions. Brief for Petitioner 24-25. However, based on the statute, its legislative history, and our prior decisions, we conclude that exclusion from interstate commerce of goods produced under substandard conditions is not simply a means to enforce other statutory goals; it is itself a central purpose of the FLSA. Of course, under state law, the employees may have a lien on the employer’s property superior to petitioner’s lien. See Tenn. Code Ann. §66-13-101 (1982) (creating statutory wage lien on “corporate or firm property of every character and description”). However, any such lien would exist independent of the application of the FLSA to petitioner. Petitioner also argues that application of the “hot goods” prohibition to secured creditors will interfere with the operation of the Bankruptcy Code. Because Ely has not filed for bankruptcy, however, this issue is not before us. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 1192 (fabrics failing to conform to flammability standards); 15 U. S. C. § 1211 (household refrigerators without prescribed safety devices); 15 U. S. C. §§ 1263(a)-(c), (f) (misbranded or banned hazardous substances); 21 U. S. C. §§ 331(a)-(d) (adulterated or misbranded food, drugs, and cosmetics); 21 U. S. C. §§ 458(a)(2)-(4) (adulterated, misbranded, or uninspected poultry products).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 70 ]	sc_adminaction
KLEPPE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. NEW MEXICO et al. No. 74-1488. Argued March 23, 1976 Decided June 17, 1976 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Edmund B. Clark, and Dirk D. Snel. George T. Harris, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Murdaugh Stuart Madden for the Humane Society of the United States; by Paul A. Lenzini for the International Association of Game, Fish, and Conservation Commissioners; and by Thomas H. Wakefield for Hope Ryden. Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by 7. Frank Mendicino, Attorney General, and Sterling A. Case, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wyoming et al.; by Robert List, Attorney General, for the Nevada State Board of Agriculture; by Jack E. Hull and John C. Miller for the Central Committee of Nevada State Grazing Boards et al.; and by David R. Belding and William I. Althen for Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case is whether Congress exceeded its powers under the Constitution in enacting the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act. I The Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, 85 Stat. 649, 16 U. S. C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted in 1971 to protect “all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States,” § 2 (b) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1332 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), from “capture, branding, harassment, or death.” §1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act provides that all such horses and burros on the public lands administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or by the Secretary of Agriculture through the Forest Service are committed to the jurisdiction of the respective Secretaries, who are “directed to protect and manage [the animals] as components of the public lands... in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” § 3 (a), 16 U. S. C. § 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). If protected horses or burros “stray from public lands onto privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform the nearest federal marshal or agent of the Secretary, who shall arrange to have the animals removed.” § 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Section 6, 16 U. S. C. § 1336 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Secretaries to promulgate regulations, see 36 CFR § 231.11 (1975) (Agriculture); 43 CFR pt. 4710 (1975) (Interior), and to enter into cooperative agreements with other landowners and with state and local governmental agencies in furtherance of the Act’s purposes. On August 7, 1973, the Secretaries executed such an agreement with the New Mexico Livestock Board, the agency charged with enforcing the New Mexico Estray Law, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 47-14-1 et seq. (1966). The agreement acknowledged the authority of the Secretaries to manage and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States within the State and established a procedure for evaluating the claims of private parties to ownership of such animals. The Livestock Board terminated the agreement three months later. Asserting that the Federal Government lacked power to control wild horses and burros on the public lands of the United States unless the animals were moving in interstate commerce or damaging the public lands and that neither of these bases of regulation was available here, the Board notified the Secretaries of its intent “to exercise all regulatory, impoundment and sale powers which it derives from the New Mexico Estray Law, over all estray horses, mules or asses found running at large upon public or private lands within New Mexico.... This includes the right to go upon Federal or State lands to take possession of said horses or burros, should the Livestock Board so desire.” App. 67, 72. The differences between the Livestock Board and the Secretaries came to a head in February 1974. On February 1, 1974, a New Mexico rancher, Kelley Stephenson, was informed by the BLM that several unbranded burros had been seen near Taylor Well, where Stephenson watered his cattle. Taylor Well is on federal property, and Stephenson had access to it and some 8,000 surrounding acres only through a grazing permit issued pursuant to § 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1270, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 315b. After the BLM made it clear to Stephenson that it would not remove the burros and after he personally inspected the Taylor Well area, Stephenson complained to the Livestock Board that the burros were interfering with his livestock operation by molesting his cattle and eating their feed. Thereupon the Board rounded up and removed 19 unbranded and unclaimed burros pursuant to the New Mexico Estray Law. Each burro was seized on the pub-lie lands of the United States and, as the director of the Board conceded, each burro fit the definition of a wild free-roaming burro under § 2 (b) of the Act. App. 43. On February 18, 1974, the Livestock Board, pursuant to its usual practice, sold the burros at a public auction. After the sale, the BLM asserted jurisdiction under the Act and demanded that the Board recover the animals and return them to the public lands. On March 4, 1974, appellees filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment that the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court held the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) from enforcing its provisions. The court found that the Act “conflicts with... the traditional doctrines concerning wild animals,” New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 (1975), and is in excess of Congress’ power under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. That Clause, the court found, enables Congress to regulate wild animals found on the public land only for the “protection of the public lands from damage of some kind.” 406 F. Supp., at 1239 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, this power was exceeded in this case because “[t]he statute is aimed at protecting the wild horses and burros, not at protecting the land they live on.” Ibid. We noted probable jurisdiction, 423 U. S. 818 (1975), and we now reverse. II The Property Clause of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In passing the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, Congress deemed the regulated animals “an integral part of the natural system of the public lands” of the United States, § 1, 16 U. S. C, § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), and found that their management was necessary “for achievement of an ecological balance on the public lands.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, p. 5 (1971). According to Congress, these animals, if preserved in their native habitats, “contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See Hearing on Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 69, 122, 128, 138, 169, 183 (1971). Indeed, Congress concluded, the wild free-roaming horses and burros “are living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Despite their importance, the Senate committee found: “[These animals] have been cruelly captured and slain and their carcasses used in the production of pet food and fertilizer. They have been used for target practice and harassed for ‘sport’ and profit. In spite of public outrage, this bloody traffic continues unabated, and it is the firm belief of the committee that this senseless slaughter must be brought to an end.” S. Rep. No. 92-242, pp. 1-2 (1971). For these reasons, Congress determined to preserve and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States. The question under the Property Clause is whether this determination can be sustained as a “needful” regulation “respecting” the public lands. In answering this question, we must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 537 (1911) United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537-538 (1840). Appellees argue that the Act cannot be supported by the Property Clause. They contend that the Clause grants Congress essentially two kinds of power: (1) the power to dispose of and make incidental rules regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal property. According to appellees, the first power is not broad enough to support legislation protecting wild animals that live on federal property; and the second power is not implicated since the Act is designed to protect the animals, which are not themselves federal property, and not the public lands. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Act was not passed in part to protect the public lands of the United States or that Congress cannot assert a property interest in the regulated horses and burros superior to that of the State. But we need not consider whether the Act can be upheld on either of these grounds, for we reject appellees’ narrow reading of the Property Clause. Appellees ground their argument on a number of cases that, upon analysis, provide no support for their position. Like the District Court, appellees cite Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928), for the proposition that the Property Clause gives Congress only the limited power to regulate wild animals in order to protect the public lands from damage. But Hunt, which upheld the Government’s right to kill deer that were damaging foliage in the national forests, only holds that damage to the land is a sufficient basis for regulation; it contains no suggestion that it is a necessary one. Next, appellees refer to Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 89 (1907). The referenced passage in that case states that the Property Clause “clearly... does not grant to Congress any legislative control over the States, and must, so far as they are concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging to the United States within their limits.” But this does no more than articulate the obvious: The Property Clause is a grant of power only over federal property. It gives no indication of the kind of “authority” the Clause gives Congress over its property. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), is of even less help to appellees. Appellees rely upon the following language from Camfield: “While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a State, which it would have within a Territory, we do not think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own protection.” Id., at 525-526 (emphasis added). Appellees mistakenly read this language to limit Congress’ power to regulate activity on the public lands; in fact, the quoted passage refers to the scope of congressional power to regulate conduct on private land that affects the public lands. And Camfield holds that the Property Clause is broad enough to permit federal regulation of fences built on private land adjoining public land when the regulation is for the protection of the federal property. Camfield contains no suggestion of any limitation on Congress’ power over conduct on its own property; its sole message is that the power granted by the Property Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits. Lastly, appellees point to dicta in two cases to the effect that, unless the State has agreed to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, Congress’ rights in its land are “only the rights of an ordinary proprietor....” Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 527 (1885). See also Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, 264 (1963). In neither case was the power of Congress under the Property Clause at issue or considered and, as we shall see, these dicta fail to account for the raft of cases in which the Clause has been given a broader construction. In brief, beyond the Fort Leavenworth and Paul dicta, appellees have presented no support for their position that the Clause grants Congress only the power to dispose of, to make incidental rules regarding the use of, and to protect federal property. This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are “needful” rules “respecting” the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S., at 29-30; Light v. United States, 220 U. S., at 537; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that “[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 29. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 294-295 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272, 273 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 21 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 27 (1947); Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 99 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537. The decided cases have supported this expansive reading. It is the Property Clause, for instance, that provides the basis for governing the Territories of the United States. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 673-674 (1945); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 305 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 149 (1904); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537; Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 336-337 (1810). See also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 381 (1948). And even over public land within the States, “[t]he general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case.” Camfield v. United States, supra, at 525. We have noted, for example, that the Property Clause gives Congress the power over the public lands “to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them....” Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 405 (1917). And we have approved legislation respecting the public lands “[i]f it be found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers [on the public lands].” Cornfield v. United States, supra, at 525. In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor, and of a legislature over the public domain. Alabama v. Texas, supra, at 273; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 297 (1929); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 474 (1915). Although the Property Clause does not authorize “an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State,” it does permit “an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 30 (footnote omitted). In our view, the “complete power” that Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there. Ill Appellees argue that if we approve the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act as a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Property Clause, then we have sanctioned an impermissible intrusion on the sovereignty, legislative authority, and police power of the State and have wrongly infringed upon the State’s traditional trustee powers over wild animals. The argument appears to be that Congress could obtain exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the public lands in the State only by state consent, and that in the absence of such consent Congress lacks the power to act contrary to state law. This argument is without merit. Appellees’ claim confuses Congress’ derivative legislative powers, which are not involved in this case, with its powers under the Property Clause. Congress may acquire derivative legislative power from a State pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl, 17, of the Constitution by consensual acquisition of land, or by nonconsensual acquisition followed by the State's subsequent cession of legislative authority over the land. Paul v. United States, 371 U. S., at 264; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., at 541-542. In either case, the legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no residual state police power, e. g., Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture of Cal., 318 U. S. 285 (1943), to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise certain authority. E. g., Paul v. United States, supra, at 265; Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U. S. 518, 528-530 (1938); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 147-149 (1937). But while Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the State’s consent or cession, the presence or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress’ powers under the Property Clause. Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. Mason Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Washington, 302 U. S. 186, 197 (1937); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S., at 403-405; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 283 (1899). And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S., at 100; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353, 359 (1922). As we said in Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S., at 526, in response to a somewhat different claim: “A different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.” Thus, appellees' assertion that “[ajbsent state consent by complete cession of jurisdiction of lands to the United States, exclusive jurisdiction does not accrue to the federal landowner with regard to federal lands within the borders of the State,” Brief for Appellees 24, is completely beside the point; and appellees’ fear that the Secretary’s position is that “the Property Clause totally exempts federal lands within state borders from state legislative powers, state police powers, and all rights and powers of local sovereignty and jurisdiction of the states,” id., at 16, is totally unfounded. The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico, and the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands. But where those state laws conflict with the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, or with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede. McKelvey v. United States, supra, at 359. Again, none of the cases relied upon by appellees are to the contrary. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 650 (1930), merely states the rule outlined above that, “without more,” federal ownership of lands within a State does not withdraw those lands from the jurisdiction of the State. Likewise, Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474, 487-488 (1946), holds only that, in the absence of consent or cession, the Federal Government did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over certain federal forest reserve lands in Arkansas and the State retained legislative jurisdiction over those lands. No question was raised regarding Congress’ power to regulate the forest reserves under the Property Clause. And in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228, 230-231 (1925), the Court found that Congress had not purported to assume jurisdiction over highways within the Rocky Mountain National Park, not that it lacked the power to do so under the Property Clause. In short, these cases do not support appellees’ claim that upholding the Act would sanction an impermissible intrusion upon state sovereignty. The Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico; it merely overrides the New Mexico Estray Law insofar as it attempts to regulate federally protected animals. And that is but the necessary consequence of valid legislation under the Property Clause. Appellees’ contention that the Act violates traditional state power over wild animals stands on no different footing. Unquestionably the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 402 (1948); Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545, 549 (1924); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 528 (1896). But, as Geer v. Connecticut cautions, those powers exist only “in so far as [their] exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.” Ibid. “No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of [wildlife], but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers.” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434 (1920). Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, precludes a State from imposing prohibitory licensing fees on nonresidents shrimping in its waters, Toomer v. Witsell, supra; the Treaty Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, permits Congress to enter into and enforce a treaty to protect migratory birds despite state objections, Missouri v. Holland, supra; and the Property Clause gives Congress the power to thin overpopulated herds of deer on federal lands contrary to state law. Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928). We hold today that the Property Clause also gives Congress the power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding. IV In this case, the New Mexico Livestock Board entered upon the public lands of the United States and removed wild burros. These actions were contrary to the provisions of the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act. We find that, as applied to this case, the Act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. We need not, and do not, decide whether the Property Clause would sustain the Act in all of its conceivable applications. Appellees are concerned that the Act's extension of protection to wild free-roaming horses and burros that stray from public land onto private land, § 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), will be read to provide federal jurisdiction over every wild horse or burro that at any time sets foot upon federal land. While it is clear that regulations under the Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control, Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), we do not think it appropriate in this declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause empowers Congress to protect animals on private lands or the extent to which such regulation is attempted by the Act. We have often declined to decide important questions regarding “the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case,” Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954), or in the absence of “an adequate and full-bodied record.” Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U. S. 111, 113 (1962). Cf. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426 (1948). We follow that course in this case and leave open the question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands under the Property Clause. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The landowner may elect to allow straying wild free-roaming horses and burros to remain on his property, in which case he must so notify the relevant Secretary. He may not destroy any such animals, however. § 4 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Under the New Mexico law, an estray is defined as: “Any bovine animal, horse, mule or ass, found running at large upon public or private lands, either fenced or unfenced, in the state of New Mexico, whose owner is unknown in the section where found, or which shall be fifty (50) miles or more from the limits of its usual range or pasture, or that is branded with a brand which is not on record in the office of the cattle sanitary board of New Mexico....” N. M. Stat. Ann. §47-14-1 (1966). It is not disputed that the animals regulated by the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act are estrays within the meaning of this law. The record is somewhat unclear on this point, but appellees conceded at oral argument that all the burros were seized on the public lands of the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. Appellees are the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico Livestock Board, the Board’s director, and a purchaser of three of the burros seized at Taylor Well. Since appellees did not file suit against the Secretary of Agriculture, the District Court’s injunction was limited to the Secretary of the Interior, who is the appellant in this Court. The court also held that the Act could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause because “all the evidence establishes that the wild burros in question here do not migrate across state lines” and “Congress made no findings to indicate that it was in any way relying on the Commerce Clause in enacting this statute.” 406 F. Supp., at 1239. While the Secretary argues in this Court that the Act is sustainable under the Commerce Clause, we have no occasion to address this contention since we find the Act, as applied, to be a permissible exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. Congress expressly ordered that the animals were to be managed and protected in order “to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” § 3 (a), 16 U. 8. C. § 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Cf. Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928). See infra, at 545-546. The Secretary makes no claim here, however, that the United States owns the wild free-roaming horses and burros found on public land. Indeed, Hunt v. United States, supra, and Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), both relied upon by appellees, are inconsistent with	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 25 ]	sc_adminaction
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. v. PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS, INC. No. 85-390. Argued April 29, 1986 Decided June 2, 1986 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Black-mun, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Marshall and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 496. Edward J. Perez argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Thomas Bonaventura, John Haggerty, John H. Garvey, and Nicholas P. Miller. Harold R. Farrow argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Sol Schildhause and Siegfried Hesse Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Connecticut by Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General, Clarine N. Riddle, Deputy Attorney General, and William B. Gundling, Assistant Attorney General; for the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin, by Harold H. Fuhrman; for the city of New York by Paul S. Ryerson, Patrick J. Grant, and Hadley W. Gold; for the city of Palo Alto, California, et al. by Michael A. Small, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Steven L. Mayer, Steven F. Nord, Donald S. Green-berg, Mary Jo Levinger, John Sanford Todd, P. Lawrence Klose, Carter J. Stroud, John W. Witt, R. R. Campagna, Jack White, R. K. Fox, Gordon Phillips, Victor Kaleta, Edward J. Cooper, George Agnost, Richard Terzian, J. Robert Flandrick, Roger Picquet, Stanley E. Remelmeyer, James Jackson, and Robin Faisant; for Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. et al. by Debra T. Yarbrough, Robert W. Barker, and L. Andrew Tollin; for the National Association of Broadcasters by Michael S. Home and Michael D. Berg; for the National Federation of Local Cable Programmers et al. by James N. Horwood, Alan J. Roth, Joseph Van Eaton, and Donald Weightman; for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by Roy D. Bates, William I. Thornton, Jr., John W. Witt, Roger F. Cutler, George Agnost, J. Lamar Shelley, Robert J. Alfton, James K. Baker, Frank B. Gummey III, James D. Montgomery, Clifford D. Pierce, Jr., William H. Taube, and Charles S. Rhyne; for the National League of Cities et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Jeffrey H. Howard; for the Office of Communication of United Church of Christ et al. by Henry Getter and Andrew J. Schwartzman; and for Wisconsin Bell, Inc., by Robert A. Christensen, Joan F. Kessler, and Floyd S. Keene. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States et al. by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Ginsburg, and Jack D. Smith; for the American Cable Publishers Institute, Inc., by Peter C. Smoot; for Guam Cable TV by Richard L. Brown; for the Mid-America Legal Foundation by John M. Cannon, Susan W. Wanat, and Ann Plunkett Sheldon; for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., by Richard M. Cooper and Walter J. Josiah, Jr.; for the National Cable Television Association, Inc., by Brenda L. Fox, Michael S. Schooler, and H. Bartow Farr III; for the National Satellite Cable Association by Mark J. Tauber and Deborah C. Costlow; for Nor-West Cable Communications Partnership et al. by David Rosenweig and Jerome D. Krings; for Space, the Satellite Television Industry Association, Inc., by Richard L. Brown; and for Tele-Communications, Inc., et al. by Stuart W. Gold, Robert D. Joffe, and Henry J. Gerken. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Charles S. Sims, Burt Neubome, and Paul Hoffman; for Best View Cablevision, Inc., by Lawrence S. Bader, Paul R. Grand, and Diana Parker; for UNDA-USA et al. by Robert L. Stem and Patrick F. Geary; and for Nicholas W. Carlin, pro se. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Preferred Communications, Inc., sued petitioners City of Los Angeles (City) and the Department of Water and Power (DWP) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The complaint alleged a violation of respondent’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, by reason of the City’s refusal to grant respondent a cable television franchise and of DWP’s refusal to grant access to DWP’s poles or underground conduits used for power lines. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed with respect to the Sherman Act, but reversed as to the First Amendment claim. 754 F. 2d 1396 (1985). We granted certiorari with respect to the latter issue, 474 U. S. 979 (1985). Respondent’s complaint against the City and DWP alleged, inter alia, the following facts: Respondent asked Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PT&T) and DWP for permission to lease space on their utility poles in order to provide cable television service in the south central area of Los Angeles. App. 6a. These utilities responded that they would not lease the space unless respondent first obtained a cable television franchise from the City. Ibid. Respondent asked the City for a franchise, but the City refused to grant it one, stating that respondent had failed to participate in an auction that was to award a single franchise in the area. Id., at 6a-7a. The complaint further alleged that cable operators are First Amendment speakers, id., at 3a, that there is sufficient excess physical capacity and economic demand in the south central area of Los Angeles to accommodate more than one cable company, id., at 4a, and that the City’s auction process allowed it to discriminate among franchise applicants based on which one it deemed to be the “best.” Id., at 6a. Based on these and other factual allegations, the complaint alleged that the City and DWP had violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the California Constitution, and certain provisions of state law. Id., at lla-19a. The City did not deny that there was excess physical capacity to accommodate more than one cable television system. But it argued that the physical scarcity of available space on public utility structures, the limits of economic demand for the cable medium, and the practical and esthetic disruptive effect that installing and maintaining a cable system has on the public right-of-way justified its decision to restrict access to its facilities to a single cable television company. 754 F. 2d, at 1401. The District Court dismissed the free speech claim without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). It also dismissed the antitrust claims, reasoning that petitioners were immune from antitrust liability under the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1963). Finally, it declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 754 F. 2d 1396 (1985). It upheld the conclusion that petitioners were immune from liability under the federal antitrust laws. Id., at 1411-1415. But it reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the First Amendment claim, and remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 1401-1411. It held that, taking the allegations in the complaint as true, id., at 1399, the City violated the First Amendment by refusing to issue a franchise to more than one cable television company when there was sufficient excess physical and economic capacity to accommodate more than one. Id., at 1401-1405, 1411. The Court of Appeals expressed the view that the facts alleged in the complaint brought respondent into the ambit of cases such as Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), rather than of cases such as Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969), and Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 (1984). 754 F. 2d, at 1403-1411. We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent’s complaint should not have been dismissed, and we therefore affirm the judgment of that court; but we do so on a narrower ground than the one taken by it. The well-pleaded facts in the complaint include allegations of sufficient excess physical capacity and economic demand for cable television operators in the area which respondent sought to serve. The City, while admitting the existence of excess physical capacity on the utility poles, the rights-of-way, and the like, justifies the limit on franchises in terms of minimizing the demand that cable systems make for the use of public property. The City characterizes these uses as the stringing of “nearly 700 miles of hanging and buried wire and other appliances necessary for the operation of its system.” Brief for Petitioners 12. The City also characterizes them as “a permanent visual blight,” ibid., and adds that the process of installation and repair of such a system in effect subjects city facilities designed for other purposes to a servitude which will cause traffic delays and hazards and esthetic unsightliness. Respondent in its turn replies that the City does not “provide anything more than speculations and assumptions,” and that the City’s “legitimate concerns are easily satisfied without the need to limit the right to speak to a single speaker.” Brief for Respondent 9. We of course take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true for the purpose of a motion to dismiss, see, e. g., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117, 125-126, n. 5 (1975). Ordinarily such a motion frames a legal issue such as the one which the Court of Appeals undertook to decide in this case. But this case is different from a case between private litigants for two reasons: first, it is an action of a municipal corporation taken pursuant to a city ordinance that is challenged here, and, second, the ordinance is challenged on colorable First Amendment grounds. The City has adduced essentially factual arguments to justify the restrictions on cable franchising imposed by its ordinance, but the factual assertions of the City are disputed at least in part by respondent. We are unwilling to decide the legal questions posed by the parties without a more thoroughly developed record of proceedings in which the parties have an opportunity to prove those disputed factual assertions upon which they rely. We do think that the activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First Amendment interests. Respondent alleges: “The business of cable television, like that of newspapers and magazines, is to provide its subscribers with a mixture of news, information and entertainment. As do newspapers, cable television companies use a portion of their available space to reprint (or retransmit) the communications of others, while at the same time providing some original content.” App. 3a. Thus, through original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, respondent seeks to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats. We recently noted that cable operators exercise “a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their programming will include.” FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 707 (1979). Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public speakers, and pamphleteers. Respondent’s proposed activities would seem to implicate First Amendment interests as do the activities of wireless broadcasters, which were found to fall within the ambit of the First Amendment in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 386, even though the free speech aspects of the wireless broadcasters’ claim were found to be outweighed by the Government interests in regulating by reason of the scarcity of available frequencies. Of course, the conclusion that respondent’s factual allegations implicate protected speech does not end the inquiry. “Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 799 (1985). Moreover, where speech and conduct are joined in a single course of action, the First Amendment values must be balanced against competing societal interests. See, e. g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, supra, at 805-807; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968). We do not think, however, that it is desirable to express any more detailed views on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question raised by respondent’s complaint and the City’s responses to it without a fuller development of the disputed issues in the case. We think that we may know more than we know now about how the constitutional issues should be resolved when we know more about the present uses of the public utility poles and rights-of-way and how respondent proposes to install and maintain its facilities on them. The City claims that no such trial of the issues is required, because the City need not “generate a legislative record” in enacting ordinances which would grant one franchise for each area of the City. Brief for Petitioners 44. “Whether a limitation on the number of franchises ... is ‘reasonable,’” the City continues, “thus cannot turn on a review of historical facts.” Id., at 45. The City supports its contention in this regard by citation to cases such as United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 179 (1980), and Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 236-237 (1981). Brief for Petitioners 45, n. 52. The flaw in the City’s argument is that both Fritz and Wilson involved Fifth Amendment equal protection challenges to legislation, rather than challenges under the First Amendment. Where a law is subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does not have the same controlling force. But cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 459 (1978). This Court “may not simply assume that the ordinance will always advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive activity.” Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S., at 803, n. 22; Landmark Communications, Inc v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 843-844 (1978). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the dismissal of respondent’s complaint by the District Court, and remand the case to the District Court so that petitioners may file an answer and the material factual disputes between the parties may be resolved. It is so ordered. California authorizes municipalities to limit the number of cable television operators in an area by means of a “franchise or license” system, and to prescribe “rules and regulations” to protect customers of such operators. See Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 53066 (West Supp. 1986). Congress has recently endorsed such franchise systems. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779. Pursuant to the authority granted by the State, the City has adopted a provision forbidding the construction or operation of a cable television system within city limits unless a franchise is first obtained. See Los Angeles, Cal., Admin. Code, Art. 13, § 13.62(a) (1979). A city ordinance provides that franchises are to be allotted by auction to the bidder offering “the highest percentage of gross annual receipts” derived from the franchise and “such other compensation or consideration... as may be prescribed by the Council in the advertisement for bids and notice of sale.” See Los Angeles Ordinance 58,200, § 5.2 (1927). In October 1982, the City published an advertisement soliciting bids for a cable television franchise in the south central area of Los Angeles. The advertisement indicated that only one franchise would be awarded, and it established a deadline for the submission of bids. App. 91a. It also set forth certain nonfinaneial criteria to be considered in the selection process, including the degree of local participation in management or ownership reflecting the ethnic and economic diversity of the franchise area, the capacity to provide 52 channels and two-way communication, the willingness to set aside channels for various public purposes and to provide public access facilities, the willingness to develop other services in the public interest, the criminal and civil enforcement record of the company and its principals, the degree of business experience in cable television or other activities, and the willingness to engage in creative and aggressive affirmative action. Id., at 98a, 101a-102a, 105a, 108a-109a. Respondent did not submit a bid in response to this solicitation, and the franchise was eventually awarded to another cable operator. They also include allegations that the City imposes numerous other conditions upon a successful applicant' for a franchise. It is claimed that, entirely apart from the limitation of franchises to one in each area, these conditions violate respondent’s First Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals did not reach these contentions, and neither do we.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. CAPATO, on behalf of B. N. C. et al. No. 11-159. Argued March 19, 2012 Decided May 21, 2012 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Eric D. Miller argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Michael S. Raab, and Kelsi Brown Corkran. Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Andrew J. Pincus, Michael B. Kimberly, Bernard A. Kuttner, and Jeffrey A. Meyer. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Cancer Legal Resource Center of the Disability Rights Legal Center by Mark B. Helm, Charles D. Siegal, and David C. Thompson; and for the National Senior Citizens Law Center et al. by Rochelle Bobroff and Lawrence D. Rohlfing. Catherine W. Short filed a brief for Jennifer Lahl et al. as amici curiae. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Karen and Robert Capato married in 1999, Robert died of cancer less than three years later. With the help of in vitro fertilization, Karen gave birth to twins 18 months after her husband's death. Karen's application for Social Security survivors benefits for the twins, which the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied, prompted this litigation. The technology that made the twins' conception and birth possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated by Congress when the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act (Act) originated (1939) or were amended to read as they now do (1965). Karen Capato, respondent here, relies on the Act's initial definition of “child” in 42 U. S. C. § 416(e): “ ‘[C]hild' means... the child or legally adopted child of an [insured] individual.” Robert was an insured individual, and the twins, it is uncontested, are the biological children of Karen and Robert. That satisfies the Act’s terms, and no further inquiry is in order, Karen maintains. The SSA, however, identifies subsequent provisions, §§ 416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C), as critical, and reads them to entitle biological children to benefits only if they qualify for inheritance from the decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement. We conclude that the SSA’s reading is better attuned to the statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction that garners the Court’s respect under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). I Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999. Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile. Because the couple wanted children, Robert, before undergoing chemotherapy, deposited his semen in a sperm bank, where it was frozen and stored. Despite Robert’s aggressive treatment regime, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001. The Capatos, however, wanted their son to have a sibling. Robert’s health deteriorated in late 2001, and he died in Florida, where he and Karen then resided, in March 2002. His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage. The will made no provision for children conceived after Robert’s death, although the Capatos had told their lawyer they wanted future offspring to be placed on a par with existing children. Shortly after Robert’s death, Karen began in vitro fertilization using her husband’s frozen sperm. She conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins in September 2003, 18 months after Robert’s death. Karen Capato claimed survivors insurance benefits on behalf of the twins. The SSA denied her application, and the U. S. District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the agency’s decision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a (decision of the Administrative Law Judge); id., at 15a (District Court opinion). In accord with the SSA’s construction of the statute, the District Court determined that the twins would qualify for benefits only if, as § 416(h)(2)(A) specifies, they could inherit from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law. Robert Capato died domiciled in Florida, the court found. Under that State’s law, the court noted, a child born posthumously may inherit through intestate succession only if conceived during the decedent’s lifetime. Id., at 27a-28a. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Under § 416(e), the appellate court concluded, “the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow” qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law. 631 F. 3d 626, 631 (2011). Courts of Appeals have divided on the statutory interpretation question this case presents. Compare ibid, and Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F. 3d 593, 596-597 (CA9 2004) (biological but posthumously conceived child of insured wage earner and his widow qualifies for benefits), with Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F. 3d 954, 960-964 (CA8 2011), and Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F. 3d 49, 54-63 (CA4 2011) (posthumously conceived child’s qualification for benefits depends on intestacy law of State in which wage earner was domiciled). To resolve the conflict, we granted the Commissioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 565 U. S. 1033 (2011). II Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1939 to provide a monthly benefit for designated surviving family members of a deceased insured wage earner. “Child’s insurance benefits” are among the Act’s family-protective measures. 53 Stat. 1364, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402(d). An applicant qualifies for such benefits if she meets the Act’s definition of “child,” is unmarried, is below specified age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of the insured’s death. § 402(d)(1). To resolve this case, we must decide whether the Capato twins rank as “child[ren]” under the Act’s definitional provisions. Section 402(d) provides that “[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title)” of a deceased insured individual “shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit.” Section 416(e), in turn, states: “The term ‘child’ means (1) the child or legally adopted child of.an individual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3)... the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [who meets certain conditions].” The word “child,” we note, appears twice in §416(e)’s opening sentence: initially in the prefatory phrase, “[t]he term ‘child’ means...,” and, immediately thereafter, in subsection (e)(1) (“child or legally adopted child”), delineating the first of three beneficiary categories. Unlike §§ 416(e)(2) and (e)(3),' which specify the circumstances under which stepchildren and grandchildren qualify for benefits, § 416(e)(1)' lacks any elaboration. Compare § 416(e)(1) (referring simply to “the child... of an individual”) with, e. g., § 416(e)(2) (applicant must have been a stepchild for at least nine months before the insured individual’s death). A subsequent definitional provision further addresses the term “child.” Under the heading “Determination of family status,” § 416(h)(2)(A) provides: “In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s domiciliary State].” An applicant for child benefits who does not meet §416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy-law criterion may nonetheless qualify for benefits under one of several other criteria the Act prescribes. First, an applicant who “is a son or daughter” of an insured individual, but is not determined to be a “child” under the intestacy-law provision, nevertheless ranks as a “child” if the insured and the other parent went through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid but for certain legal impediments. § 416(h)(2)(B). Further, an applicant is deemed a “child” if, before death, the insured acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his or her son or daughter, or if the insured had been decreed by a court to be the father or mother of the applicant, or had been ordered to pay child support. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i). In addition, an applicant may gain “child” status upon proof that the insured individual was the applicant’s parent and “was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant” when the insured individual died. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii). The SSA has interpreted these provisions in regulations adopted through notice-and-eomment rulemaking. The regulations state that an applicant may be entitled to benefits “as a natural child, legally adopted child, stepchild, grandchild, stepgrandchild, or equitably adopted child.” 20 CFR §404.354. Defining “[w]ho is the insured’s natural child,” §404.355, the regulations closely track 42 U. S. C. §§ 416(h)(2) and (h)(3). They state that an applicant may qualify for insurance benefits as a “natural child” by meeting any of four conditions: (1) The applicant “could inherit the insured’s personal property as his or her natural child under State inheritance laws”; (2) the applicant is “the insured’s natural child and [his or her parents] went through a ceremony which would have resulted in a valid marriage between them except for a legal impediment”;. (3) before death, the insured acknowledged in writing his or her parentage of the applicant, was decreed by a court to be the applicant’s parent, or was ordered by a court to contribute to the applicant’s support; or (4) other evidence shows that the insured is the applicant’s “natural father or mother” and was either living with, or contributing to the support of, the applicant. 20 CFR § 404.355(a) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the SSA reads the statute, 42 U. S. C. § 416(h) governs the meaning of “child” in § 416(e)(1). In other words, § 416(h) is a gateway through which all applicants for insurance benefits as a “child” must pass. See Beeler, 651 F. 3d, at 960 (“The regulations make clear that the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the provisions of § 416(h) are the exclusive means by which an applicant can establish ‘child’ status under § 416(e) as a natural child.”). III Karen Capato argues, and the Third Circuit held, that § 416(h), far from supplying the governing law, is irrelevant in this case. Instead, the Court of Appeals determined, § 416(e) alone is dispositive of the controversy. 631 F. 3d, at 630-631. Under § 416(e), “child” means “child of an [insured] individual,” and the Capato twins, the Third Circuit observed, clearly fit that definition: They are undeniably the children of Robert Capato, the insured wage earner, and his widow, Karen Capato. Section 416(h) comes into play, the court reasoned, only when “a claimant’s status as a deceased wage-earner’s child is in doubt.” Id., at 631. That limitation, the court suggested, is evident from § 416(h)’s caption: “Determination of family status.” Here, “there is no family status to determine,” the court said, id., at 630, so § 416(h) has no role to play. In short, while the SSA regards § 416(h) as completing §416(e)’s sparse definition of “child,” the Third Circuit considered each subsection to control different situations: § 416(h) governs when a child’s family status needs to be determined; § 416(e), when it does not. When is there no need to determine a child’s family status? The answer that the Third Circuit found plain: whenever the claimant is “the biological child of a married couple.” Id., at 630. We point out, first, some conspicuous flaws in the Third Circuit’s and respondent Karen Capato’s reading of the Act’s provisions, and then explain why we find the SSA’s interpretation persuasive. A Nothing in § 416(e)’s tautological definition (“ 'child’ means... the child... of an individual”) suggests that Congress understood the word “child” to refer only to the children of married parents. The dictionary definitions offered by respondent are not so confined. See Webster’s New International Dictionary 465 (2d ed. 1934) (defining “child” as, inter alia, “[i]n Law, legitimate offspring; also, sometimes, esp. in wills, an adopted child, or an illegitimate offspring, or any direct descendant, as a grandchild, as the intention may appear”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 214 (11th ed. 2003) (“child” means “son or daughter,” or “descendant”). See also Restatement (Third) of Property §2.5(1) (1998) (“[a]n individual is the child of his or her genetic parents,” and that may be so “whether or not [the parents] are married to each other”). Moreover, elsewhere in the Act, Congress expressly limited the category of children covered to offspring of a marital union. See § 402(d)(3)(A) (referring to the “legitimate... child” of an individual). Other contemporaneous statutes similarly differentiate child of a marriage (“legitimate child”) from the unmodified term “child.” See, e.g., Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, ch. 443, § 120, 56 Stat. 385 (defining “child” to include “legitimate child,” “child legally adopted,” and, under certain conditions, “stepchild” and “illegitimate child” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor does § 416(e) indicate that Congress intended “biological” parentage to be prerequisite to “child” status under that provision. As the SSA points out, “[i]n 1939, there was no such thing as a scientifically proven biological relationship between a child and a father, which is... part of the reason that the word ‘biological’ appears nowhere in the Act.” Reply Brief 6. Notably, a biological parent is not necessarily a child’s parent under law. Ordinarily, “a parent-child relationship does not exist between an adoptee and the adoptee’s genetic parents.” Uniform Probate Code §2-119(a), 8 U. L. A. 55 (Supp. 2011) (amended 2008). Moreover, laws directly addressing use of today’s assisted reproduction technology do not make-biological parentage a universally determinative criterion. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 7613(b) (West Supp. 2012) (“The donor of semen... for use in artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child.”); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 46, § 4B (West 2010) (“Any child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother and such husband.”). We note, in addition, that marriage does not ever and always make the parentage of a child certain, nor does the absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child’s parentage is uncertain. An unmarried couple can agree that a child is theirs, while the parentage of a child born during a marriage may be uncertain. See Reply Brief 11 (“Respondent errs in treating ‘marital’ and ‘undisputed’ as having the same meaning.”). Finally, it is far from obvious that Karen Capato’s proposed definition — “biological child of married parents,” see Brief for Respondent 9 — would cover the posthumously conceived Capato twins. Under Florida law, a marriage ends upon the death of a spouse. See Price v. Price, 114 Fla. 233, 235, 153 So. 904, 905 (1934). If that law applies, rather than a court-declared preemptive federal law, the Ca-pato twins, conceived after the death of their father, would not qualify as “marital” children. B Resisting the importation of words not found in § 416(e)— “child” means “the biological child of married parents,” Brief for Respondent 9 — the SSA finds, a key textual cue in § 416(h)(2)(A)’s opening instruction: “In determining whether an applicant is the child... of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter,” the Commissioner shall apply state intestacy law. (Emphasis added.) Respondent notes the absence of any cross-reference in § 416(e) to § 416(h). Id., at 18. She overlooks, however, that § 416(h) provides the crucial link. The “subchapter” to which § 416(h) refers is Subchapter II of the Act, which spans §§401 through 434. Section 416(h)’s reference to “this subchapter” thus includes both §§ 402(d) and 416(e). Having explicitly complemented § 416(e) by the definitional provisions contained in § 416(h), Congress had no need to place a redundant cross-reference in § 416(e). See Schafer, 641 F. 3d, at 54 (Congress, in § 416(h)(2)(A), provided “plain and explicit instruction on how the determination of child status should be made”; on this point, the statute’s text “could hardly be more clear.”). The original version of today’s § 416(h) was similarly drafted. It provided that, “[i]n determining whether an applicant is the... child... of [an] insured individual for purposes of sections 401-409 of this title, the Board shall apply [state intestacy law].” 42 U. S. C. §409(m) (1940 ed.) (emphasis added). Sections 401-409 embraced §§ 402(c) and 409(k), the statutory predecessors of 42 U. S. C. §§ 402(d) and 416(e) (2006 ed.), respectively. Reference to state law to determine an applicant’s status as a “child” is anything but anomalous. Quite the opposite. The Act commonly refers to state law on matters of family status. For example, the Act initially defines “wife” as “the wife of an [insured] individual,” if certain conditions are satisfied. § 416(b). Like § 416(e), § 416(b) is, at least in part, tautological (“ ‘wife’ means the [insured's] wife”). One must read on, although there is no express cross-reference, to § 416(h) (rules on “[determination of family status”) to complete the definition. Section 416(h)(1)(A) directs that, “/or purposes of this subchapter,” the law of the insured’s domicile determines whether “[the] applicant and [the] insured individual were validly married,” and if they were not, whether the applicant would nevertheless have “the same status” as a wife under the State’s intestacy law. (Emphasis added.) The Act' similarly defines the terms “widow,” “husband,” and “widower.” See §§ 416(c), (f), (g), (h)(1)(A). Indeed, as originally enacted, a single provision mandated the use of state intestacy law for “determining whether an applicant is the wife, widow, child, or parent of [an] insured individual.” 42 U. S. C. §409(m) (1940 ed.). All wife, widow, child, and parent applicants thus had to satisfy the same criterion. To be sure, children born during their parents’ marriage would have readily qualified under the 1939 formulation because of their eligibility to inherit under state law. But requiring all “child” applicants to qualify under state intestacy law installed a simple test, one that ensured benefits for persons plainly within the legislators’ contemplation, while avoiding congressional entanglement in the traditional state-law realm of family relations. Just as the Act generally refers to state law to determine whether an applicant qualifies as a wife, widow, husband, widower, 42 U. S. C. § 416(h)(1) (2006 ed.), child or parent, § 416(h)(2)(A), so in several sections (§§ 416(b), (c), (e)(2), (f), (g)), the Act sets duration-of-relationship limitations. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 777-782 (1975) (discussing §416(e)(2)’s requirement that, as a check against deathbed marriages, a parent-stepchild relationship must exist “not less than nine months immediately preceding [insured’s death]”)- Time limits also qualify the statutes of several States that accord inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children. See Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 249.5(c) (West Supp. 2012) (allowing inheritance if child is' in útero within two years of parent’s death); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-120(11) (2011) (child in útero within three years or born within 45 months); Iowa Code Ann. §633.220A(1) (West Supp. 2012) (child born within two years); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:391.1(A) (West 2008) (child born within three years); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §30.1-04-19(11) (Lexis 2010) (child in útero within three years or born within 45 months). See also Uniform Probate Code § 2-120(k), 8 U. L. A. 58 (Supp. 2011) (treating a posthumously conceived child as “in gestation at the individual’s death,” but only if specified time limits are met). No time constraints attend the Third Circuit’s ruling in this case, under which the biological child of married parents is eligible for survivors benefits, no matter the length of time between the father’s death and the child’s conception and birth. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-37 (counsel for Karen Capato acknowledged that, under the preemptive federal rule he advocated,' and the Third Circuit adopted, a child born four years after her father’s death would be eligible for benefits). The paths to receipt of benefits laid out in the Act and regulations, we must not forget, proceed from Congress’ perception of the core purpose of the legislation. The aim was not to create a program “generally benefiting needy persons”; it was, more particularly, to “provide... dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.” Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 52 (1977). We have recognized that “where state intestacy law provides that a child may take personal property from a father’s estate, it may reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent’s life and at his death.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 514 (1976). Reliance on state intestacy law to determine who. is a “child” thus serves the Act’s driving objective. True, the intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children outside the Act’s central concern. Intestacy laws in a number of States, as just noted, do provide for inheritance by posthumously conceived children, see supra, at 555, and under federal law, a child conceived shortly before her father’s death may be eligible for benefits even though she never actually received her father’s support. It was nonetheless Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generality of Cases. It did so here by employing eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law as a workable substitute for burdensome case-by-case determinations whether the child was, in fact, dependent on her father’s earnings. Respondent argues that on the SSA’s reading, natural children alone must pass through a § 416(h) gateway. Adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and step-grandchildren, it is true, are defined in § 416(e), and are not further defined in § 416(h). Respondent overlooks, however, that although not touched by § 416(h), beneficiaries described in §§ 416(e)(2) and (e)(3) must meet other statutorily prescribed criteria. In short, the Act and regulations set different eligibility requirements for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and stepgrandchildren, see 20 CFR §§404.356-404.358, but it hardly follows that applicants in those categories are treated more advantageously than are children who must meet a § 416(h) criterion. The SSA’s construction of the Act, respondent charges, raises serious constitutional concerns under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. Brief for Respondent 42; see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). She alleges: “Under the government’s interpretation..., posthumously conceived children are treated as an inferior subset of natural children who are ineligible for government benefits simply because of their date of birth and method of conception.” Brief for Respondent 42-43. Even the Courts of Appeals that have accepted the reading of the Act respondent advances have rejected this argument. See 631 F. 3d, at 628, n. 1 (citing Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F. 3d 1102, 1112 (CA9 2009)). We have applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to laws “burdening] illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents, because Visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.’” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 461 (1988) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972)). No showing has been made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents. We therefore need not decide whether heightened scrutiny would be appropriate were that the case. Under rational-basis review, the regime Congress adopted easily passes inspection. As the Ninth Circuit held, that regime is “reasonably related to the government’s twin interests in [reserving] benefits [for] those children who have lost a parent’s support, and in using reasonable presumptions to minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case basis.” Vernoff, 568 F. 3d, at 1112 (citing Mathews, 427 U. S., at 509). IV As we have explained, § 416(e)(l)’s statement, “[t]he term ‘child’ means... the child... of an individual,” is a definition of scant utility without aid from neighboring provisions. See Schafer, 641 F. 3d, at 54. That aid is supplied by § 416(h)(2)(A), which completes the definition of “child” “for purposes of th[e] subchapter” that includes § 416(e)(1). Under the completed definition, which the SSA employs, § 416(h)(2)(A) refers to state law to determine the status of a posthumously conceived child. The SSA’s interpretation of the relevant provisions, adhered to without deviation for many decades, is at least reasonable; the agency’s reading is therefore entitled to this Court’s deference under Chevron, 467 U. S. 837. Chevron deference is appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 226-227 (2001). Here, as already noted, the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is set forth in regulations published after notice-and-comment rulemaking. See supra, at 549. Congress gave the Commissioner authority to promulgate rules “necessary or appropriate to carry out” the Commissioner’s functions and the relevant statutory provisions. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(a), 902(a)(5). The Commissioner’s regulations are neither “arbitrary or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 562 U. S. 44, 53 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). They thus warrant the Court’s approbation. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 217-222, 225 (2002) (deferring to the Commissioner’s “considerable authority” to interpret the Act). V Tragic circumstances — Robert Capato’s death before he and his wife could raise a family — gave rise to this case. But the law Congress enacted calls for resolution of Karen	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 105 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL CO. et al. No. 87-65. Argued January 20, 1988 Decided May 2, 1988 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 708. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 708. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Robert D. Parrillo argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs was William A. Curran. Floyd Abrams argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Edward F. FLindle and Joseph V. Cavanagh, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Edwin S. Kneedler, and Douglas N. Letter; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Michael P. McDonald. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Lynette Labinger, Martha Minow, Kathleen M. Sullivan, and Marjorie Heins; and for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by James C. Goodale and John G. Koeltl. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States seeks reinstatement of a judgment of contempt against a newspaper and its executive editor for violating an invalid temporary restraining order against publication. Having concluded that the court-appointed prosecutor who sought certiorari and briefed and argued the case without the authorization of the Solicitor General may not represent the United States before this Court, we dismiss the writ of certiorari. I On November 8, 1985, Raymond J. Patriarca, son of Raymond L. S. Patriarca, by then deceased, filed suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), its Director, the Department of Justice, the Attorney General of the United States, the Providence Journal Company (Journal), and WJAR Television Ten (WJAR), seeking to enjoin further dissemination of logs and memoranda compiled from 1962 to 1965 during the course of illegal electronic surveillance, see Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602 F. 2d 1010, 1013 (CA1 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1071 (1980), of the plaintiff’s father. The complaint, as amended, was based on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552 (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U. S. C. § 2510 et seq. (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), and the Fourth Amendment, and alleged that the FBI had improperly released the logs and memoranda to the journal and WJAR pursuant to a FOIA request following the death of the senior Patriarca. The summons, complaint, and a motion for a temporary restraining order were served on the Journal on November 12, 1985. The next day counsel for the various parties gathered for a conference with the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. During that conference, of which, apparently, there is no transcript, the Chief Judge entered a temporary restraining order barring publication of the logs and memoranda and set a hearing for Friday, November 15. Counsel for both the Journal and the federal defendants objected to the order. During the evening of November 13, respondent Charles M. Hauser, executive editor of the Journal, was first advised of the restraining order. After discussing with other Journal executives the perils of noncompliance, Hauser decided to publish a story based on the logs and memoranda. The following day, November 14, the Journal published one article about the Patriarcas and another about the “clash” between the District Court and the Journal. See App. 39, 18. Patriarca forthwith filed a motion to have the Journal and Hauser adjudged in criminal contempt. Id., at 223. Patriarca, however, declined to prosecute the contempt motion, and the District Court decided not to ask the United States Attorney to pursue the matter because of his representation of the federal defendants in the underlying civil action. Invoking Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), the District Court appointed William A. Curran of the Rhode Island Bar as “prosecuting attorney with full authority to prosecute” the pending contempt motion. App. 237-238. On Curran’s application, the District Court then ordered respondents to show cause why they should not be adjudged in criminal contempt. Id., at 31-32. Following a hearing on February 10, 1986, the District Court found respondents in criminal contempt of the order entered on November 13. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider whether Patriarca’s statutory and Fourth Amendment claims had merit, and whether his privacy interest outweighed the Journal’s First Amendment interest in publication, and thus that the temporary restraining order entered to preserve the status quo pending consideration of significant legal issues was valid, even though it subsequently had been vacated. The District Court fined the Journal $100,000 and suspended a jail sentence for Hauser, placing him on probation for 18 months and ordering that he perform 200 hours of public service. Id., at 194-197. Respondents appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment of contempt. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F. 2d 1342 (1986). The court found that the temporary restraining order was “transparently invalid” under the First Amendment, and thus its constitutionality could be collaterally challenged in the contempt proceedings. Id., at 1353. According to the court, none of the grounds asserted in support of the order, including FOIA, Title III, and the Fourth Amendment, provided even a colorable basis for the prior restraint ordered by the District Court. The Court of Appeals, then sitting en banc, summarily modified the panel’s opinion, holding that even those subject to a transparently invalid order must make a good-faith effort to seek emergency appellate relief. It ruled, however, that the publisher may proceed to publish and challenge the constitutionality of the order in the contempt proceeding if timely access to the appellate court is not available or if a timely decision is not forthcoming. The court was not convinced that respondents could have obtained emergency relief before the publisher had to make a final decision whether to run the story the following day, and found it unfair to subject respondents to substantial sanctions for failing to follow the newly announced procedures. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F. 2d 1354 (1987). Because of the importance of the issues, we granted certiorari. 484 U. S. 814 (1987). II Before we can decide whether respondents could properly be held in contempt for violating the District Court’s subsequently invalidated restraining order, we must consider respondents’ motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari. It appears that the manner in which this unusual case reached us departed significantly from established practice. After the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of contempt and, sitting en banc, modified the panel’s opinion, the special prosecutor sought authorization from the Solicitor General to file a petition here for a writ of certiorari. By letter dated July 2, 1987, the Solicitor General denied that authorization. See App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss la-2a (SG Letter). Respondents argue that, without this permission, the special prosecutor cannot proceed before this Court. While denying authorization to the special prosecutor to file or to appear on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General questioned whether our recent decision in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987), rendered such authorization unnecessary in a case concerning a criminal contempt charge prosecuted by private counsel appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b). See SG Letter. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2. We find no such implication in our decision in Young, and we conclude that the special prosecutor lacks the authority to represent the United States before this Court. Because he is not a party entitled to petition for certiorari under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1), we must dismiss the heretofore-granted writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction. A Title 28 U. S. C. § 518(a) provides in relevant part: “Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court... in which the United States is interested.” The Attorney General by regulation has delegated authority to the Solicitor General: “The following-described matters are assigned to, and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by, the Solicitor General, in consultation with each agency or official concerned: “(a) Conducting, or assigning and supervising, all Supreme Court cases, including appeals, petitions for and in opposition to certiorari, briefs and arguments, and... settlement thereof.” 28 CFR § 0.20 (1987). Thus, unless this is a case other than one “in which the United States is interested,” § 518(a), it must be conducted and argued in this Court by the Solicitor General or his designee. Cf. United States v. Winston, 170 U. S. 522, 524-525 (1898); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 458 (1869). B The present case clearly is one “in which the United States is interested.” The action was initiated in vindication of the “judicial Power of the United States,” U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1 (emphasis added), and it is that interest, unique to the sovereign, that continues now to be litigated in this Court. The special prosecutor seeks to reinstate a judgment of criminal contempt in a federal court, including a possible prison sentence for the individual defendant and a substantial fine for the newspaper defendant. The fact that the allegedly criminal conduct concerns the violation of a court order instead of common law or a statutory prohibition does not render the prosecution any less an exercise of the sovereign power of the United States. Indeed, just last Term, in a case much like the present one, involving a prosecution for criminal contempt under 18 U. S. C. § 401(3), we flatly stated: “Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action represent the United States... Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S., at 804 (emphasis added). See also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 445 (1911) (“[Proceedings at law for criminal contempt are between the public and the defendant...”). The special prosecutor and the Solicitor General argue that this case is not one “in which the United States is interested” because that phrase, as used in § 518(a), refers solely to those cases where the interests of the Executive Branch of the United States are at issue. In this litigation, the argument goes, the special prosecutor acted in support of the power of the Judicial Branch, rather than in furtherance of the Executive’s constitutional responsibility, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 3, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” This suggested interpretation of § 518(a), however, presumes that there is more than one “United States” that may appear before this Court, and that the United States is something other than “the sovereign composed of the three branches....” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 696 (1974). We find such a proposition somewhat startling, particularly when supported by the office whose authority would be substantially diminished by its adoption, and we reject that construction as inconsistent with the plain meaning of § 518(a). It seems to be elementary that even when exercising distinct and jealously separated powers, the three branches are but “co-ordinate parts of one government.” J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). Congress is familiar enough with the language of separation of powers that we shall not assume it intended, without saying so, to exclude the Judicial Branch when it referred to the “interest of the United States.” Moreover, while there may well be matters that are uniquely Executive Branch concerns, we do not think they would be fairly described by the broad statutory language of § 518(a). In Young, we reaffirmed the inherent authority of a federal court to initiate a criminal contempt proceeding for disobedience of its order, and its ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt action. 481 U. S., at 793. This power, considered to be a part of the judicial function, is grounded first and foremost upon necessity: “The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other branches.” Id., at 796. The special prosecutor claims his appearance before this Court is necessary for the vindication of the District Court’s authority. For just as the District Court would be “at the mercy of another branch in deciding whether such proceedings should be initiated,” ibid., if it lacked the power to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt charge, the judgment vindicating the District Court’s authority would be vulnerable to the Attorney General’s withholding of authorization to defend it. This argument, however, overlooks the circumstances under which the special prosecutor actually came to be in a position to seek review in this Court. When, as here, a district court’s judgment of contempt has been reversed on appeal, a special prosecutor may decide to seek a writ of certiorari on the basis of his professional judgment that the court of appeals’ decision merits review. See generally this Court’s Rule 17. Sometimes, as apparently occurred here, the special prosecutor and the Solicitor General will disagree with respect to whether the case presents issues worthy of review by this Court. That kind of disagreement actually arises on a regular basis between the Solicitor General and attorneys representing various agencies of the United States. But that disagreement does not interfere with the Judiciary’s power to protect itself. In this very case, before the consent of the Solicitor General ever became relevant, members of the Judiciary had decided that the District Judge erred in adjudging the defendants in contempt. Where the majority of a panel of a court of appeals or perhaps, as here, a majority of an en banc court, itself has decided in favor of the alleged contemner, the necessity that required the appointment of an independent prosecutor has faded and, indeed, is no longer present. When, on the other hand, a district court has adjudged a party in contempt, and the appellate court has affirmed, a special prosecutor has little need of the services of this Court to fulfill his or her duties. It is only if the contemner petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari that the Solicitor General need be consulted and his authorization or participation obtained to oppose the petition and defend the judgment. Under such circumstances, if the Solicitor General declines to authorize a defense of the judgment and if § 518(a) prevented the special prosecutor from proceeding, the independent ability of the Judiciary to vindicate its authority might appear to be threatened: both courts would have agreed that the contemner had disobeyed an order of the court, but the Executive’s judgment to the contrary would threaten to undermine those judicial decisions. This threat, however, is inconsequential, for it is this Court, a part of the Judicial Branch, that must decide whether to exercise its discretion to review the judgment below, and it is well within this Court’s authority to appoint an amicus curiae to file briefs and present oral argument in support of that judgment. See, e. g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U. S. 922 (1982) (order appointing amicus curiae in support of judgment); United States v. Fausto, 480 U. S. 904 (1987) (same). The Solicitor General argues that § 518(a) does not apply to a contempt proceeding that is initiated unilaterally by a federal court, because in Young this Court sustained the power of the court to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt charge, despite the fact that 28 U. S. C. § 516, in language certainly somewhat similar to that of § 518(a), requires such litigation to be conducted by a Government attorney: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,... is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.” Also, 28 U. S. C. § 547 requires: “Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district, shall... prosecute for all offenses against the United States.” The Solicitor General concludes that Young necessarily implies that these broadly worded reservations of litigating authority, including § 518(a), do not apply to the case at hand. Young neither expressed nor implied any such special consideration for a judicially initiated contempt proceeding. Both statutes implicated but not discussed in Young provide for the Attorney General’s exclusive control over specified litigation except as otherwise provided or authorized by law. A fair reading of Young indicates that a federal court’s inherent authority to punish disobedience and vindicate its authority is an excepted provision or authorization within the meaning of §§ 516 and 547. The “‘power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts,’ ” and was not first recognized by this Court in Young; rather, it “‘has.been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law.”’ Young, 481 U. S., at 795, quoting Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 266 U. S. 42, 65-66 (1924). Thus, contrary to the Solicitor General’s intimation, Young did not read an exception into §§ 516 and 547; instead, Young is consistent with the plain language of the provisos to those sections. Section 518(a), by way of vivid contrast, contains no such proviso. c If the plain statutory language of § 518(a) were not reason enough to persuade us to accept respondents’ objections and dismiss the writ of certiorari, we observe that the salutory policies that support § 518(a) could be undermined by, and anomalous consequences could result from, the approach urged upon the Court by the special prosecutor and the Solicitor General. Among the reasons for reserving litigation in this Court to the Attorney General and the Solicitor General, is the concern that the United States usually should speak with one voice before this Court, and with a voice that reflects not the parochial interests of a particular agency, but the common interests of the Government and therefore of all the people. Without the centralization of the decision whether to seek certiorari, this Court might well be deluged with petitions from every federal prosecutor, agency, or instrumentality, urging as the position of the United States, a variety of inconsistent positions shaped by the immediate demands of the case sub judice, rather than by longer term interests in the development of the law. Under the procedures set out in Young, it seems evident that the majority of contempt cases will be prosecuted by the United States Attorney. See 481 U. S., at 801. Under the special prosecutor’s interpretation of § 518(a), whereby a contempt citation initiated by a district court is not a case “in which the United States is interested,” the United States Attorney would be free to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court without the authorization of the Solicitor General. We need not speculate how a United States Attorney would resolve the conflict between his duty “to the preservation of respect for judicial authority,” United States Attorneys’ Manual §9-39.318 (1984), and his duty to his superiors at the Department of Justice, because we reject out of hand the interpretation of § 518(a) that creates the potential for such a conflict. Similarly, if the United States Attorney concluded that a court of appeals’ decision reversing a judgment of contempt did not merit further review and declined to file a petition with this Court, it would seem to follow from the Solicitor General’s interpretation, that the district judge could then appoint another special prosecutor solely for purposes of seeking certiorari and, if the writ were granted, litigating the case before this Court. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss 9, n. 7. But, surely, neither the force of historical practice, nor the necessity of protecting the dignity of the district court— whose judgment of contempt has been reversed on appeal-warrants attributing such power to the district judge. Ill We conclude that a criminal contempt prosecution brought to vindicate the authority of the Judiciary and to punish disobedience of a court order is a suit “in which the United States is interested,” within the meaning of § 518(a), regardless of who is appointed by the district court to prosecute the action. In this case, the special prosecutor filed a petition for a writ of certiorari without the authorization of the Solicitor General, and thus without authorization to appear on behalf of the United States. Absent a proper representative of the Government as a petitioner in this criminal prosecution, jurisdiction is lacking and the writ of certiorari, heretofore granted, is now dismissed. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The conference was held in the Chief Judge’s chambers at 12:30 p.m. on November 13. The District Court was prepared to hear argument the very next day, but, in order to accommodate counsel, set the matter for November 15 at 10 a.m. On November 15, as previously scheduled, the District Court held a hearing. After argument by counsel, the court set a preliminary injunction hearing for Tuesday, November 19, extending the restraining order until that date. App. 58-71. Following the preliminary injunction hearing, the court vacated the temporary restraining order, denied preliminary injunctive relief against the Journal and WJAR, and granted a preliminary injunction against further dissemination of the logs and memoranda by the federal defendants. Id., at 71-89. Our decision in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987), in any event, would have prohibited Patriarca from taking such action. In Young, we instructed courts to request the United States Attorney to prosecute the criminal contempt charge, and, if the United States Attorney declined, to appoint as a special prosecutor a private attorney other than the attorney for an interested party. Id., at 801. The United States as amicus curiae, argues that the District Court’s reasons were legally “insufficient” to support the decision not to ask a Government attorney to undertake the contempt prosecution, because the proseeution of the Journal in order to vindicate the District Court’s authority did not pose any conflict for Government attorneys. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1, and n. 1. Because of our disposition of this case, we need not address the circumstances under which the procedures prescribed in Young, of requesting the appropriate prosecuting authority to pursue the contempt action, may be bypassed. As we hold today, a federal statute deprives the special prosecutor of the authority to pursue the litigation in this Court on behalf of the United States when the Solicitor General declines to petition for certiorari or to authorize the filing of such a petition. We dismiss the writ even though the United States eventually expressed its “interest” in the litigation and the Solicitor General filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae in support of the position taken by the special prosecutor. See Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72 (1987); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 63-64 (1986). Section 401 reads: “A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as... (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.” In fact, this Court relies on the Solicitor General to exercise such independent judgment and to decline to authorize petitions for review in this Court in the majority of the cases the Government has lost in the courts of appeals. See Andres v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 764-765, n. 9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); MeCree, The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 Wash. U. L. Q. 337, 341 (1981). See also Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General — Representing the Interests of the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. Rev. 527, 535 (1969) (“The Solicitor General has a special obligation to aid the Court as well as to serve his client.... In providing for the Solicitor General, subject to the direction of the Attorney General, to attend to the ‘interests of the United States’ in litigation, the statutes have always been understood to mean the long-range interests of the United States, not simply in terms of its fisc, or its success in the particular litigation, but as a government, as a people”) (footnote omitted). In Young we emphasized: “This principle of restraint in contempt counsels caution in the exercise of the power to appoint a private prosecutor. We repeat that the rationale for the appointment authority is necessity. If the Judiciary were completely dependent on the Executive Branch to redress direct affronts to its authority, it would be powerless to protect itself if that branch declined prosecution.... [T]he court will exercise its inherent power of self-protection only as a last resort.” 481 U. S., at 801. The plain language of §§ 516 and 547 resolves any conflict between the express reservations of authority over litigation therein provided and any other provision of law that vests litigation authority elsewhere. A statute that begins with “Except as otherwise provided by law” creates a general rule that applies unless contradicted in some other provision. The Court in Young had no reason to address the application of §§ 516 and 547. This was not because those provisions do not apply to a contempt proceeding initiated by a court, but because having reaffirmed the well-established inherent authority of a federal court to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt charge, there was no conflict with the statutory requirements. The fact that § 518(a) admits of no exception, of course, does not mean that Congress, if it so chooses, cannot exempt litigation from the otherwise blanket coverage of the statute. It does mean, however, that any such alleged exception must be scrutinized and subjected to the ordinary tools of statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended to supersede § 518(a). Indeed, Congress has enacted some provisions that suggest exceptions to the blanket coverage of § 518(a). See, e. g., Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 169, 96 Stat. 51 (preserving existing authority of the Tennessee Valley Authority “to represent itself by attorneys of its choosing,” while adding, see § 117, 96 Stat. 32, the United States Claims Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to the courts named in § 518(a)); Ethics in Government Act of 1978, § 601(a) as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 594(a)(9) (authorizing independent counsel to initiate and conduct prosecutions “in any court of competent jurisdiction... in the name of the United States”). See, as to the last cited Act, In re Sealed Case, 267 U. S. App. D. C. 178, 838 F. 2d 476, prob. juris, noted sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 484 U. S. 1058 (1988). See also Stern, “Inconsistency” in Government Litigation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 759 (1951) (discussing independent litigating authority of Interstate Commerce Commission). Without pausing here to construe the effect of any of these enactments, we note that there is no similar indication that Congress intended any such exception for a special prosecutor appointed by a court to prosecute a contempt charge, despite the fact that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) reflects a longstanding practice — of which we assume Congress is aware — of private prosecutions of contempt actions. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S., at 793-796. Similarly, nothing in § 518(a) precludes Members of Congress or the Judiciary from adding their views in litigation before this Court as intervenors or amici curiae, a practice we have long recognized, see, e. g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986), and which in some instances is directly authorized by statute, see, e. g., 2 U. S. C. § 288e(a). It may well be, as the Solicitor General contends, that even while pursuing a judicially initiated contempt prosecution, the United States Attorney remains, for all practical purposes, an officer and representative of the Executive Branch under the direction of the Attorney General. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss 9, n. 7. But from the standpoint of § 518(a), the Solicitor’s and the special prosecutor’s interpretation would seem to permit a United States Attorney to appear in this Court on behalf of the interests at stake in a contempt prosecution. How a case is captioned is of no significance to our holding. As we have previously observed, “courts must look behind names that symbolize the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy is presented.” United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426, 430 (1949). Thus, even if the case had not been recaptioned by the special prosecutor upon the filing, of a petition in this Court to reflect the “	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 26 ]	sc_adminaction
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR OF MASSACHUSETTS et al. v. FEENEY No. 78-233. Argued February 26, 1979- — Decided June 5, 1979 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Blackmun, RehNQuist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. SteveNS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which White, J., joined, post, p. 281. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BebnNAN, J., joined, post, p. 281. Thomas R. Kiley, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Edward F. Vena, Assistant Attorney General. Richard P. Ward argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Stephen B. Perlman, Eleanor D. Acheson, John H. Mason, and John Reinstein. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, and William C. Bryson for the United States; and by John J. Curtin, Jr., for the American Legion. Samuel J. Babinove and Phyllis N. Segal filed a brief for the National Organization for Women et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Deanne Siemer for the United States Office of Personnel Management et al.; and by Paul D. Kamenar for the Washington Legal Foundation. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a challenge to the constitutionality of the Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 23, on the ground that it discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under ch. 31, § 23, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. The preference operates overwhelmingly to the advantage of males. The appellee Helen B. Feeney is not a veteran. She brought this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the absolute-preference formula established in ch. 31, § 23, inevitably operates to exclude women from consideration for the best Massachusetts civil service jobs and thus unconstitutionally denies them the equal protection of the laws. The three-judge District Court agreed, one judge dissenting. Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (Mass. 1976). The District Court found that the absolute preference afforded by Massachusetts to veterans has a devastating impact upon the employment opportunities of women. Although it found that the goals of the preference were worthy and legitimate and that the legislation had not been enacted for the purpose of discriminating against women, the court reasoned that its exclusionary impact upon women was nonetheless so severe as to require the State to further its goals through a more limited form of preference. Finding that a more modest preference formula would readily accommodate the State’s interest in aiding veterans, the court declared ch. 31, § 23, unconstitutional and enjoined its operation. Upon an appeal taken by the Attorney General of Massachusetts, this Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of our intervening decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U. S. 884. The Davis case held that a neutral law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact; instead the disproportionate impact must be traced to a purpose to discriminate on the basis of race. 426 U. S., at 238-244. Upon remand, the District Court, one judge concurring and one judge again dissenting, concluded that a veterans’ hiring preference is inherently nonneutral because it favors a class from which women have traditionally been excluded, and that the consequences of the Massachusetts absolute-preference formula for the employment opportunities of women were too inevitable to have been “unintended.” Accordingly, the court reaffirmed its original judgment. Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143. The Attorney General again appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and probable jurisdiction of the appeal was noted. 439 U. S. 891. I A The Federal Government and virtually all of the States grant some sort of hiring preference to veterans. The Massachusetts preference, which is loosely termed an “absolute lifetime” preference, is among the most generous. It applies to all positions in the State’s classified civil service, which constitute approximately 60% of the public jobs in the State. It is available to “any person, male or female, including a nurse,” who was honorably discharged from the United States Armed Forces after at least 90 days of active service, at least one day of which was during “wartime.” Persons who are deemed veterans and who are otherwise qualified for a particular civil service job may exercise the preference at any time and as many times as they wish. Civil service positions in Massachusetts fall into two general categories, labor and official. For jobs in the official service, with which the proofs in this action were concerned, the preference mechanics are uncomplicated. All applicants for employment must take competitive examinations. Grades are based on a formula that gives weight both to objective test results and to training and experience. Candidates who pass are then ranked in the order of their respective scores on an “eligible list.” Chapter 31, § 23, requires, however, that disabled veterans, veterans, and surviving spouses and surviving parents of veterans be ranked — in the order of their respective scores — above all other candidates. Rank on the eligible list and availability for employment are the sole factors that determine which candidates are considered for appointment to an official civil service position. When a public agency has a vacancy, it requisitions a list of “certified eligibles” from the state personnel division. Under formulas prescribed by civil service rules, a small number of candidates from the top of an appropriate list, three if there is only one vacancy, are certified. The appointing agency is then required to choose from among these candidates. Although the veterans’ preference thus does not guarantee that a veteran will be appointed, it is obvious that the preference gives to veterans who achieve passing scores a well-nigh absolute advantage. B The appellee has lived in Dracut, Mass., most of her life. She entered the work force in 1948, and for the next 14 years worked at a variety of jobs in the private sector. She first entered the state civil service system in 1963, having competed successfully for a position as Senior Clerk Stenographer in the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. There she worked for four years. In 1967, she was promoted to the position of Federal Funds and Personnel Coordinator in the same agency. The agency, and with it her job, was eliminated in 1975. During her 12-year tenure as a public employee, Ms. Feeney took and passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations. On several she did quite well, receiving in 1971 the second highest score on an examination for a job with the Board of Dental Examiners, and in 1973 the third highest on a test for an Administrative Assistant position with a mental health center. Her high scores, however, did not win her a place on the certified eligible list. Because of the veterans’ preference, she was ranked sixth behind five male veterans on the Dental Examiner list. She was not certified, and a lower scoring veteran was eventually appointed. On the 1973 examination, she was placed in a position on the list behind 12 male veterans, 11 of whom had lower scores. Following the other examinations that she took, her name was similarly ranked below those of veterans who had achieved passing grades. Ms. Feeney’s interest in securing a better job in state government did not wane. Having been consistently eclipsed by veterans, however, she eventually concluded that further competition for civil service positions of interest to veterans would be futile. In 1975, shortly after her civil defense job was abolished, she commenced this litigation. C The veterans’ hiring preference in Massachusetts, as in other jurisdictions, has traditionally been justified as a measure designed to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupations. See, e. g., Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Service, 361 Mass. 480, 281 N. E. 2d 53 (1972). The Massachusetts law dates back to 1884, when the State, as part of its first civil service legislation, gave a statutory preference to civil service applicants who were Civil War veterans if their qualifications were equal to those of nonveterans. 1884 Mass. Acts, ch. 320, § 14 (sixth). This tie-breaking provision blossomed into a truly absolute preference in 1895, when the State enacted its first general veterans’ preference law and exempted veterans from all merit selection requirements. 1895 Mass. Acts, ch. 501, § 2. In response to a challenge brought by a male non-veteran, this statute was declared violative of state constitutional provisions guaranteeing that government should be for the “common good” and prohibiting hereditary titles. Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 N. E. 1005 (1896). The current veterans’ preference law has its origins in an 1896 statute, enacted to meet the state constitutional standards enunciated in Brown v. Russell. That statute limited the absolute preference to veterans who were otherwise qualified. A closely divided Supreme Judicial Court, in an advisory opinion issued the same year, concluded that the preference embodied in such a statute would be valid. Opinion of the Justices, 166 Mass. 589, 44 N. E. 625 (1896). In 1919, when the preference was extended to cover the veterans of World War I, the formula was further limited to provide for a priority in eligibility, in contrast to an absolute preference in hiring. See Corliss v. Civil Service Comm’rs, 242 Mass. 61, 136 N. E. 356 (1922). In Mayor of Lynn v. Commissioner of Civil Service, 269 Mass. 410, 414, 169 N. E. 502, 503-504 (1929), the Supreme Judicial Court, adhering to the views expressed in its 1896 advisory opinion, sustained this statute against a state constitutional challenge. Since 1919, the preference has been repeatedly amended to cover persons who served in subsequent wars, declared or undeclared. See 1943 Mass. Acts, ch. 194; 1949 Mass. Acts, ch. 642, § 2 (World War II); 1954 Mass. Acts, ch. 627 (Korea); 1968 Mass. Acts, ch. 531, § 1 (Vietnam), The current preference formula in ch. 31, § 23, is substantially the same as that settled upon in 1919. This absolute preference— even as modified in 1919 — has never been universally popular. Over the years it has been subjected to repeated legal challenges, see Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Service, swpra (collecting cases), to criticism by civil service reform groups, see, e. g., Report of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Service on Initiative Bill Relative to Veterans’ Preference, S. No. 279 (1926); Report of Massachusetts Special Commission on Civil Service and Public Personnel Administration 37-43 (June 15, 1967), and, in 1926, to a referendum in which it was reaffirmed by a majority of 51.9%. See id., at 38. The present case is apparently the first to challenge the Massachusetts veterans’ preference on the simple ground that it discriminates on the basis of sex. D The first Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute defined the term “veterans” in gender-neutral language. See 1896 Mass. Acts, ch. 517 § 1 (“a person” who served in the United States Army or Navy), and subsequent amendments have followed this pattern, see, e. g., 1919 Mass. Acts, ch. 150, § 1 (“any person who has served...”); 1954 Mass Acts, ch. 627, § 1 (“any person, male or female, including a nurse”). Women who have served in official United States military units during wartime, then, have always been entitled to the benefit of the preference. In addition, Massachusetts, through a 1943 amendment to the definition of “wartime service,” extended the preference to women who served in unofficial auxiliary women’s units. 1943 Mass. Acts, ch. 194. When the first general veterans’ preference statute was adopted in 1896, there were no women veterans. The statute, however, covered only Civil War veterans. Most of them were beyond middle age, and relatively few were actively competing for public employment. Thus, the impact of the preference upon the employment opportunities of non-veterans as a group and women in particular was slight. Notwithstanding the apparent attempts by Massachusetts to include as many military women as possible within the scope of the preference, the statute today benefits an overwhelmingly male class. This is attributable in some measure to the variety of federal statutes, regulations, and policies that have restricted the number of women who could enlist in the United States Armed Forces, and largely to the simple fact that women have never been subjected to a military draft. See generally Binkin and Bach 4-21. When this litigation was commenced, then, over 98% of the veterans in Massachusetts were male; only 1.8% were female. And over one-quarter of the Massachusetts population were veterans. During the decade between 1963 and 1973 when the appellee was actively participating in the State’s merit selection system, 47,005 new permanent appointments were made in the classified official service. Forty-three percent of those hired were women, and 57% were men. Of the women appointed, 1.8% were veterans, while 54% of the men had veteran status. A large unspecified percentage of the female appointees were serving in lower paying positions for which males traditionally had not applied.- On each of 50 sample eligible lists that are part of the record in this case, one or more women who would have been certified as eligible for appointment on the basis of test results were displaced by veterans whose test scores were lower. At the outset of this litigation appellants conceded that for “many of the permanent positions for which males and females have competed” the veterans’ preference has “resulted in a substantially greater proportion of female eligibles than male eligibles” not being certified for consideration. The impact of the veterans’ preference law upon the public employment opportunities of women has thus been severe. This impact lies at the heart of the appellee’s federal constitutional claim. II The sole question for decision on this appeal is whether Massachusetts, in granting an absolute lifetime preference to veterans, has discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the States all power of classification. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 314. Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described by the law. When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137. The calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471; San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1. In assessing an equal protection challenge, a court is called upon only to measure the basic validity of the legislative classification. Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 29-30; Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106. When some other independent right is not at stake, see, e. g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, and when there is no “reason to infer antipathy,” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97, it is presumed that “even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process....” Ibid. Certain classifications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm. A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. But, as was made clear in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, even if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose. Classifications based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting). This Court’s recent cases teach that such classifications must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives, Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197, and are in many settings unconstitutional. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71;, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636; Craig v. Boren, supra; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199; Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268; Caban v. Mohammed, supra. Although public employment is not a constitutional right, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, and the States have wide discretion in framing employee qualifications, see, e. g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, supra, these precedents dictate that any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. B The cases of Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., supra, recognize that when a neutral law has a disparate impact upon a group that has historically been the victim of discrimination, an unconstitutional purpose may still be at work. But those cases signaled no departure from the settled rule • that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results. Davis upheld a job-related employment test that white people passed in proportionately greater numbers than Negroes, for there had been no showing that racial discrimination entered into the establishment or formulation of the test. Arlington Heights upheld a zoning board decision that tended to perpetuate racially segregated housing patterns, since, apart from its effect, the board’s decision was shown to be nothing more than an application of a constitutionally neutral zoning policy. Those principles apply with equal force to a case involving alleged gender discrimination. When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that its effects upon women are disproportionably adverse, a twofold inquiry is thus appropriate. The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender based. If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., supra. In this second inquiry, impact provides an “important starting point,” 429 U. S., at 266, but purposeful discrimination is “the condition that offends the Constitution.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16. It is against this background of precedent that we consider the merits of the case before us. Ill A The question whether ch. 31, § 23, establishes a classification that is overtly or covertly based upon gender must first be considered. The appellee has conceded that ch. 31, § 23, is neutral on its face. She has also acknowledged that state hiring preferences for veterans are not per se invalid, for she has limited her challenge to the absolute lifetime preference that Massachusetts provides to veterans. The District Court made two central findings that are relevant here: first, that ch. 31, § 23, serves legitimate and worthy purposes; second, that the absolute preference was not established for the purpose of discriminating against women. The appellee has thus acknowledged and the District Court has thus found that the distinction between veterans and nonveterans drawn by ch. 31, § 23, is not a pretext for gender discrimination. The appellee’s concession and the District Court’s finding are clearly correct. If the impact of this statute could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made by the law was in fact not neutral. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., supra, at 266. But there can be but one answer to the question whether this veteran preference excludes significant numbers of women from preferred state jobs because they are women or because they are nonveterans. Apart from the facts that the definition of “veterans” in the statute has always been neutral as to gender and that Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status in a way that has been inclusive of women who have served in the military, this is not a law that can plausibly be explained only as a gender-based classification. Indeed, it is not a law that can rationally be explained on that ground. Veteran status is not uniquely male. Although few women benefit from the preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially all female. To the contrary, significant numbers of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans — male as well as female — are placed at a disadvantage. Too many men are affected by ch. 31, § 23, to permit the inference that the statute is but a pretext for preferring men over women. Moreover, as the District Court implicitly found, the purposes of the statute provide the surest explanation for its impact. Just as there are cases in which impact alone can unmask an invidious classification, cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, there are others, in which — notwithstanding impact — the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be missed. This is one. The distinction made by ch. 31, § 23, is, as it seems to be, quite simply between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women. B The dispositive question, then, is whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts veterans' preference legislation. As did the District Court, she points to two basic factors which in her view distinguish ch. 31, § 23, from the neutral rules at issue in the Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights cases. The first is the nature of the preference, which is said to be demonstrably gender-biased in the sense that it favors a status reserved under federal military policy primarily to men. The second concerns the impact of the absolute lifetime preference upon the employment opportunities of women, an impact claimed to be too inevitable to have been unintended. The appellee contends that these factors, coupled with the fact that the preference itself has little if any relevance to actual job performance, more than suffice to prove the discriminatory intent required to establish a constitutional violation. 1 The contention that this veterans’ preference is “inherently nonneutral” or “gender-biased” presumes that the State, by favoring veterans, intentionally incorporated into its public employment policies the panoply of sex-based and assertedly discriminatory federal laws that have prevented all but a handful of women from becoming veterans. There are two serious difficulties with this argument. First, it is wholly at odds with the District Court’s central finding that Massachusetts has not offered a preference to veterans for the purpose of discriminating against women. Second, it cannot be reconciled with the assumption made by both the appellee and the District Court that a more limited hiring •preference for veterans could be sustained. Taken together, these difficulties are fatal. To the extent that the status of veteran is one that few women have been enabled to achieve, every hiring preference for veterans, however modest or extreme, is inherently gender-biased. If Massachusetts by offering such a preference can be said intentionally to have incorporated into its state employment policies the historical gender-based federal military personnel practices, the degree of the preference would or should make no constitutional difference. Invidious discrimination does not become less so because the discrimination accomplished is of a lesser magnitude. Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not. The District Court’s conclusion that the absolute veterans’ preference was not originally enacted or subsequently reaffirmed for the purpose of giving an advantage to males as such necessarily compels the conclusion that the State intended nothing more than to prefer “veterans.” Given this finding, simple logic suggests that an intent to exclude women from significant public jobs was not at work in this law. To reason that it was, by describing the preference as “inherently nonneutral” or “gender-biased,” is merely to restate the fact of impact, not to answer the question of intent. To be sure, this case is unusual in that it involves a law that by design is not neutral. The law overtly prefers veterans as such. As opposed to the written test at issue in Davis, it does not purport to define a job-related characteristic. To the contrary, it confers upon a specifically described group — perceived to be particularly deserving — a competitive headstart. But the District Court found, and the appellee has not disputed, that this legislative choice was legitimate. The basic distinction between veterans and nonveterans, having been found not gender-based, and the goals of the preference having been found worthy, ch. 31 must be analyzed as is any other neutral law that casts a greater burden upon women as a group than upon men as a group. The enlistment policies of the Armed Services may well have discriminated on the basis of sex. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677; cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498. But the history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case. 2 The appellee’s ultimate argument rests upon the presumption, common to the criminal and civil law, that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions. Her position was well stated in the concurring opinion in the District Court: “Conceding... that the goal here was to benefit the veteran, there is no reason to absolve the legislature from awareness that the means chosen to achieve this goal would freeze women out of all those state jobs actively sought by men. To be sure, the legislature did not wish to harm women. But the cutting-off of women’s opportunities was an inevitable concomitant of the chosen scheme — as inevitable as the proposition that if tails is up, heads must be down. Where a law’s consequences are that inevitable, can they meaningfully be described as unintended?” 451 F. Supp., at 151. This rhetorical question implies that a negative answer is obvious, but it is not. The decision to grant a preference to veterans was of course “intentional.” So, necessarily, did an adverse impact upon nonveterans follow from that decision. And it cannot seriously be argued that the Legislature of Massachusetts could have been unaware that most veterans are men. It would thus be disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable. “Discriminatory purpose,” however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 179 (concurring opinion). It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part “because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Yet nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service. To the contrary, the statutory history shows that the benefit of the preference was consistently offered to “any person” who was a veteran. That benefit has been extended to women under a very broad statutory definition of the term veteran. The preference formula itself, which is the focal point of this challenge, was first adopted — so it appears from this record — out of a perceived need to help a small group of older Civil War veterans. It has since been reaffirmed and extended only to cover new veterans. When the totality of legislative actions establishing and extending the Massachusetts veterans’ preference are considered, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242, the law remains what it purports to be: a preference for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over women. IV Veterans’ hiring preferences represent an awkward — and, many argue, unfair — exception to the widely shared view that merit and merit alone should prevail in the employment policies of government. After a war, such laws have been enacted virtually without opposition. During peacetime, they inevitably have come to be viewed in many quarters as undemocratic and unwise. Absolute and permanent preferences, as the	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE et al. v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY et al. No. 92-1223. Argued November 8, 1993 Decided February 23, 1994 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 504. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 504. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Leonard Schaitman, and Sandra Wien Simon. David M. Smith argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority were William R. Tobey, William E. Persina, and Pamela P. Johnson. Mark D. Roth, Charles A. Hobbie, Stuart A. Kirsch, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for respondent American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO. Rossie D. Alston, Jr., filed a brief for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Gregory O’Duden and Elaine Kaplan filed a brief for the National Treasury Employees- Union as amiciis curiae urging affirmance. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to consider whether disclosure of the home addresses of federal civil service employees by their employing agency pursuant to a request made by the employees’ collective-bargaining representative under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U. S. C. §§7101-7135 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion” of the employees’ personal privacy within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. Concluding that it would, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I The controversy underlying this case arose when two local unions requested the petitioner federal agencies to provide them with the names and home addresses of the agency employees in the bargaining units represented by the unions. The agencies supplied the unions with the employees’ names and work stations, but refused to release home addresses. In response, the unions filed unfair labor practice charges with respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), in which they contended that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Labor Statute), 5 U. S. C. §§7101-7135 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), required the agencies to divulge the addresses. The Labor Statute generally provides that agencies must, “to the extent not prohibited by law,” furnish unions with data that are necessary for collective-bargaining purposes. § 7114(b)(4). The agencies argued that disclosure of the home addresses was prohibited by the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act), 5 U. S. C. § 552a (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Relying on its earlier decision in Department of Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N H., 37 F. L. R. A. 515 (1990) (Portsmouth), application for enforcement denied and cross-petition for review granted sub nom. FLRA v. Department of Navy, Naval Communications Unit Cutler, 941 F. 2d 49 (CA1 1991), the Authority rejected that argument and ordered the agencies to divulge the addresses. Department of Defense, Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., Dallas, Tex., 37 F. L. R. A. 930 (1990); Department of Navy, 37 F. L. R. A. 652 (1990). A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted enforcement of the Authority’s orders. 975 F. 2d 1105 (1992). The panel majority agreed with the Authority that the unions’ requests for home addresses fell within a statutory exception to the Privacy Act. That Act does not bar disclosure of personal information if disclosure would be “required under section 552 of this title [the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)].” 5 U. S. C. §552a(b)(2). The court below observed that FOIA, with certain enumerated exceptions, generally mandates full disclosure of information held by agencies. In the view of the Court of Appeals, only one of the enumerated exceptions— the provision exempting from FOIA’s coverage personnel files “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6) (Exemption 6) — potentially applied to this case. 975 F. 2d, at 1109. In determining whether Exemption 6 applied, the Fifth •Circuit balanced the public interest in effective collective bargaining embodied in the Labor Statute against the interest of employees in keeping their home addresses private. The court recognized that, in light of our decision in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989), other Courts of Appeals had concluded that the only public interest to be weighed in the Exemption 6 balancing analysis is the extent to which FOIA’s central purpose of opening agency action to public scrutiny would be served by disclosure. Rejecting that view, however, the panel majority reasoned that Reporters Committee “has absolutely nothing to say about... the situation that arises when disclosure is initially required by some statute other than the FOIA, and the FOIA is employed only secondarily.” 975 F. 2d, at 1113. In such cases, the court ruled that “it is proper for the federal court to consider the public interests embodied in the statute which generates the disclosure request.” Id., at 1115. Applying this approach, the court concluded that, because the weighty interest in public sector collective bargaining identified by Congress in the Labor Statute would be advanced by the release of the home addresses, disclosure “would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Id., at 1116. In the panel majority’s view, because Exemption 6 would not apply, FOIA would require disclosure of the addresses; in turn, therefore, the Privacy Act did not forbid the agencies to divulge the addresses, and the Authority’s orders were binding. Ibid. The dissenting judge argued that Reporters Committee controlled the case and barred the agencies from disclosing their employees’ addresses to the unions. Id., at 1116-1119 (Garza, J., dissenting). We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 1003 (1993), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning whether the Privacy Act forbids the disclosure of employee addresses to collective-bargaining representatives pursuant to information requests made under the Labor Statute. II Like the Court of Appeals, we begin our analysis with the terms of the Labor Statute, which governs labor-management relations in the federal civil service. Consistent with the congressional finding that “labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest,” 5 U. S. C. § 7101(a), the Labor Statute requires an agency to accord exclusive recognition to a labor union that is elected by employees to serve as the representative of a bargaining unit. § 7111(a). An exclusive representative must represent fairly all employees in the unit, regardless of whether they choose to become union members. § 7114(a)(1). The Labor Statute also imposes a duty on the agency and the exclusive representative to negotiate in good faith for the purpose of arriving at a collective-bargaining agreement. § 7114(a)(4). To fulfill its good-faith bargaining obligation, an agency must, inter alia, “furnish to the exclusive representative involved, or its authorized representative, upon request and, to the extent not prohibited by law, data... (B) which is reasonably available and necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining.” § 7114(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The Authority has determined that the home addresses of bargaining unit employees constitute information that is “necessary” to the collective-bargaining process because through them, unions may communicate with employees more effectively than would otherwise be possible. See Portsmouth, 37 F. L. R. A., at 532 (“In the home environment, the employee has the leisure and the privacy to give the full and thoughtful attention to the union’s message that the workplace generally does not permit”); Farmers Home Admin. Finance Office, 23 F. L. R. A. 788, 796-797 (1986). This determination, which has been upheld by several Courts of Appeals, is not before us. Nor is there any dispute that the addresses are “reasonably available.” Therefore, unless disclosure is “prohibited by law,” agencies such as petitioners must release home addresses to exclusive representatives upon request. Petitioners contend that the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure. This statute provides in part: “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be... (2) required under section 552 of this title [FOIA].” 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b)(2) (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). The employee addresses sought by the unions are “records” covered by the broad terms of the Privacy Act. Therefore, unless FOIA would require release of the addresses, their disclosure is “prohibited by law,” and the agencies may not reveal them to the unions. We turn, then, to FOIA. As we have recognized previously, FOIA reflects “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 360-361 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also ERA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 79-80 (1973). Thus, while “disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of [FOIA],” there are a number of exemptions from the statute’s broad reach. Rose, supra, at 361. The exemption potentially applicable to employee addresses is Exemption 6, which provides that FOIA’s disclosure requirements do not apply to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6). Thus, although this case requires us to follow a somewhat convoluted path of statutory cross-references, its proper resolution depends upon a discrete inquiry: whether disclosure of the home addresses “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of [the] personal privacy” of bargaining unit employees within the meaning of FOIA. For guidance in answering this question, we need look no further than to our decision in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989). Reporters Committee involved FOIA requests addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation that sought the “rap sheets” of several individuals. In the process of deciding that the FBI was prohibited from disclosing the contents of the rap sheets, we reaffirmed several basic principles that have informed our interpretation of FOIA. First, in evaluating whether a request for information lies within the scope of a FOIA exemption, such as Exemption 6, that bars disclosure when it would amount to an invasion of privacy that is to some degree “unwarranted,” “a court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended the [exemption to protect.” Id., at 776. See also Rose, supra, at 372. Second, the only relevant “public interest in disclosure” to be weighed in this balance is the extent to which disclosure would serve the “core purpose of the FOIA,” which is “contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” Reporters Comm., supra, at 775 (internal quotation marks omitted). We elaborated on this point at some length: “[FOIA’s] basic policy of ‘full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language’ indeed focuses on the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to. Official information that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.” 489 U. S., at 773 (quoting Rose, supra, at 360-361) (other internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Rose, supra, at 372 (Exemption 6 cases “require a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of [FOIA] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, “whether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for information is made.” Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 771. Because “Congress ‘clearly intended’ the FOIA ‘to give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as one with a special interest [in a particular document],’ ” ibid, (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 149 (1975)), except in certain cases involving claims of privilege, “the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her FOIA request,” 489 U. S., at 771. III The principles that we followed in Reporters Committee can be applied easily to this case. We must weigh the privacy interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their addresses against the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis — the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would “she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties” or otherwise let citizens know “what their government is up to.” Reporters Comm., supra, at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted). The relevant public interest supporting disclosure in this case is negligible, at best. Disclosure of the addresses might allow the unions to communicate more effectively with employees, but it would not appreciably further “the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to.” 489 U. S., at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, such disclosure would reveal little or nothing about the employing agencies or their activities. Even the Fifth Circuit recognized that “[r]elease of the employees’... addresses would not in any meaningful way open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” 975 F. 2d, at 1113. Apparently realizing that this conclusion follows ineluctably from an application of the FOIA tenets we embraced in Reporters Committee, respondents argue that Reporters Committee is largely inapposite here because it dealt with an information request made directly under FOIA, whereas the unions’ requests for home addresses initially were made under the Labor Statute, and implicated FOIA only incidentally through a chain of statutory cross-references. In such a circumstance, contend respondents, to give full effect to the three statutes involved and to allow unions to perform their statutory representational duties, we should import the policy considerations that are made explicit in the Labor Statute into the FOIA Exemption 6 balancing analysis. If we were to do so, respondents are confident we would conclude that the Labor Statute’s policy favoring collective bargaining easily outweighs any privacy interest that employees might have in nondisclosure. We decline to accept respondents’ ambitious invitation to rewrite the statutes before us and to disregard the FOIA principles reaffirmed in Reporters Committee. The Labor Statute does not, as the Fifth Circuit suggested, merely “borro[w] the FOIA’s disclosure calculus for another purpose.” 975 F. 2d, at 1115. Rather, it allows the disclosure of information necessary for effective collective bargaining only “to the extent not prohibited by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 7114(b)(4). Disclosure of the home addresses is prohibited by the Privacy Act unless an exception to that Act applies. The terms of the Labor Statute in no way suggest that the Privacy Act should be read in light of the purposes of the Labor Statute. If there is an exception, therefore, it must be found within the Privacy Act itself. Congress could have enacted an exception to the Privacy Act’s coverage for information “necessary” for collective-bargaining purposes, but it did not do so. In the absence of such a provision, respondents rely on the exception for information the disclosure of which would be “required under [FOIA].” §552a(b)(2). Nowhere, however, does the Labor Statute amend FOIA’s disclosure requirements or grant information requesters under the Labor Statute special status under FOIA. Therefore, because all FOIA requesters have an equal, and equally qualified, right to information, the fact that respondents are seeking to vindicate the policies behind the Labor Statute is irrelevant to the FOIA analysis. Cf. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 771-772. In her concurring opinion in FLRA v. Department of Treasury, Financial Management Serv., 884 F. 2d 1446 (CADC 1989), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1055 (1990), then-judge Ginsburg cogently explained why we must reject respondents’ central argument: “The broad cross-reference in 5 U. S. C. § 7114(b)(4) — ‘to the extent not prohibited by law’ — picks up the Privacy Act unmodified; that Act, in turn, shelters personal records absent the consent of the person to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure would be required under the [FOIA]. “Once placed wholly within the FOIA’s domain, the union requesting information relevant to collective bargaining stands in no better position than members of the general public. True, unions have a special interest in identifying and communicating with persons in the bargaining unit, an interest initially accommodated by [the Labor Statute]. The bargaining process facilitation interest is ultimately unavailing, however, because it ‘falls outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve,’ i. e., the interest in advancing ‘public understanding of the operation or activities of the government.’” 884 F. 2d, at 1457 (quoting Reporters Comm., supra, at 775). Against the virtually nonexistent FOIA-related public interest in disclosure, we weigh the interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their home addresses. Cf. Department of State v. Ray, 502 U. S. 164, 173-177 (1991); Rose, 425 U. S., at 372. Because a very slight privacy interest would suffice to outweigh the relevant public interest, we need not be exact in our quantification of the privacy interest. It is enough for present purposes to observe that the employees’ interest in nondisclosure is not insubstantial. It is true that home addresses often are publicly available through sources such as telephone directories and voter registration lists, but “[i]n an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.” Reporters Comm., supra, at 763. The privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 “encompass[es] the individual’s control of information concerning his- or her person.” 489 U. S., at 763. An individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in some form. Here, for the most part, the unions seek to obtain the addresses of nonunion employees who have decided not to reveal their addresses to their exclusive representative. See n. 5, supra. Perhaps some of these individuals have failed to join the union that represents them due to lack of familiarity with the union or its services. Others may be opposed to their union or to unionism in general on practical or ideological grounds. Whatever the reason that these employees have chosen not to become members of the union or to provide the union with their addresses, however, it is clear that they have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union-related mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone calls or visits, that would follow disclosure. Many people simply do not want to be disturbed at home by work-related matters. Employees can lessen the chance of such unwanted contacts by not revealing their addresses to their exclusive representative. Even if the direct union/ employee communication facilitated by the disclosure of home addresses were limited to mailings, this does not lessen the interest that individuals have in preventing at least some unsolicited, unwanted mail from reaching them at their homes. We are reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions. Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). Moreover, when we consider that other parties, such as commercial advertisers and solicitors, must have the same access under FOIA as the unions to the employee address lists sought in this case, see supra, at 496, 499, it is clear that the individual privacy interest that would be protected by nondisclosure is far from insignificant. Because the privacy interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their home addresses substantially outweighs the negligible FOIA-related public interest in disclosure, we conclude that disclosure would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6). FOIA, thus, does not require the agencies to divulge the addresses, and the Privacy Act, therefore, prohibits their release to the unions. IV Respondents argue that our decision will have a number of untoward effects. First, they contend that without access to home addresses, public sector unions will be unable to communicate with, and represent effectively, all bargaining unit employees. Such a result, they believe, thwarts the collective-bargaining policies explicitly embodied in the Labor Statute. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 7101(a) (congressional finding that “labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest”). According to respondents, it is illogical to believe that Congress intended the Privacy Act and FOIA to be interpreted in a manner that hinders the effectuation of the purposes motivating the Labor Statute. Respondents, however, place undue emphasis on what they perceive to be the impulses of the Congress that enacted the Labor Statute, and neglect to consider the language in that statute that calls into play the limitations of the Privacy Act. Speculation about the ultimate goals of the Labor Statute is inappropriate here; the statute plainly states that an agency need furnish an exclusive representative with information that is necessary for collective-bargaining purposes only “to the extent not prohibited by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 7114(b)(4). Disclosure of the addresses in this case is prohibited “by law,” the Privacy Act. By disallowing disclosure, we do no more than give effect to the clear words of the provisions we construe, including the Labor Statute. Cf. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there”). Second, respondents fear that our ruling will allow agencies, acting pursuant to the Privacy Act, to refuse to provide unions with other employee records, such as disciplinary reports and performance appraisals, that the unions need in order to perform their duties as exclusive bargaining representatives. This concern is not presented in this case, however, and we do not address it. Finally, respondents contend that our decision creates an unnecessary and unintended disparity between public and private sector unions. While private sector unions assertedly are entitled to receive employee home address lists from employers under the National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board, respondents claim that federal sector unions now will be needlessly barred from obtaining this information, despite the lack of any indication that Congress intended such a result. See Department of Treasury, 884 F. 2d, at 1457-1461 (R. Ginsburg, J., concurring). We do not question that, as a general matter, private sector labor law may provide guidance in parallel public sector matters. This fact has little relevance here, however, for unlike private sector employees, federal employees enjoy the protection of the Privacy Act, and that statute prohibits the disclosure of the address lists sought in this case. To the extent that this prohibition leaves public sector unions in a position different from that of their private sector counterparts, Congress may correct the disparity. Cf. Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499 (1985). V For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. So ordered. Local 1657 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union represents a bargaining unit composed of employees of the Navy CBC Exchange in Gulfport, Mississippi. Local 1345 of respondent American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, represents a worldwide bargaining unit composed of employees of the Army and Air Force Exchange, which is headquartered in Dallas, Texas. Petitioners are the U. S. Department of Defense, U. S. Department of the Navy, Navy CBC Exchange, Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, Mississippi, and the U. S. Department of Defense, Army and Air Force Exchange, Dallas, Texas. See, e. g., Department of Navy, Navy Exchange v. FLRA, 975 F. 2d 348 (CA7 1992); FLRA v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F. 2d 503 (CA2 1992); FLRA v. Department of Navy, Naval Communications Unit Cutler, 941 F. 2d 49 (CA11991); FLRA v. Department of Treasury, Financial Management Serv., 884 F. 2d 1446 (CADC 1989), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1055 (1990). See, e. g., FLRA v. Department of Defense, Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., 984 F. 2d 370, 373 (CA10 1993); Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, at 507-508. The written-consent provision of the Privacy Act is not implicated in this case. The unions already have access to the addresses of their members and to those of nonmembers who have divulged this information to them. It is not disputed that the unions are able to contact bargaining unit employees at work and ask them for their home addresses. In practical effect, the unions seek only those addresses that they do not currently possess: the addresses of nonunion employees who have not revealed this information to their exclusive representative. We also note that we are not asked in this case to consider the potential applicability of any other Privacy Act exceptions, such as the “routine use” exception. See 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b)(3). Respondents rely solely on the argument that the unions’ requests for home addresses fall within the Privacy Act’s FOIA exception. Our decision in Reporters Committee turned on the applicability of FOIA Exemption 7(C) to the requests for “rap sheets.” In pertinent part, Exemption 7(C) provides that “[FOIA] does not apply to matters that are... (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information... (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(7)(C). When we applied the FOIA principles discussed in the text, we concluded that “[t]he privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high,” and that “the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir” when third parties seek law enforcement records concerning private citizens, given that those records would shed no light on the activities of government agencies or officials. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 780. Because the privacy interest outweighed the relevant public interest, we held as a categorical matter that such records are excepted from FOIA’s broad disclosure requirements by Exemption 7(C). Ibid. Exemption 7(C) is more protective of privacy than Exemption 6: The former provision applies to any disclosure that “could reasonably be expected to constitute” an invasion of privacy that is “unwarranted,” while the latter bars any disclosure that “would constitute” an invasion of privacy that is “clearly unwarranted.” Contrary to the view of the court below, see 975 F. 2d, at 1113, however, the fact that Reporters Committee dealt with a different FOIA exemption than the one we focus on today is of little import. Exemptions 7(C) and 6 differ in the magnitude of the public interest that is required to override the respective privacy interests protected by the exemptions. As we shall see in Part III, infra, however, the dispositive issue here is the identification of the relevant public interest to be weighed in the balance, not the magnitude of that interest. Reporters Committee provides the same guidance in making this identification in Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6 cases. See, e. g., Department of State v. Ray, 502 U. S. 164 (1991) (Exemption 6 case applying Reporters Committee). In this regard, see Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F. 2d, at 512 (“Nowhere in the [Labor Statute] does its language indicate that the disclosure calculus required by FOIA should be modified. Nowhere do we find a qualification that the policies of collective bargaining should be integrated into FOIA”); Department of Treasury, 884 F. 2d, at 1453 (“Privacy Act exception b(2) speaks only of FOIA. We do not believe we are entitled to engage in the sort of imaginative reconstruction that would be necessary to introduce collective bargaining values into the [FOIA] balancing process”). Even the Authority'has recognized that “employees have some privacy interest in their home	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 46 ]	sc_adminaction
DECKER, OREGON STATE FORESTER, et al. v. NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER No. 11-338. Argued December 3, 2012 Decided March 20, 2013 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I and II. Roberts, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, post, p. 615. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 616. Breyer, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Timothy S. Bishop argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 11-347 were Jeffrey W. Sarles, Richard Bulger, Chad damage, Michael B. Kimberly, Per A. Ramfjord, Leonard J. Feldman, Jason T. Morgan, and Willliam K. Sargent. Ellen F. Ro-senblum, Attorney General of Oregon, Mary H. Williams, Deputy Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Erin C. Lagesen, Assistant Attorney General, filed briefs for petitioners in No. 11-338. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Ver-rilli, Assistant Attorney General Moreno, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Shenkman, Pratik A. Shah, and Aaron P. Avila. Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Pamela S. Karlan, Deborah A. Sivas, Paul A. Kampmeier, Christopher G. Winter, and Kevin K. Russell Together with No. 11-347, Georgia-Pacific West, Inc., et al. v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curias urging reversal in both cases were filed for the State of Arkansas et al. by Dustin McDaniel, Attorney General of Arkansas, Charles Moulton and Eric Estes, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, and Kendra Akin Jones, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Luther Strange of Alabama, Michael C. Geraghty of Alaska, Pamela Jo Bondi of Florida, Samuel S. Olens of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Greg F. Zoeller of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Jack Conway of Kentucky, James D. “Buddy" Caldwell of Louisiana, William J. Schneider of Maine, Bill Schuette of Michigan, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Chris Koster of Missouri, Steve Bullock of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Michael A. Delaney of New Hampshire, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Michael DeWine of Ohio, E. Scott Pruitt of Oklahoma, Linda L. Kelly of Pennsylvania, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shuttle'ff of Utah, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II of Virginia, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, Darrell McGraw of West Virginia, and Gregory A. Phillips of Wyoming; for the American Forest Resource Council et al. by Scott W. Horngren and Caroline M. Lobdell; for the Association of Oregon Counties et al. by Ronald S. Yockim and Daniel Gail Chadwick; for Law Professors by Brian J. Murray and Kevin P. Holewin-ski; for the National Alliance of Forest Owners et al. by Clifton S. Elgar-ten, Kirsten L. Nathanson, David Y. Chung, and William R. Murray; for the National Governors Association et al. by Roderick E. Walston and Lisa E. Soronen; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by M. Reed Hopper and Damien M. Schiff; for the Ruffed Grouse Society by Ryan L. Woody; and for the Society of American Foresters et al. by Virginia S. Albrecht, Eric J. Murdock, and Ryan A. Shores. Thomas J. Ward and Quentin Riegel filed a brief of amici curiae for the National Association of Home Builders et al. urging reversal in No. 11-338. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 11-347 were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by James T. Banks, Christopher T. Handman, Mary Helen Wimberly, Ellen Steen, and Michael C. For mica; and for the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center by Karen R. Earned. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the Environmental Protection Information Center et al. by Michael R. Lozeau and Sharon E. Duggan; for Law Professors by Sanne H. Knudsen and Amy J. Wildermuth; for Northwest Environmental Advocates et al. by James S. Coon; for the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations et al. by Eric R. Glitzenstein; for the Western Division of the American Fisheries Society et al. by Kristen L. Boyles; for Kevin Boston by Shaun A. Goho; and for Robert Wayland et al. by Stephanie Tai. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Aaron L. Nielson, Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, and Sheldon Gilbert; for Law Professors by Allison M. LaPlante; and for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by Steven J. Lechner. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present the question whether the Clean Water Act and its implementing regulations require permits before channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads can be discharged into the navigable waters of the United States. Under the statute and its implementing regulations, a permit is required if the discharges are deemed to be “associated with industrial activity.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(p)(2)(B). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency), with the responsibility to enforce the Act, has issued a regulation defining the term “associated with industrial activity” to cover only discharges “from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.” 40 CFR § 122.26(b)(14) (2006). The EPA interprets its regulation to exclude the type of stormwater discharges from logging roads at issue here. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-27. For reasons now to be explained, the Court concludes the EPA’s determination is a reasonable interpretation of its own regulation; and, in consequence, deference is accorded to the interpretation under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461 (1997). I—I A Congress passed the Clean Water Act in 1972 to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a). A central provision of the Act is its requirement that individuals, corporations, and governments secure National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits before discharging pollution from any point source into the navigable waters of the United States. See §§ 1311(a), 1362(12); EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S. 200, 205 (1976). The Act defines “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” § 1362(14). When the Act took effect, the EPA found it difficult to process permit applications from countless owners and operators of point sources throughout the country. The Agency issued regulations exempting certain types of point-source discharges from the NPDES permitting scheme, but in 1977 those directives were found invalid. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the statute did not give the EPA “authority to exempt categories of point sources from the permit requirements” of the Act. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F. 2d 1369, 1377. In response the EPA issued new regulations to define with more precision which categories of discharges qualified as point sources in the first place. Among these regulations was the so-called Silvicultural Rule. This rule is at issue here. It provides: “Silvicultural point source means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance related to rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities which are operated in connection with silvicultural activities and from which pollutants are discharged into waters of the United States. The term does not include non-point source silvicultural activities such as nursery operations, site preparation, reforestation and subsequent cultural treatment, thinning, prescribed burning, pest and fire control,' harvesting operations, surface drainage, or road construction and maintenance from which there is natural, runoff.” 40 CFR § 122.27(b)(1) (2006). Under the quoted rule, any discharge from a logging-related source that qualifies as a point source requires an NPDES permit unless some other federal statutory provision exempts it from that coverage. In one such provision, 33 U. S. C. § 1342(p), Congress has exempted certain discharges of stormwater runoff. The statutory exemptions were considered necessary because, from the outset, the EPA had encountered recurring difficulties in determining how best to manage discharges of this kind. See, e. g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F. 2d 1292, 1295-1296 (CA9 1992). In 1987, Congress responded to these problems and adopted various stormwater-related amendments to the Act. § 405, 101 Stat. 69, 33 U. S. C. § 1342(p). The 1987 amendments exempt from the NPDES permitting scheme most “discharges composed entirely of stormwa-ter.” §1342(p)(l). The general exemption, however, does not extend to all stormwater discharges. As relevant here, Congress directed the EPA to continue to require permits for stormwater discharges “associated with industrial activity.” § 1342(p)(2)(B). The statute does not define that term, but the EPA adopted a regulation (hereinafter Industrial Stormwater Rule) in which it defined it as “the discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant. The term does not include discharges from facilities or activities excluded from the NPDES program under this part 122. For the categories of industries identified in this section, the term includes, but is not limited to, storm water discharges from... immediate access roads and rail lines used or traveled by carriers of raw materials, manufactured products, waste material, or by-products used or created by the facility....” 40 CFR § 122.26(b)(14). The Industrial Stormwater Rule also specified that, with one exception not relevant here, “[f]acilities classified as Standard Industrial Classificatio[n] 24” are “considered to be engaging in ‘industrial activity’ for purposes of paragraph (b)(14).” Ibid. The Standard Industrial Classifications are a system used by federal agencies to categorize firms engaged in different types of business activity. See Dept, of Labor, Standard Industrial Classifications Manual, online at http://Avww.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html (as visited Mar. 14, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Standard Industrial Classification 24 identifies industries involved in the field of “Lumber and Wood Products.” 2 App. 64. This includes the “Logging” industry, defined as “[e]s-tablishments primarily engaged in cutting timber and in producing... primary forest or wood raw materials.” Ibid. On November 30, 2012—three days before the instant cases were argued in this Court—the EPA issued its final version of an amendment to the Industrial Stormwater Rule. The amendment was the Agency’s response to the Court of Appeals’ ruling now under review. The amended version seeks to clarify the types of facilities within Standard Industrial Classification 24 that are deemed to be engaged in industrial activity for purposes of the rule. The amended Industrial Stormwater Rule does not cover all facilities within Standard Industrial.Classification 24. It limits covered stormwater discharges to “ [facilities classified within Standard Industrial Classification 24, Industry Group 241 that are rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities operated in connection with silvicultural activities... and Industry Groups 242 through 249.” 77 Fed. Reg. 72974, pt. 122, subpt. B (2012). It should be noted, by way of explanation, that an Industry Group is a subcategory of businesses within a Standard Industrial Classification. Industry Group 241 is “Logging,” while Industry Groups 242 through 245 are, respectively, “Sawmills and Planing Mills,” “Millwork, Veneer, Plywood, and Structural Wood,” “Wood Containers,” and “Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes.” Industry Group 249 is “Miscellaneous Wood Products.” Industry Groups 246 through 248 are blank categories. Standard Industrial Classifications Manual, swpra, Major Group 24. It is fair to say the purpose of the amended regulation is to bring within the NPDES permit process only those logging operations that involve the four types of activity (rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log storage facilities) that are defined as point sources by the explicit terms of the Silvicultural Rule. Up to this stage in the litigation, of course, the cases have been concerned with the Industrial Stormwater Rule before the amendment adopted on November 30, 2012. The amended regulation will determine whether from this point forward NPDES permits will be required for the stormwa-ter discharges at issue. The parties disagree about the significance of the amended rule for purposes of these cases. Before reaching this and other preliminary points, however, it is appropriate to set forth the facts and history of the cases leading to the proceedings in this Court. B At issue are discharges of channeled stormwater runoff from two logging roads in Oregon’s Tillamook State Forest, lying in the Pacific Coast Range about 40 miles west of Portland. Petitioner Georgia-Pacific West, along with other logging and paper-products companies, has a contract with the State of Oregon to harvest timber from the forest. It uses the roads for that purpose. When it rains (which it does often in the mountains of northwest Oregon, averaging in some areas more than 100 inches per year), water runs off the graded roads into a system of ditches, culverts, and channels that discharge the water into nearby rivers and streams. The discharges often contain large amounts of sediment, in the form of dirt and crushed gravel from the roads. There is evidence that this runoff can harm fish and other aquatic organisms. In September 2006, respondent Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. It invoked the Clean Water Act’s citizen-suit provision, 33 U. S. C. § 1365, and named as defendants certain firms involved in logging and paper-products operations (including petitioner Georgia-Pacific West), as well as state and local governments and officials (including the state forester of Oregon, who is now petitioner Doug Decker). The suit alleged that the defendants caused discharges of channeled stormwater runoff into two waterways—the South Fork Trask River and the Little South Fork Rilchis River. The defendants had not obtained NPDES permits, and so, the suit alleged, they had violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. It concluded that NPDES permits were not required because the ditches, culverts, and channels were not point sources of pollution under the Act and the Silvicultural Rule. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, 640 F. 3d 1063 (2011). It relied upon three principal propositions. First, it held that the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1365 notwithstanding a different provision of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1369(b)(1), limiting judicial review of EPA regulations. Second, the Court of Appeals held that while the EPA’s Silvicultural Rule is ambiguous on the question whether the conveyances at issue are point sources, those conveyances must be deemed point sources under the rule in order to give effect to the Act’s expansive definition of the term. Third, the Court of Appeals held that because the Industrial Stormwater Rule makes cross-reference to Standard Industrial Classification 24, the discharges at issue are “associated with industrial activity” within the meaning of the regulation, despite the EPA’s conclusion to the contrary. The regulation was held to be unambiguous on this point. The Court of Appeals thus ruled that the discharges were from point sources and not exempt from the NPDES permitting scheme by the Industrial Stormwater Rule. It followed that petitioners had been in violation of the Act. This Court granted certiorari. 567 U. S. 933 (2012). H-f Before proceeding to the merits, it is necessary to consider two jurisdictional questions. A Respondent NEDC invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under 33 U. S. C. § 1365(a), which “authorize^] private enforcement of the provisions of [the Clean Water Act]” and its implementing regulations. Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U. S. 607, 613, n. 5 (1992). Petitioners, however, maintain that this suit is barred by a separate provision of the Act, § 1369(b). That statute provides for “judicial review in the United States courts of appeals of various particular actions by the [EPA] Administrator, including establishment of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge of pollutants.” Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1981). Where that review is available, it is the exclusive means of challenging actions covered by the statute, § 1369(b)(2), and an application for review must be lodged in the court of appeals within 120 days of the Administrator’s action, § 1369(b)(1). The Court of Appeals was correct to rule that the exclusive jurisdiction mandate is not applicable in this suit. Section 1369(b) extends only to certain suits challenging some Agency actions. It does not bar a district court from entertaining a citizen suit under § 1365 when the suit is against an alleged violator and seeks to enforce an obligation imposed by the Act or its regulations. The present action is within the scope of § 1365. It is a claim to enforce what is at least a permissible reading of the Silvicultural Rule. The rule is ambiguous: Its characterization of silvicultural harvesting operations “from which there is natural runoff,” 40 CFR § 122.27(b)(1), as a nonpoint source might be read, as petitioners contend, to apply to the channeled stormwater runoff at issue; or it might be read, as respondent NEDC urges, to apply only to runoff not collected in channels or other engineered improvements. See New Oxford American Dictionary 1167 (3d ed. 2010) (Oxford Diet.) (“natural” means “existing in or caused by nature; not made or caused by humankind”). NEDC’s reading would make the channeled discharges here point-source pollution under the Act. In its view only this interpretation can be squared with the Act’s broad definition of “point source.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(14). On this premise, the instant suit is an effort not to challenge the Silvicultural Rule but to enforce it under a proper interpretation. It is a basic tenet that “regulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated.” United States v. Larionoff, 431 U. S. 864, 873 (1977). For jurisdictional purposes, it is unnecessary to determine whether NEDC is correct in arguing that only its reading of the Silvicultural Rule is permitted under the Act. It suffices to note that NEDC urges the Court to adopt a “purposeful but permissible reading of the regulation... to bring it into harmony with... the statute.” Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U. S. 561, 573 (2007). NEDC does not seek “an implicit declaration that the... regulations were invalid as written.” Ibid. And, as a result, § 1369(b) is not a jurisdictional bar to this suit. B “It is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U. S. 932, 936 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle requires us to determine whether the EPA’s recent amendment to the Industrial Stormwater Rule makes the cases moot. In a supplemental brief filed after oral argument, petitioner Decker, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, takes the position that the recent amendment makes these cases moot in relevant part. See Supp. Brief for Petitioners in No. 11-338, pp. 4-6; Supp. Brief for United States 4-8. That conclusion is incorrect. “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 307 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, despite the recent amendment, a live controversy continues to exist regarding whether petitioners may be held liable for unlawful discharges under the earlier version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule. Respondent NEDC continues to press its claim that petitioners’ discharges are unlawful under both the amended regulation and the earlier version. See Supp. Brief for Respondent 3-13. The instant cases provide no occasion to interpret the amended regulation. “ ‘[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.’ ” Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, ante, at 37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005)). The parties, however, have litigated the suit extensively based on the earlier version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule; and that version governed petitioners’ past discharges, which might be the basis for the imposition of penalties even if, in the future, those types of discharges will not require a permit. If the Court of Appeals is correct that petitioners were obligated to secure NPDES permits before discharging channeled stormwater runoff, the District Court might order some remedy for their past violations. The Act contemplates civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day, 33 U. S. C. § 1319(d), as well as attorney’s fees for prevailing parties, § 1365(d). NEDC, in addition, requests injunctive relief for both past and ongoing violations, in part in the form of an order that petitioners incur certain environmental-remediation costs to alleviate harms attributable to their past discharges. Under these circumstances, the cases remain live and justiciable, for the possibility of some remedy for a proven past violation is real and not remote. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 64-65 (1987). The District Court, it is true, might rule that NEDC’s arguments lack merit, or that the relief it seeks is not warranted on the facts of these cases. That possibility, however, does not make the cases moot. “There may be jurisdiction and yet an absence of merits.” General Investment Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 271 U. S. 228, 230 (1926). 1—1 )—H HH The substantive question of the necessity for an NPDES permit under the earlier rule now must be addressed. Under the Act, petitioners were required to secure NPDES permits for the discharges of channeled stormwater runoff only if the discharges were “associated with industrial activity,” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(p)(2)(B), as that statutory term is defined in the preamendment version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule, 40 CFR § 122.26(b)(14). Otherwise, the discharges fall within the Act’s general exemption of “discharges composed entirely of stormwater” from the NPDES permitting scheme. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(p)(l). NEDC first contends that the statutory term “associated with industrial activity” unambiguously covers discharges of channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). That view, however, overlooks the multiple definitions of the terms “industrial” and “industry.” These words can refer to business activity in general, yet so too can they be limited to “economic activity concerned with the processing of raw materials and manufacture of goods in factories.” Oxford Diet. 887. The latter definition does not necessarily encompass outdoor timber harvesting. The statute does not foreclose more specific definition by the Agency, since it provides no further detail as to its intended scope. Somewhat more plausible is NEDC’s claim that the pre-amendment version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule unambiguously required a permit for the discharges at issue. NEDC reasons that under the rule, “[f]or the categories of industries identified in this section,” NPDES permits are required for, among other things, “storm water discharges from... immediate access roads... used or traveled by carriers of raw materials.” 40 CFR § 122.26(b)(14). Yet this raises the question whether logging is a “categor[y] of industr[y]” identified by the section. The regulation goes on to identify a list of “categories of facilities” that “are considered to be engaging in ‘industrial activity’ for purposes” of the Industrial Stormwater Rule. Ibid. In the earlier version of the regulation, this list included “[facilities classified as Standard Industrial Classification] 24,” which encompasses “Logging.” Ibid. See also supra, at 604. Hence, NEDC asserts, logging is among the categories of industries for which “storm water discharges from... immediate access roads... used or traveled by carriers of raw materials” required NPDES permits under the earlier version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule. § 122.26(b)(14). NEDC further notes, in support of its reading of the regulation, that modern logging is a large-scale, highly mechanized enterprise, using sophisticated harvesting machines weighing up to 20 tons. See Brief for Respondent 4-5. The EPA takes a different view. It concludes that the earlier regulation invoked Standard Industrial Classification 24 “ ‘to regulate traditional industrial sources such as sawmills.’” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-25. It points to the regulation’s reference to “facilities” and the classification’s reference to “establishments,” which suggest industrial sites more fixed and permanent than outdoor timber-harvesting operations. Ibid. See also 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 48008 (1990). This reading is reinforced by the Industrial Stormwater Rule’s definition of discharges associated with industrial activity as discharges “from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.” 40 CFR § 122.26(b)(14). This language lends support to the EPA’s claim that the regulation does not cover temporary, outdoor logging installations. It was reasonable for the Agency to conclude that the conveyances at issue are “directly related” only to the harvesting of raw materials, rather than to “manufacturing,” “processing,” or “raw materials storage areas.” See Oxford Diet. 1066 (manufacturing is “mak[ing] (something) on a large scale using machinery”); id., at 1392 (processing is “perform[ing] a series of mechanical or chemical operations on (something) in order to change or preserve it”). In addition, even if logging as a general matter is a type of economic activity within, the regulation’s scope, a reasonable interpretation of the regulation could still require the discharges to be related in a direct way to operations “at an industrial plant” in order to be subject to NPDES permitting. NEDC resists this conclusion, noting that elsewhere in the Industrial Stormwater Rule the EPA has required NPDES permits for stormwater discharges associated with other types of outdoor economic activity. See § 122.26(b)(14)(iii) (mining); § 122.26(b)(14)(v) (landfills receiving industrial waste); § 122.26(b)(14)(x) (large construction sites). The EPA reasonably could conclude, however, that these types of activities tend to be more fixed and permanent than timber-harvesting operations are and have a closer connection to traditional industrial sites. In light of the language of the regulation just discussed, moreover, the inclusion of these types of economic activity in the Industrial Stormwater Rule need not be read to mandate that all stormwater discharges related to these activities fall within the rule, just as the inclusion of logging need not be read to extend to all discharges from logging sites. The regulation’s reach may be limited by the requirement that the discharges be “directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.” § 122.26(b)(14). It is well established	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 32 ]	sc_adminaction
KELLEY, COMMISSIONER, SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT v. JOHNSON No. 74-1269. Argued December 8, 1975 Decided April 5, 1976 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blacicmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 249. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 249. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Patrick A. Sweeney argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Hoivard E. Packman. Leonard D. Wexler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard T. Haefeli. James vanR. Springer filed a brief for the International Brotherhood of Police Officers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York originally dismissed respondent’s complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a regulation promulgated by petitioner limiting the length of a policeman’s hair. On respondent’s appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that judgment was reversed, and on remand the District Court took testimony and thereafter granted the relief sought by respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari, 421 U. S. 987 (1975), to consider the constitutional doctrine embodied in the rulings of the Court of Appeals. We reverse. I In 1971 respondent’s predecessor, individually and as president of the Suffolk County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, brought this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against petitioner’s predecessor, the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department. The Commissioner had promulgated Order No. 71-1, which established hair-grooming standards applicable to male members of the police force. The regulation was directed at the style and length of hair, sideburns, and mustaches; beards and goatees were prohibited, except for medical reasons; and wigs conforming to the regulation could be worn for cosmetic reasons. The regulation was attacked as violative of respondent patrolman's right of free expression under the First Amendment and his guarantees of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it was “not based upon the generally_accepted standard of grooming in the community” and. .placed “an undue restriction” upon his activities therein. ' The Court of Appeals held that cases characterizing the uniformed civilian services as “para-military,” and sustaining hair regulations on that basis, were not soundly grounded historically. It said that the fact that a police force is organized “with a centralized administration and a disciplined rank and file for efficient conduct of its affairs" did not foreclose respondent’s claim, but instead bore only upon “the existence of a legitimate state interest to be reasonably advanced by the regulation.” Dwen v. Barry, 483 F. 2d 1126, 1128-1129 (1973). The Court of Appeals went on to decide that “choice of personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual’s personal liberty” and is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It further held that the police department had “failed to make the slightest showing of the relationship between its regulation and the legitimate interest it sought to promote.” Id., at 1130-1131. On the basis of this reasoning it concluded that neither dismissal nor summary judgment in the District Court was appropriate, since the department “has the burden of establishing a genuine public need for the regulation.” Id., at 1131. Thereafter the District Court, under the compulsion of the remand from the Court of Appeals, took testimony on the question of whether or not there was a “genuine public need.” The sole witness was the Deputy Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department, petitioner’s subordinate, who testified as to the police department’s concern for the safety of the patrolmen, and the need for some standards of uniformity in appearance. The District Court held that “[n]o proof” was offered to support any claim of the need for the protection of the police officer, and that while “proper grooming” is an ingredient of a good police department’s esprit de corps, petitioner's standards did not establish a public need because they ultimately reduced to “[ujniformity for uniformity’s sake.” The District Court granted the relief prayed for by respondent, and on petitioner's appeal that judgment was affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals. 508 F. 2d 836. I h-I Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This section affords not only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of “liberty,” but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restrictions by the State. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 572 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring). The “liberty” interest claimed by respondent here, of course, is distinguishable from the interests protected by the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). Each of those cases involved a substantial claim of infringement on the individual's freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life. But whether the citizenry at large has some sort of “liberty” interest within the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal appearance is a question on which this Court's cases offer little, if any, guidance. We can, nevertheless, assume an affirmative answer for purposes of deciding this case, because we find that assumption insufficient to carry the day for respondent's claim. Respondent has sought the protectiqn.:Jíf-_the- Fourteenth Amendment, not as a member of the citizenry at large, but on the contrary as an employee of the police department of Suffolk County, a subdivision o'f the State of New York. While the Court of Appeals made passing reference to this distinction, it was thereafter apparently ignored. We think, however, it is highly significant. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968), after noting that state employment may not be conditioned on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights, the Court stated that “[a]t the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” More recently, we have sustained comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon activities of both federal and state employees lying at the core of the First Amendment. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973). If such state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First Amendment, there is surely even more room fór restrictive regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The hair-length regulation here touches respondent as ax) employee of the county and, more particularly, as a policeman. Respondent's employer has, in accordance wijth its well-established duty to keep the peace, placed myriad demands upon the members of the police force, duties which have no counterpart with respect to the public at large. Respondent must wear a standard uniform, specific in each detail. When in uniform he must salute the flag. He may not take an active role in local political affairs by way of being a party delegate or contributing or soliciting political contributions. He may not smoke in public. All of these and other regulations of the Suffolk County Police Department infringe on respondent's freedom of choice in personal matters, and it was apparently the view of the Court of Appeals that the burden is on the State to prove a “genuine public need” for each and every one of these regulations. This view was based upon the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the “unique judicial deference” accorded by the judiciary to regulation of members of the military was inapplicable because there was no historical or functional justification for the characterization of the police as “para-military.” But the conclusion that such cases are inapposite, however correct, in no way detracts from the deference due Suffolk County’s choice of an organizational structure for its police force. Here the county has chosen a mode of organization which it undoubtedly deems the most efficient in enabling its police to carry out the duties assigned to them under state and local law. Such a choice necessarily gives weight to the overall need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity. The county’s choice of an organizational structure, therefore, does not depend for its constitutional validity on any doctrine of historical prescription. Nor, indeed, has respondent made any such claim. His argument does not challenge the constitutionality of the organizational structure, but merely asserts that the present hair-length regulation infringes his asserted liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe, however, that the hair-length regulation cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be rather considered in the context of the county’s chosen mode of organization for its police force. The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State’s police power, and virtually all state and local governments employ a uniformed police force to aid in the accomplishment of that purpose. Choice of organization, dress, and equipment for law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State’s police power. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168-170 (1944); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 246-247 (1941). Having recognized in other contexts the wide latitude accorded the government in the “dispatch of its own internal affairs,” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961), we think Suffolk County’s police regulations involved here are entitled to similar weight. Thus the question is not, as the Court of Appeals conceived it to be, whether the State can “establish” a “genuine public need” for the specific regulation. It is whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county’s method of organizing its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100-101 (1947); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 30-31, 35-37 (1905). We think the answer here is so clear that the District Court was quite right in the first instance to have dismissed respondent’s complaint. Neither this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position to weigh the policy arguments in favor of and against a rule regulating hairstyles as a part of regulations governing a uniformed civilian service. The constitutional issue to be decided by these courts is whether petitioner’s determination that such regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded “arbitrary,” and therefore a deprivation of respondent’s “liberty” interest in freedom to choose his own hairstyle. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488 (1955). The overwhelming majority of state and local police of the present day are uniformed. This fact itself testifies to the recognition by those who direct those operations, and by the people of the States and localities who directly or indirectly choose such persons, that similarity in appearance of police officers is desirable. This choice may be based on a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the members of the public, or a desire for the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police force itself. Either one is a sufficiently rational justification for regulations so as to defeat respondent’s claim based on the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals relied on Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), and amicus in its brief in support of respondent elaborates an argument based on the language in Garrity that “policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.” Id., at 500. Garrity, of course, involved the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964). Certainly its language cannot be taken to suggest that the claim of a member of a uniformed civilian service based on the “liberty” interest protected by the Fourteenth-Amaiidment must necessarily be treated for constitutional purposes the same as a similar claim by a member of the general public. The regulation challenged_here — did- not violate any right guaranteed respondent by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in reversing the District Court’s original judgment dismissing the action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Order No. 71-1 (1971), amending Chapter 2 of the Rules and Procedures, Police Department, County of Suffolk, N. Y., provided: “2/75.0 Members of the Force and Department shall be neat and clean at all times while on duty. Male personnel shall comply with the following grooming standards unless excluded by the Police Commissioner due to special assignment: “2/75.1 HAIR: Hair shall be neat, clean, trimmed, and present a groomed appearance. Hair will not touch the ears or the collar except the closely cut hair on the back of the neck. Hair in front will be groomed so that it does not fall below the band of properly worn headgear. In no case will the bulk or length of the hair interfere with the proper wear of any authorized headgear. The acceptability of a member’s hair style will be based upon the criteria in this paragraph and not upon the style in which he chooses to wear his hair. “2/75.2 SIDEBURNS: If an individual chooses to wear sideburns, they will be neatly trimmed and tapered in the same manner as his haircut. Sideburns will not extend below the lowest part of the exterior ear opening, will be of even width (not flared), and will end with a clean-shaven horizontal line. "2/75.3 MUSTACHES: A short and neatly trimmed mustache may be worn, but shall not extend over the top of the upper lip or beyond the corners of the mouth. “2/75.4 BEARDS & GOATEES: The face will be clean-shaven other than the wearing of the acceptable mustache or sideburns. Beards and goatees are prohibited, except that a Police Surgeon may grant a waiver for the wearing of a beard for medical reasons with the approval of the Police Commissioner. When a Surgeon prescribes that a member not shave, the beard will be kept trimmed symmetrically and all beard hairs will be kept trimmed so that they do not protrude more than one-half inch from the skin surface of the face. “2/75.5 WIGS: Wigs or hair pieces will not be worn on duty in uniform except for cosmetic reasons to cover natural baldness or physical disfiguration. If under these conditions, a wig or hair piece is worn, it will conform to department standards.” App. 57-58. E. g., Stradley v. Andersen, 478 F. 2d 188 (CA8 1973); Greenwald v. Frank, 40 App. Div. 2d 717, 337 N. Y. S. 2d 225 (1972), aff’d without opinion, 32 N. Y. 2d 862, 299 N. E. 2d 895 (1973). The District Court’s dismissal was based on cases upholding the discretionary power of the military and National Guard to regulate a soldier’s hair length. See Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F. 2d 908 (CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 941 (1970); Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F. 2d 1102 (CA2), cert. dismissed, 396 U. S. 976 (1969). 483 F. 2d, at 1130. While it recognized the distinction between citizens and uniformed employees of police and fire departments, the Court of Appeals stated that the individual’s status did not bear on the existence of his right but on whether the right was outweighed by a legitimate state interest. Id., at 1130 n. 9. On remand, the complaint was appropriately amended to reflect the interim renumbering and modification of the hair-grooming regulation. The former sections 2/75.0-2/75.3, see n. 1, supra, were modified to provide as follows: “Members of the Force will be neat and clean at all times while on duty. Male personnel will comply with the following grooming standards unless excluded by the Police Commissioner due to special assignments: “A. Hair will be neat, clean, trimmed and present a groomed appearance. Hair will not go below the ears or the collar except the closely cut hair on the back of the neck. Pony tails are prohibited. In no case will the bulk or length of the hair interfere with the proper wear of any authorized headgear. “B. If a member chooses to wear sideburns, they will be neatly trimmed. Sideburns will not extend below the lowest part of the ear. Sideburns shall not be flared beyond 2" in width and will end with a clean-shaven horizontal line. Sideburns shall not connect with the mustache. “C. A neatly trimmed mustache may be worn.” Rules and Procedures, Police Department, County of Suffolk, N. Y., 2/2.16 (hereinafter Rules and Procedures). Sections 2/75.4-2/75.5, see n. 1, supra, were simply renumbered as 2/2.16, subdivisions D and E, respectively. Deputy Commissioner Rapp’s testimony on remand was directed to the regulation as modified. For present purposes, the differences are immaterial. Illustrating one safety problem, Rapp showed that an assailant could throw an officer off balance by grabbing his hair from the rear and levering against the patrolman’s back. After noting that the prohibition against “ponytails” was thus a proper one, the District Court stated: “The remainder of 2/2.16A, however, bears no relationship to safety but rather related to hair styling. The potential danger in hairdress is the ability of the offender to grip the hair and hold the fate of the police officer in his hand. Bulk and length of the hair is not regulated except as it interferes with ‘the proper wear of any authorized headgear.’ Thus the regulation would permit bulky and lengthy hair on the top of the head, thereby presenting the very problem that was demonstrated. In the remaining subdivisions, sideburns, mustaches and wigs are regulated and beards are barred. No proof was offered to support any claim of the need for the protection of the police officer in the pertinent regulations.” Pet. for Cert. 7a. The District Court’s findings with respect to the relationship between morale and grooming standards are as follows: “The high morale of police personnel is a matter of grave concern to the department. Proper grooming is an ingredient of the esprit de corps of a good law enforcement organization. The self-esteem generated in the individual and the respect commanded from the public it serves promotes [sic] the efficiency of the organization’s work. However, with the exception of the general requirement that hair, sideburns and mustaches be neatly trimmed, the regulations do not provide standards for proper grooming. Rather, the standards do nothing more than demand uniformity. Uniformity for uniformity’s sake does not establish a public need. Defendant offered no proof that beards, goatees, hair styles that extend below the ears or collar, or sideburns that extend below the lowest part of the ear or beyond 2" in width and do not end with a cleanshaven horizontal line affect the morale of the members of the police department or earn the disrespect of the public.” Id., at 7a-8a. While noting Rapp’s testimony that uniformity was required for identification, the District Court stated: “It would appear, however, that the uniform (issued by the department) supplies the necessary identification for police work.” Rules and Procedures 4/1.0-4/1.3. Id., 6/2.2. Id., 2/2.5. Id., 2/5.1. See, e. g., id., 2/14.0 et seq. (Code of Ethics). The Court of Appeals itself found that while there was no desire on the part of local governments like Suffolk County to create a “military force,” “[t]he use of such organization evolved as a 'practical administrative solution . . . 483 F. 2d, at 1128-1129 (emphasis added).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
MEYER, COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE, et al. v. GRANT et al. No. 87-920. Argued April 25, 1988 Decided June 6, 1988 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Maurice G. Knaizer, First Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Duane Woodard, Attorney General, pro se, Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, and Charles B. Howe and Billy J. Shuman, Deputy Attorneys General. William C. Danks argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by James J. Sandman, Steven R. Shapiro, and John A. Powell; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In Colorado the proponents of a new law, or an amendment to the State Constitution, may have their proposal placed on the ballot at a general election if they can obtain enough signatures of qualified voters on an “initiative petition” within a 6-month period. One section of the state law regulating the initiative process makes it a felony to pay petition circu-lators. The question in this case is whether that provision is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the statute abridged appellees’ right to engage in political speech and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. We agree. I Colorado is one of several States that permits its citizens to place propositions on the ballot through an initiative process. Colo. Const., Art. V, §1; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§1-40-101 to 1-40-119 (1980 and Supp. 1987). Under Colorado law, proponents of an initiative measure must submit the measure to the State Legislative Council and the Legislative Drafting Office for review and comment. The draft is then submitted to a three-member title board, which prepares a title, submission clause, and summary. After approval of the title, submission clause, and summary, the proponents of the measure then have six months to obtain the necessary signatures, which must be in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total number of voters who cast votes for all candidates for the Office of Secretary of State at the last preceding general election. If the signature requirements are met, the petitions may be filed with the Secretary of State, and the measure will appear on the ballot at the next general election. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§1-40-101 to 1-40-105 (1980 and Supp. 1987). State law requires that the persons who circulate the approved drafts of the petitions for signature be registered voters. Colo. Const., Art. V, §1(6). Before the signed petitions are filed with the Secretary of State, the circulators must sign affidavits attesting that each signature is the signature of the person whose name it purports to be and that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, each person signing the petition is a registered voter. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-40-109 (Supp. 1987). The payment of petition circulators is punished as a felony. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-40-110 (1980), n. 1, supra. Appellees are proponents of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would remove motor carriers from the jurisdiction of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. In early 1984 they obtained approval of a title, submission clause, and summary for a measure proposing the amendment and began the process of obtaining the 46,737 signatures necessary to have the proposal appear on the November 1984 ballot. Based on their own experience as petition circulators, as well as that of other unpaid circulators, appel-lees concluded that they would need the assistance of paid personnel to obtain the required number of signatures within the allotted time. They then brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of Colorado seeking a declaration that the statutory prohibition against the use of paid circulators violates their rights under the First Amendment. After a brief trial, the District Judge entered judgment upholding the statute on alternative grounds. First, he concluded that the prohibition against the use of paid circula-tors did not burden appellees’ First Amendment rights because it did not place any restraint on their own expression or measurably impair efforts to place initiatives on the ballot. The restriction on their ability to hire paid circulators to speak for them was not significant because they remained ,free to use their money to employ other spokesmen who could advertise their cause. Second, even assuming, arguendo, that the statute burdened appellees’ right to engage in political speech, the District Judge concluded that the burden was justified by the State’s interests in (a) making sure that an initiative measure has a sufficiently broad base to warrant its placement on the ballot, and (b) protecting the integrity of the initiative process by eliminating a temptation to pad petitions. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the District Court. After granting rehearing en banc, however, the court reversed. The en banc majority concluded that the record demonstrated that petition circulators engage in the communication of ideas while they are obtaining signatures and that the available pool of circu-lators is necessarily smaller if only volunteers can be used. “Thus, the effect of the statute’s absolute ban on compensation of solicitors is clear. It impedes the sponsors’ opportunity to disseminate their views to the public. It curtails the discussion of issues that normally accompanies the circulation of initiative petitions. And it shrinks the size of the audience that can be reached.... In short, like the campaign expenditure limitations struck down in Buckley, the Colorado statute imposes a direct restriction which ‘necessarily reduces the quantity of expression _’ Buckley [v. Valeo], 424 U. S. [1,] 19 [(1976)].” 828 F. 2d 1446, 1453-1454 (CA10 1987) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals then rejected the State’s asserted justifications for the ban. It first rejected the suggestion that the ban was necessary either to prevent fraud or to protect the public from circulators that might be too persuasive: “The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection is not dependent on ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’ NAACP v. Button, [371 U. S. 415, 445 (1963)]. ‘The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind .... In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.’ Thomas v. Collins, [323 U. S. 516, 545 (1945)] (Jackson, J., concurring).” Id., at 1455. The court then rejected the suggestion that the ban was needed to assure that the initiative had a broad base of public support because, in the court’s view, that interest was adequately protected by the requirement that the petition be signed by five percent of the State’s eligible voters. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument advanced by a dissenting judge that since Colorado had no obligation to afford its citizens an initiative procedure, it could impose this condition on its use. Having decided to confer the right, the State was obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution because, unlike Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328 (1986), which involved only commercial speech, this case involves “core political speech.” II We fully agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that this case involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 45 (1976). The First Amendment provides that Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The Fourteenth Amendment makes that prohibition applicable to the State of Colorado. As we explained in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940), “[t]he freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are/arhong the fundamental personal rights and liberties which' are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.” Unquestionably, whether the trucking industry should be deregulated in Colorado is a matter of societal concern that appellees have a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal sanctions. “The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” Id., at 101-102. The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 (1957). Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment. The circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change. Although a petition circulator may not have to persuade potential signatories that a particular proposal should prevail to capture their signatures, he or she will át least have to persuade them that the matter is one deserving of the public scrutiny and debate that would attend its consideration by the whole electorate. This will in almost every case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and why its advocates support it. Thus, the circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive- communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as “core political speech.” The refusal to permit appellees to pay petition circulators restricts political expression in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey appellees’ message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion. The Colorado Supreme Court has itself recognized that the prohibition against the use of paid circulators has the inevitable effect of reducing the total quantum of speech on a public issue. When called upon to consider the constitutionality of the statute at issue here in another context in Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P. 2d 760, 763 (1983), that court described the burden the statute imposes on First Amendment expression: “As mentioned previously, statutes that limit the power of the people to initiate legislation are to be closely scrutinized and narrowly construed. That the statute in question acts as a limitation on ACORN’s ability to circulate petitions cannot be doubted. We can take judicial notice of the fact that it is often more difficult to get people to work without compensation than it is to get them to work for pay. As the dissent in State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 94, [104,] 508 P. 2d 149[, 155] (1973) (Rosellini, J., dissenting), observed: “ ‘The securing of sufficient signatures to place an initiative measure on the ballot is no small undertaking. Unless the proponents of a measure can find a layge number of volunteers, they must hire persons to solicit signatures or abandon the project. I think we can take judicial notice of the fact that the solicitation of signatures on petitions is work. It is time-consuming and it is tiresome — so much so that it seems that few but the young have the strength, the ardor and the stamina to engage in it, unless, of course, there is some remuneration.’” Appellants argue that even if the statute imposes some limitation on First Amendment expression, the burden is permissible because other avenues of expression remain open to appellees and because the State has the authority to impose limitations on the scope of the state-created right to legislate by initiative. Neither of these arguments persuades us that the burden imposed on appellees’ First Amendment rights is acceptable. That appellees remain free to employ other means to disseminate their ideas does not take their speech through petition circulators outside the bounds of First Amendment protection. Colorado’s prohibition of paid petition circulators restricts access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one communication. That it leaves open “more burdensome” avenues of communication, does not relieve its burden on First Amendment expression. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986). Cf. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 296, 299 (1981). The First Amendment protects appellees’ right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing. Relying on Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328 (1986), Colorado contends that because the power of the initiative is a state-created right, it is free to impose limitations on the exercise of that right. That reliance is misplaced. In Posadas the Court concluded that “the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling. ” Id., at 345-346. The Court of Appeals quite properly pointed out the logical flaw in Colorado’s attempt to draw an analogy between the present case and Posadas. The decision in Posadas does not suggest that “the power to ban casino gambling entirely would include the power to ban public discussion of legislative proposals regarding the legalization and advertising of casino gambling.” 828 F. 2d, at 1456. Thus it does not support the position that the power to ban initiatives entirely includes the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions. And, as the Court of Appeals further observed: “Posadas is inapplicable to the present case for a more fundamental reason — the speech restricted in Posadas was merely ‘commercial speech which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction ....”’ Posadas, [478 U. S., at 340] (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976)). . . . Here, by contrast, the speech at issue is ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms,’ Buckley, 424 U. S., at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (1968))— an area of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith.” Id., at 1456-1457. We agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the statute trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is “at its zenith.” For that reason the burden that Colorado must overcome to justify this criminal law is well-nigh insurmountable. HH t-H 1 — I We are not persuaded by the State s arguments that the prohibition is justified by its interest in making sure that an initiative has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the ballot, or by its interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the former interest is adequately protected by the requirement that no initiative proposal may be placed on the ballot unless the required number of signatures has been obtained. Id., at 1455. The State’s interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the State has failed to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appel-lees’ ability to communicate their message in order to meet its concerns. The Attorney General has argued that the petition circulator has the duty to verify the authenticity of signatures on the petition and that compensation might provide the circulator with a temptation to disregard that duty. No evidence has been offered to support that speculation, however, and we are not prepared to assume that a professional circulator — whose qualifications for similar future assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence and integrity — is any more likely to accept false signatures than a volunteer who is motivated entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the ballot. Other provisions of the Colorado statute deal expressly with the potential danger that circulators might be tempted to pad their petitions with false signatures. It is a crime to forge a signature on a petition, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-13-106 (1980), to make false or misleading statements relating to a petition, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-40-119 (Supp. 1987), or to pay someone to sign a petition, Colo. Rev. Stat. §1-40-110 (1980). Further, the top of each page of the petition must bear a statement printed in red ink warning potential signatories that it is a felony to forge a signature on a petition or to sign the petition when not qualified to vote and admonishing signatories not to sign the petition unless they have read and understand the proposed initiative. These provisions seem adequate to the task of minimizing the risk of improper conduct in the circulation of a petition, especially since the risk of fraud or corruption, or the appearance thereof, is more remote at the petition stage of an initiative than at the time of balloting. Cf. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790 (1978) (“The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue”). “[LJegislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 50. That principle applies equally to “the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation.” Id., at 48. The Colorado statute prohibiting the payment of petition circulators imposes a burden on political expression that the State has failed to justify. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Its judgment is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. Colorado Rev. Stat. § 1-40-110 (1980) provides: “Any person, corporation, or association of persons who directly or indirectly pays to or receives from or agrees to pay to or receive from any other person, corporation, or association of persons any money or other thing of value in consideration of or as an inducement to the circulation of an initiative or referendum petition or in consideration of or as an inducement to the signing of any such petition commits a class 5 felony and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1-105, C. R. S. (1973).” Although the November 1984 election in which appellees had first hoped to present their proposal to the citizens of Colorado is long past, we note that this action is not moot. Neither party suggests that the action is moot. Rather, both assert that the controversy between them is one capable of repetition, yet evading review. We may exercise jurisdiction over this action if “ ‘(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U. S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam.), quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam). We are satisfied that both elements are present in this ease. Colorado grants the proponents of an initiative only six months in which to obtain the necessary signatures. The likelihood that a proponent could obtain a favorable ruling within that time, much less act upon such a ruling in time to obtain the needed signatures, is slim at best. Further, the initiative sought by appellees has not been enacted. Appellees, however, continue to advocate its adoption and plan future attempts to obtain the signatures necessary to place the issue on the ballot. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the same controversy will recur between these two parties, yet evade meaningful judicial review. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 774-775 (1978); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969). In support of its conclusion that the prohibition against the use of paid circulators did not inhibit the placement of initiative measures on the general ballot, the District Court compared Colorado’s experience with that of 20 States which have an initiative process but do not prohibit paid circu-lators. It noted that since 1910, Colorado has ranked fourth in the total number of initiatives placed on the ballot. This statistic, however, does not reject the possibility that even more petitions would have been successful if paid circulators had been available, or, more narrowly, that these appellees would have had greater success if they had been able to hire extra help. As the District Court itself noted, “the evidence indicates [appellees’] purposes would be enhanced if the corps of volunteers could be augmented by a cadre of paid, workers.” 741 F. 2d 1210, 1212 (CA10 1984) (Appendix). The record in this case demonstrates that the circulation of appellees’ petition involved political speech. Paul Grant, one of the appellees, testified about the nature of his conversations with voters in an effort to get them to sign the petition: “[T]he way we go about soliciting signatures is that you ask the person— first of all, you interrupt the person in their walk or whatever they are doing. You intrude upon them and ask them, “Are you a registered voter? “If you get a yes, then you tell the person your purpose, that you are circulating a petition to qualify the issue on the ballot in November, and tell them what about, and they say, ‘Please let me know a little bit more.’ Typically, that takes maybe a minute or two, the process of explaining to the persons that you are trying to put the initiative on the ballot to exempt Colorado transportation from [State Public Utilities Commission] regulations. “Then you ask the person if they will sign your petition. If they hesitate, you try to come up with additional arguments to get them to sign. “[We try] to explain the not just deregulation in this industry, that it would free up to industry from being cartelized, allowing freedom from moral choices, price competition for the first time, lowering price costs, which we estimate prices in Colorado to be $150 million a year in monopoly benefits. We have tried to convey the unfairness and injustice of the existing system, where some businesses are denied to go into business simply to protect the profits of existing companies. “We tried to convey the unfairness of the existing system, which has denied individuals the right to start their own businesses. In many cases, individuals have asked for an authority and been turned down because huge corporate organizations have opposed them.” 2 Record 10-11. This testimony provides an example of advocacy of political reform that falls squarely within the protections of the First Amendment. Our recognition that the solicitation of signatures for a petition involves protected speech follows from our recognition in Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), that the solicitation of charitable contributions often involves speech protected by the First Amendment and that any attempt to regulate solicitation would necessarily infringe that speech: “Prior authorities, therefore, clearly establish that charitable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests — communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes —that are within the protection of the First Amendment. Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.” Id., at 632. Paul Grant testified that compensation resulted in more people being “able and willing” to circulate petitions. 2 Record 19-20. As he succinctly concluded: “[M]oney either enables people to forego leaving a job, or enables them to have a job.” Ibid. Colorado also seems to suggest that it is permissible to mute the voices of those who can afford to pay petition circulators. See Brief for Appellants 17. “But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 48-49 (1976). The concern that persons who can pay petition cir-culators may succeed in getting measures on the ballot when they might otherwise have failed cannot defeat First Amendment rights. As we said in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 790-791, paid advocacy “may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.... ‘[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .’ Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48-49. . . . [T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.” Cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45, 60 (1982) (“The State’s fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech”). Section 1-40-106 provides in part: “(1) At the top of each page of every initiative or referendum petition shall be printed, in plain red letters no smaller than the impression of ten-point, boldface type, the following: “WARNING “IT IS A FELONY: “For anyone to sign any initiative or referendum petition with any name other than his or her own or to knowingly sign his or her name more than once for the same measure or to sign such petition when not a qualified elector. “DO NOT SIGN THIS PETITION UNLESS YOU ARE A “QUALIFIED ELECTOR “TO BE A QUALIFIED ELECTOR, YOU MUST BE: “(a) At least eighteen years of age. “(b) A citizen of the United States. “(c) A resident of the state of Colorado and have resided in the state at least thirty-two days. “(d) A resident of the precinct in which you live for at least thirty-two days. “Do not sign this petition unless you have read or had read to you the proposed initiative or referred measure or the summary of an initiated measure in its entirety and understand its meaning.”	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
BELL v. BURSON, DIRECTOR, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY No. 5586. Argued March 23, 1971 Decided May 24, 1971 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, HarlaN, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., and Black and Blackmun, JJ., concurred in the result. Elizabeth Roediger Rindskopf argued the cause for petitioner pro hac vice. With her on the brief was Howard Moore, Jr. Dorothy T. Beasley, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Courtney Wilder Stanton, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Georgia’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provides that the motor vehicle registration and driver’s license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he posts security to cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties in reports of the accident. The administrative hearing conducted prior to the suspension excludes consideration of the motorist’s fault or liability for the accident. The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s contention that the State’s statutory scheme, in failing before suspending the licenses to afford him a hearing on the question of his fault or liability, denied him due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment: the court held that “ ‘Fault’ or ‘innocence’ are completely irrelevant factors.” 121 Ga. App. 418, 420, 174 S. E. 2d 235, 236 (1970). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. App. 27. We granted certiorari. 400 U. S. 963 (1970). We reverse. Petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia communities. On Sunday afternoon, November 24, 1968, petitioner was involved in an accident when five-year-old Sherry Capes rode her bicycle into the side of his automobile. The child’s parents filed an accident report with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety indicating that their daughter had suffered substantial injuries for which they claimed damages of $5,000. Petitioner was thereafter informed by the Director that unless he was covered by a liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident he must file a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 or present a notarized release from liability, plus proof of future financial responsibility, or suffer the suspension of his driver’s license and vehicle registration. App. 9. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing before the Director asserting that he was not liable as the accident was unavoidable, and stating also that he would be severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by a suspension of his licenses. A hearing was scheduled but the Director informed petitioner that “[t]he only evidence that the Department can accept and consider is: (a) was the petitioner or his vehicle involved in the accident; (b) has petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or (c) does petitioner come within any of the exceptions of the'Law.” App. 11. At the administrative hearing the Director rejected petitioner’s proffer of evidence on liability, ascertained that petitioner was not within any of the statutory exceptions, and gave petitioner 30 days to comply with the security requirements or suffer suspension. Petitioner then exercised his statutory right to an appeal de novo in the Superior Court. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-602 (1958). At that hearing, the court permitted petitioner to present his evidence on liability, and, although the claimants were neither parties nor witnesses, found petitioner free from fault. As a result, the Superior Court ordered “that the petitioner’s driver’s license not be suspended . . . [until] suit is filed against petitioner for the purpose of recovering damages for the injuries sustained by the child . . . .” App. 15. This order was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in overruling petitioner’s constitutional contention. If the statute barred the- issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or who did not post security, the statute would not, under our cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 (1933); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352 (1932); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). It does not follow, however, that the amendment also permits the Georgia statutory scheme where not all motorists, but rather only motorists involved in accidents, are required to post security under penalty of loss of the licenses. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S. 583 (1926). Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Goldberg V. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a “right” or a “privilege.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) (disqualification for unemployment compensation); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956) (discharge from public employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958) (denial of a tax exemption); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra (withdrawal of welfare benefits). See also Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 385-386 (1908); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941). We turn then to the nature of the procedural due process which must be afforded the licensee on the question of his fault or liability for the accident. A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. Thus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 270-271, with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). Clearly, however, the inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in litigation between the parties involved in the accident. Since the only purpose of the provisions before us is to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility, of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee. The State argues that the licensee's interest in avoiding the suspension of his licenses is outweighed by countervailing governmental interests and therefore that this procedural due process need not be afforded him. We disagree. In cases where there is no reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against a licensee, Georgia’s interest in protecting a claimant from the possibility of an unrecoverable judgment is not, within the context of the State's fault-oriented scheme, a justification for denying the process due its citizens. Nor is additional expense occasioned by the expanded hearing sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement. “ 'While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process.’ ” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (SDNY 1968). The main thrust of Georgia’s argument is that it need not provide a hearing on liability because fault and liability are irrelevant to the statutory scheme. We may assume that were this so, the prior administrative hearing presently provided by the State would be “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). But “[i]n reviewing state action in this area . . . we look to substance, not to bare form, to determine whether constitutional minimums have been honored.” Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96, 106-107 (1963) (concurring opinion). And looking to the operation of the State’s statutory scheme, it is clear that liability, in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of responsibility, plays a crucial role in the Safety Responsibility Act. If prior to suspension there is a release from liability executed by the injured party, no suspension is worked by the Act. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-606 (1958). The same is true if prior to suspension there is an adjudication of nonliability. Ibid. Even after suspension has been declared, a release from liability or an adjudication of nonliability will lift the suspension. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-607 (Supp. 1970). Moreover, other of the Act’s exceptions are developed around liability-related concepts. Thus, we are not dealing here with a no-fault scheme. Since the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State’s determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing. The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be “meaningful,” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965), and “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, at 313. It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard. Finally, we reject Georgia’s argument that if it must afford the licensee an inquiry into the question of liability, that determination, unlike the determination of the matters presently considered at the administrative hearing, need not be made prior to the suspension of the licenses. While “[m]any controversies have raged about . . . the Due Process Clause,” ibid., it is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case” before the termination becomes effective. Ibid. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S., at 152-156; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971). We hold, then, that under Georgia’s present statutory scheme, before the State may deprive petitioner of his driver’s license and vehicle registration it must provide a forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident. We deem it inappropriate in this case to do more than lay down this requirement. The alternative methods of compliance are several. Georgia may decide merely to include consideration of the question at the administrative hearing now provided, or it may elect to postpone such a consideration to the de novo judicial proceedings in the Superior Court. Georgia may decide to withhold suspension until adjudication of an action for damages brought by the injured party. Indeed, Georgia may elect to abandon its present scheme completely and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other States. Finally, Georgia may reject all of the above and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The area of choice is wide: we hold only that the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on liability of the nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Blackmun concur in the result. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-601 et seq. (1958). In pertinent part the Act provides that anyone involved in an accident must submit a report to the Director of Public Safety. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-604 (Supp. 1970). Within 30 days of the receipt of the report the Director “shall suspend the license and all registration certificates and all registration plates of the operator and owner of any motor vehicle in any manner involved in the accident unless or until the operator or owner has previously furnished or immediately furnishes security, sufficient ... to satisfy any judgments for damages or injuries resulting . . . and unless such operator or owner shall give proof of financial responsibility for the future as is required in section 92A-615.1. . . Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-605 (a) (Supp. 1970). Section 92A-615.1 (Supp. 1970) requires that “such proof must be maintained for a one-year period.” Section 92A-605 (a) works no suspension, however, (1) if the owner or operator had in effect at the time of the accident a liability insurance policy or other bond, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-605 (c) (Supp. 1970); (2) if the owner or operator qualifies as a self-insurer, ibid.; (3) if only the owner or operator was injured, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-606 (1958); (4) if the automobile was legally parked at the time of the accident, ibid.; (5) if as to an owner, the automobile was being operated without permission, ibid.; or (6) “[i]f, prior to the date that the Director would otherwise suspend license and registration ... there shall be filed with the Director evidence satisfactory to him that the person who would otherwise have to file security has been released from liability or been finally adjudicated not to be liable or has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments . . . .” Ibid. Questions concerning the requirement of proof of future financial responsibility are not before us. The State’s brief, at 4, states: “The one year period for proof of financial responsibility has now expired, so [petitioner] would not be required to file such proof, even if the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed.” Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-602 (1958) provides: “The Director shall administer and enforce the provisions of this Chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its administration and shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the Director under the provisions of this Chapter. Such hearing need not be a matter of record and the decision as rendered by the Director shall be final unless the aggrieved person shall desire an appeal, in which case he shall have the right to enter an appeal to the superior court of the county of his residence, by notice to the Director, in the same manner as appeals are entered from the court of ordinary, except that the appellant shall not be required to post any bond nor pay the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person desires, the appeal may be heard by the judge at term or in chambers or before a jury at the first term. The hearing on the appeal shall be de novo, however, such appeal shall not act as a supersedeas of any orders or acts of the Director, nor shall the appellant be allowed to operate or permit a motor vehicle to be operated in violation of any suspension or revocation by the Director, while such appeal is pending. A notice sent by registered mail shall be sufficient service on the Director that such appeal has been entered.” Petitioner stated at oral argument that while “it would be possible to raise [an equal protection argument] ... we don’t raise this point here.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. See, e. g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245 (1947); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U. S. 594 (1950). The various alternatives include compulsory insurance plans, public or joint public-private unsatisfied judgment funds, and assigned claims plans. See R. Keeton & J. O’Connell, After Cars Crash (1967).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF OREGON, et al. v. SMITH No. 86-946. Argued December 8, 1987 Decided April 27, 1988 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 674. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. William F. Gary, Deputy Attorney General of Oregon, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Virginia L, Linder, Solicitor General, Michael D. Reynolds, Assistant Solicitor General, and Christine Chute, Assistant Attorney General. Suanne Lovendahl argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Together with No. 86-947, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon, et al. v. Black, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by Charles A. Horsky, David H. Remes, John A. Powell, and David B. Goldstein; for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Amy Adelson, Lois C. Waldman, and Marc D. Stem; and for the Native American Church of North America et al. by Walter R. Echo-Hawk and Steven C. Moore. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents are drug and alcohol abuse rehabilitation counselors who were discharged after they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, during a religious ceremony of the Native American Church. Both applied for and were denied unemployment compensation by petitioner Employment Division. The Oregon Supreme Court held that this denial, although proper as a matter of Oregon law, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In reaching that conclusion the state court attached no significance to the fact that the possession of peyote is a felony under Oregon law punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years. Because we are persuaded that the alleged illegality of respondents’ conduct is relevant to the constitutional analysis, we granted certiorari, 480 U. S. 916 (1987), and now vacate the judgments and remand for further proceedings. I Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black were employed by the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT), a nonprofit corporation that provides treatment for alcohol and drug abusers. Both were qualified to be counselors, in part, because they had former drug and alcohol dependencies. As a matter of policy, ADAPT required its recovering counselors to abstain from the use of alcohol and illegal drugs. ADAPT terminated respondents’ employment because they violated that policy. As to each of them the violation consisted of a single act of ingesting a small quantity of peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church. It is undisputed that respondents are members of that church, that their religious beliefs are sincere, and that those beliefs motivated the “misconduct” that led to their discharge. Both respondents applied for unemployment compensation. Petitioner Employment Division considered the applications in a series of administrative hearings and appeals, at the conclusion of which it determined that the applications should be denied. Petitioner considered and rejected respondents’ constitutional claim and concluded that they were ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related “misconduct.” The Oregon Court of Appeals, considering the constitutional issue en banc, reversed the Board’s decisions. The Oregon Supreme Court granted the State’s petitions for review in both cases to consider whether the denial of benefits violated the Oregon Constitution or the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The cases were argued together, but the court issued separate opinions, fully analyzing the constitutional issues only in Smith. In accordance with its usual practice, the court first addressed the Oregon constitutional issue. The court concluded: “Under the Oregon Constitution’s freedom of religion provisions, claimant has not shown that his right to worship according to the dictates of his conscience has been infringed upon by the denial of unemployment benefits. We do not imply that a governmental rule or policy disqualifying a person from employment or from public services or benefits by reason of conduct that rests on a religious belief or a religious practice could not impinge on the religious freedom guaranteed by Article I, sections 2 and 3. Nor do we revive a distinction between constitutional ‘rights’ and ‘privileges.’ But here it was not the government that disqualified claimant from his job for ingesting peyote. And the rule denying unemployment benefits to one who loses his job for what an employer permissibly considers misconduct, conduct incompatible with doing the job, is itself a neutral rule, as we have said. As long as disqualification by reason of the religiously based conduct is peculiar to the particular employment and most other jobs remain open to the worker, we do not believe that the state is denying the worker a vital necessity in applying the ‘misconduct’ exception of the unemployment compensation law.” 301 Ore. 209, 216, 721 P. 2d 445, 448-449 (1986). Turning to the federal issue, the court reasoned that our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981), required it to hold that the denial of unemployment benefits significantly burdened respondent’s religious freedom. The court also concluded that the State’s interest in denying benefits was not greater in this case than in Sherbert or Thomas. This conclusion rested on the premise that the Board had erroneously relied on the State’s interest in proscribing the use of dangerous drugs rather than just its interest in the financial integrity of the compensation fund. Whether the state court believed that it was constrained by Sherbert and Thomas to disregard the State’s law enforcement interest, or did so because it believed petitioner to have conceded that the legality of respondent’s conduct was not in issue, is not entirely clear. The relevant paragraph in the court’s opinion reads as follows: “Nor is the state’s interest in this case a more ‘overriding’ or ‘compelling’ interest than in Sherbert and Thomas. The Board found that the state’s interest in proscribing the use of dangerous drugs was the compelling interest that justified denying the claimant unemployment benefits. However, the legality of ingesting peyote does not affect our analysis of the state’s interest. The state’s interest in denying unemployment benefits to a claimant discharged for religiously motivated misconduct must be found in the unemployment compensation statutes, not in the criminal statutes proscribing the use of peyote. The Employment Division concedes that ‘the commission of an illegal act is not, in and of itself, grounds for disqualification from unemployment benefits. ORS 657.176(3) permits disqualification only if a claimant commits a felony in connection with work.... [T]he legality of [claimant’s] ingestion of peyote has little direct bearing on this case.” 301 Ore., at 218-219, 721 P. 2d, at 450. The court noted that although the possession of peyote is a crime in Oregon, such possession is lawful in many jurisdictions. In its opinion in Black, the court rejected the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the case should be remanded for factual findings on the religious character of respondent’s peyote use. Although the referee’s findings concerning the use of peyote were somewhat sparse, the court found them sufficient to support the conclusions that the Native American Church is a recognized religion, that peyote is a sacrament of that church, and that respondent’s beliefs were sincerely held. The court noted that other courts had acknowledged the role of peyote in the Native American Church and quoted at length from a decision of the California Supreme Court. This extensive quotation from an opinion that explains why the religious use of peyote is permitted in California raises the question whether the Oregon court might reach a similar conclusion. II Respondents contend that the sacramental use of small quantities of peyote in the Native American Church is comparable to the sacramental use of small quantities of alcohol in Christian religious ceremonies. Even though the State may generally prohibit the use of hallucinogenic drugs and alcohol for recreational purposes and strictly regulate their use for medicinal purposes, respondents assert that the Constitution requires some measure of accommodation for religious use. Alternatively, they argue that Oregon’s general prohibition against the possession of peyote is not applicable to its use in a genuine religious ceremony. Even if peyote use is a crime in Oregon, since the State does not administer its unemployment compensation program for law enforcement purposes, they conclude that our decisions in Sherbert and Thomas require that they be awarded benefits. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with respondents’ conclusion, but it did not endorse all of their reasoning. The state court appears to have assumed, without specifically deciding, that respondents’ conduct was unlawful. That assumption did not influence the court’s disposition of the cases because, as a matter of state law, the commission of an illegal act is not itself a ground for disqualifying a discharged employee from benefits. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the illegality of an employee’s misconduct is irrelevant to the analysis of the federal constitutional claim. For if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct. There is no absolute “constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part of all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S., at 409-410. On three separate occasions, however, we have held that an employee who is required to choose between fidelity to religious belief and cessation of work may not be denied unemployment compensation because he or she is faithful to the tenets of his or her church. As we explained in Sherbert: “Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.” Id., at 404. In Sherbert, as in Thomas and Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 142 (1987), the conduct that gave rise to the termination of employment was perfectly legal; indeed, the Court assumed that it was immune from state regulation. The results we reached in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie might well have been different if the employees had been discharged for engaging in criminal conduct. We have held that bigamy may be forbidden, even when the practice is dictated by sincere religious convictions. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879). If a bigamist may be sent to jail despite the religious motivation for his misconduct, surely a State may refuse to pay unemployment compensation to a marriage counselor who was discharged because he or she entered into a bigamous relationship. The protection that the First Amendment provides to “ ‘legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion,’” see Hobbie, 480 U. S., at 142 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972)) (emphasis added), does not extend to conduct that a State has validly proscribed. Neither the Oregon Supreme Court nor this Court has confronted the question whether the ingestion of peyote for sincerely held religious reasons is a form of conduct that is protected by the Federal Constitution from the reach of a State’s criminal laws. It may ultimately be necessary to answer that federal question in this case, but it is inappropriate to do so without first receiving further guidance concerning the status of the practice as a matter of Oregon law. A substantial number of jurisdictions have exempted the use of peyote in religious ceremonies from legislative prohibitions against the use and possession of controlled substances. If Oregon is one of those States, respondents’ conduct may well be entitled to constitutional protection. On the other hand, if Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, and if that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon. If that is the case, the State is free to withhold unemployment compensation from respondents for engaging in work-related misconduct, despite its religious motivation. Thus, paradoxical as it may first appear, a necessary predicate to a correct evaluation of respondents’ federal claim is an understanding of the legality of their conduct as a matter of state law. Relying on the fact that Oregon statutes prohibit the possession of peyote, see Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1987), rather than its use, and the further fact that the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the ingestion of a controlled substance into the bloodstream did not constitute “possession” within the meaning of the predecessor statute, State v. Downes, 31 Ore. App. 1183, 572 P. 2d 1328 (1977), respondents argue that their ceremonial use of the drug was not unlawful. The Attorney General of the State advises us that this argument is without merit. But in the absence of a definitive ruling by the Oregon Supreme Court we are unwilling to disregard the possibility that the State’s legislation regulating the use of controlled substances may be construed to permit peyotism or that the State’s Constitution may be interpreted to protect the practice. That the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinions in these cases not only noted that other States “exempt the religious use of peyote through caselaw,” but also quoted extensively from a California opinion that did so, lends credence to the possibility that this conduct may be lawful in Oregon. Because we are uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon, it is not now appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). The possibility that respondents’ conduct would be unprotected if it violated the State’s criminal code is, however, sufficient to counsel against, affirming the state court’s holding that the Federal Constitution requires the award of benefits to these respondents. If the Oregon Supreme Court’s holding rests on the unstated premise that respondents’ conduct is entitled to the same measure of federal constitutional protection regardless of its criminality, that holding is erroneous. ■ If, on the other hand, it rests on the unstated premise that the conduct is not unlawful in Oregon, the explanation of that premise would make it more difficult to distinguish our holdings in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie. We therefore vacate the judgments of the Oregon Supreme Court and remand the cases for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” U. S. Const., Arndt. 1. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 475.992(4)(a), 161.605(2) (1987); see 301 Ore. 209, 219, n. 2, 721 P. 2d 445, 450, n. 2 (1986) (quoted in n. 10, infra). This policy reflected ADAPT’s treatment philosophy that successful recovery from addiction requires complete abstinence from the use of alcohol and nonprescription drugs. The policy also served to assure that counselors were appropriate role models for their clients. ADAPT’s policy statement on drug and alcohol abuse provided, in pertinent part: “POLICY STATEMENT ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG USE BY EMPLOYEES “In keeping with our drug-free philosophy of treatment, and our belief in the disease concept of alcoholism, and associated complex issues involved in both alcoholism and drug addiction, we require the following of our employees: “1. Use of an illegal drug or use of prescription drugs in a nonprescribed manner is grounds for immediate termination from employment. “3. Any use of alcohol by recovering staff will not be allowed, and is grounds for immediate disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Use shall be defined as any ingestion of an alcoholic beverage, in any situation.” App. 11. Raising identical legal issues and presenting almost identical facts, these two cases proceeded in tandem through state administrative proceedings and through the state courts. They were consolidated upon order of this Court when the State’s petitions for certiorari were granted. 480 U. S. 916 (1987). Each respondent requested a hearing after his application for benefits was denied because he had been discharged for work-related misconduct. After separate hearings, a referee decided that both respondents were entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. In Black’s case, the referee held that his ingestion of peyote was “an isolated incident of poor judgment” rather than misconduct. App. 3-5. In Smith’s ease, the referee concluded that because “there is no evidence in the hearing record to indicate that granting benefits to claimants whose unemployment is caused by adherence to religious beliefs would have any significant impact on the trust fund, it cannot be held that the alleged State interest warrants interference with the claimant’s freedom of religion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 86-946, p. A25. On review the Employment Appeals Board disagreed with the referee and concluded that benefits should be denied in both cases. As to Smith, the Board ruled that the State had shown a compelling state interest in denying benefits. That interest was “in the proscription of illegal drugs, not merely in the burden upon the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund.” Id., at A19-A20. In Black’s case the Board merely reversed the referee’s finding that Black had not been fired for misconduct without reaching the First Amendment issue. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 86-947, pp. A23-A24. Oregon Rev. Stat. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987) provides that “[a]n individual shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits... if... the individual... [h]as been discharged for misconduct connected with work.” Oregon Admin. Rule 471-30-038(3) (1987) provides: “Under the provisions of ORS 657.176(2)(a) and (b), misconduct is a wilful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an employe. An act that amounts to a wilful disregard of an employer’s interest, or recurring negligence which demonstrates wrongful intent is misconduct. Isolated instances of poor judgment, good faith errors, unavoidable accidents, absences due to illness or other physical or mental disabilities, or mere inefficiency resulting from'lack of job skills or experience are not misconduct for purposes of denying benefits under ORS 657.176.” In Black’s case the majority concluded that the denial of benefits to persons who were discharged for engaging in a religious act constituted a substantial burden on free exercise rights- that was not justified by the State’s interest in protecting the Unemployment Compensation Fund from depletion and remanded for further factual findings on the religious nature of respondent’s conduct. The dissenting judges expressed the opinion that because the ingestion of peyote was prohibited by Oregon law respondent had no protectible constitutional right on which to base his claim. 75 Ore. App. 735, 707 P. 2d 1274 (1985). Smith’s case was reversed and remanded for further consideration in light of the decision in Black. 75 Ore. App. 764, 709 P. 2d 246 (1985). Article I of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part: “Section 2. Freedom of worship. All men shall be secure in the Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. “Section 3. Freedom of religious opinion. No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.” The Oregon Supreme Court stated in Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Ore. 611, 614, 625 P. 2d 123, 126 (1981): “The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.” See also Linde, E Pluribus — Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 178-179 (1984). The court commented in a footnote: “Under ORS 475.992(4) and OAR 855-80-020, the possession of peyote is a crime. Peyote (Lophophora williamsii) is a cactus that ‘contains a number of active alkaloids with varying properties; the chief hallucinogen among these alkaloids is mescaline.’ Note, Hallucinogens, 68 Colum L Rev 521, 525 (1968). The Oregon Court of Appeals, construing a previous statute, has held that religious users of peyote are not exempt from criminal sanctions. State v. Soto, 21 Or App 794, 537 P2d 142 (1975), cert den 424 US 955 (1976). The federal government and several states exempt the religious use of peyote through caselaw, statute or regulation. See State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz App 27, 504 P2d 950 (1973), cert den 417 US 946 (1974); People v. Woody, 61 Cal 2d 716, 40 Cal Rptr 69, 394 P2d 813 (1964); Whitehorn v. State, 561 P2d 539 (Okla Crim App 1977); 21 CPR § 1307.31 (1985); Iowa Code Ann § 204.204(8) (1986); NM Stat Ann § 30-31-6(D) (1980); SD Comp Laws Ann § 34-20B-14(17) (1977); Tex Stat Ann 4476-15 § 4.11 (1976).” 301 Ore., at 219, n. 2, 721 P. 2d, at 450, n. 2. 301 Ore. 221, 225-227, 721 P. 2d 451, 453-454 (1986), quoting People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-721, 394 P. 2d 813, 817-818 (1964): “ ‘Peyote, as we shall see, plays a central role in the ceremony and practice of the Native American Church, a religious organization of Indians. Although the church claims no official prerequisites to membership, no written membership rolls and no recorded theology, estimates of its membership range from 30,000 to 250,000, the wide variance deriving from differing definitions of a “member.” As the anthropologists have ascertained through conversations with members, the theology of the church combines certain Christian teachings with the belief that peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and that those who partake of peyote enter into direct contact with God. “ ‘Peyotism discloses a long history. A reference to the religious use of peyote in Mexico appears in Spanish historical sources as early as 1560. Peyotism spread from Mexico to the United States and Canada; American anthropologists describe it as well established in this country during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Today, Indians of many tribes practice Peyotism. Despite the absence of recorded dogma, the several tribes follow surprisingly similar ritual and theology; the practices of Navajo members in Arizona practically parallel those of adherents in California, Montana, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Saskatchewan. “ ‘The “meeting,” a ceremony marked by the sacramental use of peyote, composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion. The meeting convenes in an enclosure and continues from sundown Saturday to sunrise Sunday. To give thanks for the past good fortune or find guidance for future conduct, a member will “sponsor” a meeting and supply to those who attend both the peyote and the next morning’s breakfast. The “sponsor,” usually but not always the “leader,” takes charge of the meeting; he decides the order of events and the amount of peyote to be consumed. Although the individual leader exercises an absolute control of the meeting, anthropologists report a striking uniformity of its ritual. “ ‘A meeting connotes a solemn and special occasion. Whole families attend together, although children and young women participate only by their presence. Adherents don their finest clothing, usually suits for men and fancy dresses for the women, but sometimes ceremonial Indian costumes. At the meeting the members pray, sing, and make ritual use of drum, fan, eagle bone, whistle, rattle and prayer cigarette, the symbolic emblems of their faith. The central event, of course, consists of the use of peyote in quantities sufficient to produce an hallucinatory state. “ ‘At an early but fixed stage in the ritual the members pass around a ceremonial bag of peyote buttons. Each adult may take four, the customary number, or take none. The participants chew the buttons, usually with some difficulty because of extreme bitterness; later, at a set time in the ceremony any member may ask for more peyote; occasionally a member may take as many as four more buttons. At sunrise on Sunday the ritual ends; after a brief outdoor prayer, the host and his family serve breakfast. Then the members depart. By morning the effects of the peyote disappear; the users suffer no after-effects. “ ‘Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to bread and wine in certain Christian churches, it is more than a sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers are directed to it much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, to use peyote for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious. Members of the church regard peyote also as a “teacher” because it induces a feeling of brotherhood with other members; indeed it enables the participant to experience the Deity. Finally, devotees treat peyote as a “protector.” Much as a Catholic carries his medallion, an Indian G. I. often wears around his neck a beautifully beaded pouch containing one large peyote button’ ” (footnote omitted). In Sherbert v. Verner, the appellant was discharged because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. When the petitioner in Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Security Div. 450 U. S. 707 (1981), was required to work on turrets for military tanks, he terminated his employment because his religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the production of war materials. And in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., the appellant’s religion precluded work between sundown on Friday and sundown on Saturday; she was discharged because she therefore could not work all of her scheduled shifts. The distinction between the absolute constitutional protection against governmental regulation of religious beliefs on the one hand, and the qualified protection against the regulation of religiously motivated conduct, on the other, was carefully explained in our opinion in Sherbert: “The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303. Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573; cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233. On the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for ‘even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.’ Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 603. The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e. g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14. “Plainly enough, appellant’s conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation.” 374 U. S., at 402-403. See nn. 10 and 11, supra. See 21 CFR § 1307.31 (1987) (exempting use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church); Iowa Code § 204.204 (8) (1985) (same); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-6(D) (1987) (exempting use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies by bona fide religious organizations); S. D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-14(17) (1987) (exempting sacramental use of peyote in services of the Native American Church); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 4476-15 § 4.11 (Supp. 1988) (exempting use of peyote by Native American Church members with not less than 25% Indian blood in bona fide religious ceremonies). These authorities were cited by the Oregon Supreme Court. See n. 10, supra. At the time Downes was decided, Oregon law proscribed both the use and possession of controlled substances. In 1977, the Oregon Legislature passed the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.005 et seq. (1987), which repealed the use and possession statutes discussed in Downes and enacted a provision that addresses only the possession of controlled substances. See § 475.992(4). Our concern, of course, is not with whether some fact unique to respondents’ cases bars their prosecution, but with whether Oregon law provides a general exemption from the scope of its criminal laws for the religious use of peyote. See n. 10, supra	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT v. RUCKER et al. No. 00-1770. Argued February 19, 2002 — Decided March 26, 2002 James A. Feldman argued the cause for the federal petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Barbara C. Biddle, Howard S. Scher, Richard A. Hauser, Carole W. Wilson, Howard M. Schmeltzer, and Harold J. Rennett. Gary T Lafayette argued the cause for the private petitioners in No. 00-1781. With him on the briefs was Susan I Kumagai. Paul Renne argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were James Donato, Whitty Somvichian, and John Murcko Together with No. 00-1781, Oakland Housing Authority et al. v. Rucker et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities et al. by William F. Maher and Robert A. Graham; for the International City-County Management Association et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A Samp. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP et al. by Catherine M. Bishop and Julie E. Levin; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Mark J. Lopez, Steven R. Shapiro, and Alan L. Schlosser; for the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. by Bruce D. Sokler and Fernando R. Laguarda; for the Pennsylvania Association of Resident Councils et al. by Eileen D. Yacknin and Richard S. Matesic; and for Lawrence Lessig et al. by David T. Goldberg and Daniel N. Abrahamson. Kirsten D. Levingston, Michael S. Feldberg, and Martha F. Davis filed a brief for the Coalition to Protect Public Housing et al. as amici curiae. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. With drug dealers “increasingly imposing a reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-income housing tenants,” Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. § 5122, 102 Stat. 4301, 42 U. S. C. § 11901(3) (1994 ed.). The Act, as later amended, provides that each “public housing agency shall utilize leases which ... provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(Z)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Petitioners say that this statute requires lease terms that allow a local public housing authority to evict a tenant when a member of the tenant’s household or a guest engages in drug-related criminal activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or had reason to know, of that activity. Respondents say it does not. We agree with petitioners. Respondents are four public housing tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA). Paragraph 9(m) of respondents’ leases, tracking the language of § 1437d(Z)(6), obligates the tenants to “assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant’s control, shall not engage in... [a]ny drug-related criminal activity on or near the premise[s].” App. 59. Respondents also signed an agreement stating that the tenant “understand^] that if I or any member of my household or guests should violate this lease provision, my tenancy may be terminated and I may be evicted.” Id., at 69. In late 1997 and early 1998, OHA instituted eviction proceedings in state court against respondents, alleging violations of this lease provision. The complaint alleged: (1) that the respective grandsons of respondents William Lee and Barbara Hill, both of whom were listed as residents on the leases, were caught in the apartment complex parking lot smoking marijuana; (2) that the daughter of respondent Pearlie Rucker, who resides with her and is listed on the lease as a resident, was found with cocaine and a crack cocaine pipe three blocks from Rucker’s apartment; and (3) that on three instances within a 2-month period, respondent Herman Walker’s caregiver and two others were found with cocaine in Walker’s apartment. OHA had issued Walker notices of a lease violation on the first two occasions, before initiating the eviction action after the third violation. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations administering § 1437d(Z)(6) require lease terms authorizing evictions in these circumstances. The HUD regulations closely track the statutory language, and provide that “[i]n deciding to evict for criminal activity, the [public housing authority] shall have discretion to consider all of the circumstances of the case . . . .” 24 CFR § 966.4( ¿)(5)(i) (2001). The agency made clear that local public housing authorities’ discretion to evict for drug-related activity includes those situations in which “[the] tenant did not know, could not foresee, or could not control behavior by other occupants of the unit.” 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567 (1991). After OHA initiated the eviction proceedings in state court, respondents commenced actions against HUD, OHA, and OHA’s director in United States District Court. They challenged HUD’s interpretation of the statute under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), arguing that 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(Z)(6) does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of so-called “innocent” tenants, and, in the alternative, that if it does, then the statute is unconstitutional. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining OHA from “terminating the leases of tenants pursuant to paragraph 9(m) of the ‘Tenant Lease’ for drug-related criminal activity that does not occur within the tenant’s apartment unit when the tenant did not know of and had no reason to know of, the drug-related criminal activity.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 00-1770, pp. 165a-166a. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 1437d(Z)(6) unambiguously permits the eviction of tenants who violate the lease provision, regardless of whether the tenant was personally aware of the drug activity, and that the statute is constitutional. See Rucker v. Davis, 203 F. 3d 627 (CA9 2000). An en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and affirmed the District Court’s grant of the preliminary injunction. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F. 3d 1113 (2001). That court held that HUD’s interpretation permitting the eviction of so-called “innocent” tenants “is inconsistent with Congressional intent and must be rejected” under the first step of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). 237 F. 3d, at 1126. We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 976 (2001), 534 U. S. 813 (2001), and now reverse, holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(Z)(6) unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity. That this is so seems evident from the plain language of the statute. It provides that “[e]ach public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . provide that . . . any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(Z)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The en banc Court of Appeals thought the statute did not address “the level of personal knowledge or fault that is required for eviction.” 237 F. 3d, at 1120. Yet Congress’ decision not to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term “any” to modify “drug-related criminal activity,” precludes any knowledge requirement. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 609 (1989). As we have explained, “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Thus, any drug-related activity engaged in by the specified persons is grounds for termination, not just drug-related activity that the tenant knew, or should have known, about. The en banc Court of Appeals also thought it possible that “under the tenant’s control” modifies not just “other person,” but also “member%-of the tenant’s household” and “guest.” 237 F. 3d, at 1120. The court ultimately adopted this reading, concluding that the statute prohibits eviction where the tenant, “for a lack of knowledge or other reason, could not realistically exercise control over the conduct of a household member or guesti” Id., at 1126. But this interpretation runs counter to basic rules of grammar. The disjunctive “or” means that the qualification applies only to “other person.” Indeed, the view that “under the tenant’s control” modifies everything coming before it in the sentence would result in the nonsensical reading that the statute applies to “a public housing tenant . . . under the tenant’s control.” HUD offers a convincing explanation for the grammatical imperative that “under the tenant’s control” modifies only “other person”: “by ‘control,’ the statute means control in the sense that the tenant has permitted access to the premises.” 66 Fed. Reg. 28781 (2001). Implicit in the terms “household member” or “guest” is that access to the premises has been granted by the tenant. Thus, the plain language of § 1437d(Z)(6) requires leases that grant public housing authorities the discretion to terminate tenancy without regard to the tenant’s knowledge of the drug-related criminal activity. Comparing §1437d(Z)(6) to a related statutory provision reinforces the unambiguous text. The civil forfeiture statute that makes all leasehold interests subject to forfeiture when used to commit drug-related criminal activities expressly exempts tenants who had no knowledge of the activity: “[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph ... by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7) (1994 ed.). Because this forfeiture provision was amended in the same Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 that created 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(Z)(6), the en banc Court of Appeals thought Congress “meant them to be read consistently” so that the knowledge requirement should be read into the eviction provision. 237 F. 3d, at 1121-1122. But the two sections deal with distinctly different matters. The “innocent owner” defense for drug forfeiture cases was already in existence prior to 1988 as part of 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7). All that Congress did in the 1988 Act was to add leasehold interests to the property interests that might be forfeited under the drug statute. And if such a forfeiture action were to be brought against a leasehold interest, it would be subject to the pre-existing “innocent owner” defense. But 42 U. S. C. § 1437(d)(Z)(6), with which we deal here, is a quite different measure. It is entirely reasonable to think that the Government, when seeking to transfer private property to itself in a forfeiture proceeding, should be subject to an “innocent owner defense,” while it should not be when acting as a landlord in a public housing project. The forfeiture provision shows that Congress knew exactly how to provide an “innocent owner” defense. It did not provide one in § 1437d(Z)(6). The en banc Court of Appeals next resorted to legislative history. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that reference to legislative history is inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous. 237 F. 3d, at 1123. Given that the en banc Court of Appeals’ finding of textual ambigúity is wrong, see supra, at 130-132, there is no need to consult legislative history. Nor was the en banc Court of Appeals correct in concluding that this plain reading of the statute leads to absurd results. The statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease provision. Instead, it entrusts that decision to the local public housing authorities, who are in the best position to take account of, among other things, the degree to which the housing project suffers from “rampant drug-related or violent crime,” 42 U. S. C. § 11901(2) (1994 ed. and Supp. V), “the seriousness of the offending action,” 66 Fed. Reg., at 28803, and “the extent to which the leaseholder has ... taken all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action,” ibid. It is not “absurd” that a local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of the drug-related activity. Such “no-fault” eviction is a common “incident of tenant responsibility under normal landlord-tenant law and practice.” 56 Fed. Reg., at 51567. Strict liability maximizes deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 14 (1991). And, of course, there is an obvious reason why Congress would have permitted local public housing authorities to conduct no-fault evictions: Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who “cannot control drug crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the project.” 56 Fed. Reg., at 51567. With drugs leading to “murders, muggings, and other forms of violence against tenants,” and to the “deterioration of the physical environment that requires substantial government expenditures,” 42 U. S. C. § 11901(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V), it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to “provide public and other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs,” § 11901(1) (1994 ed.). In another effort to avoid the plain meaning of the statute, the en banc Court of Appeals invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance. But that canon “has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.” United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001). “Any other conclusion, while purporting to be an exercise in judicial restraint, would trench upon the legislative powers vested in Congress by Art. I, §1, of the Constitution.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 680 (1985). There are, moreover, no “serious constitutional doubts” about Congress’ affording local public housing authorities the discretion to conduct no-fault evictions for drug-related crime. Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 314, n. 9 (1993) (emphasis deleted). The en banc Court of Appeals held that HUD’s interpretation “raise[s] serious questions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” because it permits “tenants to be deprived of their property interest without any relationship to individual wrongdoing.” 237 F. 3d, at 1124-1125 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 224-225 (1961); Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482 (1915)). But both of these cases deal with the acts of government as sovereign. In Scales, the United States criminally charged the defendant with knowing membership in an organization that advocated the overthrow of the United States Government. In Danaher, an Arkansas statute forbade discrimination among customers of a telephone company. The situation in the present cases is entirely different. The government is not attempting to criminally punish or civilly regulate respondents as members of the general populace. It is instead acting as a landlord of property that it owns, invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and which Congress has expressly required. Scales and Danaher east no constitutional doubt on such actions. The Court of Appeals sought to bolster its discussion of constitutional doubt by pointing to the fact that respondents have a property interest in their leasehold interest, citing Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982). This is undoubtedly true, and Greene held that an effort to deprive a tenant of such a right without proper notice violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But, in the present cases, such deprivation will occur in the state court where OHA brought the unlawful detainer action against respondents. There is no indication that notice has not been given by OHA in the past, or that it will not be given in the future. Any individual factual disputes about whether the lease provision was actually violated can, of course, be resolved in these proceedings. We hold that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S., at 842. Section 1437d(Z)(6) requires lease terms that give local public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related activity. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. In February 1998, OHA dismissed the unlawful detainer action against Rucker, after her daughter was incarcerated, and thus no longer posed a threat to other tenants. The regulations require public housing authorities (PHAs) to impose a lease obligation on tenants: “To assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant’s control, shall not engage in: “(A) Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA’s public housing premises by other residents or employees of the PHA, or “(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises. “Any criminal activity in violation of the preceding sentence shall be cause for termination of tenancy, and for eviction from the unit.” 24 CFR §966.4(f)(12)(i) (2001). Respondents Rucker and Walker also raised Americans with Disabilities Act claims that are not before this Court. And all of the respondents raised state-law claims against OHA that are not before this Court. Even if it were appropriate to look at legislative history, it would not help respondents. The en banc Court of Appeals relied on two passages from a 1990 Senate Report on a proposed amendment to the eviction provision. 237 F. 3d, at 1123 (citing S. Rep. No. 101-316 (1990)). But this Report was commenting on language from a Senate version of the 1990 amendment, which was never enacted. The language in the Senate version, which would have imposed a different standard of cause for eviction for drug-related crimes than the unqualified language of § 1437d(Z)(6), see 136 Cong. Rec. 15991, 16012 (1990) (reproducing S. 566, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 521(f)'and 714(a) (1990)), was rejected at Conference. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-943, p. 418 (1990). And, as the dissent from the en banc decision below explained, the passages may plausibly be read as a mere suggestion about how local public housing authorities should exercise the “wide discretion to evict tenants connected with drug-related criminal behavior” that the lease provision affords them. 237 F. 3d, at 1134 (Sneed, J., dissenting). Respondents also cite language from a House Report commenting on the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 983. Brief for Respondents 15-16. For the reasons discussed supra, at 132 and this page, legislative history concerning forfeiture provisions is not probative on the interpretation of § 1437d(Z)(6). A 1996 amendment to § 1437d(Z)(6), enacted five years after HUD issued its interpretation of the statute, supports our holding. The 1996 amendment expanded the reach of § 1437d(Z)(6), changing the language of the lease provision from applying to activity taking place “on or near” the public housing premises, to activity occurring “on or off” the public housing premises. See Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, 19(a)(2), 110 Stat. 836. But Congress, “presumed to be aware” of HUD’s interpretation rejecting a knowledge requirement, made no other change to the statute. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978). For the reasons discussed above, no-fault eviction, which is specifically authorized under § 1437d(Z)(6), does not violate § 1437d(Z)(2), which prohibits public housing authorities from including “unreasonable terms and conditions [in their leases].” In addition, the general statutory provision in the latter section cannot trump the clear language of the more specific § 1437d(Z)(6). See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 524-526 (1989). The en banc Court of Appeals cited only the due process constitutional concern. Respondents raise two others: the First Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause. We agree with Judge O’Scannlain, writing for the panel that reversed the injunction, that the statute does not raise substantial First Amendment or Excessive Fines Clause concerns. Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360 (1988), forecloses respondents’ claim that the eviction of unknowing tenants violates the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association. See 203 F. 3d 627, 647 (2000). And termination of tenancy “is neither a cash nor an in-kind payment imposed by and payable to the government” and therefore is “not subject to analysis as an excessive fine.” Id., at 648.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 63 ]	sc_adminaction
ABBOTT LABORATORIES et al. v. GARDNER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, et al. No. 39. Argued January 16, 1967. Decided May 22, 1967. Gerhard A. Gesell argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, Jerome M. Feit and William W. Goodrich. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1962 Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (52 Stat. 1040, as amended by the Drug Amendments of 1962, 76 Stat. 780, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq.), to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the “established name” of the drug “prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug,” on labels and other printed material, § 502 (e)(1)(B), 21 U. S. C. § 352 (e)(1)(B). The “established name” is one designated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to § 502(e)(2) of the Act, 21 U. S. C. § 352 (e) (2); the “proprietary name” is usually a trade name under which a particular drug is marketed. The underlying purpose of the 1962 amendment was to bring to the attention of doctors and patients the fact that many of the drugs sold under familiar trade names are actually identical to drugs sold under their “established” or less familiar trade names at significantly lower prices. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, exercising authority delegated to him by the Secretary, 22 Fed. Reg. 1051, 25 Fed. Reg. 8625, published proposed regulations designed to implement the statute, 28 Fed. Reg. 1448. After inviting and considering comments submitted by interested parties the Commissioner promulgated the following regulation for the “efficient enforcement” of the Act, § 701 (a), 21 U. S. C. § 371 (a): “If the label or labeling of a prescription drug bears a proprietary name or designation for the drug or any ingredient thereof, the established name, if such there be, corresponding to such proprietary name or designation, shall accompany each appearance of such proprietary name or designation.” 21 CFR §1.104 (g)(1). A similar rule was made applicable to advertisements for prescription drugs, 21 CFR § 1.105 (b)(1). The present action was brought by a group of 37 individual drug manufacturers and by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, of which all the petitioner companies are members, and which includes manufacturers of more than 90% of the Nation’s supply of prescription drugs. They challenged the regulations on the ground that the Commissioner exceeded his authority under the statute by promulgating an order requiring labels, advertisements, and other printed matter relating to prescription drugs to designate the established name of the particular drug involved every time its trade name is used anywhere in such material. The District Court, on cross motions for summary judgment, granted the declaratory and injunctive reliéf sought, finding that the statute did not sweep so broadly as to permit the Commissioner’s “every time” interpretation. 228 F. Supp. 855. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed without reaching the merits of the case. 352 F. 2d 286. It held first that under the statutory scheme provided by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act pre-enforcement review of these regulations was unauthorized and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court. Second, the Court of Appeals held that no “actual case or controversy” existed and, for that reason, that no relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-704 (1964 ed., Supp. II), or under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, was in any event available. Because of the general importance of the question, and the apparent conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 360 F. 2d 677, which we also review today, post, p. 158, we granted certiorari. 383 U. S. 924. I. The first question we consider is whether Congress by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act intended to forbid pre-enforcement review of this sort of regulation promulgated by the Commissioner. The question is phrased in terms of “prohibition” rather than “authorization” because a survey of our cases shows that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441; Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229; Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U. S. 180; Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579; Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184; Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367. Early cases in which this type of judicial review was entertained, e. g., Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U. S. 177; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, have been reinforced by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,” 5 U. S. C. § 702, so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency discretion, 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a). The Administrative Procedure Act provides specifically not only for review of “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute” but also for review of “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U. S. C. § 704. The legislative material elucidating that seminal act manifests a congressional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions, and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the Administrative Procedure Act’s “generous review provisions” must be given a “hospitable” interpretation. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48, 51; see United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U. S. 426, 433-435; Brownell v. Tom We Shung, supra; Heikkila v. Barber, supra. Again in Rusk v. Cort, supra, at 379-380, the Court held that only upon a showing of “clear and convincing evidence” of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. See also Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 336-359 (1965). Given this standard, we are wholly unpersuaded that the statutory scheme in the food and drug area excludes this type of action. The Government relies on no explicit statutory authority for its argument that pre-enforcement review is unavailable, but insists instead that because the statute includes a specific procedure for such review of certain enumerated kinds of regulations, not encompassing those of the kind involved here, other types were necessarily meant to be excluded from any pre-enforcement review. The issue, however, is not so readily resolved; we must go further and inquire whether in the context of the entire legislative scheme the existence of that circumscribed remedy evinces a congressional purpose to bar agency action not within its purview from judicial review. As a leading authority in this field has noted, “The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent.” Jaffe, supra, at 357. In this case the Government has not demonstrated such a purpose; indeed, a study of the legislative history shows rather conclusively that the specific review provisions were designed to give an additional remedy and not to cut down more traditional channels of review. At the time the Pood, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was under consideration, in the late 1930’s, the Administrative Procedure Act had not yet been enacted, the Declaratory Judgment Act was in its infancy, and the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions under the equity power was unclear. It was these factors that led to the form the statute ultimately took. There is no evidence at all that members of Congress meant to preclude traditional avenues of judicial relief. Indeed, throughout the consideration of the various bills submitted to deal with this issue, it was recognized that “There is always an appropriate remedy in equity in cases where an administrative officer has exceeded his authority and there is no adequate remedy of law,... [and that] protection is given by the so-called Declaratory Judgments Act... H. R. Rep. No. 2755, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 8. It was specifically brought to the attention of Congress that such methods had in fact been used in the food and drug area, and the Department of Justice, in opposing the enactment of the special-review procedures of § 701, submitted a memorandum which was read on the floor of the House stating: “As a matter of fact, the entire subsection is really unnecessary, because even without any express provision in the bill for court review, any citizen aggrieved by any order of the Secretary, who contends that the order is invalid, may test the legality of the order by bringing an injunction suit against the Secretary, or the head of the Bureau, under the general equity powers of the court.” 83 Cong. Rec. 7892 (1938). The main issue in contention was whether these methods of review were satisfactory. Compare the majority and minority reports on the review provisions, H. R. Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), both of which acknowledged that traditional judicial remedies were available, but disagreed as to the need for additional procedures. The provisions now embodied in a modified form in § 701 (f) were supported by those who feared the life-and-death power given by the Act to the executive officials, a fear voiced by many members of Congress. The supporters of the special-review section sought to include it in the Act primarily as a method of reviewing agency factual determinations. For example, it was argued that the level of tolerance for poisonous sprays on apple crops, which the Secretary of Agriculture had recently set, was a factual matter, not reviewable in equity in the absence of a special statutory review procedure. Some congressmen urged that challenge to this type of determination should be in the form of a de novo hearing in a district court, but the Act as it was finally passed compromised the matter by allowing an appeal on a record with a “substantial evidence” test, affording a considerably more generous judicial review than the “arbitrary and capricious” test available in the traditional injunctive suit. A second reason for the special procedure was to provide broader venue to litigants challenging such technical agency determinations. At that time, a suit against the Secretary was proper only in the District of Columbia, an advantage that the Government sought to preserve. The House bill, however, originally authorized review in any district court, but in the face of a Senate bill allowing review only in the District of Columbia, the Conference Committee reached the compromise preserved in the present statute authorizing review of such agency actions by the courts of appeals. Against this background we think it quite apparent that the special-review procedures provided in § 701 (f), applying to regulations embodying technical factual determinations, were simply intended to assure adequate judicial review of such agency decisions, and that their enactment does not manifest a congressional purpose to eliminate judicial review of other kinds of agency action. This conclusion is strongly buttressed by the fact that the Act itself, in § 701 (f)(6), states, “The remedies provided for in this subsection shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies provided by law.” This saving clause was passed over by the Court of Appeals without discussion. In our view, however, it bears heavily on the issue, for if taken at face value it would foreclose the Government’s main argument in this case. The Government deals with the clause by arguing that it should be read as applying only to review of regulations under the sections specifically enumerated in § 701 (e). This is a conceivable reading, but it requires a considerable straining both of language and of common understanding. The saving clause itself contains no limitations, and it requires an artificial statutory construction to read a general grant of a right to judicial review begrudgingly, so as to cut out agency actions that a literal reading would cover. There is no support in the legislative background for such a reading of the clause. It was included in the House bill, whose report states that the provision.. saved as a method to review a regulation placed in effect by the Secretary whatever rights exist to initiate a historical proceeding in equity to enjoin the enforcement of the regulation, and whatever rights exist to initiate a declaratory judgment proceeding.” H. R. Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 11. The Senate conferees accepted the provision. The Government argues that the clause is included as a part of § 701 (f), and therefore should be read to apply only to those sections to which the § 701 (f) special-review procedure applies. But it is difficult to think of a more appropriate place to put a general saving clause than where Congress placed it — at the conclusion of the section setting out a special procedure for use in certain specified instances. Furthermore, the Government's reading would result in an anomaly. The §§ 701 (e)-(f) procedure was included in the Act in order to deal with the problem of technical determinations for which the normal equity power was deemed insufficient. See, supra, pp. 142-144. There would seem little reason for Congress to have enacted § 701 (f), and at the same time to have included a clause aimed only at preserving for such determinations the other types of review whose supposed inadequacy was the very reason for the special-review provisions. Under the Government’s view, indeed, it is difficult to ascertain when the saving clause would even come into play: when the special provisions apply, presumably they must be used and a court would not grant injunctive or declaratory judgment relief unless the appropriate administrative procedure is exhausted. When the special procedure does not apply, the Government deems the saving clause likewise inapplicable. The Government, to be sure, does present a rather far-fetched example of what it considers a possible application of the relief saved by § 701 (f)(6), but merely to state it reveals the weakness of the Government’s position. We prefer to take the saving clause at its face value, and to read it in harmony with the policy favoring judicial review expressed in the Administrative Procedure Act and this Court’s decisions. The only other argument of the Government requiring attention on the preclusive effect of the statute is that Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594, counsels a restrictive view of judicial review in the food and drug area. In that case the Food and Drug Administrator found that there was probable cause that a drug was “adulterated” because it was misbranded in such a way as to be “fraudulent” or “misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser or consumer.” § 304 (a), 21 U. S. C. § 334 (a). Multiple seizures were ordered through libel actions. The manufacturer of the drug brought an action to challenge directly the Administrator’s finding of probable cause. This Court held that the owner could raise his constitutional, statutory, and factual claims in the libel actions themselves, and that the mere finding of probable cause by the Administrator could not be challenged in a separate action. That decision was quite clearly correct, but nothing in its reasoning or holding has any bearing on this declaratory judgment action challenging a promulgated regulation. The Court in Ewing first noted that the “administrative finding of probable cause required by § 304 (a) is merely the statutory prerequisite to the bringing of the lawsuit,” at which the issues are aired. 339 U. S., at 598. Such a situation bears no analogy to the promulgation, after formal procedures, of a rule that must be followed by an entire industry. To equate a finding of probable cause for proceeding against a particular drug manufacturer with the promulgation of a self-operative industry-wide regulation, such as we have here, would immunize nearly all agency rulemaking activities from the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act. Second, the determination of probable cause in Ewing has “no effect in and of itself,” 339 U. S., at 598; only some action consequent upon such a finding could give it legal life. As the Court there noted, like a determination by a grand jury that there is probable cause to proceed against an accused, it is a finding which only has vitality once a proceeding is commenced, at which time appropriate challenges can be made. The Court also noted that the unique type of relief sought by the drug manufacturer was inconsistent with the policy of the Act favoring speedy action against goods in circulation that are believed on probable cause to be adulterated. Also, such relief was not specifically granted by the Act, which did provide another type of relief in the form of a consolidation of multiple libel actions in a convenient venue. 339 U. S., at 602. The drug manufacturer in Ewing was quite obviously seeking an unheard-of form of relief which, if allowed, would have permitted interference in the early stages of an administrative determination as to specific facts, and would have prevented the regular operation of the seizure procedures established by the Act. That the Court refused to permit such an action is hardly authority for cutting off the well-established jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear, in appropriate cases, suits under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act challenging final agency action of the kind present here. We conclude that nothing in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act itself precludes this action. h — ( 1 — 1 A further inquiry must, however, be made. The injunc-tive and declaratory judgment remedies are discretionary, and courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to administrative determinations unless these arise in the context of a controversy “ripe” for judicial resolution. Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. As to the former factor, we believe the issues presented are appropriate for judicial resolution at this time. First, all parties agree that the issue tendered is a purely legal one: whether the statute was properly construed by the Commissioner to require the established name of the drug to be used every time the proprietary name is employed. Both sides moved for summary judgment in the District Court, and no claim is made here that further administrative proceedings are contemplated. It is suggested that the justification for this rule might vary with different circumstances, and that the expertise of the Commissioner is relevant to passing upon the validity of the regulation. This of course is true, but the suggestion overlooks the fact that both sides have approached this case as one purely of congressional intent, and that the Government made no effort to justify the regulation in factual terms. Second, the- regulations in issue we find to be “final agency action” within the meaning of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 704, as construed in judicial decisions. An “agency action” includes any “rule,” defined by the Act as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy,” §§ 2 (c), 2 (g), 5 U. S. C. §§ 551 (4), 551 (13). The cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the “finality” element in a pragmatic way. Thus in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, a suit under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219, this Court held reviewable a regulation of the Federal Communications Commission setting forth certain proscribed contractual arrangements between chain broadcasters and local stations. The FCC did not have direct authority to regulate these contracts, and its rule asserted only that it would not license stations which maintained such contracts with the networks. Although no license had in fact been denied or revoked, and the FCC regulation could properly be characterized as a statement only of its intentions, the Court held that “Such regulations have the force of law before their sanctions are invoked as well as after. When, as here, they are promulgated by order of the Commission and the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity, they are appropriately the subject of attack... 316 U. S., at 418-419. Two more recent cases have taken a similarly flexible view of finality. In Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U. S. 40, at issue was an Interstate Commerce Commission order specifying commodities that were deemed to fall within the statutory class of “agricultural commodities.” Vehicles carrying such commodities were exempt from ICC supervision. An action was brought by a carrier that claimed to be transporting exempt commodities, but which the ICC order had not included in its terms. Although the dissenting opinion noted that this ICC order had no authority except to give notice of how the Commission interpreted the Act and would have effect only if and when a particular action was brought against a particular carrier, and argued that “judicial intervention [should] be withheld until administrative action has reached its complete development,” 351 U. S., at 45, the Court held the order reviewable. Again, in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, the Court held to be a final agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act an FCC regulation announcing a Commission policy that it would not issue a television license to an applicant already owning five such licenses, even though no specific application was before the Commission. The Court stated: “The process of rulemaking was complete. It was final agency action... by which Storer claimed to be ‘aggrieved/ ” 351 U. S., at 198. We find decision in the present case following a fortiori from these precedents. The regulation challenged here, promulgated in a formal manner after announcement in the Federal Register and consideration of comments by interested parties is quite clearly definitive. There is no hint that this regulation is informal, see Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 71, 137 F. 2d 681, or only the ruling of a subordinate official, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398, 409, aff’d, 364 F. 2d 241, or tentative. It was made effective upon publication, and the Assistant General Counsel for Food and Drugs stated in the District Court that compliance was expected. The Government argues, however, that the present case can be distinguished from cases like Frozen Food Express on the ground that in those instances the agency involved could implement its policy directly, while here the Attorney General must authorize criminal and seizure actions for violations of the statute. In the context of this case, we do not find this argument persuasive. These regulations are not meant to advise the Attorney General, but purport to be directly authorized by the statute. Thus, if within the Commissioner’s authority, they have the status of law and violations of them carry heavy criminal and civil sanctions. Also, there is no representation that the Attorney General and the Commissioner disagree in this area; the Justice Department is defending this very suit. It would be adherence to a mere technicality to give any credence to this contention. Moreover, the agency does have direct authority to enforce this regulation in the context of passing upon applications for clearance of new drugs, § 505, 21 U. S. C. § 355, or certification of certain antibiotics, § 507, 21 U. S. C. § 357. This is also a case in which the impact of the regulations upon the petitioners is sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review at this stage. These regulations purport to give an authoritative interpretation of a statutory provision that has a direct effect on the day-to-day business of all prescription drug companies; its promulgation puts petitioners in a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate. As the District Court found on the basis of uncontested allegations, “Either they must comply with the every time requirement and incur the costs of changing over their promotional material and labeling or they must follow their present course and risk prosecution.” 228 F. Supp. 855, 861. The regulations are clear-cut, and were made effective immediately upon publication; as noted earlier the agency’s counsel represented to the District Court that immediate compliance with their terms was expected. If petitioners wish to comply they must change all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; they must destroy stocks of printed matter; and they must invest heavily in new printing type and new supplies. The alternative to compliance — continued use of material which they believe in good faith meets the statutory requirements, but which clearly does not meet the regulation of the Commissioner — may be even more costly. That course would risk serious criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful distribution of “mis-branded” drugs. It is relevant at this juncture to recognize that petitioners deal in a sensitive industry, in which public confidence in their drug products is especially important. To require them to challenge these regulations only as a defense to an action brought by the Government might harm them severely and unnecessarily. Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance, access to the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or some other unusual circumstance, neither of which appears here. The Government does not dispute the very real dilemma in which petitioners are placed by the regulation, but contends that “mere financial expense” is not a justification for pre-enforcement judicial review. It is of course true that cases in this Court dealing with the standing of particular parties to bring an action have held that a possible financial loss is not by itself a sufficient interest to sustain a judicial challenge to governmental action. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113. But there is no question in the present case that petitioners have sufficient standing as plaintiffs: the regulation is directed at them in particular; it requires them to make significant changes in their everyday business practices; if they fail to observe the Commissioner’s rule they are quite clearly exposed to the imposition of strong sanctions. Compare Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, c. 21 (1958). This case is, therefore, remote from the Mellon and Perkins cases. The Government further contends that the threat of criminal sanctions for noncomplianee with a judicially untested regulation is unrealistic; the Solicitor General has represented that if court enforcement becomes necessary, “the Department of Justice will proceed only civilly for an injunction... or by condemnation.” We cannot accept this argument as a sufficient answer to petitioners’ petition. This action at its inception was properly brought and this subsequent representation of the Department of Justice should not suffice to defeat it. Finally, the Government urges that to permit resort to the courts in this type of case may delay or impede effective enforcement of the Act. We fully recognize the important public interest served by assuring prompt and unimpeded administration of the Pure Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but we do not find the Government’s argument convincing. First, in this particular case, a pre-enforcement challenge by nearly all prescription drug manufacturers is calculated to speed enforcement. If the Government prevails, a large part of the industry is bound by the decree; if the Government loses, it can more quickly revise its regulation. The Government contends, however, that if the Court allows this consolidated suit, then nothing will prevent a multiplicity of suits in various jurisdictions challenging other regulations. The short answer to this contention is that the courts are well equipped to deal with such eventualities. The venue transfer provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a), may be invoked by the Government to consolidate separate actions. Or, actions in all but one jurisdiction might be stayed pending the conclusion of one proceeding. See American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203, 215-216. A court may even in its discretion dismiss a declaratory judgment or injunctive suit if the same issue is pending in litigation elsewhere. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, 101 F. 2d 514; Carbide & Carbon C. Corp. v. United States I. Chemicals, 140 F. 2d 47; Note, Availability of a Declaratory Judgment When Another Suit Is Pending, 51 Yale L. J. 511 (1942). In at least one suit for a declaratory judgment, relief was denied with the suggestion that the plaintiff intervene in a pending action elsewhere. Automotive Equip., Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 11F. Supp. 292; See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 121 F. Supp. 696. Further, the declaratory judgment and injunctive remedies are equitable in nature, and other equitable defenses may be interposed. If a multiplicity of suits are undertaken in order to harass the Government or to delay enforcement, relief can be denied on this ground alone. Truly v. Wanzer, 5 How. 141, 142; cf. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 495. The defense of laches could be asserted if the Government is prejudiced by a delay, Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 488-490; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence §§419c-d (5th ed. Symons, 1941). And courts may even	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 61 ]	sc_adminaction
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM et al. No. 83-614. Argued April 24, 1984 Decided June 28, 1984 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. James B. Weidner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John M. Liftin, David A. Schulz, William J. Fitzpatrick, and Donald J. Crawford. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for the federal respondents were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne. Arnold M. Lerman, Andrea Timko Sallet, and H. Helmut Coring filed a brief for respondent BankAmerica Corp. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by Robert S. Rifkind; and for the Legal Foundation of America by David Crump. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Federal Reserve Board has statutory authority under § 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U. S. C. § 1843(c)(8), to authorize a bank holding company to acquire a nonbanking affiliate engaged principally in retail securities brokerage. HH BankAmerica Corp. (BAC) is a bank holding company within the meaning of the Bank Holding Company Act. In March 1982, BAC applied to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) for approval under § 4(c)(8) of the Act to acquire 100 percent of the voting shares of The Charles Schwab Corp., a company that engages through its wholly owned subsidiary, Charles Schwab & Co. (Schwab), in retail discount brokerage. The Board ordered that formal public hearings be held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to consider the application. The Securities Industry Association (SIA), a national trade association of securities brokers, and petitioner here, opposed BAC’s application and participated in those hearings. After six days of hearings, the ALJ recommended that BAC’s application be approved. After reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board adopted, with modifications, the findings and conclusions of the ALJ and authorized BAC to acquire Schwab. 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 105 (1983). SIA petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for judicial review under 12 U. S. C. § 1848. The Court of Appeals held that the Board had acted within its statutory authority in authorizing BAC’s acquisition of Schwab under § 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. The court accordingly affirmed the Board’s order. 716 F. 2d 92 (1983). We granted SIA’s petition for certiorari, 465 U. S. 1004 (1984), and now affirm. II Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act) prohibits the acquisition by bank holding companies of the voting shares of nonbanking entities unless the acquisition is specifically exempted. The principal exemption to that prohibition is found in § 4(c)(8). That provision authorizes bank holding companies, with prior Board approval, to engage in nonbanking activities that the Board determines are “so closely related to banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto.” 12 U. S. C. § 1843(c)(8). Application of the § 4(c)(8) exception requires the Board to make two separate determinations. First, the Board must determine whether the proposed activity is “closely related” to banking. If it is, the Board may amend its regulations to include the activity as a permissible nonbanking activity. Next, the Board must determine on a case-by-case basis whether allowing the applicant bank holding company to engage in the activity reasonably may be expected to produce public benefits that outweigh any potential adverse effects. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1747, pp. 16-18 (1970). A In this case, the Board held that the securities brokerage services offered by Schwab were “closely related” to banking within the meaning of § 4(c)(8). Relying on record evidence and its own banking expertise, the Board articulated the ways in which the brokerage activities provided by Schwab were similar to banking. The Board found that banks currently offer, as an accommodation to their customers, brokerage services that are virtually identical to the services offered by Schwab. 69 Fed. Res. Bull., at 107. Moreover, the Board cited a 1977 study by the Securities and Exchange Commission that found that “bank trust department trading desks, at least at the largest banks, perform the same functions, utilize the same execution techniques, employ personnel with the same general training and expertise, and use the same facilities . . . that brokers do.” Ibid. Finally, the Board concluded that the use by banks of “sophisticated techniques and resources” to execute purchase and sell orders for the account of their customers was sufficiently widespread to justify a finding that banks generally are equipped to offer the type of retail brokerage services provided by Schwab. Id., at 108. On the basis of these findings, the Board held that a securities brokerage business that is “essentially confined to the purchase and sale of securities for the account of third parties, and without the provision of investment advice to the purchaser or seller” is “closely related” to banking within the meaning of § 4(e)(8) of the BHC Act. Id., at 117. B The Board next determined that the public benefits likely to result from BAC’s acquisition of Schwab outweighed the possible adverse effects. Specifically, the Board identified as public benefits the increased competition and the increased convenience and efficiencies that the acquisition would bring to the retail brokerage business. Id., at 109-110. As to possible adverse effects, the Board determined that the proposed acquisition would not result in the undue concentration of resources, decreased competition, or unfair competitive prices. Id., at 110-114. Finally, the Board concluded that BAC’s acquisition of Schwab was not prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act. Id., at 114-116. The Board observed that the proposed acquisition would make Schwab an affiliate of BAC’s banking subsidiary and thus subject to the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act. It held, however, that Schwab was “not engaged principally in any of the activities prohibited to member bank affiliates by the Glass-Steagall Act,” and thus concluded that the acquisition was “consistent with the letter and spirit of that act.” Id., at 114. SIA challenges the Board’s order in this case on two grounds. First, it argues that the Board may not approve an activity as “closely related” to banking unless it finds that the activity will facilitate other banking operations. Second, it argues that §20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U. S. C. § 377, prohibits a bank holding company from owning any entity that is engaged principally in retail securities brokerage and thus that the Board lacked statutory authority under § 4(c)(8) to approve BAC’s acquisition of Schwab. H-H I — I A There is no express requirement in § 4(c)(8) that a proposed activity must facilitate other banking operations before it may be found to be “closely related” to banking. Indeed, the relevant statutory language does not specify any factors that the Board must consider in making that determination. The general nature of the statutory language, therefore, suggests that Congress vested the Board with considerable discretion to consider and weigh a variety of factors in determining whether an activity is “closely related” to banking. In this case, the Board concluded that Schwab’s brokerage services were “closely related” to banking because it found that the services were “operationally and functionally very similar to the types of brokerage services that are generally provided by banks and that banking organizations are particularly well equipped to provide such services.” 69 Fed. Res. Bull., at 107. The Board acted well within its discretion in ruling on such factors. Moreover, the Board’s factual findings are substantially supported by the record. Banks long have arranged the purchase and sale of securities as an accommodation, to their customers. Congress expressly endorsed this traditional banking service in 1933. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act authorizes banks to continue the practice of “purchasing and selling . . . securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for [their] own accounts].” 12 U. S. C. §24 Seventh. The Board found that in substance the brokerage services that Schwab performs for its customers are not significantly different from those that banks, under the authority of § 16, have been performing for their own customers for years. See 69 Fed. Res. Bull., at 107-109. Moreover, the amendment to Regulation Y, added by the Board in 1983 to reflect its decision in this case, expressly limits the securities brokerage services in which a bank may engage “to buying and selling securities solely as agent for the account of customers” and does not authorize “securities underwriting or dealing or investment advice or research services.” 48 Fed. Reg. 37006 (1983). Congress has committed to the Board the primary responsibility for administering the BHC Act. Accordingly, the Board’s determination of what activities are “closely related” to banking within the meaning of § 4(c)(8) “is entitled to the greatest deference. ” Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, 450 U. S. 46, 56 (1981) (ICI). In this case, the Board has articulated with commendable thoroughness the ways in which banking activities are similar to the brokerage activities at issue here. The standard the Board used to determine that Schwab’s brokerage business is “closely related” to banking is reasonable and supported by a normal reading of the statutory language of § 4(c)(8). The factual findings to which this standard was applied are substantially supported by the record. The Court of Appeals, therefore, properly deferred to the Board’s determination in this case. B The Board expressly considered and rejected SIA’s argument that BAC’s acquisition of Schwab violates the Glass-Steagall Act. That Act comprises four sections of the Banking Act of 1933. Only one of those four sections is applicable here. That provision, §20, as set forth in 12 U. S. C. § 377, provides in relevant part: “[N]o member bank shall be affiliated in any manner described in subsection (b) of section 221a of this title with any corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities ...” (emphasis added). A bank holding company’s subsidiaries are bank affiliates within the meaning of § 20. 12 U. S. C. § 221a(b). Section 20, therefore, prohibits BAC’s proposed acquisition if Schwab is “engaged principally” in any of the activities listed therein. SI A concedes that Schwab is not engaged in the “issue, flotation, underwriting, ... or distribution” of securities. It argues, however, that the term “public sale” of securities as used in § 20 applies to Schwab’s brokerage business. The Board rejected this argument, holding that “Schwab is not engaged principally in any of the activities prohibited to member bank affiliates by the Glass-Steagall Act.” 69 Fed. Res. Bull., at 114. The Board has broad power to regulate and supervise bank holding companies and banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. In this respect, the Board has primary responsibility for implementing the Glass-Steagall Act, and we accord substantial deference to the Board’s interpretation of that Act whenever its interpretation provides a reasonable construction of the statutory language and is consistent with legislative intent. ICI, supra, at 68; Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971). “Public sale” is used in conjunction with the terms “issue,” “flotation,” “underwriting,” and “distribution” of securities. None of these terms has any relevance to the brokerage business at issue in this case. Schwab does not engage in issuing or floating the sale of securities, and the terms “underwriting” and “distribution” traditionally apply to a function distinctly different from that of a securities broker. An underwriter normally acts as principal whereas a broker executes orders for the purchase or sale of securities solely as agent. Under the “familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning,” Third National Bank v. Impac, Ltd., 432 U. S. 312, 322 (1977) (footnote omitted), the term “public sale” in § 20 should be read to refer to the underwriting activity described by the terms that surround it, and to exclude the type of retail brokerage business in which Schwab principally is engaged. This reading of the statute is further supported by the Board’s longstanding interpretation of identical language found in §32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U. S. C. §78. That section prohibits interlocking management or employment between banks and any entity “primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation” of securities. 12 U. S. C. §78 (emphasis added). In January 1936, the Board interpreted the list of prohibited activities described in § 32 to exclude the kind of brokerage activities at issue here. Specifically, the Board ruled that “[a] broker who is engaged solely in executing orders for the purchase and sale of securities on behalf of others in the open market is not engaged in the business referred to in section 32.” 22 Fed. Res. Bull. 51, n. 1 (1936). Because §§32 and 20 contain identical language, were enacted for similar purposes, and are part of the same statute, the long-accepted interpretation of the term “public sale” to exclude brokerage services such as those offered by Schwab should apply as well to § 20. The Board’s interpretation of the disputed term is supported by the plain language of the statute. It is also entirely consistent with legislative intent. The legislative history demonstrates that Congress enacted § 20 to prohibit the affiliation of commercial banks with entities that were engaged principally in “activities such as underwriting.” ICI, 450 U. S., at 64; see Camp, supra, at 630-634. In 1933, Congress believed that the heavy involvement of commercial banks in underwriting and securities speculation had precipitated “the widespread bank closings that occurred during the Great Depression.” ICI, supra, at 61. One of the most serious threats to sound commercial banking perceived by Congress was the existence of “bank affiliates” that “devote themselves in many cases to perilous underwriting operations, stock speculation, and maintaining a market for the banks’ own stock often largely with the resources of the parent bank.” S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1933). Congressional concern over the underwriting activities of bank affiliates included both the fear that bank funds would be lost in speculative investments and the suspicion that the more “subtle hazards” associated with underwriting would encourage unsound banking practices. See Camp, 401 U. S., at 630. None of the more “subtle hazards” of underwriting identified in Camp is implicated by the brokerage activities at issue here. Because Schwab trades only as agent, its assets are not subject to the vagaries of the securities markets. Moreover, Schwab’s profits depend solely on the volume of shares it trades and not on the purchase or sale of particular securities. Thus, BAC has no “salesman’s stake” in the securities Schwab trades. It cannot increase Schwab’s profitability by having its bank affiliate extend credit to issuers of particular securities, nor by encouraging the bank affiliate improperly to favor particular securities in the management of depositors’ assets. Finally, the fact that § 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act allows banks to engage directly in the kind of brokerage services at issue here, to accommodate its customers, suggests that the activity was not the sort that concerned Congress in its effort to secure the Nation’s banks from the risks of the securities market. In sum, we see no reason to disturb the Board’s determination that “the business of purchasing or selling securities upon the unsolicited order of, and as agent for, a particular customer does not constitute the ‘public sale’ of securities for purposes of section 20.” 69 Fed. Res. Bull., at 114. This interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act is reasonable, consistent with the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, and deserves the deference normally accorded the Board’s construction of the banking laws. < The Board determined in this case that a securities brokerage business that is essentially limited to the purchase and sale of securities for the account of customers, and without provision of investment advice to purchaser or seller, is “closely related” to banking. We hold that the Board’s determination is consistent with the language and policies of the BHC Act. We also hold that the Board’s determination that the Glass-Steagall Act permits bank holding companies to acquire firms engaged in such a brokerage business is reasonable and supported by the plain language and legislative history of the Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. BAC operates one subsidiary bank, Bank of America. That bank is a member of the Federal Reserve System, and the parties inform us that it is the largest commercial bank in the United States. Schwab is known as a “discount” broker because of the low commissions it charges. Schwab can afford to charge lower commissions than full-service brokerage firms because it does not provide investment advice or analysis, but merely executes the purchase and sell orders placed by its customers. In addition to BAC, the Justice Department participated in the hearing as a proponent of the proposed acquisition. Section 4(c)(8) provides that the general ban on the ownership by a bank holding company of shares in any company other than a bank shall not apply to: “(8) shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto .... In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices.” 12 U. S. V. § 1843(c)(8). In making this determination, the Board generally has followed the guidelines announced in National Courier Assn. v. Board of Governors, 170 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 516 F. 2d 1229 (1975). That case held that an activity is “closely related” to banking within the meaning of § 4(c)(8) if any one of the following is demonstrated: “1. Banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services. “2. Banks generally provide services that are operationally or functionally so similar to the proposed services as to equip them particularly well to provide the proposed service. “3. Banks generally provide services that are so integrally related to the proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized form.” Id., at 313, 516 F. 2d, at 1237. The Board has recognized, however, that the National Courier guidelines do not provide the exclusive basis for finding that an activity is “closely related” to banking, and has stated that it will consider “any . . . factor that an applicant may advance to demonstrate a reasonable or close connection or relationship of the activity to banking.” 49 Fed. Reg. 806 (1984). 6 See 12 CFR § 225 (1983) (“Regulation Y”). Section 225.4 of Regulation Y contains a list of those activities already determined by the Board to be “closely related” to banking. When a bank holding company applies for approval to engage in an activity already listed in Regulation Y, the application generally will be acted on by a Reserve Bank under delegated authority from the Board. 49 Fed. Reg. 815 (1984). In acting on the application, the Reserve Bank need determine only that the public benefits that are likely to result from the applicant’s proposal will outweigh the possible adverse effects. If, as in this case, an application involves a currently unlisted activity, it must be considered by the Board itself. In that case, the Board must make both of the determinations described above before approving the application. The Board conceded that banks, unlike retail brokers, use an intervening broker to execute orders for the purchase and sale of securities traded on an exchange. The Board found, however, that banks often execute purchase and sell orders for securities that are not traded on an exchange without an intervening broker. To this extent they perform the same services as a retail broker. 69 Fed. Res. Bull., at 107. The Board, after notice and comment, subsequently amended Regulation Y to include the securities brokerage business at issue here in the list of permissible nonbanking activities. See 48 Fed. Reg. 7746 (1983) (proposed amendment published for comment); 48 Fed. Reg. 37003 (1983) (final regulation amending 12 CFR § 225.4). The final amendment to Regulation Y added as a permissible nonbanking activity: “(15) providing securities brokerage services, related securities credit activities pursuant to the Board’s Regulation T (12 CFR Part 220), and incidental activities such as offering custodial services, individual retirement accounts, and cash management services, provided that the securities brokerage services are restricted to buying and selling securities solely as agent for the account of customers and do not include securities underwriting or dealing or investment advice or research services.” 48 Fed. Reg. 37006 (1983) (emphasis in original). The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted as part of the Banking Act of 1933. 11 In proceedings before the Court of Appeals, SIA apparently challenged the Board’s public benefit analysis as well. See 716 F. 2d 92, 103-104 (CA2 1983). SIA, however, has not advanced that argument here. SIA argues that the legislative history of the 1970 amendment to § 4(c)(8) establishes that Congress expressly rejected a “functionally related” standard, and that the Board exceeded its statutory authority by relying on that standard here. This argument is without merit. In 1970, the initial versions of both the House and Senate bills changed the “closely related” test of § 4(c)(8) to a “functionally related” test. S. Rep. No. 91-1084, p. 25 (1970); H. R. Rep. No. 91-387, p. 1 (1969). The Conference Committee, however, retained the “closely related” language of the prior Act in the final version of the bill. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1747, p. 5 (1970). As we observed in Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, 450 U. S. 46, 73 (1981), the significance of this legislative history is unclear. It is, however, clear that the 1970 amendment broadened rather than restricted the Board’s discretion to determine whether nonbanking activities are significantly related to banking. See id., at 72-76. Thus, there is no indication that Congress intended to preclude consideration by the Board of the functional relationship of nonbanking activities to banking in determining whether those activities may qualify for the § 4(c)(8) exemption. Moreover, it is not clear that the Board in this case applied the “functionally related” test arguably rejected by Congress in 1970. The Board found that Schwab’s brokerage business was both “operationally and functionally very similar to” traditional banking services and that banks were well equipped to provide those services. 69 Fed. Res. Bull., at 107. See S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1933) (explaining that § 16 was intended to permit banks “to purchase and sell investment securities for their customers to the same extent as heretofore”). See n. 9, supra. Schwab also provides some incidental services to its customers such as margin lending, custodial accounts, and appropriate account maintenance. The Board also approved these as “closely related” to banking when offered incident to the approved brokerage services. See 69 Fed. Res. Bull, at 108-109. SIA has not challenged the Board’s conclusions with respect to these incidental services. Those four sections are §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32, codified respectively at 12 U. S. C. §§ 24, 377, 378, and 78. Such deference is appropriate where, as here, the Board expressly addressed the application of the Glass-Steagall Act to the proposed regulatory action and determined that the proposed action implicated none of the concerns that led to the enactment of that Act. See ICI, 450 U. S., at 68. In Camp, on the other hand, we gave less deference to regulatory action that was taken without any “expressly articulated position at the administrative level as to the meaning and impact of the provisions of [the Glass-Steagall Act].” 401 U. S., at 627. We held in Camp that agency action taken “without opinion or accompanying statement” was “hardly tantamount to an administrative interpretation” of the Glass-Steagall Act, and was not due the deference normally accorded such regulatory action. Id., at 627-628. In the typical distribution of securities, an underwriter purchases securities from an issuer, frequently in association with other underwriters. The distribution of these securities to the public may be effected by the underwriters alone, or in conjunction with a group of dealers who also purchase and sell the particular issue of securities as principals. Underwriters also may distribute securities under a “best efforts” agreement pursuant to which large blocks of specific issues of securities are offered to the public by the investment banker as agent for the issuer. A “best efforts” distribution is not technically an underwriting. 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulations 172 (2d ed. 1961). Because Schwab’s brokerage business involves none of these distribution plans, we need not consider whether a “best efforts” distribution is prohibited under § 20. Most securities firms engage in all aspects of the securities business, acting at various times as underwriters, dealers, or brokers. As underwriter and dealer, the firm buys and sells securities on its own account thereby assuming all risk of loss. As broker, the firm buys and sells securities as an agent for the account of customers. In these transactions, it is the customer, rather than the securities firm, who bears the risk of loss. Schwab is different from most securities firms in that it engages solely in the brokerage business and does not participate in underwriting or dealing in securities. Section 32 provides in relevant part: “No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicated participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank....” 12 U. S. C. § 78. SIA argues that the phrase in § 16 that allows banks to engage in “purchasing and selling . . . securities and stock, without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers” is essentially equivalent to the term in § 20 that prohibits the “public sale” of securities. This argument is unpersuasive. There is no basis for assuming that the dissimilar phrases found in §§16 and 20 are coterminous. The permissive phrase found in § 16 accurately describes securities brokerage and clearly distinguishes that activity from the activities of “dealing in, underwriting and purchasing for its own account investment securities” that are prohibited elsewhere in that section. Section 20 also prohibits bank affiliates from engaging in these latter activities. The description of securities brokerage found in § 16, however, appears nowhere in § 20. Moreover, § 16 applies only to banks, not to bank holding companies, and is not applicable here. Thus, we have no occasion to determine whether § 16 would permit banks to engage in brokerage activity on the behalf of the general public as well as for their own customers. See Hearings pursuant to S. 71 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 1052-1068 (1931). We held in that case: “The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act shows that Congress also had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking business either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular investments.” 401 U. S., at 630. See Camp, 401 U. S., at 631-634 (identifying the “subtle hazards” of affiliation with underwriting firms). All these “subtle hazards” are attributable to the promotional pressures that arise from affiliation with entities that purchase and sell particular investments on their own account.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 53 ]	sc_adminaction
UEBERSEE FINANZ-KORPORATION, A. G., v. McGRATH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUCCESSOR TO THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN. No. 178. Argued January 2, 1952. Decided April 7, 1952. Thurman Arnold argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Edward J. Ennis and Harry M. Plotkin. James L. Morrisson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baynton, Myron C. Baum and Joseph Laujer. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia for the return of certain of its property vested by the Alien Property Custodian in 1942 under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 411, as amended by the First War Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839. The District Court found for the Custodian, 82 F. Supp. 602, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 182, 191 F. 2d 327. We granted certiorari, 342 U. S. 847. The following facts were found by the District Court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals upon an abundance of evidence in the record. In 1931, Wilhelm von Opel, a citizen and resident national of Germany, owned certain shares of stock in the Adam Opel Works, a German corporation largely owned by General Motors Corporation. Wilhelm had an agreement with General Motors to sell his shares at a price. In 1931, he became alarmed at business conditions in Germany and desired to get his stock out of the country to save his investment for himself and his family from the economic and governmental influences there prevailing. In that year, he and his wife entered into what was known under German law as a usufruct agreement with their only son, Fritz, who had not lived in Germany since 1929 and for that reason was not subject to the German restrictions upon the handling of this property. By this agreement, Wilhelm’s title to the shares in the Adam Opel Works was transferred to Fritz. The instrument provided as follows: “The usufruct in the shares is not assigned to Fritz von Opel. It remains with Wilhelm von Opel and his wife . . . until the death of the survivor of them. However, 20% of all dividends and interest received will accrue to Fritz von Opel.” The instrument provided further that if Fritz died before his parents and without issue, the transfer was to be void and was to revert to his parents, the transferors. If the parents died before Fritz, he was to have the property as an advancement, to be deducted from his share in his parents’ estate. The usufruct income not drawn by the parents was also to be accounted for by Fritz as an advancement. After much expert testimony, the District Court found the law of Germany pertaining to such usufruct agreement to be as follows: “52. A right of usufruct, once established, is under German law an in rem right in property. A person having a usufruct in property has a right: “(a) to the enjoyment of the property or, in the case of money or securities, to the income from the securities; “(b) to co-possession of the property together with the person holding legal title to the property; “(c) to a voice in the management of the property insofar as the maintenance and preservation of the usufructuary’s rights under subsection (a) above are concerned; “(d) to prevent the sale or disposition of the property as a result of his right to co-possession ; “(e) the German Civil Code does not mention whether the usufructuary, for the protection of his income, has any voting rights. In the absence of a decided case the legal commentaries speculate in three different directions. One position is that the title owner has all voting rights and the usufructuary no voting rights whatsoever. The second position is that the title owner has a voting right for all measures which have nothing to do with income while the usufructuary can vote in regard to income. The third position is that the usufructuary has all the voting rights.” R. 60-61; 82 F. Supp. 602, 605. Under this agreement, Wilhelm and his wife had a usufruct in the Adam Opel stock transferred to Fritz. The latter, on October 17, 1931, sold the usufruct property to General Motors, in accordance with the contract which Wilhelm had with that company. In order to protect the several interests involved, the proceeds of the sale were transferred to petitioner, a Swiss corporation acquired by Fritz for this purpose. Eventually these funds were used to purchase stocks, later transferred to petitioner, in corporations organized under the various states of the United States, from which derived the stocks vested by the Alien Property Custodian. Fritz owned 97% of the stock of petitioner. Under the German law, as found by the District Court, a usufructuary may follow the ascertainable proceeds of the original property subject to the usufruct. Therefore, the stocks purchased by petitioner with the proceeds of the sale of the usufruct property were subject to and were treated as subject to the usufruct agreement. On June 7, 1935, Fritz placed all but three shares of the capital stock of petitioner in a safety deposit box in Zurich, Switzerland, and gave the key thereto to Hans Frankenberg, who received it as agent of Wilhelm von Opel. Frankenberg had become the managing director of petitioner at Wilhelm’s request in 1932, and exercised control over petitioner’s investments until the vesting of the property herein involved. By the delivery to Wilhelm’s agent of the key to the box containing petitioner’s stock, there was thus transferred to Wilhelm possession of the res, subject to the usufruct; and the usufruct agreement was thereby consummated. Fritz also engaged in activities on behalf of petitioner concerning its investments, but under the guidance of Wilhelm or his agent, Frankenberg. Neither Wilhelm nor his wife ever drew any income from the usufruct. An oil lease owned by one of the American corporations whose stock was purchased with proceeds from the sale of the Adam Opel shares to General Motors, was sold, and the proceeds of that sale used to pay a fine of Wilhelm in Germany. Expenses of a trip by Wilhelm to South America and one to Hungary were paid by petitioner and charged against the income account of Fritz. Petitioner owned all the stock of a subsidiary Hungarian corporation engaged in the mining of bauxite in Hungary, and in 1939 and 1940 guaranteed a loan by a Swiss bank to this corporation for its operations. The loan was repaid in November 1942. The United States was at war with Hungary from December 13, 1941. During October, November, and December 1941, the Hungarian corporation shipped bauxite to Germany and had a contract to do so until the end of 1942. In 1942, the Alien Property Custodian vested the stocks held by petitioner in several American corporations and all the right, title, and interest of petitioner in and to a certain contract with another American corporation. All of the stocks had been acquired from the proceeds of the original usufruct property. From October 5, 1931, the date of the usufruct agreement, the usufruct property was controlled, used, and in all ways handled and directed by Wilhelm and his managing agents. The interest of Fritz in petitioner was wholly subordinated to that of Wilhelm. Fritz had the bare legal title and the right to 20% of the income from the property. Wilhelm is now dead. His wife, a daughter, and the son, Fritz, still survive. Petitioner was in this Court on the pleadings in this case in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A. G., 332 U. S. 480. There, it was alleged in the complaint that petitioner was not an enemy or ally of an enemy, and that at no time specified in the complaint had the property in question been owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by an enemy, an ally of an enemy, or a national of a designated enemy country; that none of the property had been owing or belonging to or held on account of or for the benefit of any such person or interest. This Court construed these allegations “to mean that the property is free of all enemy taint and particularly that the corporations whose shares have been seized, the corporations which have a contract in which respondent has an interest, and respondent itself, are companies in which no enemy, ally of an enemy, nor any national of either has any interest of any kind whatsoever, and that respondent has not done business in the territory of the enemy or any ally of an enemy.” P. 482. The complaint alleging such facts was held to be sufficient as against a motion to dismiss, and the case was sent back for trial. Upon the trial, the facts were found as above stated. However, from the facts found, it is clear that petitioner for all practical purposes was, to the extent of 97%, largely owned, managed, used, and controlled by Wilhelm von Opel, a national of Germany. The findings demonstrate that petitioner was a corporate holding company acquired for the purpose of enabling Wilhelm to control and use his property as he saw fit. His interest was paramount and controlling. The interest of Fritz was wholly and in reality subordinated to Wilhelm’s, except as to the right of Fritz to receive 20% of the income from the usufruct property. Petitioner was neutral in name only. Its enemy taint was all but complete because of the predominant influence and control of Wilhelm. Wilhelm had and used the substance, while Fritz had the bare legal title; and such right as this gave Fritz, he exercised or failed to exercise in complete subordination to the will of his father. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said: “This case does not involve a diluted 'taint’; it involves the ownership by enemy nationals of the economic benefits of American business.” 88 U. S. App. D. C. at 183, 191 F. 2d at 328. Before 1941 the property here involved could not have been vested, because this petitioner was a corporation of a neutral country, Switzerland, unless such corporation was shown to be doing business in an enemy country or in the country of an ally of an enemy. Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457; Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A. G., supra. But on December 18,1941, Congress amended the Trading with the Enemy Act by the passage of the First War Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839, and gave respondent power to vest any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof in said property. However, under § 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, one not an enemy, as defined in § 2 of said Act, can recover any interest, right, or title which he has in the property so vested. As construed by this Court in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A. G., supra, § 2 included in the word “enemy” all corporations affected with an “enemy taint.” Since we find petitioner to be so affected because of the direct and indirect control and domination by an enemy national, Wilhelm von Opel, petitioner cannot recover under § 9 (a). It is suggested that vested property must be returned unless there is proof of actual use of the property for economic warfare against the United States. The crucial fact is not the actual use by an enemy-tainted corporation of its power in economic warfare against the United States. It is the existence of that power that is controlling and against which the Government of the United States may move. The Government does not have to wait for the enemy to do its worst before it acts. Cf. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 at 306. As the District Court said, it would be difficult “to find a stronger case of enemy taint in vested property short of full ownership by an enemy than exists in this case. ■ The neutral aspect of ownership in the property is insignificant . . . .” 82 F. Supp. at 606. In view of the decision today in Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, ante, p. 156, consideration must be given to an effort of petitioner to open the case for the assertion of the rights of Fritz von Opel. Petitioner attempted at the end of the litigation in the District Court to have the case reopened for the purpose of asserting and establishing the nonenemy status of Fritz von Opel. Because of the failure to diligently and timely assert the interest of Fritz, the District Court refused to reopen the case for further consideration of such separate interest. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as to petitioner, but in view of the novel holding in Kaufman, the Court is of the opinion that its decision in Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, is applicable. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the court below and remand the cause to the District Court for consideration, in the light of Kaufman and this opinion, of any application that may be made on behalf of Fritz von Opel within 30 days from the date of remand, and in all other respects the judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 4 ]	sc_adminaction
ALLEGHANY CORPORATION et al. v. BRESWICK & CO. et al. NO. 36. Argued January 23-24, 1957. Decided April 22, 1957. Whitney North Seymour argued the cause for the Al-leghany Corporation, appellant in No. 36. With him on the brief were David Hartfield, Jr., Edward K. Wheeler, Robert G. Seaks and Morton Moskin. Harold H. Levin argued the cause for Gruss et al., appellants in No. 36. With him on the brief were Joseph M. Proskauer and Allen L. Feinstein. Alexander Kahan argued the cause for Neuwirth, appellant in No. 36. With him on the brief was Arthur W. Lichtenstein. Robert W. Oinnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellant in No. 114. With him on the brief was B. Franklin Taylor, Jr. George Brussel, Jr. argued the cause for Breswick & Co. et al., appellees. Randolph Phillips, appellee, argued the cause pro se. They filed a brief in Nos. 36 and 114. Edward M. Garlock filed a Statement in Opposition to Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss for Baker, Weeks & Co. et al., appellants in No. 82. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen and Daniel M. Friedman filed a brief for the United States. Thomas G. Meeker, Joseph B. Levin and Aaron Levy filed a brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. These are direct appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 from a final judgment of a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of New York setting aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and restraining appellant Alleghany Corporation from issuing a new class of preferred stock that had been approved by the Commission. The case raises numerous questions regarding the jurisdiction and powers of the Commission, especially under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, for the understanding of which a rather detailed statement of the facts is necessary. Section 5 (2)(a), in its pertinent portions, provides: “It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission... (i)... for a person which is not a carrier to acquire control of two or more carriers through ownership of their stock or otherwise; or for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise... 54 Stat. 899, 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2) (a). Appellant Alleghany Corporation is a Maryland corporation whose charter provides for extensive powers of investment under no express limitation. After the passage of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-l et seq., Alleghany registered as an investment company with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In 1944, in connection with an application by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad for approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission of acquisition of the property of the Norfolk Terminal & Transportation Company, Alleghany, alleging that it controlled the Chesapeake & Ohio, filed a supplementary application with the Commission joining the Chesapeake & Ohio’s application and seeking approval of its own acquisition of control of the Terminal Company through the action of the Chesapeake & Ohio. In 1945, the Commission approved “acquisition of control” of the Terminal Company by the Chesapeake & Ohio and Alleghany as a transaction within § 5 (2) and further found that Alleghany “shall be considered as a carrier subject to the [reporting and securities] provisions of section 20 (1) to (10) and section 20a (2) to (11) of the act.” 261 I. C. C. 239, 262. Shortly thereafter, under the provisions of § 3 (c)(9) of the Investment Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission held that Alleghany was no longer an investment company within the meaning of the Investment Company Act. 20 S. E. C. 731. In March, April, and May 1954, several petitions and complaints were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission by the New York Central Railroad, a stockholder, a protective committee, and bondholder creditors of the Central, asserting violations of the law in Alleghany’s purchases of New York Central stock. In view of statements by Alleghany and Chesapeake & Ohio officials that Alleghany had disposed of its holdings of Chesapeake stock, that Commission, in June, ordered Alleghany to show cause why the 1945 order providing that Alleghany should be “considered as a carrier” should not be set aside. Alleghany replied that it would accept an order terminating its control of the Chesapeake & Ohio but requested delay until it could file a new application which, it alleged, would require the Commission’s approval and continuance of its status as a non-carrier to be “considered as a carrier” under the Interstate Commerce Act. The present proceedings were commenced by the filing of such an application by Alleghany and Central — after the ousting of the old Central management in May in a proxy fight. The contents of the application were described fully in the Report of Division 4 of the Commission: “The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company [the Big Four], the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Company [the Bridge Company or the Jeffersonville], The New York Central Railroad Company, and the Alleghany Corporation... on September 20, 1954, jointly applied under section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act... for approval and authorization of (1) (a) merger of the properties and franchises of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four for ownership, management, and operation; and (b) modification of the lease of January 2, 1930, under which Central, as lessee, operates the property of Big Four, lessor, to give effect to the acquisition of additional property pursuant to the proposed merger of Jefferson-ville into Big Four; (2) acquisition by Central and Alleghany, by virtue of their control of Big Four, of control of the properties of Jeffersonville; and (3) continuation of Alleghany’s status as a carrier subject to the provisions of section 20 (1) to (10), inclusive, and 20a (2) to (11), inclusive, of the act, as provided by section 5 (3) - thereof.” 290 I. C. C. 725-726. The Big Four already owned all the capital stock of the Jeffersonville. The Big Four itself had ceased to be an operating carrier in 1930; since then the New York Central has operated it as lessee. In addition, the New York Central owns 98.98% of the common, and 86.45% of the preferred, stock of the Big Four. On March 2, 1955, Division 4 of the Commission approved and authorized the merger of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four; approved continued control of the properties and franchises of the Jeffersonville by the Central and Alleghany; modified the lease between the Big Four and the Central; continued Alleghany as a non-carrier to be “considered as a carrier” subject to the reporting and securities provisions of the Act; and terminated the effective portions of the 1945 order in the Chesapeake & Ohio proceeding. 290 I. C. C. 725. On reconsideration, the whole Commission on May 24, 1955, affirmed the conclusions of Division 4. It held that Alleghany had acquired control over Central; that at the time the present application was filed, Alleghany was in fact “a person not a carrier which controlled an established system”; that the acquisition of control over the Central was not within § 5 (2)’s requirement of Commission approval; that the rearrangement by Central of its ownership or control of its subsidiaries was within § 5 (2)’s requirement of approval by the Commission and that Alleghany as the controlling party was a necessary party; and that the terms and conditions of the transactions were fair and reasonable. Rejecting the suggestion of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which had intervened, the whole Commission also held that it had no discretion to yield jurisdiction over Alleghany to the former agency. 295 I. C. C. 11. Subsequent to their application with respect to the Jeffersonville, Alleghany and Central, on December 17, 1954, filed an application under § 5 (2) to “acquire control” of the Boston & Albany Railroad Company, the Pittsfield and North Adams Railroad Corporation, and the Ware River Railroad Company thrpugh purchase by Central of their capital stock. The Central owned a little more than 16% of the Pittsfield’s capital stock and none of the capital stock of the other two railroads. It operated the properties of the Boston & Albany, the Pitts-field, and the Ware River under leases due to expire in 1999, 1975, and 2873 respectively. On March 22, 1955, less than three weeks after it had approved the application in the Jeffersonville proceeding, Division 4 of the Commission approved the acquisition of such control by Alleghany and Central. (Opinion not reported.) A third application filed by Alleghany, on February 18, 1955, sought permission from the Commission to issue a new 6% convertible preferred stock pursuant to a charter amendment, approved by all classes of Alleghany’s stockholders, that permitted consummation of Alleghany’s proposed plan of allowing its outstanding cumulative 5%% preferred stock to be exchanged for the new stock. On May 26, 1955, two days after the whole Commission affirmed Division 4’s orders in the Jeffersonville proceeding, Division 4 approved the new stock issue (conditioning its approval on modification of one term), and on June 22, the full Commission denied reconsideration. An action was then brought before a three-judge District Court by minority common stockholders of Alle-ghany to require the Commission to set aside its order granting Alleghany the status of a non-carrier to be “considered as a carrier” and its subsequent order approving the new class of preferred stock and to restrain Alleghany from issuing the new preferred stock. The three-judge District Court, convened under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 1337, 2321-2325, granted first a preliminary injunction, 134 F. Supp. 132 (Circuit Judge Hincks, dissenting), and then a permanent injunction setting aside the Commission’s order designating Alle-ghany as a “carrier” and also its order approving Alleghany’s new class of preferred stock, restraining its issue. 138 F. Supp. 123. Alleghany moved for a new trial based on the “acquisition of control” involved in the Boston & Albany proceeding. The District Court held that the Commission’s order in that proceeding gave no validity to the orders in the Jeffersonville proceeding because of the Commission’s failure to provide specifically in its Boston & Albany order that Alleghany should be “considered as a carrier.” 138 F. Supp., at 138. On appeal here from the final judgment below, we noted probable jurisdiction. 351 U. S. 903, 352 U. S.- 816. Alleghany urges initially that the Commission’s orders dealing with its status under the Interstate Commerce Act and dealing with its new preferred stock were not reviewable at the suit of appellees, that appellees had no standing. We find that appellees do have standing to challenge these orders. This is not a case where “the order under attack does not deal with the interests of investors,” or where the “injury feared is the indirect harm which may result to every stockholder from harm to the corporation.” Pittsburgh & W. Va. R. Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479, 487. The appellees are common stockholders of Alleghany. The new preferred stock issue approved by the Commission is convertible, and under relevant notions of standing, the threatened “dilution” of the equity of the common stockholders provided sufficient financial interest to give them standing. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U. S. 385, 388-389. Having acquired standing to institute proceedings in the District Court by virtue of the threatened financial injury, appellees could also attack the order of the Commission conferring on Alleghany the status of a person not a carrier but to be “considered as a carrier.” The status order was a source of the threatened financial injury. If the Commission acted out of bounds in decreeing its status order, it had no power to approve the new preferred stock issue and the plaintiffs would be entitled to relief. This brings us to the substantive issues in the litigation. In the main, these involve the jurisdiction of the Commission under §§ 5 (2) and 5 (3) of the Act, defining its powers. The validity of the status order under § 5 (3) turns on compliance with the statutory requirement of § 5 (2) of Commission approval “for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise....” Appellants Alleghany and the Commission contend that the Jeffersonville and the Boston & Albany transactions both support the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed with respect to the former and, as we have seen, p. 159, supra, found it unnecessary to pass on the latter. Whether the Jeffersonville transaction met the statutory requirement of § 5 (2) raises three questions. (1) Was Commission approval of Alleghany’s acquisition of control over Central required? (2) Did Alleghany in fact control Central? (3) Did the Jeffersonville transaction involve an acquisition of control by Alleghany over the properties of the Jeffersonville? The District Court held that whatever control Alle-ghany had over Central did not fit within the statutory requirement of “a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers” because the Commission had not given the approval necessary for acquisition of control of Central and its subsidiaries, “two or more carriers.” The Commission and Alleghany contend that Commission approval of the acquisition of a single, integrated system is not necessary. We need not decide this question, however, and intimate no opinion on it, for even if such approval is necessary, the statutory requirement of “a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers” refers to “control” and not to “approved control.” There seems to be no reason to read in the word “approved.” Such a holding would mean that the failure of a company engaging in a transaction requiring Commission approval to apply for that approval would deprive the Commission of jurisdiction. Remedies against a violator are provided by §5 (7), (8), and (9) of the Act. To punish a violator by depriving the Commission of jurisdiction over it would be indeed quixotic. As the Commission points out, the problem would appear clearer were Alleghany contesting, rather than acquiescing in, its jurisdiction. Control in fact then is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of § 5 (2). Division 4 of the Commission reported the following: “The capital stock of Central is widely held by the public, but control of its functions reposes in Alle-ghany and its officers as a result of a proxy contest preceding a stockholders’ meeting of May 26, 1954, at which the nominees chosen by Alleghany were elected as Central’s board of directors. Alleghany has an undivided half interest in 600,000 shares of Central stock with voting rights to the 600,000 shares under joint-ven ture agreements, and in addition, owns 15,500 shares. The voting rights of Alle-ghany represent almost 10 percent of the total shares of Central stock outstanding. The chairman of the board of directors of Alleghany, who holds the same position with Central, beneficially owns 100,200 shares of the latter’s stock. The president of Alle-ghany is a director of Central, and beneficially owns 300,100 shares of the latter’s stock. A vice president of Alleghany holds a similar position with Central.” 290 I. C. C., at 727. Division 4 recognized that “the present control of the Central system has passed to Alleghany by regular corporate procedures....” Id., at 741. The full Commission reached this conclusion: “The contention that Alleghany does not control the individual directors on Central's board ignores the realities of the situation. Alleghany and its allied interests have succeeded in electing sufficient members of the board to permit them to organize and elect their own officers. Clearly the tenure in office of such directors who permitted this action depends upon their conformance to the views of the stockholders who elected them. In our opinion the power thus reposing in Alleghany constitutes control of Central.” 295 I. C. C. 11, 16. The District Court, however, held that “if the Commission’s opinions contain a conclusion that Alleghany is in control of New York Central, those opinions lack sufficient findings to support that conclusion.” 134 F. Supp., at 147. It noted that the order of Division 4 “discloses the fact that Alleghany’s beneficial holdings of the Central stock are less than the combined individual holdings of Kirby, Young, Richardson and the Murchison group,” and concluded that “the findings do no more than say that Alleghany, with someone else, controls New York Central. They do not even say whether the someone else, alone, has control.” Ibid. We think that the District Court took too restricted a view of what constitutes “control.” In 1939, in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 145-146, arising under the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064, 1065, 47 U. S. C. § 152 (b), this Court rejected artificial tests for “control,” and left its determination in a particular case as a practical concept to the agency charged with enforcement. This was the broad scope designed for "control” as employed by Congress in the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899-900, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (3)(b). See United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U. S. 31, 38. That Act also added § 1 (3) (b) to the Interstate Commerce Act, providing: “For the purposes of [section] 5... of this Act, where reference is made to control (in referring to a relationship between any person or persons and another person or persons), such reference shall be construed to include actual as well as legal control, whether maintained or exercised through or by reason of the method of or circumstances surrounding organization or operation, through or by common directors, officers, or stockholders, a voting trust or trusts, a holding or investment company or companies, or through or by any other direct or indirect means; and to include the power to exercise control.” 54 Stat. 899-900, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (3) (b). Section 1 (3)(a) provides: “The term ‘person’ as used in this part includes an individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, company, association, or joint-stock association; and includes a trustee, receiver, assignee, or personal representative thereof.” 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C. §1(3) (a). The Commission’s findings, setting forth the events surrounding the proxy fight for control of Central, the common directors in both, the stockholdings of Alleghany’s officers and stockholders in Central, and the sworn statement of Central in the Central-Alleghany application that Central is controlled by Alleghany amply support its conclusion that “control” of Central was in Alleghany. See footnote 7, supra. The question remains whether the second portion of the statutory requirement of Commission approval “for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise...” has been met. What constitutes an acquisition of control? The District Court gave this restricted interpretation: “A merger of carriers may involve an acquisition of control by a non-carrier, where, through the merger, the non-carrier acquires control (direct or indirect) of a carrier or carrier property which the non-carrier had previously not controlled; United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U. S. 31.... But where, as in the instant case, the non-carrier (Alleghany) is (according to our assumption, argu-endo) already in indirect control of a carrier (Bridge Company), and the merger still leaves the non-carrier in indirect control of such property, no acquisition by the non-carrier results from the merger....” 138 F. Supp., at 127-128. We think that this is too narrow a reading of the statute. Not labels but the nature of the changed relation is crucial in determining whether a rearrangement within a railroad system constitutes an “acquisition of control” under §5(2). The Court has already considered twice what constitutes an “acquisition of control” under the Interstate Commerce Act. In New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, the Court interpreted § 5 (2) as it read in the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 481: “Whenever the Commission is of opinion... that the acquisition, to the extent indicated by the Commission, by one of such carriers of the control of any other such carrier or carriers either under a lease or by the purchase of stock or in any other manner not involving the consolidation of such carriers into a single system for ownership and operation, will be in the public interest, the Commission shall have authority by order to approve and authorize such acquisition, under such rules and regulations and for such consideration and on such terms and conditions as shall be found by the Commission to be just and reasonable in the premises.” In that ease the order of the Commission permitting the New York Central Railroad to acquire control, by lease, of the railroad systems of the Big Four and the Michigan Central Railroad Companies, was under review. Minority stockholders contended, inter alia, that the Commission could not authorize “acquisition of control” by lease since the Central had already acquired control of both railroads by stock ownership. The Court held that the “disjunctive phrasing of the statute ‘either under a lease or by the purchase of stock’ must be read in the light of its obvious purpose and cannot be taken to mean that one method must be exclusive of the other.” 287 U. S., at 23. Nowhere did it intimate that the lease was not an “acquisition of control,” even though the Central already had stock ownership control of both railroads. In fact, the refusal to set aside the Commission’s order necessarily involved approval of the Commission’s finding of an “acquisition of control,” and the Court further stated: “The public interest is served by economy and efficiency in operation. If the expected advantages are inadequately secured by stock ownership and would be better secured by lease, the statute affords no basis for the contention that the latter may not be authorized although the former exists. The fact that one precedes the other cannot be regarded as determinative if the desired coordination is not otherwise obtainable.” Ibid. The Transportation Acts of 1933, 48 Stat. 211, and 1940, 54 Stat. 898, rewrote § 5 but retained the “acquisition of control” language, except that the phrase relating to method of acquisition — “under a lease or by the purchase of stock or in any other manner not involving the consolidation of such carriers into a single system”— became, for acquisitions by both carriers and non-carriers, an all-inclusive phrase in the 1940 Act — “through ownership of their stock or otherwise.” These changes do not lessen the authority of the New York Central Securities case in the scope to be given to an “acquisition of control.” In United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U. S. 31, the Court interpreted § 5, as amended by the 1940 Act, 54 Stat. 899, 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5. The Court held that the non-carrier parent (Union) of a carrier (Refiners) that proposed to purchase the property and franchises of another carrier (Marshall) “acquired control” of the property and franchises of the vendor and was therefore subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. The substantive issues in that case were of course different from those of the present case, since there had been no prior relation between the non-carrier parent and the vendor-carrier. In reaching its decision, however, the Court was explicit regarding the purpose of § 5: “It is not doubted that if Union, having control of Refiners, sought to acquire stock control of Marshall, Union would be required by § 5 (2) (b) to apply for the Commission’s authority to do so. But it is said that having control of Refiners, Union may, by procuring Refiners’ compliance with the purchase provisions of the statute alone, extend its control indefinitely to other carriers merely by directing the purchase of their property and business by Refiners, without subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission as provided in § 5 (3), so long as Union does not act directly as the purchaser of the property or of a controlling stock interest in such other carriers. “We think that neither the language nor the legislative history of the statute admits of so narrow a construction. Section 5 (4) makes it unlawful, without the approval of the Commission as provided by § 5 (2) (a), for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise. Not only is- this language broad enough in terms to embrace the acquisition of control by a non-carrier through the purchase, by a controlled carrier, of the property and business of another carrier, but the legislative history indicates that such was its purpose.” Id., at 36-37. See also id., at 37-40. In other words, a non-carrier may not gain “control” over carriers free of Commission regulation merely by operating through subsidiaries. The crux of each inquiry to determine whether there has been an “acquisition of control” is the nature of the change in relations between the companies whose proposed transaction is before the Commission for approval. Does the transaction accomplish a significant increase in the power of one over the other, for example, an increased voice in management or operation, or the ability to accomplish financial transactions or operational changes with greater legal ease? This is the issue, and not the immediacy or remoteness of the parent from the proposed transaction, for, as we said in the Marshall Transport case, the parent can always, by operating through subsidiaries, make itself more remote. In deciding this type of issue, of course, the finding of the Commission that a given transaction does or does not constitute a significant increase in the power of one company over another is not to be overruled so long as “there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body....” Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 146. The principal issue, therefore, in the Jeffersonville proceeding is not Alleghany’s remoteness from, or closeness to, the proposed transaction but rather the nature of the proposed transaction itself. The Big Four, whose stock was largely owned by Central, owned all the stock of the Jeffersonville. (By agreement between the Big Four and the Central, this stock was held by the Central.) The proposal was to merge the Jeffersonville into the Big Four. While the immediate practical effects of the merger on the operation of the Jeffersonville might be small, even minimal, a merger is the ultimate in one company obtaining control over another. So long as the Jeffersonville existed as a separate company, there was always the possibility that the Big Four, through the Central, might sell, or be forced to divest itself of, the Jeffersonville stock, and that the control of the Jeffersonville might thus pass to another railroad. In considering this possibility, it is important to note that the Jeffersonville does not connect physically with the Big Four but connects with it only by virtue of the Big Four’s trackage rights over the Baltimore & Ohio, and that the Jeffersonville, with its few miles of track, also connects with the Pennsylvania, Baltimore & Ohio, Louisville & Nashville, Illinois Central, and Chesapeake & Ohio Railroads. The merger of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four virtually precludes any change in the relation of the Jeffer-sonville lines to the Central system. The Jeffersonville will be no more. In view of this, it cannot reasonably be said that there has been no increase in the power of the Big Four, the Central, and, through its relation with them, Alleghany over the Jeffersonville. While it is not always profitable to analogize “fact” to “fiction,” La Fontaine’s fable of the crow, the cheese, and the fox demonstrates that there is a substantial difference between holding a piece of cheese in the beak and putting it in the stomach. Denial of power to the Commission to regulate the elimination of the Jeffersonville from the national transportation scene would be a disregard of the responsibility placed on it by Congress to oversee combinations and consolidations of carriers and “to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers...” and the further requirement that “All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., preceding § 1. We hold that the Commission was justified in finding that the merger of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four involved an “acquisition of control” of the Jeffersonville by Central and Alleghany within the meaning of § 5 (2) of the Act. Since the status order of the Commission is supportable by virtue of the Jeffersonville proceeding, we need not consider the District Court’s denial of Alleghany’s motion, based on the Boston & Albany proceeding, for a new trial. Several other matters urged by appellees remain to be considered. Appellees contend that Alleghany did not acquire control of any carrier in the Jeffersonville proceeding since the application was made by the Big Four as lessor and	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 65 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION v. LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD CO. et al. No. 80-1925. Argued January 20, 1982 Decided March 24, 1982 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Edward D. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert Hart and Harold A. Ross. Lewis B. Kaden argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mary P. Bass and Thomas M. Taranto. Joshua I. Schwartz argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., Lois G. Williams, Joseph Woodward, and Ronald M. Etters J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by William T. Coleman, Jr., Donald T. Bliss, and Zoé E. Baird, for the American Public Transit Association; by Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Benjamin L. Brown, John Dekker, James B. Brennan, George Agnost, Roger F. Cutler, Lee E. Holt, George F. Knox, Jr., Walter M. Powell, Allen G. Schwartz, J. Lamar Shelley, John W. Witt, Max P. Zall, Conard B. Mattox, Jr., and Charles S. Rhyne for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers; and by Ross D. Davis for the National League of Cities. Martin L. Barr, Jerome Thier, and Anthony Cagliostro filed a brief for the New York State Public Employment Relations Board as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad engaged in interstate commerce. I The Long Island Rail Road (the Railroad), incorporated m 1834, provides both freight and passenger service to Long Island. In 1966, after 132 years of private ownership and a period of steadily growing operating deficits, the Railroad was acquired by New York State through the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Thereafter, the Railroad continued to conduct collective bargaining pursuant to the procedures of the Railway Labor Act. 44 Stat. (part 2) 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The United Transportation Union, petitioner in this case, represents the Railroad’s conductors, brakemen, switchmen, firemen, motormen, collectors, and related train crew employees. In 1978, the Union notified the Railroad that it desired to commence negotiations and the parties began collective bargaining as provided by the Act. They failed to reach agreement during preliminary negotiations and, in April 1979, the Railroad and the Union jointly petitioned the National Mediation Board for assistance. Seven months of mediation efforts by the Board failed to produce agreement, however, and the Board released the case from mediation. This triggered a 30-day cooling-off period under the Act; absent Presidential intervention, the Act permits the parties to resort to economic weapons, including strikes, upon the expiration of the cooling-off period. The Union anticipated the State’s challenge to the applicability of the Act to the Railroad; on December 7, 1979, one day before the expiration of the 30-day cooling-off period, it sued in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the dispute was covered by the Railway Labor Act and not the Taylor Law, New York’s law governing public employee collective bargaining and prohibiting strikes by public employees. The next day, the Union commenced what was to be a brief strike. Pursuant to the Act, the President of the United States intervened on December 14, thus imposing an additional 60-day cooling-off period which was to expire on February 13, 1980. A few days before the expiration of the 60-day period*- the State converted the Railroad from a private stock corporation to a public benefit corporation, apparently believing that the change would eliminate Railway Labor Act coverage and bring the employees under the umbrella of the Taylor Law. The Railroad then filed suit in state court on February 13, 1980, seeking to enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law. Before the state court acted, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York heard and decided the Union’s suit for declaratory relief, holding that the Railroad was a carrier subject to the Railway Labor Act, that the Act, rather than the Taylor Law, was applicable, and that declaratory relief was in order. 509 F. Supp. 1300 (1980). In a footnote the District Court rejected the argument now presented to this Court that application of the Act to a state-owned railroad was inconsistent with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). 509 F. Supp., at 1306, n. 4. The District Court noted that in National League of Cities, the Supreme Court “specifically held that the operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an integral part of governmental activity” and affirmed the rulings in California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), and United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), which held that the Railway Labor Act and the Safety Appliance Act could be applied to state-owned railroads. 509 F. Supp., at 1306, n. 4. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the operation of the Railroad was an integral state governmental function and that the federal Act displaced “essential governmental decisions” involving that function. 634 F. 2d 19 (CA2 1980). The court applied a balancing approach and held that the State’s interest in controlling the operation of its railroad outweighed the federal interest in having the federal Act apply. We granted certiorari, 452 U. S. 960 (1981), and we reverse. II There can be no serious question that, as both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held, the Railroad is subject to the terms of the Railway Labor Act, or that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the plenary authority to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry in general. This dispute concerns the application of this acknowledged congressional authority to a state-owned railroad; we must decide whether that application so impairs the ability of the State to carry out its constitutionally preserved sovereign function as to come into conflict with the Tenth Amendment. A The Railroad claims immunity from the Railway Labor Act, relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, where we held that Congress could not impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and local governments. The Fair Labor Standards Act generally requires covered employers to pay employees no less than a minimum hourly wage and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for all time worked in any workweek in excess of 40 hours. Prior to 1974, the Act excluded most governmental employers. However in that year Congress amended the law to extend its provisions in somewhat modified form to “public agencies,” including state governments and their political subdivisions. We held that the 1974 amendments were invalid “insofar as [they] operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions . . . .” 426 U. S., at 852. (Emphasis supplied.) Only recently we had occasion to apply the National League of Cities doctrine in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In holding that the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), did not violate the Tenth Amendment by usurping state authority over land-use regulations, we set out a three-prong test to be applied in evaluating claims under National League of Cities: “[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the challenged regulation regulates the ‘States as States.’ [426 U. S.], at 854. Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably ‘attributes of state sovereignty.’ Id., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that the States’ compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.’ Id., at 852.” 452 U. S., at 287-288. The key prong of the National League of Cities test applicable to this case is the third one, which examines whether “the States’ compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.’” B The determination of whether a federal law impairs a state’s authority with respect to “areas of traditional [state] functions” may at times be a difficult one. In this case, however, we do not write on a clean slate. As the District Court noted, in National League of Cities we explicitly reaffirmed our holding in United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), and in two other cases involving federal regulation of railroads: “The holding of United States v. California ... is quite consistent with our holding today. There California’s activity to which the congressional command was directed was not in an area that the States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities. It was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged in ‘common carriage by rail in interstate commerce . . . .’ 297 U. S., at 182.” 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18. It is thus clear that operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is not an integral part of traditional state activities generally immune from federal regulation under National League of Cities. See also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 422-424 (1978) (concurring opinion). The Long Island is concededly a railroad engaged in interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals undertook to distinguish the three railroad cases discussed in National League of Cities, noting that they dealt with freight carriers rather than primarily passenger railroads such as the Long Island. That distinction does not warrant a different result, however. Operation of passenger railroads, no less than operation of freight railroads, has traditionally been a function of private industry, not state or local governments. It is certainly true that some passenger railroads have come under state control in recent years, as have several freight lines, but that does not alter the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by state and local governments. Federal regulation of state-owned railroads simply does not impair a state’s ability to function as a state. Ill In concluding that the operation of a passenger railroad is not among those governmental functions generally immune from federal regulation under National League of Cities, we are not merely following dicta of that decision or looking only to the past to determine what is “traditional.” In essence, National League of Cities held that under most circumstances federal power to regulate commerce could not be exercised in such a manner as to undermine the role of the states in our federal system. This Court’s emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal regulation. Rather it was meant to require an inquiry into whether the federal regulation affects basic state prerogatives in such a way as would be likely to hamper the state government’s ability to fulfill its role in the Union and endanger its “separate and independent existence.” 426 U. S., at 851. Just as the Federal Government cannot usurp traditional state functions, there is no justification for a rule which would allow the states, by acquiring functions previously performed by the private sector, to erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation. Railroads have been subject to comprehensive federal regulation for nearly a century. The Interstate Commerce Act— the first comprehensive federal regulation of the industry— was passed in 1887. A year earlier we had held that only the Federal Government, not the states, could regulate the interstate rates of railroads. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886). The first federal statute dealing with railroad labor relations was the Arbitration Act of 1888; the provisions of that Act were invoked by President Cleveland in reaction to the Pullman strike of 1894. Federal mediation of railroad labor disputes was first provided by the Erdman Act of 1898 and strengthened by the Newlands Act of 1913. In 1916, Congress mandated the 8-hour day in the railroad industry. After federal operation of the railroads during World War I, Congress passed the Transportation Act of 1920, which further enhanced federal involvement in railroad labor relations. Finally, in 1926, Congress passed the Railway Labor Act, which was jointly drafted by representatives of the railroads and the railroad unions. The Act has been amended a number of times since 1926, but its basic structure has remained intact. The Railway Labor Act thus has provided the framework for collective bargaining between all interstate railroads and their employees for the past 56 years. There is no comparable history of longstanding state regulation of railroad collective bargaining or of other aspects of the railroad industry. Moreover, the Federal Government has determined that a uniform regulatory scheme is necessary to the operation of the national rail system. In particular, Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor relations is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy. A disruption of service on any portion of the interstate railroad system can cause serious problems throughout the system. Congress determined that the most effective means of preventing such disruptions is by way of requiring and facilitating free collective bargaining between railroads and the labor organizations representing their employees. Rather than absolutely prohibiting strikes, Congress decided to assure equitable settlement of railroad labor disputes, and thus prevent interruption of rail service, by providing mediation and imposing cooling-off periods, thus creating “an almost interminable” collective-bargaining process. Detroit & T.S.L.R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 149 (1969). “[T]he procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute.” Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E.C.R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966). To allow individual states, by acquiring railroads, to circumvent the federal system of railroad bargaining, or any of the other elements of federal regulation of railroads, would destroy the uniformity thought essential by Congress and would endanger the efficient operation of the interstate rail system. In addition, a state acquiring a railroad does so knowing that the railroad is subject to this longstanding and comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of its operations and its labor relations. See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S., at 568. Here the State acquired the Railroad with full awareness that it was subject to federal regulation under the Railway Labor Act. At the time of the acquisition, a spokesman stated: “We just have a new owner and a new board of directors. We’re under the Railway Labor Act, just as we’ve always been. The people do not become state employes, they remain railroad employes and retain all the benefits and drawbacks of that.” The parties proceeded along those premises for the next 13 years, with both sides making use of the procedures available under the Railway Labor Act, and with Railroad employees covered by the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Conversely, Railroad employees were not eligible for any of the retirement, insurance, or job security benefits of state employees. The State knew of and accepted the federal regulation; moreover, it operated under federal regulation for 13 years without claiming any impairment of its traditional sovereignty. Indeed, the State’s initial response to this suit was to acknowledge that the Railway Labor Act applied. It can thus hardly be maintained that application of the Act to the State’s operation of the Railroad is likely to impair the State’s ability to fulfill its role in the Union or to endanger the “separate and independent existence” referred to in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 851. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. The Railroad’s western terminus is Pennsylvania Station in Manhattan; there it connects with lines of railroads which serve other parts of the country. The eastern terminus is at Montauk Point, at the tip of Long Island, but most of its main and branch line'traffic originates in the western half of Long Island, in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, and in the suburbs of Nassau and western Suffolk Counties. By far the bulk of the Railroad’s business is carrying commuters between Long Island’s suburban communities and their places of employment in New York City. However, the Railroad supplies Long Island’s only freight service; it does a significant volume of freight business, with 1979 freight revenue of over $12 million. On January 17,1980, the Railroad responded to the Union’s suit for declaratory judgment by asserting that no justiciable controversy existed because the Railroad did not believe the Taylor Law applied and therefore had no intention to invoke its provisions. The Presidential intervention also triggered the creation of a Presidential Emergency Board to investigate and report on the matter. The Railroad acknowledges in its brief that its freight service, which is admittedly engaged in interstate commerce, “eliminat[es] any dispute regarding its coverage by the RLA.” Brief for Respondents 23. In the Court of Appeals, the Railroad maintained that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state-owned passenger railroads. 634 F. 2d, at 23. Whatever merit that claim may have had, it is no longer tenable. After that court rendered its decision, Congress amended the Act to add § 9a, 95 Stat. 681, 45 U. S. C. § 159a (1976 ed., Supp. V). Section 9a establishes special procedures to be applied to any dispute “between a publicly funded and publicly operated carrier providing rail commuter service . . . and its employees.” See Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930). The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. 88 Stat. 55. The 1974 amendments modified several of the definitions contained in 29 U. S. C. § 203. However, even if these three requirements are met, the federal statute is not automatically unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. The federal interest may still be so great as to “justiffy] state submission.” 452 U. S., at 288, n. 29. Cf. Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946). Farden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957). “[T]here [is] certainly no question that a Stated operation of a common carrier, even without profit and as a ‘public function,’ would be subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. . . . “The National League of Cities opinion focused its delineation of the ‘attributes of sovereignty1... on a determination as to whether the State’s interest involved ‘functions essential to separate and independent existence.’ [426 U. S., at 845], quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 580 (1911). It should be evident, I would think, that the running of a business enterprise is not an integral operation in the area of traditional government functions. . . . Indeed, the reaffirmance of the holding in United States v. California, supra, by National League of Cities, supra, at 854, n. 18, strongly supports this understanding.” 435 U. S., at 422-424 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and in judgment). At the time of this suit, there were 17 commuter railroads in the United States; only 2 of those railroads were publicly owned and operated, both by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. American Public Transit Assn., Transit Fact Book 74-75 (1979). Those two public railroads — the Long Island and the Staten Island — were originally private railroads. The Staten Island was founded in 1899 and acquired by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 1971. Moody’s Transportation Manual 97 (1979). The initial exercise of the federal authority over railroads occurred before the completion of the first transcontinental railroad. See the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862. 12 Stat. 489. Of course, federal regulation of interstate transportation goes back many more years than that. See the 1793 Act regulating coastal trade discussed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). 24 Stat. 379. Ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501. 30 Stat. 424. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103. Adamson Act of 1916, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721. 41 Stat. 456. Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. (part 2) 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The purposes of the Railway Labor Act are set out in §2 of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151a: “The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Under the recent amendments to the Act, adding a new § 9a, 95 Stat. 68, 45 U. S. C. § 159a (1976 ed., Supp. V), the process has been made even more “long and drawn out” insofar as it applies to publicly owned commuter rail lines such as the Long Island. The law now provides for a “cooling-off period” of up to 240 days after failure of mediation. Any party to the dispute, or the Governor of any state through which the rail service operates, may request appointment of a Presidential Emergency Board to investigate and report on the dispute. If the dispute is not settled within 60 days after creation of the Emergency Board, the National Mediation Board must hold a public hearing at which each party must appear and explain any refusal to accept the Emergency Board’s recommendations. The law then requires appointment of a second Emergency Board at the request of any party or Governor of an affected state. That Emergency Board must examine the final offers submitted by each party and must determine which is the most reasonable. Finally, if a work stoppage occurs, substantial penalties are provided against the party refusing to accept the offer determined by the Emergency Board to be most reasonable.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 82 ]	sc_adminaction
SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT WALPOLE v. HILL et al. No. 84-438. Argued March 25, 1985 Decided June 17, 1985 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, -post, p. 457. Barbara A. H. Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Martin E. Levin, Assistant Attorney General. Jamie Ann Sabino, by appointment of the Court, 469 U. S. 1084, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Richard B. Klibaner. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Kathleen A. Felton; and for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold Overoye, Assistant Attorney General, William George Prahl and Susan J. Orton, Deputy Attorneys General, Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Anthony B. Ching, Solicitor General, Joseph L. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Cornelius Tuohy, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Lilly, Attorney General of Hawaii, Neil Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, David Armstrong, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Lewis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Attorney General of Mississippi, Robert L. Gibbs, Assistant Attorney General, John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, John M. Morris, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Paul Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, John Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, Gerald L. Baliles, Attorney General of Virginia, and A. G. McGlintoek, Attorney General of Wyoming. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Massachusetts inmates who comply with prison rules can accumulate good time credits that reduce the term of imprisonment. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 127, § 129 (West 1974). Such credits may be lost “if a prisoner violates any rule of his place of confinement.” Ibid. The question presented is whether revocation of an inmate’s good time credits violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the decision of the prison disciplinary board is not supported by evidence in the record. We conclude that where good time credits constitute a protected liberty interest, a decision to revoke such credits must be supported by some evidence. Because the record in this case contains sufficient evidence to support the decision of the disciplinary board, we reverse. I — I Respondents Gerald Hill and Joseph Crawford are inmates at a state prison in Walpole, Mass. In May 1982, they each received prison disciplinary reports charging them with assaulting another inmate. At separate hearings for each inmate, a prison disciplinary board heard testimony from a prison guard, Sergeant Maguire, and received his written disciplinary report. According to the testimony and report, Maguire heard an inmate twice say loudly, “What’s going on?” The voice came from a walkway that Maguire could partially observe through a window. Maguire immediately opened the door to the walkway and found an inmate named Stephens bleeding from the mouth and suffering from a swollen eye. Dirt was strewn about the walkway, and Maguire viewed this to be further evidence of a scuffle. He saw three inmates, including respondents, jogging away together down the walkway. There were no other inmates in the area, which was enclosed by a chain link fence. Maguire concluded that one or more of the three inmates had assaulted Stephens and that they had acted as a group. Ma-guire also testified at Hill’s hearing that a prison “medic” had told him that Stephens had been beaten. Hill and Crawford each declared their innocence before the disciplinary board, and Stephens gave written statements that the other inmates had not caused his injuries. After hearing the evidence in each case, the disciplinary board found respondents guilty of violating prison regulations based on their involvement in the assault. App. 19, 27. The board recommended that Hill and Romano each lose 100 days of good time and be confined in isolation for 15 days. Respondents unsuccessfully appealed the board’s action to the superintendent of the prison. Id., at 23, 30. They then filed a complaint in the Superior Court, State of Massachusetts, alleging that the decisions of the board violated their constitutional rights because “there was no evidence to confirm that the incident took place nor was there any evidence to state that if the incident did take place the [respondents] were involved.” Id., at 10. After reviewing the record, the Superior Court concluded that “the Board’s finding of guilty rested, in each case, on no evidence constitutionally adequate to support that finding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 8b. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for respondents and ordered that the findings of the disciplinary board be voided and the lost good time restored. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 392 Mass. 198, 466 N. E. 2d 818 (1984). Inmates who observe prison rules, the state court noted, have a statutory right to good time credits and the loss of such credits affects a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 201, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821. The Supreme Judicial Court then observed that an entitlement to “judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the board’s findings” logically follows from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974). 392 Mass., at 201, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821. Without deciding whether the appropriate standard of review is “some evidence” or the stricter test of “substantial evidence,” id., at 203, n. 5, 466 N. E. 2d, at 822, n. 5, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the trial judge that the record failed to present even “some evidence which, if believed, would rationally permit the board’s findings.” Id., at 203, 466 N. E. 2d, at 822 (footnote omitted). The Massachusetts Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of certiorari urging this Court to decide whether prison inmates have a due process right to judicial review of prison disciplinary proceedings or, alternatively, whether the standard of review applied by the state court was more stringent than is required by the Due Process Clause. Pet. for Cert, i, 20-21. We granted the petition, 469 U. S. 1016 (1984), and we now reverse. II Petitioner first argues that the state court erred by holding that there is a constitutional right to judicial review of the sufficiency of evidence where good time credits are revoked in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973) (per curiam), petitioner contends, found no denial of due process where a filing fee prevented claimants from obtaining judicial review of an administrative decision reducing welfare payments. Petitioner urges that a similar conclusion should apply here: respondents were afforded all the process due when they received a hearing before the disciplinary board. Cf. id., at 659-660 (pretermination eviden-tiary hearing met requirements of due process despite lack of judicial review). Respondents answer by noting decisions of this Court which suggest that due process might require some form of judicial review of administrative decisions that threaten constitutionally protected liberty or property interests. See, e. g., St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51-52 (1936); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284-285 (1922). The extent to which legislatures may commit to an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights is a difficult question of constitutional law. See, e. g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 109 (1977); 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28:3 (2d ed. 1984); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362,1375-1378,1388-1391 (1953). The per curiam opinion in Ortwein did not purport to resolve this question definitively; nor are we disposed to construe that case as implicitly holding that due process would never require some form of judicial review of determinations made in prison disciplinary proceedings. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting) (“under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process”). Whether the Constitution requires judicial review is only at issue if such review is otherwise barred, and we will not address the constitutional question unless it is necessary to the resolution of the case before the Court. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974). Assuming, arguendo, that a decision revoking good time credits would violate due process if it were not supported by some modicum of evidence, we need not decide today whether the Constitution also requires judicial review of a challenge to a decision on such grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court correctly observed, 392 Mass., at 201, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821, that this Court has not previously held that the Due Process Clause creates a right to judicial review of prison disciplinary proceedings. Although the opinion of the state court does speak in terms of a constitutional entitlement, careful examination of that opinion persuades us that judicial review was available to respondents pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 249, §4 (West Supp. 1984), which provides in pertinent part: “A civil action in the nature of certiorari to correct errors in proceedings which are not according to the course of the common law, which proceedings are not otherwise reviewable by motion or by appeal, may be brought in the supreme judicial or superior court.” Petitioner notes that there is no statutory provision for judicial review of decisions by a prison disciplinary board. Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court has observed that “ ‘[i]n the absence of a statutory method of judicial review, certiorari is an appropriate mode for correcting errors of law arising out of an administrative action.”’ Taunton Eastern Little League v. Taunton, 389 Mass. 719, 720, n. 1, 452 N. E. 2d 211, 212, n. 1 (1983), quoting Reading v. Attorney General, 362 Mass. 266, 269, 285 N. E. 2d 429, 431 (1972). In the present case, the Supreme Judicial Court expressly stated that respondents, who framed their complaints as petitions for a “‘writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum,”’ should have brought civil actions pursuant to § 4. 392 Mass., at 199, n. 2, 466 N. E. 2d, at 819, n. 2. The state court supported this conclusion by citing its previous decision in Boston Edison Co. v. Board of Selectmen of Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 242 N. E. 2d 868 (1968), and the decision of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts in Cepulonis v. Commissioner of Correction, 15 Mass. App. 292, 445 N. E. 2d 178 (1983). Boston Edison relied on §4 to review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support decisions by town selectmen denying rights-of-way for power lines. At the time Boston Edison was decided, § 4 allowed a party to petition the Supreme Judicial Court for a writ of certiorari on a claim “that the evidence which formed the basis of the action complained of or the basis of any specified finding or conclusion was as a matter of law insufficient to warrant such action, finding or conclusion.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 249, §4 (West 1959). Petitioner correctly informed this Court that the quoted phrase and the writ of certiorari were abolished by 1973 amendments to §4, 1973 Mass. Acts, ch. 1114, § 289. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 50-51. Somewhat inexplicably, petitioner failed to add that the 1973 amendments substituted “ ‘a civil action in the nature of certiorari’ ” for the previously available writ, and did not narrow the relief formerly obtainable under the statute. See, e. g., Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 374 Mass. 37, 47-49, 371 N. E. 2d 728, 737-738 (1977). The second decision cited by the Supreme Judicial Court, Cepulonis, construed an inmate’s challenge to a finding of a prison disciplinary board “as seeking review in the nature of certiorari” under §4. 15 Mass. App., at 292, 445 N. E. 2d, at 178. Cepulonis did not address a due process claim; instead, the inmate contended that the disciplinary board’s finding was not supported by “reliable evidence” as required by regulations of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections. Id., at 293, 445 N. E. 2d, at 179. Thus, Boston Edison and Cepulonis relied on § 4 to provide an avenue for judicial review where an adjudicatory decision by a nonjudicial body was challenged as not supported by sufficient evidence. In those cases, the aggrieved parties argued that the evidence was insufficient to meet standards imposed by state law. See also 1001 Plays, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 879, 444 N. E. 2d 931 (1983) (§4 challenge to sufficiency of evidence to support denial of license for video game arcade); McSweeney v. Town Manager of Lexington, 379 Mass. 794, 401 N. E. 2d 113 (1980) (noting that appropriate standard varies according to nature of action sought to be reviewed). Nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court in this case suggests that §4 would be unavailable where a party alleges that evidence is insufficient under a standard imposed by the Federal Constitution. Cf. 392 Mass., at 202-203, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821-822 (failure to provide for review under state Administrative Procedure Act does not indicate legislative intent to preclude judicial review of sufficiency of evidence for disciplinary board decisions). Indeed, previous decisions by the Supreme Judicial Court indicate that §4 provides a means of review in state court where an administrative decision is challenged on federal constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Taunton Eastern Little League v. Taunton, supra, at 720-722, 452 N. E. 2d, at 212-213 (Establishment Clause challenge to rescission, of beano license). We therefore interpret the opinion of the state court as holding that §4 provides a mechanism for judicial review of respondents’ claims. Given the rule of judicial restraint requiring us to avoid unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues, see, e. g., Ashwander v. TWA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring), we decline to decide in this case whether due process would require judicial review. r — H HH h-4 The issue we address is whether findings of a prison disciplinary board that result in the loss of good time credits must be supported by a certain amount of evidence in order to satisfy due process. Petitioner argues that the Supreme Judicial Court applied too strict a standard in reviewing the decision of the disciplinary board and that such decisions should be upheld unless they are arbitrary and capricious. Brief for Petitioner 5, 19-21; Pet. for Cert. i, 20-21. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), the Court held that due process requires procedural protections before a prison inmate can be deprived of a protected liberty interest in good time credits. Petitioner does not challenge the holding below that Massachusetts law creates a liberty interest in good time credits. See also Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 456 N. E. 2d 1100 (1983) (statutory good time credits constitute a liberty interest protected by due process). Accordingly, we proceed on the assumption that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the loss of the good time credits involved here, and direct our inquiry to the nature of the constitutionally required procedures. Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits, Wolff held that the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. 418 U. S., at 563-567. Although Wolff did not require either judicial review or a specified quantum of evidence to support the factfinder’s decision, the Court did note that “the provision for a written record helps to assure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental human rights may have been abridged, will act fairly.” Id., at 565. We now hold that revocation of good time does not comport with “the minimum requirements of procedural due process,” id., at 558, unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record. The requirements of due process are flexible and depend on a balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government action. E. g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). Where a prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits, the loss of such credits threatens his prospective freedom from confinement by extending the length of imprisonment. Thus the inmate has a strong interest in assuring that the loss of good time credits is not imposed arbitrarily. 418 U. S., at 561. This interest, however, must be accommodated in the distinctive setting of a prison, where disciplinary proceedings “take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so.” Ibid. Consequently, in identifying the safeguards required by due process, the Court has recognized the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners, avoiding burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation, and preserving the disciplinary process as a means of rehabilitation. See, e. g., Ponte v. Real, 471 U. S. 491 (1985); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 321-322 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 562-563. Requiring a modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue administrative burdens. In a variety of contexts, the Court has recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence. See, e. g., Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430, 432 (1973) (per curiam) (revocation of probation); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 239 (1957) (denial of admission to bar); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927) (deportation). Because the written statement mandated by Wolff requires a disciplinary board to explain the evidence relied upon, recognizing that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision to revoke good time credits will not impose significant new burdens on proceedings within the prison. Nor does it imply that a disciplinary board’s factual findings or decisions with respect to appropriate punishment are subject to second-guessing upon review. We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if “there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .” United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S., at 106. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See ibid.; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133-134 (1924); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F. 2d 1011, 1018 (CA8 1974). We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement. Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances. See Wolff, 418 U. S., at 562-563, 567-569. The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact. Revocation of good time credits is not comparable to a criminal conviction, id., at 556, and neither the amount of evidence necessary to support such a conviction, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), nor any other standard greater than some evidence applies in this context. IV Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that the evidence before the disciplinary board was sufficient to meet the requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause. The disciplinary board received evidence in the form of testimony from the prison guard and copies of his written report. That evidence indicated that the guard heard some commotion and, upon investigating, discovered an inmate who evidently had just been assaulted. The guard saw three other inmates fleeing together down an enclosed walkway. No other inmates were in the area. The Supreme Judicial Court found that this evidence was constitutionally insufficient because it did not support an inference that more than one person had struck the victim or that either of the respondents was the assailant or otherwise participated in the assault. 392 Mass., at 203-204, 466 N. E. 2d, at 822. This conclusion, however, misperceives the nature of the evidence required by the Due Process Clause. The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Instead, due process in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing. Although the evidence in this case might be characterized as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Respondents relied only upon the Federal Constitution, and did not claim that the disciplinary board’s findings failed to meet evidentiary standards imposed by state law. See id., at 199, n. 2, 466 N. E. 2d, at 819, n. 2; Brief for Respondents 17. Because the determination of the disciplinary board was not so lacking in evidentiary support as to violate due process, the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
DUSENBERY v. UNITED STATES No. 00-6567. Argued October 29, 2001 Decided January 8, 2002 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. GiNsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 173. Allison M. Zieve, by appointment of the Court, 532 U. S. 940, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Alan B. Morrison. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and William C. Brown. Julia M. Carpenter filed a brief for the DKT Liberty Project as amicus curiae urging reversal. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the adequacy of the means employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to provide notice to a federal prisoner of his right to contest the administrative forfeiture of property seized during the execution of a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. In April 1986, officers of the FBI arrested petitioner Larry Dean Dusenbery at a house trailer in Atwater, Ohio. Later that day, they obtained and executed a search warrant, seizing drugs, drug paraphernalia, several firearms, a ballistic knife, an automobile registered in the name of petitioner's stepmother, and various other items of personal property. Among these was $21,989 in cash, $394 of which had been found on petitioner’s person, $7,600 in the inside pocket of a coat in the dining area and $14,045 in a briefcase found on the floor in the living room. Two months later, petitioner pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to a charge of possession with intent to distribute 813 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1) (1988 ed.). He was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment followed by 6 years of special parole. Two years later, the United States, no longer expecting the firearms and knife to be used as evidence in a future prosecution, and unable to determine their rightful owner, sought and obtained an order from the District Court authorizing the FBI to destroy them. The FBI also began the process of administratively forfeiting the cash and the automobile. At this time, designated agents of the FBI were allowed to dispose of property seized pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. §801 et seq. (1988 ed.), without initiating judicial proceedings if the property’s value did not exceed $100,000, and if no person claimed an interest in the property within 20 days after the Government published notice of its intention to forfeit and sell or otherwise dispose of it. § 881(a)(6) (subjecting to forfeiture all proceeds traceable to an unlawful exchange for a controlled substance and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities traceable to such an exchange); § 881(d) (providing that laws relating to summary and judicial forfeiture for violation of the customs laws apply to controlled substance forfeitures); 19 U. S. C. §§ 1607-1609 (1988 ed.) (setting forth customs law requirements for summary forfeitures). To effect such a forfeiture, the statute required the agency to send written notice of the seizure together with information on the applicable forfeiture procedures to each party who appeared to have an interest in the property. § 1607(a). It also required the publication for at least three successive weeks of a similar notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the judicial district in which the forfeiture proceeding was brought. Ibid.; 21 CFR §1816.75 (1988). The FBI sent letters of its intention to forfeit the cash by certified mail addressed to petitioner care of the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Milan, Michigan, where he was then incarcerated; to the address of the residence where petitioner was arrested; and to an address in Randolph, Ohio, the town where petitioner’s mother lived. App. 21-28. It placed the requisite legal notice in three consecutive Sunday editions of the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Id., at 24-30. Similar practices were followed with respect to the proposed forfeiture of the car. Brief for Petitioner 3. The FBI received no response to these notices within the time allotted, and so declared the items administratively forfeited. Ibid.; App. 15. An FBI agent turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service on December 13,1988. Id., at 16-17. Nearly five years later, petitioner moved in the District Court pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case. The United States responded that all of the items of petitioner’s property that were not used in his drug business had been returned to him and that other items seized had long since been forfeited to the Government. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that any challenge to the forfeiture proceedings should have been brought in a civil action, not as a motion ancillary to petitioner’s now-closed criminal case. Case No. 5:95-CV-1872 (ND Ohio, Oct. 5, 1995). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Judgt. order reported at 97 F. 3d 1451 (1996), App. 31. The Court of Appeals agreed that petitioner could not pursue his claim through a Rule 41(e) motion since the criminal proceedings against him had been completed. It held that the District Court abused its discretion, however, by not construing the motion as a civil complaint seeking equitable relief for a due process challenge to adequacy of the notice of the administrative forfeiture. Following remand, the District Court entered an order allowing discovery and subsequently presided over a telephone deposition of James Lawson, an Inmate Systems Officer who began to work in the mailroom at- FCI Milan early in 1988 and who had submitted an affidavit in the case. Lawson testified that he signed the certified mail receipt for the FBI’s notice to petitioner regarding the cash. App. 49-50. He also testified about the procedures within FCI Milan for accepting, logging, and delivering certified mail addressed to inmates. Id., at 50. Lawson explained that the procedure would have been for him to log the mail in, for petitioner’s “Unit Team” to sign for it, and for it then to be given to petitioner. Id., at 51. But he said that a paper trail no longer existed because the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had a policy of holding prison logbooks for only one year after they were closed. Id., at 51-52. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court ruled that the Government’s sending of notice by certified mail to petitioner’s place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. Case No. 5:95-CV-1872 (ND Ohio, Jan. 19, 1999). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 223 F. 3d 422 (CA6 2000). Citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950), it held that the Government’s notice of the cash forfeiture comported with due process even in. the absence of proof that the mail actually reached petitioner. 223 F. 3d, at 424. Because Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions about what the Due Process Clause requires of the United States when it seeks to provide notice to a federal inmate of its intention to forfeit property in which the inmate appears to have an interest, we granted certiorari to consider the adequacy of the FBI’s notice to petitioner of its intended forfeiture of the cash. 531 U. S. 1189 (2001). We now affirm the judgment below. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without “due process of law.” From these “cryptic and abstract words,” Mullane, supra, at 313, we have determined that individuals whose property interests are at stake are entitled to “notice and an opportunity to be heard.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 48 (1993). Petitioner urges that, in analyzing his due process claim, we follow the approach articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). Brief for Petitioner 12; Reply Brief for Petitioner 7. There we spoke of a balancing of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) a cost-benefit analysis of the risks of an erroneous deprivation versus the probable value of additional safeguards, and (3) the Government’s interest, including the function involved and any fiscal and administrative burdens associated with using different procedural safeguards. 424 U. S., at 335. The United States, on the other hand, urges us to apply the method set forth in Mullane, supra, which espouses a more straightforward test of reasonableness under the circumstances. Brief for United States 27. We think Mullane supplies the appropriate analytical framework. The Mathews balancing test was first conceived in the context of a due process challenge to the adequacy of administrative procedures used to terminate Social Security disability benefits. Although we have since invoked Mathews to evaluate due process claims in other contexts, see Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 444 (1992) (citing cases), we have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims. Since Mullane was decided, we have regularly turned to it when confronted with questions regarding the adequacy of the method used to give notice. See, e. g., New York City v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 293, 296 (1953); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 (1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 210 (1962); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38, 39 (1972) (per curiam); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444, 448 (1982); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791, 797 (1983); Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 484 (1988). We see no reason to depart from this well-settled practice. Mullane itself involved a due process challenge to the constitutional sufficiency of notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund established under state law. A trustee of such a common trust fund sought a judicial decree settling its accounts as against all parties having an interest in the fund. The only notice of the application for this decree was by court-ordered publication in a newspaper for four successive weeks. 339 U. S., at 309-310. We held that this notice was constitutionally defective as to known persons whose whereabouts were also known, because it was not “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id., at 314, 319; see also id., at 315 (“The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it”). Was the notice in this ease “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances” to apprise petitioner of the pendency of the cash forfeiture? The Government here carried its burden of showing the following procedures had been used to give notice. The FBI sent certified mail addressed to petitioner at the correctional facility where he was incarcerated. At that facility, prison mailroom staff traveled to the city post office every day to obtain all the mail for the institution, including inmate mail. App. 36. The staff signed for all certified mail before leaving the post office. Once the mail was transported back to the facility, certified mail was entered in a logbook maintained in the mailroom. Id., at 37. A member of the inmate’s Unit Team then signed for the certified mail to acknowledge its receipt before removing it from the mailroom, and either a Unit Team member or another staff member distributed the mail to the inmate during the institution’s “mail call.” Id., at 37, 51. Petitioner does not seriously contest the FBI’s use of the postal service to send its certified letter to him, a method our cases have recognized as adequate for known addressees when we have found notice by publication insufficient. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11 (“This case is not really a mailed notice case because the procedures that are inadequate are the procedures that happened after the mailing”). Instead, he argues that the notice was insufficient because due process generally requires “actual notice” to interested parties prior to forfeiture, which he takes to mean actual receipt of notice. Brief for Petitioner 8,15, 18-19; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. For this proposition he cites Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U. S., at 796-797. But the only sentence in Mennonite arguably supporting petitioner’s view appears in a footnote. That sentence reads: “Our cases have required the State to make efforts to provide actual notice to all interested parties comparable to the efforts that were previously required only in in 'personam actions.” Id., at 797, n. 3. It does not say that the State must provide actual notice, but that it must attempt to provide actual notice. Since Mennonite concluded that mailed notice of a pending tax sale to a mortgagee of record was constitutionally sufficient, id., at 799, the sentence is at best inconclusive dicta for the view petitioner espouses. We note that none of our cases cited by either party has required actual notice in proceedings such as this. Instead, we have allowed the Government to defend the “reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method ... on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315. Petitioner argues that because he was housed in a federal prison at the time of the forfeiture, the FBI could have made arrangements with the BOP to assure the delivery of the notice in question to him. Brief for Petitioner 17. But it is hard to see why such a principle would not also apply, for example, to members of the Armed Forces both in this country and overseas. Undoubtedly the Government could make a special effort in any case (just as it did in the movie “Saving Private Ryan”) to assure that a particular piece of mail reaches a particular individual who is in one way or another in the custody of the Government. It could, for example, have allowed petitioner to make an escorted visit to the post office himself in order to sign for his letter. But the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government; it requires only that the Government’s effort be “reasonably calculated” to apprise a party of the pendency of the action; “ ‘[t]he criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements ....’” Mullane, supra, at 315. Nor does the Due Process Clause require the Government to substitute the procedures proposed by petitioner for those in place at FCI Milan in 1988. See Brief for Petitioner 17 (suggesting that the Government could send the notice to a prison official with a request that a prison employee watch the prisoner open the notice, cosign a receipt, and mail the signed paper back to the agency from which it came). The suggested procedures would work primarily to bolster the Government’s ability to establish that the prisoner actually received notice of the forfeiture, a problem petitioner perceives to be the FCI Milan’s procedures’ primary defect. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15 (explaining that the problem is that “[t]he procedure doesn’t require verification of delivery”). But as we have noted above, our cases have never required actual notice. The facts of the present case, moreover, illustrate the difficulty with such a requirement. The letter in question was sent to petitioner in 1988, but the claim of improper notice was first asserted in 1993. What might be reasonably fresh in the minds of all parties had the question arisen contemporaneously will surely be stale five years later. The issue would often turn on disputed testimony as to whether the letter was in fact delivered to petitioner. The title to property should not depend on such vagaries. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent does not contend, as petitioner does, that due process could be satisfied in this case only with actual notice. It makes an alternative argument that the FBI’s notice was constitutionally flawed because it was “ ‘substantially less likely to bring home notice’ than a feasible substitute,” post, at 174 (quoting Mullane, supra, at 314-315) — namely, the methods used currently by the BOP, which generally require an inmate to sign a logbook acknowledging delivery, see post, at 180,181-182 (describing current BOP procedures and noting the practicability of BOP Unit Team member’s “linger[ing]” a little longer to secure an inmate’s signature). Just how requiring the end recipient to sign for a piece of mail substantially improves the reliability of the delivery procedures leading up to that person’s receipt, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent does not persuasively explain. Nor is there any probative evidence to this effect in the record. Even if one accepts that the BOP’s current procedures improve delivery to some degree, our cases have never held that improvements in the reliability of new procedures necessarily demonstrate the infirmity of those that were replaced. Other areas of the law, moreover, have for strong policy reasons resisted rules crediting the notion that, “ ‘because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.’ ” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 407, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 864 (1994 ed.) (quoting Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire R. Co., 21 Law Times Rep. (n. s.) 261, 263 (1869), and explaining that Rule 407’s prohibition against use of subsequent remedial measures to prove fault attempts to avoid discouraging persons from taking steps to further safety). In this case, we believe the same principle supports our conclusion that the Government ought not be penalized and told to “try harder,” post, at 180, simply because the BOP has since upgraded its policies. Here, the use of the mail addressed to petitioner at the penitentiary was clearly acceptable for much the same reason we have approved mailed notice in the past. Short of allowing the prisoner to go to the post office himself, the remaining portion of the delivery would necessarily depend on a system in effect within the prison itself relying on prison staff. We think the FBI’s use of the system described in detail above was “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [petitioner] of the pendency of the action.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. Due process requires no more. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Rule 41(e) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property.” In a letter received before argument, the Solicitor General advised us that the BOP now requires the retention of certified mail logbooks for 11 years in accordance with its implementation of Government record retention policies under the Federad Records Act of 1950, 44 U. S. C. §2901 et seq. (1994 ed.). See, e. g., Whiting v. United States, 231 F. 3d 70, 76 (CA1 2000) (due process satisfied by Government’s sending certified letter to inmate at his prison facility absent proof that mail delivery was unreliable); Yeung Mung Weng v. United States, 137 F. 3d 709, 715 (CA2 1998) (mailed notice to custodial institution inadequate unless in fact delivered to the intended recipient); United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F. 3d 147, 155 (CA3 2000) (en banc) (Government bears burden of demonstrating the existence of procedures that are reasonably calculated to ensure that actual notice will be given); United States v. Minor, 228 F. 3d 352, 358 (CA4 2000) (endorsing One Toshiba Color Television, supra); United States v. Woodall, 12 F. 3d 791, 794-795 (CA8 1993) (requiring actual notice to defendant or his counsel of agency’s intent to forfeit property); United States v. Real Property, 135 F. 3d 1312, 1315 (CA9 1998) (adequate to send summons by certified mail to jail with procedures for distributing mail directly to the inmate); United States v. Clark, 84 F. 3d 378, 381 (CA10 1996) (sufficient to send certified mail to prisoner at jail where he was located). E. g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 319 (1950) (noting that the mails “are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of communication”); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 116 (1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 214 (1962); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791, 798 (1983); Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 (1988). The Government’s brief notes that the term “actual notice” is not free from ambiguity as used by this Court in cases such as Tulsa, supra, and by other courts. Brief for United States 20, n. 12 (stating that the term has been used both to distinguish notice by mail from notice by publication and to refer to the actual receipt of the notice by the intended recipient); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1087 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “actual notice” as “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party”). We think the best way to avoid this confusion is to equate, as petitioner does, “actual notice” with “receipt of notice.” To try to show that there is a “significant risk,” Brief for Petitioner 14, that notice mailed to a prison will not reach an inmate, petitioner has cited several cases from various Courts of Appeals involving postforfeiture challenges. As the Government argues, these cases, like petitioner’s own suit here, involve only claims that notice was not received, not findings of nonreceipt.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 34 ]	sc_adminaction
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. TELLIER et ux. No. 351. Argued January 27, 1966. Decided March 24, 1966. Jack S. Levin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Acting Assistant Attorney General Roberts and Robert A. Bernstein. Michael Kaminsky argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether expenses incurred by a taxpayer in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution may qualify for deduction from taxable income under § 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which allows a deduction of “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . ...” The respondent Walter F. Tellier was engaged in the business of underwriting the public sale of stock offerings and purchasing securities for resale to customers. In 1956 he was brought to trial upon a 36-count indictment that charged him with violating the fraud section of the Securities Act of 1933 and the mail fraud statute, and with conspiring to violate those statutes. He was found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to pay an $18,000 fine and to serve four and a half years in prison. The judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal. In his unsuccessful defense of this criminal prosecution, the respondent incurred and paid $22,964.20 in legal expenses in 1956. He claimed a deduction for that amount on his federal income tax return for that year. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and was sustained by the Tax Court. T. C. Memo. 1963-212, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1062. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in a unanimous en banc decision, 342 F. 2d 690, and we granted certiorari. 382 U. S. 808. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. There can be no serious question that the payments deducted by the respondent were expenses of his securities business under the decisions of this Court, and the Commissioner does not contend otherwise. In United States v. Gilmore, 372 U. S. 39, we held that “the origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was ‘business’ or ‘personal’ ” within the meaning of § 162 (a). 372 U. S., at 49. Cf. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, 153; Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488, 494, 496. The criminal charges against the respondent found their source in his business activities as a securities dealer. The respondent’s legal fees, paid in defense against those charges, therefore clearly qualify under Gilmore as “expenses paid or incurred ... in carrying on any trade or business” within the meaning of § 162 (a). The Commissioner also concedes that the respondent’s legal expenses were “ordinary” and “necessary” expenses within the meaning of § 162 (a). Our decisions have consistently construed the term “necessary” as imposing only the minimal requirement that the expense be “appropriate and helpful” for “the development of the [taxpayer’s] business.” Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 113. Cf. Kornhauser v. United States, supra, at 152; Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U. S. 90, 93-94; Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467, 471; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413-415. The principal function of the term “ordinary” in § 162 (a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the asset. Welch v. Helvering, supra, at 113-116. The legal expenses deducted by the respondent were not capital expenditures. They were incurred in his defense against charges of past criminal conduct, not in the acquisition of a capital asset. Our decisions establish that counsel fees comparable to those here involved are ordinary business expenses, even though a “lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime.” Welch v. Helvering, supra, at 114. Kornhauser v. United States, supra, at 152-153; cf. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 376. It is therefore clear that the respondent’s legal fees were deductible under § 162 (a) if the provisions of that section are to be given their normal effect in this case. The Commissioner and the Tax Court determined, however, that even though the expenditures meet the literal requirements of § 162 (a), their deduction must nevertheless be disallowed on the ground of public policy. That view finds considerable support in other administrative and judicial decisions. It finds no support, however, in any regulation or statute or in any decision of this Court, and we believe no such “public policy” exception to the plain provisions of § 162 (a) is warranted in the circumstances presented by this case. We start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing. That principle has been firmly imbedded in the tax statute from the beginning. One familiar facet of the principle is the truism that the statute does not concern itself with the lawfulness of the income that it taxes. Income from a criminal enterprise is taxed at a rate no higher and no lower than income from more conventional sources. “[T]he fact that a business is unlawful [does not] exempt it from paying the taxes that if lawful it would have to pay.” United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 263. See James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213. With respect to deductions, the basic rule, with only a few limited and well-defined exceptions, is the same. During the Senate debate in 1913 on the bill that became the first modern income tax law, amendments were rejected that would have limited deductions for losses to those incurred in a “legitimate” or “lawful” trade or business. Senator Williams, who was in charge of the bill, stated on the floor of the Senate that “[T]he object of this bill is to tax a man’s net income; that is to say, what he has at the end of the year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform men’s moral characters; that is not the object of the bill at all. The tax is not levied for the purpose of restraining people from betting on horse races or upon 'futures/ but the tax is framed for the purpose of making a man pay upon his net income, his actual profit during the year. The law does not care where he got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although the law may very properly care in another way.” 50 Cong. Rec. 3849. The application of this principle is reflected in several decisions of this Court. As recently as Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U. S. 27, we sustained the allowance of a deduction for rent and wages paid by the operators of a gambling enterprise, even though both the business itself and the specific rent and wage payments there in question were illegal under state law. In rejecting the Commissioner’s contention that the illegality of the enterprise required disallowance of the deduction, we held that, were we to “enforce as federal policy the rule espoused by the Commissioner in this case, we would come close to making this type of business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts, while all other business would be taxable on the basis of net income. If that choice is to be made, Congress should do it.” Id., at 29. In Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U. S. 90, the Court upheld deductions claimed by opticians for amounts paid to doctors who prescribed the eyeglasses that the opticians sold, although the Court was careful to disavow “approval of the business ethics or public policy involved in the payments . . . .” 343 U. S., at 97. And in Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467, a case akin to the one before us, the Court upheld deductions claimed by a dentist for lawyer’s fees and other expenses incurred in unsuccessfully defending against an administrative fraud order issued by the Postmaster General. Deduction of expenses falling within the general definition of § 162 (a) may, to be sure, be disallowed by specific legislation, since deductions “are a matter of grace and Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses.” Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U. S., at 28. The Court has also given effect to a precise and longstanding Treasury Regulation prohibiting the deduction of a specified category of expenditures; an example is lobbying expenses, whose nondeductibility was supported by considerations not here present. Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498. But where Congress has been wholly silent, it is only in extremely limited circumstances that the Court has countenanced exceptions to the general principle reflected in the Sullivan, Lilly and Heininger decisions. Only where the allowance of a deduction would “frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct” have we upheld its disallowance. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S., at 473. Further, the “policies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced by some governmental declaration of them.” Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U. S., at 97. (Emphasis added.) Finally, the “test of nondeductibility always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction.” Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U. S. 30, 35. In that case, as in Hoover Express Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 38, we upheld the disallowance of deductions claimed by taxpayers for fines and penalties imposed upon them for violating state penal statutes; to allow a deduction in those circumstances would have directly and substantially diluted the actual punishment imposed. The present case falls far outside that sharply limited and carefully defined category. No public policy is offended when a man faced with serious criminal charges employs a lawyer to help in his defense. That is not “proscribed conduct.” It is his constitutional right. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335. In an adversary system of criminal justice, it is a basic of our public policy that a defendant in a criminal case have counsel to represent him. Congress has authorized the imposition of severe punishment upon those found guilty of the serious criminal offenses with which the respondent was charged and of which he was convicted. But we can find no warrant for attaching to that punishment an additional financial burden that Congress has neither expressly nor implicitly directed. To deny a deduction for expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution would impose such a burden in a measure dependent not on the seriousness of the offense or the actual sentence imposed by the court, but on the cost of the defense and the defendant’s particular tax bracket. We decline to distort the income tax laws to serve a purpose for which they were neither intended nor designed by Congress. The judgment is Affirmed. “ (a) In general. — There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in- carrying on any trade or business . . . .” 26 U. S. C. § 162. 48 Stat. 84, §17, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a). 18 U. S. C. § 1341. 18 U. S. C. §371. United States v. Tellier, 255 F. 2d 441 (C. A. 2d Cir.). See Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1142, 1145; Wolfman, Professors and the “Ordinary and Necessary” Business Expense, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1089, 1111-1112. See Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 Tax L. Rev. 241. See Sarah Backer, 1 B. T. A. 214; Norvin R. Lindheim, 2 B. T. A. 229; Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T. C. 562; Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. 2d 178 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Commissioner v. Schwartz, 232 F. 2d 94 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F. 2d 568 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F. 2d 953 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F. 2d 855, 856 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Port v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 334, 163 F. Supp. 645. See also Note, Business Expenses, Dis-allowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale L. J. 108; 4 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25.49 ff. Compare Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 3 T. C. 310; G. C. M. 24377, 1944 Cum. Bull. 93; Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense, 42 Taxes 808, 833-834. In challenging the amendments, Senator Williams also stated: “In other words, you are going to count the man as having money which he has not got, because he has lost it in a way that you do not approve of.” 50 Cong. Rec. 3850. Specific legislation denying deductions for payments that violate public policy is not unknown. E. g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 162 (c) (disallowance of deduction for payments to officials and employees of foreign countries in circumstances where the payments would be illegal if federal laws were applicable; cf. Treas. Reg. §1.162-18); §165 (d) (deduction for wagering losses limited to extent of wagering gains). See also Stabilization Act of 1942, § 5 (a), 56 Stat. 767, 50 U. S. C. App. § 965 (a) (1946 ed.), Defense Production Act of 1950, §405 (a), 64 Stat. 807, as amended, c. 275, § 104 (i), 65 Stat. 136 (1951), 50 U. S. C. App. § 2105 (a) (1952 ed.), and Defense Production Act of 1950, §405 (b), 64 Stat. 807, 50 U. S. C. App. §2105 (b) (1952 ed.) (general authority in President to prescribe extent to which payments violating price and wage regulations should be disregarded by government agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service; see'Rev. Rui. 56-180, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 94). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (a), which provides that “Penalty payments with respect to Federal taxes, whether on account of negligence, delinquency, or fraud, are not deductible from gross income”; Joint Committe on Internal Revenue Taxation, Staff Study of Income Tax Treatment of Treble Damage Payments under the Antitrust Laws, Nov. 1, 1965, p. 16 (proposal that § 162 be amended to deny deductions for certain fines, penalties, treble-damage payments, bribes, and kickbacks). Cf. Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, 1954 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 715, 730-731: “. . . Section 23 (a)(1)(A) [the predecessor of § 162 (a)] is not an essay in morality, designed to encourage virtue and discourage sin. It ‘was not contrived as an arm of the law to enforce State criminal statutes . . . .’ Nor was it contrived to implement the various regulatory statutes which Congress has from time to time enacted. The provision is more modestly concerned with ‘commercial net income’ — a businessman’s net accretion in wealth during the taxable year after due allowance for the operating costs of the business. . . . There is no evidence in the Section of an attempt to punish taxpayers . . . when the Commissioner feels that a state or federal statute has been flouted. The statute hardly operates ‘in a vacuum,’ if it serves its own vital function and leaves other problems to other statutes.”	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
ZENITH RADIO CORP. v. UNITED STATES No. 77-539. Argued April 25, 1978 Decided June 21, 1978 MaRshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Frederick L. Ikenson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Eugene L. Stewart and Philip J. Curtis. Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, Richard A. Allen, Leonard Schaitman, David M. Cohen, and Robert H. Mundheim. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Saul L. Sherman for the American Importers Assn., Inc.; and by N. David Palmeter and David P. Houlihan for the Union des Industries de la Communauté Europeenne. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Marjorie M. Shostak, S. Richard Shostak, Theodore B. Olson, and James P. O’Hara for Craig Corp. et al.; and by Robert E. Herzstein for Ford Motor Co. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Under § 303 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 687, as amended, 19 U. S. C. § 1303 (a) (1976 ed.), whenever a foreign country pays a “bounty or grant” upon the exportation of a product from that country, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to levy a countervailing duty, “equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant,” upon importation of the product into the United States. The issue in this case is whether Japan confers a “bounty” or “grant” on certain consumer electronic products by failing to impose a commodity tax on those products when they are exported, while imposing the tax on the products when they are sold in Japan. I Under the Commodity Tax Law of Japan, Law No. 48 of 1962, see App. 44-48, a variety of consumer goods, including the electronic products at issue here, are subject to an “indirect” tax — -a tax levied on the goods themselves, and computed as a percentage of the manufacturer’s sales price rather than the income or wealth of the purchaser or seller. The Japanese tax applies both to products manufactured in Japan and to those imported into Japan. On goods manufactured in Japan, the tax is levied upon shipment from the factory; imported products are taxed when they are withdrawn from the customs warehouse. Only goods destined for consumption in Japan are subject to the tax, however. Products shipped for export are exempt, and any tax paid upon the shipment of a product is refunded if the product is subsequently exported. Thus the tax is “remitted” on exports. In April 1970 petitioner, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, filed a petition with the Commissioner of Customs, requesting assessment of countervailing duties on a number of consumer electronic products exported from Japan to this country. Petitioner alleged that Japan had bestowed a “bounty or grant” upon exportation of these products by, inter alia, remitting the Japanese Commodity Tax that would have been imposed had the products been sold within Japan. In January 1976, after soliciting the views of interested parties and conducting an investigation pursuant to Treasury Department regulations, see 19 CFR § 159.47 (c) (1977), the Acting Commissioner of Customs published a notice of final determination, rejecting petitioner's request. 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976). Petitioner then filed suit in the Customs Court, claiming that the Treasury Department had erred in concluding that remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax was not a bounty or grant within the purview of the countervailing-duty statute. The Department defended on the ground that, since the remission of indirect taxes was “nonexcessive,” the statute did not require assessment of a countervailing duty. In the Department's terminology, a remission of taxes is “nonexces-sive’' if it does not exceed the amount of tax paid or otherwise due; thus, for example, if a tax of $5 is levied on goods at the factory, the return of the $5 upon exportation would be “nonexcessive,” whereas a payment of $8 from the government to the manufacturer upon exportation would be “excessive” by $3. The Department pointed out that the current version of § 303 is in all relevant respects unchanged from the countervailing-duty statute enacted by Congress in 1897, and that the Secretary — in decisions dating back to 1898 — has always taken the position that the nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax is not a bounty or grant within the meaning of the statute. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Customs Court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the Secretary to assess countervailing duties on all Japanese consumer electronic products specified in petitioner’s complaint. 430 F. Supp. 242 (1977). The court acknowledged the Secretary’s longstanding interpretation of the statute. It concluded, however, that this administrative practice could not be sustained in light of this Court’s decision in Downs v. United States, 187 U. S. 496 (1903), which held that an export bounty had been conferred by a complicated Russian scheme for the regulation of sugar production and sale, involving, among other elements, remission of excise taxes in the event of exportation. On appeal by the Government, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, dividing 3-2, reversed the judgment of the Customs Court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the United States. 64 C. C. P. A. 130, 562 F. 2d 1209 (1977). The majority opinion distinguished Downs on the ground that it did not decide the question of whether non-excessive remission of an indirect tax, standing alone, constitutes a bounty or grant upon exportation. The court then examined the language of § 303 and the legislative history of the 1897 provision and concluded that, “in determining whether a bounty or grant has been conferred, it is the economic result of the foreign government’s action which controls.” 64 C. C. P. A., at 138-139, 562 F. 2d, at 1216. Relying primarily on the “long-continued” and “uniform” administrative practice, id., at 142-143, 146-147, 562 F. 2d, at 1218-1219, 1222-1223, and secondarily on congressional “acquiescence” in this practice through repeated re-enactment of the controlling statutory language, id., at 143-144, 562 F. 2d, at 1220, the court held that interpretation of “bounty or grant” so as not to include a nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax is “a lawfully permissible interpretation of § 303.” Id., at 147, 562 F. 2d, at 1223. We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 1060 (1978), and we now affirm. II It is undisputed that the Treasury Department adopted the statutory interpretation at issue here less than a year after passage of the basic countervailing-duty statute in 1897, see T. D. 19321, 1 Synopsis of [Treasury] Decisions 696 (1898), and that the Department has uniformly maintained this position for over 80 years. This longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation is entitled to considerable weight. “When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. ‘To sustain [an agency’s] application of [a] statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.’ ” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965), quoting Unemployment Compensation Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153 (1946). Moreover, an administrative “practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the [persons] charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.” Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933); see, e. g., Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408 (1961). The question is thus whether, in light of the normal aids to statutory construction, the Department’s interpretation is “sufficiently reasonable” to be accepted by a reviewing court. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U. S. 60, 75 (1975). Our examination of the language, the legislative history, and the overall purpose of the 1897 provision persuades us that the Department’s initial construction of the statute was far from unreasonable; and we are unable to find anything in the events subsequent to that time that convinces us that the Department was required to abandon this interpretation. A The language of the 1897 statute evolved out of two earlier countervailing-duty provisions that had been applicable only to sugar imports. The first provision was enacted in 1890, apparently for the purpose of protecting domestic sugar refiners from unfair foreign competition; it provided for a fixed countervailing duty on refined sugar imported from countries that “pay, directly or indirectly, a [greater] bounty on the exportation of” refined sugar than on raw sugar. Tariff Act of 1890, ¶ 237, 26 Stat. 584. Although the congressional debates did not focus sharply on the meaning of the word “bounty,” what evidence there is suggests that the term was not intended to encompass the nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax. Thus, one strong supporter of increased protection for American sugar producers heavily criticized the export “bounties” conferred by several European governments, and attached a concise description of “The Bounty Systems in Europe”; both the remarks and the description indicated that the “bounties” consisted of the amounts by which government payments exceeded the excise taxes that had been paid upon the beets from which the sugar was produced. See 21 Cong. Bee. 9529, 9532 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Gibson); id., at 9537 (description). According to the description, for example, French sugar manufacturers paid an “excise tax [of] $97.06 per gross ton[,] [b]ut upon the export of a ton of sugar... received back as a drawback $117.60, making a clear bounty of $20.54 per gross ton of sugar exported.” Ibid. This concept of a “net” bounty — that is, a remission in excess of taxes paid or otherwise due — as the trigger for a countervailing-duty requirement emerged more clearly in the second sugar provision, enacted in 1894. Tariff Act of 1894, ¶ 18214, 28 Stat. 521. The 1894 statute extended the countervailing-duty requirement to all imported sugar, raw as well as refined, and provided for payment of a fixed duty on all sugar coming from a country which “pays, directly or indirectly, a bounty on the export thereof.” A proviso to the statute made clear, however, that no duties were to be assessed in the event that the “bounty” did not exceed the amount of taxes already paid. The author of the 1894 provision, Senator' Jones, expressly characterized this difference between the amounts received upon exportation and the amounts already paid in taxes as the “net bounty” on exportation. 26 Cong. Rec. 5705 (1894) (discussing German export bounty system). The 1897 statute greatly expanded upon the coverage of the 1894 provision by making the countervailing-duty requirement applicable to all imported products. Tariff Act of 1897, § 5, 30 Stat. 205, quoted in n. 8, supra. There are strong indications, however, that Congress intended to retain the “net bounty” concept of the 1894 provision as the criterion for determining when a countervailing duty was to be imposed. Although the proviso in the 1894 law was deleted, the 1897 statute did provide for levying of duties equal to the “net amount” of any export bounty or grant. And the legislative history suggests that this language, in addition to establishing a responsive mechanism for determining the appropriate amount of countervailing duty, was intended to incorporate the prior rule that nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes would not trigger the countervailing-duty requirement at all. There is no question that the prior rule was carried forward in the version of the 1897 statute that originally passed the House. This version did not extend the countervailing-duty requirement to all imports. Instead, it merely modified the 1894 sugar provision so that the amount of the countervailing duty, rather than being fixed, would be “equal to [the export] bounty, or so much thereof as may be in excess of any tax collected by [the foreign] country upon [the] exported [sugar], or upon the beet or cane from which it was produced....” See 30 Cong. Rec. 1634 (1897). The House Report unequivocally stated that the countervailing duty was intended to be “equivalent to the net export bounty paid by any country.” H. R. Rep. No. 1, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., 4r-5 (1897) (emphasis supplied). The Senate deleted the House provision from the bill and replaced it with the more general provision that was eventually enacted into law. See 30 Cong. Rec. 1733 (1897) (striking House provision); id., at 2226 (adopting general provision) ; id., at 2705, 2750 (House agreement to Senate amendment). The debates in the Senate indicate, however, that — aside from extending the coverage of the House provision — the Senate did not intend to change its substance. Senator Allison, the sponsor of the Senate amendment, explained that the House provision was being “stricken from the bill,” because “the same paragraph in substance [is] being inserted [in] section [5], making this countervailing duty apply to all articles instead of to [sugar] alone.” Id., at 1635. See also id., at 1732 (remarks of Sen. White). Senator Allison twice remarked that the countervailing duty that he was proposing was an “imitation” of the one provided in the 1894 statute, id., at 1719; see id., at 1674, and later in the debates he stated — in response to a question as to whether the countervailing duty would be equal to “the whole amount of the export bounty” — that “[the bounty contemplated] is the net bounty, less the taxes and reductions... id., at 1721 (answering question from Sen. Vest). An additional indication of the Senate’s intent can be found in the extended discussion of the effect that the statute would have with respect to German sugar exports. Time after time the amount of the German “bounty” — and, correspondingly, the amount of the countervailing duty that would be imposed under the statute — was stated to be 38$ per 100 pounds of refined sugar, and 270 per 100 pounds of raw sugar. See, e. g., id., at 1650 (remarks of Sens, Allison, Vest, and Caffery), 1658 (Sens. Allison and Jones), 1680 (Sen. Jones), 1719 (Sens. Allison and Lindsay), 1729 (Sen. Caffery), 2823-2824 (Sens. Aldrich and Jones). These figures were supplied by the Treasury Department itself, see id., at 1719 (remarks of Sen. Allison), 1722 (letter from Treasury Department to Sen. Caf-fery), and were utilized by both proponents and opponents of the measure. And yet it was frequently acknowledged during the debates that Germany exempted sugar exports from its domestic consumption tax of $2.16 per 100 pounds, an amount far in excess of the 380 and 270 figures. See, e. g., id., at 1646 (remarks of Sen. Vest), 1651 (Sen. Caffery), 1697 (same), 2205 (same). Had the Senators considered the mere remission of an indirect tax to be a “bounty,” it seems unlikely that they would have stated that the German “bounties” were only 380 and 270 per 100 pounds. Especially in light of the strong opposition to countervailing duties even of the magnitude of 380 and 270, see, e. g., id., at 1719 (remarks of Sen. Lindsay), 2203-2205 (remarks of Sen. Gray), it seems reasonable to infer that Congress did not intend to impose countervailing duties of many times this magnitude. B Regardless of whether this legislative history absolutely compelled the Secretary to interpret “bounty or grant” so as not to encompass any nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, there can be no doubt that such a construction was reasonable in light of the statutory purpose. Cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356, 374 (1973). This purpose is relatively clear from the face of the statute and is confirmed by the congressional debates: The countervailing duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by their governments. See, e. g., 30 Cong. Rec. 1674 (remarks of Sen. Allison), 2205 (Sen. Caffery), 2225 (Sen. Lindsay) (1897). The Treasury Department was well positioned to establish rules of decision that would accurately carry out this purpose, particularly since it had contributed the very figures relied upon by Congress in enacting the statute. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 192 (1969). In deciding in 1898 that a nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes did not result in the type of competitive advantage that Congress intended to counteract, the Department was clearly acting in accordance with the shared assumptions of the day as to the fairness and economic effect of that practice. The theory underlying the Department’s position was that a foreign country’s remission of indirect taxes did not constitute subsidization of that country’s exports. Rather, such remission was viewed as a reasonable measure for avoiding double taxation of exports — once by the foreign country and once upon sale in this country. As explained in a recent study prepared by the Department for the Senate Committee on Finance: “ [The Department’s construction was] based on the principle that, since exports are not consumed in the country of production, they should not be subject to consumption taxes in that country. The theory has been that the application of countervailing duties to the rebate of consumption [and other indirect] taxes would have the effect of double taxation of the product, since the United States would not only impose its own indirect taxes, such as Federal and state excise taxes and state and local sales taxes, but would also collect, through the use of the countervailing duty, the indirect tax imposed by the exporting country on domestically consumed goods.” Senate Committee on Finance, Executive Branch GATT Studies, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (1974). This intuitively appealing principle regarding double taxation had been widely accepted both in this country and abroad for many years prior to enactment of the 1897 statute. See, e. g., Act of July 4, 1789, § 3, 1 Stat. 26 (remission of import duties upon exportation of products); 4 Works and Correspondence of D. Ricardo 216-217 (pamphlets and papers first published in 1822); A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book Four, ch. IV (1776). C The Secretary’s interpretation of the countervailing-duty statute is as permissible today as it was in 1898. The statute has been re-enacted five times by Congress without any modification of the relevant language, see n. 8, supra, and, whether or not Congress can be said to have “acquiesced” in the administrative practice, it certainly has not acted to change it. At the same time, the Secretary’s position has been incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is followed by every major trading nation in the world; foreign tax systems as well as private expectations thus have been built on the assumption that countervailing duties would not be imposed on nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes. In light of these substantial reliance interests, the longstanding administrative construction of the statute should “not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.” McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 481 (1921); see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S., at 18. Aside from the contention, discussed in Part III, infra, that the Department’s construction is inconsistent with this Court’s decisions, petitioner’s sole argument is that the Department’s position is premised on false economic assumptions that should be rejected by the courts. In particular, petitioner points to “modern” economic theory suggesting that remission of indirect taxes may create an incentive to export in some circumstances, and to recent criticism of the GATT rules as favoring producers in countries that rely more heavily on indirect than on direct taxes. But, even assuming that these arguments are at all relevant in view of the legislative history of the 1897 provision and the longstanding administrative construction of the statute, they do not demonstrate the unreasonableness of the Secretary’s current position. Even “modem” economists do not agree on the ultimate economic effect of remitting indirect taxes, and — given the present state of economic knowledge — it may be difficult, if not impossible, to measure the precise effect in any particular case. See, e. g., Executive Branch GATT Studies, supra, at 13-14, 17; Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 L. & Policy in Int’l Bus. 351 (1975). More fundamentally, as the Senate Committee with responsibility in this area recently stated, “the issues involved in applying the countervailing duty law are complex, and... internationally, there is [a] lack of any satisfactory agreement on what constitutes a fair, as opposed to an ‘unfair,’ subsidy.” S. Rep. No. 93-1298, p. 183 (1974). In this situation, it is not the task of the judiciary to substitute its views as to fairness and economic effect for those of the Secretary. Ill Notwithstanding all of the foregoing considerations, this would be a very different case if, as petitioner contends, the Secretary’s practice were contrary to this Court’s decision in Downs v. United States, 187 U. S. 496 (1903). Upon close examination of the admittedly opaque opinion in that case, however, we do not believe that Downs is controlling on the question presented here. The Russian sugar laws at issue in Downs were, as the Court noted, “very complicated.” Id., at 502. Much of the Court’s opinion was devoted to an exposition of these provisions, see id., at 502-512, but for present purposes only two features are relevant: (1) excise taxes imposed on sugar sales within Russia were remitted on exports; and (2) the exporter received, in addition, a certificate entitling its bearer to sell an amount of sugar in Russia, equal to the quantity exported, without paying the full excise tax otherwise due. This certificate was transferable and had a substantial market value related to the amount of tax forgiveness that it carried with it. The Secretary, following the same interpretation of the statute that he followed here, imposed a countervailing duty based on the value of the certificates alone, and not on the excise taxes remitted on the exports themselves. Downs, the importer, sought review, claiming that the Russian system did not confer any countervailable bounty or grant within the meaning of the 1897 statute. He did not otherwise challenge the amount of the duty assessed by the Secretary. The issue as it came before this Court, therefore, was whether a nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax, together with the granting of an additional benefit represented by the value of the certificate, constituted a “bounty or grant.” Since the amount of the bounty was not in question, neither the parties nor this Court focused carefully on the distinction between remission of the excise tax and conferral of the certificate. Petitioner argues, however, that certain broad language in the Court’s opinion suggests that mere remission of a tax, even if nonexcessive, must be considered a bounty or grant within the meaning of the statute. Petitioner relies in particular on the following language: “The details of this elaborate procedure for the production, sale, taxation and exportation of Russian sugar are of much less importance than the two facts which appear clearly through this maze of regulations, viz.: that no sugar is permitted to be sold in Russia that does not pay an excise tax of R. 1.75 per pood, and that sugar exported pays no tax at all.... When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation.” Id., at 515. This passage is inconsistent with both preceding and subsequent language which suggests that the Court understood the “bounty” to reside in the value of the certificates. At one point the Court stated that “[t]he amount [the exporter] receives for his export certificate [on the market], say, R. 1.25, is the exact amount of the bounty he receives upon exportation....” Ibid. And the Court in conclusion specifically endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s holding to the same effect, see n. 17, supra: “[T]he Circuit Court of Appeals found: 'That the Russian exporter of sugar obtained from his government a certificate, solely because of such exportation, which is worth in the open market of that country from R. 1.25 to R. 1.64 per pood, or from 1.8 to 2.35 cents per pound. ■ Therefore we hold that the government of Russia does secure to the exporter of that country, as the inevitable result of its action, a money reward or gratuity whenever he exports sugar from Russia.’ We all concur in this expression of opinion.” 187 U. S., at 516. Given this other language, we cannot read for its broadest implications the passage on which petitioner relies. In our view the passage does no more than establish the proposition that an excessive remission of taxes — there, the combination of the exemption with the certificates — is an export bounty within the meaning of the statute. As the court below noted, “ '[i]t is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used/ ” 64 C. C. P. A., at 134, 562 F. 2d, at 1213, quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821). No one argued in Downs that a nonexcessive remission of taxes, standing alone, would have constituted a bounty on exportation, and indeed that issue was not presented on the facts of the case. It must also be remembered, of course, that the Court did affirm the Secretary’s decision, and that decision rested on the conclusion that a bounty had been paid only to the extent that the remission exceeded the taxes otherwise due. In light of all these circumstances, the isolated statement in Downs relied upon by petitioner cannot be dispositive here. The judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is, accordingly, Affirmed. Section 303 (a) provides in relevant part: “(1) Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, then upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when exported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by remanufaeture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed. “(5) The Secretary shall from time to time ascertain and determine, or estimate, the net amount of each such bounty or grant, and shall declaje the net amount so determined or estimated. “(6) The Secretary shall make all regulations he deems necessary for the identification of articles and merchandise subject to duties under this section and for the assessment and collection of such duties. All determinations by the Secretary under this section, and all determinations by the Commission under subsection (b) (1) of this section (whether affirmative or negative) shall be published in the Federal Register.” 19 U. S. C. § 1303 (a) (1976 ed.). See App. 12-13, 30-31; An Outline of Japanese Taxes 128-129 (Tax Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Finance, 1976). For the products at issue here, the rate of taxation apparently ranges from 15% to 20%. See App. 13-14; An Outline of Japanese Taxes, swpra, at 131. For purposes of this opinion, we adopt the convention followed by the parties and use the term “remission” to encompass both the exemption of exports from initial taxation and the refund to the exporter of any taxes already paid. The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated the authority to make countervailing-duty determinations to the Commissioner of Customs, subject to the Secretary’s approval. See 19 CFR § 159.47 (1977). The products included television receivers, radio receivers, radio-phonograph combinations, radio-television-phonograph combinations, radio-tape-recorder combinations, record players and phonographs complete with amplifiers and speakers, tape recorders, tape players, and color television picture tubes	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 20 ]	sc_adminaction
GONZALES v. UNITED STATES. No. 69. Argued February 1-2, 1955.' Decided March 14, 1955. Hayden C. Covington argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and Carl H. Imlay. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This is another prosecution under 62 Stat. 622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a), for refusal to submit to induction into the armed services. The only question necessary to the decision of this case is whether petitioner, claiming exemption because of conscientious objections to participation in war, was entitled to receive a copy of the recommendation made by the Department of Justice to the Appeal Board under the provisions of § 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 612, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j). The trial judge held that he was not, and that the classification of petitioner as I-A was valid. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, 120 F. Supp. 730, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 212 F. 2d 71. Petitioner registered under the selective service laws on January 4, 1950. In his classification questionnaire, filed on March 9,1951, he claimed exemption as a minister and conscientious objector, his claims stemming from his association with the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Under the doctrines of this sect, each member is a minister; and. their tenets are widely interpreted as banning personal participation in political wars. See Sicurella v. United States, ante, p. 385. Only petitioner’s conscientious objector claim is now before the Court. Petitioner’s secular education consisted of elementary school training and two years of high school. On September 27, 1948, he married a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The record indicates that, beginning in November 1949, he received “private instruction” in the Bible from a member of the sect, and that in December he began “actively serving” as a Jehovah’s Witness. On January 4, 1950, petitioner registered under the selective service laws. The following month he was ordained as a minister of the Witnesses. Petitioner’s religious affiliation, at least as late as 1948, had been Catholic, and his parents and family were Catholic. He began work with the Great Lakes Steel Corporation, a steel plant manufacturing articles of war, on August 19,1950. On October 1, 1950, petitioner was recognized as a “pioneer” by the Jehovah’s Witnesses and embarked on more extensive religious activities. In his special form for conscientious objectors, filed on April 3, 1951, petitioner claimed exemption from combatant. and noncombatant service. He relied on “the ten commandments of God found in the Bible” to support his claim. He said he would use force “[i]n protection of person and ministerial activities, but at no time in aggression.” Petitioner declined to rely on the official pronouncements of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to support his position, stating that “I am basing myself entirely on my knowledge of the Bible.” He supported his claims, however, with an affidavit signed by 22 persons, attesting to petitioner’s activity in the Witnesses for the 18 months preceding April 8,1951, and with a certificate of 4 persons stating that petitioner was conducting weekly Bible studies with them. Petitioner had not given public expression to his views “other than” through his general religious activity. After an intervening classification of III-A (dependency deferment), petitioner was classified I-A. on January 8, 1952. On February 19, 1952, following a personal appearance, the local Board decided unanimously to continue petitioner in I-A, and petitioner noted an appeal. The Appeal Board made a tentative finding against him and referred the case to the Department of Justice. The FBI then made its investigation and petitioner was given a hearing. The hearing officer, while noting that petitioner “appeared to be a sincere Jehovah’s Witness and as such is conscientiously opposed to war," recommended denial of the conscientious objector classification. The Department of Justice, in its report to the Appeal Board, made a similar recommendation. In accepting the view expressed by the hearing officer, the Department found support in “[t]he fact that registrant became a member of the Jehovah’s Witness sect one month after his Selective Service System registration in January, 1950, despite the fact that his wife had been a member for many years." No copy of this report or other notice of the recommendation was given petitioner prior to the Appeal Board’s decision. On December 11, 1952, the Appeal Board unanimously classified petitioner I-A, and upon his refusal to submit to induction this prosecution was brought. Petitioner contends that his classification is invalid because he was not furnished a copy of the Justice Department’s recommendation to the Appeal Board and accorded an opportunity to reply thereto. Section 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, outlining the procedure in conscientious objector cases, is silent on this question. But a similar silence was not held to be a considered rejection of the right of a registrant to be supplied with a fair résumé of adverse evidence in the FBI reports, United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S. 1 (1953); Simmons v. United States, ante, p. 397, and we believe it also to be implicit in the Act and Regulations — viewed against our underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play — that a copy of the recommendation of the Department be furnished the registrant at the time it is forwarded to the Appeal Board, and that he be afforded an opportunity to reply. It is true that the recommendation of the Department is advisory. 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j). Indeed, this very consideration led us in United States v. Nugent, supra, to allow considerable latitude in the auxiliary hearing which culminated in the Department’s report. A natural corollary of this, however, is that a registrant be given an opportunity to rebut this recommendation when it comes to the Appeal Board, the agency with the ultimate responsibility for classification. For in the usual case it is the Appeal Board which renders the selective service determination considered “final” in the courts, not to be overturned unless there is no basis in fact. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114. It should be emphasized, moreover, that in contrast to the strictly appellate functions it exercises in other cases, the Appeal Board in handling conscientious objector claims is the first selective service board to receive the Department’s recommendation, and is usually the only decision-making body to pass on the entire file. An opportunity for the registrant to reply is therefore the only means of insuring that this Board will have all of the relevant data. Furthermore, if the registrant is to present his case effectively to the Appeal Board, he must be cognizant of all the facts before the Board as well as the over-all position of the Department of Justice. See Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U. S. 292, 300-305; United States v. Abilene & So. Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 289; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93. The facts here underscore this necessity. The Department in its recommendation emphasizes that the petitioner was of a Catholic family and concluded that petitioner’s “affiliation with [Jehovah’s Witnesses] has been too recent and too closely related to his draft status to warrant the acceptance of his conscientious objector position as genuine. The fact that registrant became a member of the Jehovah’s Witness sect one month after his . . . registration . . . lends weight to this conclusion.” But petitioner contends he was a member of the Witnesses before he registered, and there is testimony that he had not been of the Catholic belief since 1948. Nor was this facet of the case explored at the Department of Justice hearing. If petitioner had been afforded a copy of the recommendation, he might have successfully contradicted the basis of the Department’s conclusion or diminished the forcefulness of its thrust. The record also discloses that the local Board apparently placed little emphasis on the lateness of petitioner’s conversion, inquiring instead about the tenets of the sect and petitioner’s employment in the steel plant. On appeal, it was logical for petitioner to direct his attention to these matters. But the Department of Justice based its rejection of his claim on the proximity of petitioner’s conversion to his registration for the draft, a contention of which he had no knowledge and no opportunity to meet. The petitioner was entitled to know the thrust of the Department’s recommendation so he could muster his facts and arguments to meet its contentions. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 18. Nor is this requirement inconsistent with the views expressed in United States v. Nugent, supra, that selective service procedures, “geared to meet the imperative needs of mobilization and national vigilance,” are not to be delayed by “litigious interruption.” The registrant in that case sought to make the auxiliary procedure of the Department of Justice “a full-scale trial for each appealing registrant.” We refused to compel “an all-out collateral attack at the [Department of Justice] hearing on the testimony obtained in its prehearing investigation.” Here all that is involved is the mailing of a copy of the Department’s recommendation to the registrant and permitting a reply to the Appeal Board. The registrant already has the right to file a statement with the Appeal Board. Just as the right to a hearing means the right to a meaningful hearing, United States v. Nugent, supra; Simmons v. United States, supra, so the right to file a statement before the Appeal Board includes the right to file a meaningful statement, one based on all the facts in the file and made with awareness of the recommendations and arguments to be countered. A similar problem has arisen once before in the administration of our selective service laws. Under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, local Boards referred to panels of clergymen and laymen of a particular faith questions concerning the validity of ministerial and divinity student claims. The panel interviewed the registrant and made a report to the local Board. In sustaining the use of these panels, this Court emphasized the right of the registrant under the regulations to examine the report and “explain or correct it, or deny it.” Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304, 313. See also Eagles v. Horowitz, 329 U. S. 317, 323. And, in a case where it was not shown that the registrant had access to the panel’s report, Judge Learned Hand said: “As the case comes to us, the board made use of evidence of which [the registrant] may have been unaware, and which he had no chance to answer: a prime requirement of any fair hearing.” United States v. Balogh, 157 F. 2d 939, 943, judgment vacated on other grounds, 329 U. S. 692. See also Brewer v. United States, 211 F. 2d 864 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1954). So basic, indeed, is this “prime requirement of any fair hearing” that counsel for the Government contended for the first time in oral argument that the rights of the registrant were amply protected by the provision in the regulations for a mode of “rehearing.” In short, the argument is that after the Appeal Board decides against the registrant and his file is returned to the local Board, he has the right under the selective service regulations to examine all information in his file, including the recommendation of the Department, 32 CFR § 1606.32 (a) (1); 32 CFR § 1606.38 (c). The registrant would then have a right to request a reopening of his classification, 32 CFR § 1625.1 (a); 32 CFR § 1625.2, if he submitted “proof of error in documents submitted to the appeal board by the Department of Justice.” Moreover, he may present his contentions to the Director of Selective Service or the State Director of Selective Service, requesting a reopening of his classification or a reconsideration by the Appeal Board, 32 CFR § 1625.3 (a); 32 CFR § 1626.61 (a). We believe these remedies to be too little and too late. Too little, because the right to present petitioner’s side of the case is broader than the bare right to correct “errors” made by the Department in its recommendation. Too late, because, except with the permission of the national or state Director, only the local Board may reopen the case; and a certain reluctance is to be expected after the Appeal Board, albeit on incomplete presentation, has rejected the registrant’s claim. Moreover, the local Board has discretion to refuse to reopen the case if it “is of the opinion that the information accompanying such request fails to present any facts in addition to those considered when the registrant was classified or, even if new facts are presented, the local board is of the opinion that such facts, if true, would not justify a change in such registrant’s classification . . . .” 32 CFR § 1625.4. We hold that the over-all procedures set up in the statute and regulations, designed to be “fair and just” in their operation, 62 Stat. 605, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 (c), require that the registrant receive a copy of the Justice Department’s recommendation and be given a reasonable opportunity to file a reply thereto. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding petitioner’s conviction for refusing to submit to induction, is Reversed. A much more extensive narration of petitioner’s background is given in the hearing officer’s report. (R. 11a et seq.) The latter document, under applicable regulations, 32 CFR (1954 Supp.) § 1626.25, was not transmitted to the Appeal Board for its consideration in classifying petitioner. The complete text of the report is as follows: “Registrant was bom July 22, 1931, in San Antonio, Texas. He left the Edison High School of that city in June, 1948, after two years of attendance and took employment as a sheet metal worker with a local firm. He married his present wife in September, 1948. In the summer of 1949 he came to Detroit and worked as a laborer for the Adams Lumber Company until July, 1950. From August, 1950 to present he has been employed as a laborer and general maintenance man at the Great Lakes Steel Corporation. Registrant previously was a Catholic and has five sisters and a brother all of whom are Catholics. His parents were Catholics. His mother is dead and his father lives in San Antonio, Texas. Registrant’s wife became a Jehovah’s Witness in 1941 and registrant was baptized a member in February, 1950. In October, 1950, he became a ‘pioneer’ and he participates in the usual activities of his sect, attending several weekly meetings including the Theocratic Ministry School. He also does house to house work and sells the publications of the sect. Registrant bases his claim for exemption upon his own personal interpretation of the Bible with the guidance of the Watchtower Bible aids and relies particularly on the Ten Commandments. He believes in the use of force in self defense. “The investigation reflects that registrant is well regarded in the several communities in which he has lived and that he and his wife are said to be very religious. Neighbors advise that they hold Bible studies in their apartment and appear to devote considerable time to religious work. References and co-religionists state that he is a devoted member of the sect and applies himself earnestly to his religious work. Employment records reveal that registrant was remembered as a good worker and that his record is good and contains no derogatory information. “After a personal appearance, the Hearing Officer stated that registrant appeared to be a sincere Jehovah’s Witness but concluded that his affiliation with that sect has been too recent and too closely related to his draft status to warrant the acceptance of his conscientious objector position as genuine. The fact that registrant became a member of the Jehovah’s Witness sect one month after his Selective Service System registration in January, 1950, despite the fact that his wife had been a member for many years, lends weight to this conclusion. “After consideration of the entire file and record, the Department of Justice finds that the registrant’s objections to combatant and noncombatant service are not sustained. It is, therefore, recommended to your Board that registrant’s claim for exemption from both combatant and noncombatant training and service be not sustained.” This section does provide that the Department of Justice shall make an “appropriate inquiry,” and hold a “hearing” with respect to the claimed conscientious objections. If after such hearing it finds the claims unfounded, “it shall recommend to the appeal board that such objections be not sustained.” The regulations are of the same tenor, 32 CFR (1954 Supp.) § 1626.25. Inapplicable to the instant question are cases dealing with whether a recommendation or intermediate report is necessary to begin with, Labor Board v. Mackay Co., 304 U. S. 333; Public Service Corp. v. S. E. C., 129 F. 2d 899 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1942), whether the recommendation can be subjected to judicial review, Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U. S. 103, and whether satisfactory procedures were employed in formulating the recommendation, Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241; Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294. The latter three cases are distinguishable, moreover, because they do not involve individualized fact finding and classification, but legislative determinations, political judgments, and the exercise of judicial discretion in the imposition of sentence. See also Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N. J. 498, 105 A. 2d 545 (1954). “The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.” See 32 CFR § 1626.12. “The person appealing may attach to his appeal a statement specifying the matters in which he believes the local board erred, may direct attention to any information in the registrant’s file which he believes the local board has failed to consider or to give sufficient weight, and may set out in full any information which was offered to the local board and which the local board failed or refused to include in the registrant’s file.” It is true that this section requires that the statement be made at the time the appeal is initiated. And 32 CFR § 1626.24 (b) provides that “the appeal board shall not receive or consider any information which is not contained in the record received from the local board except (1) the advisory recommendation from the Department of Justice under § 1626.25, and (2) general information concerning economic, industrial, and social conditions.” But the broad scope of review provided in § 1626.12 is inconsistent with any implication that registrants in conscientious objector cases are required to file their statements with the initial appeal. Such a requirement, if indeed the section is viewed as an absolute bar to supplemental and amendatory statements, may be proper in the normal case. But where the record is augmented on appeal, the registrant can effectively point out error and failure to consider only after the Department of Justice has acted. See letter of General Hershey, February 4, 1955.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 106 ]	sc_adminaction
FORNEY v. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY No. 97-5737. Argued April 22, 1998 Decided June 15, 1998 Bkeyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ralph Wilborn argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Tim Wilborn and Erie Schnaufer. Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for respondent in support of petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and William Kanter. Allen R. Snyder, by invitation of the Court, 522 U. S. 1088 (1998), argued the cause as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether a Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying benefits may appeal a district court order remanding the case to the agency for further proceedings. We conclude that the law authorizes such an appeal. I Sandra K. Forney, the petitioner, applied for Social Security disability benefits under § 228 of the Social Security Act, as added, 70 Stat. 815, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. §423. A Social Security Administration Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined (1) that Forney had not worked since the onset of her medical problem, and (2) that she was more than minimally disabled, but (3) that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits automatically. Moreover, her disability, (4) while sufficiently serious to prevent her return to her former work (cook, kitchen manager, or baker), (5) was not serious enough to prevent her from holding other jobs available in the economy (such as order clerk or telephone answering service operator). App. 12-28. The ALJ consequently denied her disability claim, id., at 28, and the Administration’s Appeals Council denied Forney’s request for review, App. to Pet. for Cert. 39-40; see generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U. S. 137, 140-142 (1987) (setting forth five-part “disability” test); 20 CFR §404.1520 (1997) (same). Forney then sought judicial review in Federal District Court. The court found the agency’s final determination— that Forney could hold other jobs — inadequately supported because those jobs “require frequent or constant reaching,” but the record showed that Forney’s “ability to reach is impaired.” Forney v. Secretary, Civ. No. 94-6357 (D. Ore., May 1, 1995); App. 127-128. The District Court then entered a judgment, which remanded the ease to the agency for further proceedings (pursuant to sentence four of 42 U. S. C. § 405(g)). Id, at 128. Forney sought to appeal the remand order. She contended that, because the agency had already had sufficient opportunity to prove the existence of other relevant employment (and for other reasons), its denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal. Forney v. Chater, 108 F. 3d 228, 234 (1997). Forney sought certiorari. Both she and the Solicitor General agreed that Forney had the legal right to appeal from the District Court’s judgment. The Solicitor General suggested that we reverse the Ninth Circuit and remand the case so that it could hear Forney’s appeal. We granted cer-tiorari to consider the merits of this position, and we appointed an amicus to defend the Ninth Circuit’s decision. We now agree with Forney and the Solicitor General that the Court of Appeals should have heard Forney’s appeal. r*H Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants the “courts of appeals . . . jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” (Emphasis added.) Forney’s appeal falls within the scope of this jurisdictional grant. That is because the District Court entered its judgment under the authority of the special “judicial review” provision of the Social Security Act, which says, in its fourth sentence, that “district court[s]” (reviewing, for example, agency denials of Social Security disability claims) “shall have power to enter ... a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [agency] with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing,” 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (emphasis added), and which adds, in its eighth sentence, that the “judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions,” ibid, (emphases added). This Court has previously held that this statutory language means what it says, namely, that a district court order remanding a Social Security disability benefit claim to the agency for further proceedings is a “final judgment” for purposes of § 1291 and it is, therefore, appealable. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617 (1990); see also Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U. S. 292, 294 (1993) (statute that requires attorney’s fees application to be filed within “thirty days of final judgment” requires filing within 30 days of entry of § 405(g) “sentence four” district court remand order, not within 30 days Of final agency decision after remand). Finkelstein is not identical to the case before us. It involved an appeal by the Government; this case involves an appeal by a disability benefits claimant. Moreover, the need for immediate appeal in Finkelstein was arguably greater than that here. The District Court there had invalidated a set of Health and Human Services regulations, and the Government might have found it difficult to obtain appellate review of this matter of general importance. Further, the Court, in Finkelstein, said specifically that it would “express no opinion about appealability” where a party seeks to “appeal on the ground that” the district court should have granted broader relief. 496 U. S., at 623, n. 3. Finkelstein’s logic, however, makes these features of that case irrelevant here. Finkelstein focused upon a “class of orders” that Congress had made “appealable under § 1291.” Id., at 628. It reasoned, primarily from the language of § 405(g), that a district court judgment remanding a Social Security disability benefit case fell within that class. Nothing in the language, either of the statute or the Court’s opinion, suggests that such an order could be “final” for purposes of appeal only when the Government seeks to appeal but not when the claimant seeks to do so. Nor does the opinion’s reasoning permit an inference that “finality” turns on the order’s importance or the availability (or lack of availability) of an avenue for appeal from the different, later, agency determination that might emerge after remand. The Ninth Circuit itself recognized that the District Court’s judgment was “final” for purposes of appeal, for it said that any effort “to conclude” that a judgment remanding the ease is “not final for the claimant” was “inconsistent” with Finkelstein. 108 F. 3d, at 232. The court added that it would be “error for the district court to attempt to retain jurisdiction” after remanding the case; and it wrote that the remand judgment, which ended the “civil action,” must be “ ‘final’ in a formalistic sense ... for all parties to it.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals nonetheless reached a “no appeal” conclusion — but on a different ground. It pointed out that a “party normally may not appeal [a] decision in its favor.” Ibid, (citing Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241, 242 (1939)). And it said that Forney had obtained a decision in her favor here. Because Forney “may, on remand, secure all of the relief she seeks,” the court wrote, she is a “prevailing” party and therefore cannot appeal. 108 F. 3d, at 232-233. We do not agree. We concede that this Court has held that a “party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it.” Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 333 (1980). But this Court also has clearly stated that a party is “aggrieved” and ordinarily can appeal a decision “granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested.” United States v. Jose, 519 U. S. 54, 56 (1996) (per curiam). And this latter statement determines the outcome of this case. Forney’s complaint sought as relief: “1. That this eourt reverse and set aside the decision... denying [the] claim for disability benefits; “2. In the alternative, that this eourt remand the case back to the Secretary for proper evaluation of the evidence or a hearing de novo.” App. 37. The context makes clear that, from Forney’s perspective, the second “alternative,” which means further delay and risk, is only half a loaf. Thus, the District Court’s order gives petitioner some, but not all, of the relief she requested; and she consequently can appeal the District Court’s order insofar as it denies her the relief she has sought. Indeed, to hold to the contrary would deny a disability claimant the right to seek reversal (instead of remand) through a cross-appeal in cases where the Government itself appeals a remand order, as the Government has every right to do. See Finkelstein, supra, at 619. The Solicitor General points to many cases that find a right to appeal in roughly comparable circumstances. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 12 (citing Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F. 3d 1572 (CA Fed. 1997) (permitting appeal where prevailing party recovered reasonable royalty but was denied lost profits); Castle v. Rubin, 78 F. 3d 654 (CADC 1996) (per curiam) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded partial backpay but denied reinstatement and front pay); La Plante v. American Honda Motor Co., 27 F. 3d 731 (CA1 1994) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded compensatory but not punitive damages); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F. 2d 107 (CA3 1991) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded damages but denied attorney’s fees); Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F. 2d 619 (CA3 1990) (permitting appeal where prevailing party denied consequential damages); Carrigan v. Exxon Co., U. S. A., 877 F. 2d 1237 (CA5 1989) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded damages but not injunc-tive relief)). The contrary authority that amicus, through diligent efforts, has found arose in less closely analogous circumstances and consequently does not persuade us. Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below 17, and n. 13; see, e.g., Parr v. United States, 351 U. S. 513, 518 (1956) (order granting Government’s motion to dismiss indictment without prejudice as not appealable by defendant in part because the dismissal would not be “final” (emphasis added)); see also CH2M Hill Central, Inc. v. Herman, 131 F. 3d 1244, 1246-1247 (CA7 1997) (claimant cannot appeal agency appeals panel remand of case for further agency hearing, for appeals order is not type of final agency decision that is reviewable under relevant judicial review statute); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F. 2d 11, 16 (CA1 1988) (same); Stripe-A-Zone v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’rs, 643 F. 2d 230, 233 (CA5 1981) (same). Finally, we recognize that the Ninth Circuit expressed concern that a rule of law permitting appeals in these circumstances would impose additional, and unnecessary, burdens upon federal appeals courts. The Solicitor General, while noting that the federal courts reviewed nearly 10,000 Social Security Administration decisions in 1996, says that the “[pjractical [cjonsequences” of permitting appeals “[a]re limited.” Brief for Respondent 26; Reply Brief for Respondent 17, n. 13. Except for unusual cases, he believes, a claimant obtaining a remand will prefer to return to the agency rather than to appeal immediately seeking outright agency reversal — because appeal means further delay, because the chance of obtaining reversal should be small, and because the appeal (if it provokes a Government cross-appeal) risks losing all. Brief for Respondent 26-29. Regardless, as we noted in Finkelstein, congressional statutes governing appealability normally proceed by defining “classes” of cases where appeals will (or will not) lie. 496 U. S., at 628. The statutes at issue here do not give courts the power to redefine, or to subdivide, those classes, according to whether or not they believe, in a particular case, further agency proceedings might obviate the need for an immediate appeal. Thus, if the Solicitor General proves wrong in his prediction, the remedy must be legislative in nature. For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 105 ]	sc_adminaction
PILLSBURY et al., DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS, v. UNITED ENGINEERING CO. et al. No. 229. Argued December 6, 1951. Decided January 2, 1952. Samuel D. Slade argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, Leavenworth Colby and Benjamin Forman. Edward R. Kay argued the "cause for respondents. With, him on the brief was Lyman Henry. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the . Court. These four cases present the same question, namely, the construction and application of the statute of limitations provision of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, § 13 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 913 (a), which provides in pertinent part as follows: “The right to compensation for disability under this Act shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury . . . .” The claims here involved were filed from eighteen to twenty-four months from the dates the employees were injured. The Deputy Commissioner held that the claims were nevertheless timely, since they had been filed within one year after the claimants had become disabled because of their injuries. The District Court vacated the awards, 92 F. Supp. 898, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the claims were barred because not “filed within one year after the injury,” 187 F. 2d 987, 990. We granted certiorari, 342 U. S. 847, because of a conflict between circuits, identical to the present conflict between the holdings of the Deputy Commissioner and the Court of Appeals, as to the construction to be given the limita-, tions provision. This same question was before us in 1940 in Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F. 2d 667, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 309 U. S. 619. Petitioners contend that the word “injury” as used in the statute should be construed to mean “disability.” This contention is premised on petitioners’ conclusion that § 6 (a) of the Act, which provides that “No compensation shall be allowed for the first seven days of-the disability,” (“disability” is elsewhere defined in the Act as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment”) and § 19 (a), which provides that “a claim . . . may be filed ... at any time after the first seven days of disability following any injury,” operate to prevent the filing of a claim before seven days of disability have occurred. Since, as was the case of each of the claimants here, an injured employee may fail to accrue seven days’ “disability” within a year after his injury, petitioners argue that such an employee will be barred from filing his claim before his right to file it arises, if “injury” is construed to mean “injury.” Thus, petitioners conclude that the limitation should not be made to run until the injury becomes compensable, i. e., after seven days’ “disability.” But the right to recover for disability is one thing, and the right to file a claim is another. It has long been the practice of the Deputy Commissioner to permit filing' to avoid the running of the one-year limitation period here involved. A proper interpretation of §§ 6 (a) and 19 (a) does not prohibit the filing of a claim before the accrual of seven days’ disability. ' Each of the claimants here was immediately aware of his injury, received medical treatment, and suffered continuous pain. We are npt here dealing with a latent injury or an occupational disease. We are not free, under the guise of construction, to amend the statute by inserting therein before the word “injury” the word “compensable” so as to make “injury” read as if it were “disability.” Congress knew the difference between “disability” and “injury” and used the words advisedly. This view is especially compelling when it is noted that the two words are used in the same sentence of the limitations provision; therein “disability” is related to the right to compensation, while- “injury” is related to the period within which the claim must be filed. Furthermore, Congress defined both “disability” and “injury” in the Act, and its awareness of the difference is apparent throughout. Thus, we think that when Congress used “disability” and “injury” in the same sentence, making each word applicable to a different thing, it did not intend the carefully distinguished and separately defined words to mean the same thing. Congress meant what it said when it limited recovery to one year from date of injury, and “injury” does not mean “disability.” We are aware that this is a humanitarian Act, and that it should be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes; but that does hot give us the power to rewrite the statute of limitations at will, and make what was intended to be a limitation no limitation at all. Petitioners’ construction would have the effect of extending the limitation indefinitely if a claim for disability had not been filed; the provision would then be one of extension rather than limitation. While it might be desirable for the statute to provide as petitioners contend, the power to change the statute is with Congress, not us. The judgments are Affirmed. The conflict is between the instant decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Great American Indemnity Co. v. Britton, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 44, 179 F. 2d 60. 44 Stat. 1426, 33 U. S. C. § 906 (a). . 44 Stat. 1426, 33 U. S. C. § 902 (10). 44 Stat. 1435, 33 U. S. C. § 919 (a). “Sec. -2. When used in this Act— “(2) The term ‘injury’ means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of-such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment. “(10) ‘Disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the- employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” 44 Stat. 1424-1425, 33 U. S. C. § 902 (2), (10).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 30 ]	sc_adminaction
WATT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. ALASKA No. 79-1890. Argued January 13, 1981 Decided April 21, 1981 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 273. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 276. Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for petitioners in No. 79-1890. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moor-man, and Dirk D. Snel. Charles K. Cranston argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 79-1904. G. Thomas Koester, Assistant Attorney General of Alaska, argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was Wilson L. Condon, Attorney General. Together with No. 79-1904, Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Alaska et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The narrow issue presented by these cases is which of two federal statutes provides the formula for distribution of revenues received from oil and gas leases on national wildlife refuges reserved from public lands. I The Kenai National Moose Range was created in 1941 by the withdrawal of nearly two million acres from public lands on the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska. See Exec. Order No. 8979, 3 CFR 1043 (1938-1943 Comp.). See also Public Land Order No. 3400, 29 Fed. Reg. 7094-7095 (1964) (adjusting the boundaries). The Kenai Moose Range, as its name suggests, provides a refuge and breeding ground for moose. The Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior administers it as part of the national wildlife refuge system. Commercially significant quantities of oil underlie the Kenai Moose Range. Pursuant to authority under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U. S. C. § 181 et seq., the Secretary of the Interior issued oil and gas leases for the Kenai Moose Range, beginning in the mid-1950’s. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1 (1965). The United States has received substantial revenues from these leases. From first receipt in 1954, the Secretary has distributed these revenues according to the formula provided in § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 450, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 191. This formula prescribes that 90% of the revenues be paid to the State of Alaska and 10% to the United States Treasury. In 1975, the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service inquired of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior whether revenues from oil and gas leases in wildlife refuges created by withdrawal of public lands should be distributed according to § 401 (c) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, 49 Stat. 383, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 715s (c), rather than under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The Director’s inquiry was prompted by the 1964 amendments to § 401 (a), which added the word “minerals” to a list of refuge resources, the revenues from which were to be distributed according to the statutory formula. Pub. L. 88-523, 78 Stat. 701. According to this formula, 25% of the revenues are paid to counties wherein the refuge lies, and remaining funds are used by the Department of the Interior for public purposes. The Solicitor ruled that the 1964 amendment governed, superseding § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 79-1890, p. 26a. The Comptroller General concurred in the view of the Solicitor. 55 Comp. Gen. 117 (1975). Upon request for reconsideration by the State of Alaska in 1976, the Comptroller General affirmed his initial decision. See Op. Comp. Gen. in File: B-l 18678, June 11, 1976, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 79-1890, p. 42a. The Kenai Peninsula Borough then brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking a declaration that the amended § 401 (a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act governed the distribution of oil and gas revenues from the Kenai Moose Range. Kenai Borough is the “county” within which the Moose Range lies. If § 401 (a) governs, it will receive 25% of the revenues and the State none. The State of Alaska then filed suit in the same court against the Secretary and various federal officials, seeking a declaration that § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act still governed distribution of these same oil and gas revenues. If that provision applies, the State will continue to receive 90% of the funds and, so far as federal law is concerned, Kenai Borough none. The District Court consolidated the lawsuits. The District Court granted summary judgment for the State of Alaska. 436 F. Supp. 288 (1977). Upon examination of the apparently conflicting statutes, the court held that the term “minerals” in the amended Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act referred only to oil and gas found on land acquired for wildlife refuges. Id., at 292. Distribution of oil and gas revenues from leases on public land reserved for wildlife refuges, it held, continues to be determined by § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Ibid. The court viewed the legislative history of the 1964 amendments as demonstrating that Congress was concerned primarily with the difficulties of acquiring land for refuges and that Congress expected no increase in revenues from the Kenai Moose Range to result from the amendments. Id., at 291-292. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 612 F. 2d 1210 (1980). That court found the legislative history largely ambiguous. Id., at 1213. It refused to find that the addition of the word “minerals” to the amended Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act had repealed by implication the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 without a clear showing that this was the intent of Congress. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 549-551 (1974). The court further approved the District Court’s holding because it gave effect to each statute. 612 F. 2d, at 1214-1215. We granted certiorari. Sub nom. Andrus v. Alaska, 449 U. S. 818 (1980). We now affirm. II The Secretary and the Kenai Borough rely primarily on the “plain language” of § 401 (a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. They contend that it provides without ambiguity that mineral resources from all national wildlife refuges be distributed according to the formula described in § 401 (a) of the Act. As currently phrased, § 401 (a) provides: “[A] 11 revenues received by the Secretary of the Interior from the sale or other disposition of animals, salmonoid carcassas [sic], timber, hay, grass, or other products of the soil, minerals, shells, sand, or gravel, [or] from other privileges... shall be... reserved in a separate fund for disposition as hereafter prescribed.” 16 U. S. C. § 715s (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The provision defines the wildlife refuge system to include lands “acquired or reserved” for conservation and protection of certain fish and wildlife. No restriction is placed upon the common meaning of “minerals.” Given this clarity, it is argued, resort to the legislative history is unnecessary or improper. We agree with the Secretary that “[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). See Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424 (1981). But ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the inquiry. Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976); United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940). This is because the plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.). The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect. E. g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892) ; United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167, 175 (1931). Sole reliance on the “plain language” of § 401 (a) would assume the answer to the question at issue. These cases involve two statutes, each of which by its literal terms applies to the facts before us. Restatement of the terms of § 401 (a) cannot answer which statute Congress intended to control. Recognizing this, the Secretary invokes the maxim of construction that the more recent of two irreconcilably conflicting statutes governs. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.02 (4th ed. 1973). Without depreciating this general rule, we decline to read the statutes as being in irreconcilable conflict without seeking to ascertain the actual intent of Congress. Our examination of the legislative history is guided by another maxim: “ ‘repeals by implication are not favored/ ” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S., at 549, quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). “The intention of the legislature to repeal must be ‘clear' and manifest.’ ” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939), quoting Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596, 602 (1883). We must read the statutes to give'effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose. Mancari, supra, at 551; see Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U. S. 389, 394 (1940). Ill Congress gave extensive consideration to the purpose and probable effect of the 1964 amendments to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. Pub; L. 88-523, 78 Stat. 701. Nonetheless, and we think it significant, there is no explanation in the legislative history for the addition of the single word “minerals” to the list of refuge resources subject to the Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 1753, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (hereinafter 1964 H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 1096, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (hereinafter 1964 S. Rep.); 110 Cong. Rec. 19882-19883 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Ostertag). Our study of the few legislative materials pertinent to the insertion of “minerals” persuades us that Congress intended to work no change in the pre-existing formula for distribution of mineral revenues from federal wildlife refuges. A Prior to 1964, § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 governed distribution of revenues from mineral leases on wildlife refuges withdrawn from public lands. This conclusion cannot be seriously questioned. First, from the time the first mineral revenues were generated on such lands until well after 1964, the Secretary invariably distributed the revenues as provided in the Mineral Leasing Act. Second, the Comptroller General long ago ruled that the only other arguably applicable statute, the then unamended Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 383 (hereinafter 1935 Refuge Act), see n. 4, supra, did not govern the disposal of revenues from mineral leases on wildlife refuges. 21 Comp. Gen. 873 (1942). See also Comp. Gen., B-105133, Oct. 10, 1951, App. 82. Third, our opinion in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1 (1965), strongly suggests that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 governed the distribution of revenues from reserved refuge lands prior to 1964. That case, involved the authority of the Secretary to issue oil leases on the Kenai Moose Range after the lands had been withdrawn from the public domain by Executive Order. In holding that the Executive Order did not deprive the Secretary of this power, this Court held that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 conferred the necessary statutory authorization on the Secretary to grant the leases. “The Act excluded from its application certain designated lands, but did not exclude land within wildlife refuge areas.” Id., at 4 (footnote omitted). Because §35 of the Mineral Leasing Act prescribes the distribution formula for revenues received from all leases issued “under the provisions of this chapter,” we think it an inescapable deduction from Tallman that, prior to 1964, the Act continued to provide the formula for disposition of revenues generated by leases on public lands after the lands were withdrawn for wildlife refuges. Neither the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 nor the 1935 Refuge Act authorized the Secretary to issue leases for mineral extraction from refuges created from acquired lands. 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 9 (1941) (Attorney General Jackson); 21 Comp. Gen. 873 (1942). Congress responded by passing the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, Act of Aug. 7, 1947, ch. 513, 61 Stat. 913, 30 U. S. C. § 351 et seg. See n. 10, supra. In addition to conferring authority on the Secretary to issue leases for specified minerals, including oil and gas, it provided that revenues from the leases be “distributed in the same manner as prescribed for other receipts from the lands affected by the lease.” 30 U. S. C. § 355.. As' applied to wildlife refuges created from acquired lands, this provision requires that mineral revenues be distributed according to the formula in the 1935 Refuge Act. Thus, when Congress amended the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act in 1964, the disposition of oil and gas revenues was reasonably clear. Such revenues from reserved refuge lands were distributed according to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Revenues from acquired refuge lands were distributed according to the formula in the 1935 Refuge Act, not by its own terms, but by operation of the 1947 Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands. B The question presented by these cases is whether Congress intended to alter this program of revenue distribution when it amended the 1935 Refuge Act in 1964. The impetus for proposals leading to the passage of the amendments was the difficulty the Department had experienced in acquiring new refuge lands. See 1964 S. Rep. 5; 1964 H. R. Rep. 2. Localities resisted having land removed from local tax roles. The purpose of the amendments was to “provide a more equitable formula for payments to counties as compensation for loss of taxable properties that have been acquired by the Federal wildlife refuge system.” 1964 S. Rep. 2. See 1964 H. R. Rep. 2-3. Public Law 88-523 met this problem by changing the formula for distribution of revenues from refuges consisting of acquired lands. §401 (c)(1), 78 Stat. 701. The new formula provided that counties within which acquired refuge lands lay could receive, at their option, a payment based on the adjusted cost of the lands rather than on revenues produced. Congress intended the Department to pay more to counties under the new law than it had under the old. There is no explanation in the legislative history of Pub. L. 88-523 for the insertion of “minerals” in the list of resources subject to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. Such silence is suggestive, because Congress was concerned that the Department have sufficient funds to make the increased payments mandated by the amendments. See 1964 S. Rep. 12 (statement of Secretary Udall); 1964 H. R. Rep. 11. Congress might be expected to have mentioned a change wrought through the amendments which would increase refuge revenues by amounts exceeding total existing refuge revenues. During deliberations on the amendments, the Fish and Wildlife Service presented to Senate and House Committees tables showing present payments to counties containing refuges, and payments estimated under the proposed amendments. 1964 S. Rep. 13; 1964 H. R. Rep. 3. The relevant table shows no change in the expected payments to the Borough of Kenai Peninsula. This table assumed that oil and gas revenues were governed by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 both before and after the amendments. The inference seems inescapable that Congress in 1964 did not intend by the insertion of “minerals” in § 401 (a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act to subject revenues from oil leases on reserved refuge lands to its distribution formula. The more reasonable explanation for the intended effect of including “minerals” is provided by the Department of the Interior. The insertion of “minerals” appears first in 1962 in proposed bills supported by the Department as substitutes for other bills then pending before the House and Senate to increase payments to counties. S. 2138, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H. R. 13176, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). In its report to the Committees, the Department offered no particular explanation for this new term, but the Secretary here concedes that this change was included within the proposal’s descriptive category of “various perfecting... provisions.” See Letter from Frank P. Briggs, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, June 20, 1962, in S. Rep. No. 1919, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1962); H. R. Rep. No. 2499, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1962). The insertion of “minerals” in § 401 (a) could both leave the mineral revenues from reserved lands subject to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and “perfect” § 401 (a) by incorporating prior changes. The 1947 Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands subjected mineral revenues from lands acquired for wildlife refuges to the distribution formula in the 1935 Refuge Act. We hold that Congress inserted “minerals” in the amended § 401 (a) to recognize the effect of the 1947 Act and to make clear that the amended distribution formula applied to mineral revenues from acquired lands. This conclusion draws support from the evident fact that Congress was concerned almost exclusively with problems related to acquired refuge lands in adopting the 1964 amendments. Finally, the Department of the Interior interpreted the amendments when passed, and for 10 years thereafter, as not altering the distribution formula. The Department’s contemporaneous construction carries persuasive weight. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S., at 16. Such attention to contemporaneous construction is particularly appropriate in these cases, because the Department first proposed the amendment. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 120 (1978). The Department’s current interpretation, being in conflict with its initial position, is entitled to considerably less deference. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976). In these cases, we find it wholly unpersuasive. IV In summary, we hold that revenues generated by oil and gas leases on federal wildlife refuges consisting of reserved public lands must be distributed according to the formula provided in § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Finding no “clearly expressed congressional intention” to repeal this provision by implication, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S., at 551, we conclude that the term “minerals” in § 401 (a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act applies only to minerals on acquired refuge lands. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Today, the Kenai Moose Range is the only national wildlife refuge created from public lands where oil is being pumped. See Brief for Federal Petitioners 4, n. 4. Substantial quantities of oil, however, are thought to underlie other reserved refuge lands in Alaska. Between 1966 and 1976, Kenai Range generated more than $57 million in oil lease revenues. App. 64. In 1964, Kenai Range generated more than $3.8 million in revenues from oil and gas leases. In that same year, refuges on reserved public land in the contiguous 48 States generated $3,143 in oil and gas revenues. App. to Brief for Federal Petitioners la-2a. In interpreting Congress’ directions for distribution of oil revenues from reserved refuge lands, it should be remembered that historically Kenai alone has generated such revenues. In pertinent part, the current § 35, as set forth in 30 U. S. C. § 191, provides: “All money received from sales, bonuses, royalties, and rentals of the public lands under the provisions of this chapter... shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States;... of those from Alaska... 90 per cen-tum thereof shall be paid to the State of Alaska for disposition by the legislature....” States other than Alaska receive only 50% of public land mineral revenues under the Act. Ibid. By its terms, the Mineral Leasing Act applies to specified minerals, including oil and gas, on all lands owned by the United States, except those lands excluded by the Act. 30 U. S. C. § 181. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 4, and n. 3 (1965). Prior to 1964, § 401 governed distribution of revenues from “the sale or other disposition of surplus wildlife, or of timber, hay, grass, or other spontaneous products of the soil, shell, sand, or gravel, and from other privileges on refuges.” Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 378, 383. The current version of § 401 (a) is given in the text, infra, at 265. Section 401 (c) currently provides: “(1) The Secretary shall pay out the fund, for each fiscal year..., to each county in which is situated any fee area whichever of the following amounts is greater: “(A) An amount equal to the product of 75 cents multiplied by the total acreage of that portion of the fee area which is located within such county. “(B) An amount equal to three-fourths of 1 per centum of the fair market value, as determined by the Secretary, of that portion of the fee area... which is located within such county. “ (C) An amount equal to 25 per centum of the net receipts collected by the Secretary in connection with operation of and management of such fee area during the fiscal year.... “(2) At the end of each fiscal year the Secretary shall pay out of the fund for such fiscal year to each county in which any reserve area is situated, an amount equal to 25 per centum of the net receipts collected by the Secretary in connection with the operation and management of such area during such fiscal year... 16 U. S. C. § 715s (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Section 401 (b) allows the Secretary to pay any expenses related to revenue production or distribution from this fund. Section 401 (e) provides that funds remaining after expenses and the States are paid are transferred to the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, established for the laudable purpose of purchasing migratory bird refuges. Since this litigation commenced in 1976, 90% of oil and gas revenues from the Kenai Range has been paid into an escrow account that now contains more than $23 million. Brief for Federal Petitioners 4, n. 4. In addition to declaratory relief, Kenai Borough sought an accounting of revenues paid to the State since 1964 under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 but allegedly due the Borough, and recovery of such payments. The State sought a resumption of accustomed payments under the Mineral Leasing Act.. In general, “acquired lands are those granted or sold to the United States by a State or citizen and public domain lands were usually never in state or private ownership.” Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 65, n. 2 (1966). The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 applies only to public lands. Id., at 65. In 1978, Congress rejected new amendments to §401 (a) that would have defined minerals as “including, but not limited to, crude petroleum and natural gas.” H. R. 8394, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House Report recommending this bill stated that the language was added to “insure” that after the effective date oil and gas revenues from Kenai would be distributed according to the formula in §401 (c). H. R. Rep. No. 95-1197, p. 8 (1978). The Report disclaims any intention to affect the outcome of these cases, then pending in the Court of Appeals. Ibid. The Senate then rejected even this amendment, Members stating that it would be inappropriate to malee any judgment about the proper allocation of these resources while these cases were still in the courts. 124 Cong. Rec. 31436-31440 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Culver and Sen. Gravel). The sole issue that has been before the courts during this five years of litigation is the intent of Congress in adding the single term “minerals” to the statute in 1964. Congress declined to clarify its intent in 1978. Accordingly, we are left to resolve by judicial construction what should be addressed as a question of legislative policy judgment: the appropriate distribution among federal, state, and local governments of natural resource revenues. “Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 326 U. S. 404 (1945). The Secretary speculates that Congress in 1964 probably assumed that oil and gas revenues from refuges on reserved lands were governed by the 1935 Refuge Act. The basis for this argument is language in the 1935 Refuge Act, continued today, that the Act governed the disposition of "shell, sand, or gravel, and from other privileges on refuges.” See n. 4, supra. It sometimes was contended that “other privileges” included oil and gas leases. See Memorandum of July 6, 1951, Chief Counsel of the Fish and Wildlife Service, App. 87. As noted, the Comptroller General-rejected this contention in 1942 and 1951. For the reasons elaborated in the text, we believe that it was understood by Congress that the 1935 Refuge Act did not govern the leasing of minerals.' Indeed, even the 1946 opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior that the provision authorized oil leases on acquired refuge lands, App. 68, is contradicted by Congress’ passage of the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, Act of Aug. 7, 1947, ch. 513, 61 Stat. 913, 30 U. S. C. § 351 et seq., which subsequently conferred this very authority on the Department. See also 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 9 (1941). The dissent also speculates — inconsistently, we think — that Congress embraced this often discredited interpretation of the 1935 Refuge Act, post, at 279-280, n. 3. The dissent criticizes the Court for concluding that Congress’ insertion of "minerals” in § 401 (a) did not change pre-existing law. Post, at 278-279. The dissent then explains that Congress added “minerals” in 1964 not to change the law, but to reaffirm that the 1935 Refuge Act already governed disposition of oil revenues from reserved refuge lands. Post, at 279-280, n. 3. In other words, the dissent contradicts itself and joins us in positing that the addition of “minerals” was never intended to work a substantive change, but disagrees merely about what the law provided prior to the 1964 amendments. The Secretary argues that Tallman's construction of the Mineral Leasing Act should not now be binding, because the Court did not need to construe the Act. This is incorrect. The Court was required to determine that the Secretary had statutory authority to issue oil leases on refuges withdrawn from public lands, before it could reach the question whether the Executive Orders withdrawing the refuge lands limited that authority. The Court examined the language of § 1 of the Act and found that it gave the Secretary the requisite authority. See 380 U. S., at 4, n. 3. The 1964 payment formula was liberalized further in	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 25 ]	sc_adminaction
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. BEACH COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al. No. 92-603. Argued March 29, 1993 Decided June 1, 1993 John F. Manning argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Douglas N. Letter, and Bruce G. Forrest. Deborah C. Costlow argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief for respondents Beach Communications, Inc., et al. was Thomas C. Power. Daniel L. Brenner, Michael S. Schooler, Diane B. Burstein, H. Bartow Farr III, and Paul M. Smith filed a brief for respondent National Cable Television Association. Richard Ruda filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In providing for the regulation of cable television facilities, Congress has drawn a distinction between facilities that serve separately owned and managed buildings and those that serve one or more buildings under common ownership or management. Cable facilities in the latter category are exempt from regulation as long as they provide services without using public rights-of-way. The question before us is whether there is any conceivable rational basis justifying this distinction for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act), 98 Stat. 2779, amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., to establish a national framework for regulating cable television. One objective of the Cable Act was to set out “franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the' needs and interests of the local community.” §601(2), 47 U. S. C. § 521(2). To that end, Congress provided for the franchising of cable systems by local governmental authorities, § 621(a), 47 U. S. C. § 541(a), and prohibited any person from operating a cable system without a franchise, subject to certain exceptions, § 621(b), 47 U. S. C. § 541(b). Section 602(7) of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. § 522(7) (Supp. 1993), determines the reach of the franchise requirement by defining the operative term “cable system.” A cable system means any facility designed to provide video programming to multiple subscribers through “closed transmission paths,” but does not include, inter alia, “a facility that serves only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such facility or facilities us[e] any public right-of-way.” § 602(7)(B), 47 U. S. C. § 522(7)(B) (1988 ed., Supp. V). In part, this provision tracks a regulatory “private cable” exemption previously promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) pursuant to preexisting authority under the Communications Act. See 47 CFR § 76.5(a) (1984) (exempting from the definition of “cable television system” “any such facility that serves or will serve only subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management”)! The earlier regulatory exemption derived in turn from the Commission’s first set of cable rules, published in 1965. See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F. C. C. 683, 741 (1965) (exempting from the definition of “community antenna television system” “any such facility which serves only the residents of one or more apartment dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, and commercial establishments located on the premises of such an apartment house”). The Cable Act narrowed the terms of the regulatory exemption by further excluding from the exemption any closed transmission facilities that use public rights-of-way. This case arises out of an FCC proceeding clarifying the agency’s interpretation of the term "cable system” as it is used in the Gable Act. See In re Definition of a Cable Television System, 5 F. C. C. Rcd. 7638 (1990). In this proceeding, the Commission addressed the application of the exemption codified in §602(7)(B) to satellite master antenna television (SMATV) facilities. Unlike a traditional cable television system, which delivers video programming to a large community of subscribers through coaxial cables laid under city streets or along utility lines, an SMATV system typically receives a signal from a satellite through a. small satellite dish located on a rooftop and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or complex of buildings. See 5 F. C. C. Rcd., at 7639. The Commission ruled that an SMATV system that serves multiple buildings via a network of interconnected physical transmission lines is a cable system, unless it falls within the §602(7)(B) exemption. See id., at 7639-7640. Consistent with the plain terms of the statutory exemption, the Commission concluded that such an SMATV system is subject to the franchise requirement if its transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way. See id., at 7641-7642. Respondents Beach Communications, Inc., Maxtel Limited Partnership, Pacific Cablevision, and Western Cable Communications, Inc. — SMATV operators that would be subject to franchising under the Cable Act as construed by the. Commission-petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. The Court of Appeals rejected respondents’ statutory challenge to the Commission’s interpretation, but a majority of the court found merit in the claim that § 602(7) violates the implied equal protection guarantee of the Due Process Clause. 294 U. S. App. D. C. 377, 959 F. 2d 975 (1992). In the absence of what it termed “the predominant rationale for local franchising” (use of public rights-of-way), the court saw no rational basis “[o]n the record,” and was “unable to imagine” any conceivable basis, for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and those SMATV cable systems that link separately owned and managed buildings. Id., at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987. The court remanded the record and directed the FCC to provide “additional ‘legislative facts’ ” to justify the distinction. Ibid. A report subsequently filed by the Commission failed to satisfy the Court of Appeals. The Commission stated that it was “unaware of any desirable policy or other considerations . . . that would support the challenged distinctions,” other than those offered by a concurring member of the court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. The concurrence had believed it sufficient that Congress could have reasoned that SMATV systems serving separately owned buildings are more similar to traditional cable systems than are facilities serving commonly owned buildings, in terms of the problems presented for consumers and the potential for regulatory benefits. See 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 392, 959 F. 2d, at 990 (Mikva, C. J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In a second opinion, the majority found this rationale to be “a naked intuition, unsupported by conceivable facts or policies,” 296 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 143, 965 F. 2d 1103, 1105 (1992), and held that “the Cable Act violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, insofar as it imposes a discriminatory franchising requirement,” id., at 142, 965 F. 2d, at 1104. The court declared the franchise requirement void to the extent it covers respondents and similarly situated SMATV operators. Id., at 144, 965 F. 2d, at 1106. Because the Court of Appeals held an Act of Congress unconstitutional, we granted certiorari. 506 U. S. 997 (1992). We now reverse. II Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 485 (1990); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587, 600-603 (1987); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-179 (1980); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484-485 (1970). Where there are “plausible reasons” for Congress’ action, “our inquiry is at an end.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, at 179. This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. “The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted). On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as the Cable Act comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, see Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360, 370 (1988), and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,” Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 364 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 331-332 (1981). Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, at 179. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960). Thus, the absence of “‘legislative facts’ ” explaining the distinction “[o]n the record,” 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987, has no significance in rational-basis analysis. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U. S. 1, 15 (1992) (equal protection “does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification”). In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. See Vance v. Bradley, supra, at 111. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 464 (1981). “ ‘Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.’” Lehnhausen, supra, at 365 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 510 (1937)). These restraints on judicial review have added force “where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179. Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement — much like classifying governmental beneficiaries — “inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The distinction at issue here represents such a line: By excluding from the definition of “cable system” those facilities that serve commonly owned or managed buildings without using public rights-of-way, § 602(7)(B) delineates the bounds of the regulatory field. Such scope-of-eoverage provisions are unavoidable components of most economic or social legislation. In establishing the franchise requirement, Congress had to draw the line somewhere; it had to choose which facilities to franchise. This necessity renders the precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally. See, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483 (1955): “The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.” Id., at 489 (citations omitted). Applying these principles, we conclude that the common-ownership distinction is constitutional. There are at least two possible bases for the distinction; either one suffices. First, Congress borrowed §602(7)(B) from pre-Cable Act regulations, and although the existence of a prior administrative scheme is certainly not necessary to the rationality of the statute, it is plausible that Congress also adopted the FCC’s earlier rationale. Under that rationale, eommon ownership was thought to be indicative of those systems for which the costs of regulation would outweigh the benefits to consumers. Because the number of subscribers was a similar indicator, the Commission also exempted cable facilities that served fewer than 50 subscribers. See 47 CFR § 76.5(a) (1984). In explaining both exemptions, the Commission stated: “[N]ot all [systems] can be subject to effective regulation with the resources available nor is regulation necessarily needed in every instance. A sensible regulatory program requires that a division between the regulated and unregulated be made in a manner which best conserves regulatory energies and allows the most cost effective use of available resources. In attempting to make this division, we have focused on subscriber numbers as well as the multiple unit dwelling indicia on the theory that the very small are inefficient to regulate and can safely be ignored in terms of their potential for impact on broadcast service to the public and on multiple unit dwelling facilities on the theory that this effectively establishes certain maximum size limitations.” In re Definition of a Cable Television System, 67 F. C. C. 2d 716, 726 (1978). This regulatory-efficiency model, originally suggested by Chief Judge Mikva in his concurring opinion, provides a conceivable basis for the common-ownership exemption. A legislator might rationally assume that systems serving only commonly owned or managed buildings without crossing public rights-of-way would typically be limited in size or would share some other attribute affecting their impact on the welfare of cable viewers such that regulators could “safely ignor[e]” these systems. Respondents argue that Congress did not intend common ownership to be a surrogate for small size, since Congress simultaneously rejected the FCC’s 50-subscriber exemption by omitting it from the Cable Act. Brief for Respondents 22. Whether the posited reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated Congress is “constitutionally irrelevant,” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, in any event, the FCC’s explanation indicates that both common ownership and number of subscribers were considered indicia of “very small” cable systems. Respondents also contend that an SMATV operator could increase his subscription base and still qualify for the exemption simply by installing a separate satellite dish on each building served. Brief for Respondents 42. The additional cost of multiple dishes and associated transmission equipment, however, would impose an independent constraint on system size. Furthermore, small size is only one plausible ownership-related factor contributing to consumer welfare. Subscriber influence is another. Where an SMATV system serves a complex of buildings under common ownership or management, individual subscribers could conceivably have greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the cable operator (even if the number of dwelling units were large), since all the subscribers could negotiate with one voice through the common owner or manager. Such an owner might have substantial leverage, because he could withhold permission to operate the SMATV system on his property. He would also have an incentive to guard the interests of his tenants. Thus, there could be less need to establish regulatory safeguards for subscribers in commonly owned complexes. Respondents acknowledge such possibilities, see id., at 44, and we certainly cannot say that these assumptions would be irrational. There is a second conceivable basis for the statutory distinction. Suppose competing SMATV operators wish to sell video programming to subscribers in a group of contiguous buildings, such as a single city block, which can be interconnected by wire without crossing a public right-of-way. If all the buildings belong to one owner or are commonly managed, that owner or manager could freely negotiate a deal for all subscribers on a competitive basis. But if the buildings are separately owned and managed, the first SMATV operator who gains a foothold by signing a contract and installing a satellite dish and associated transmission equipment on one of the buildings would enjoy a powerful cost advantage in competing for the remaining subscribers: He could connect additional buildings for the cost of a few feet of cable, whereas any competitor would have to recover the cost of his own satellite headend facility. Thus, the first operator could charge rates well above his cost and still undercut the competition. This potential for effective monopoly power might theoretically justify regulating the latter class of SMATV systems and not the former. Ill The Court of Appeals quite evidently believed that the crossing or use of a public right-of-way is the only conceivable basis upon which Congress could rationally require local franchising of SMATV systems. See 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 143, 965 F. 2d, at 1105; 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987. As we have indicated, however, there are plausible rationales unrelated to the use of public rights-of:way for regulating cable facilities serving separately owned and managed buildings. The assumptions underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but the very fact that they are “arguable” is sufficient, on rational-basis review, to “immuniz[e]” the congressional choice from constitutional challenge. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S., at 112. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 — enacted after the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case — amended the Communications Act to provide, among other things, for the regulation of rates charged by cable systems. See §3,106 Stat. 1464. The 1992 Act renumbered the subsections of 47 U. S. C. § 522 but did not amend the provision at issue, which is now subsection (7). We refer to the current version of the Communications Act. In its initial interpretation of the Cable Act, the Commission had ruled that the dispositive distinction between a cable system and other video distribution systems was “the crossing of the public rights-of-way, not the ownership, control or management” of the buildings served. In re Amendments of Parts 1, 68, & 76, 104 F. C. C. 2d 386, 396-397 (1986). After a District Court held that this interpretation contravened the unambiguous terms of the statute, the Commission abandoned it in the proceedings at issue here. See In re Definition of a Cable Television System, 5 F. C. C. Rcd. 7638, 7641 (1990). Respondents also claimed that the Cable Act’s franchise requirement violates the First Amendment and that the § 602(7)(B) classification should receive heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause because it discriminates on the basis of speech activities. The Court of Appeals held the First Amendment claim unripe, 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 386-387, 959 F. 2d, at 984-985, and refused to address the heightened scrutiny argument without first applying “rational basis” analysis, id, at 388, 959 F. 2d, at 986. Chief Judge Mikva dissented for the reasons given in his earlier concurrence. 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 144, 965 F. 2d, at 1106. The Court of Appeals had also questioned whether there existed a rational basis for distinguishing facilities connecting separately owned buildings by wire from those that do not connect separate buildings or that do so only by wireless media, such as radio or microwave transmission. See 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 382, 389, 959 F. 2d, at 980, 987. In its second opinion, however, the court found it unnecessary to consider that question, see 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 143, 965 F. 2d, at 1105, and it is not presented here. As they did in the Court of Appeals, respondents seek heightened scrutiny, claiming that the statute discriminates on the basis of First Amendment activities. Brief for Respondents Beach Communications, Inc., et al. 12-17 (hereinafter Brief for Respondents). We will confine ourselves, however, to the question presented, which is limited to whether the distinction in §602(7)(B) is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose under the Due Process Clause.” Pet. for Cert. I. The Court of Appeals did not reach respondents’ heightened-serutiny challenge because it found merit in their rational-basis contentions. 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 388, 969 F. 2d, at 986. In renewing their arguments for heightened scrutiny here, see Brief for Respondents 14-15, respondents point to the burdens imposed on franchised cable systems under the newly enacted Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, an Act the Court of Appeals had no opportunity to consider. In these circumstances, respondents’ arguments for heightened scrutiny are best left open for consideration by the Court of Appeals on remand. Respondents also raise a threshold issue. They argue that no case or controversy exists, or that the issue is “moot,” on the theory that Congress “adopted” the Court of Appeals’ “construction” of §602(7) (presumably thereby acquiescing in the judgment that local franchising must depend on use of public rights-of-way) when it took no action to amend or defend the provision in later passing the 1992 Act. Brief for Respondents 8-12. Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). This notion of congressional adoption of statutory interpretations, however, has no place in constitutional review, and the controversy presented in this case is obviously a live one, since petitioners stand ready to defend the statute as drafted. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970) (classification does not violate equal protection simply because it “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1913) (“The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific”); Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 354 (1907) (“logical appropriateness of the inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons” and “exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedies are not required”). According to respondents, the FCC’s pre-Cable Act common-ownership exemption provides no support for the rationality of § 602(7)(B) for another reason. They assert that the regulatory exemption’s sole purpose was to exempt master antenna television (MATV) facilities — ordinary rooftop antenna facilities that receive conventional broadcast signals for transmission by wire to units within a single multiunit building or complex, see 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 379-380, 959 F. 2d, at 977-978. Respondents argue that this prior exemption merely reflected the FCC's judgment that common antennas, unlike SMATV systems, were nothing more than residential amenities posing no threat to broadcast services. See Brief for Respondents 23-25. This argument is unavailing, because Congress is not bound by the administrative derivation of the “private cable” exemption. Moreover, regardless of the origin of the exemption, the Commission had already applied it to SMATV facilities before passage of the Cable Act. See In re Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 F. C. C. 2d 1223, 1224, n. 3 (1983), aff’d sub nom. New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC, 242 U. S. App. D. C. 126, 749 F. 2d 804 (1984). Indeed, in these proceedings, the Commission construed §602(7) to apply equally to SMATV and MATV facilities. See 5 F C. C. Rcd., at 7639-7641.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 37 ]	sc_adminaction
ADOPTIVE COUPLE, Petitioners v. BABY GIRL, a minor child under the age of fourteen years, et al. No. 12-399. Supreme Court of the United States Argued April 16, 2013. Decided June 25, 2013. Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for Respondent Guardian ad Litem in support of the Petitioners. Charles A. Rothfeld, Washington, DC, for Respondents Birth Father, et al. Edwin S. Kneedler, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondents Birth Father, et al. Mark Fiddler, Fiddler Law Office, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, Lisa S. Blatt, Counsel of Record, Christopher S. Rhee, R. Reeves Anderson, Bob Wood, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Thomas P. Lowndes, Charleston, SC, Paul D. Clement, Counsel of Record, Kelsi Brown Corkran, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, for Guardian ad Litem as Representative of Baby Girl. John S. Nichols, Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson & Delgado LLC, Columbia, SC, Shannon Phillips Jones, Charleston, SC, Lesley Ann Sasser, Charleston, SC, Charles A. Rothfeld, Counsel of Record, Andrew J. Pincus, Paul W. Hughes, Michael B. Kimberly, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, Jeffrey A. Meyer, Yale Law School Supreme Court Clinic, New Haven, CT, for Respondent Birth Father. Lloyd B. Miller, William R. Perry, Anne D. Noto, Colin Cloud Hampson, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry, LLP, Washington, DC, Carter G. Phillips, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Todd Hembree, Attorney General, Chrissi Ross Nimmo, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel of Record, Cherokee Nation, Tahlequah, OK, for Respondent Cherokee Nation. Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee. Because Baby Girl is classified in this way, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 required her to be taken, at the age of 27 months, from the only parents she had ever known and handed over to her biological father, who had attempted to relinquish his parental rights and who had no prior contact with the child. The provisions of the federal statute at issue here do not demand this result. Contrary to the State Supreme Court's ruling, we hold that 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) -which bars involuntary termination of a parent's rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is likely to result from the parent's "continued custody" of the child-does not apply when, as here, the relevant parent never had custody of the child. We further hold that § 1912(d) -which conditions involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to an Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made to prevent the "breakup of the Indian family"-is inapplicable when, as here, the parent abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child. Finally, we clarify that § 1915(a), which provides placement preferences for the adoption of Indian children, does not bar a non-Indian family like Adoptive Couple from adopting an Indian child when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child. We accordingly reverse the South Carolina Supreme Court's judgment and remand for further proceedings. I "The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 - 1963, was the product of rising concern in the mid-1970's over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). Congress found that "an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were being] broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies." § 1901(4). This "wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes" prompted Congress to enact the ICWA, which establishes federal standards that govern state-court child custody proceedings involving Indian children. Id., at 32, 36, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also § 1902 (declaring that the ICWA establishes "minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families"). Three provisions of the ICWA are especially relevant to this case. First, "[a]ny party seeking" an involuntary termination of parental rights to an Indian child under state law must demonstrate that "active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful." § 1912(d). Second, a state court may not involuntarily terminate parental rights to an Indian child "in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." § 1912(f). Third, with respect to adoptive placements for an Indian child under state law, "a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families." § 1915(a). II In this case, Birth Mother (who is predominantly Hispanic) and Biological Father (who is a member of the Cherokee Nation) became engaged in December 2008. One month later, Birth Mother informed Biological Father, who lived about four hours away, that she was pregnant. After learning of the pregnancy, Biological Father asked Birth Mother to move up the date of the wedding. He also refused to provide any financial support until after the two had married. The couple's relationship deteriorated, and Birth Mother broke off the engagement in May 2009. In June, Birth Mother sent Biological Father a text message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental rights. Biological Father responded via text message that he relinquished his rights. Birth Mother then decided to put Baby Girl up for adoption. Because Birth Mother believed that Biological Father had Cherokee Indian heritage, her attorney contacted the Cherokee Nation to determine whether Biological Father was formally enrolled. The inquiry letter misspelled Biological Father's first name and incorrectly stated his birthday, and the Cherokee Nation responded that, based on the information provided, it could not verify Biological Father's membership in the tribal records. Working through a private adoption agency, Birth Mother selected Adoptive Couple, non-Indians living in South Carolina, to adopt Baby Girl. Adoptive Couple supported Birth Mother both emotionally and financially throughout her pregnancy. Adoptive Couple was present at Baby Girl's birth in Oklahoma on September 15, 2009, and Adoptive Father even cut the umbilical cord. The next morning, Birth Mother signed forms relinquishing her parental rights and consenting to the adoption. Adoptive Couple initiated adoption proceedings in South Carolina a few days later, and returned there with Baby Girl. After returning to South Carolina, Adoptive Couple allowed Birth Mother to visit and communicate with Baby Girl. It is undisputed that, for the duration of the pregnancy and the first four months after Baby Girl's birth, Biological Father provided no financial assistance to Birth Mother or Baby Girl, even though he had the ability to do so. Indeed, Biological Father "made no meaningful attempts to assume his responsibility of parenthood" during this period. App. to Pet. for Cert. 122a (Sealed; internal quotation marks omitted). Approximately four months after Baby Girl's birth, Adoptive Couple served Biological Father with notice of the pending adoption. (This was the first notification that they had provided to Biological Father regarding the adoption proceeding.) Biological Father signed papers stating that he accepted service and that he was "not contesting the adoption." App. 37. But Biological Father later testified that, at the time he signed the papers, he thought that he was relinquishing his rights to Birth Mother, not to Adoptive Couple. Biological Father contacted a lawyer the day after signing the papers, and subsequently requested a stay of the adoption proceedings. In the adoption proceedings, Biological Father sought custody and stated that he did not consent to Baby Girl's adoption. Moreover, Biological Father took a paternity test, which verified that he was Baby Girl's biological father. A trial took place in the South Carolina Family Court in September 2011, by which time Baby Girl was two years old. 398 S.C. 625, 634-635, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555-556 (2012). The Family Court concluded that Adoptive Couple had not carried the heightened burden under § 1912(f) of proving that Baby Girl would suffer serious emotional or physical damage if Biological Father had custody. See id., at 648-651, 731 S.E.2d, at 562-564. The Family Court therefore denied Adoptive Couple's petition for adoption and awarded custody to Biological Father. Id., at 629, 636, 731 S.E.2d, at 552, 556. On December 31, 2011, at the age of 27 months, Baby Girl was handed over to Biological Father, whom she had never met. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court's denial of the adoption and the award of custody to Biological Father. Id., at 629, 731 S.E.2d, at 552. The State Supreme Court first determined that the ICWA applied because the case involved a child custody proceeding relating to an Indian child. Id., at 637, 643, n. 18, 731 S.E.2d, at 556, 560, n. 18. It also concluded that Biological Father fell within the ICWA's definition of a " 'parent.' " Id., at 644, 731 S.E.2d, at 560. The court then held that two separate provisions of the ICWA barred the termination of Biological Father's parental rights. First, the court held that Adoptive Couple had not shown that "active efforts ha[d] been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family." § 1912(d) ; see also id., at 647-648, 731 S.E.2d, at 562.Second, the court concluded that Adoptive Couple had not shown that Biological Father's "custody of Baby Girl would result in serious emotional or physical harm to her beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., at 648-649, 731 S.E.2d, at 562-563 (citing § 1912(f) ). Finally, the court stated that, even if it had decided to terminate Biological Father's parental rights, § 1915(a)'s adoption-placement preferences would have applied. Id., at 655-657, 731 S.E.2d, at 566-567. We granted certiorari. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 831, 184 L.Ed.2d 646 (2013). III It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; 398 S.C., at 644, n. 19, 731 S.E.2d, at 560, n. 19 ("Under state law, [Biological] Father's consent to the adoption would not have been required"). The South Carolina Supreme Court held, however, that Biological Father is a "parent" under the ICWA and that two statutory provisions-namely, § 1912(f) and § 1912(d) -bar the termination of his parental rights. In this Court, Adoptive Couple contends that Biological Father is not a "parent" and that § 1912(f) and § 1912(d) are inapplicable. We need not-and therefore do not-decide whether Biological Father is a "parent." See § 1903(9) (defining "parent"). Rather, assuming for the sake of argument that he is a "parent," we hold that neither § 1912(f) nor § 1912(d) bars the termination of his parental rights. A Section 1912(f) addresses the involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to an Indian child. Specifically, § 1912(f) provides that "[n]o termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,... that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." (Emphasis added.) The South Carolina Supreme Court held that Adoptive Couple failed to satisfy § 1912(f) because they did not make a heightened showing that Biological Father's "prospective legal and physical custody" would likely result in serious damage to the child. 398 S.C., at 651, 731 S.E.2d, at 564 (emphasis added). That holding was error. Section 1912(f) conditions the involuntary termination of parental rights on a showing regarding the merits of "continued custody of the child by the parent." (Emphasis added.) The adjective "continued" plainly refers to a pre-existing state. As Justice SOTOMAYOR concedes, post, at 2577 - 2578 (dissenting opinion) (hereinafter the dissent), "continued" means "[c]arried on or kept up without cessation" or "[e]xtended in space without interruption or breach of conne[ct]ion." Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 909 (1981 reprint of 1971 ed.) (Compact OED); see also American Heritage Dictionary 288 (1981) (defining "continue" in the following manner: "1. To go on with a particular action or in a particular condition; persist.... 3. To remain in the same state, capacity, or place"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 493 (1961) (Webster's) (defining "continued" as "stretching out in time or space esp. without interruption"); Aguilar v. FDIC, 63 F.3d 1059, 1062 (C.A.11 1995) (per curiam ) (suggesting that the phrase "continue an action" means "go on with... an action" that is "preexisting"). The term "continued" also can mean "resumed after interruption." Webster's 493; see American Heritage Dictionary 288. The phrase "continued custody" therefore refers to custody that a parent already has (or at least had at some point in the past). As a result, § 1912(f) does not apply in cases where the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian child. Biological Father's contrary reading of § 1912(f) is nonsensical. Pointing to the provision's requirement that "[n]o termination of parental rights may be ordered... in the absence of a determination" relating to "the continued custody of the child by the parent," Biological Father contends that if a determination relating to "continued custody" is inapposite in cases where there is no "custody," the statutory text prohibits termination. See Brief for Respondent Birth Father 39. But it would be absurd to think that Congress enacted a provision that permits termination of a custodial parent's rights, while simultaneously prohibiting termination of a noncustodial parent's rights. If the statute draws any distinction between custodial and noncustodial parents, that distinction surely does not provide greater protection for noncustodial parents. Our reading of § 1912(f) comports with the statutory text demonstrating that the primary mischief the ICWA was designed to counteract was the unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian families due to the cultural insensitivity and biases of social workers and state courts. The statutory text expressly highlights the primary problem that the statute was intended to solve: "an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were being] broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies." § 1901(4) (emphasis added); see also § 1902 (explaining that the ICWA establishes " minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families" (emphasis added)); Holyfield, 490 U.S., at 32-34, 109 S.Ct. 1597. And if the legislative history of the ICWA is thought to be relevant, it further underscores that the Act was primarily intended to stem the unwarranted removal of Indian children from intact Indian families. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 8 (1978) (explaining that, as relevant here, "[t]he purpose of [the ICWA] is to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes" (emphasis added)); id., at 9 (decrying the "wholesale separation of Indian children" from their Indian families); id., at 22 (discussing "the removal" of Indian children from their parents pursuant to §§ 1912(e) and (f) ). In sum, when, as here, the adoption of an Indian child is voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights, the ICWA's primary goal of preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian children and the dissolution of Indian families is not implicated. The dissent fails to dispute that nonbinding guidelines issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) shortly after the ICWA's enactment demonstrate that the BIA envisioned that § 1912(f)'s standard would apply only to termination of a custodial parent's rights. Specifically, the BIA stated that, under § 1912(f), "[a] child may not be removed simply because there is someone else willing to raise the child who is likely to do a better job"; instead, "[i]t must be shown that... it is dangerous for the child to remain with his or her present custodians." Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67593 (1979) (emphasis added) (hereinafter Guidelines). Indeed, the Guidelines recognized that § 1912(f) applies only when there is pre-existing custody to evaluate. See ibid. ("[T]he issue on which qualified expert testimony is required is the question of whether or not serious damage to the child is likely to occur if the child is not removed"). Under our reading of § 1912(f), Biological Father should not have been able to invoke § 1912(f) in this case, because he had never had legal or physical custody of Baby Girl as of the time of the adoption proceedings. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Biological Father never had physical custody of Baby Girl. And as a matter of both South Carolina and Oklahoma law, Biological Father never had legal custody either. See S.C.Code Ann. § 63-17-20(B) (2010) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, the custody of an illegitimate child is solely in the natural mother unless the mother has relinquished her rights to the child"); Okla. Stat., Tit. 10, § 7800 (West Cum.Supp. 2013) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, the mother of a child born out of wedlock has custody of the child until determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction"). In sum, the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in finding that § 1912(f) barred termination of Biological Father's parental rights. B Section 1912(d) provides that "[a]ny party" seeking to terminate parental rights to an Indian child under state law "shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful." (Emphasis added.) The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Biological Father's parental rights could not be terminated because Adoptive Couple had not demonstrated that Biological Father had been provided remedial services in accordance with § 1912(d). 398 S.C., at 647-648, 731 S.E.2d, at 562. We disagree. Consistent with the statutory text, we hold that § 1912(d) applies only in cases where an Indian family's "breakup" would be precipitated by the termination of the parent's rights. The term "breakup" refers in this context to "[t]he discontinuance of a relationship," American Heritage Dictionary 235 (3d ed. 1992), or "an ending as an effective entity," Webster's 273 (defining "breakup" as "a disruption or dissolution into component parts: an ending as an effective entity"). See also Compact OED 1076 (defining "break-up" as, inter alia, a "disruption, separation into parts, disintegration"). But when an Indian parent abandons an Indian child prior to birth and that child has never been in the Indian parent's legal or physical custody, there is no "relationship" that would be "discontinu[ed]"-and no "effective entity" that would be "end[ed]"-by the termination of the Indian parent's rights. In such a situation, the "breakup of the Indian family" has long since occurred, and § 1912(d) is inapplicable. Our interpretation of § 1912(d) is, like our interpretation of § 1912(f), consistent with the explicit congressional purpose of providing certain "standards for the removal of Indian children from their families." § 1902 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., § 1901(4) ; Holyfield, 490 U.S., at 32-34, 109 S.Ct. 1597. In addition, the BIA's Guidelines confirm that remedial services under § 1912(d) are intended "to alleviate the need to remove the Indian child from his or her parents or Indian custodians," not to facilitate a transfer of the child to an Indian parent. See 44 Fed.Reg., at 67592 (emphasis added). Our interpretation of § 1912(d) is also confirmed by the provision's placement next to § 1912(e) and § 1912(f), both of which condition the outcome of proceedings on the merits of an Indian child's "continued custody" with his parent. That these three provisions appear adjacent to each other strongly suggests that the phrase "breakup of the Indian family" should be read in harmony with the "continued custody" requirement. See United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988) (explaining that statutory construction "is a holistic endeavor" and that "[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme"). None of these three provisions creates parental rights for unwed fathers where no such rights would otherwise exist. Instead, Indian parents who are already part of an "Indian family" are provided with access to "remedial services and rehabilitative programs" under § 1912(d) so that their "custody" might be "continued" in a way that avoids foster-care placement under § 1912(e) or termination of parental rights under § 1912(f). In other words, the provision of "remedial services and rehabilitative programs" under § 1912(d) supports the "continued custody" that is protected by § 1912(e) and § 1912(f). Section 1912(d) is a sensible requirement when applied to state social workers who might otherwise be too quick to remove Indian children from their Indian families. It would, however, be unusual to apply § 1912(d) in the context of an Indian parent who abandoned a child prior to birth and who never had custody of the child. The decision below illustrates this point. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that § 1912(d) mandated measures such as "attempting to stimulate [Biological] Father's desire to be a parent." 398 S.C., at 647, 731 S.E.2d, at 562. But if prospective adoptive parents were required to engage in the bizarre undertaking of "stimulat[ing]" a biological father's "desire to be a parent," it would surely dissuade some of them from seeking to adopt Indian children. And this would, in turn, unnecessarily place vulnerable Indian children at a unique disadvantage in finding a permanent and loving home, even in cases where neither an Indian parent nor the relevant tribe objects to the adoption. In sum, the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in finding that § 1912(d) barred termination of Biological Father's parental rights. IV In the decision below, the South Carolina Supreme Court suggested that if it had terminated Biological Father's rights, then § 1915(a)'s preferences for the adoptive placement of an Indian child would have been applicable. 398 S.C., at 655-657, 731 S.E.2d, at 566-567. In so doing, however, the court failed to recognize a critical limitation on the scope of § 1915(a). Section 1915(a) provides that "[i]n any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families." Contrary to the South Carolina Supreme Court's suggestion, § 1915(a)'s preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no "preference" to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward. In this case, Adoptive Couple was the only party that sought to adopt Baby Girl in the Family Court or the South Carolina Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioners 19, 55; Brief for Respondent Birth Father 48; Reply Brief for Petitioners 13. Biological Father is not covered by § 1915(a) because he did not seek to adopt Baby Girl; instead, he argued that his parental rights should not be terminated in the first place. Moreover, Baby Girl's paternal grandparents never sought custody of Baby Girl. See Brief for Petitioners 55; Reply Brief for Petitioners 13; 398 S.C., at 699, 731 S.E.2d, at 590 (Kittredge, J., dissenting) (noting that the "paternal grandparents are not parties to this action"). Nor did other members of the Cherokee Nation or "other Indian families" seek to adopt Baby Girl, even though the Cherokee Nation had notice of-and intervened in-the adoption proceedings. See Brief for Respondent Cherokee Nation 21-22; Reply Brief for Petitioners 13-14. The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted to help preserve the cultural identity and heritage of Indian tribes, but under the State Supreme Court's reading, the Act would put certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor-even a remote one-was an Indian. As the State Supreme Court read §§ 1912(d) and (f), a biological Indian father could abandon his child in utero and refuse any support for the birth mother-perhaps contributing to the mother's decision to put the child up for adoption-and then could play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the mother's decision and the child's best interests. If this were possible, many prospective adoptive parents would surely pause before adopting any child who might possibly qualify as an Indian under the ICWA. Such an interpretation would raise equal protection concerns, but the plain text of §§ 1912(f) and (d) makes clear that neither provision applies in the present context. Nor do § 1915(a)'s rebuttable adoption preferences apply when no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. We therefore reverse the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. It is undisputed that Baby Girl is an "Indian child" as defined by the ICWA because she is an unmarried minor who "is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe," § 1903(4)(b). See Brief for Respondent Birth Father 1, 51, n. 22; Brief for Respondent Cherokee Nation 1; Brief for Petitioners 44 ("Baby Girl's eligibility for membership in the Cherokee Nation depends solely upon a lineal blood relationship with a tribal ancestor"). It is also undisputed that the present case concerns a "child custody proceeding," which the ICWA defines to include proceedings that involve "termination of parental rights" and "adoptive placement," § 1903(1). Around the same time, the Cherokee Nation identified Biological Father as a registered member and concluded that Baby Girl was an "Indian child" as defined in the ICWA. The Cherokee Nation intervened in the litigation approximately three months later. According to the guardian ad litem, Biological Father allowed Baby Girl to speak with Adoptive Couple by telephone the following day, but then cut off all communication between them. Moreover, according to Birth Mother, Biological Father has made no attempt to contact her since the time he took custody of Baby Girl. If Biological Father is not a "parent" under the ICWA, then § 1912(f) and § 1912(d) -which relate to proceedings involving possible termination of "parental" rights-are inapplicable. Because we conclude that these provisions are inapplicable for other reasons, however, we need not decide whether Biological Father is a "parent." With a torrent of words, the dissent attempts to obscure the fact that its interpretation simply cannot be squared with the statutory text. A biological father's "continued custody" of a child cannot be assessed if the father	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
CITIZENS TO PRESERVE OVERTON PARK, INC., et al. v. VOLPE, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al. No. 1066. Argued January 11, 1971 Decided March 2, 1971 MARSHALL, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and HarlaN, Stewart, White, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Black, J., filed a separate opinion, in which BrennaN, J., joined, post, p. 421. Blackmun, J., filed a separate statement, post, p. 422. Douglas, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. John W. Vardaman, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Edward Bennett Williams. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for respondent Volpe. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Gray, Alan 8. Rosenthal, and Daniel Joseph. J. Alan Hanover argued the cause for respondent Speight. With him on the brief were David M. Pack, Attorney General of Tennessee, Lurton C. Good-pasture, Assistant Attorney General, and James B. Jalenak. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by James M. Maniré and Jack Petree for the city of Memphis et al., and by Roberts B. Owen and Gerald P. Norton for the Committee of 100 on the Federal City, Inc., et al. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Marshall, announced by Mr. Justice Stewart. The growing public concern about the quality of our natural environment has prompted Congress in recent years to enact legislation designed to curb the accelerating destruction of our country’s natural beauty. We are concerned in this case with § 4 (f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended, and § 18 (a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 823, 23 U. S. C. § 138 (1964 ed., Supp. V) (hereafter § 138). These statutes prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from authorizing the use of federal funds to finance the construction of highways through public parks if a “feasible and prudent” alternative route exists. If no such route is available, the statutes allow him to approve construction through parks only if there has been “all possible planning to minimize harm” to the park. Petitioners, private citizens as well as local and national conservation organizations, contend that the Secretary has violated these statutes by authorizing the expenditure of federal funds for the construction of a six-lane interstate highway through a public park in Memphis, Tennessee. Their claim was rejected by the District Court, which granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. After oral argument, this Court granted a stay that halted construction and, treating the application for the stay as a petition for certiorari, granted review. 400 U. S. 939. We now reverse the judgment below and remand for further proceedings in the District Court. Overton Park is a 342-acre city park located near the center of Memphis. The park contains a zoo, a nine-hole municipal golf course, an outdoor theater, nature trails, a bridle path, an art academy, picnic areas, and 170 acres of forest. The proposed highway, which is to be a six-lane, high-speed, expressway, will sever the zoo from the rest of the park. Although the roadway will be depressed below ground level except where it crosses a small creek, 26 acres of the park will be destroyed. The highway is to be a segment of Interstate Highway 1-40, part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. 1-40 will provide Memphis with a major east-west expressway which will allow easier access to downtown Memphis from the residential areas on the eastern edge of the city. Although the route through the park was approved by the Bureau of Public Roads in 1956 and by the Federal Highway Administrator in 1966, the enactment of § 4 (f) of the Department of Transportation Act prevented distribution of federal funds for the section of the highway designated to go through Overton Park until the Secretary of Transportation determined whether the requirements of § 4 (f) had been met. Federal funding for the rest of the project was, however, available; and the state acquired a right-of-way on both sides of the park. In April 1968, the Secretary announced that he concurred in the judgment of local officials that 1-40 should be built through the park. And in September 1969 the State acquired the right-of-way inside Overton Park from the city. Final approval for the project — the route as well as the design— was not announced until November 1969, after Congress had reiterated in § 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act that highway construction through public parks was to be restricted. Neither announcement approving the route and design of 1-40 was accompanied by a statement of the Secretary’s factual findings. He did not indicate why he believed there were no feasible and prudent alternative routes or why design changes could not be made to reduce the harm to the park. Petitioners contend that the Secretary’s action is invalid without such formal findings and that the Secretary did not make an independent determination but merely relied on the judgment of the Memphis City Council. They also contend that it would be “feasible and prudent” to route 1-40 around Overton Park either to the north or to the south. And they argue that if these alternative routes are not “feasible and prudent,” the present plan does not include “all possible” methods for reducing harm to the park. Petitioners claim that 1-40 could be built under the park by using either of two possible tunneling methods, and they claim that, at a minimum, by using advanced drainage techniques the expressway could be depressed below ground level along the entire route through the park including the section that crosses the small creek. Respondents argue that it was unnecessary for the Secretary to make formal findings, and that he did, in fact, exercise his own independent judgment which was supported by the facts. In the District Court, respondents introduced affidavits, prepared specifically for this litigation, which indicated that the Secretary had made the decision and that the decision was supportable. These affidavits were contradicted by affidavits introduced by petitioners, who also sought to take the deposition of a former Federal Highway Administrator who had participated in the decision to route 1-40 through Overton Park. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that formal findings by the Secretary were not necessary and refused to order the deposition of the former Federal Highway Administrator because those courts believed that probing of the mental processes of an administrative decisionmaker was prohibited. And, believing that the Secretary’s authority was wide and reviewing courts’ authority narrow in the approval of highway routes, the lower courts held that the affidavits contained no basis for a determination that the Secretary had exceeded his authority. We agree that formal findings were not required. But we do not believe that in this case judicial review based solely on litigation affidavits was adequate. A threshold question — whether petitioners are entitled to any judicial review — is easily answered. Section 701 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 701 (1964 ed., Supp. V), provides that the action of “each authority of the Government of the United States,” which includes the Department of Transportation, is subject to judicial review except where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” In this case, there is no indication that Congress sought to prohibit judicial review and there is most certainly no “showing of 'clear and convincing evidence’ of a... legislative intent” to restrict access to judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U. S. 180, 185 (1956). Similarly, the Secretary’s decision here does not fall within the exception for action “committed to agency discretion.” This is a very narrow exception. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 Col. L. Rev. 55 (1965). The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.” S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945). Section 4 (f) of the Department of Transportation Act and § 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act are clear and specific directives. Both the Department of Transportation Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act provide that the Secretary “shall not approve any program or project” that requires the use of any public parkland “unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park... 23 U. S. C. § 138 (1964 ed., Supp. V); 49 U. S. C. § 1653 (f) (1964 ed., Supp. V). This language is a plain and explicit bar to the use of federal funds for construction of highways through parks — only the most unusual situations are exempted. Despite the clarity of the statutory language, respondents argue that the Secretary has wide discretion. They recognize that the requirement that there be no “feasible” alternative route admits of little administrative discretion. For this exemption to apply the Secretary must find that as a matter of sound engineering it would not be feasible to build the highway along any other route. Respondents argue, however, that the requirement that there be no other “prudent” route requires the Secretary to engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests. They contend that the Secretary should weigh the detriment resulting from the destruction of parkland against the cost of other routes, safety considerations, and other factors, and determine on the basis of the importance that he attaches to these other factors whether, on balance, alternative feasible routes would be “prudent.” But no such wide-ranging endeavor was intended. It is obvious that in most cases considerations of cost, directness of route, and community disruption will indicate that parkland should be used for highway construction whenever possible. Although it may be necessary to transfer funds from one jurisdiction to another, there will always be a smaller outlay required from the public purse when parkland is used since the public already owns the land and there will be no need to pay for right-of-way. And since people do not live or work in parks, if a highway is built on parkland no one will have to leave his home or give up his business. Such factors are common to substantially all highway construction. Thus, if Congress intended these factors to be on an equal footing with preservation of parkland there would have been no need for the statutes. Congress clearly did not intend that cost and disruption of the community were to be ignored by the Secretary. But the very existence of the statutes indicates that protection of parkland was to be given paramount importance. The few green havens that are public parks were not to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or community disruption resulting from alternative routes reached extraordinary magnitudes. If the statutes are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the destruction of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes present unique problems. Plainly, there is “law to apply” and thus the exemption for action “committed to agency discretion” is inapplicable. But the existence of judicial review is only the start: the standard for review must also be determined. For that we must look to § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706 (1964 ed., Supp. V), which provides that a “reviewing court shall... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found” not to meet six separate standards. In all cases agency action must be set aside if the action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements. 5 U. S. C. §§706 (2) (A), (B), (C), (D) (1964 ed., Supp. V). In certain narrow, specifically limited situations, the agency action is to be set aside if the action was not supported by “substantial evidence.” And in other equally narrow circumstances the reviewing court is to engage in a de novo review of the action and set it aside if it was “unwarranted by the facts.” 5 U. S. C. §§ 706 (2)(E), (F) (1964 ed., Supp. V). Petitioners argue that the Secretary’s approval of the construction of 1-40 through Overton Park is subject to one or the other of these latter two standards of limited applicability. First, they contend that the “substantial evidence” standard of § 706 (2) (E) must be applied. In the alternative, they claim that § 706 (2) (F) applies and that there must be a de novo review to determine if the Secretary’s action was “unwarranted by the facts.” Neither of these standards is, however, applicable. Review under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself, 5 U. S. C. § 553 (1964 ed., Supp. V), or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing. See 5 U. S. C. § § 556, 557 (1964 ed., Supp. V). The Secretary’s decision to allow the expenditure of federal funds to build 1-40 through Overton Park was plainly not an exercise of a rulemaking function. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.01 (1958). And the only hearing that is required by either the Administrative Procedure Act or the statutes regulating the distribution of federal funds for highway construction is a public hearing conducted by local officials for the purpose of informing the community about the proposed project and eliciting community views on the design and route. 23 U. S. C. § 128 (1964 ed., Supp. V). The hearing is nonadjudicatory, quasi-legislative in nature. It is not designed to produce a record that is to be the basis of agency action — the basic requirement for substantial-evidence review. See H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. Petitioners’ alternative argument also fails. De novo review of whether the Secretary’s decision was “unwarranted by the facts” is authorized by § 706 (2) (P) in only two circumstances. First, such de novo review is authorized when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate. And, there may be independent judicial factfinding when issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action. H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. Neither situation exists here. Even though there is no de novo review in this case and the Secretary’s approval of the route of 1-40 does not have ultimately to meet the substantial-evidence test, the generally applicable standards of § 706 require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly, the Secretary’s decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. See, e. g., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 185 (1935); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 14—15 (1926). But that presumption is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review. The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U. S. 666, 676-677 (1960). This determination naturally begins with a delineation of the scope of the Secretary’s authority and discretion. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 359 (1965). As has been shown, Congress has specified only a small range of choices that the Secretary can make. Also involved in this initial inquiry is a determination of whether on the facts the Secretary’s decision can reasonably be said to be within that range. The reviewing court must consider whether the Secretary properly construed his authority to approve the use of parkland as limited to situations where there are no feasible alternative routes or where feasible alternative routes involve uniquely difficult problems. And the reviewing court must be able to find that the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in this case there are no feasible alternatives or that alternatives do involve unique problems. Scrutiny of the facts does not end, however, with the determination that the Secretary has acted within the scope of his statutory authority. Section 706 (2) (A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2)(A) (1964 ed., Supp. V). To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Jaffe, supra, at 182. See McBee v. Bomar, 296 F. 2d 235, 237 (CA6 1961); In re Josephson, 218 F. 2d 174, 182 (CA1 1954); Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (ND Cal. 1968). See also Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 360 F. 2d 715, 719 (CA2 1966). Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. The final inquiry is whether the Secretary’s action followed the necessary procedural requirements. Here the only procedural error alleged is the failure of the Secretary to make formal findings and state his reason for allowing the highway to be built through the park. Undoubtedly, review of the Secretary’s action is hampered by his failure to make such findings, but the absence of formal findings does not necessarily require that the case be remanded to the Secretary. Neither the Department of Transportation Act nor the Federal-Aid Highway Act requires such formal findings. Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act requirements that there be formal findings in certain rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings do not apply to the Secretary’s action here. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 553 (a)(2), 554 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V). And, although formal findings may be required in some cases in the absence of statutory directives when the nature of the agency action is ambiguous, those situations are rare. See City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685 (1944); American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 320 (1953). Plainly, there is no ambiguity here; the Secretary has approved the construction of 1-40 through Overton Park and has approved a specific design for the project. Petitioners contend that although there may not be a statutory requirement that the Secretary make formal findings and even though this may not be a case for the reviewing court to impose a requirement that findings be made, Department of Transportation regulations require them. This argument is based on DOT Order 5610.1, which requires the Secretary to make formal findings when he approves the use of parkland for highway construction but which was issued after the route for 1-40 was approved. Petitioners argue that even though the order was not in effect at the time approval was given to the Overton Park project and even though the order was not intended to have retrospective effect the order represents the law at the time of this Court’s decision and under Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281-282 (1969), should be applied to this case. The Thorpe litigation resulted from an attempt to evict a tenant from a federally funded housing project under circumstances that suggested that the eviction was prompted by the tenant’s objections to the management of the project. Despite repeated requests, the Housing Authority would not give an explanation for its action. The tenant claimed that the eviction interfered with her exercise of First Amendment rights and that the failure to state the reasons for the eviction and to afford her a hearing denied her due process. After denial of relief in the state courts, this Court granted certiorari “to consider whether [the tenant] was denied due process by the Housing Authority’s refusal to state the reasons for her eviction and to afford her a hearing at which she could contest the sufficiency of those reasons.” 393 U. S., at 272. While the case was pending in this Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued regulations requiring Housing Authority officials to inform tenants of the reasons for an eviction and to give a tenant the opportunity to reply. The case was then remanded to the state courts to determine if the HUD regulations were applicable to that case. The state court held them not to be applicable and this Court reversed on the ground that the general rule is “that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” 393 U. S., at 281. While we do not question that DOT Order 5610.1 constitutes the law in effect at the time of our decision, we do not believe that Thorpe compels us to remand for the Secretary to make formal findings. Here, unlike the situation in Thorpe, there has been a change in circumstances — additional right-of-way has been cleared and the 26-acre right-of-way inside Overton Park has been purchased by the State. Moreover, there is an administrative record that allows the full, prompt review of the Secretary’s action that is sought without additional delay which would result from having a remand to the Secretary. That administrative record is not, however, before us. The lower courts based their review on the litigation affidavits that were presented. These affidavits were merely “post hoc” rationalizations, Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962), which have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for review. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, supra; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943). And they clearly do not constitute the “whole record” compiled by the agency: the basis for review required by § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See n. 30, supra. Thus it is necessary to remand this case to the District Court for plenary review of the Secretary’s decision. That review is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision. But since the bare record may not disclose the factors that were considered or the Secretary’s construction of the evidence it may be necessary for the District Court to require some explanation in order to determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority and if the Secretary’s action was justifiable under the applicable standard. The court may require the administrative officials who participated in the decision to give testimony explaining their action. Of course, such inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is usually to be avoided. United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 422 (1941). And where there are administrative findings that were made at the same time as the decision, as was the case in Morgan, there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before such inquiry may be made. But here there are no such formal findings and it may be that the only way there can be effective judicial review is by examining the decisionmakers themselves. See Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U. S. 280 (1955). The District Court is not, however, required to make such an inquiry. It may be that the Secretary can prepare formal findings including the information required by DOT Order 5610.1 that will provide an adequate explanation for his action. Such an explanation will, to some extent, be a “post hoc rationalization” and thus must be viewed critically. If the District Court decides that additional explanation is necessary, that court should consider which method will prove the most expeditious so that full review may be had as soon as possible. Reversed and remanded. Me. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. See, e. g., The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. V); Environmental Education Act, 84 Stat. 1312, 20 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq. (1970 ed.); Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485, 42 U. S. C. § 1857 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. V); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 114, 42 U. S. C. §§4371-4374 (1970 ed.). “It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After August 23, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use.” 82 Stat. 824, 49 U. S. C. § 1653 (f) (1964 ed., Supp. V). “It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After the effective date of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use.” 23 U. S. C. § 138 (1964 ed., Supp. V). 49 U. S. C. § 1653 (f) (1964 ed., Supp. V); 23 U. S. C. § 138 (1964 ed., Supp. V). Ibid. See 23 U. S. C. § 103. The ease originated in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On application of the Secretary of Transportation it was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, which entered the summary judgment. 432 F. 2d 1307 (CA6 1970). This Court ordered the case to be heard on an expedited schedule. The proposed right-of-way will be 250 to 450 feet wide and will follow the route of a presently existing, nonaccess bus route, which carries occasional bus traffic along a 40- to 50-foot right-of-way. See 23 U. S. C. § 103 (d) (1964 ed., Supp. V). 1-40 will also provide an express bypass for east-west traffic through Memphis. At that time the Bureau of Public Roads was a part of the Department of Commerce. The Department of Transportation Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1651 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. V), which became effective on April 1, 1967, transferred the Bureau to the new Department of Transportation. The Secretary approved these acquisitions in 1967 shortly after the effective date of § 4 (f). The State paid the City $2,000,000 for the 26-acre right-of-way and $206,000 to the Memphis Park Commission to replace park facilities that were to be destroyed by the highway. The city of Memphis has used $1,000,000 of these funds to pay for a new 160-acre park and it is anticipated that additional parkland will be acquired with the remaining money. Respondents argue that the only issue raised by petitioners’ pleadings is the failure of the Secretary to make formal findings. But when petitioners’ complaint is read in the revealing light of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 (1957), it is clear that petitioners have also challenged the merits of the Secretary’s decision. Petitioners contend that former Federal Highway Administrator Bridwell’s account of an April 3, 1968, meeting with the Memphis City Council given to the Senate Subcommittee on Roads of the Senate Committee on Public Works supports this charge. See Hearings on Urban Highway Planning, Location, and Design before the Subcommittee on Roads of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 478-480 (1968). Petitioners argue that either a bored tunnel or a cut-and-cover tunnel, which is a fully depressed route covered after construction, could be built. Respondents contend that the construction of a tunnel by either method would greatly increase the cost of the project, would create safety hazards,	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 28 ]	sc_adminaction
BATES et al. v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA No. 76-316. Argued January 18, 1977 Decided June 27, 1977 BlacKmtjN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Powell, and RehNquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 386. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 389. Rehnquist, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 404. William C. Canby, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Melvin L. Wulf. John P. Frank argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Orme Lewis. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Baker, and Barry Grossman. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by John B. Schmidt for the Chicago Council of Lawyers; by Peter H. Schuck and Alan B. Morrison for the Consumers Union of United States, Inc., et al.; and by Philip L. Goar for the Mountain Plains Congress of Senior Organizations et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Justin A. Stanley and H. Blair White for the American Bar Assn.; by Peter M. Sfikas for the American Dental Assn.; by Ellis Lyons, Bennett Boskey, and Edward A. Groobert for the American Optometric Assn.; by James W. Rankin and Donald E. Scott for the American Veterinary Medical Assn.; by Alfred L. Scanlan and George W. Liebmann for the Maryland State Bar Assn., Inc., et al.; by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, Stuart H. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, and John J. Miles, Assistant Attorney General, for the Virginia State Bar; and by Roger P. Stokey, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by the American Medical Assn.; by John J. Relihan and Martin J. Solomon for the Arizona Credit Union League, Inc.; by Edward L. Lascher, Herbert M. Rosenthal, and Stuart A. Forsyth for the State Bar of California; and by Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, Andrew A. Vañore, Jr., Senior Deputy Attorney General, Norma S. Harrell, Associate Attorney General, and Harry W. McGalliard for the State Bar of North Carolina. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. As part of its regulation of the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of that State has imposed and enforces a disciplinary-rule that restricts advertising by attorneys. This case presents two issues: whether §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, forbid such state regulation, and whether the operation of the rule violates the First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth. I Appellants John R. Bates and Van O’Steen are attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona. As such, they are members of the appellee, the State Bar of Arizona. After admission to the bar in 1972, appellants worked as attorneys with the Maricopa County Legal Aid Society. App. 221. In March 1974, appellants left the Society and opened a law office, which they call a “legal clinic,” in Phoenix. Their aim was to provide legal services at modest fees to persons of moderate income who did not qualify for governmental legal aid. Id., at 75. In order to achieve this end, they would accept only routine matters, such as uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of name, for which costs could be kept down by extensive use of paralegals, automatic typewriting equipment, and standardized forms and office procedures. More complicated cases, such as contested divorces, would not be accepted. Id., at 97. Because appellants set their prices so as to have a relatively low return on each case they handled, they depended on substantial volume. Id., at 122-123. After conducting their practice in this manner for two years, appellants concluded that their practice and clinical concept could not survive unless the availability of legal services at low cost was advertised and, in particular, fees were advertised. Id., at 120-123. Consequently, in order to generate the necessary flow of business, that is, “to attract clients,” id., at 121; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, appellants on February 22, 1976, placed an advertisement (reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion, infra, at 385) in the Arizona Republic, a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Phoenix metropolitan area. As may be seen, the advertisement stated that appellants were offering “legal services at very reasonable fees,” and listed their fees for certain services. Appellants concede that the advertisement constituted a clear violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-101 (B), incorporated in Rule 29 (a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A Ariz. Rev. Stat., p. 26 (Supp. 1976). The disciplinary rule provides in part: “(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.” Upon the filing of a complaint initiated by the president of the State Bar, App. 350, a hearing was held before a three-member Special Local Administrative Committee, as prescribed by Arizona Supreme Court Rule 33. App. 16. Although the committee took the position that it could not consider an attack on the validity of the rule, it allowed the parties to develop a record on which such a challenge could be based. The committee recommended that each of the appellants be suspended from the practice of law for not less than six months. Id., at 482. Upon further review by the Board of Governors of the State Bar, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Rule 36, the Board recommended only a one-week suspension for each appellant, the weeks to run consecutively. App. 486-487. Appellants, as permitted by the Supreme Court’s Rule 37, then sought review in the Supreme Court of Arizona, arguing, among other things, that the disciplinary rule violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because of its tendency to limit competition, and that the rule infringed their First Amendment rights. The court rejected both claims. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P. 2d 640 (1976). The plurality may have viewed with some skepticism the claim that a restraint on advertising might have an adverse effect on competition. But, even if the rule might otherwise violate the Act, the plurality concluded that the regulation was exempt from Sherman Act attack because the rule “is an activity of the State of Arizona acting as sovereign.” Id., at 397, 555 P. 2d, at 643. The regulation thus was held to be shielded from the Sherman Act by the state-action exemption of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Turning to the First Amendment issue, the plurality noted that restrictions on professional advertising have survived constitutional challenge in the past, citing, along with other cases, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955), and Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 (1935). Although recognizing that Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), held that commercial speech was entitled to certain protection under the First Amendment, the plurality focused on passages in those opinions acknowledging that special considerations might bear on the advertising of professional services by lawyers. See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S., at 773 n. 25; id., at 773-775 (concurring opinion); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S., at 825 n. 10. The plurality apparently was of the view that the older decisions dealing with professional advertising survived these recent cases unscathed, and held that Disciplinary Rule 2-101 (B) passed First Amendment muster. Because the court, in agreement with the Board of Governors, felt that appellants’ advertising “was done in good faith to test the constitutionality of DR 2-101 (B),” it reduced the sanction to censure only. 113 Ariz., at 400, 555 P. 2d, at 646. Of particular interest here is the opinion of Mr. Justice Holohan in dissent. In his view, the case should have been framed in terms of “the right of the public as consumers and citizens to know about the activities of the legal profession,” id., at 402, 555 P. 2d, at 648, rather than as one involving merely the regulation of a profession. Observed in this light, he felt that the rule performed a substantial disservice to the public: “Obviously the information of what lawyers charge is important for private economic decisions by those in need of legal services. Such information is also helpful, perhaps indispensable, to the formation of an intelligent opinion by the public on how well the legal system is working and whether it should be regulated or even altered.... The rule at issue prevents access to such information by the public.” Id., at 402-403, 555 P. 2d, at 648-649. Although the dissenter acknowledged that some types of advertising might cause confusion and deception, he felt that the remedy was to ban that form, rather than all advertising. Thus, despite his “personal dislike of the concept of advertising by attorneys,” id., at 402, 555 P. 2d, at 648, he found the ban unconstitutional. We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 813 (1976). II The Sherman Act In Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), this Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply against certain state action. See also Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332, 344-345 (1904). In Parker a raisin producer-packer brought suit against California officials challenging a state program designed to restrict competition among growers and thereby to maintain prices in the raisin market. The Court held that the State, “as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.” 317 U. S., at 352. Appellee argues, and the Arizona Supreme Court held, that the Parker exemption also bars the instant Sherman Act claim. We agree. Of course, Parker v. Brown has not been the final word on the matter. In two recent cases the Court has considered the state-action exemption to the Sherman Act and found it inapplicable for one reason or another. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 (1976). Goldfarb and Cantor, however, are distinguishable, and their reasoning supports our conclusion here. In Goldfarb we held that § 1 of the Sherman Act was violated by the publication of a minimum-fee schedule by a county bar association and by its enforcement by the State Bar. The schedule and its enforcement mechanism operated to create a rigid price floor for services and thus constituted a classic example of price fixing. Both bar associations argued that their activity was shielded by the state-action exemption. This Court concluded that the action was not protected, emphasizing that “we need not inquire further into the state-action question because it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent.” 421 U. S., at 790. In the instant case, by contrast, the chai-lenged restraint is the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court under its Rules 27 (a) and 29 (a) and its Disciplinary Rule 2-101 (B). That court is the ultimate body wielding the State’s power over the practice of law, see Ariz. Const., Art. 3; In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 P. 29 (1926), and, thus, the restraint is “compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.” 421 U. S., at 791. Appellants seek to draw solace from Cantor. The defendant in that case, an electric utility, distributed light bulbs to its residential customers without additional charge, including the cost in its state-regulated utility rates. The plaintiff, a retailer who sold light bulbs, brought suit, claiming that the utility was using its monopoly power in the distribution of electricity to restrain competition in the sale of bulbs. The Court held that the utility could not immunize itself from Sherman Act attack by embodying its challenged practices in a tariff approved by a state commission. Since the disciplinary rule at issue here is derived from the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, appellants argue by analogy to Cantor that no immunity should result from the bar’s success in having the Code adopted by the State. They also assert that the interest embodied in the Sherman Act must prevail over the state interest in regulating the bar. See 428 U. S., at 595. Particularly is this the case, they claim, because the advertising ban is not tailored so as to intrude upon the federal interest to the minimum extent necessary. See id., at 596 n. 34, and 597. We believe, however, that the context in which Cantor arose is critical. First, and most obviously, Cantor would have been an entirely different case if the claim had been directed against a public official or public agency, rather than against a private party. Here, the appellants’ claims are against the State. The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process. In re Wilson, 106 Ariz. 34, 470 P. 2d 441 (1970). Although the State Bar plays a part in the enforcement, of the rules, its role is completely defined by the court; the appellee acts as the agent of the court under its continuous supervision. Second, the Court emphasized in Cantor that the State had no independent regulatory interest in the market for light bulbs. 428 U. S., at 584-585; id., at 604-605, 612-614 (concurring opinions). There was no suggestion that the bulb program was justified by flaws in the competitive market or was a response to health or safety concerns. And an exemption for the program was not essential to the State’s regulation of electric utilities. In contrast, the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State’s power to protect the public. Indeed, this Court in Goldfarb acknowledged that “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’ ” 421 U. S., at 792. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117, 123-124 (1961). More specifically, controls over solicitation and advertising by attorneys have long been subject to the State’s oversight. Federal interference with a State’s traditional regulation of a profession is entirely unlike the intrusion the Court sanctioned in Cantor. Finally, the light-bulb program in Cantor was instigated by the utility with only the acquiescence of the state regulatory commission. The State’s incorporation of the program into the tariff reflected its conclusion that the utility was authorized to employ the practice if it so desired. See 428 U. S., at 594, and n. 31. The situation now before us is entirely different. The disciplinary rules reflect a clear articulation of the State’s policy with régard to professional behavior. Moreover, as the instant case shows, the rules are subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker — the Arizona Supreme Court — in enforcement proceedings. Our concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to state policy is reduced in such a situation; we deem it significant that the state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State’s supervision-is so active. We conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court’s determination that appellants’ Sherman Act claim is barred by the Parker v. Brown exemption must be affirmed. I — I hH The First Amendment A Last Term, in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), the Court considered the validity under the First Amendment of a Virginia statute declaring that a pharmacist was guilty of “unprofessional conduct” if he advertised prescription drug prices. The pharmacist would then be subject to a monetary penalty or the suspension or revocation of his license. The statute thus effectively prevented the advertising of prescription drug price information. We recognized that the pharmacist who desired to advertise did not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact or to comment on any cultural, philosophical, or political subject; his desired communication was characterized simply: “T will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.’ ” Id., at 761. Nonetheless, we held that commercial speech of that kind was entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. Our analysis began, ibid., with the observation that our cases long have protected speech even though it is in the form of a paid advertisement, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); in a form that is sold for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); or in the form of a solicitation to pay or contribute money, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). If commercial speech is to be distinguished, it “must be distinguished by its content.” 425 U. S., at 761. But a consideration of competing interests reinforced our view that such speech should not be withdrawn from protection merely because it proposed a mundane commercial transaction. Even though the speaker’s interest is largely economic, the Court has protected such speech in certain contexts. See, e. g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575 (1969); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). The listener’s interest is substantial: the consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975). And commercial speech serves to Inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. See FTC v. Procter & Camble Co., 386 U. S. 568, 603-604 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking. 425 U. S., at 761-765. Arrayed against these substantial interests in the free flow of commercial speech were a number of proffered justifications for the advertising ban. Central among them were claims that the ban was essential to the maintenance of professionalism among licensed pharmacists. It was asserted that adyertising would create price competition that might cause the pharmacist to economize at the customer’s expense. He might reduce or eliminate the truly professional portions of his services: the maintenance and packaging of drugs so as to assure their effectiveness, and the supplementation on occasion of the prescribing physician’s advice as to use. Moreover, it was said, advertising would cause consumers to price-shop, thereby undermining the pharmacist’s effort to monitor the drug use of a regular customer so as to ensure that the prescribed drug would not provoke an allergic reaction or be incompatible with another substance the customer was consuming. Finally, it was argued that advertising would reduce the image of the pharmacist as a skilled and specialized craftsman — an image that was said to attract talent to the profession and to reinforce the good habits of those in it — to that of a mere shopkeeper. Id., at 766-768. Although acknowledging that the State had a strong interest in maintaining professionalism among pharmacists, this Court concluded that the proffered justifications were inadequate to support the advertising ban. High professional standards were assured in large part by the close regulation to which pharmacists in Virginia were subject. Id., at 768. And we observed that “on close inspection it is seen that the State’s protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance.” Id., at 769. But we noted the presence of a potent alternative to this “highly paternalistic” approach: “That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them.” Id., at 770. The choice between the dangers of suppressing information and the dangers arising from its free flow was seen as precisely the choice “that the First Amendment makes for us.” Ibid. See also Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 97 (1977). We have set out this detailed summary of the Pharmacy opinion because the conclusion that Arizona’s disciplinary rule is violative of the First Amendment might be said to flow a fortiori from it. Like the Virginia statutes, the disciplinary rule serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep the public in ignorance. Because of the possibility, however, that the differences among professions might bring different constitutional considerations into play, we specifically reserved judgment as to other professions. In the instant case we are confronted with the arguments directed explicitly toward the regulation of advertising by licensed attorneys. B The issue presently before us is a narrow one. First, we need not address the peculiar problems associated with advertising claims relating to the quality of legal services. Such claims probably are not susceptible of precise measurement or verification and, under some circumstances, might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false. Appellee does not suggest, nor do we perceive, that appellants’ advertisement contained claims, extravagant or otherwise, as to the quality of services. Accordingly, we leave that issue for another day. Second, we also need not resolve the problems associated with in-person solicitation of clients — at the hospital room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue influence — by attorneys or their agents or “runners.” Activity of that kind might well pose dangers of overreaching and misrepresentation not encountered in newspaper announcement advertising. Hence, this issue also is not before us. Third, we note that appellee’s criticism of advertising by attorneys does not apply with much force to some of the basic factual content of advertising: information as to the attorney’s name, address, and telephone number, office hours, and the like. The American Bar Association itself has a provision in its current Code of Professional Responsibility that would allow the disclosure of such information, and more, in the classified section of the telephone directory. DR 2-102 (A) (6) (1976). We recognize, however, that an advertising diet limited to such spartan fare would provide scant nourishment. The heart of the dispute before us today is whether lawyers also may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be performed. Numerous justifications are proffered for the restriction of such price advertising. We consider each in turn: 1. The Adverse Effect on Professionalism. Appellee places particular emphasis on the adverse effects that it feels price advertising will have on the legal profession. The key to professionalism, it is argued, is the sense of pride that involvement in the discipline generates. It is claimed that price advertising will bring about commercialization, which will undermine the attorney’s sense of dignity and self-worth. The hustle of the marketplace will adversely affect the profession’s service • orientation, and irreparably damage the delicate balance between the lawyer’s need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve. Advertising is also said to erode the client’s trust in his attorney: Once the client perceives that the lawyer is motivated by profit, his confidence that the attorney is acting out of a commitment to the client’s welfare is jeopardized. And advertising is said to tarnish the dignified public image of the profession. We recognize, of course, and commend the spirit of public service with which the profession of law is practiced and to which it is dedicated. The present Members of this Court, licensed attorneys all, could not feel otherwise. And we would have reason to pause if we felt that our decision today would undercut that spirit. But we find the postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained. At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in such self-deception. And rare is the client, moreover, even one of modest means, who enlists the aid of an attorney with the expectation that his services will be rendered free of charge. See B. Christensen, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means 152-153 (1970). In fact, the American Bar Association advises that an attorney should reach “a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made,” and that this is to be done “[a]s soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed.” Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-19 (1976). If the commercial basis of the relationship is to be promptly disclosed on ethical grounds, once the client is in the office, it seems inconsistent to condemn the candid revelation of the same information before he arrives at that office. Moreover, the assertion that advertising will diminish the attorney's reputation in the community is open to question. Bankers and engineers advertise, and yet these professions are not regarded as undignified. In fact, it has been suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise creates public disillusionment with the profession. The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession’s failure to reach out and serve the community: Studies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of services or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney. Indeed, cynicism with-regard to the profession may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential clients. It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a form of public service, rather than as a means of earning a living, and they looked down on “trade” as unseemly. See H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 5, 210-211 (1953). Eventually, the attitude toward advertising fostered by this view evolved into an aspect of the ethics of the profession. Id., at 211. But habit and tradition are not in themselves an adequate answer to a constitutional challenge. In this day, we do not belittle the person who earns his living by the strength of his arm or the force of his mind. Since the belief that lawyers are somehow “above” trade has become an anachronism, the historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled. 2. The Inherently Misleading Nature of Attorney Advertising. It is argued that advertising of legal services inevitably will be misleading (a) because such services are so individualized with regard to content and quality as to prevent informed comparison on the basis of an advertisement, (b) because the consumer of legal services is unable to determine in advance just what services he needs, and (c) because advertising by attorneys will highlight irrelevant factors and fail to show the relevant factor of skill. We are not persuaded that restrained professional advertising by lawyers inevitably will be misleading. Although many services performed by attorneys are indeed unique, it is doubtful that any attorney would or could advertise fixed prices for services of that type. The only services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine ones: the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like — the very services advertised by appellants. Although the precise service demanded in each task may vary slightly, and although legal services are not fungible, these facts do not make advertising misleading so long as the attorney does the necessary work at the advertised price. The argument that legal services are so unique that fixed rates cannot meaningfully be established is refuted by the record in this case: The appellee State Bar itself sponsors a Legal Services Program in which the participating attorneys agree to perform services like those advertised by the appellants at standardized rates. App. 459-478. Indeed, until the decision of this Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Maricopa County Bar Association apparently had a schedule of suggested minimum fees for standard legal tasks. App. 355. We thus find of little force the assertion that advertising is misleading because of an inherent lack of standardization in legal services. The second component of the argument — that advertising ignores the diagnostic role — fares little better. It is unlikely that many people go to an attorney merely to ascertain if they have a clean bill of legal health. Rather, attorneys are likely to be employed to perform specific tasks. Although the client may not know the detail involved in performing the task, he no doubt is able to identify the service he desires at the level of generality to which advertising lends itself. The third component is not without merit: Advertising does not provide a complete foundation on which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed decision. The alternative — the prohibition of advertising— serves only to restrict the information that flows to consumers. Moreover,	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ATLANTA, as successor in interest to FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CARTERSVILLE, GEORGIA v. BARTOW COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS et al. No. 83-1620. Argued October 30, 1984 Decided March 19, 1985 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Charles T. Zink argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was L. Trammell Newton, Jr. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Michael L. Paup, and Ernest J. Brown. Grace E. Evans, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, James P. Googe, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, First Assistant Attorney General, Verley J. Spivey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James C. Pratt, Assistant Attorney General, and G. Carey Nelson. Marvin S. Sloman, Brian M. Lidji, Peter S. Chantilis, Cecilia H. Morgan, Christopher G. Sharp, and Bruce W. Bowman, Jr., filed a brief for American Bank & Trust Co. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by John P. Krill, Paul A. Adams, and George T. Bell; for Citizens and Southern National Bank by John L. Coalson, Jr.; for the County of Dallas, Texas, et al. by Earl Luna, Randel B. Gibbs, and Tim Kirk; for the Pennsylvania Bankers Association by John J. Brennan and P. J. DiQuinzio; and for the Virginia Bankers Association by John W. Edmonds III and Fred W. Palmore III. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Two Terms ago, this Court, by a 6-2 vote, ruled that Rev. Stat. §3701, as amended, 31U. S. C. §742 (1976 ed.), prohibited a State from imposing on bank shares a property tax computed on the basis of the bank’s net worth without deduction for tax-exempt United States obligations held by the bank. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U. S. 855 (1983). Section 3701 at that time provided: “[A]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other nonproperty taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or inheritance taxes.” In this case, we address a question left open in American Bank, see 463 U. S., at 865, n. 10: must a State, for property tax purposes, allow a bank to deduct from net worth the full value of tax-exempt United States obligations it holds, or is § 3701 satisfied by a limited deduction that excludes from net worth only that portion of the federal obligations properly attributable to assets rather than to liabilities? HH Effective January 1, 1980, the State of Georgia imposed a property tax on the fair market value of the shares of the stockholders of banks and banking associations. 1978 Ga. Laws, No. 795, §2, p. 523, codified as Ga. Code Ann. § 48-6-90(a)(l) (1982). The fair market value of a bank’s shares was to be determined “by adding together the amount of the capital stock, paid-in capital, appropriated retained earnings, and retained earnings ... as shown on the unconsolidated statement of condition of the bank . . . and dividing the sum by the number of outstanding shares . . . .” This fair market value represented the bank’s net worth. The State allowed banks, in the calculation of net worth, to deduct certain holdings, such as real estate taxed separately, § 48-6-90(a)(l), but did not authorize a deduction for the value of United States obligations held by the bank. When appellant’s predecessor-in-interest bank filed its 1980 amended return, entitled “Determination of Taxable Value of Bank Shares,” with appellee Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors, it deducted from its net worth the total value of the federal securities the bank held. App. A-4. The Board disallowed that deduction, and the Board of Tax Equalization affirmed the disallowance. Appellant then took its case to the Superior Court of Bartow County, which consolidated it with cases filed by two other banks: Citizens and Southern National Bank, whose deduction of United States securities the Board of Tax Equalization also had disallowed, and Bartow County Bank, whose deduction a different panel of the same Board had allowed. The Superior Court ruled in favor of disallowance, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 285 S. E. 2d 920 (1982). The banks appealed to this Court; we vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the then-recent decision in American Bank, supra. Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 463 U. S. 1221 (1983). On the remand to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the parties conceded that the Georgia bank-share tax statute, if construed to prohibit any deduction for the value of federal obligations a bank holds, would be invalid under the principles announced in American Bank. The court therefore sought to save the statute by construing it to allow a bank to deduct from its net worth “the percentage of assets attributable to federal obligations.” Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 251 Ga. 831, 834, 312 S. E. 2d 102, 105 (1984). The court explained that if 9.75 percent of a bank’s total assets consisted of federal obligations, the bank would be entitled to reduce its net worth by 9.75 percent. Id., at 835-836, 312 S. E. 2d, at 106. According to the court, such a proportionate deduction recognizes that some of a bank’s federal obligations are represented on the bank’s balance sheet by liabilities, while some are represented by net worth. Because the bank-share tax is assessed on net worth, not on total assets, the court reasoned, a proportionate deduction immunizes tax-exempt values, for it excludes federal obligations from the tax base — net worth — to the extent that they are represented there. Id., at 833, 312 S. E. 2d, at 105. The court rejected the banks’ argument that the total value of federal obligations had to be deducted from net worth in order for § 3701 to be satisfied; it indicated that such an absolute deduction would not only insulate the federal obligations from the share tax, as §3701 requires, but would go beyond §3701 and shelter the bank’s taxable assets from the tax. Id., at 834, 312 S. E. 2d, at 105. One of the three banks, appellant First National Bank of Atlanta, appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). 467 U. S. 1214 (1984). h-i Until 1959, Rev. Stat. §3701 provided m pertinent part: “[A]ll stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.” In that year, however, Congress added a second sentence to §3701: “This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax,” with certain exceptions not relevant here. Pub. L. 86-346, § 105(a), 73 Stat. 622, 31 U. S. C. §742 (1976 ed.). In American Bank, this Court stated that §3701, as amended, provided a “sweeping” exemption for federal obligations, 463 U. S., at 862, and that the word “considered” in the second sentence of § 3701 means “taken into account, or included in the accounting.” Ibid. Appellant contends that those statements preclude the pro rata deduction approved by the Georgia Supreme Court because they must be read to mean that unless federal obligations are excluded in full from the total assets before net worth is determined, they are “taken into account or included” in the tax computation, and therefore § 3701 is violated. Contrary to appellant’s arguments, however, American Bank’s definition of “considered,” when read in proper context, does not dispose of the question here. The issue in American Bank was whether a bank-share tax is a form of tax to. which §3701 applies. As was noted in American Bank, this Court, prior to the 1959 addition to § 3701, consistently had held that § 3701 prohibited taxes imposed on federal obligations, but did not prohibit nondiscriminatory taxes imposed on other property interests such as corporate shares, even though the value of the interest was measured by underlying assets, including federal obligations. 463 U. S., at 858. The 1959 addition “rejected and set aside” that “rather formalistic pre-1959 approach to § 3701.” Id., at 862. The 1959 addition made clear that a tax that does not provide an exemption for federal obligations “is barred regardless of its form if federal obligations must be considered, either directly or indirectly in computing the tax” (emphasis in original). Ibid. American Bank therefore addressed the forms of taxation that must allow an exemption for federal obligations; it did not examine the scope of the exemption that must be provided. Ill An analysis of the scope of the exemption that § 3701 requires must begin with Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313 (1930). In that case this Court struck down, as violative of § 3701, a Missouri tax imposed upon the personal property of an insurance company. The tax base at issue in Gehner was calculated as follows: (1) the value of tax-exempt bonds held by the insurer was subtracted from total assets to determine total taxable assets; (2) total taxable assets were divided by total assets to obtain the ratio of total taxable assets to total assets; (3) that percentage figure was multiplied by total liabilities; and (4) the pro rata portion of liabilities was subtracted from total taxable assets to determine taxable net worth, upon which the tax was based. The Court held that the pro rata deduction violated §3701 because it made the ownership of United States bonds the basis for denying a full deduction of liabilities, and thereby increased the tax burden of the taxpayer. The Court drew support for its holding from the recognized principle that “a State may not subject one to a greater burden upon his taxable property merely because he owns tax-exempt government securities.” Id., at 321, citing National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508 (1928). Justice Stone, in sharp dissent, joined by Justices Holmes and Brandéis, stated that he would have held that the State “does not infringe any constitutional immunity by requiring liabilities to be deducted from all the assets, including tax exempt bonds . . . .” 281 U. S., at 323. He argued that the Court’s holding ignored the fact that tax-exempt federal obligations are, in part, liable for the debts of the taxpayer, and that the Court incorrectly assumed that tax-exempt securities alone contributed to the taxpayer’s net worth. He also thought the Court’s conclusion that the taxpayer’s ownership of exempt bonds increased the taxpayer’s tax burden was not supportable. He pointed out that a taxpayer who had $200,000 in taxable capital and $100,000 in liabilities had a tax base of $100,000, while a taxpayer who held $100,000 in taxable assets, $100,000 in tax-exempt bonds, and $100,000 in liabilities had a tax base of only $50,000 after the pro rata deduction. The latter taxpayer’s liability therefore was reduced, not increased, by ownership of exempt bonds. Justice Stone also pointed out that the full-deduction method adopted by the Court allowed a taxpayer to shelter taxable assets by purchasing an equivalent amount of Government bonds. The full deduction therefore did more than immunize the bonds from taxation; it “confers upon that ownership an affirmative benefit at the expense of the taxing power of the state, by relieving the [taxpayer] from the full burden of taxation on net worth to which his taxable assets have in some measure contributed.” Id., at 328. One must concede that were Gehner still an authoritative decision, it would control this case, because it indicates that anything less than a full deduction for federal obligations fails to provide the tax exemption required by § 3701 and the Constitution. Gehner, however, has no vitality today, for the Court has adopted the views expressed by Justice Stone. Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court, has stated flatly that Gehner's extension of the principles of immunity to “condemn more than an increase in the tax rate on taxable dollars for those owning exempt securities” was “soon repudiated.” United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U. S. 233, 245 (1965). And just one Term after Gehner was decided, the Court upheld provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921 that allowed taxpayers to exclude from gross income interest received on state or municipal obligations, and to take a deduction for interest paid on indebtedness, except interest paid on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase tax-exempt obligations. Denman v. Slayton, 282 U. S. 514 (1931). In Denman, the taxpayer argued that the principles of National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra, as reaffirmed and applied in Gehner, required that the taxpayer be allowed both an exemption for the interest received on tax-free obligations and a deduction for the interest paid. The Court held to the contrary: “While guaranteed exemptions must be strictly observed, this obligation is not inconsistent with reasonable classification designed to subject all to the payment of their just share of a burden fairly imposed.” 282 U. S., at 519. Echoing Justice Stone’s Gehner dissent, 281 U. S., at 328, the Court noted that under the taxpayer’s theory of immunity, he could shelter taxable income by the simple expedient of purchasing exempt obligations with borrowed money and paying interest equivalent to the taxable income. 282 U. S., at 519-520. Similarly, in Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U. S. 371 (1934), the Court upheld provisions of the Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1924 that permitted deduction of depreciation and expenses of buildings owned by life insurance companies only on condition that the company include in its gross income the otherwise nontaxable rental value of the space it occupied. The Court stated that the condition did not amount to a tax upon the tax-exempt rental value, but merely was a permissible “apportionment of expenses.” Id., at 381. In United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., supra, a unanimous Court “affirm[ed] the principle announced in Denman and Independent Life that the tax laws may require tax-exempt income to pay its way” by upholding the pro rata deduction provisions of the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 (hereinafter Life Insurance Tax Act). 381 U. S., at 247. Under those provisions, a life insurance company’s investment income is divided into the policyholders’ share, which is not taxed, and the company’s share, which is taxed, and a company is allowed to deduct only its share of tax-exempt interest from its gross income. The Court rejected the argument that the insurer should be allowed to deduct not only its share, but the full amount of exempt interest earned, by reasoning like that of the Gehner dissent: “Undoubtedly the 1959 Act does not wholly ignore the receipt of tax-exempt interest in arriving at taxable investment income. The . . . company will pay more than it would if it had the full benefit of the exclusion for [the policyholders’ reserve] and at the same time could reduce taxable income by the full amount of exempt interest. But this result necessarily follows from the application of the principle of charging exempt income with a fair share of the burdens properly allocable to it. In the last analysis Atlas’ insistence on both the full reserve and exempt-income exclusions is tantamount to saying that those who purchase exempt securities instead of taxable ones are constitutionally entitled to reduce their tax liability and to pay less tax per taxable dollar than those owning no such securities. The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity does not require such a benefit to be conferred on the ownership of municipal bonds.” 381 U. S., at 251. In sum, ever since Gehner, each time this Court has addressed the scope of the tax exemption for Government obligations, it has concluded that the exemption need not be a total exclusion, but, instead, may be limited by charging tax-exempt obligations and interest their fair share of related expenses or burdens. Appellant seeks to avoid the import of these cases by arguing that they were addressed to the tax immunity required by the Constitution, see Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (1829), rather than to the requirements of §3701. It is true that §3701 was not directly at. issue in Atlas Life, Independent Life, or Denman, and that Atlas Life did note that Gehner had been discredited “insofar as Gehner rested on a doctrine of implied constitutional immunity.” 381 U. S., at 245, n. 16. But this Court consistently has “treated [§ 3701] as principally a restatement of the constitutional rule.” Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 397 (1983). See also Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S. 143, 144 (1955); New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, 672 (1950). IV The 1959 addition to § 3701 did not broaden the scope of the exemption required by § 3701 beyond that mandated by the Constitution, as interpreted in Atlas Life, Denman, and Independent Life. The sparse legislative history of the addition certainly provides no support for the assertion that Congress intended to provide a broader exemption. We noted in American Bank, 463 U. S., at 865-866, that the catalyst for the amendment was an Idaho tax imposed upon an individual “according to and measured by his net income.” See Idaho Code § 63-3011 (1948). Even though this Court had ruled that §3701 precluded the States from taxing interest on federal obligations, Idaho took the position that it need not exempt the interest received on federal obligations from the “gross income” from which taxable net income was derived. Noting Idaho’s stance, the Senate and House Reports on the 1959 addition stated: “The bill . . . makes it clear that the exemption for Federal obligations extends to every form of taxation that would require either the obligation, or the interest on it, or both to be considered directly or indirectly in the computation of the tax.” S. Rep. No. 909, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1959); H. R. Rep. No. 1148, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1959). The discussion of the addition in the ensuing hearings confirms that Congress intended to abolish the formalistic distinction between taxes on income and taxes measured by income that underlay Idaho’s arguments. See Public Debt Ceiling and Interest Rate Ceiling on Bonds, Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 69-72 (1959) (supplemental statement of Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson). Appellant points to nothing in the legislative history indicating that Congress understood the addition actually to broaden the scope of the exemption, as well as to clarify the forms of taxes to which the exemption applied. Congress enacted the pro rata deduction upheld in Atlas Life just three months before adopting the 1959 addition to §3701. Its deliberations over the Life Insurance Tax Act included extended debate whether the pro rata deduction included in that Act satisfactorily protected tax-exempt values. See Atlas Life, 381 U. S., at 240-242. In deciding that the pro rata deduction was adequate, Congress rejected the argument that Gehner prohibited pro rata deductions. Given this almost contemporaneous rejection of arguments founded on Gehner's construction of §3701, see United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271, 277 (1975), it does not make sense to assume that, in amending §3701, Congress intended sub silentio to broaden the required exemption to preclude pro rata deductions. Further, as the Gehner dissent, Denman, and Atlas Life recognized, if banks are allowed to deduct from their assets both federal obligations and the liabilities fairly chargeable to those federal obligations, their ownership will shelter taxable income. In 1959 many, if not most, commercial banks held sufficient federal obligations to shelter their taxable assets completely. Therefore, to presume that Congress intended to prohibit a pro rata deduction in the 1959 addition, we also would have to presume that Congress intended virtually to eliminate the usefulness of share taxes, the prevailing form of state taxation of banks in 1959. We will not infer such an intent from the sparse discussions of Idaho’s troublesome income tax that constitute the entire legislative history of the 1959 addition. We hold instead that §3701, as amended, provides an exemption no broader than that which the Constitution requires. V We see no need to depart from the principle established in Atlas Life that a pro rata deduction that does no more than allocate to tax-exempt values their “just share of a burden fairly imposed” is constitutional. 381 U. S., at 251. There is little to add to the persuasive arguments for upholding such a pro rata deduction made by Justice Stone in his dissent in Gehner, and by Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court in Atlas Life. Appellant asserts that a different rule is required here because allowing a pro rata deduction will decrease the investment attractiveness of federal obligations. See Smith v. Davis, 323 U. S. 111, 117 (1944). The validity of that proposition, in our view, is highly questionable. Were federal obligations permitted to shelter taxable assets, the States likely would be unable to raise worthwhile revenues through bank share taxes. In that event, one would expect that the States would move to tax banks through franchise or other non-property taxes specifically excepted from the proscriptions of §3701. Counsel for the United States as amicus curiae in support of appellant stated at oral argument that the Federal Government does not know if such franchise taxes would result in a greater or lesser burden upon federal obligations. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. It is far from clear, therefore, that the pro rata deduction would diminish the attractiveness of federal obligations more than the alternative taxes the States would adopt were a full deduction required. Indeed, banks and banking associations have filed briefs as amici curiae in support of Georgia’s position here, in part because they fear that a decision striking down the pro rata deduction would result in uncertainty and increased costs to the banks as States adopt other forms of taxation. See, e. g., Brief for Pennsylvania Bankers Association, Brief for Virginia Bankers Association, and Brief for Citizens and Southern National Bank. Furthermore, appellant and its amici point to no evidence indicating that the difference in cost to the banks between a pro rata deduction and a full deduction is significant enough to prompt banks to forgo the advantages of federal obligations, such as their extreme liquidity and safety, and to invest their money elsewhere. See Brief for Pennsylvania Bankers Association as Amicus Curiae 15-18; Brief for Citizens and Southern National Bank as 'Amicus Curiae 8-10. The tax exemption required by the Constitution and § 3701 is not a tax shelter. Federal obligations may be acquired, in part, by liabilities, and, when they are, a pro rata method of allocating a fair share of the federal obligations to liabilities does not infringe upon the constitutional or statutory immunity federal obligations enjoy. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is affirmed. It is so ordered. Title 31 of the United States Code was not enacted into positive law until 1982, when it was reformulated, it was said, “without substantive change.” See Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 1067. Section 3701, as it had been amended by an addition in 1959, see Pub. L. 86-346, § 105(a), 73 Stat. 622, 31 U. S. C. § 742 (1976 ed.), was replaced in the 1982 reformulation by 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a). Because the tax at issue here was levied in 1980, the pre-1982 form of the statute technically controls this case. Effective January 1, 1984, the 1978 statute was repealed and replaced by another providing that “depository financial institutions shall be subject to all forms of state and local taxation in the same manner and to the same extent as other business corporations in Georgia.” 1983 Ga. Laws, No. 524, § 5, p. 1355, codified as Ga. Code Ann. § 48-6-90 (Supp. 1984). The court declined to decide whether Rev. Stat. §3701 would entitle a bank to a full deduction if it could prove that its federal obligations were “actually purchased from capital stock or surplus.” 251 Ga., at 834, n. 3, 312 S. E. 2d, at 105, n. 3. Some States have provided for a pro rata deduction similar to that formulated by the Georgia Supreme Court, either by statute or by administrative practice. See, e. g., Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, §7701.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); Texas Research League, Status of the Texas Bank Shares Tax, A Report to the Joint Select Committee (of the Texas Legislature) on Fiscal Policy 11-12 (1984). Another of the three banks, Citizens and Southern National Bank, now has changed its position and has filed a brief amicus curiae in support of appellees. This Court, in Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S. 113 (1935), struck down a state-trust-company share tax that provided a pro rata deduction for tax-exempt securities. That decision, however, rested on the fact that the tax discriminated against federal obligations by allowing a deduction for the value of shares the trust company held in corporations that already had been taxed or were exempt from taxes, without allowing a like deduction for federal obligations and shares the trust company held in national banks. The Court did not reach the issue whether, absent such discrimination, a pro rata deduction for federal obligations would have satisfied the Constitution or § 3701. The decision, therefore, is of no controlling relevance here. It is also worthy of note that the Treasury Department advised Congress that the pro-rata-deduction provisions of the Life Insurance Tax Act of 1959 did not result in the imposition of any tax on the tax-exempt interest insurers received on state and municipal bonds. 105 Cong. Rec. 8402 (1959) (letter from David A. Lindsay, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, to Senator Harry F. Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance). Only a few months later, the same Treasury Department made no mention of any intent to revise § 3701 to prohibit such a pro rata deduction, and, instead, described the addition to §3701 as intended merely to resolve the controversy over Idaho’s attempt to distinguish between a tax on exempt interest and a tax measured by exempt interest. Public Debt Ceiling and Interest Rate Ceiling on Bonds, Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 69-72 (1959) (supplemental statement of Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson). In 1960, commercial banks held $61.1 billion in United States Treasury securities, while they had equity capital of only $21 billion. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, State and Local Taxation of Banks, Report of a Study Under Public Law 91-156, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Part III, p. 12 (Comm. Print 1971) (hereinafter Report of a Study). In 1958, 27 States imposed bank share taxes and 21 States taxed banks through excise, franchise, or income taxes. S. Leland, The History and Impact of Section 5219 on the Taxation of National Banks, reprinted in Report of a Study 309, 316.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
LAWYER v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al. No. 95-2024. Argued February 19, 1997 Decided June 25, 1997 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 583. Robert J. Shapiro argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was C. Martin Lawyer III, pro se. Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for the state appel-lees, With him on the brief were Peter Antonacci, Deputy Attorney General of Florida, George L. Waas, Assistant Attorney General, Donald L. Bell, Stephen N. Zack, B. Elaine New, and Ben H. Hill III. Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Patrick, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Mark L. Gross, and Rebecca K. Troth. Robert B. McDuff, James M. Landis, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, and Todd A. Cox filed a brief for appellees Senator James T. Hargrett, Jr., et al. Robinson O. Everett filed a brief for Americans for the Defense of Constitutional Rights, Inc., as amicus curiae. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant was one of several plaintiffs in this suit challenging the configuration of a Florida legislative district under the Equal Protection Clause. All parties except appellant reached a provisional settlement agreement and, after a fairness hearing, a three-judge District Court approved the remedial districting plan proposed in the agreement. Appellant claims that the District Court acted without giving the State an adequate opportunity to make its own redistricting choice by approving the remedial plan without first adjudicating the legality of the original plan, that the court had no authority to approve any settlement over his objection, and that the remedial plan violates the Constitution. We hold that the State exercised the choice to which it was entitled under our cases, that appellant has no right to block the settlement, and that he has failed to point up any unconstitutionality in the plan proposed. H — I After the 1990 Decennial Census, the Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan for Florida’s 40 Senate districts and 120 House districts. Following the procedure for reapportionment set forth in the State Constitution, see Fla. Const., Art. III, § 16(c) (1970), the attorney general of Florida petitioned the State Supreme Court for a declaration that the plan comported with state and federal law. That court approved the redistricting plan, while noting that time constraints imposed by the State Constitution precluded a full review of objections raised to the plan under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. The court retained jurisdiction to entertain further objections to the plan. See In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 597 So. 2d 276, 285-286 (Fla.), amended, 601 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1992); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1001 (1994). Since five Florida counties, including Hillsborough County where the city of Tampa is located, are covered jurisdictions under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1996); see also Johnson, supra, at 1001, n. 2, the state attorney general submitted the redistricting plan to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance. On June 16, 1992, the Department declined to preclear the proposed State Senate districts, on the grounds that the redistricting plan divided “politically cohesive minority populations” in the Hills-borough County area and failed to create a majority-minority district in that region. Letter from Assistant United States Attorney General John Dunne to Florida Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth (quoted in In re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, supra, at 547 (Shaw, C. J., specially concurring)); see also De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 F. Supp. 1550, 1556 (ND Fla. 1992), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Johnson v. De Grandy, supra. The Supreme Court of Florida then entered an order encouraging the state legislature to adopt a new plan to address the Justice Department’s objection, and noting that if the legislature failed to act, the court itself would adopt a reapportionment plan. See 815 F. Supp., at 1556; see also 601 So. 2d, at 544-645. The state court was advised that the Governor had no intent to convene the legislature in extraordinary session and that neither the President of the Senate nor the Speaker of the House of Representatives would convene his respective House. Ibid.; see also 815 F. Supp., at 1556. The court concluded that a legislative impasse had occurred and, invoking authority under state law, revised the Senate redistricting plan to address the Justice Department’s objection. 601 So. 2d, at 545. The amended plan, known as Plan 330, called for an irregularly shaped Senate District 21, with a voting-age population 45.8% black and 9.4% Hispanic and comprising portions of four counties in the Tampa Bay area. Id., at 546. The district included the central portions of Tampa in Hillsborough County, the eastern shore of Tampa Bay running south to Bradenton in Manatee County, central portions of St. Peters-burg in Pinellas County, a narrow projection eastward through parts of Hillsborough and Polk Counties, and a narrow finger running north from St. Petersburg to Clearwater. See Juris. Statement 29a. Although the State Supreme Court acknowledged that the district was “more contorted” than other possible plans and that black residents in different parts of the district might have little in common besides their race, it decided that such concerns “must give way to racial and ethnic fairness.” See 601 So. 2d, at 546. Elections were held under Plan 330 in 1992 and 1994. On April 14, 1994, appellant and five other residents of Hillsborough County filed this suit in the District Court invoking jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 2201, et seq., naming the State of Florida, its attorney general, and the United States Department of Justice as defendants, and alleging that District 21 in Plan 330 violated the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and in-junctive relief, including an order requiring Florida to reconfigure the district. See App. 14. A three-judge District Court was convened and ultimately permitted intervention by the State Senate, House of Representatives, Secretary of State, District 21 Senator James T. Hargrett, Jr., and a group of black and Hispanic voters residing in District 21. Record 33, 78; 159 Tr. 25, 30 (Sept. 27, 1995). At a status conference held on July 6, 1995, shortly after we decided Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995), all parties agreed to the appointment of a mediator to seek resolution of the suit, see Record 78, at 2; 134 Tr. 13, 14, 16 (July 6, 1995), though pretrial proceedings continued during the ensuing mediation. After the mediator declared an impasse in late October, see 166 Tr. 8 (Oct. 26,1995), the parties contin.ued discussions on their own and on November 2, 1995, filed with the District Court a settlement agreement signed on behalf of all parties except appellant. App. 17-21. The agreement noted that while the defendants and defendant-intervenors denied the plaintiffs’ claims that District 21 was unconstitutional, all parties to the settlement concurred that “there is a reasonable factual and legal basis for the plaintiffs’ claim.” Id., at 17. The agreement proposed revising District 21 under a new plan, called Plan 386, which would be subject to public comment and, if approved by the District Court after a public hearing, would be used in state elections unless Florida adopted a new plan. Id., at 18-19. District 21, as revised in Plan 386, would no longer extend into Polk County or north toward Clearwater, would have a boundary length decreased by 58%, and would include a resident black voting-age population reduced from 45.0% to 36.2%. Id., at 25, 40. The proposed district would cover portions of three counties instead of four and continue to include land on both sides of Tampa Bay. Record 169, attachment 4. At a status conference held the same day the parties filed the settlement agreement, the District Court sought and received specific assurances from lawyers for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House that they were authorized to represent their respective government bodies in the litigation and enter into the settlement proposed. 180 Tr. 23-24 (Nov. 2,1995). Appellant argued that the District Court was required to hold Plan 330 unconstitutional before it could adopt a new districting plan, see id., at 16, but the District Court disagreed, noting that “there is simply not a litigable issue with respect to what we have for shorthand purposes referred to as liability and we ought simply then to proceed... to resolve the issue of the fairness of this proposed settlement and entertain any objections [concerning it].” Id., at 26. The District Court scheduled a hearing on the proposed plan for November 20, giving notice in 13 area newspapers and making details of the plan available for review in the clerk’s office. See App. 161. Before the hearing, the settling parties submitted evidence including affidavits and declarations addressing the factors considered in revising District 21, Record 188, and appellant submitted his own remedial plan for a District 21 wholly contained within Hills-borough County, Record 172, at A4. At the hearing, counsel for the State Senate summarized the prehearing filings submitted by proponents of the settlement and the rationale behind the agreement. App. 160-172. The District Court denied appellant’s motion for ruling on his motion for summary judgment on the legality of Plan 330, saying that “[i]t makes no difference whether we grant the motion or not.... [I]f we granted your motion, we would be in this precise posture we are in now.” Id., at 173. Appellant then argued that District 21, as redrawn in Plan 386, would still be unconstitutional because only race could explain its contours, see id., at 175-188, and counsel for a former state legislator spoke to the same effect, id., at 188-190. On March 19,1996, the District Court approved the settlement. See 920 F. Supp. 1248, 1257 (MD Fla. 1996). The panel majority first held that it was not obliged to find the existing District 21 unconstitutional in order to approve the settlement. While recognizing the need to “guard against any disingenuous adventures” by litigants, id., at 1252, n. 2, the majority noted that a State should not be deprived of the opportunity to avoid “an expensive and protracted contest and the possibility of an adverse and disruptive adjudication” by a rule insisting on “a public mea culpa” as the sole condition for dispensing with “a dispositive, specific determination of the controlling constitutional issue.” Id., at 1252, and n. 2. To balance the competing interests, the court required a showing of a substantial “evidentiary and legal” basis for the plaintiffs’ claim before the settlement would be approved, id., at 1252, and it held the standard satisfied. “Each party either states unequivocally that existing District 21 is unconstitutionally configured or concedes, for purposes of settlement, that the plaintiffs have established prima facie unconstitutionality.” Id., at 1253, n. 3. The majority found that the “boundaries of current District 21 are markedly uneven and, in some respects, extraordinary,” id., at 1253, and that the district “bears at least some of the conspicuous signs of a racially conscious contrivance,” id., at 1255. The District Court then turned to the merits of Plan 386 to determine whether its formation had been “dominated by the single-minded focus” on race that it understood to be constitutionally forbidden under Miller. 920 F. Supp., at 1254. The court observed that the November 20 hearing “produced but two dissenters, plaintiff Lawyer and a former state Senator, both of whom neither presented relevant evidence nor offered germane legal argument.” Id., at 1255. The District Court concluded that a “constitutional objection to the proposed District 21 is not established. In its shape and composition, proposed District 21 is, all said and done, demonstrably benign and satisfactorily tidy, especially given the prevailing geography.” Ibid. The court noted that the new district’s percentage of minority residents would approximate the racial features of the region surrounding Tampa Bay better than Plan 330 did, that the district’s boundaries would be “less strained and irregular” than those in Plan 330, and that all candidates, regardless of race, would have an opportunity to seek office, with “both a fair chance to win and the usual risk of defeat.” Id., at 1255, 1256. Chief Judge Tjoflat concurred specially. He agreed that Plan 386 was constitutional but thought that the new plan could not be approved without a judicial determination that Plan 330 was unconstitutional, as he concluded it was. Id., at 1256-1257. We noted probable jurisdiction, 519 U. S. 926 (1996), and now affirm. II A Appellant argues that the District Court erred in approving the settlement agreement without formally holding Plan 330 unconstitutional, thereby denying the State’s legislature and Supreme Court the opportunity to devise a new redistricting plan. See Brief for Appellant 23, 32-33. Appellant relies on Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25 (1993), in which we recognized that “ ‘reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court’ [and that] [a]bsent evidence that these state branches will fail timely to perform that duty, a federal court must neither affirmatively obstruct state apportionment nor permit federal litigation to be used to impede it.” Id., at 34 (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 27 (1975)). Appellant cites Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U. S. 535 (1978), for the proposition that when a federal court declares an existing apportionment plan unconstitutional, it should, if possible, afford “a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than... devise and order into effect its own plan.” Id., at 540 (opinion of White, J.). Appellant claims that the District Court’s approval of the settlement agreement without first holding Plan 330 unconstitutional impaired the State’s interest in exercising “primary responsibility for apportionment of [its] federal congressional and state legislative districts,” Growe, supra, at 34, and had the derivative effect of “eviscerat[ing] the individual rights of” appellant, as a citizen and voter, to “the liberties derived from the diffusion of sovereign power... to representative state government,” Brief for Appellant 26. The substance of what appellant claims as a right to the benefit of political diffusion is nothing other than the rule declared in the cases he cites, that state redistricting responsibility should be accorded primacy to the extent possible when a federal court exercises remedial power. See Growe, 507 U. S., at 34. A State should be given the opportunity to make its own redistricting decisions so long as that is practically possible and the State chooses to take the opportunity. Ibid. When it does take the opportunity, the discretion of the federal court is limited except to the extent that the plan itself runs afoul of federal law. In this case, the State has selected its opportunity by entering into the settlement agreement, which for reasons set out below in Part II-B it had every right to do. And it has availed itself of that opportunity by proposing a plan as embodied in the settlement agreement. There can be no question on the present record that proponents of the plan included counsel authorized to represent the State itself, and there is no reason to suppose that the State’s attorney general lacked authority to propose a plan as an incident of his authority to represent the State in this litigation. The evidence, indeed, was entirely in his favor. The participation of counsel for each legislative chamber confirmed both the continuing refusal of the legislature to address the issue in formal session and the authority of the attorney general to propose the settlement plan on the State’s behalf. On these facts, the District Court’s approval of the settlement agreement was entirely consistent with the principles underlying our cases that have granted relief on the ground that a district court had failed to respect the affected government’s entitlement to originate its own redistricting policy. Since the State, through its attorney general, has taken advantage of the option recognized in Growe and Wise to make redistricting decisions in the first instance, there are no reasons in those cases to burden its exercise of choice by requiring a formal adjudication of unconstitutionality. B We find no merit, either, in appellant’s apparently distinct claim that, regardless of any effect on the State’s districting responsibility, the District Court was bound to adjudicate liability before settlement because appellant did not agree to settle. See Brief for Appellant 27. “It has never been supposed that one party — whether an original party, a party that was joined later, or an intervenor — could preclude other parties from settling their own disputes.” Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. 501, 528-529 (1986). While appellant was entitled to present evidence and have his objections heard at the hearing to consider approval of the agreement, he “does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding [his] consent.” Id., at 529; cf. 7B C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1797.1, p. 412 (2d ed. 1986) (fact of opposition does not necessitate disapproval of class-action settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23). While a settlement agreement subject to court approval in a nonclass action may not impose duties or obligations on an unconsenting party or “dispose” of his claims, see Firefighters, supra, at 529, the agreement here did none of those things. It disposed of appellant’s claim not in the forbidden sense of cutting him off from a remedy to which he was entitled, but only in the legitimate sense of granting him an element of the very relief he had sought. As a remedy for what appellant claimed to be an unconstitutional plan he had requested the elimination of that plan, and the settlement and decree gave him that relief. To afford him a right to the formality of a decree in addition to the substance of the relief sought would be to allow a sore winner to obscure the point of the suit. In most civil litigation, and in this suit in particular, “the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the judgment produces.... The real value of the judicial pronouncement — what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a ‘case or controversy’ rather than an advisory opinion — is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 761 (1987). Appellant, of course, wanted something more than being rid of Plan 330, for he wanted a new plan that would be constitutional. But insofar as he would have been entitled to that following a formal decree of the court, he is now in the same position he would have enjoyed if he had had such a decree: his views on the merits of the proposed plan were heard, and his right to attack it in this appeal is entirely unimpaired. To the extent that he claims anything more, he is trying to do what we have previously said he may not do: to demand an adjudication that the State of Florida, represented by the attorney general, could indeed have demanded, see Growe, 507 U. S., at 34; Wise, 437 U. S., at 540 (opinion of White, J.), but instead waived. r-H I — I I — I The District Court concluded that Plan 386 did not subordinate traditional districting principles to race. See 920 F. Supp., at 1254-1255. That finding is subject to review for clear error, see Miller, 515 U. S., at 915-917, of which we find none. The District Court looked to the shape and composition of District 21 as redrawn in Plan 386 and found them “demonstrably benign and satisfactorily tidy.” 920 F. Supp., at 1255. The district is located entirely in the Tampa Bay area, has an end-to-end distance no greater than that of most Florida Senate districts, and in shape does not stand out as different from numerous other Florida House and Senate districts. See App. 26, 60-75. While District 21 crosses a body of water and encompasses portions of three counties, evidence submitted showed that both features are common characteristics of Florida legislative districts, being products of the State’s geography and the fact that 40 Senate districts are superimposed on 67 counties. See id., at 28, 32-33. Addressing composition, the District Court found that the residents of District 21 “regard themselves as a community.” 920 F. Supp., at 1255. Evidence indicated that District 21 comprises a predominantly urban, low-income population, the poorest of the nine districts in the Tampa Bay region and among the poorest districts in the State, whose white and black members alike share a similarly depressed economic condition, see App. 30-31, 49-51, and interests that reflect it, id., at 149-154. The fact that District 21 under Plan 386 is not a majority black district, the black voting-age population being 36.2%, supports the District Court’s finding that the district is not a “safe” one for black-preferred candidates, but one that “offers to any candidate, without regard to race, the opportunity” to seek and be elected to office. 920 F. Supp., at 1256. Based on these and other considerations, the District Court concluded that traditional districting principles had not been subordinated to race in drawing revised District 21. Appellant calls this finding clearly erroneous, charging that District 21 encompasses more than one county, crosses a body of water, is irregular in shape, lacks compactness, and contains a percentage of black voters significantly higher than the overall percentage of black voters in Hillsborough, Manatee, and Pinellas Counties. Brief for Appellant 40-45. Appellant’s first four points ignore unrefuted evidence showing that on each of these points District 21 is no different from what Florida’s traditional districting principles could be expected to produce. See supra, at 580-581. As to appellant’s final point, we have never suggested that the percentage of black residents in a district may not exceed the percentage of black residents in any of the counties from which the district is created, and have never recognized similar racial composition of different political districts as being necessary to avoid an inference of racial gerrymandering in any one of them. Since districting can be difficult, after all, just because racial composition varies from place to place, and counties and voting districts do not depend on common principles of size and location, facts about the one do not as such necessarily entail conclusions about the other. In short, the evidence amply supports the trial court’s views that race did not predominate over Florida’s traditional districting principles in drawing Plan 386. Appellant has provided nothing that calls that conclusion into question, much less that points to any clear error. We accordingly affirm the decision of the District Court. It is so ordered. In separate litigation, we rejected §2 vote dilution claims attacking certain Senate districts in the Miami and Pensacola areas created by the legislature’s redistricting plan (as modified by the State Supreme Court through Plan 330). See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997 (1994). At the time, the District Court had permitted the Florida Senate to intervene, see Record 33, but had yet to rule on motions to intervene from Senator Hargrett and from the group of minority voters in District 21. The District Court indicated that it intended to grant all pending motions to intervene, and treated prospective intervenors as parties. 134 Tr. 4 (July 6,1995). The House of Representatives had yet to file a motion to intervene, but was represented at the status conference and indicated its intention to file a motion to intervene. Id., at 24. No one at the status conference objected to submitting the matter to mediation. The Secretary of State was not represented at the conference. We reject appellees’ contention that appellant failed to preserve this claim for appeal. Appellant argued below that the District Court should rule on the legality of Plan 330 before approving a remedial plan, see, e. g., Record 173, and appellant’s statements asking that the state legislature and Supreme Court be given the opportunity to redistrict following a finding of liability fairly encompass the claim he presents here. See 166 Tr. 30-31, 36-37, 39, 40 (Oct. 26, 1995); 180 Tr. 15-16 (Nov. 2, 1995). The dissent argues that Article III, § 16, of the Florida Constitution provides the exclusive means by which redistrieting can take place. See ;post, at 585-586, and n. 2. But this article in terms provides only that the state legislature is bound to redistrict within a certain time after each decennial census, for which it may be required to convene. See Fla. Const., Art. Ill, § 16(a). The dissent says that the state legislature is “implicitly authorized, to reapportion” after an existing plan is held unconstitutional and, further, that the Supreme Court of Florida has “by implication” the authority to redraw districts in the event a federal court invalidates a redistrieting plan on constitutional grounds. See post, at 585-586, n. 2. We disagree on this question of state law only insofar as the dissent views this implicit authority to limit the broad discretion possessed by the attorney general of Florida in representing the State in litigation. See, e. g., Ervin v. Collins, 85 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1956) (noting that, under Florida law, “the Attorney General as the chief law officer of the state and absent express legislative restriction to the contrary, may exercise his power and authority in the premises [the power to litigate] as the public interest may require”); see also State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So. 2d 891, 894-896 (Fla. 1972) (Ervin, J., specially concurring). Absent a state-court determination to the contrary, we do not see Article III, § 16, as placing the attorney general’s settling authority in doubt, over against his representation to the contrary. The District Court indicated that it would look to the Florida House and Senate as an initial matter to fashion any new districting plan, see Tr. 14, 18-19, 21-22 (Sept. 27, 1995), and directed the state appellees to file a monthly “report informing the Court of any formal actions initiated by any public official or branch of government regarding Florida’s senatorial ‘reapportionment plan.’” Record 78, at 5. The Florida Senate filed such status reports as directed, indicating that apart from the ongoing litigation, no formal actions had been initiated by any public official or branch of state government regarding Florida’s senatorial plan. Record 121, 141, 160. The dissent challenges the authority of those representing the State House and Senate to speak for those bodies and further claims that even if they were authorized, the District Court was required to “demand clearer credentials” on their part. See post, at 586. However this may be, the State was represented by the attorney general and it is by virtue of his agreement as counsel that the State was a party to the agreement. The settlement and subsequent judgment do not, of course, prevent the state legislature from redistricting yet again. See App. 19. Notwithstanding the dissent’s claim, see post, at 584, nothing in Firefighters limits its rule to remedial consent decrees that follow an adjudication of liability. To the contrary, the holding in Firefighters was expressly based on the principle that “it is the parties’ agreement that serves as the source of the court’s authority to enter any [consent] judgment at all,” 478 U. S., at 522, and our opinion in that case makes no reference to any findings of liability. There is no merit to appellant’s contention that the District Court failed to adjudicate the constitutionality of District 21. See Brief for Appellant 35. The District Court noted the deference due the State, and expressly held Plan 386 to be constitutional. 920 F. Supp. 1248, 1255, 1256 (MD Fla. 1996) (“Plan 386 passes any pertinent test of constitutionality and fairness”). The distance is 50.miles and record evidence indicates that only 15 of the 40 Senate districts in Florida cover less distance from end-to-end. See App. 26. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the presence in a district of a body of water, even without a connecting bridge and even if such districting necessitates land travel	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 26 ]	sc_adminaction
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE et al. v. ROSE et al. No. 74-489. Argued October 8, 1975 Decided April 21, 1976 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., post, p. 382, Blackmun, J., post, p. 385, and Rehnquist, J., post, p. 389, filed dissenting opinions. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Allan Abbot Tuttle, Leonard Schaitman, and Donald Etra. Barrington D. Parker, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Melvin L. Wulf and John IT. F. Shattuck. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents, student editors or former student editors of the New York University Law Review researching disciplinary systems and procedures at the military service academies for an article for the Law Review, were denied access by petitioners to case summaries of honor and ethics hearings, with personal references or other identifying information deleted, maintained in the United States Air Force Academy’s Honor and Ethics Code reading files, although Academy practice is to post copies of such summaries on 40 squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy and to distribute copies to Academy faculty and administration officials. Thereupon respondents brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against petitioners, the Department of the Air Force and Air Force officers who supervise cadets at the United States Air Force Academy (hereinafter collectively the Agency). The District Court granted petitioner Agency’s motion for summary judgment — without first requiring production of the case summaries for inspection — holding in an unreported opinion that case summaries even with deletions of personal references or other identifying information were “matters... related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,” exempted from mandatory disclosure by § 552 (b)(2) of the statute. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that § 552 (b) (2) did not exempt the case summaries from mandatory disclosure. 495 F. 2d 261 (1974). The Agency argued alternatively, however, that the case summaries constituted “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” exempted from mandatory disclosure by § 552 (b)(6). The District Court held this exemption inapplicable to the case summaries, because it concluded that disclosure of the summaries without names or other identifying information would not subject any former cadet to public identification and stigma, and the possibility of identification by another former cadet could not, in the context of the Academy’s practice of distribution and official posting of the summaries, constitute an invasion of personal privacy proscribed by § 552 (b)(6). Pet. for Cert. 32A. The Court of Appeals disagreed with this approach, stating that it “ignores certain practical realities” which militated against the conclusion “that the Agency’s internal dissemination of the summaries lessens the concerned cadets’ right to privacy, as embodied in Exemption six.” 496 F. 2d, at 267. But the court refused to hold, on the one hand, either “that [the Agency] must now, without any prior inspection by a court, turn over the summaries to [respondents] with only the proper names removed...” or, on the other hand, “that Exemption Six covers all, or any part of, the summaries in issue.” Id., at 268. Rather, the Court of Appeals held that because the Agency had not carried its burden in the District Court, imposed by the Act, of “sustain [ing] its action” by means of affidavits or testimony, further inquiry was required, and “the Agency must now produce the summaries themselves in court” for an in camera inspection “and cooperate with the judge in redacting the records so as to delete personal references and all other identifying information.... We think it highly likely that the combined skills of court and Agency, applied to the summaries, will yield edited documents sufficient for the purpose sought and sufficient as well to safeguard affected persons in their legitimate claims of privacy.” Ibid. (Footnotes omitted.) We granted certiorari, 420 U. S. 923 (1975). We affirm. I The District Court made factual findings respecting the administration of the Honor and Ethics Codes at the Academy. See Pet. for Cert. 28A-29A, nn. 5, 6. Under the Honor Code enrolled cadets pledge: “We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does.” The Honor Code is administered by an Honor Committee composed of Academy cadets. Suspected violations of the Code are referred to the Chairman of the Honor Committee, who appoints a three-cadet investigatory team which, with advice from the legal adviser, evaluates the facts and determines whether a hearing before an Honor Board of eight cadets, is warranted. If the team finds no hearing warranted, the case is closed. If it finds there should be a hearing, the accused cadet may call witnesses to testify in his behalf, and each cadet squadron may ordinarily send two cadets to observe. The Board may return a guilty finding only upon unanimous vote. If the verdict is guilty, under certain circumstances the Board may grant the guilty cadet “discretion,” for which a vote of six of the eight members is required. A verdict of guilty with discretion is equivalent to a not-guilty finding in that the cadet is returned to his cadet squadron in good standing. A verdict of guilty without discretion results in one of three alternative dispositions: the cadet may resign from the Academy, request a hearing before a Board of Officers, or request a trial by court-martial. At the announcement of the verdict, the Honor Committee Chairman reminds all cadets present at the hearing that all matters discussed at the hearing are confidential and should not be discussed outside the room with anyone other than an honor representative. A case summary consisting of a brief statement, usually only one page, of the significant facts is prepared by the Committee. As we have said, copies of the summaries are posted on 40 squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy, and distributed among Academy faculty and administration officials. Cadets are instructed not to read the summaries, unless they have a need, beyond mere curiosity, to know their contents, and the reading files are covered with a notice that they are “for official use only.” Case summaries for not-guilty and discretion cases are circulated with names deleted; in guilty cases, the guilty cadet’s name is not deleted from the summary, but posting on the bulletin boards is deferred until after the guilty cadet has left the Academy. Ethics Code violations are breaches of conduct less serious than Honor Code violations, and administration of Ethics Code cases is generally less structured, though similar. In many instances, ethics cases are handled informally by the cadet squadron commander, the squadron ethics representative, and the individual concerned. These cases are not necessarily written up and no complete file is maintained; a case is written up and the summary placed in back of the Honor Code reading files only if it is determined to be of value for the cadet population. Distribution of Ethics Code summaries is substantially the same as that of Honor Code summaries, and their confidentiality, too, is maintained by Academy custom and practice. II Our discussion may conveniently begin by again emphasizing the basic thrust of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. Y). We canvassed the subject at some length three years ago in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 79-80 (1973), and need only briefly review that history here. The Act revises § 3, the public disclosure section, of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (1964 ed.). The revision was deemed necessary because “Section 3 was generally recognized as falling far short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more as a withholding statute than a disclosure statute.” Mink, supra, at 79. Congress therefore structured a revision whose basic purpose reflected “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.” S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965) (hereinafter S. Rep. No. 813). To make crystal clear the congressional objective — in the words of the Court of Appeals, “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny,” 495 F. 2d, at 263 — Congress provided in § 552 (c) that nothing in the Act should be read to “authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated....” Consistently with that objective, the Act repeatedly states “that official information shall be made available ‘to the public/ ‘for public inspection.’ ” Mink, supra, at 79. There are, however, exemptions from compelled disclosure. They are nine in number and are set forth in § 552 (b). But these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. “These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (c)...,” Mink, supra, at 79, and must be narrowly construed. Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 340, 343, 484 F. 2d 820, 823 (1973); 173 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 193, 523 F. 2d 1136, 1142 (1975); Soucie v. David, 145 U. S. App. D. C. 144, 157, 448 F. 2d 1067, 1080 (1971). In sum, as said in Mink, supra, at 80: “Without question,, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands. Subsection (b) is part of this scheme and represents the congressional determination of the types of information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential, if it so chooses. As the Senate Committee explained, it was not 'an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one either.... Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.’ S. Rep. No. 813, p. 3.” Mindful of the congressional purpose, we then turn to consider whether mandatory disclosure of the case summaries is exempted by either of the exemptions involved here, discussing, first, Exemption 2, and, second, Exemption 6. Ill The phrasing of Exemption 2 is traceable to congressional dissatisfaction with the exemption from disclosure under former § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of “any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency.” 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (1964 ed.). The sweep of that wording led to withholding by agencies from disclosure of matter “rang[ing] from the important to the insignificant.” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1966) (hereinafter H. R. Rep. No. 1497). An earlier effort at minimizing this sweep, S. 1666 introduced in the 88th Congress in 1963, applied the “internal management” exemption only to matters required to be published in the Federal Register; agency orders and records were exempted from other public disclosure only when the information related “solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency.” The distinction was highlighted in the Senate Report on S. 1666 by reference to the latter as the “more tightly drawn” exempting language. S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1964). No final action was taken on S. 1666 in the 88th Congress; the Senate passed the bill, but it reached the House too late for action. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 18 n. 18 (1974). But the bill introduced in the Senate in 1965 that became law in 1966 dropped the “internal management” exemption for matters required to be published in the Federal Register and consolidated all exemptions into a single subsection. Thus, legislative history plainly evidences the congressional conclusion that the wording of Exemption 2, “internal personnel rules and practices,” was to have a narrower reach than the Administrative Procedure Act’s exemption for “internal management” matters. But that is not the end of the inquiry. The House and Senate Reports on the bill finally enacted differ upon the scope of the narrowed exemption. The Senate Report stated: “Exemption No. 2 relates only to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel’s use of parking facilities or regulations of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.” S. Rep. No. 813, p. 8. The House Report, on the other hand, declared: “2. Matters related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency: Operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners would be exempt from disclosure, but this exemption would not cover all ‘matters of internal management’ such as employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures which are withheld under the present law.” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, p. 10. Almost all courts that have considered the difference between the Reports have concluded that the Senate Report more accurately reflects the congressional purpose. Those cases relying on the House, rather than the Senate, interpretation of Exemption 2, and permitting agency withholding of matters of some public interest, have done so only where necessary to prevent the circumvention of agency regulations that might result from disclosure to the subjects of regulation of the procedural manuals and guidelines used by the agency in discharging its regulatory function. See, e. g., Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 610 (SD Tex. 1972); Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (DC 1972), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 368, 484 F. 2d 1086 (1973); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (ND Cal. 1971) (dictum). Moreover, the legislative history indicates that this was the primary concern of the committee drafting the House Report. See Hearings on H. R. 5012 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 29-30 (1965), cited in H. R. Rep. No. 1497, p. 10 n. 14. We need not consider in this case the applicability of Exemption 2 in such circumstances, however, because, as the Court of Appeals recognized, this is not a case “where knowledge of administrative procedures might help outsiders to circumvent regulations or standards. Release of the [sanitized] summaries, which constitute quasi-legal records, poses no such danger to the effective operation of the Codes at the Academy.” 495 F. 2d, at 265 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the materials sought in this case are distributed to the subjects of regulation, the cadets, precisely in order to assure their compliance with the known content of the Codes. It might appear, nonetheless, that the House Report’s reference to “[operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure” supports a much broader interpretation of the exemption than the Senate Report’s circumscribed examples. This argument was recently considered and rejected by Judge Wilkey speaking for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Vaughn v. Rosen, 173 U. S. App. D. C., at 193-194, 523 F. 2d, at 1142: “Congress intended that Exemption 2 be interpreted narrowly and specifically. In our view, the House Report carries the potential of exempting a wide swath of information under the category of ‘operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure....’ The House Report states that the exemption ‘would not cover all “matters of internal management” such as employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures...’ and yet it gives precious little guidance as to which matters are covered by the exemption and which are not. Although it is equally terse, the Senate Report indicates that the line sought to be drawn is one between minor or trivial matters and those more substantial matters which might be the subject of legitimate public interest. “This is a standard, a guide, which an agency and then a court, if need be, can apply with some certainty, consistency and clarity.... “Reinforcing this interpretation is ‘the clear legislative intent [of the FOIA] to assure public access to all governmental records whose disclosure would not significantly harm specific governmental interests.’ [Soucie v. David, 145 U. S. App. D. C. 144, 157, 448 F. 2d 1067, 1080 (1971)]. As a result, we have repeatedly stated that ‘[t]he policy of the Act requires that the disclosure requirements be construed broadly, the exemptions narrowly.’ [Ibid.; Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 340, 343, 484 F. 2d 820, 823 (1973).] Thus, faced with a conflict in the legislative history, the recognized principal purpose of the FOIA requires us to choose that interpretation most favoring disclosure. “The second major consideration favoring reliance upon the Senate Report is the fact that it was the only committee report that was before both houses of Congress. The House unanimously passed the Senate Bill without amendment, therefore no conference committee was necessary to reconcile conflicting provisions.... “... [W]e as a court viewing the legislative history must be wary of relying upon the House Report, or even the statements of House sponsors, where their views differ from those expressed in the Senate. As Professor Davis said: The basic principle is quite elementary: The content of the law must depend upon the intent of both Houses, not of just one.’ [See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.31, p. 175 (1970 Supp.).] By unanimously passing the Senate Bill without amendment, the House denied both the Senate Committee and the entire Senate an opportunity to object (or concur) to the interpretation written into the House Report (or voiced in floor colloquy). This being the case, we choose to rely upon the Senate Report.” For the reasons stated by Judge Wilkey, and because we think the primary focus of the House Report was on exemption of disclosures that might enable the regulated to circumvent agency regulation, we too “choose to rely upon the Senate Report” in this regard. The District Court had also concluded in this case that the Senate Report was “the surer indication of congressional intent.” Pet. for Cert. 34A n. 21. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to take “a firm stand on the issue,” concluding that “the difference of approach between the House and Senate Reports would not affect the result here.” 495 F. 2d, at 265. The different conclusions of the two courts in applying the Senate Report's interpretation centered upon a disagreement as to the materiality of the public significance of the operation of the Honor and Ethics Codes. The District Court based its conclusion on a determination that the Honor and Ethics Codes “[b]y definition... are meant to control only those people in the agency.... The operation of the Honor Code cannot possibly affect anyone outside its sphere of voluntary participation which is limited by its function and its publication to the Academy.” Pet. for Cert. 34A. The Court of Appeals on the other hand concluded that under “the Senate construction of Exemption Two, [the] case summaries... clearly fall outside its ambit” because “[s]ueh summaries have a substantial potential for public interest outside the Government.” 495 F. 2d, at 265. We agree with the approach and conclusion of the Court of Appeals. The implication for the general public of the Academy's administration of discipline is obvious, particularly so in fight of the unique role of the military. What we have said of the military in other contexts has equal application here: it “constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian,” Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953), in which the internal law of command and obedience invests the military officer with “a particular position of responsibility.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 744 (1974). Within this discipline, the accuracy and effect of a superior’s command depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability of subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of subordinates depends upon the unquestioned specific and customary reliability of the superior. The importance of these considerations to the maintenance of a force able and ready to fight effectively renders them undeniably significant to the public role of the military. Moreover, the same essential integrity is critical to the military’s relationship with its civilian direction. Since the purpose of the Honor and Ethics Codes administered and enforced at the Air Force Academy is to ingrain the ethical reflexes basic to these responsibilities in future Air Force officers, and to select out those candidates apparently unlikely to serve these standards, it follows that the nature of this instruction — and its adequacy or inadequacy — is significantly related to the substantive public role of the Air Force and its Academy. Indeed, the public’s stake in the operation of the Codes as they affect the training of future Air Force officers and their military careers is underscored by the Agency’s own proclamations of the importance of cadet-administered Codes to the Academy’s educational and training program. Thus, the Court of Appeals said, and we agree: “[Respondents] have drawn our attention to various items such as newspaper excerpts, a press conference by an Academy officer and a White House Press Release, which illustrate the extent of general concern with the working of the Cadet Honor Code. As the press conference and the Press Release show, some of the interest has been generated — or at least enhanced — by acts of the Government itself. Of course, even without such official encouragement, there would be interest in the treatment of cadets, whose education is publicly financed and who furnish a good portion of the country’s future military leadership. Indeed, all sectors of our society, including the cadets themselves, have a stake in the fairness of any system that leads, in many instances, to the forced resignation of some cadets. The very study involved in this case bears additional witness to the degree of professional and academic interest in the Academy’s student-run system of discipline.... [This factor] differentiate [s] the summaries from matters of daily routine like working hours, which, in the words of Exemption Two, do relate ‘solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.’ ” 495 F. 2d, at 265 (emphasis in Court of Appeals opinion). In sum, we think that, at least where the situation is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation, Exemption 2 is not applicable to matters subject to such a genuine and significant public interest. The exemption was not designed to authorize withholding of all matters except otherwise secret law bearing directly on the propriety of actions of members of the public. Rather, the general thrust of the exemption is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the public could not reasonably be expected to have an interest. The case summaries plainly do not fit that description. They are not matter with merely internal significance. They do not concern only routine matters. Their disclosure entails no particular administrative burden. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that, given the Senate interpretation, “the Agency’s withholding of the case summaries (as edited to preserve anonymity) cannot be upheld by reliance on the second exemption.” Id., at 266. IV Additional questions are involved in the determination whether Exemption 6 exempts the case summaries from mandatory disclosure as “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The first question is whether the clause “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” modifies “personnel and medical files” or only “similar files.” The Agency argues that Exemption 6 distinguishes “personnel” from “similar” files, exempting all “personnel files” but only those “similar files” whose disclosure constitutes “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” and that the case summaries sought here are "personnel files.” On this reading, if it is determined that the case summaries are “personnel files,” the Agency argues that judicial inquiry is at an end, and that the Court of Appeals therefore erred in remanding for determination whether disclosure after redaction would constitute “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The Agency did not argue its suggested distinction between “personnel” and “similar” files to either the District Court or the Court of Appeals, and the opinions of both courts treat Exemption 6 as making no distinction between “personnel” and “similar” files in the application of the “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” requirement. The District Court held that “ [i] t is only the identifying connection to the individual that casts the personnel, medical, and similar files within the protection of [the] sixth exemption.” Pet. for Cert. 30A-31A. The Court of Appeals stated: “[W]e are dealing here with 'personnel’ or'similar files.’ But the key words, of course, are 'a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’....” 495 F. 2d, at 266. We agree with these views, for we find nothing in the wording of Exemption 6 or its legislative history to support the Agency’s claim that Congress created a blanket exemption for personnel files. Judicial interpretation has uniformly reflected the view that no reason would exist for nondisclosure in the absence of a showing of a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, whether the documents are filed in “personnel” or “similar” files. See, e. g., Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F. 2d 133, 135 (CA3 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 122, 126, 498 F. 2d 73, 77 (1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 340, 484 F. 2d 820 (1973); Getman v. NLRB, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 209, 213, 450 F. 2d 670, 674 (1971). Congressional concern for the protection of the kind of confidential personal data usually included in a personnel file is abundantly clear. But Congress also made clear that nonconfidential matter was not to be insulated from disclosure merely because it was stored by an agency in its “personnel” files. Rather, Congress sought to construct an exemption that would require a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act “to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” The device adopted to achieve that balance was the limited exemption, where privacy was threatened, for “clearly unwarranted” invasions of personal privacy. Both House and Senate Reports can only be read as disclosing a congressional purpose to eschew a blanket exemption for “personnel... and similar files” and to require a balancing of interests in either case. Thus the House Report states, H. R. Rep. No. 1497, p. 11: “The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual’s right of privacy and the preservation of the public’s right to Government information by excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual.” Similarly, the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 813, p. 9, states: “The phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an individual’s private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public’s right to governmental information.” Plainly Congress did not itself strike the balance as to “personnel files” and confine the courts to striking the balance only as to “similar files.” To the contrary, Congress enunciated a single policy, to be enforced in both cases by the courts, “that will involve a balancing” of the private and public interests. This was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as to medical files, and that conclusion is equally applicable to personnel files: “Exemption (6) of the Act covers.. medical files... the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’ Where a purely medical file is withheld under authority of Exemption (6), it will be for the District Court ultimately to determine any dispute as to whether that exemption was properly invoked.” Ackerly v. Ley, 137 U. S. App. D. C. 133, 136-137, n. 3, 420 F. 2d 1336, 1339-1340, n. 3 (1969) (ellipses in original). See also Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, supra, at 135. Congress’ recent action in amending the Freedom of Information Act to make explicit its agreement with judicial decisions requiring the disclosure of nonexempt portions of otherwise exempt files is consistent with this conclusion. Thus, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 2 ]	sc_adminaction
MILLS et al. v. ROGERS et al. No. 80-1417. Argued January 13, 1982 Decided June 18, 1982 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stephen Sckultz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts. Richard Cole argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert Burdick. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Paul L. Perito and C. Frederick Ryland for the American College of Neuropsychopharmacol-ogy; by Joel I. Klein and H. Bartow Farr III for the American Psychiatric Association; and by Robert H. Weber and Jonathan Brant for the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Joseph R. Tafelski for Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc.; by Paul R. Friedman, Jane Bloom Yohalem, John Townsend Rich, and Donald N. Bersojf for the American Psychological Association et al.; and by William Alsup for Barbara Jamison et al. Louis M. Aucoin III filed a brief for Patients’ Rights Advocacy Services, Inc., as amicus curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether involuntarily committed mental patients have a constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. I This litigation began on April 27, 1975, when respondent Rubie Rogers and six other persons filed suit against various officials and staff of the May and Austin Units of the Boston State Hospital. The plaintiffs all were present or former mental patients at the institution. During their period of institutionalization all had been forced to accept unwanted treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Alleging that forcible administration of these drugs violated rights protected by the Constitution of the United States, the plaintiffs — respondents here — sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. The District Court certified the case as a class action. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352, n. 1 (Mass. 1979). Although denying relief in damages, the court held that mental patients enjoy constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interests in deciding for themselves whether to submit to drug therapy. The District Court found that an involuntary “commitment” provides no basis for an inference of legal “incompetency” to make this decision under Massachusetts law. Id., at 1361-1362. Until a judicial finding of incompetency has been made, the court concluded, the wishes of the patients generally must be respected. Id., at 1365-1368. Even when a state court has rendered a determination of incompetency, the District Court found that the patient’s right to make treatment decisions is not forfeited, but must be exercised on his behalf by a court-appointed guardian. Id., at 1364. Without consent either by the patient or his guardian, the court held, the patient’s liberty interests may be overridden only in an emergency. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F. 2d 650 (1980). It agreed that mental patients have a constitutionally protected interest in deciding for themselves whether to undergo treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Id., at 653. It also accepted the trial court’s conclusion that Massachusetts law recognizes involuntarily committed persons as presumptively competent to assert this interest on their own behalf. See id., at 657-659. The Court of Appeals reached different conclusions, however, as to the circumstances under which state interests might override the liberty interests of the patient. The Court of Appeals found that the State has two interests that must be weighed against the liberty interests asserted by the patient: a police power interest in maintaining order within the institution and in preventing violence, see id., at 655, and a parens patriae interest in alleviating the sufferings of mental illness and in providing effective treatment, see id., at 657. The court held that the State, under its police powers, may administer medication forcibly only upon a determination that “the need to prevent violence in a particular situation outweighs the possibility of harm to the medicated individual” and that “reasonable alternatives to the administration of antipsychotics [have been] ruled out.” Id., at 656. Criticizing the District Court for imposing what it regarded as a more rigid standard, the Court of Appeals held that a hospital’s professional staff must have substantial discretion in deciding when an impending emergency requires involuntary medication. The Court of Appeals reserved to the District Court, on remand, the task of developing mechanisms to ensure that staff decisions under the “police power” standard accord adequate procedural protection to “the interests of the patients.” With respect to the State’s parens patriae powers, the Court of Appeals accepted the District Court’s state-law distinction between patients who have and patients who have not been adjudicated incompetent. Where a patient has not been found judicially to be “incompetent” to make treatment decisions under Massachusetts law, the court ruled that the parens patriae interest will justify involuntary medication only when necessary to prevent further deterioration in the patient’s mental health. See id., at 660. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s conclusion that a guardian must be appointed to make nonemergency treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. Even for incompetent patients, however, it ruled that the State’s parens patriae interest would justify prescription only of such treatment as would be accepted voluntarily by “the individual himself... were he competent” to decide. Id., at 661. The Court of Appeals held that the patient’s interest in avoiding undesired drug treatment generally must be protected procedurally by a judicial determination of “incompetency.” If such a determination were made, further on-the-scene procedures still would be required before antipsychotic drugs could be administered forcibly in a particular instance. Ibid. Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals involved constitutional issues of potentially broad significance, we granted certiorari. Okin v. Rogers, 451 U. S. 906 (1981). II A The principal question on which we granted certiorari is whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. This question has both substantive and procedural aspects. See 634 F. 2d, at 656, 661; Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836, 841 (CA3 1981). The parties agree that the Constitution recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. Assuming that they are correct in this respect, the substantive issue involves a definition of that protected constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it. See Youngberg v. Romeo, post, at 319-320; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 560 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 147-154 (1973); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25-27 (1905). The procedural issue concerns the minimunf procedures required by the Constitution for determining that the individual’s liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance. See Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 606 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). As a practical matter both the substantive and procedural issues are intertwined with questions of state law. In theory a court might be able to define the scope of a patient’s federally protected liberty interest without reference to state law. Having done so, it then might proceed to adjudicate the procedural protection required by the Due Process Clause for the federal interest alone. Cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). For purposes of determining actual rights and obligations, however, questions of state law cannot be avoided. Within our federal system the substantive rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum. State law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 7, 12 (1979); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719 (1975); see also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). If so, the broader state protections would define the actual substantive rights possessed by a person living within that State. Where a State creates liberty interests broader than those protected directly by the Federal Constitution, the procedures mandated to protect the federal substantive interests also might fail to determine the actual procedural rights and duties of persons within the State. Because state-created liberty interests are entitled to the protection of the federal Due Process Clause, see, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, supra, at 488; Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, at 7, the full scope of a patient’s due process rights may depend in part on the substantive liberty interests created by state as well as federal law. Moreover, a State may confer procedural protections of liberty interests that extend beyond those minimally required by the Constitution of the United States. If a State does so, the minimal requirements of the Federal Constitution would not be controlling, and would not need to be identified in order to determine the legal rights and duties of persons within that State. B Roughly five months after the Court of Appeals decided this case, and shortly after this Court granted certiorari, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts announced its decision in Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N. E. 2d 40 (1981) (Roe). Roe involved the right of a noninstitutional-ized but mentally incompetent person to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Expressly resting its decision on the common law of Massachusetts as well as on the Federal Constitution, Massachusetts’ highest court held in Roe that a person has a protected liberty interest in “ ‘decid[ing] for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs.’” Id., at 433, n. 9, 421 N. E. 2d, at 51, n. 9. The court found — again apparently on the basis of the common law of Massachusetts as well as the Constitution of the United States — that this interest of the individual is of such importance that it can be overcome only by “an overwhelming State interest.” Id., at 434, 421 N. E. 2d, at 51. Roe further held that a person does not forfeit his protected liberty interest by virtue of becoming incompetent, but rather remains entitled to have his “substituted judgment” exercised on his behalf. Ibid. Defining this “substituted judgment” as one for which “[n]o medical expertise is required,” id., at 435, 421 N. E. 2d, at 52, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court required a judicial determination of substituted judgment before drugs could be administered in a particular instance, except possibly in cases of medical emergency. C The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that its decision was limited to cases involving noninstitutionalized mental patients. See id., at 417, 441, 452-453, 421 N. E. 2d, at 42, 55, 61-62. Nonetheless, respondents have argued in this Court that Roe may influence the correct disposition of the case at hand. We agree. Especially in the wake of Roe, it is distinctly possible that Massachusetts recognizes liberty interests of persons adjudged incompetent that are broader than those protected directly by the Constitution of the United States. Compare Roe, supra, at 434, 421 N. E. 2d, at 51 (protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted treatment continues even when a person becomes incompetent and creates a right of incompetents to have their “substituted judgment” determined), with Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 429-430 (1979) (because a person “who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness” is not “wholly at liberty,” and because the complexities of psychiatric diagnosis “render certainties virtually beyond reach,” “practical considerations” may require “a compromise between what it is possible to prove and what protects the rights of the individual”). If the state interest is broader, the substantive protection that the Constitution affords against the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs would not determine the actual substantive rights and duties of persons in the State of Massachusetts. Procedurally, it also is quite possible that a Massachusetts court, as a matter of state law, would require greater protection of relevant liberty interests than the minimum adequate to survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Compare Roe, supra, at 434, 421 N. E. 2d, at 51 (“We have... stated our preference for judicial resolution of certain legal issues arising from proposed extraordinary medical treatment...”), with Youngberg v. Romeo, post, at 322-323 (“[T]here certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making [treatment] decisions”), and with Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S., at 608, n. 16 (Courts must not “unduly burde[n] the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult social problems. The judicial model for factfinding for all constitutionally protected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn rational decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise”). Again on this hypothesis state law would be dispositive of the procedural rights and duties of the parties to this case. Finally, even if state procedural law itself remains unchanged by Roe, the federally mandated procedures will depend on the nature and weight of the state interests, as well as the individual interests, that are asserted. To identify the nature and scope of state interests that are to be balanced against an individual’s liberty interests, this Court may look to state law. See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 148, and n. 42, 151, and nn. 48-50; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 661-663 (1977). Here we view the underlying state-law predicate for weighing asserted state interests as being put into doubt, if not altered, by Roe. D It is unclear on the record presented whether respondents, in the District Court, did or did not argue the existence of “substantive” state-law liberty interests as a basis for their claim to procedural protection under the federal Due Process Clause, or whether they may have claimed state-law procedural protections for substantive federal interests. In their brief in this Court, however, respondents clearly assert state-law arguments as alternative grounds for affirming both the “substantive” and “procedural” decisions of the Court of Appeals. See Brief for Respondents, especially at 61, 71-72, 92-95. Until certain questions have been answered, we think it would be inappropriate for us to attempt to weigh or even to identify relevant liberty interests that might be derived directly from the Constitution, independently of state law. It is this Court’s settled policy to avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional issues. See, e. g., City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 294 (1982); New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582-583, n. 22 (1979); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 502-509 (1961); Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 347-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J:, concurring). This policy is supported, although not always required, by the prohibition against advisory opinions. Cf. United States v. Hastings, 296 U. S. 188, 193 (1935) (review of one basis for a decision supported by another basis not subject to examination would represent “an expression of an abstract opinion”). In applying this policy of restraint, we are uncertain here which if any constitutional issues now must be decided to resolve the controversy between the parties. In the wake of Roe, we cannot say with confidence that adjudication based solely on identification of federal constitutional interests would determine the actual rights and duties of the parties before us. And, as an additional cause for hesitation, our reading of the opinion of the Court of Appeals has left us in doubt as to the extent to which state issues were argued below and the degree to which the court’s holdings may rest on subsequently altered state-law foundations. Because of its greater familiarity both with the record and with Massachusetts law, the Court of Appeals is better situated than we to determine how Roe may have changed the law of Massachusetts and how any changes may affect this case. Accordingly, we think it appropriate for the Court of Appeals to determine in the first instance whether Roe requires revision of its holdings or whether it may call for the certification of potentially dispositive state-law questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 150-151 (1976). The Court of Appeals also may consider whether this is a case in which abstention now is appropriate. See generally Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 813-819 (1976). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. As used in this litigation, the term “antipsychotic drugs” refers to medications such as Thorazine, Mellaril, Prolixin, and Haldol that are used in treating psychoses, especially schizophrenia. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342,1359-1360 (Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 634 F. 2d 650, 653 (CA1 1980). Sometimes called “major tranquilizers,” these compounds were introduced into psychiatry in the early 1950’s. See Cole & Davis, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 2 A. Freedman, H. Kaplan, & B. Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry II, pp. 1921-1922 (2d ed. 1975). It is not disputed that such drugs are “mind-altering.” Their effectiveness resides in their capacity to achieve such effects. Citing authorities, petitioners assert that such drugs are essential not only to the treatment of individual disorders, but also to the preservation of institutional order generally needed for effective therapy. See Brief for Petitioners 17 — 41, 54-100. Respondents dispute this claim, also with support from medical authorities. Respondents also emphasize that antipsychotic drugs carry a significant risk of adverse side effects. These include such neurological syndromes as parkinsonisms, characterized by a mask-like face, retarded volitional movements, and tremors; akathisia, a clinical term for restlessness; dystonic reactions, including grimacing and muscle spasms; and tardive dyskinesia, a disease characterized in its mild form by involuntary muscle movements, especially around the mouth. Tardive dyskinesia can be even more disabling in its most severe forms. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp., at 1360; Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in L. Goodman & A. Gilman, The Pharmalogical Basis of Therapeutics 152, 169 (5th ed. 1975). The respondents also presented constitutional and statutory challenges to a hospital policy of secluding patients against their will. 478 F. Supp., at 1352. Their complaint additionally asserted claims for damages under state tort law. Id., at 1352,1383. The District Court held that state law prevented seclusion except where necessary to prevent violence. See id., at 1371, 1374. Neither this decision, nor the denial of relief on the damages claims, is in issue before this Court. The District Court characterized liberty to make “the intimate decision as to whether to accept or refuse [antipsychotic] medication” as “basic to any right of privacy” and therefore protected by the Constitution. See id., at 1366. The court did not derive this right from any particular constitutional provision, although it did observe that the “concept of a right of privacy... embodies First Amendment concerns.” Ibid. In relying on the First Amendment the court reasoned that “the power to produce ideas is fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and is entitled to comparable constitutional protection.” Id., at 1367. Under the common law of torts, the right to refuse any medical treatment emerged from the doctrines of trespass and battery, which were applied to unauthorized touchings by a physician. See, e. g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-739, 370 N. E. 2d 417, 424 (1977); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 18 (4th ed. 1971). In this case the petitioners had argued — as they continue to argue — that the judicial commitment proceedings conducted under Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 123 (West Supp. 1982-1983), provide a determination of incompetency sufficient to warrant the State in providing treatment over the objections of the patient. In rejecting this argument as a matter of state law, the District Court relied principally on the language of the relevant Massachusetts statutes and on the regulations of the Department of Mental Health. See 478 F. Supp., at 1359, 1361 (citing Department of Mental Health Regulation §221.02 (“No person shall be deprived of the right to manage his affairs... solely by reason of his admission or commitment to a facility except where there has been an adjudication that such person is incompetent”), and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 123, § 25 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (“No person shall be deemed to be incompetent to manage his affairs... solely by reason of his admission or commitment in any capacity...”)). The court also appears to have engaged in independent factfinding leading to the same conclusion: “The weight of the evidence persuades this court that, although committed mental patients do suffer at least some impairment of their relationship to reality, most are able to appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that may reasonably be expected from receiving psychotropic medication.” 478 F. Supp., at 1361. The District Court defined an emergency as a situation in which failure to medicate “would result in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to th[e] patient, other patients, orto staffmembers of the institution.” Id., at 1365. The Court of Appeals termed it “intuitively obvious” that “a person has a constitutionally protected interest in being left free by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs.” 634 F. 2d, at 653. Although the Court of Appeals found that the “precise textual source in the Constitution for the protection of this interest is unclear,” ibid,., it concluded that “a source in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the protection of this interest exists, most likely as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal security.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to examine the conclusion of the District Court that First Amendment interests also were implicated. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in requiring what it construed as an overly simplistic mathematical calculation of the “quantitative” likelihood of harm. See id., at 656. It asserted, apparently as a minimum, that “the determination that medication is necessary must be made by a qualified physician as to each individual patient to be medicated.” Ibid. A number of other States also distinguish between the standards governing involuntary commitment and those applying to determinations of incompetency to make treatment decisions. For a survey as of December 1, 1977, see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients’ Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 461, 504-525 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that civil commitment does not raise even a presumption of incompetence. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F. 2d 65 (1971). In imposing this “substituted judgment” standard the Court of Appeals appears to have viewed its holding as mandated by the Federal Constitution. See 634 F. 2d, at 661 (“In so holding, we do not imply that the Constitution...”). But it followed its ultimate substantive conclusion with a citation to a Massachusetts case: “Cf. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,” 373 Mass. 728, 370 N. E. 2d 417 (1977). Saikeivicz held that a court must apply the “substituted judgment” standard in determining whether to approve painful medical treatment for a profoundly retarded man incapable of giving informed consent. In Saikeivicz the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court appears to have relied on both the Federal Constitution and the law of Massachusetts to support its decision. See id., at 738-741, 370 N. E. 2d, at 424-425. But the Massachusetts court characterized its analysis as having identified a “constitutional right of privacy,” id., at 739, 370 N. E. 2d, at 424, thus creating some doubt as to the extent that the decision had an independent state-law basis. The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with the District Court that this determination, under Massachusetts law, would require a decision by the probate court under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 123, §25 (West Supp. 1982-1983); see ch. 201, §§ 1, 6,12 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (appointment and powers of guardians). It suggested, however, that nonjudicial procedures would satisfy the federal constitutional requirements of due process. See 634 F. 2d, at 659-660. The Court of Appeals again instructed the District Court to develop procedural safeguards adequate to protect the patient’s substantive interests. See id., at 661. Constitutional questions involving the rights of committed mental pa.tients to refuse antipsychotic drugs have been presented in other recent cases, including Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836 (CA3 1981), and Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (ND Ohio 1980). On the issues raised, see generally Plotkin, supra; Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 237 (1974). Pet. for Cert. 1. In this Court petitioners appear to concede that involuntarily committed mental patients have a constitutional interest in freedom from bodily invasion, see Brief for Petitioners 43-47, but they deny that this interest is “fundamental.” They also assert that it is outweighed in an appropriate balancing test by compelling state interests in administering antipsychotic drugs. Id., at 54-68. As do the parties, we assume for purposes of this discussion that involuntarily committed mental patients do retain liberty interests protected directly by the Constitution, cf. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), and that these interests are implicated by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs. Only “assuming” the existence of such interests, we of course intimate no view as to the weight of such interests in comparison with possible countervailing state interests. See 383 Mass., at 417, and n. 1, 433, n. 9, 421 N. E. 2d, at 42, and n. 1, 51, n. 9. Although the Massachusetts court quoted this formulation from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Rogers v. Okin, 634 F. 2d, at 653, the quotation is used to define the right, rather than to identify its legal source. Roe noted that Rogers v. Okin found the source of this right in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court continued its discussion by stating its reliance on three bases, two of them not cited in Rogers v. Okin: the “inherent power of the court to prevent mistakes or abuses by guardians, whose authority comes from the Commonwealth,” and the “common law” right of persons to decide what will be done with their bodies. 383 Mass., at 433, n. 9, 421 N. E. 2d, at 51, n. 9. See id., at 435, 421 N. E. 2d, at 52: “The determination of what the incompetent individual would do if competent will probe the incompetent individual’s values and preferences, and such an inquiry, in a case involving antipsychotic drugs [and a noninstitu-tionalized but incompetent patient], is best made in courts of competent jurisdiction.” Having held that a “ward possesses but is incapable of exercising personally” the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, the Massachusetts Supreme Court viewed the “primary dispute” as over “who ought to exercise this right on behalf of the ward.” Id., at 433, 421 N. E. 2d, at 51. The Supreme Judicial Court in Roe identified six “relevant” but “not exclusive” factors that should guide the decisions of the lower courts: “(1) the ward’s expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his religious beliefs; (3) the impact upon the ward’s family; (4) the probability of adverse side effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and (6) the prognosis with treatment.” Id., at 444, 421 N. E. 2d, at 57. It emphasized that the determination “must ‘give the fullest possible expression to the character and circumstances’ ” of the individual patient and that “this is a subjective rather than an objective determination.” Id., at 444, 421 N. E. 2d, at 56 (citation and footnote omitted). See id., at 440-441	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS et al. No. 85-792. Argued November 10, 1986 Decided June 8, 1987 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’ConnoR, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 287. Henri F. Rush argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-792. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Robert S. Burk, and Sidney L. Strickland, Jr. Joseph L. Manson III, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-793. With him on the briefs was Michael E. Roper. Harold A. Ross argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers in both cases. John O’B. Clarke, Jr., argued the cause for respondent United Transportation Union in both cases. With him on the brief was Robert L. Hart. Charles A. Miller, Gregg H. Levy, and Mark B. Goodwin filed a brief for respondents Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al. Together with No. 85-793, Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Richard T. Comvay, William F. Sheehan, and Kenneth P. Kolson filed a brief for the Association of American Railroads et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. On September 15, 1980, Union Pacific Railroad Co. (UP) and Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (MP) and their respective corporate parents filed a joint application with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) seeking permission for UP to acquire control of MP. The same day, a similar but separate application was jointly filed by UP and the Western Pacific Railroad Co. (WP). In a consolidated proceeding, the control applications were opposed by a number of labor organizations, including respondents Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) and United Transportation Union (UTU), as well as several competing railroads, including petitioner Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. (MKT) and the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. (DRGW). MKT and DRGW, in addition to opposing the mergers, filed responsive applications seeking the right to conduct operations using the track of the new consolidated carrier in the event that the control applications were approved. MKT’s request for trackage rights specified that “MKT, with its own employees, and at its sole cost and expense, shall operate its engines, cars and trains on and along Joint Track.” Proposed Trackage Rights Agreement § 5, Finance Docket No. 30,000 (Sub.-No. 25). DRGW’s application indicated that it “may, at its option, elect to employ its own crews for the movement of its trains, locomotives and cars to points on or over the Joint Track.” Proposed Track-age Rights Agreement § 6(c)(3), Finance Docket No. 30,000 (Sub.-No. 18). On October 20, 1982, the ICC approved UP’s control acquisitions and granted MKT’s application for trackage rights over 200 miles of MP and UP track in four States and DRGW’s application for rights over 619 miles of MP track between Pueblo and Kansas City. See Union Pacific Corp., Pacific Rail System, Inc. & Union Pacific R. Co.—Control—Missouri Pacific Corp. & Missouri Pacific R. Co., 366 I. C. C. 459 (1982), aff’d sub nom. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. ICC, 237 U. S. App. D. C. 99, 736 F. 2d 708 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1208 (1985). The approved trackage rights were to become effective “immediately upon consummation of the consolidations.” 366 I. C. C., at 590. It is the Commission’s standard practice, in pursuit of its statutory responsibility to shield railroad employees from dislocations resulting from actions that it approves, see 49 U. S. C. § 11347, to impose on trackage rights transactions a set of employee protections known as the “NW-BN-Mendocino” conditions. See Norfolk and Western R. Co.—Trackage Rights—Burlington Northern, Inc., 354 I. C. C. 605 (1978), modified, Mendocino Coast R. Co.—Lease and Operate—California Western R. Co., 360 I. C. C. 653 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. United States, 219 U. S. App. D. C. 23, 675 F. 2d 1248 (1982). These provide, inter alia, for “the selection of forces from all employees involved,” 354 I. C. C., at 610, in transactions involving the dismissal or displacement of employees, and for retention of “[t]he rates of pay, rules, working conditions and all collective bargaining and other rights, privileges and benefits... unless changed by future collective bargaining agreements or applicable statutes.” Ibid. The ICC’s October 20, 1982, order indicated, without discussion, that approval of the trackage rights applications was “subject to the imposition of employee protective conditions to the extent specified in [NW-BN and Mendocino].” 366 I. C. C., at 654. See also id., at 471, 622. The control transactions among UP, MP, and WP were consummated on December 22, 1982, at which point the grants of trackage rights also became effective. MKT commenced its operations, using its own crews, on or about January 6, 1983; and DRGW shortly thereafter entered into an agreement with MP providing “for using MP crews on [DRGW] trains for a temporary, interim period, after which [DRGW] will operate the trains with [its] own crews.” App. in Nos. 83-2290 and 83-2317 (CADC), p. 6. Although numerous parties, including BLE, had petitioned for review of the Commission’s October 20, 1982, order (which was affirmed in most respects some 18 months later, see Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. ICC, supra), no question concerning the crewing of MKT or DRGW trains was raised at that time. However, on April 4, 1983, BLE filed with the Commission a “Petition for Clarification,” contending that the Commission had no jurisdiction to, and as a matter of consistent practice did not, inject itself into labor matters such as crew selection, and asking the Commission to declare that its October 20, 1982, order did not have the intent or effect of authorizing the tenant carriers to use their own crews on routes that they had not previously served. In a brief order served May 18, 1983, the Commission denied the petition, ruling that its prior decision “does not require clarification.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-793, p. A38. The tenant railroads, it said, had proposed to use their own crews in their trackage rights applications, and “our approval of the applications authorizes such operations.” Ibid. Within the period prescribed by Commission rules for filing petitions for administrative review, see 49 CFR § 1115.3(e) (1986), both BLE and UTU sought “reconsideration” of the Commission’s denial. In addition to repeating BLE’s earlier arguments, the unions contended that the tenant railroads’ crewing procedures constituted a unilateral change in working conditions forbidden by the NW-BN-Mendocino labor protective conditions, by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (RLA), and by collective-bargaining agreements, and that the Commission had made no findings that would justify exempting the trackage rights transactions from applicable labor laws. In a lengthy order served on October 25, 1983, responding in some detail to all of the major contentions, the Commission denied the petitions. In particular, the Commission emphasized its reliance on 49 U. S. C. § 11341(a), which provides that a carrier participating in a consolidation approved by the Commission “is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law... as necessary to let that person carry out the transaction....” The Commission concluded that the exemption provided by this section extends to the RLA and is self-executing, requiring no findings by the Commission to make it effective. On December 16, 1983, BLE petitioned for judicial review of the May 18, 1983, and October 25, 1983, orders; UTU petitioned for review of the latter order on December 23, 1983. The cases were consolidated, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated both orders. 245 U. S. App. D. C. 311, 761 F. 2d 714 (1985). The court rejected the threshold claim that the appeals were time barred, and concluded on the merits that if the ICC intended to exempt the railroads from the requirements of the RLA, it was required to explain, as it had not done, why that exemption was necessary to effectuate the transactions it approved. The dissent disagreed on both counts. MKT and the Commission filed petitions for certiorari on the question of the proper construction of § 11841(a), which we granted and consolidated for argument. See 475 U. S. 1081 (1986). We now conclude that the petitions for review must be dismissed. I The petitions for review and the Court of Appeals’ order encompass both the May 18, 1983, order refusing to clarify the Commission’s prior approval order, and the October 25, 1983, order refusing to reconsider that refusal to clarify. We consider first the appeal of the latter order. With certain exceptions not relevant here, see 28 U. S. C. § 1336(b), judicial review of final orders of the ICC is governed by the Hobbs Act, 28 U. S. C. §2341 et seq., which provides that any party aggrieved by a “final order” of the Commission “may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.” §2344. A Commission order in a rail proceeding is “final on the date on which it is served.” 49 U. S. C. §10327(i). The Commission’s order refusing to reconsider its refusal to clarify thus became final on October 25, 1983, and the unions’ petitions for review — filed on December 16, 1983, and December 23, 1983 — were therefore timely for purposes of reviewing that order (though they obviously were not timely for purposes of reviewing the original order of October 20, 1982). However, although the timeliness requirements of the Hobbs Act were satisfied, the order from which the unions have appealed is unreviewable. The Commission’s authority to reopen and reconsider its prior actions stems from 49 U. S. C. § 10327(g), which provides: “The Commission may, at any time on its own initiative because of material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances— “(A) reopen a proceeding; “(B) grant rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of an action of the Commission; and “(C) change an action of the Commission. “An interested party may petition to reopen and reconsider an action of the Commission under this paragraph under regulations of the Commission.” When the Commission reopens a proceeding for any reason and, after reconsideration, issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties, that order — even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order — is re viewable on its merits. See, e. g., United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U. S. 424 (1947). Where, however, the Commission refuses to reopen a proceeding, what is reviewable is merely the lawfulness of the refusal. Absent some provision of law requiring a reopening (which is not asserted to exist here), the basis for challenge must be that the refusal to reopen was “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” 5 U. S. C. §706 (2)(A). We have said that overturning the refusal to reopen requires “a showing of the clearest abuse of discretion,” United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U. S. 515, 534-535 (1946), and we have actually reversed the ICC only once, see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 (1932), in a decision that was “promptly restricted... to its special facts,... and... stands virtually alone.” ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503, 515 (1944). See also Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 295-296 (1974). More importantly for present purposes, all of our cases entertaining review of a refusal to reopen appear to have involved petitions alleging “new evidence” or “changed circumstances” that rendered the agency’s original order inappropriate. See id., at 295, and cases cited therein; Jersey City, supra, at 514-518, and cases cited therein. We know of no case in which we have reviewed the denial of a petition to reopen based upon no more than “material error” in the original agency decision. There is good reason for distinguishing between the two. If review of denial to reopen for new evidence or changed circumstances is unavailable, the petitioner will have been deprived of all opportunity for judicial consideration-even on a “clearest abuse of discretion” basis — of facts which, through no fault of his own, the original proceeding did not contain. By contrast, where no new data but only “material error” has been put forward as the basis for reopening, an appeal places before the courts precisely the same substance that could have been brought there by appeal from the original order — but asks them to review it on the strange, one-step-removed basis of whether the agency decision is not only unlawful, but so unlawful that the refusal to reconsider it is an abuse of discretion. Such an appeal serves no purpose whatever where a petition for reconsideration has been filed within a discretionary review period specifically provided by the agency (and within the period allotted for judicial review of the original order), since in that situation the petition tolls the period for judicial review of the original order, which can therefore be appealed to the courts directly after the petition for reconsideration is denied. And where the petition is filed outside that period (and outside the period for judicial review of the original order) judicial review would serve only the peculiar purpose of extending indefinitely the time within which seriously mistaken agency orders can be judicially overturned. That is to say, the Hobbs Act’s 60-day limitation provision would effectively be subjected to a proviso that reads: “Provided, however, that if the agency error is so egregious that refusal to correct it would be an abuse of discretion, judicial review may be sought at any time.” For these reasons, we agree with the conclusion reached in an earlier case by the Court of Appeals that, where a party petitions an agency for reconsideration on the ground of “material error,” i. e., on the same record that was before the agency when it rendered its original decision, “an order which merely denies rehearing of... [the prior] order is not itself reviewable.” Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 169 U. S. App. D. C. 154, 156, n. 7, 515 F. 2d 385, 387, n. 7 (1974). See also SEC v. Louisiana Public Service Comm’n, 353 U. S. 368, 371-372 (1957); National Bank of Davis v. Comptroller of Currency, 233 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 285, and n. 3, 725 F. 2d 1390, 1391, and n. 3 (1984); 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2). This rule is familiar from other contexts. If a judicial panel or an en banc court denies rehearing, no one supposes that that denial, as opposed to the panel opinion, is an appealable action (though the filing of a timely rehearing petition, like the filing of a timely petition for agency reconsideration, extends the time for appealing from the original decision). It is irrelevant that the Commission’s order refusing reconsideration discussed the merits of the unions’ claims at length. Where the Commission’s formal disposition is to deny reconsideration, and where it makes no alteration in the underlying order, we will not undertake an inquiry into whether reconsideration “in fact” occurred. In a sense, of course, it always occurs, since one cannot intelligently rule upon a petition to reconsider without reflecting upon, among other things, whether clear error was shown. It would hardly be sensible to say that the Commission can genuinely deny reconsideration only when it gives the matter no thought; nor to say that the character of its action (as grant or denial) depends upon whether it chooses to disclose its reasoning. Rather, it is the Commission’s formal action, rather than its discussion, that is dispositive. Accordingly, the petitions for review of the Commission’s October 25, 1983, order refusing to reconsider its May 18, 1983, refusal to clarify should have been dismissed. That portion of the concurrence which deals with the issue of jurisdiction (Part I) consists largely of the citation and discussion of numerous cases affording judicial review of agency refusals to reopen. In the third from last paragraph, however, one finds the acknowledgment that all these cases involved refusals “based upon new evidence or changed circumstances” rather than upon “material error,” post, at 293-294, and are therefore fully in accord with the principle set forth in the present opinion. The only point of dispute between this opinion and the concurrence is whether separate treatment of refusals to reopen based on material error has some basis in statute or is rather, as the concurrence would have it, “a pure creature of judicial invention.” Post, at 294. Even if our search for statutory authorization were limited to the text of the Hobbs Act, it seems to us not inventiveness but the most plebeian statutory construction to find implicit in the 60-day limit upon judicial review a prohibition against the agency’s permitting, or a litigant’s achieving, perpetual availability of review by the mere device of filing a suggestion that the agency has made a mistake and should consider the matter again. Substantial disregard of the Hobbs Act is effected, not by our opinion, but by what the concurrence delivers (after having rejected our views) in Part II of its opinion: on-the-merits review of an agency decision of law rendered 14 months before the petition for review was filed, using the same standard of review that would have been applied had appeal been filed within the congressionally prescribed 60-day period. Statutory authority for preventing this untoward result need not be sought solely in the Hobbs Act, however. While the Hobbs Act specifies the form of proceeding for judicial review of ICC orders, see 5 U. S. C. § 703, it is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that codifies the nature and attributes of judicial review, including the traditional principle of its unavailability “to the extent that... agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. §701 (a)(2). We have recently had occasion to apply this limitation to the general grant of jurisdiction contained in 28 U. S. C. § 1331, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985); it applies to the general grant of jurisdiction of the Hobbs Act as well. In Chaney we found that the type of agency decision in question “has traditionally been ‘committed to agency discretion,’ and... that the Congress enacting the APA did not intend to alter that tradition.” Id., at 832. As discussed above, we perceive that a similar tradition of non-reviewability exists with regard to refusals to reconsider for material error, by agencies as by lower courts; and we believe that to be another tradition that 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2) was meant to preserve. We are confirmed in that view by the impossibility of devising an adequate standard of review for such agency action. One is driven either to apply the ordinary standards for reviewing errors of fact or law (in which event the time limitation of the Hobbs Act — or whatever other time limitation applies to the particular case — will be entirely frustrated); or else to adopt some “clearly erroneous” standard (which produces the strange result that only really bad mistakes escape the time limitation — whatever “really bad” might mean in this context where great deference is already accorded to agency action). The concurrence chooses to impale itself upon the first horn of this dilemma. The concurrence’s effort to bring SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947), into the present discussion is misguided. That case pertains to the basis that a court may use for the affirmance of agency action that is reviewable. (It may not affirm on a basis containing any element of discretion-including discretion to find facts and interpret statutory ambiguities — that is not the basis the agency used, since that would remove the discretionary judgment from the agency to the court.) Chenery has nothing whatever to do with whether agency action is reviewable. It does not establish, as the concurrence evidently believes, the principle that if the agency gives a “reviewable” reason for otherwise unreviewable action, the action becomes reviewable. To demonstrate the falsity of that proposition it is enough to observe that a common reason for failure to prosecute an alleged criminal violation is the prosecutor’s belief (sometimes publicly stated) that the law will not sustain a conviction. That is surely an eminently “reviewable” proposition, in the sense that courts are well qualified to consider the point; yet it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review. Finally, we may note that the concurrence’s solution to review of denials of reconsideration, in addition to nullifying limitation periods, is simply not workable (or not workable on any basis the concurrence has explained) in the vast majority of cases. The concurrence reviews the Commission’s stated conclusions regarding 49 U. S. C. § 11341 on the usual basis applicable to agency conclusions of law, and reviews the Commission’s stated refusal to consider the newly raised (though previously available) issue of RLA crewing rights on an “abuse of discretion” standard. The vast majority of denials of reconsideration, however, are made without statement of reasons, since 5 U. S. C. § 555(e) exempts from the normal APA requirement of “a brief statement of the grounds for denial” agency action that consists of “affirming a prior denial.” One wonders how, in this more normal context, the concurrence would go about determining what answer Chenery supplies to the question of reviewability — and, if the answer permits review, what standard to apply. Under the proper analysis, the solution is clear: If the petition that was denied sought reopening on the basis of new evidence or changed circumstances review is available and abuse of discretion is the standard; otherwise, the agency’s refusal to go back over ploughed ground is nonreviewable. rH HH There remains BLE’s appeal from the May 18, 1983, order denying its petition for clarification. While the petition for review was filed more than 60 days after that order was served, we conclude that it was nonetheless effective, because the timely petition for administrative reconsideration stayed the running of the Hobbs Act’s limitation period until the petition had been acted upon by the Commission. A contrary conclusion is admittedly suggested by the language of the Hobbs Act and of 49 U. S. C. §10327(i), which provides that, “Notwithstanding” the provision authorizing the Commission to reopen and reconsider its orders (§ 10327(g)), “an action of the Commission... is final on the date on which it is served, and a civil action to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside the action may be filed after that date.” This would seem to mean that the pendency of reconsideration motions does not render Commission orders nonfinal for purposes of triggering the Hobbs Act limitations period. The same argument could be made, however, with respect to a similar provision of the APA, 5 U. S. C. §704, which reads in relevant part: “Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section [entitled ‘Actions Reviewable’] whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for... any form of reconsider-ations, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.” That language has long been construed by this and other courts merely to relieve parties from the requirement of petitioning for rehearing before seeking judicial review (unless, of course, specifically required to do so by statute — see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§717r, 3416(a)), but not to prevent petitions for reconsideration that are actually filed from rendering the orders under reconsideration nonfinal. See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U. S. 532, 541 (1970) (dictum); CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U. S. 316, 326-327 (1961) (dictum); id., at 339-343 (Whittaker, J., dissenting); Outland v. CAB, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93, 284 F. 2d 224, 227 (1960). We can find no basis for distinguishing the language of § 10327(f) from that of § 704. The appeal from the denial of clarification was therefore timely. As with the Commission’s denial of reconsideration, however, its denial of clarification was not an appealable order. If BLE’s motion is treated as a genuine “Petition for Clarification” —! e., as seeking nothing more than specification, one way or the other, of what the original order meant with regard to crewing rights — then the denial is unappealable because BLE was not “aggrieved” by it within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. BLE could have been aggrieved by a refusal to clarify in this narrow sense only if the refusal left it uncertain as to the Commission’s view of its rights or obligations, which plainly was not the case. Though the May 18, 1983, order denied the petition for clarification, the text of the denial made it unmistakably clear that the Commission interpreted the October 20, 1982, order as authorizing MKT and DRGW to use their own crews. BLE could, of course, disagree with that construction, but it could hardly complain that the clarification it sought had not been provided. In fact, however, we think that BLE’s petition was understood by all of the parties to be in effect a petition to reopen. BLE did not merely ask the Commission for clarification; it asked for clarification “in the manner set forth [in the petition],” App. in Nos. 83-2290 and 83-2317 (CADC), p. 5, %. e., for “clarification” that the October 20, 1982, order meant what the unions believed it to mean. Most precisely described, the petition sought, in the alternative, clarification or (in the event clarification would be contrary to the union’s interpretation) reopening of the earlier order. Even when the petition is viewed as a petition to reopen, however, the Commission’s denial is no more reviewable than is its denial of the petitions for reconsideration discussed earlier. BLE brought forth no new evidence or changed circumstances; it merely urged the Commission to correct what BLE thought to be a serious error of law. That should have been sought many months earlier, by an appeal from the original order. We are not prepared to acknowledge an exception to that requirement where an order is ambiguous, so that a party might think that its interests are not infringed. The remedy for such ambiguity is to petition the Commission for reconsideration within the 60-day period, enabling judicial review to be pursued (if Commission resolution of the ambiguity is adverse) after disposition of that petition. Otherwise, the time limits of the Hobbs Act would be held hostage to ever-present ambiguities. If, of course, the ICC’s action here had gone beyond what was (at most) clarification of an ambiguity, and in the guise of interpreting the original order in fact revised it, that would have been a new order immediately ap-pealable. It is impossible to make such a contention here. It was, at the very most, arguable that the Commission’s routine reference to the general NW-BN-Mendocino conditions was meant to cause those conditions to supersede, in the event of conflict, the specific terms of the trackage rights applications that the Commission generally approved — and also far from certain that any conflict between the two existed, since it was unclear whether the protective conditions extended to the situation in which the landlord and tenant railroads conduct no joint operations and the tenant carries only traffic for its own account. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. Vacated and remanded. Ordinarily, a petition for relief from a final order is denominated a “petition to reopen.” See 49 CFR §§ 1115.3(a), 1115.4 (1986). A Commission rule, however, permits parties to “see[k] relief not provided for in any other rule,” 49 CFR § 1117.1 (1986), including clarification of the terms of a prior order. See Burlington Northern Inc. v. United States, 459 U. S. 131, 136 (1982). The ICC’s regulations, for example, provide as follows: “(a) A discretionary appeal is permitted. It will be designated a ‘petition for administrative	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 65 ]	sc_adminaction
RED LION BROADCASTING CO., INC., et al. v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. No. 2. Argued April 2-3, 1969. Decided June 9, 1969. Roger Robb argued the cause for petitioners in No. 2. With him on the brief were H. Donald Kistler and Thomas B. Sweeney. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States and the Federal Communications Commission, petitioners in No. 717 and respondents in No. 2. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Deputy Solicitor General Springer, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Henry Getter, and Daniel R. Ohlbaum. Archibald Cox argued the cause for respondents in No. 717. With him on the brief for respondents Radio Television News Directors Assn, et al. were W. Theodore Pierson, Harold David Cohen, Vernon C. Kohlhaas, and J. Laurent ScharjJ. On the brief for respondent National Broadcasting Co., Inc., were Lawrence J. McKay, Raymond L. Falls, Jr., Corydon B. Dunham, Howard Mon-derer, and Abraham P. Ordover. On the brief for respondent Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., were Lloyd N. Cutler, J. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk, Robert V. Evans, and Herbert Wechsler. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 717 and affirmance in No. 2 were filed by Melvin L. Wulf and Eleanor Holmes Norton for the American Civil Liberties Union, and by Earle K. Moore and William B. Ball for the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ et al. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations urging reversal in No. 717. Together with No. 717, United States et al. v. Radio Television News Directors Assn. et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued April 3, 1969. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Communications Commission has for many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage. This is known as the fairness doctrine, which originated very early in the history of broadcasting and has maintained its present outlines for some time. It is an obligation whose content has been defined in a long series of FCC rulings in particular cases, and which is distinct from the statutory requirement of § 315 of the Communications Act that equal time be allotted all qualified candidates for public office. Two aspects of the fairness doctrine, relating to personal attacks in the context of controversial public issues and to political editorializing, were codified more precisely in the form of FCC regulations in 1967. The two cases before us now, which were decided separately below, challenge the constitutional and statutory bases of the doctrine and component rules. Red Lion involves the application of the fairness doctrine to a particular broadcast, and RTNDA arises as an action to review the FCC’s 1967 promulgation of the personal attack and political editorializing regulations, which were laid down after the Red Lion litigation had begun. I. A. The Red Lion Broadcasting Company is licensed to operate a Pennsylvania radio station, WGCB. On November 27, 1964, WGCB carried a 15-minute broadcast by the Reverend Billy James Hargis as part of a “Christian Crusade” series. A book by Fred J. Cook entitled “Goldwater — Extremist on the Right” was discussed by Hargis, who said that Cook had been fired by a newspaper for making false charges against city officials; that Cook had then worked for a Communist-affiliated publication; that he had defended Alger Hiss and attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the Central Intelligence Agency; and that he had now written a “book to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater.” When Cook heard of the broadcast he concluded that he had been personally attacked and demanded free reply time, which the station refused. After an exchange of letters among Cook, Red Lion, and the FCC, the FCC declared that the Hargis broadcast constituted a personal attack on Cook; that Red Lion had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness doctrine as expressed in Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 (1962), to send a tape, transcript, or summary of the broadcast to Cook and offer him reply time; and that the station must provide reply time whether or not Cook would pay for it. On review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the FCC’s position was upheld as constitutional and otherwise proper. 127 U. S. App. D. C. 129, 381 F. 2d 908 (1967). B. Not long after the Red Lion litigation was begun, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 31 Fed. Reg. 5710, with an eye to making the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and more readily enforceable, and to specifying its rules relating to political editorials. After considering written comments supporting and opposing the rules, the FCC adopted them substantially as proposed, 32 Fed. Reg. 10303. Twice amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 11531, 33 Fed. Reg. 5362, the rules were held unconstitutional in the RTNDA litigation by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on review of the rule-making proceeding, as abridging the freedoms of speech and press. 400 F. 2d 1002 (1968). As they now stand amended, the regulations read as follows: “Personal attacks; political editorials. “(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee’s facilities. “(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable (1) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal attacks which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (3) to bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee). “Note: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming within [ (3)], above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable in the general area of political broadcasts [(2)], above. See, section 315 fa) of the Act, 47 U. S. C. 315 (a); Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Dandling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance. 29 F. R. 10415. The categories listed in [(3)] are the same as those specified in section 315 (a) of the Act. “(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification of the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the candidate to respond over the licensee’s facilities: Provided, however, That where such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph sufficiently far in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and to present it in a timely fashion.” 47 CFR §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (all identical). C. Believing that the specific application of the fairness doctrine in Red Lion, and the promulgation of the regulations in RTNDA, are both authorized by Congress and enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment, we hold them valid and constitutional, reversing the judgment below in RTNDA and affirming the judgment below in Red Lion. II. The history of the emergence of the fairness doctrine and of the related legislation shows that the Commission’s action in the Red Lion case did not exceed its authority, and that in adopting the new regulations the Commission was implementing congressional policy rather than embarking on a frolic of its own. A. Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacaphony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard. Consequently, the Federal Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies among competing applicants in a manner responsive to the public “convenience, interest, or necessity.” Very shortly thereafter the Commission expressed its view that the “public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views, and the commission believes that the principle applies... to all discussions of issues of importance to the public.” Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev’d on other grounds, 59 App. D. C. 197, 37 F. 2d 993, cert. dismissed, 281 U. S. 706 (1930). This doctrine was applied through denial of license renewals or construction permits, both by the FRC, Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 61 App. D. C. 311, 62 F. 2d 850 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933), and its successor FCC, Young People’s Association for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F. C. C. 178 (1938). After an extended period during which the licensee was obliged not only to cover and to cover fairly the views of others, but also to refrain from expressing his own personal views, Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F. C. C. 333 (1940), the latter limitation on the licensee was abandoned and the doctrine developed into its present form. There is a twofold duty laid down by the FCC’s decisions and described by the 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C. 1246 (1949). The broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public issues, United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515 (1945), and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects the opposing views. New Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950). This must be done at the broadcaster’s own expense if sponsorship is unavailable. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963). Moreover, the duty must be met by programming obtained at the licensee’s own initiative if available from no other source. John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615 (1950); see Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 P & F Radio Reg. 602 (1960); The Evening News Assn., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 283 (1950). The Federal Radio Commission had imposed these two basic duties on broadcasters since the outset, Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev’d on other grounds, 59 App. D. C. 197, 37 F. 2d 993, cert. dismissed, 281 U. S. 706 (1930); Chicago Federation of Labor v. FRC, 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 36 (1929), aff’d, 59 App. D. C. 333, 41 F. 2d 422 (1930); KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. FRC, 60 App. D. C. 79, 47 F. 2d 670 (1931), and in particular respects the personal attack rules and regulations at issue here have spelled them out in greater detail. When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public issue, both the doctrine of cases such as Red Lion and Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 (1962), and also the 1967 regulations at issue in RTNDA require that the individual attacked himself be offered an opportunity to respond. Likewise, where one candidate is endorsed in a political editorial, the other candidates must themselves be offered reply time to use personally or through a spokesman. These obligations differ from the general fairness requirement that issues be presented, and presented with coverage of competing views, in that the broadcaster does not have the option of presenting the attacked party’s side himself or choosing a third party to represent that side. But insofar as there is an obligation of the broadcaster to see that both sides are presented, and insofar as that is an affirmative obligation, the personal attack doctrine and regulations do not differ from the preceding fairness doctrine. The simple fact that the attacked men or unen-dorsed candidates may respond themselves or through agents is not a critical distinction, and indeed, it is not unreasonable for the FCC to conclude that the objective of adequate presentation of all sides may best be served by allowing those most closely affected to make the response, rather than leaving the response in the hands of the station which has attacked their candidacies, endorsed their opponents, or carried a personal attack upon them. B. The statutory authority of the FCC to promulgate these regulations derives from the mandate to the “Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires” to promulgate “such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions... as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter....” 47 U. S. C. § 303 and § 303 (r). The Commission is specifically directed to consider the demands of the public interest in the course of granting licenses, 47 U. S. C. §§ 307 (a), 309 (a); renewing them, 47 U. S. C. § 307; and modifying them. Ibid. Moreover, the FCC has included among the conditions of the Red Lion license itself the requirement that operation of the station be carried out in the public interest, 47 U. S. C. § 309 (h). This mandate to the FCC to assure that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a broad one, a power “not niggardly but expansive,” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219 (1943), whose validity we have long upheld. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940); FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U. S. 86, 90 (1963); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933). It is broad enough to encompass these regulations. The fairness doctrine finds specific recognition in statutory form, is in part modeled on explicit statutory provisions relating to political candidates, and is approvingly reflected in legislative history. In 1959 the Congress amended the statutory requirement of § 315 that equal time be accorded each political candidate to except certain appearances on news programs, but added that this constituted no exception “from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.” Act of September 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (emphasis added). This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, announced that the phrase “public interest,” which had been in the Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues. In other words, the amendment vindicated the FCC’s general view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard. Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. And here this principle is given special force by the equally venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction. Here, the Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation. Thirty years of consistent administrative construction left undisturbed by Congress until 1959, when that construction was expressly accepted, reinforce the natural conclusion that the public interest language of the Act authorized the Commission to require licensees to use their stations for discussion of public issues, and that the FCC is free to implement this requirement by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridgment of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship proscribed by § 326 of the Act. The objectives of § 315 themselves could readily be circumvented but for the complementary fairness doctrine ratified by § 315. The section applies only to campaign appearances by candidates, and not by family, friends, campaign managers, or other supporters. Without the fairness doctrine, then, a licensee could ban all campaign appearances by candidates themselves from the air and proceed to deliver over his station entirely to the supporters of one slate of candidates, to the exclusion of all others. In this way the broadcaster could have a far greater impact on the favored candidacy than he could by simply allowing a spot appearance by the candidate himself. It is the fairness doctrine as an aspect of the obligation to operate in the public interest, rather than §315, which prohibits the broadcaster from taking such a step. The legislative history reinforces this view of the effect of the 1959 amendment. Even before the language relevant here was added, the Senate report on amending § 315 noted that “broadcast frequencies are limited and, therefore, they have been necessarily considered a public trust. Every licensee who is fortunate in obtaining a license is mandated to operate in the public interest and has assumed the obligation of presenting important public questions fairly and without bias.” S. Rep. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1959). See also, specifically adverting to Federal Communications Commission doctrine, id., at 13. Rather than leave this approval solely in the legislative history, Senator Proxmire suggested an amendment to make it part of the Act. 105 Cong. Rec. 14457. This amendment, which Senator Pastore, a manager of the bill and a ranking member of the Senate Committee, considered “rather surplusage,” 105 Cong. Rec. 14462, constituted a positive statement of doctrine and was altered to the present merely approving language in the conference committee. In explaining the language to the Senate after the committee changes, Senator Pastore said: “We insisted that that provision remain in the bill, to be a continuing reminder and admonition to the Federal Communications Commission and to the broadcasters alike, that we were not abandoning the philosophy that gave birth to section 315, in giving the people the right to have a full and complete disclosure of conflicting views on news of interest to the people of the country.” 105 Cong. Rec. 17830. Senator Scott, another Senate manager, added that: “It is intended to encompass all legitimate areas of public importance which are controversial,” not just politics. 105 Cong. Rec. 17831. It is true that the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine was not actually adjudicated until after 1959, so that Congress then did not have those rules specifically before it. However, the obligation to offer time to reply to a personal attack was presaged by the FCC’s 1949 Report on Editorializing, which the FCC views as the principal summary of its ratio decidendi in cases in this area: “In determining whether to honor specific requests for time, the station will inevitably be confronted with such questions as... whether there may not be other available groups or individuals who might be more appropriate spokesmen for the particular point of view than the person making the request. The latter’s personal involvement in the controversy may also be a factor which must be considered, for elementary considerations of fairness may dictate that time be allocated to a person or group which has been specifically attacked over the station, where otherwise no such obligation would exist.” 13 F. C. C., at 1251-1252. When the Congress ratified the FCC’s implication of a fairness doctrine in 1959 it did not, of course, approve every past decision or pronouncement by the Commission on this subject, or give it a completely free hand for the future. The statutory authority does not go so far. But we cannot say that when a station publishes personal attacks or endorses political candidates, it is a misconstruction of the public interest standard to require the station to offer time for a response rather than to leave the response entirely within the control of the station which has attacked either the candidacies or the men who wish to reply in their own defense. When a broadcaster grants time to a political candidate, Congress itself requires that equal time be offered to his opponents. It would exceed our competence to hold that the Commission is unauthorized by the statute to employ a similar device where personal attacks or political editorials are broadcast by a radio or television station. In light of the fact that the “public interest” in broadcasting clearly encompasses the presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to the public; the fact that the FCC has rested upon that language from, its very inception a doctrine that these issues must be discussed, and fairly; and the fact that Congress has acknowledged that the analogous provisions of § 315 are not preclusive in this area, and knowingly preserved the FCC’s complementary efforts, we think the fairness doctrine and its component personal attack and political editorializing regulations are a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority. The Communications Act is not notable for the precision of its substantive standards and in this respect the explicit provisions of § 315, and the doctrine and rules at issue here which are closely modeled upon that section, are far more explicit than the generalized “public interest” standard in which the Commission ordinarily finds its sole guidance, and which we have held a broad but adequate standard before. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U. S. 86, 90 (1953); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 216-217 (1943) ; FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933). We cannot say that the FCC’s declaratory ruling in Red Lion, or the regulations at issue in RTNDA, are beyond the scope of the con-gressionally conferred power to assure that stations are operated by those whose possession of a license serves “the public interest.” III. The broadcasters challenge the fairness doctrine and its specific manifestations in the personal attack and political editorial rules on conventional First Amendment grounds, alleging that the rules abridge their freedom of speech and press. Their contention is that the First Amendment protects their desire to use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency. No man may be prevented from saying or publishing what he thinks, or from refusing in his speech or other utterances to give equal weight to the views of his opponents. This right, they say, applies equally to broadcasters. A. Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948), differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952). For example, the ability of new technology to produce sounds more raucous than those of the human voice justifies restrictions on the sound level, and on the hours and places of use, of sound trucks so long as the restrictions are reasonable and applied without discrimination. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). When two people converse face to face, both should not speak at once if either is to be clearly understood. But the range of the human voice is so limited that there could be meaningful communications if half the people in the United States were talking and the other half listening. Just as clearly, half the people might publish and the other half read. But the reach of radio signals is incomparably greater than the range of the human voice and the problem of interference is a massive reality. The lack of know-how and equipment may keep many from the air, but only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible communication is to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized in the present state of commercially acceptable technology. It was this fact, and the chaos which ensued from permitting anyone to use any frequency at whatever power level he wished, which made necessary the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, as the Court has noted at length before. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 210-214 (1943). It was this reality which at the very least necessitated first the division of the radio spectrum into portions reserved respectively for public broadcasting and for other important radio uses such as amateur operation, aircraft, police, defense, and navigation; and then the subdivision of each portion, and assignment of specific frequencies to individual users or groups of users. Beyond this, however, because the frequencies reserved for public broadcasting were limited in number, it was essential for the Government to tell some applicants that they could not broadcast at all because there was room for only a few. Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same “right” to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum. This has been the consistent view of the Court. Congress unquestionably has the power to grant and deny licenses and to eliminate existing stations. FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1933). No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because “the public interest” requires it “is not a denial of free speech.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 227 (1943). By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant to public broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a major role to play as the Congress itself recognized in § 326, which forbids FCC interference with “the right of free speech by means of radio communication.” Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U. S. 358, 361-362 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 546 (1947). It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). “[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). It is the right of the	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 37 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. NAVAJO NATION No. 01-1375. Argued December 2, 2002 Decided March 4, 2003 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 514. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clark, Gregory G. Garre, Todd S. Aagaard, and R. Anthony Rogers. Paul E. Frye argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Rickard W. Hughes, David O. Stewart, Samuel J. Buffone, Levon B. Henry, and Richard B. Collins. V. Thomas Lankford and Terrance G. Reed filed a brief for the Peabody Coal Co. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Jicarilla Apache Nation et al. by Jill Elise Grant; for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians by Charles A Hobbs and Christopher T. Steams; and for the National Congress of American Indians by Jeffrey S. Sutton and John E. Echohawk. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. § 396a et seq., and the role it assigns to the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) with respect to coal leases executed by an Indian Tribe and a private lessee. The controversy centers on 1987 amendments to a 1964 coal lease entered into by the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company (Peabody) and the Navajo Nation (Tribe), a federally recognized Indian Tribe. The Tribe seeks to recover money damages from the United States for an alleged breach of trust in connection with the Secretary’s approval of coal lease amendments negotiated by the Tribe and Peabody. This Court’s decisions in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I), and United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II), control this case. Concluding that the controversy here falls within Mitchell Fs domain, we hold that the Tribe’s claim for compensation from the Federal Government fails, for it does not derive from any liability-imposing provision of the IMLA or its implementing regulations. I A The IMLA, which governs aspects of mineral leasing on Indian tribal lands, states that “unallotted lands within any Indian reservation,” or otherwise under federal jurisdiction, “may, with the approval of the Secretary, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the tribal council or other authorized spokesmen for such Indians, for terms not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities.” §396a. In addition “to providing] Indian tribes with a profitable source of revenue,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 179 (1989), the IMLA aimed to foster tribal self-determination by “giv[ing] Indians a greater say in the use and disposition of the resources found on Indian lands,” BHP Minerals Int’l Inc., 139 I. B. L. A. 269, 311 (1997). Prior to enactment of the IMLA, decisions whether to grant mineral leases on Indian land generally rested with the Government. See, e. g., Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 26, 41 Stat. 31, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 399; see also infra, at 509 (describing § 399). Indian consent was not required, and leases were sometimes granted over tribal objections. See H. R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1938); S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 230 (2000). The IMLA, designed to advance tribal independence, empowers Tribes to negotiate mining leases themselves, and, as to coal leasing, assigns primarily an approval role to the Secretary. Although the IMLA covers mineral leasing generally, in a number of discrete provisions it deals particularly with oil and gas leases. See 25 U. S. C. § 396b (requirements for public auctions of oil and gas leases); §396d (oil and gas leases are “subject to the terms of any reasonable cooperative unit or other plan approved or prescribed by [the] Secretary”); § 396g (“[T]o avoid waste or to promote the conservation of natural resources or the welfare of the Indians,” the Secretary may approve leases of Indian lands “for the subsurface storage of oil and gas.”). The IMLA contains no similarly specific prescriptions for coal leases; it simply remits coal leases, in common with all mineral leases, to the governance of rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary. § 396d. During all times relevant here, the IMLA regulations provided that “Indian tribes... may, with the approval of the Secretary... or his authorized representative, lease their land for mining purposes.” 25 CFR §211.2 (1985). In line with the IMLA itself, the regulations treated oil and gas leases in more detail than coal leases. The regulations regarding royalties, for example, specified procedures applicable to oil and gas leases, including criteria for the Secretary to employ in setting royalty rates. §§211.13, 211.16, 211.17. As to coal royalties, in contrast, the regulations required only that the rate be “not less than 10 cents per ton.” § 211.15(c). No other limitation was placed on the Tribe’s negotiating capacity or the Secretary’s approval authority. B The Tribe involved in this case occupies the largest Indian reservation in the United States. Over the past century, large deposits of coal have been discovered on the Tribe’s reservation lands, which are held for it in trust by the United States. Each year, the Tribe receives millions of dollars in royalty payments pursuant to mineral leases with private companies. Peabody mines coal on the Tribe’s lands pursuant to leases covered by the IMLA. This case principally concerns Lease 8580 (Lease or Lease 8580), which took effect upon approval by the Secretary in 1964. App. 188-220. The Lease established a maximum royalty rate of 37.5 cents per ton of coal, id., at 191, but made that figure “subject to reasonable adjustment by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative” on the 20-year anniversary of the Lease and every ten years thereafter, id., at 194. As the 20-year anniversary of Lease 8580 approached, its royalty rate of 37.5 cents per ton yielded for the Tribe only “about 2% of gross proceeds.” 263 F. 3d 1325, 1327 (CA Fed. 2001). This return was higher than the ten cents per ton minimum established by the then-applicable IMLA regulations. See 25 CFR § 211.15(c) (1985). It was substantially lower, however, than the 1214 percent of gross proceeds rate Congress established in 1977 as the minimum permissible royalty for coal mined on federal lands under the Mineral Leasing Act. See Pub. L. 94-377, §6, 90 Stat. 1087, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 207(a). For some years starting in the 1970’s, to gain a more favorable return, the Tribe endeavored to renegotiate existing mineral leases with private lessees, including Peabody. See App. 138-139, 143-144. In March 1984, the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council wrote to the Secretary asking him to exercise his contractually conferred authority to adjust the royalty rate under Lease 8580. On June 18, 1984, the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, acting pursuant to authority delegated by the Secretary, sent Peabody an opinion letter raising the rate to 20 percent of gross proceeds. Id., at 8-9. Contesting the Area Director’s rate determination, Peabody filed an administrative appeal in July 1984, pursuant to 25 CFR § 2.3(a) (1985). 46 Fed. Cl., at 222. The appeal was referred to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, John Fritz, then acting as both Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, 263 F. 3d, at 1328. In March 1985, Fritz permitted Peabody to supplement its brief and requested additional cost, revenue, and investment data. 46 Fed. Cl., at 222. He thereafter appeared ready to reject Peabody’s appeal. Ibid.; App. 89-97 (undated draft letter). By June 1985, both Peabody and the Tribe anticipated that an announcement favorable to the Tribe was imminent. Id., at 98-99. On July 5, 1985, a Peabody Vice President wrote to Interior Secretary Donald Hodel, asking him either to postpone decision on Peabody’s appeal so the parties could seek a negotiated settlement, or to rule in Peabody’s favor. Id., at 98-100. A copy of Peabody’s letter was sent to the Tribe, id., at 100, which then submitted its own letter urging the Secretary to reject Peabody’s request and to secure the Department’s prompt release of a decision in the Tribe’s favor, id., at 119-121. Peabody representatives met privately with Secretary Hodel in. July 1985, 46 Fed. Cl., at 222; no representative of the Tribe was present at, or received notice of, that meeting, id., at 219. On July 17, 1985, Secretary Hodel sent a memorandum to Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz. App. 117-118. The memorandum “suggested]” that Fritz “inform the involved parties that a decision on th[e] appeal is not imminent and urge them to continue with efforts to resolve this matter in a mutually agreeable fashion.” Id., at 117. “Any royalty adjustment which is imposed on those parties without their concurrence,” the memorandum stated, “will almost certainly be the subject of protracted and costly appeals,” and “could well impair the future of the contractual relationship” between the parties. Ibid. Secretary Hodel added, however, that the memorandum was “not intended as a determination of the merits of the arguments of the parties with respect to the issues which are subject to the appeal.” Id., at 118. The Tribe was not told of the Secretary’s memorandum to Fritz, but learned that “‘someone from Washington’ had urged a return to the bargaining table.” 46 Fed. Cl., at 223; see App. 342-344. Facing “severe economic pressure,” 263 F. 3d, at 1328; App. 355-356, the Tribe resumed negotiations with Peabody in August 1985, 46 Fed. Cl., at 223. On September 23, 1985, the parties reached a tentative agreement on a package of amendments to Lease 8580. Ibid. They agreed to raise the royalty rate to 121/2 percent of monthly gross proceeds, and to make the new rate retroactive to February 1, 1984. App. 287. The 12% percent rate was at the time customary for leases to mine coal on federal lands and on Indian lands. The amendments acknowledged the legitimacy of tribal taxation of coal production, but stipulated that the tax rate would be capped at eight percent. Id., at 295, 299. In addition, Peabody agreed to pay the Tribe $1.5 million when the amendments became effective, and $7.5 million more when Peabody began mining additional coal, as authorized by the Lease amendments. Id., at 292-293. The agreement “also addressed ancillary matters such as provisions for future royalty adjustments, arbitration procedures, rights of way, the establishment of a tribal scholarship fund, and the payment by Peabody of back royalties, bonuses, and water payments.” 46 Fed. Cl., at 224. “In consideration of the benefits associated with these lease amendments,” the parties agreed to move jointly to vacate the Area Director’s June 1984 decision, which had raised the royalty to 20 percent. App. 286. In August 1987, the Navajo Tribal Council approved the amendments. 46 Fed. Cl., at 224. The parties signed a final agreement in November 1987, App. 309, and Secretary Hodel approved it on December 14, 1987, id., at 337-339. Shortly thereafter, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Area Director’s decision was vacated. 46 Fed. Cl., at 224. In. 1993, the Tribe brought suit against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging, inter alia, that the Secretary’s approval of the amendments to the Lease constituted a breach of trust. The Tribe sought $600 million in damages. The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment for the United States. 46 Fed. Cl. 217 (2000). In no uncertain terms, that court found that the Government owed general fiduciary duties to the Tribe, which, in its view, the Secretary had flagrantly dishonored by acting in the best interests of Peabody rather than the Tribe. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Tribe had entirely failed to link that breach of duty to any statutory or regulatory obligation which could “be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation for the government’s fiduciary wrongs.” Id., at 236. Accordingly, the court held that the United States was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 263 F. 3d 1325 (2001). The Government’s liability to the Tribe, it said, turned on whether “the United States controls the Indian resources.” Id., at 1329. Relying on 25 U. S. C. §399 and regulations promulgated thereunder, the Court of Appeals determined that the measure of control the Secretary exercised over the leasing of Indian lands for mineral development sufficed to warrant a money judgment against the United States for breaches of fiduciary duties connected to coal leasing. 263 F. 3d, at 1330-1332. But see infra, at 509. The appeals court agreed with the Federal Claims Court that the Secretary’s actions regarding Peabody’s administrative appeal violated the Government’s fiduciary obligations to the Tribe, in that those actions “suppressed] and concealed] ” the decision of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and “thereby favor[ed] Peabody interests to the detriment of Navajo interests.” 263 F. 3d, at 1332. Based on these determinations, the Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of damages. Id., at 1333. Judge Schall concurred in part and dissented in part. Id., at 1333-1341. It was not enough, he maintained, for the Tribe to show a violation of a general fiduciary relationship stemming from federal involvement in a particular area of Indian affairs. Rather, a Tribe “must show the breach of a specific fiduciary obligation that falls within the contours of the statutes and regulations that create the general fiduciary relationship at issue.” Id., at 1341. In his view, “the only government action in this case that implicated a specific fiduciary responsibility” was the Secretary’s 1987 approval of the Lease amendments. Id., at 1339. The Secretary had been deficient, Judge Schall concluded, in approving the amendments without first conducting an independent economic analysis of the amended agreement. Id., at 1339-1341. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing. We granted certiorari, 535 U. S. 1111 (2002), and now reverse. II A “It is axiomatic that the Umted States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 212. The Tribe asserts federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. That Act provides: “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe... whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band, or group.” “If a claim falls within the terms of the [Indian] Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively consented to suit.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 216. Although the Indian Tucker Act confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims, it is not itself a source of substantive rights. Ibid.; see Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 538. To state a litigable claim, a tribal plaintiff must invoke a rights-creating source of substantive law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218. Because “[t]he [Indian] Tucker Act itself provides the necessary consent” to suit, ibid., however, the rights-creating statute or regulation need not contain “a second waiver of sovereign immunity,” id., at 218-219. B Mitchell I and Mitchell II are the pathmarking precedents on the question whether a statute or regulation (or combination thereof) “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218. In Mitchell I, we considered whether the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 (GAA), 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §331 et seq. (1976 ed.) (§§331-333 repealed 2000), authorized an award of money damages against the United States for alleged mismanagement of forests located on lands allotted to tribal members. The GAA authorized the President of the United States to allot agricultural or grazing land to individual tribal members residing on a reservation, § 331, and provided that “the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted... in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made,” §348. We held that the GAA did not create private rights enforceable in a suit for money damages under the Indian Tucker Act. After examining the GAA’s language, history, and purpose, we concluded that it “created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources.” Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 542. In particular, we stressed that §§ 1 and 2 of the GAA removed a standard element of a trust relationship by making “the Indian allottee, and not a representative of the United States,... responsible for using the land for agricultural or grazing purposes.” Id., at 542-543; see id., at 543 (“Under this scheme,... the allottee, and not the United States, was to manage the land.”). We also determined that Congress decided to have “the United States ‘hold the land... in trust’ not because it wished the Government to control use of the land..., but simply because it wished to prevent alienation of the land and to ensure that allottees would be immune from state taxation.” Id., at 544. Because “the Act [did] not... authoriz[e], much less requir[e], the Government to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian allottees,” id., at 545, we held that the GAA established no right to recover money damages for mismanagement of such resources. We left open, however, the possibility that other sources of law might support the plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Id., at 546, and n. 7. In Mitchell II, we held that a network of other statutes and regulations did impose judicially enforceable fiduciary duties upon the United States in its management of forested allotted lands. “In contrast to the bare trust created by the [GAA],” we observed, “the statutes and regulations now before us clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians.” 463 U. S., at 224. As to managing the forests and selling timber, we noted, Congress instructed the Secretary to be mindful of “the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs,” 25 U. S. C. § 406(a), and specifically to take into account: “(1) the state of growth of the timber and the need for maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the benefit of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and best use of the land, including the advisability and practicality of devoting it to other uses for the benefit of the owner and his heirs, and (3) the present and future financial needs of the owner and his heirs.” Ibid. Proceeds from timber sales were to be paid to landowners “or disposed of for their benefit.” Ibid. Congress’ prescriptions, Interior Department regulations, and “daily supervision over the harvesting and management of tribal timber” by the Department’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, we emphasized, combined to place under federal control “[virtually every stage of the process.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 222-224 (describing comprehensive timber management statutes and regulations promulgated thereunder). Having determined that the statutes and regulations “established] fiduciary obligations of the Government in the management and operation of Indian lands and resources,” we concluded that the relevant legislative and executive prescriptions could “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained.” Id., at 226. A damages remedy, we explained, would “fur-the[r] the purposes of the statutes and regulations, which clearly require that the Secretary manage Indian resources so as to generate proceeds for the Indians.” Id., at 226-227. To state a claim cognizable under the Indian Tucker Act, Mitchell I and Mitchell II thus instruct, a Tribe must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties. See 463 U. S., at 216-217, 219. If that threshold is passed, the court must then determine whether the relevant source of substantive law “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].” Id., at 219. Although “the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people” can “reinforc[e]” the conclusion that the relevant statute or regulation imposes fiduciary duties, id., at 225, that relationship alone is insufficient to support jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act. Instead, the analysis must train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions. Those prescriptions need not, however, expressly provide for money damages; the availability of such damages may be inferred. See id., at 217, n. 16 (“[T]he substantive source of law may grant the claimant a right to recover damages either expressly or by implication.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). C We now consider whether the IMLA and its implementing regulations can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for the Government’s alleged breach of trust in this case. We conclude that they cannot. 1 The Tribe’s principal contention is that the IMLA’s statutory and regulatory scheme, viewed in its entirety, attaches fiduciary duties to each Government function under that scheme, and that the Secretary acted in contravention of those duties by approving the 12V2 percent royalty contained in the amended Lease. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 20, 30-38. We read the IMLA differently. As we see it, the statute and regulations at issue do not provide the requisite “substantive law” that “mandates] compensation by the Federal Government.” Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218. The IMLA and its implementing regulations impose no obligations resembling the detailed fiduciary responsibilities that Mitchell II found adequate to support a claim for money damages. The IMLA simply requires Secretarial approval before coal mining leases negotiated between Tribes and third parties become effective, 25 U. S. C. § 396a, and authorizes the Secretary generally to promulgate regulations governing mining operations, § 396d. Yet the dissent concludes that the IMLA imposes “one or more specific statutory obligations, as in Mitchell II, at the level of fiduciary duty whose breach is compensable in damages.” Post, at 521. The endeavor to align this case with Mitchell II rather than Mitchell I, however valiant, falls short of the mark. Unlike the “elaborate” provisions before the Court in Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 225, the IMLA and its regulations do not “give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources... for the benefit of the Indians,” id., at 224. The Secretary is neither assigned a comprehensive managerial role nor, at the time relevant here, expressly invested with responsibility to secure “the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 25 U. S. C. § 406(a)). Instead, the Secretary’s involvement in coal leasing under the IMLA more closely resembles the role provided for the Government by the GAA regarding allotted forest lands. See Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 540-544. Although the GAA required the Government to hold allotted land “in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made,” id., at 541 (quoting 25 U. S. C. § 348), that Act did not “authoriz[e], much less requir[e], the Government to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian allottees,” Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 545. Similarly here, the IMLA and its regulations do not assign to the Secretary managerial control over coal leasing. Nor do they even establish the “limited trust relationship,” id., at 542, existing under the GAA; no provision of the IMLA or its regulations contains any trust language with respect to coal leasing. Moreover, as in Mitchell I, imposing fiduciary duties on the Government here would be out of line with one of the statute's principal purposes. The GAA was designed so that “the allottee, and not the United States,... [would] manage the land.” Id., at 543. Imposing upon the Government a fiduciary duty to oversee the management of allotted lands would not have served that purpose. So too here. The IMLA aims to enhance tribal self-determination by giving Tribes, not the Government, the lead role in negotiating mining leases with third parties. See supra, at 494. As the Court of Federal Claims recognized, “[t]he ideal of Indian self-determination is directly at odds with Secretarial control over leasing.” 46 Fed. Cl., at 230. 2 The Tribe nevertheless argues that the actions of the Secretary targeted in this case violated discrete statutory and regulatory provisions whose breach is redressable in an action for damages. In this regard, the Tribe relies extensively on 25 U. S. C. § 399, see, e. g., Brief for Respondent 22-23,30-31, upon which the Court of Appeals placed considerable weight as well, see 263 F. 3d, at 1330-1331; supra, at 501. That provision, however, is not part of the IMLA and does not govern Lease 8580. Enacted almost 20 years before the IMLA, § 399 authorizes the Secretary to lease certain unallotted Indian lands for mining purposes on terms she sets, and does not provide for input from the Tribes concerned. See supra, at 494. In exercising that authority, the Secretary is authorized to “perform any and all acts... as may be necessary and proper for the protection of the interests of the Indians and for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this section into full force and effect.” §399. But that provision describes the Secretary’s leasing authority under § 399; it does not bear on the Secretary’s more limited approval role under the IMLA. Similarly unavailing is the Tribe’s reliance on the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA), 25 U. S. C. §2101 et seq. See Brief for Respondent 23-24, 30. The IMDA governs the Secretary’s approval of agreements for the development of certain Indian mineral resources through exploration and like activities. It does not establish standards governing the Secretary’s approval of mining leases negotiated by a Tribe and a third party. The Lease in this case, in short, falls outside the IMDA’s domain. See Reply Brief 12-13. Citing 25 U. S. C. §396a, the IMLA’s general prescription, see supra, at 493, the Tribe next asserts that the Secretary violated his “duty to review and approve any proposed coal lease with care to promote IMLA’s basic purpose and the [Tribe’s] best interests.” Brief for Respondent 39. To support that assertion, the Tribe points to various Government reports identifying 20 percent as the appropriate royalty, see id,., at 5-7, 15, and to the Secretary’s decision, made after receiving ex parte communications from Peabody, to withhold departmental action, see id., at 9-10, 15. In the circumstances presented, the Tribe maintains, the Secretary’s eventual approval of the 12Vz percent royalty violated his duties under § 396a in two ways. First, the Secretary’s approval was “improvident,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 48, because it allowed the Tribe’s coal “to be conveyed for what [the Secretary] knew to be about half of	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 25 ]	sc_adminaction
MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al. v. JERRICO, INC. No. 79-253. Argued March 19, 1980 Decided April 28, 1980 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Solicitor General McCree. Thomas W. Power argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were William E. Anderson and Curtis L. Wilson. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Under § 16 (e) of the Pair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (e), sums collected as civil penalties for the unlawful employment of child labor are returned to the Employment Standards Administration (ESA) of the Department of Labor in reimbursement for the costs of determining violations and assessing penalties. The question for decision is whether this provision violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by creating an impermissible risk of bias in the Act’s enforcement and administration. I The child labor provisions of federal law are primarily contained in § 12 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1067, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 212. The Secretary of Labor has designated the ESA as the agency responsible for enforcing these provisions, 36 Fed. Reg. 8755 (1971). The ESA in turn carries out its responsibilities through regional offices, and the assistant regional administrator of each office has been charged with the duty of determining violations and assessing penalties. Appellee Jerrico, Inc., is a Delaware corporation that manages approximately 40 restaurants in Kentucky, Indiana, Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida. In a series of investigations from 1969 to 1975, the ESA uncovered over 150 violations of the child labor provisions at appellee’s various establishments. After considering the factors designated by statute and regulations, the ESA Assistant Regional Administrator in the Atlanta office assessed a total fine of $103,000 in civil penalties for the various violations. That figure included a supplemental assessment of $84,500 because of his conclusion that the violations were willful. Appellee filed exceptions to the determination and assessment of the Assistant Regional Administrator, and pursuant to 29 U. S. C. § 216 (e), a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge. Witnesses included employees of appellee and representatives of the Department of Labor. The Administrative Law Judge accepted the Assistant Regional Administrator’s contention that violations had occurred, concluding that the record showed “a course of violations” for which “[respondent's responsibility cannot be disputed.” At the same time, he was persuaded by appellee’s witnesses and by a review of the evidence that the violations were not willful. Accordingly, he reduced the total assessment to $18,500. Appellee did not seek judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Instead, it brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the civil penalty provisions of the Act on constitutional grounds and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against their continued enforcement. Appellee accepted the determination of the Administrative Law Judge and alleged no unfairness in the proceedings before him. Nonetheless, it contended that § 16 (e) of the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by providing that civil penalties must be returned to the ESA as reimbursement for enforcement expenses and by allowing the ESA to allocate such fines to its various regional offices. According to appellee, this provision created an impermissible risk and appearance of bias by encouraging the assistant regional administrator to make unduly numerous and large assessments of civil penalties. After the parties engaged in discovery with respect to the administration of § 16 (e), appellee moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion. It acknowledged that the Office of Administrative Law Judges was unaffected by the total amount of the civil penalties. At the same time, the court concluded that the reimbursement provision created an impermissible risk of bias on the part of the assistant regional administrator. Citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927), and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972), the court found that because a regional office’s greater effort in uncovering violations could lead to an increased amount of penalties and a greater share of reimbursements for that office, § 16 (e) could distort the assistant regional administrator’s objectivity in assessing penalties for violations of the child labor provisions of the Act. We noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U. S. 949 (1979), and now reverse. II A The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns.of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 259-262, 266-267 (1978). The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 344 (1976). At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, “generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,” Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him. The requirement of neutrality has been jealously guarded by this Court. In Tumey v. Ohio, supra, the Court reversed convictions rendered by the mayor of a town when the mayor’s salary was paid in part by fees and costs levied by him acting in a judicial capacity. The Court stated that the Due Process Clause would not permit any “procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused.” 273 U. S., at 532. Tumey was applied in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, supra, to invalidate a procedure by which sums produced from a mayor’s court accounted for a substantial portion of municipal revenues, even though the mayor’s salary was not augmented by those sums. The forbidden “possible temptation,” we concluded, is also present “when the mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.” 409 U. S., at 60. We have employed the same principle in a variety of settings, demonstrating the powerful and independent constitutional interest in fair adjudicative procedure. Indeed, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954), and this “stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties,” In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955). See also Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974). Appellee contends that these principles compel the conclusion that the reimbursement provision of the Act violates the Due Process Clause. We conclude, however, that the strict requirements of Tumey and Ward are not applicable to the determinations of the assistant regional administrator, whose functions resemble those of a prosecutor more closely than those of a judge. The biasing influence that appellee discerns in § 16 (e) is, we believe, too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional constraints applicable to the decisions of an administrator performing prosecutorial functions. To explain our conclusion, we turn to the relevant sections of the Act. As noted above, the major portions of the federal child labor provisions appear in 29 U. S. C. § 212, which outlaws the employment in interstate commerce of “oppressive child labor,” as that term is defined in 29 U. S. C. § 203 (l) and implementing regulations. These provisions demonstrate a firm federal policy of “protect [ing] the safety, health, well-being, and opportunities for schooling of youthful workers.” 29 CFR § 570.101 (1979). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1937); S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 6 (1937); Before 1974, the Secretary of Labor enforced the child labor provisions primarily through actions for injunctive relief, see 29 U. S. C. §§ 212 (b), 217, and for criminal sanctions, see 29 U. S. C. §§ 216 (a), 215(a)(4). Having found such relief to be an inadequate or insufficiently flexible remedy for violations of the law, cf. H. R. Rep. No. 93-913, p. 15 (1974), Congress in 1974 authorized the Secretary to assess a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 for each violation of § 212. 29 U. S. C. § 216 (e). Under this provision for the assessment of civil penalties, the Secretary’s determination of the existence of a violation and of the amount of the penalty is not final if the person charged with a violation enters an exception within 15 days of receiving notice. In the event that such an exception is entered, the final determination is made in an administrative hearing conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 554. The administrative law judge “may affirm, in whole or in part, the determination by the Administrator of the occurrence of violations or . . . may find that no violations occurred, and shall order payment of a penalty in the amount originally assessed or in a lesser amount ... or order that respondent pay no penalty, as appropriate.” 29 CFR § 580.32 (a) (1979). He is directed to consider the same factors considered by the assistant regional administrator in making his original assessment. Ibid. Under the natural construction of this regulation, the administrative law judge is required to conduct a de novo review of all factual and legal issues. The provision whose constitutionality is at issue in this case is a part of 29 U. S. C. § 216 (e), the civil penalty section of the Act. That provision states that civil penalties collected for violations of the child labor law “shall be applied toward reimbursement of the costs of determining the violations and assessing and collecting such penalties, in accordance with the provisions of section 9a of this title.” Section 9a, 29 U. S. C. § 9a, added in 1934, provides in turn that all sums “received by the Department of Labor in payment of the cost of such work shall be deposited to the credit of the appropriation of that bureau, service, office, division, or other agency of the Department of Labor which supervised such work, and may be used, in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the ordinary expenses of such agency and/or to secure the special services of persons who are neither officers nor employees of the United States.” The record developed in the District Court permits a detailed description of the administration of the reimbursement provision in the years 1976, 1977, and 1978. It is plain that no official’s salary is affected by the levels of the penalties. In all three years the sums collected as child labor penalties amounted to substantially less than 1% of the ESA’s budget. And in each of those years, the ESA did not spend the full amount appropriated to it, and the sums that were not spent were returned to the Treasury. The amounts returned to the Treasury in that fashion substantially exceeded the sums collected under § 16 (e) in all three years. The challenged provisions have not, therefore, resulted in any increase in the funds available to the ESA over the amount appropriated by Congress. Civil penalties for child labor violations are allocated by the national office of the ESA, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Labor. In 1976, the sums collected were allocated to and retained by the ESA national office; in 1977, they were allocated to the national office, to the Office of the Solicitor of Labor, and to the various regional offices in proportion to the amounts expended on enforcement of the child labor provisions; and in 1978, the penalties were held in the Treasury. Civil penalties have never been allotted to the regional offices on the basis of the total amount of penalties collected by particular offices. The District Court concluded that in these circumstances the challenged provision violated the Due Process Clause under the principles set forth in Tumey and Ward. It noted that, as the 1977 practice demonstrated, the ESA has discretion to return sums collected as civil penalties .to the regional offices in proportion to the amounts expended on enforcement efforts. Increased enforcement costs could thus lead to a larger share of reimbursements. According to the court, an assistant regional administrator would therefore be inclined to maximize the total expenditures on enforcement of the child labor provisions of the Act, and those increased expenditures would result in an increase in the number and amount of penalties assessed. The court concluded that this possibility created an unconstitutional risk of bias in the assistant regional administrator’s enforcement decisions. We disagree. The assistant regional administrator simply cannot be equated with the kind of decisionmakers to which the principles of Tumey and Ward have been held applicable. He is not a judge. He performs no judicial or quasi-judicial functions. He hears no witnesses and rules on no disputed factual or legal questions. The function of assessing a violation is ..akin to that of a prosecutor or civil plaintiff. If the employer excepts to a penalty — as he has a statutory right to do- — -he is entitled to a dé novo hearing before .an administrative law judge. In that hearing the assistant regional administrator acts as the complaining party and bears the burden of proof on contested issues. 29 CFR § 580.21 (a) (1979). Indeed, the Secretary’s regulations state that the notice of penalty assessment and the employer’s exception “shall, respectively, be given the effect of a complaint and answer thereto for purposes of the administrative proceeding.” 29 CFR § 580.3 (b) (1979). It is the administrative law judge, not the assistant regional administrator, who performs the function of adjudicating child labor violations. As the District Court found, the reimbursement provision of § 16 (e) is inapplicable to the Office of Administrative Law Judges. The rigid requirements of Turney and Ward, designed for officials performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, are not applicable to those acting in a prosecutorial or plaintiff-like capacity. Our legal system has traditionally accorded wide discretion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement process, see Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614 (1973), and similar considerations have been found applicable to administrative prosecutors as well, see Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S. 411, 414 (1958); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 182 (1967). Prosecutors need not be entirely “neutral and detached,” cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S., at 62. In an adversary system, they are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law. The constitutional interests in accurate finding of facts and application of law, and in preserving a fair and open process for decision, are not to the same degree implicated if it is the prosecutor, and not the judge, who is offered an incentive for securing civil penalties. The distinction between judicial and non judicial officers was explicitly made in Tumey, 273 U. S., at 535, where the Court noted that a state legislature “may, and often ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by offering to those who shall initiate and carry on such prosecutions rewards for thus acting in the interest of the State and the people.” See also Hortonville School Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Assn., 426 U. S. 482, 495 (1976). We do not suggest, and appellants do not contend, that the Due Process Clause imposes no limits on the partisanship of administrative prosecutors. Prosecutors are also public officials; they too must serve the public interest. Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). In appropriate circumstances the Court has made clear that traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which the enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 567, n. 7, 568-574 (1975); Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939). Moreover, the decision to enforce — or not to enforce — may itself result in significant burdens on a defendant or a statutory beneficiary, even if he is ultimately vindicated in an adjudication. Cf. 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 215-256 (2d ed. 1979). A scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional questions. See Borden-kircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 365 (1978); cf. 28 U. S. C. § 528 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) (disqualifying federal prosecutor from participating in litigation in which he has a personal interest). But the strict requirements of neutrality cannot be the same for administrative prosecutors as for judges, whose duty it is to make the final decision and whose impartiality serves as the ultimate guarantee of a fair and meaningful proceeding in our constitutional regime. B In this case, we need not say with precision what limits there may be on a financial or personal interest of one who performs a prosécutorial function, for here the influence alleged to impose bias is exceptionally remote. No governmental official stands to profit economically from vigorous enforcement of the child labor provisions of the Act. The salary of the assistant regional administrator is fixed by law. 5 U. S. C. § 5332 (1976 ed. and Supp. III). The pressures relied on in such cases as. Tumey v. Ohio, supra; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 579 (1973); and Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 245, 250 (1977) (per curiam), are entirely absent here. Nor is there a realistic possibility that the assistant regional administrator’s judgment will be distorted by the prospect of institutional gain as a result of zealous enforcement efforts. As we have noted, the civil penalties collected under § 16 (e) represent substantially less than 1% of the budget of the ESA. In each of the relevant years, the amount of the ESA’s budget that was returned to the Treasury was substantially greater than the amount collected as civil penalties. Unlike in Ward and Tumey, it is plain that the enforcing agent is in no sense financially dependent on the maintenance of a high level of penalties. Furthermore, since it is the national office of the ESA, and not any assistant regional administrator, that decides how to allocate civil penalties, such administrators have no assurance that the penalties they assess will be-returned to their offices at all. See Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U. S. 61 (1928). Moreover, the ESA’s administration of the Act has minimized any potential for bias. In the only year in which the ESA elected to allocate part of the civil penalties to the regional offices, it did so in proportion to the expenses incurred in investigating and prosecuting child labor violations, not on the basis of the amounts of penalties collected. Thus, even if an assistant regional administrator were to act on the assumption that civil penalties would be returned to his office in any given year, his decision to assess an unjustifiably large penalty in a particular case would be of no benefit to his office, since that decision would not produce an increase in the level of expenses. The District Court’s conclusion that the reimbursement provision violated the Due Process Clause was evidently premised on its perception that an assistant regional administrator might be tempted to devote an unusually large quantity of resources to enforcement efforts in the hope that he would ultimately obtain a higher total allocation of federal funds to his office. This increase in enforcement effort, the court suggested, might incline the assistant regional administrator to assess an unjustified number of penalties, and to make those penalties unduly high. But in light of the factors discussed above, it is clear that this possibility is too remote to violate the constraints applicable to the financial or personal interest of officials charged with prosecutorial or plaintiff-like functions. In order to produce the predicted result, the ESA would be required to decide to allocate civil penalties to regional offices; the sums allocated to the particular regional office would have to exceed any amount of that office’s budget returned to the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year; the assistant regional administrator would have to receive authorization from his superiors to expend additional funds to increase his enforcement expenditures to the desired level; the increased expenditures would have to result in an increase in penalties; and the administrative law judge and reviewing courts would have to accept or ratify the assistant regional administrator’s assessments. “[U]nder a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975), it is exceedingly improbable that the assistant regional administrator’s enforcement decisions would be distorted by some expectation that all of these contingencies would simultaneously come to fruition. We are thus unable to accept appellee’s contention that, on this record and as presently administered, the reimbursement provision violates standards of procedural fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Those factors include “any history of prior violations; any evidence of willfulness or failure to take reasonable precautions to avoid violations; the number of minors illegally employed; the age of the minors so employed and records of the required proof of age; the occupations in which the minors were so employed; exposure of such minors to hazards and any resultant injury to such minors; the duration of such illegal employment; and, as appropriate, the hours of the day in which it occurred and whether such employment was during or outside school hours.” 29 CFR § 579.5 (c) (1979). For example, we have invalidated a system in which justices of the peace were paid for issuance but not for nonissuance of search warrants, Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 245 (1977) (per curiam); prohibited the trial of a defendant before a judge who has previously held the defendant in contempt, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455 (1971); forbidden a state administrative board consisting of optometrists in private practice from hearing charges filed against licensed optometrists competing with board members, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 578-579 (1973); and prohibited a parole officer from making the determination whether reasonable grounds exist for the revocation of parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 485-486 (1972). See xi. 1, supra. See n. 9, infra, and accompanying text. The section was originally designed “[t]o authorize the Department of Labor to make special statistical studies upon payment of the cost thereof, and for other purposes.” See 48 Stat. 582; S. Rep. No. 322, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). In 1976, the ESA collected about $151,000 in child labor penalties; in 1977, $650,000; and in 1978, $592,000. By comparison, $87,407,000 was appropriated to the ESA in 1976; $98,992,000 in 1977; and $119,632,000 in 1978. See Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1980— Appendix 652; Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1979 — Appendix 623-624; Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978 — Appendix 510. The record indicates that, in 1976, the ESA returned $981,000 to the Treasury; $870,000 was returned in 1977; and $4,600,000 in 1978. In that year a total of $559,800 was allotted, including $194,800 to the national office. The Chicago office received $44,300, the highest allotment of any regional office; the Denver office received the lowest, $4,900. Appellee claims that the hearing before the administrative law judge is not truly de novo because the judge has the authority only to determine the existence of the violation, not to assess the reasonableness of the penalty. We are unable to discern any such limitation on the administrative law judge’s authority. Under federal regulations, the administrative law judge is expressly empowered to review the amount of the penalty and is required to consider precisely those factors considered by the assistant regional administrator in making his assessment. See 29 CFR § 579.5 (1979). Indeed, in this very case the Administrative Law Judge carefully reviewed the Assistant Regional Administrator’s assessment and reduced it by over 80%. Appellee correctly points out that in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972), we held that the availability of a trial de novo before an unbiased judge did not remove the constitutional infirmity in an original trial before one whose impartiality was impaired. A litigant, we said, “is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.” Id., at 61-62. Ward does not aid appellee in this case, however, for the administrative law judge presides over the initial adjudication. Appellee errs in suggesting that the Office of Administrative Law Judges is also entitled to reimbursement under §16 (e). When read in conjunction with 29 U. S. C. § 9 (a), that section allows reimbursement to offices that “supervised [the] work” of “determining the violations and assessing and collecting [the] penalties.” The Office of Administrative Law Judges does not “supervise” that work. Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act expressly forbids such supervision. 5 U. S. C. § 554 (d). The Office of Administrative Law Judges maintains an administrative section within the Department of Labor entirely separate from that of the supervising body, the ESA, and the Office has a separate budget. Cf., e. g., Adams v. Richardson, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 267, 480 F. 2d 1159 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 142 U. S. App. D. C. 74, 439 F. 2d 584 (1971); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 139 U. S. App. D. C. 226, 432 F. 2d 659 (1970), vacated as moot, 404 U. S. 403 (1972); Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 379 Mass. 703,-,-, 400 N. E. 2d 1231, 1247, 1252-1253 (1980). See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1752-1756 (1975); Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 485 (1940). In particular, we need not say whether different considerations might be held to apply if the alleged biasing influence contributed to prosecutions against particular persons, rather than to a general zealousness in the enforcement process. Even if the ESA received a considerable amount in civil penalties in a particular year, of course, it is possible that Congress would decide to appropriate a correspondingly lower amount from the Treasury. We need not, of course, say whether the alleged biasing influence is too remote to raise constitutional objections even under the standards of Ward and Tumey.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 70 ]	sc_adminaction
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE et al. v. DUKE ENERGY CORP. et al. No. 05-848. Argued November 1, 2006 Decided April 2, 2007 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Auto, JJ., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part III-A. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 582. Sean H. Donahue argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were David T. Goldberg, Jeffrey M. Gleason, J. Blanding Holman IV, and Caleb Jaffe. Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wooldridge, James A. Feldman, Katherine J. Barton, Ann R. Klee, Chet M. Thompson, Granta Y. Nakayama, Thomas W. Swegle, Carol S. Holmes, David W. Schnare, and Alan Dion. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Mark D. Hopson, Kathryn B. Thomson, Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Henry V. Nickel, F. William Brownell, Makram Jaber, Marc E. Manly, Catherine S. Stempien, Garry S. Rice, T. Thomas Cottingham III, and Nash E. Long III Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by Zulima V. Farber, former Attorney General of New Jersey, Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, and Kevin P. Auerbacher and Jung W. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Terry Goddard, Attorney General of Arizona, Joseph P. Mikitish, Assistant Attorney General, Robert J. Spagnoletti, former Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General of Kentucky, Douglas Scott Porter, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Alan F. Hoffman and Neil D. Gordon, Assistant Attorneys General, Rob McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, and Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, former Attorney General of New York, Caitlin J. Halligan, Solicitor General, Andrew Bing and Daniel J. Chepaitis, Assistant Solicitors General, Peter H. Lehner, Robert Rosenthal, J. Jared Snyder, and Michael J. Myers, Assistant Attorneys General, by Susan Shinkman and Robert A Reiley, and by the Attorneys General and former Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Carl C. Dan-berg of Delaware, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire, Patricia A Madrid of New Mexico, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, and William H. Sorrell of Vermont; for the American Lung Association et al. by Hope M. Babcock; for the Chesapeake Bay Foundation et al. by Michael D. Goodstein and Julie Kaplan; for Law Professors by Jared A Goldstein; for the National Parks Conservation Association et al. by George E. Hays and Michael A. Costa; for STAPPA et al. by Richard E. Ayres; for Current and Former Members of Congress by Stephanie Tai; and for Former Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency Carol M. Browner et al. by Holly D. Gordon and Deborah A Sivas. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General, and Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General and former Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: David W. Marquez of Alaska, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Steve Carter of Indiana, Phill Kline of Kansas, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Robert F. McDonnell of Virginia, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for APA Watch by Lawrence J. Joseph; for the American Public Power Association et al. by Janet Pitterle Holt, Rae E. Cronmiller, and Richard H. Robinson; for the Electric Utility Industry by Steven G. McKinney, Michael D. Freeman, and P. Stephen Gidiere III; for Law Professors by David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Lee A Casey; for the Manufacturers Association Work Group by Charles H. Knauss, Robert V. Zener, Julie C. Becker, Richard S. Wasserstrom, Kevin B. Belford, M. Elizabeth Cox, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; for the National Environmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project by Leslie Sue Ritts and Lorane F. Hebert; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, et al. by Scott H. Segal and Jason B. Hutt; for Walter C. Barber by Robert L. Brubaker; and for U. S. Representative Joe L. Barton by George C. Landrith and Christopher C. Horner. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. In the 1970s, Congress added two air pollution control schemes to the Clean Air Act: New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD), each of them covering modified, as well as new, stationary sources of air pollution. The NSPS provisions define the term “modification,” 42 U. S. C. § 7411(a)(4), while the PSD provisions use that word “as defined in” NSPS, § 7479(2)(C). The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conform its PSD regulations on “modification” to their NSPS counterparts, and that EPA’s 1980 PSD regulations can be given this conforming construction. We hold that the Court of Appeals’s reading of the 1980 PSD regulations, intended to align them with NSPS, was inconsistent with their terms and effectively invalidated them; any such result must be shown to comport with the Act’s restrictions on judicial review of EPA regulations for validity. I The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676, broadened federal authority to combat air pollution, see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 845-846 (1984), and directed EPA to devise National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) limiting various pollutants, which the States were obliged to implement and enforce, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7409, 7410. The amendments dealing with NSPS authorized EPA to require operators of stationary sources of air pollutants to use the best technology for limiting pollution, Chevron, supra, at 846; see also 1 F. Grad, Environmental Law §2.03 [14], p. 2-356 (2006), both in newly constructed sources and those undergoing “modification,” 42 U. S. C. § 7411(a)(2). Section 111(a) of the 1970 amendments defined this term within the NSPS scheme as “any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted,” 42 U. S. C. § 7411(a)(4). EPA’s 1975 regulations implementing NSPS provided generally that “any physical or operational change to an existing facility which results in an increase in the emission rate to the atmosphere of any pollutant to which a standard applies shall be considered a modification within the meaning of section 111.” 40 CFR §60.14(a) (1976). Especially significant here is the identification of an NSPS “modification” as a change that “increase^]... the emission rate,” which “shall be expressed as kg/hr of any pollutant discharged into the atmosphere. ” § 60.14(b). NSPS, however, did too little to “achiev[e] the ambitious goals of the 1970 Amendments,” R. Belden, Clean Air Act 7 (2001) (hereinafter Belden), and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 685, included the PSD provisions, which aimed at giving added protection to air quality in certain parts of the country “notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of” the NAAQS. 42 U. S. C. § 7470(1). The 1977 amendments required a PSD permit before a “major emitting facility” could be “constructed” in an area covered by the scheme. § 7475(a). As originally enacted, PSD applied only to newly constructed sources, but soon a technical amendment added the following subparagraph: “The term ‘construction’ when used in connection with any source or facility, includes the modification (as defined in section 111(a)) of any source or facility.” §14(a)(54), 91 Stat. 1402, 42 U. S. C. § 7479(2)(C); see also New York v. EPA, 413 F. 3d 3, 13 (CADC 2005) (per curiam). In other words, the “construction” requiring a PSD permit under the statute was made to include (though it was not limited to) a “modification” as defined in the statutory NSPS provisions. In 1980, EPA issued PSD regulations, which “limited the application of [PSD] review” of modified sources to instances of “‘major’ modification,” Belden 46, defined as “any physical change in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary source that would result in a significant net emissions increase of any pollutant subject to regulation under the Act.” 40 CFR § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987). Further regulations in turn addressed various elements of this definition, three of which are to the point here. First, the regulations specified that an operational change consisting merely of “[a]n increase in the hours of operation or in the production rate” would not generally constitute a “physical change in or change in the method of operation.” § 51.166(b)(2)(iii)(/). For purposes of a PSD permit, that is, such an operational change would not amount to a “modification” as the Act defines it. Second, the PSD regulations defined a “net emissions increase” as “[a]ny increase in actual emissions from a particular physical change or change in the method of operation,” net of other contemporaneous “increases and decreases in actual emissions at the source.” §51.166(b)(3)(i). “Actual emissions” were defined to “equal the average rate, in tons per year, at which the unit actually emitted the pollutant during a two-year period which precedes the particular date and which is representative of normal source operation.” §51.166(b)(21)(ii). “[AJetual emissions” were to be “calculated using the unit’s actual operating hours [and] production rates.” Ibid. Third, the term “significant” was defined as “a rate of emissions that would equal or exceed” one or another enumerated threshold, each expressed in “tons per year.” § 51.166(b)(23)(i). It would be bold to try to synthesize these statutory and regulatory provisions in a concise paragraph, but three points are relatively clear about the regime that covers this case: (a) The Act defines modification of a stationary source of a pollutant as a physical change to it, or a change in the method of its operation, that increases the amount of a pollutant discharged or emits a new one. (b) EPA’s NSPS regulations require a source to use the best available pollution-limiting technology only when a modification would increase the rate of discharge of pollutants measured in kilograms per hour. (c) EPA’s 1980 PSD regulations require a permit for a modification (with the same statutory definition) only when it is a major one and only when it would increase the actual annual emission of a pollutant above the actual average for the two prior years. The Court of Appeals held that Congress’s provision defining a PSD modification by reference to an NSPS modification caught not only the statutory NSPS definition, but also whatever regulatory gloss EPA puts on that definition at any given time (for the purposes of the best technology requirement). When, therefore, EPA’s PSD regulations specify the “change” that amounts to a “major modification” requiring a PSD permit, they must measure an increase in “the amount of any air pollutant emitted,” 42 U. S. C. § 7411(a)(4), in terms of the hourly rate of discharge, just the way NSPS regulations do. Petitioners and the United States say, on the contrary, that when EPA addresses the object of the PSD scheme it is free to put a different regulatory interpretation on the common statutory core of “modification,” by measuring increased emission not in terms of hourly rate but by the actual, annual discharge of a pollutant that will follow the modification, regardless of rate per hour. This disagreement is the nub of the case. II Respondent Duke Energy Corporation runs 30 coal-fired electric generating units at eight plants in North and South Carolina. United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F. 3d 539, 544 (CA4 2005). The units were placed in service between 1940 and 1975, and each includes a boiler containing thousands of steel tubes arranged in sets. Ibid. Between 1988 and 2000, Duke replaced or redesigned 29 tube assemblies in order to extend the life of the units and allow them to run longer each day. Ibid. The United States filed this action in 2000, claiming, among other things, that Duke violated the PSD provisions by doing this work without permits. Environmental Defense, North Carolina Sierra Club, and North Carolina Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby/Education Fund intervened as plaintiffs and filed a complaint charging similar violations. Duke moved for summary judgment, one of its positions being that none of the projects was a “major modification” requiring a PSD permit because none increased hourly rates of emissions. The District Court agreed with Duke’s reading of the 1980 PSD regulations. It reasoned that their express exclusion of “ ‘[a]n increase in the hours of operation’ ” from the definition of a “ ‘physical change or change in the method of operation’” implied that “post-project emissions levels must be calculated assuming” preproject hours of operation. 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 640-641 (MDNC 2003). Consequently, the District Court said, a PSD “major modification” can occur “only if the project increases the hourly rate of emissions.” Id., at 641. The District Court found further support for its construction of the 1980 PSD regulations in one letter and one memorandum written in 1981 by EPA’s Director of the Division of Stationary Source Enforcement, Edward E. Reich. Id., at 641-642. The United States and intervenor-plaintiffs (collectively, plaintiffs) subsequently stipulated “that they do not contend that the projects at issue in this case caused an increase in the maximum hourly rate of emissions at any of Duke Energy’s units.” App. 504. Rather, their claim “is based solely on their contention that the projects would have been projected to result in an increased utilization of the units at issue.” Ibid. Duke, for its part, stipulated to plaintiffs’ right to appeal the District Court’s determination that projects resulting in greater operating hours are not “major modifications” triggering the PSD permit requirement, absent an increase in the hourly rate of emissions. The District Court then entered summary judgment for Duke on all PSD claims. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, “albeit for somewhat different reasons.” 411 F. 3d, at 542. “[T]he language and various interpretations of the PSD regulations... are largely irrelevant to the proper analysis of this case,” reasoned the Court of Appeals, “because Congress’ decision to create identical statutory definitions of the term ‘modification’” in the NSPS and PSD provisions of the Clean Air Act “has affirmatively mandated that this term be interpreted identically” in the regulations promulgated under those provisions. Id., at 547, n. 3, 550. The Court of Appeals relied principally on the authority of Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U. S. 247, 250 (1981), where we held against the Government’s differing interpretations of the word “wages” in different tax provisions. 411 F. 3d, at 550. As the Court of Appeals saw it, Rowan establishes an “effectively irrebuttable” presumption that PSD regulations must contain the same conditions for a “modification” as the NSPS regulations, including an increase in the hourly rate of emissions. 411 F. 3d, at 550. As the Court of Appeals said, Duke had not initially relied on Rowan, see 411 F. 3d, at 547, n. 4, and when the Court sua sponte requested supplemental briefing on Rowan's relevance, plaintiffs injected a new issue into the case. They argued that a claim that the 1980 PSD regulation exceeded statutory authority would be an attack on the validity of the regulation that could not be raised in an enforcement proceeding. See 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(2). Under § 307(b) of the Act, they said, judicial review for validity can be obtained only by a petition to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, generally within 60 days of EPA’s rule-making. 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b). The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. “Our choice of this interpretation of the PSD regulations... is not an invalidation of those regulations,” it said, because “the PSD regulations can be interpreted” to require an increase in the hourly emissions rate as an element of a major “modification” triggering the permit requirement. 411 F. 3d, at 549, n. 7. To show that the 1980 PSD regulations are open to this construction, the Court of Appeals cited the conclusions of the District Court and the Reich opinions. We granted the petition for certiorari brought by intervenor-plaintiffs, 547 U. S. 1127 (2006), and now vacate. III The Court of Appeals understood that it was simply construing EPA’s 1980 PSD regulations in a permissible way that left them in harmony with their NSPS counterpart and, hence, the Act’s single definition of “modification.” The plaintiffs say that the Court of Appeals was rewriting the PSD regulations in a way neither required by the Act nor consistent with their own text. It is true that no precise line runs between a purposeful but permissible reading of the regulation adopted to bring it into harmony with the Court of Appeals’s view of the statute, and a determination that the regulation as written is invalid. But the latter occurred here, for the Court of Appeals’s efforts to trim the PSD regulations to match their different NSPS counterparts can only be seen as an implicit declaration that the PSD regulations were invalid as written. A In applying the 1980 PSD regulations to Duke’s conduct, the Court of Appeals thought that, by defining the term “modification” identically in its NSPS and PSD provisions, the Act required EPA to conform its PSD interpretation of that definition to any such interpretation it reasonably adhered to under NSPS. But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as “effectively irrebuttable.” 411 F. 3d, at 550. We also understand that “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section.” Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932). Thus, the “natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning... is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.” Ibid. A given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies. The point is the same even when the terms share a common statutory definition, if it is general enough, as we recognized in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337 (1997). There the question was whether the term “employees” in § 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covered former employees. Title VII expressly defined the term “employee,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(f), but the definition was “consistent with either current or past employment,” 519 U. S., at 342, and we held that “each section” of Title VII “must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning that would- resolve the issue in dispute,” id., at 343-344. If Robinson were inconsistent with Rowan (on which the Court of Appeals relied), it would be significant that Robinson is the later case, but we read the two as compatible. In Rowan, the question was whether the value of meals and lodging given to employees by an employer for its own convenience should be counted in computing “wages” under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U. S. C. § 3101 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U. S. C. § 3301 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). Treasury Regulations made this value “includable in ‘wages’ as defined in FICA and FUTA, even though excludable from ‘wages’ under the substantially identical” statutory definition of “wages” for income-tax withholding purposes. 452 U. S., at 252. Although we ultimately held that the income-tax treatment was the proper one across the board, we did not see it this way simply because a “substantially identical” definition of “wages” appeared in each of the different statutory provisions. Instead, we relied on a manifest “congressional concern for the interest of simplicity and ease of administration.” Id., at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted). The FICA and FUTA regulations fell for failing to “serve that interest,” id., at 257, not for defying definitional identity. In fact, in a setting much like Rowan, we recently declined to require uniformity when resolving ambiguities in identical statutory terms. In United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200 (2001), we rejected the notion that using the phrase “wages paid” in both “the discrete taxation and benefits eligibility contexts” can, standing alone, “compel symmetrical construction,” id., at 213; we gave “substantial judicial deference” to the “longstanding,” “reasonable,” and differing interpretations adopted by the Internal Revenue Service in its regulations and Revenue Rulings. Id., at 218-220. There is, then, no “effectively irrebuttable” presumption that the same defined term in different provisions of the same statute must “be interpreted identically.” 411 F. 3d, at 550. Context counts. It is true that the Clean Air Act did not merely repeat the term “modification” or the same definition of that word in its NSPS and PSD sections; the PSD language referred back to the section defining “modification” for NSPS purposes. 42 U. S. C. §7479(2)(C).But that did not matter in Robinson, and we do not see the distinction as making any difference here. Nothing in the text or the legislative history of the technical amendments that added the cross-reference to NSPS suggests that Congress had details of regulatory implementation in mind when it imposed PSD requirements on modified sources; the cross-reference alone is certainly no unambiguous congressional code for eliminating the customary agency discretion to resolve questions about a statutory definition by looking to the surroundings of the defined term, where it occurs. See New York, 413 F. 3d, at 19 (“So far as appears,... [this] incorporation by reference [is] the equivalent of Congress’s having simply repeated in the [PSD] context the definitional language used before in the NSPS context”); cf. 91 Stat. 745 (expressly incorporating in an unrelated provision of the 1977 amendments “the interpretative regulation of the [EPA] Administrator... published in 41 Federal Register 55524-30” with specified exceptions); New York, supra, at 19 (“Congress’s failure to use such an express incorporation of prior regulations for ‘modification’ cuts against” any suggestion that “Congress intended to incorporate” into the Act the “preexisting regulatory definition” of “modification”). Absent any iron rule to ignore the reasons for regulating PSD and NSPS “modifications” differently, EPA’s construction need do no more than fall within the limits of what is reasonable, as set by the Act’s common definition. B The Court of Appeals’s reasoning that the PSD regulations must conform to their NSPS counterparts led the court to read those PSD regulations in a way that seems to us too far a stretch for the language used. The 1980 PSD regulations on “modification” simply cannot be taken to track the Agency’s regulatory definition under the NSPS. True, the 1980 PSD regulations may be no seamless narrative, but they clearly do not define a “major modification” in terms of an increase in the “hourly emissions rate.” On its face, the definition in the PSD regulations specifies no rate at all, hourly or annual, merely requiring a physical or operational change “that would result in a significant net emissions increase of any” regulated pollutant. 40 CFR § 51.166(b)(2)(i). But even when a rate is mentioned, as in the regulatory definitions of the two terms, “significant” and “net emissions increase,” the rate is annual, not hourly. Each of the thresholds that quantify “significant” is described in “tons per year,” § 51.166(b)(23)(i), and a “net emissions increase” is an “increase in actual emissions” measured against an “average” prior emissions rate of so many “tons per year,” §§51.166(b)(3)(i) and (21)(ii). And what is further at odds with the idea that hourly rate is relevant is the mandate that “[ajctual emissions shall be calculated using the unit’s actual operating hours,” § 51.166(b)(21)(ii), since “actual emissions” must be measured in a manner that looks to the number of hours the unit is or probably will be actually running. What these provisions are getting at is a measure of actual operations averaged over time, and the regulatory language simply cannot be squared with a regime under which “hourly rate of emissions,” 411 F. 3d, at 550 (emphasis deleted), is dispositive. The reasons invoked by the Court of Appeals for its different view are no match for these textual differences. The appellate court cited two authorities ostensibly demonstrating that the 1980 PSD regulations “can be interpreted consistently” with the hourly emissions test, the first being the analysis of the District Court in this case. Id., at 549, n. 7. The District Court thought that an increase in the hourly emissions rate was necessarily a prerequisite to a PSD “major modification” because a provision of the 1980 PSD regulations excluded an “ ‘increase in the hours of operation or in the production rate’ ” from the scope of “ ‘[a] physical change or change in the method of operation.’ ” 278 F. Supp. 2d, at 640-641 (quoting 40 CFR §§51.166(b)(2)(iii)(/) and (3)(i)(a) (1987)). The District Court read this exclusion to require, in effect, that a source’s hours of operation “be held constant” when preproject emissions are being compared with postproject emissions for the purpose of calculating the “net emissions increase.” 278 F. Supp. 2d, at 640. We think this understanding of the 1980 PSD regulations makes the mistake of overlooking the difference between the two separate components of the regulatory definition of “major modification”: “[1] any physical change in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary source that [2] would result in a significant net emissions increase of any pollutant subject to regulation under the Act.” § 51.166(b)(2)(i); cf. New York, 413 F. 3d, at 11 (“[The statutory] definition requires both a change — whether physical or operational — and a resulting increase in emissions of a pollutant” (emphasis in original)); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F. 2d 901, 907 (CA7 1990) (same). The exclusion of “increase in... hours... or... production rate,” §51.166(b)(2)(iii)(/), speaks to the first of these components (“physical change... or change in... method,” § 51.166(b)(2)(i)), but not to the second (“significant net emissions increase,” ibid.). As the preamble to the 1980 PSD regulations explains, forcing companies to obtain a PSD permit before they could simply adjust operating hours “would severely and unduly hamper the ability of any company to take advantage of favorable market conditions.” 45 Fed. Reg. 52704. In other words, a mere increase in the	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 32 ]	sc_adminaction
KAWASHIMA et ux. v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL No. 10-577. Argued November 7, 2011 Decided February 21, 2012 Thomas J. Whalen argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Mark A. Johnston, Nicholas T Mo-raites, Edward O. C. Ord, and Jenny Lin-Alva. Curtis E. Gannon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Donald E. Keener, and Bryan S. Beier. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Ira J. Kurzban; for National Immigration and Criminal Defense Organizations by Sri Srinivasan; and for Johnnie M. Walters by Richard W. O’Neill and Robert S. Fink. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns whether aliens who commit certain federal tax crimes are subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony. We hold that violations of 26 U. S. C. §§7206(1) and (2) are crimes “involving] fraud or deceit” under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and are therefore aggravated felonies as that term is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. §1101 et seq., when the loss to the Government exceeds $10,000. H-l Petitioners, Akio and Fusako Kawashima, are natives and citizens of Japan who have been lawful permanent residents of the United States since June 21, 1984. In 1997, Mr. Ka-washima pleaded guilty to one count of willfully making and subscribing a false tax return in violation of 26 U. S. C. §7206(1). Mrs. Kawashima pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 7206(2). Following their convictions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged the Kawashimas with being deport-able from the United States as aliens who had been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable”)- In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress listed categories of offenses that qualify as “aggravated felonies” for the purpose of deportation. See § 1101(a)(43). Here, the Government charged the Kawashimas with being deportable for committing offenses under subparagraph (M) of § 1101(a)(43). That subparagraph classifies as an aggravated felony an offense that either: “(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.” Hereinafter, we refer to § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) as “Clause (i)” and to § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) as “Clause (ii).” At their deportation hearing, the Kawashimas argued that their convictions under 26 U. S. C. § 7206 did not qualify as aggravated felonies under subparagraph (M). The Immigration Judge disagreed and ordered removal, concluding that the Kawashimas’ convictions qualified as aggravated felonies under Clause (i). The Kawashimas appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Board to reopen its decision, the Kawashimas filed petitions for review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that “convictions for violating §§7206(1) and (2) in which the tax loss to the government exceeds $10,000 constitute aggravated felonies under subsection (M)(i).” 615 F. 3d 1043, 1053 (2010). The court concluded that Mr. Kawashima’s conviction under §7206(1) qualified as an aggravated felony within Clause (i)’s definition “because it involved ‘fraud or deceit’ and because his offense resulted in a loss to the government in excess of $10,000.” Id., at 1055. The Ninth Circuit also determined that Mrs. Kawashima’s conviction under § 7206(2) “necessarily‘involve [d] fraud or deceit.’” Id., at 1055. But because Mrs. Kawashima’s plea agreement was not in the administrative record, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the Board to determine whether Mrs. Kawashima’s conviction had caused a loss to the Government in excess of $10,000. Id., at 1056-1057. We granted the Kawashimas’ petition for a writ of certio-rari to determine whether their convictions for violations of 26 U. S. C. §§ 7206(1) and (2) respectively qualify as aggravated felonies under Clause (i). 563 U. S. 1007 (2011). We now affirm. II The Kawashimas argue that they cannot be deported for commission of an “aggravated felony” because crimes under §§7206(1) and (2) do not “involvfe] fraud or deceit” as required by Clause (i). The Kawashimas also assert that their convictions under §7206 are not “aggravated felonies” because tax crimes are not included within Clause (i) at all. We address each argument in turn. A The Kawashimas contend that their offenses of conviction do not fall within the scope of Clause (i) because neither “fraud” nor “deceit” is a formal element of a conviction under §7206(1) or §7206(2). The Government responds that the Kawashimas’ convictions necessarily involved deceit because they required a showing that the Kawashimas willfully made materially false statements. To determine whether the Ka-washimas’ offenses “involv[e] fraud or deceit” within the meaning of Clause (i), we employ a categorical approach by looking to the statute defining the crime of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183, 186 (2007) (applying the approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 599-600 (1990)). If the elements of the offenses establish that the Kawashimas committed crimes involving fraud or deceit, then the first requirement of Clause (i) is satisfied. Mr. Kawashima was convicted of violating 26 U. S. C. §7206(1), which provides that any person who “[w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter,” shall be guilty of a felony. Mr. Kawashima does not dispute that the elements of a violation of §7206(1) include, inter alia, that the document in question was false as to a material matter, that the defendant did not believe the document to be true and correct as to every material matter, and that he acted willfully with the specific intent to violate the law. See, e. g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F. 3d 1369, 1382 (CA4 1996); United States v. Kaiser, 893 F. 2d 1300, 1305 (CA11 1990); United States v. Marabelles, 724 F. 2d 1374,1380 (CA9 1984); United States v. Whyte, 699 F. 2d 375, 381 (CA7 1983). Although the words “fraud” and “deceit” are absent from the text of § 7206(1) and are not themselves formal elements of the crime, it does not follow that his offense falls outside of Clause (i). The scope of that clause is not limited to offenses that include fraud or deceit as formal elements. Rather, Clause (i) refers more broadly to offenses that “involv[e]” fraud or deceit — meaning offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct. When subparagraph (M) was enacted, the term “deceit” meant “the act or practice of deceiving (as by falsification, concealment, or cheating).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 584 (1993). Mr. Kawashima’s conviction under § 7206(1) establishes that he knowingly and willfully submitted a tax return that was false as to a material matter. He therefore committed a felony that involved “deceit.” Turning to Mrs. Kawashima, our analysis follows a similar path. Mrs. Kawashima was convicted of violating 26 U. S. C. § 7206(2), which declares that any person who “[willfully aids or assists in . . . the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter,” has committed a felony. Mrs. Kawashima does not dispute that the elements of a violation of § 7206(2) include, inter alia, that the document in question was false as to a material matter and that the defendant acted willfully. See Aramony, supra, at 1382; United States v. Sassak, 881 F. 2d 276, 278 (CA6 1989); United States v. Hooks, 848 F. 2d 785, 788-789 (CA7 1988); United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F. 2d 1423, 1426-1427 (CA9 1983). We conclude that Mrs. Kawa-shima’s conviction establishes that, by knowingly and willfully assisting her husband’s filing of a materially false tax return, Mrs. Kawashima also committed a felony that involved “deceit.” The language of Clause (i) is clear. Anyone who is convicted of an offense that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000” has committed an aggravated felony and is subject to deportation pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The elements of willfully making and subscribing a false corporate tax return, in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 7206(1), and of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return, in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 7206(2), establish that those crimes are de-portable offenses because they necessarily entail deceit. B The Kawashimas’ second argument is based on inferences drawn from the interaction of Clause (i) and Clause (ii). The full text of subparagraph (M) reads as follows: “(43) The term ‘aggravated felony’ means— “(M) an offense that— “(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or “(ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.” The Kawashimas argue that when Clause (i) is read together with Clause (ii), Clause (i) must be interpreted as being inapplicable to tax crimes. In their view, subparagraph (M), when considered in its entirety, demonstrates that Congress was addressing two mutually exclusive categories of crimes in subparagraph (M)’s two clauses: general, nontax crimes involving fraud or deceit that cause actual losses to real victims in Clause (i), and tax crimes involving revenue losses to the Government in Clause (ii). For the reasons discussed below, this argument cannot overcome the plain language of Clause (i), which encompasses the Kawashimas’ offenses of conviction. 1 The Kawashimas contend that textual differences between Clauses (i) and (ii) indicate that Congress' intended to exclude tax crimes from Clause (i). Specifically, they note that Clause (i) addresses “loss to the victim,” whereas Clause (ii) addresses “revenue loss to the Government.” This difference in language does not establish Congress’ intent to remove tax crimes from the scope of Clause (i). Clause (i) covers a broad class of offenses that involve fraud or deceit. Clause (i) thus uses correspondingly broad language to refer to the wide range of potential losses and victims. Clause (ii), on the other hand, is limited to the single type of offense “described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion),” which, by definition, can only cause one type of loss (revenue loss) to one type of victim (the Government). Congress’ decision to tailor Clause (ii)’s language to match the sole type of offense covered by Clause (ii) does not demonstrate that Congress also intended to implicitly circumscribe the broad scope of Clause (i)’s plain language. 2 Next, the Kawashimas argue that interpreting Clause (i) to include tax crimes violates the presumption against superfluities by rendering Clause (ii) completely redundant to Clause (i). Clause (ii) explicitly states that convictions for tax evasion pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7201 that cause a revenue loss of at least $10,000 to the Government are aggravated felonies. The Kawashimas assert that, if Clause (i) applies to tax crimes, then qualifying convictions for tax evasion under Clause (ii) would also qualify as aggravated felonies under Clause (i), because tax evasion is a crime involving fraud or deceit. To buttress this argument, the Kawashi-mas point to a body of law providing that a conviction for tax evasion under §7201 collaterally estops the convicted taxpayer from contesting a civil penalty under 26 U. S. C. § 6663(b) for “underpayment... attributable to fraud.” See, e. g., Gray v. Commissioner, 708 F. 2d 243, 246 (CA6 1983) (“Numerous federal courts have held that a conviction for federal income tax evasion, either upon a plea of guilty, or upon a jury verdict of guilt, conclusively establishes fraud in a subsequent civil tax fraud proceeding through application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel”). Therefore, according to the Kawashimas, if Clause (i) covers tax offenses, then Clause (ii) is mere surplusage. We disagree with the Kawashimas’ contention that the specific mention of one type of tax crime in Clause (ii) impliedly limits the scope of Clause (i)’s plain language, which extends to any offense that “involves fraud or deceit.” We think it more likely that Congress specifically included tax evasion offenses under 26 U. S. C. § 7201 in Clause (ii) to remove any doubt that tax evasion qualifies as an aggravated felony. Several considerations support this conclusion. Like §§ 7206(1) and (2), § 7201 does not, on its face, mention fraud or deceit. Instead, § 7201 simply provides that “[a]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by [the Internal Revenue Code] or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony.” Accordingly, neither fraud nor deceit is among the elements of a conviction under §7201, which include: (1) willfulness; (2) the existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or an attempted evasion of the tax. Boulware v. United States, 552 U. S. 421, 424, n. 2 (2008). A conviction under § 7201, therefore, only qualifies as an aggravated felony under Clause (i) if a willful, affirmative attempt to evade a tax necessarily entails fraud or deceit. This Court’s decision in United States v. Scharton, 285 U. S. 518 (1932), gave Congress good reason to doubt that a conviction under §7201 satisfies that condition. In Schar-ton, the defendant was indicted for attempting to evade income taxes by falsely understating his taxable income. The question before the Court was whether the crime was subject to the 3-year statute of limitations generally applicable to tax crimes, or whether it was instead subject to the 6-year statute of limitations applicable to “ ‘offenses involving the defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner.’ ” Id., at 520, n. 2 (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 585 (1926 ed., Supp. V)). The Government argued that the 6-year statute of limitations applied because “fraud is implicit in the concept of evading or defeating” and because any effort to evade a tax is tantamount to an attempt to defraud the taxing body. 285 U. S., at 520-521. The Court rejected that argument, noting that, in an indictment for evasion, “an averment [of intent to defraud] would be sur-plusage, for it would be sufficient to plead and prove a willful attempt to evade or defeat.” Id., at 521. Moreover, §7201 includes two offenses: “the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the assessment of a tax as well as the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the payment of a tax.” Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343, 354 (1965) (emphasis in original). As the Government notes, it is possible to willfully evade or defeat payment of a tax under § 7201 without making any misrepresentation. For example, §7201 can be violated by a taxpayer who files a truthful tax return, but who also takes affirmative steps to evade payment by moving his assets beyond the reach of the Internal Revenue Service. Although the Government concedes that evasion-of-payment cases will almost invariably involve some affirmative acts of fraud or deceit, it is still true that the elements of tax evasion pursuant to §7201 do not necessarily involve fraud or deceit. Thus, we conclude that the specific inclusion of tax evasion in Clause (ii) was intended to ensure that tax evasion pursuant to § 7201 was a deportable offense. Clause (ii) does not implicitly remove all other tax offenses from the scope of Clause (i)’s plain language. 3 The Kawashimas also assert that the separate treatment of tax crimes and crimes involving fraud and deceit in the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) supports their contention that Congress did not intend to include tax crimes within Clause (i). They point to the fact that, in 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission included within the Guidelines a category of “offenses involving fraud or deceit.” USSG §§ 2F1.1 to 2F1.2 (deleted effective Nov. 1,2001). The Commission simultaneously included “offenses involving taxation” as a separate category. §2T1.1 et seq. (Nov. 2011). Although the Kawashimas acknowledge that they have found no evidence that Congress actually considered the Guidelines, they contend that “it is likely that the language of [Clause (i)] and [Clause (ii)] was taken from the Sentencing Guidelines” by the sponsors of the bill that expanded the definition of aggravated felony to include subparagraph (M). Brief for Petitioners 29. Therefore, the theory goes, we can infer from the similar language in the Guidelines that Congress did not intend Clause (i) to include tax crimes. We reject the Kawashimas’ reliance on the Guidelines. The Kawashimas’ argument is at odds with the fact that, unlike the Guideline that the Kawashimas cite, Clause (ii) does not refer to all offenses “involving taxation.” Rather, Clause (ii) is expressly limited to tax evasion offenses under § 7201. That textual difference undercuts any inference that Congress was considering, much less incorporating, the distinction drawn by the Guidelines. C Finally, the Kawashimas argue that subparagraph (M)’s treatment of tax crimes other than tax evasion is ambiguous, and that we should therefore construe the statute in their favor. It is true that we have, in the past, construed ambiguities in deportation statutes in the alien’s favor. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 320 (2001). We think the application of the present statute clear enough that resort to the rule of lenity is not warranted. * * * For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that convictions under 26 U. S. C. §§ 7206(1) and (2) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000 qualify as aggravated felonies pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Because the Kawashimas are subject to deportation as aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. On March 1, 2003, most of the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased to exist. Before 1996, there were two procedures for removing aliens from the country: “deportation” of aliens who were already present, and “exclusion” of aliens seeking entry or reentry into the country. Since 1996, the Government has used a unified procedure, known as “removal,” for both exclusion and deportation. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229, 1229a. We use the terms “deportation” and “removal” interchangeably in this opinion. We note that the issue whether the Kawashimas’ offenses satisfy the second requirement of Clause (i) — that the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000 — is not before us. We address only whether their offenses of conviction qualify as crimes “involv[ing] fraud or deceit.”	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 6 ]	sc_adminaction
GUTKNECHT v. UNITED STATES No. 71. Argued November 20, 1969 Decided January 19, 1970 Michael E. Tigar argued the cause for petitioner pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Melvin L. Wulf and Chester Bruvold. Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Attorney General Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, and Philip R. Monahan. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by George Soli and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress, and by Marvin M. Karpatkin, Michael N. Pollet, and E. Curry First for the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents an important question under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 62 Stat. 604, as amended, 65 Stat. 75, 81 Stat. 100. Petitioner registered with his Selective Service Local Board and was classified I-A. Shortly thereafter he received a II-S (student) classification. In a little over a year he notified the Board that he was no longer a student and was classified I-A. Meanwhile he had asked for an exemption as a conscientious objector. The Board denied that exemption, reclassifying him as I-A, and he appealed to the State Board. While that appeal was pending, he surrendered his registration certificate and notice of classification by leaving them on the steps of the Federal Building in Minneapolis with a statement explaining he was opposed to the war in Vietnam. That was on October 16, 1967. On November 22, 1967, his appeal to the State Board was denied. On November 27, 1967, he was notified that he was I-A. On December 20, 1967, he was declared delinquent by the local board. On December 26, 1967, he was ordered to report for induction on January 24,1968. He reported at the induction center, but in his case the normal procedure of induction was not followed. Rather, he signed a statement, “I refuse to take part, or all, [sic] of the prescribed processing.” Thereafter he was indicted for wilfully and knowingly failing and neglecting “to perform a duty required of him” under the Act. He was tried without a jury, found guilty, and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. 283 F. Supp. 945. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 406 F. 2d 494. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 394 U. S. 997. I Among the defenses tendered at the trial was the legality of the delinquency regulations which were applied to petitioner. It is that single question which we will consider. By the regulations promulgated under the Act a local board may declare a registrant to be a “delinquent” whenever he “has failed to perform any duty or duties required of him under the selective service law other than the duty to comply with an Order to Report for Induction (SSS Form No. 252) or the duty to comply with an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of Employer (SSS Form No. 153)... 32 CFR § 1642.4. In this case, petitioner was declared a delinquent for failing to have his registration certificate (SSS Form No. 2) and current classification notice (SSS Form No. 110) in his personal possession at all times, as required by 32 CFR §§.1617.1 and 1623.5, respectively. The consequences of being declared a delinquent under § 1642.4 are of two types: (1) Registrants who have deferments or exemptions may be reclassified in one of the classes available for service, I-A, I-A-O, or I-O, whichever is deemed applicable. 32 CFR § 1642.12. (2) Registrants who are already classified I-A, I-A-O, or I-O, and those who are reclassified to such a status, will be given first priority in the order of call for induction, requiring them to be called even ahead of volunteers for induction. 32 CFR § 1642.13. The latter consequence deprives the registrant of his previous standing in the order of call as set out in 32 CFR § 1631.7. The order-of-call provision in use when petitioner was declared “delinquent” is set out in 32 CFR § 1631.7 (a). The provision lists, in order, six categories of registrants and provides that the registrants shall be selected and ordered to report for induction according to the order of those categories. The first category is delinquents; the next category is volunteers; the other four categories consist of nonvolunteers. In this case, the petitioner was in the third of the six categories at the time he was declared to be a “delinquent.” By virtue of the declaration of delinquency he was moved to the first of the categories which meant, according to the brief of the Department of Justice, that “it is unlikely that petitioner, who was 20 years of age when ordered to report for induction, would have been called at such an early date had he not been declared a delinquent.” If a person, who is ordered to report for induction or alternative civilian service, refuses to comply with that order, he subjects himself to criminal prosecution. See 32 CFR §§ 1642.41, 1660.30. There is no doubt concerning the propriety of the latter criminal sanction, for Congress has specifically provided for the punishment of those who disobey selective service statutes and regulations in § 12 of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). The question posed by this case concerns the legitimacy of the delinquency regulations, which were applied to the petitioner, so as to deprive him of his previous standing in the order of call. II There is a preliminary point which must be mentioned and that is the suggestion that petitioner should have taken an administrative appeal from the order declaring him “delinquent” and that his failure to do so bars the defense in the criminal prosecution. The pertinent regulation is 32 CFR § 1642.14, which gives a delinquent who “is classified in or reclassified into Class I-A, Class I-A-0 or Class I-O” three rights: (a) the right to a personal appearance, upon request, “under the same circumstances as in any other case”; (b) the right to have his classification reopened “in the discretion of the local hoard”; and (c) the right to an appeal “under the same circumstances and by the same persons as in any other case.” (Emphasis added.) The right to a personal appearance “in any other case” is covered by 32 CFR § 1624.1 (a). That section gives the right to “[e]very registrant after his classification is determined by the local board” provided a request is made therefor within 30 days. (Emphasis added.) The action taken against this petitioner, however, did not involve classification. The term “classification” is used exclusively in the regulations to refer to classification in one of the classes determining availability for service, e. g., I-A, I-O. See 32 CFR pts. 1621-1623. “Delinquency” is not such a classification, and a registrant is “declared” a delinquent, not “classified” as a delinquent. See 32 CFR pt. 1642. The right to reopen his classification is also irrelevant to petitioner as he is not attacking his classification, but only his accelerated induction. The right to appeal “as in any other case” is covered by 32 CFR § 1626.2(a). That section provides that “[t]he registrant... may appeal to an appeal board from the classification of a registrant by the local board.” (Emphasis added.) Again, since petitioner was not classified in conjunction with his delinquency, but only had his induction accelerated, it would mean that he did not have the right to an appeal under the regulations. We are not advised, in any authoritative way, that this interpretation of the regulations is contrary to the administrative construction of them or to the accepted practice. Ill We come then to the merits. The problem of “delinquency” goes back to the 1917 Act, 40 Stat. 76, as shown in the Appendix to this opinion. The present “delinquency” regulations with which we are concerned stem from the 1948 Act, 62 Stat. 604. The regulations issued under the 1948 Act were substantially identical to th'e present delinquency regulations, 32 CFR pt. 1642. Nothing in the 1948 Act or in any prior Act makes reference to delinquency or delinquents. The regulations purport to issue under the authority of § 10 of the 1948 Act. Section 10, however, relates neither to selection (§5) nor to deferments and exemptions (§6), but simply to the administration of the Act as delegated to the President: “The President is authorized — (1) to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this title.” 62 Stat. 619. The delinquency provisions of 32 CFR pt. 1642 survived the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 largely intact. Again, however, there is nothing to indicate that Congress authorized the Selective Service System to reclassify exempt or deferred registrants for punitive purposes and to provide for accelerated induction of delinquents. Rather, the Congress reaffirmed its intention under § 12 (60 U. S. C. App. § 462 (1964 ed., Supp. IV)), to punish delinquents through the criminal law. It is true, of course, that Congress referred to “delinquents” in § 6 (h)(1), 81 St-at. 102, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (h)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV): “As used in this subsection, the term ‘prime age group’ means the age group which has been designated by the President as the age group from which selections for induction into the Armed Forces are first to be made after delinquents and volunteers.” (Emphasis added.) This reference concerns only an order-of-call provision which institutes a call by age groups, 32 CFR § 1631.7 (b), a provision which has never been used. This casual mention of the term “delinquents,” moreover, must be measured against the explicit congressional provision for criminal punishment of those who violate the selective service laws, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), the congressional provision for exemptions and deferments, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), and congressional expressions emphasizing the importance of an impartial order of call, 50 U. S. C. App. § 455 (1964 ed., Supp. IV); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 9-10. Thus it was that the Solicitor General stated in his brief in Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, No. 46, O. T. 1968, 393 U. S. 233: “It is difficult to believe that Congress intended the local boards to have the unfettered discretion to decide that any violation of the Act or regulations warrants a declaration of delinquency, reclassification and induction... Brief for the United States 54. Judge Dooling stated in United States v. Eisdorfer, 299 F. Supp. 975, 989: “The delinquency procedure has no statutory authorization and no Congressional support except what can be spelled out of the 1967 amendment of 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (h)(1).... The delinquency regulations, moreover, disregard the structure of the Act; deferments and priorities-of-induction, adopted in the public interest, are treated as if they were forfeitable personal privileges.” Oestereich involved a case where a divinity school student with a statutory exemption and a IV-D classification was declared “delinquent” for turning in his registration certificate to the Government in protest against the war in Vietnam. His Board thereupon reclassified him as I-A. After he exhausted his administrative remedies, he was ordered to report for induction. At that point he brought suit in the District Court for judicial review of the action by the Board. We held that under the unusual circumstances of the case, pre-induction judicial review was permissible prior to induction and that there was no statutory authorization to use the “delinquency” procedure to deprive a registrant of a statutory exemption. We said: “There is no suggestion in the legislative history that, when Congress has granted an exemption and a registrant meets its terms and conditions, a Board can nonetheless withhold it from him for activities or conduct not material to the grant or withdrawal of the exemption. So to hold would make the Boards free-wheeling agencies meting out their brand of justice in a vindictive manner. “Once a person registers and qualifies for a statutory exemption, we find no legislative authority to deprive him of that exemption because of conduct or activities unrelated to the merits of granting or continuing that exemption.” 393 U. S., at 237. The question in the instant case is different because no- “exemption,” no “deferment,” no “classification” in the statutory sense is involved. “Delinquency” was used here not to change a classification but to accelerate petitioner’s induction from the third category to the first; and it was that difference which led the Court of Appeals to conclude that what we said in Oestereich was not controlling here. Deferment of the order of call may be the bestowal of great benefits; and its acceleration may be extremely punitive. As already indicated, the statutory policy is the selection of persons for training and service “in an impartial manner.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 455 (a)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). That is the only express statutory provision which gives specific content to that phrase. That section does permit people registered at one time to be selected “before, together with, or after” persons registered at a prior time. Moreover, those who have not reached the age of 19 are given a deferred position in the order of call. But those variations in the phrase “in an impartial manner” are of no particular help in the instant case, except to underline the concern of Congress with the integrity of that phrase. We know from the legislative history that, while Congress did not address itself specifically to the “delinquency” issue, it was vitally concerned with the order of selection, as well as with exemptions and deferments. Thus in 1967 a Conference Report brought House and Senate together against the grant of power to the President to initiate “a random system of selection” — a grant which, it was felt, would preclude Congress from “playing an affirmative role” in the constitutional task of “raising armies.” II. R. Conf. Rep. No. 346, supra, at 9-10. It is difficult to believe that with that show of resistance to a grant of a more limited power, there was acquiescence in the delegation of a broad, sweeping power to Selective Service to discipline registrants through the “delinquency” device. The problem of the order of induction was once more before the Congress late in 1969. Section 5 (a) (2) of the 1967 Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §455 (a)(2) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), provided: “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the President in establishing the order of induction for registrants within the various age groups found qualified for induction shall not effect any change in the method of determining the relative order of induction for such registrants within such age groups as has been heretofore established and in effect on the date of enactment of this paragraph, unless authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.” While §5 (a) (2) gave the President authority to designate a prime age group for induction, it required him to select from the oldest first within the group. S. Rep. No. 91-531, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1. The Act of November 26, 1969, 83 Stat. 220, repealed § 5 (a) (2) pursuant to a request of the President that a random system of selection be authorized. See S. Rep. No. 91-531, supra, at 3-4; H. R. Rep. No. 91-577, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 9. The random system has now been put in force. It applies of course only prospectively. But its legislative history, as well as the concern of the Congress that the order in which registrants are inducted be achieved “in an impartial manner,” emphasizes a deep concern by Congress with the problems of the order of induction as well as with those of exemptions, deferments, and classifications. While § 5 (a) (1) provides that “there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color,” 50 U. S. C. App. § 455 (a)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), there is no suggestion that as respects other types of discrimination the Selective Service has freewheeling authority to ride herd on the registrants using immediate induction as a disciplinary or vindictive measure. The power under the regulations to declare a registrant “delinquent” has no statutory standard or even guidelines. The power is exercised entirely at the discretion of the local board. It is a broad, roving authority, a type of administrative absolutism not congenial to our law-making traditions. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 128-129, we refused to impute to Congress the grant of “unbridled discretion” to the Secretary of State to issue or withhold a passport from a citizen “for any substantive reason he may choose.” Id., at 128. Where the liberties of the citizen are involved, we said that “we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.” Id., at 129. The Director of Selective Service described the “delinquency” regulations as designed “to prevent, wherever possible, prosecutions for minor infractions of rules” during the selective service processing. We search the Act in vain for any clues that Congress desired the Act to have punitive sanctions apart from the criminal prosecutions specifically authorized. Nor do we read it as granting personal privileges that may be forfeited for transgressions that affront the local board. If federal or state laws are violated by registrants, they can be prosecuted. If induction is to be substituted for these prosecutions, a vast rewriting of the Act is needed. Standards would be needed by which the legality of a declaration of “delinquency” could be judged. And the regulations, when written, would be subject to the customary inquiries as to infirmities on their face or in their application, including the question whether they were used to penalize or punish the free exercise of constitutional rights. Reversed. Mr. Chief Justice Burger concurs in the result reached by the Court generally for the reasons set put in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart. Mr. Justice White joins the opinion of the Court insofar as it holds that Congress has not delegated to the President the authority to promulgate the delinquency regulations involved in this case. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Under the Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, if a registrant failed to return his questionnaire or to report for physical examination, he was mailed a special order directing him to report for military service at a specified time. The registrant became a member of the service on the date specified in his order; any refusal to obey that order subjected him to prosecution under military law for desertion. “Since in most instances the delinquent registrant would never receive the order, due to not being in contact with his local board, he would normally acquire the status of a deserter without having any actual knowledge of his induction.” Selective Service System, Enforcement of the Selective Service Law 13 (Special Monograph No. 14, 1950). Thus, enforcement of the 1917 Act rested principally with the military, with court-martial being the main weapon of enforcement. In passing the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, Congress specifically ended the practice of subjecting delinquent registrants to military jurisdiction immediately upon receipt of their orders to report. Rather, § 11 of the Act provided that no registrant should be tried in a military court for disobeying selective service laws until he had been actually inducted, vesting criminal jurisdiction until such time in the United States district courts. No mention was made in the 1940 Act of “delinquency” or “delinquents.” These terms were first introduced by the Selective Service regulations issued under the Act, 32 CFR, c. VI (Supp. 1940), which prescribed various duties for registrants and defined a “delinquent” as one who failed to perform them: “A ‘delinquent’ is... (b) any registrant who prior to his induction into the military service fails to perform at the required time, or within the allowed period of given time, any duty imposed upon him by the selective service law, and directions given pursuant thereto, and has no valid reason for having failed to perform that duty.” 32 CFR § 601.106 (Supp.1940). Furthermore, the regulations provided definite procedures for processing delinquents: after giving them notice of their suspected delinquency, 32 CFR § 603.389 (Supp. 1940), and after investigating those suspected charges, 32 CFR §603.390 (Supp. 1940), the Selective Service System provided for two possible dispositions: On the one hand— “If the local board is convinced that a delinquent is not innocent of wrongful intent, or if a suspected delinquent does not report to the board within 5 days after the mailing of the Notice of Delinquency..., the board should report him to a United States District Attorney for prosecution under section 11 of the Selective Service Act.” 32 CFR § 603.391 (a) (Supp. 1940). On the other hand— “If the board finds that the suspected delinquent is innocent of any wrongful intent, the board shall proceed with him just as if he were never suspected of being a delinquent.” 32 CFR § 603.390 (a) (Supp. 1940). The February 1942 amendments to the regulations added a provision by which local boards would advise the United States Attorney in the exercise of his discretion not to prosecute those who had violated the selective service laws: “If it is determined that the delinquency is not wilful, or that substantial justice will result, the local board should encourage the delinquent to comply with his obligations under the law and, if he does so or offers to do so, should urge that any charge of delinquency against him or any prosecution of him for delinquency be dropped.” 32 CFR §642.5 (Cum. Supp. 1938-1943). This process was called the “enforcement procedure of education and persuasion.” Selective Service System, Enforcement of the Selective Service Law, supra, at 1-3. “The first steps of the board were to try educating and persuading [the delinquent] to comply, but if such failed his case was referred to the United States attorney for further education and persuasion or if such also failed, for prosecution.” Selective Service System, Organization and Administration of the System 241 (Special Monograph No. 3, 1951). If it was determined that the delinquency was “wilful” or that for any reason the United States Attorney should not exercise his discretion not to prosecute, the registrant was given an opportunity to avoid prosecution by “volunteering” for induction. “[T]he registrant could volunteer for induction from any classification, not just I-A, any time he so desired, and if he was a delinquent under prosecution such volunteering was often allowed from any stage of the proceedings.” Ibid. This procedure made it possible for the boards to siphon into military service some delinquents who might otherwise have traveled to jail: “Since the purpose of the [selective service] law is to provide men for the military establishment rather than for the penitentiaries, it would seem that when a registrant is willing to be inducted, he should not be prosecuted for minor offenses committed during his processing.” Selective Service System, Legal Aspects of Selective Service 47 (Rev. 1969). In November 1943, a new and substantially different set of regulations was issued. These regulations did not rely upon a delinquent’s “volunteering” for induction; instead they provided for reclassification of deferred or exempted delinquents into classes available for service, 32 CFR § 642.12 (a) (Supp. 1943), and provided for their priority induction without regard to the order of call established elsewhere in the regulations, 32 CFR § 642.13 (a) (Supp. 1943). A deferred or exempted registrant who was reclassified into a class available for service was accorded the procedural rights of personal appearance and appeal to which he would otherwise have been entitled. 32 CFR § 642.14 (a) (Supp. 1943). In the case of a registrant who was not reclassified as a result of his delinquency, the local board could “reopen” the classification and accord rights of personal appearance and appeal “at any time before induction.” 32 CFR § 642.14 (b) (Supp. 1943). If the local board determined that the registrant “knowingly became a delinquent,” however, it was directed to decline to reopen the registrant’s classification. Ibid. With respect to those registrants who were given appeal rights under § 642.14, the appeal board would determine if they had “knowingly” become delinquents. If they had, they were to be retained in a class available for service. If they had not, they were to be “classified on appeal in the usual manner” and their status as delinquents was to be “disregarded.” 32 CFR § 642.14 (c) (Supp. 1943). The purpose of these regulations was “to prevent delay in the induction of apprehended delinquent registrants.” Selective Service System, Enforcement of the Selective Service Law, supra, at 56 (emphasis added). More important, the Service recognized that the procedure had little to do with the statutory exemptions delineated by Congress but, rather, was punitive in nature: “[T]he Selective Service Regulations concerning delinquents... were amended again on November 1, 1943.... The purposes of these changes were... To provide for the administrative penalty to a delinquent of prompt classification into Classes I-A, I-A-0 or IV-E as available for service, in addition to the existing criminal sanction.” (Ibid.) (Emphasis added.) The regulation of November 1, 1943, purportedly drew its authority from § 3 of the 1940 Act, 54 Stat. 885. Nothing in that section, however, gives the Service powers of punitive reclassification and accelerated induction. Moreover, to the extent that § 3 has been so construed, it would conflict with the spirit of § 4 (a): “The selection of men for training and service under section 3... shall be made in an impartial manner, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, from the men who are liable for such training and service and who at the time of selection are registered and classified but not deferred or exempted.” 54 Stat. 887 (emphasis added). The delinquency provisions under the 1940 Act expired on March 31, 1947. The provisions issued under the 1948 Act are discussed in the text, supra. Under the terms of 32 CFR §1631.7 (a)(1) in effect at the time of petitioner’s trial, the first in line for induction were “[delinquents who have attained the age of 19 years in the order of their dates of birth with the oldest being selected first.” That provision has been included in the new § 1631.7 (a) promulgated after the random system of selection, discussed hereafter, was adopted. The order of call provided for by 32 CFR § 1631.7 (b) concerned calls of a designated “age group or groups,” a system never used. Cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185. In McKart, the petitioner, who challenged his I-A classification, was given a right to appeal under the regulations but failed to exercise it. This Court held that this failure did not preclude the petitioner from raising the invalidity of his I-A classification as a defense to his prosecution for refusal to report for induction. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, we held, was inapplicable where the question sought to be raised was solely one of statutory interpretation, id., at 197-199, and where application of the doctrine would serve to deprive a criminal defendant of a defense to his prosecution, id., at 197. The Department of Justice does not suggest that a registrant who has been declared a “delinquent” has administrative remedies for a review of that action. It points out, however, that the regulations, 32 CFR § 1642.4 (c), provide that: “A registrant who has been declared to be a delinquent may be removed from that status by the local board at any time.” It suggests that “at least up to the time of the issuance of the order to report for priority induction, it would be an abuse of discretion for a board to refuse removal in the case of a registrant who sought in good faith to correct his breach of duty.” Whatever may be the ultimate reach of 32 CFR § 1642.4 (c), it seems to be conceded that it has little relevance to the present case where, the Department states, “the local board had solid	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 106 ]	sc_adminaction
HOPKINS v. COHEN, ACTING SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE. No. 276. Argued March 11-12, 1968. Decided April 2, 1968. Allen Sharp and Harold H. Gearinger argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the briefs was Israel Steingold. Harris Weinstein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Weisl and Morton Hollander. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether the ceiling on an attorney’s fee under §206 (b)(1) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 79 Stat. 403, 42 U. S. C. §406 (b)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. II), is based on the benefits received by the claimant alone or may be based also on the benefits that other dependent members of his family receive by virtue of the claimant’s disability. Respondent ruled that petitioner was not totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the Act. The District Court reversed and awarded the claimant’s attorney a fee equal to 25% of the benefits accruing to the claimant alone. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 374 P. 2d 726. Because its ruling as to attorney fees conflicted with decisions of the Fourth Circuit (see Redden v. Celebrezze, 361 F. 2d 815; Lambert v. Celebrezze, 361 F. 2d 677), we granted the petition for certiorari. 389 U. S. 811. The disabled claimant qualifies under § 223 of the Act (42 U. S. C. § 423 (1964 ed., Supp. II)) and figures his primary benefits under § 215 of the Act (42 U. S. C. §415 (1964 ed., Supp. II)). The claimants who receive benefits as relatives of the disabled person who qualifies under § 223, figure their eligibility and amount of benefits under § 202 of the Act (42 U. S. C. §402 (1964 ed., Supp. II); wife, § 202 (b); child, § 202 (d); widow, § 202 (e); widower, § 202 (f); mother, § 202(g); parent, § 202 (h)). Section 202 of the Act describes in (b)(1) and (b)(2) the benefits payable to the wife on the disability of the husband, and in (d) (1) and (d) (2) the disability benefits of the child of the disabled claimant. The wife (§ 202 (b)(1)(A)) and the child (§ 202 (d)(1)(A)) may file for these benefits. But they need not always do so themselves, for the Act makes the right to such benefits dependent primarily on the status and condition of those dependent persons. The wife and child each compute their benefits on the basis of a percentage share of the disabled claimant’s primary benefits determined under § 223. See §§ 202 (b)(2) and 202 (d)(2). The maximum family benefit depends upon the amount of the primary benefit to which the disabled claimant is entitled. See §§ 215 (a) and 203 (a). The scheme of the Act thus proceeds from a recognition of an intimate relationship between the varying amounts of benefits due the disabled claimant and his dependents. Hopkins was receiving disability payments under § 223 between March 1961 and December 1962; his wife and two children were also receiving benefits during this same period as dependents of a recipient of disability payments (§ 202). In December 1962 these benefits were terminated, on the ground that petitioner was no longer “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies, and then sought review in the District Court. The District Court’s order reversed the administrative decision as to disability. And pursuant to this order the Director of the Bureau of Disability Insurance wrote petitioner as follows: “Based on the recent amendments to the Social Security Act, you are entitled to receive $123.10. Your wife and the two children are each entitled to receive $51.50. These new monthly rates are effective beginning January 1965. “Section 206 (b)(1) of the Social Security Act provides that [y]our attornéy may ask the court to approve a fee not to exceed 25 percent of past-benefits due you. We are, therefore, withholding the amount of $936.20, which represents 25 percent of your past-due benefits of $3,744.00 pending action by the court on the amount of the attorney fee. The amount withheld will be applied against the fee set by the court and will be mailed directly to your attorney; any remaining amount will be sent to you. “Benefit payments for you and your wife will continue to be combined. The next husband-wife check will be for $5,032.60. This represents payment for January 1963 through December 1965. You will receive this check within a few days. After that, the regular monthly check for $174.60 will be sent shortly after the month for which, it is payable. “The children’s check for the period of January 1963 through December 1963, [sic], in the amount of $3,463.50, will be sent to you shortly. After that, their monthly, regular check for $103.00 will be sent to you as usual.” Section 206 (b)(1), restricting the amount of an attorney’s fee, speaks of “the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled.” Respondent argues that only a plaintiff can satisfy such a description, not a non-party. It is also urged that dependents who are not joined as parties have not received a judgment and that the benefits accruing to the wife and the children are not benefits to which the husband, the only claimant, is “entitled” within the meaning of § 206 (b)(1). That seems to us to be too technical a construction of the Act which we need not adopt. In this instance, proof of the husband’s “claim” results in a package of benefits to his immediate family; and those benefits inure to the benefit of the head of the family who files the “claim.” The legislative history of §206 (b)(1) speaks of the desire of Congress to reduce “contingent fee” arrangements and to restrict an attorney’s fee to an amount “not in excess of 25 percent of accrued benefits.” We find nothing in the history of § 206 (b)(1) that would likewise restrict those “accrued benefits” to amounts owed the claimant, as distinguished from his dependents, viz., the wife and the children. Reversed. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 42 U. S. C. § 466 (b) (1) presently provides: “Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an' attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Secretary may, notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (i) of this title, certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. In case of any such judgment, no other fee may _ be payable or certified for payment for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.” “Petitioner,” as used in this opinion, refers to Raymond Hopkins, the Social Security claimant. The interest involved in the case, as it reaches this Court on the issue of the proper amount of the attorney’s fee, is, however, that of Hopkins’ attorney, Allen Sharp. See 20 CFB §§ 404.603-404.604. Nor are the wife and children required to become parties to proceedings on review of an administrative determination. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 405 (b) and (g); and 20 CFR §§404.909-404.910; 404.916-404.919 ; 404.945; 404.951. The Social Security Amendments of 1967 changed former § 202 (b) to read: “Except as provided in subsection (q), such wife's insurance benefit for each month shall be equal to whichever of the following is the smaller: (A) one-half of the primary insurance amount of her husband (or, in the case of a divorced wife, her former husband) for such month, or (B) $105.” Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 103 (Jan. 2, 1968). The record reveals that petitioner applied for benefits for his two children in his initial application for disability payments. Although that application did not encompass a claim for benefits on behalf of his wife, it is made clear in the application that his wife was also applying for benefits. It does not appear, however, whether the separate application for wife’s benefits was filed by her or by petitioner on her behalf. See n. 3, supra. No question is raised concerning the propriety of the claims that were filed. Nor is this a case where any question has been raised concerning the right of the wife or children to benefits. Rather, the wife and children had been receiving them as dependents of a disabled person until they were terminated by respondent’s erroneous decision that the husband was no longer disabled. When that decision was reversed by the District Court, the only impediment standing in the way of the receipt of past-due benefits by the wife and children was removed. In a realistic sense, then, the attorney was- representing fully the interests of the wife and children when he litigated the question of the husband’s disability. S. Rep. No. 404, Pt. I, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 122. “It has come to the attention of the committee that attorneys have upon occasion charged what appear to be inordinately large fees for representing claimants in Federal district court actions arising under the social security program. Usually, these large fees result from a contingent-fee arrangement under which the attorney is entitled to a percentage (frequently one-third to one-half) of the accrued benefits. Since litigation necessarily involves a considerable lapse of time, in many cases large amounts of accrued benefits, and consequently large legal fees, are payable if the claimant wins his case. “The committee bill would provide that whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant, it would have express authority to allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee, not in excess of 25 percent of accrued benefits, for services rendered in connection with the claim; no other fee would be payable. . .	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 61 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. S.A. EMPRESA DE VIACAO AEREA RIO GRANDENSE (VARIG AIRLINES) et al. No. 82-1349. Argued January 18, 1984 Decided June 19, 1984 Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Carter G. Phillips, Leonard Schaitman, and John C. Hoyle. Richard F. Gerry argued the cause for respondents in both cases and filed a brief for respondents in No. 82-1350. Phillip D. Bostwick and James B. Hamlin filed a brief for respondent Varig Airlines in No. 82-1349. Robert R. Smiley III filéd a brief for respondents Mascher et al. in No. 82-1349. Together with No. 82-1350, United States v. United Scottish Insurance Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Marc S. Moller and Donald I. Marlin filed a brief for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in these two cases to determine whether the United States may be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §2671 et seq., for the negligence of the Federal Aviation Administration in certificating certain aircraft for use in commercial aviation. I — I A. No. 82-m9 On July 11, 1973, a commercial jet aircraft owned by respondent S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) was flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris when a fire broke out in one of the aft lavatories. The fire produced a thick black smoke, which quickly filled the cabin and cockpit. Despite the pilots’ successful effort to land the plane, 124 of the 135 persons on board died from asphyxiation or the effects of toxic gases produced by the fire. Most of the plane’s fuselage was consumed by a postimpact fire. The aircraft involved in this accident was a Boeing 707, a product of the Boeing Co. In 1958 the Civil Aeronautics Agency, a predecessor of the FAA, had issued a type certificate for the Boeing 707, certifying that its designs, plans, specifications, and performance data had been shown to be in conformity with minimum safety standards. Seaboard Airlines originally purchased this particular plane for domestic use; in 1969 Seaboard sold the plane to respondent Varig Airlines, a Brazilian air carrier, which used the plane commercially from 1969 to 1973. After the accident respondent Varig Airlines brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act seeking damages for the destroyed aircraft. The families and personal representatives of many of the passengers, also respondents here, brought a separate suit under the Act pressing claims for wrongful death. The two actions were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Respondents asserted that the fire originated in the towel disposal area located below the sink unit in one of the lavatories and alleged that the towel disposal area was not capable of containing fire. In support of their argument, respondents pointed to an air safety regulation requiring that waste receptacles be made of fire-resistant materials and incorporate covers or other provisions for containing possible fires. 14 CFR § 4b.381(d) (1956). Respondents claimed that the CAA had been negligent when it inspected the Boeing 707 and issued a type certificate to an aircraft that did not comply with CAA fire protection standards. The District Court granted summary judgment for the United States on the ground that California law does not recognize an actionable tort duty for inspection and certification activities. The District Court also found that, even if respondents had stated a cause of action in tort, recovery against the United States was barred by two exceptions to the Act: the discretionary function exception, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a), and the misrepresentation exception, § 2680(h). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 692 F. 2d 1205 (1982). The Court of Appeals reasoned that a private person inspecting and certificating aircraft for airworthiness would be liable for negligent inspection under the California “Good Samaritan” rule, see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§323 and 324A (1965), and concluded that the United States should be judged by the same rule. 692 F. 2d, at 1207-1208. The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s argument that respondents’ actions were barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h), which provides that the United States is not subject to liability for any claim arising out of misrepresentation. Interpreting respondents’ claims as arising from the negligence of the CAA inspection rather than from any implicit misrepresentation in the resultant certificate, the Court of Appeals held that the misrepresentation exception did not apply. 692 F. 2d, at 1208. Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed the Government’s reliance upon the discretionary function exception to the Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a), which exempts the United States from liability for claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty....” The Court of Appeals viewed the inspection of aircraft for compliance with air safety regulations as a function not entailing the sort of policymaking discretion contemplated by the discretionary function exception. 692 F. 2d, at 1208-1209. B. No. 82-1350 On October 8, 1968, a DeHavilland Dove aircraft owned by respondent John Dowdle and used in the operation of an air taxi service caught fire in midair, crashed, and burned near Las Vegas, Nev. The pilot, copilot, and. two passengers were killed. The cause of the crash was an in-flight fire in the forward baggage compartment of the aircraft. The DeHavilland Dove airplane was manufactured in the United Kingdom in 1951 and then purchased by Air Wisconsin, another air taxi operator. In 1965 Air Wisconsin contracted with Aerodyne Engineering Corp. to install a gasoline-burning cabin heater in the airplane. Aerodyne applied for, and was granted, a supplemental type certificate from the FAA authorizing the installation of the heater. Aerodyne then installed the heater pursuant to its contract with Air Wisconsin. In 1966, relying in part upon the supplemental type certificate as an indication of the airplane’s airworthiness, respondent Dowdle purchased the DeHavilland Dove from Air Wisconsin. In the aftermath of the crash, respondent Dowdle filed this action for property damage against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Respondent insurance companies also filed suit under the Act, seeking reimbursement for moneys paid for liability coverage on behalf of Dowdle. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that the crash resulted from defects in the installation of the gasoline line leading to the cabin heater. The District Court concluded that the installation did not comply with the applicable FAA regulations and held that the Government was negligent in certifying an installation that did not comply with those safety requirements. Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment for respondents. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for the District Court to consider whether the California courts would impose a duty of due care upon the Government by applying the “Good Samaritan” doctrine of §§323 and 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 614 F. 2d 188 (1979). The Court of Appeals also requested the District Court to determine whether, under the facts of this case, the California courts would find such a duty breached if a private person had issued the supplemental type certificate in question here. On remand, the District Court again entered judgment for respondents, finding that the California “Good Samaritan” rule would apply in this case and would give rise to liability on these facts. On the Government’s second appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 692 F. 2d 1209 (1982). In so holding, the Court of Appeals followed reasoning nearly identical to that employed in its decision in No. 82-1349, decided the same day. We granted certiorari, 461 U. S. 925 (1983), and we now reverse. II In the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C. § 1421(a) (l), Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to promote the safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by establishing minimum standards for aircraft design, materials, workmanship, construction, and performance. Congress also granted the Secretary the discretion to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations governing the inspection of aircraft, including the manner in which such inspections should be made. § 1421(a)(3). Congress emphasized, however, that air carriers themselves retained certain responsibilities to promote the public interest in air safety: the duty to perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety, § 1421(b), the duty to make or cause to be made every inspection required by the Secretary, § 1425(a), and the duty to observe and comply with all other administrative requirements established by the Secretary, § 1425(a). Congress also established a multistep certification process to monitor the aviation industry’s compliance with the requirements developed by the Secretary. Acting as the Secretary’s designee, the FAA has promulgated a comprehensive set of regulations delineating the minimum safety standards with which the designers and manufacturers of aircraft must comply before marketing their products. See 14 CFR pts. 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35 (1983). At each step in the certification process, FAA employees or their representatives evaluate materials submitted by aircraft manufacturers to determine whether the manufacturer has satisfied these regulatory requirements. Upon a showing by the manufacturer that the prescribed safety standards have been met, the FAA issues an appropriate certificate permitting the manufacturer to continue with production and marketing. The first stage of the FAA compliance review is type certification. A manufacturer wishing to introduce a new type of aircraft must first obtain FAA approval of the plane’s basic design in the form of a type certificate. After receiving an application for a type certificate, the Secretary must “make, or require the applicant to make, such tests during manufacture and upon completion as the Secretary... deems reasonably necessary in the interest of safety....” 49 U. S. C. § 1423(a)(2). By regulation, the FAA has made the applicant itself responsible for conducting all inspections and tests necessary to determine that the aircraft comports with FAA airworthiness requirements. 14 CFR §§21.33, 21.35 (1983). The applicant submits to the FAA the designs, drawings, test reports, and computations necessary to show that the aircraft sought to be certificated satisfies FAA regulations. §§21.17(a)(1), 21.21(a)(b). In the course of the type certification process, the manufacturer produces a prototype of the new aircraft and conducts both ground and flight tests. §21.35. FAA employees or their representatives then review the data submitted by the applicant and make such inspections or tests as they deem necessary to ascertain compliance with the regulations. § 21.33(a). If the FAA finds that the proposed aircraft design comports with minimum safety standards, it signifies its approval by issuing a type certificate. 49 U. S. C. § 1423(a)(2); 14 CFR § 21.21(a)(1) (1983). Production may not begin, however, until a production certificate authorizing the manufacture of duplicates of the prototype is issued. 49 U. S. C. § 1423(b). To obtain a production certificate, the manufacturer must prove to the FAA that it has established and can maintain a quality control system to assure that each aircraft will meet the design provisions of the type certificate. 14 CFR §§21.139, 21.143 (1983). When it is satisfied that duplicate aircraft will conform to the approved type design, the FAA issues a production certificate, and the manufacturer may begin mass production of the approved aircraft. Before any aircraft may be placed into service, however, its owner must obtain from the FAA an airworthiness certificate, which denotes that the particular aircraft in question conforms to the type certificate and is in condition for safe operation. 49 U. S. C. § 1423(c). It is unlawful for any person to operate an aircraft in air commerce without a valid airworthiness certificate. § 1430(a). An additional certificate is required when an aircraft is altered by the introduction of a major change in its type design. 14 CFR §21.113 (1983). To obtain this supplemental type certificate, the applicant must show the FAA that the altered aircraft meets all applicable airworthiness requirements. § 21.115(a). The applicant is responsible for conducting the inspections and tests necessary to demonstrate that each change in the type design complies with the regulations. §§ 21.115(b), 21.33(b). The methods used by FAA employees or their representatives to determine an applicant’s compliance with minimum safety standards are generally the same as those employed for basic type certification. FAA Order 8110.4, Type Certification 32 (1967) (hereinafter FAA Order 8110.4); CAA Manual of Procedure, Flight Operations and Airworthiness, Type Certification §.5106(a) (1957) (hereinafter CAA Manual of Procedure). With fewer than 400 engineers, the FAA obviously cannot complete this elaborate compliance review process alone. Accordingly, 49 U. S. C. § 1355 authorizes the Secretary to delegate certain inspection and certification responsibilities to properly qualified private persons. By regulation, the Secretary has provided for the appointment of private individuals to serve as designated engineering representatives to assist in the FAA certification process. 14 CFR §183.29 (1984). These representatives are typically employees of aircraft manufacturers who possess detailed knowledge of an aircraft’s design based upon their day-to-day involvement in its development. See generally Improving Aircraft Safety 29-30. The representatives act as surrogates of the FAA in examining, inspecting, and testing aircraft for purposes of certification. 14 CFR §183.1 (1984). In determining whether an aircraft complies with FAA regulations, they are guided by the same requirements, instructions, and procedures as FAA employees. FAA Order 8110.4, p. 151; CAA Manual of Procedure §.70(b). FAA employees may briefly review the reports and other data submitted by representatives before certificating a subject aircraft. Improving Aircraft Safety 31-32; FAA Order 8110.4, p. 159; CAA Manual of Procedure §.77. rH I — I I — I The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), authorizes suits against the United States for damages “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or. death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” The Act further provides that the United States shall be liable with respect to tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” §2674. The Act did not waive the sovereign immunity of the United States in all respects, however; Congress was careful to except from the Act’s broad waiver of immunity several important classes of tort claims. Of particular relevance here, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a) provides that the Act shall not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” (Emphasis added.) The discretionary function exception, embodied in the second clause of § 2680(a), marks the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals. Although the Court has previously analyzed the legislative history of § 2680(a), see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 26-30 (1953), we briefly review its highlights for a proper understanding of the application of the discretionary function exception to this case. During the years of debate and discussion preceding the passage of the Act, Congress considered a number of tort claims bills including exceptions from the waiver of sovereign immunity for claims based upon the activities of specific federal agencies, notably the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. See, e. g., H. R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H. R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940); S. 2690, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). In 1942, however, the 77th Congress eliminated the references to these particular agencies and broadened the exception to cover all claims based upon the execution of a statute or regulation or the performance of a discretionary function. H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); S. 2207, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). The language of the exception as drafted during the 77th Congress is identical to that of § 2680(a) as ultimately adopted. The legislative materials of the 77th Congress illustrate most clearly Congress’ purpose in fashioning the discretionary function exception. A Government spokesman appearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary described the discretionary function exception as a “highly important exception:” “[It is] designed to preclude application of the act to a claim based upon an alleged abuse of discretionary authority by a regulatory or licensing agency — for example, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Foreign Funds Control Office of the Treasury, or others. It is neither desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort. The same holds true of other administrative action not of a regulatory nature, such as the expenditure of Federal funds, the execution of a Federal project, and the like. “On the other hand, the common law torts of employees of regulatory agencies, as well as of all other Federal agencies, would be included within the scope of the bill.” Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 28, 33 (1942) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea). It was believed that claims of the kind embraced by the discretionary function exception would have been exempted from the waiver of sovereign immunity by judicial construction; nevertheless, the specific exception was added to make clear that the Act was not to be extended into the realm of the validity of legislation or discretionary administrative action. Id., at 29; id., at 37, Memorandum, with Appendixes, Federal Tort Claims Act (explanatory of Comm. Print of H. R. 5373, 1942). It was considered unnecessary to except by name such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, as had earlier bills, because the language of the discretionary function exception would “exemp[t] from the act claims against Federal agencies growing out of their regulatory activities.” Id., at 8 (emphasis added). The nature and scope of § 2680(a) were carefully examined in Dalehite v. United States, supra. Dalehite involved vast claims for damages against the United States arising out of a disastrous explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, which had been produced and distributed under the direction of the United States for export to devastated areas occupied by the Allied Armed Forces after World War II. Numerous acts of the Government were charged as negligent: the cabinet-level decision to institute the fertilizer export program, the failure to experiment with the fertilizer to determine the possibility of explosion, the drafting of the basic plan of manufacture, and the failure properly to police the storage and loading of the fertilizer. The Court concluded that these allegedly negligent acts were governmental duties protected by the discretionary function exception and held the action barred by § 2680(a). Describing the discretion protected by § 2680(a) as “the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one’s judgment of the best course,” id., at 34, the Court stated: “It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the ‘discretionary function or duty’ that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.” Id., at 35-36 (footnotes omitted). Respondents here insist that the view of § 2680(a) expressed in Dalehite has been eroded, if not overruled, by subsequent cases construing the Act, particularly Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955), and Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 95 U. S. App. D. C. 189, 221 F. 2d 62, summarily aff’d sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U. S. 907 (1955). While the Court’s reading of the Act admittedly has not followed a straight line, we do not accept the supposition that Dalehite no longer represents a valid interpretation of the discretionary function exception. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, supra, involved a claim under the Act for damages to cargo aboard a vessel that ran aground, allegedly owing to the failure of the light in a lighthouse operated by the Coast Guard. The plaintiffs contended that the Coast Guard had been negligent in inspecting, maintaining, and repairing the light. Significantly, the Government conceded that the discretionary function exception was not implicated in Indian Towing, arguing instead that the Act contained an implied exception from liability for “uniquely governmental functions.” Id., at 64. The Court rejected the Government’s assertion, reasoning that it would “push the courts into the ‘non-governmental’-'governmentar quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations.” Id., at 65. In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., supra, two aircraft collided in midair while both were attempting to land at Washington National Airport. The survivors of the crash victims sued the United States under the Act, asserting the negligence of air traffic controllers as the cause of the collision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit permitted the suit against the Government. In its petition for certiorari, the Government urged the adoption of a “governmental function exclusion” from liability under the Act and pointed to § 2680(a) as textual support for such an exclusion. Pet. for Cert, in United States v. Union Trust Co., O. T. 1955, No. 296, p. 18. The Government stated further that § 2680(a) was “but one aspect of the broader exclusion from the statute of claims based upon the performance of acts of a uniquely governmental nature.” Id., at 37. This Court summarily affirmed, citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, supra. 350 U. S. 907 (1955). Given the thrust of the arguments presented in the petition for certiorari and the pointed citation to Indian Towing, the summary disposition in Union Trust Co. cannot be taken as a wholesale repudiation of the view of § 2680(a) set forth in Dalehite. As in Dalehite, it is unnecessary — and indeed impossible— to define with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception. From the legislative and judicial materials, however, it is possible to isolate several factors useful in determining when the acts of a Government employee are protected from liability by § 2680(a). First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case. As the Court pointed out in Dalehite, the exception covers “[n]ot only agencies of government... but all employees exercising discretion.” 346 U. S., at 33. Thus, the basic inquiry concerning the application of the discretionary function exception is whether the challenged acts of a Government employee — whatever his or her rank — are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability. Second, whatever else the discretionary function exception may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals. Time and again the legislative history refers to the acts of regulatory agencies as examples of those covered by the exception, and it is significant that the early tort claims bills considered by Congress specifically exempted two major regulatory agencies by name. See supra, at 808-810. This emphasis upon protection for regulatory activities suggests an underlying basis for the inclusion of an exception for discretionary functions in the Act: Congress wished to prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. By fashioning an exception for discretionary governmental functions, including regulatory activities, Congress took “steps to protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient government operations.” United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 163 (1963). HH < We now consider whether the discretionary function exception immunizes from tort liability the FAA certification process involved in these cases. Respondents in No. 82-1349 argue that the CAA was negligent in issuing a type certificate for the Boeing 707 aircraft in 1958 because the lavatory trash receptacle did not satisfy applicable safety regulations. Similarly, respondents in No. 82-1350 claim negligence in the FAA’s issuance of a supplemental type certificate in 1965 for the DeHavilland Dove aircraft; they assert that the installation of the fuel line leading to the cabin heater violated FAA airworthiness standards. From the records in these cases there is no indication that either the Boeing 707 trash receptacle or the DeHavilland Dove cabin heater was actually inspected or reviewed by an FAA inspector or representative. Brief for Respondent Varig Airlines in No. 82-1349, pp. 8, 15; Brief for United States 10, n. 10, and 37. Respondents thus argue in effect that the negligent failure of the FAA to inspect certain aspects of aircraft type design in the process of certification gives rise to a cause of action against the United States under the Act. The Government, on the other hand, urges that the basic responsibility for satisfying FAA air safety standards rests with the manufacturer, not with the FAA. The role of the FAA, the Government says, is merely to police the conduct of private individuals by monitoring their compliance with FAA regulations. According to the Government, the FAA accomplishes its monitoring function by means of a “spot-check” program designed to encourage manufacturers and operators to comply fully with minimum safety requirements. Such regulatory activity, the Government argues, is the sort of governmental conduct protected by the discretionary function exception to the Act. We agree that the discretionary function exception precludes a tort action based upon the conduct of the FAA in certificating these aircraft for use in commercial aviation. As noted supra, at 804, the Secretary of Transportation has the duty to promote safety in air transportation by promulgating reasonable rules and regulations governing the inspection, servicing, and overhaul of civil aircraft. 49 U. S. C. § 1421(a)(3)(A). In her discretion, the Secretary may also prescribe “the periods for, and the manner in, which such inspection, servicing, and overhaul shall he made, including provision for examinations and reports by properly qualified private persons whose examinations or reports the Secretarty of Transportation may accept in lieu of those made by its officers and employees.” § 1421(a)(3)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, Congress specifically empowered the Secretary to establish and implement a mechanism for enforcing compliance with minimum safety standards according to her “judgment of the best course.” Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S., at 34. In the exercise of this discretion, the FAA, as the Secretary’s designee, has devised a system of compliance review that involves certification of aircraft design and manufacture at several stages of production. See supra, at 804-806. The FAA certification process is founded upon a relatively simple notion: the duty to ensure that an aircraft conforms to FAA safety regulations lies with the manufacturer and operator, while the FAA retains the responsibility for policing compliance. Thus, the manufacturer is required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the applicable regulations; the FAA then reviews the data for conformity purposes by conducting a “spot check” of the manufacturer’s work. The operation of this “spot-check” system is outlined in detail in the handbooks and manuals developed by the CAA and FAA for the use of their employees. For example, the CAA Manual of Procedure for type certification in effect at the time of the certification of the Boeing 707 provided: “Conformity determination may be varied depending upon circumstances. A manufacturer’s policies, quality control procedures, experience, inspection personnel, equipment, and facilities will dictate the extent of conformity inspection to be conducted or witnessed by [CAA employees]. Differences between manufacturers require that the conformity program be adjusted to fit existing conditions. In the case of an inexperienced manufacturer whose ability is unknown, it may be necessary to conduct a high percentage of conformity inspections until such time as the [CAA] inspector feels he can safely rely to a greater degree upon the company inspectors. He may then gradually reduce his own inspection or witnessing accordingly. “Experienced manufacturers having previously demonstrated the acceptability of their quality control and inspection competence... should benefit by greater [CAA] confidence. In such cases, conformity determination may be made through a planned system of spot-checking critical parts and assemblies and by reviewing inspection records and materials review dispo sitions.... It is not intended that the inspector personally conduct a complete conformity inspection of each part he records on a [CAA] form. He should, however, visually inspect and witness	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 33 ]	sc_adminaction
DIXON et al. v. UNITED STATES. No. 486. Argued March 30-31, 1965. Decided May 3, 1965. Bernard E. Brandes argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Sanford Saideman. Frank I. Goodman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Wayne G. Barnett and Joseph Kovner. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the issue decided today in United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., No. 628, ante, p. 54. Petitioners are members of a partnership which, during the tax year 1952, bought 33 short-term noninterest-bear-ing notes from issuers at discounts between 2⅜% and 3¾% of face value. The notes had maturities ranging from 190 to 272 days. Their total face value was $43,050,000, and the total issue price was $42,222,357. The partnership sold 20 of the 33 notes before the end of the tax year but after having held them for more than six months, realizing a gain of $494,528. The remaining 13 notes were disposed of in the next tax year. In its 1952 return the partnership reported the $494,528 gain as a long-term capital gain, and, although on the accrual basis, did not accrue any income on account of the 13 unsold notes. Petitioners’ individual income tax returns reflected the same treatment for their respective distributive shares of the partnership income derived from the sale of the notes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the gain realized was taxable as ordinary income, and also that a portion of the original issue discount on the 13 unsold notes was earned and reportable as ordinary income for 1952. Petitioners paid the resulting deficiencies, and in this suit for refund the United States prevailed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, 224 P. Supp. 358, and in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 333 F. 2d 1016. We brought the case here on certiorari, 379 U. S. 943, to resolve a conflict with United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., supra. We affirm. Our holding today in Midland-Boss that original issue discount is not entitled to capital gains treatment under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code requires that we affirm the result below unless an affirmance is precluded by an argument made here and not in Midland-Boss. The petitioners contend that in purchasing the notes they relied upon the Commissioner’s published acquiescence in the Tax Court’s decision in Caulkins v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 656, aff’d 144 F. 2d 482, not withdrawn until the transaction was closed, which acquiescence would require treating the gain realized as gain on the sale or exchange of a capital asset. Although petitioners concede that under § 7805 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the Commissioner has discretion to apply the withdrawal of the acquiescence retroactively, cf. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180, they contend that he abused his discretion in this case. Section 7805 (b) provides: “Retroactivity of Regulations or Rulings. — The Secretary [of the Treasury] or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.” In Caulkins the Tax Court allowed capital gains treatment of the full amount received by the taxpayer upon the retirement of an “Accumulative Installment Certificate,” a debt security under which the lender made 10 annual remittances to the borrower in the amount of $1,500 each in return for a payment of $20,000 in the tenth year. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., supra, at 63. This result gave capital gains treatment to an amount corresponding to but not in the form of original issue discount. The basis for this result was an interpretation of § 117 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1938, c. 289, 52 Stat. 447, which was re-enacted as § 117 (f) of the 1939 Code, and which provided that “amounts received by the holder upon the retirement of bonds, debentures, notes, or certificates or other evidences of indebtedness . . . with interest coupons or in registered form, shall be considered as amounts received in exchange therefor.” The Commissioner’s 1955 withdrawal of his acquiescence in the Tax Court’s decision in Caulkins was made retroactive as a genera] matter, but an exception was made for “amounts received upon redemption of Accumulative Installment Certificates issued by Investors Syndicate which were purchased during the period beginning December 25, 1944, the date acquiescence in the Caulkins case was announced and March 14, 1955, the date this Revenue Ruling is published .. ..” The exception thus covered only the debt securities of the specific type involved in Caulkins, and issued by the particular issuer there involved. In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, supra, at 183-184, we held that the Commissioner is empowered retroactively to correct mistakes of law in the application of the tax laws to particular transactions. He may do so even where a taxpayer may have relied to his detriment on the Commissioner’s mistake. See Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129. This principle is no more than a reflection of the fact that Congress, not the Commissioner, prescribes the tax laws. The Commissioner’s rulings have only such force as Congress chooses to give them, and Congress has not given them the force of law. Consequently it would appear that the Commissioner’s acquiescence in an erroneous decision, published as a ruling, cannot in and of itself bar the United States from collecting a tax otherwise lawfully due. But petitioners point to prefatory statements in the Internal Revenue Bulletins for 1952 and other years stating that Tax Court decisions acquiesced in “should be relied upon by officers and employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue as precedents in the disposition of other cases.” See, e. g., 1952-1 Cum. Bull. iv. These are merely guidelines for Bureau personnel, however, and hardly help the petitioners here. The title pages of the same Revenue Bulletins give taxpayers explicit warning that rulings “. . . are for the information of taxpayers and their counsel as showing the trend of official opinion in . . . the Bureau of Internal Revenue; the rulings other than Treasury Decisions have none of the force or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not commit the Department to any interpretation of the law which has not been formally approved and promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury.” (Emphasis added.) This admonition, together with the language of § 7805 (b)’s predecessor, § 3791 (b) of the 1939 Code, gave ample notice that the Commissioner’s acquiescence in Caulkins was not immune from subsequent retroactive correction to eliminate a mistake of law. Indeed, long before the tax year here in question this Court had made it clear that “The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to make law . . . but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.” Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, supra, at 134. There we held that the Commissioner could make retroactive a new regulation increasing tax liability beyond that provided for by the prior regulation where the superseding regulation corrected an erroneous interpretation of the statute. “The statute defines the rights of the taxpayer and fixes a standard by which such rights are to be measured. The regulation constitutes only a step in the administrative process. It does not, and could not, alter the statute. It is no more retroactive in its operation than is a judicial determination construing and applying a statute to a case in hand.” Id., at 135. This reasoning applies with even greater force to the Commissioner’s rulings and acquiescences. Therefore the acquiescence in Caulkins, even assuming for the moment that it embodied the Commissioner’s acceptance of the treatment petitioners urge upon us here, does not preclude the Commissioner from collecting the tax lawfully due under the statute. We cannot agree with petitioners that Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, supra, supports a finding that the Commissioner abused, his discretion in giving retroactive effect to the withdrawal of the acquiescence. In that case the Commissioner had issued general pronouncements according exempt status to all automobile clubs similarly situated, following letter rulings to that effect in favor of the taxpayer. The Commissioner then corrected his erroneous view and, in 1945, specifically revoked the taxpayer’s exemption for 1943 and subsequent years. We rejected the taxpayer’s claim that the Commissioner had abused the discretion given him by § 7805 (b)’s predecessor. The Commissioner’s action had been forecast in a General Counsel Memorandum in 1943, and the corrected ruling had been applied to all automobile clubs for tax years back to 1943. 353 U. S., at 185-186. Petitioners make two arguments based on Automobile Club of Michigan. First, they contend that the Commissioner’s decision to apply his change of position retroactively to them is an abuse of discretion because, unlike the taxpayer in Automobile Club, they had no notice in the relevant tax year that the Commissioner was about to correct his mistake of law, and thus had purchased the discounted notes in express reliance upon the Commissioner’s published acquiescence in Caulkins. Second, they argue that the Commissioner abused his discretion because the retroactive withdrawal of his acquiescence in Caulkins excepted certificates of the type involved in Caulkins if issued by the issuer there involved and purchased while the acquiescence was in effect; this is said to be an unreasonable and arbitrary classification since, petitioners assert, there is no significant difference between the excepted certificates and the notes that they had purchased. Although we mentioned certain facts in support of our conclusion in Automobile Club that there had not been an abuse of discretion in that case, it does not follow that the absence of one or more of these facts in another case wherein a ruling or regulation is applied retroactively establishes an abuse of discretion. Automobile Club merely examined all the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether the Commissioner had there abused his discretion. 353 U. S., at 185. In the present case it cannot be said that the Commissioner abused his discretion in either of the respects urged by petitioners. The absence of notice does not prove an abuse, since, for the reasons we have stated, the petitioners were not justified in relying on the acquiescence as precluding correction of the underlying mistake of law and the retroactive application of the correct law to their case. Since no reliance was warranted, no notice was required. Nor is there merit in the argument that the Commissioner abused his discretion in distinguishing Investors Syndicate Accumulative Installment Certificates from other debt securities, for we do not think the Commissioner’s acquiescence in Caulkins was to be interpreted as his acceptance of the proposition that earned original issue discount was entitled to capital gains treatment. That interpretation might be properly put upon his acquiescence only if, first, the Tax Court in Caulkins squarely decided that any discount element in the amount realized by the taxpayer on the retirement of the certificate was not to be taxed as ordinary income but as capital gain, and, second, the decision of the Tax Court should be read as holding that the tax treatment of gain attributable to discount is the same on sales and retirements. But Caul-kins embodies neither of these holdings. Therefore, when the Commissioner revoked his acquiescence in 1955 he was not repudiating his earlier acceptance of a decision that prescribed capital gains treatment for the earned original issue discount here involved. Consequently, his decision to except Accumulative Installment Certificates from the retroactive application of his nonacquiescence in Caulkins could not constitute an abuse of discretion of which the petitioners may complain. As to item first: that the Tax Court in Caulkins did not squarely decide that the discount element in the amount realized by the taxpayer on the retirement of a debt security is to be taxed as a capital gain is apparent from its opinion. The Tax Court seemed to regard the only significant issue before it as whether the taxpayer’s certificate of indebtedness was a “registered” certificate within the meaning of § 117 (f). There was no explicit consideration of whether any discount element in the amount realized by the taxpayer on the certificate was to be taxed as ordinary income or as capital gain. It is at best highly questionable, therefore, that by acquiescing in this decision the Commissioner conceded that § 117 (f) extended capital gains treatment to the discount element in the certificate of indebtedness. As to item second: the petitioners were not warranted in reading Caulkins as holding that the gain realized on a sale that is attributable to original issue discount is to be given the same tax treatment as gain so attributable realized on a retirement. The opinion deals only with, and rests squarely upon, § 117 (f), which is concerned with retirements. It is true that, in the case of securities in registered form or with coupons attached, that section was added by the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680, 714r-715, to eliminate a difference in treatment between sales and retirements. See, e. g., Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U. S. 436; Watson v. Commissioner, 27 B. T. A. 463. But the opinion in Caulkins appears erroneously to carry forward a distinction and to give more favorable treatment to retirements. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., supra, at 63-66. Thus petitioners should not have read Caulkins as they did. Indeed the Tax Court has since distinguished Caulkins on the ground that it rested on the § 117 (f) language of retirement and consequently was inapplicable to a sale. See Paine v. Commissioner, 23 T. C. 391, 401, rev’d on other grounds, 236 F. 2d 398 (C. A. 8th Cir.); United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., supra, at 65. Furthermore, even on the assumption that Caulkins may be read as petitioners contend, petitioners had the burden of demonstrating that Accumulative Installment Certificates could not rationally be distinguished from other discounted securities. Cf. American State Bank v. United States, 279 F. 2d 585, 589-590 (C. A. 7th Cir.) ; Schwartz v. Commissioner, 40 T. C. 191, 193. But the record is devoid of any evidence of effort by petitioners to discharge this burden by showing the absence of any significant difference between the holders of Accumulative Installment Certificates and themselves. Indeed, the Commissioner might well have believed that however mistaken the view that his acquiescence in Caul-kins was tantamount to an acceptance of capital gains treatment for original issue discount, the assumption that such treatment would be given the discount element of their debt securities was more understandable in the case of holders of Accumulative Installment Certificates — -the same obligations as were involved in Caulkins• — than, in the case of other taxpayers. So thinking, the Commissioner might further have concluded that equitable considerations pointed to making an exception to the retroactive application of the nonacquiescence for the holders of these Certificates. It is not for us to pass upon the wisdom of any such distinction. It suffices that on this record we cannot say that the distinction was so devoid of rational basis that we must now overturn the Commissioner’s judgment. Insofar as petitioners’ arguments question the policy of empowering the Commissioner to correct mistakes of law retroactively when a taxpayer acts to his detriment in reliance upon the Commissioner’s acquiescence in an erroneous Tax Court decision, their arguments are more appropriately addressed to Congress. Congress has seen fit to allow the Commissioner to correct mistakes of law, and in § 7805 (b) has given him a large measure of discretion in determining when to apply his corrections retroactively. In the circumstances of this case we cannot say that this discretion was abused. Affirmed. The petitioners concede the correctness of this treatment of the earned discount on the 13 unsold notes if original issue discount is reportable as ordinary income. Again, as in Midland-Boss, we do not reach or intimate any view upon the question whether an accrual-basis taxpayer is required to report discount earned before the final disposition of an obligation. See United States v. Midland-Ross, ante, p. 54, at 58, note 4. The Commissioner initially published a notification of nonac-quiescence. See Rev. Rul. 11581, 1943 Cum. Bull. 1, 28. He published his acquiescence after the Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court. See Rev. Rul. 11907, 1944 Cum. Bull. 1, 5. The withdrawal of his acquiescence and the reinstatement of his initial nonacquies-cence came in 1955, in 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 7, and Rev. Rul. 55-136, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 213. Section 3791 (b) of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 467, was similarly worded except that the 1954 Act substituted “The Secretary or his delegate” for “The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary . . . .” Whether the discount element of the gain from the notes here involved is a capital or an income item is governed by the relevant provisions of the 1939 Code, but the statute governing the retroactive application of the withdrawal of the acquiescence in 1955 is § 7805 (b) of the 1954 Code, and not § 3791 (b) of the 1939 Code. This makes no practical difference since the two provisions are identical apart from the variance mentioned above. The withdrawal was published March 14, 1955. However, the exception was later limited to certificates acquired before December 31, 1954, Rev. Rul. 56-299, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 603, apparently because § 1232 of the 1954 Code applies to obligations issued after that date. See also Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U. S. 428; Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129, 134-135. Compare the current Internal Revenue Bulletins, wherein, with specific regard to aequiescences, it is stated: “Actions of aequiescences in adverse decisions shall be relied on by Revenue officers and others concerned as conclusions of the Service only to the application of the law to the facts in the particular case. Caution should be exercised in extending the application of the decision to a similar case unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the same . . . E. g., 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 3. And the introduction to Revenue Rulings now expressly warns that “Except where otherwise indicated, published rulings and procedures apply retroactively.” Id., at 1. See also Rev. Proc. 62-28, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 496, which states at 604: “A ruling . . . may be revoked or modified at any time in the wise administration of the taxing statutes. ... If a ruling is revoked or modified, the revocation or modification applies to all open years under the statutes, unless the Commissioner exercises the discretionary powers given to him under section 7805 (b) of the Code to limit the retroactive effect of the ruling.” See also Miller v. United States, 294 U. S. 435, 439-440; Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U. S. 315, 320-322. The Commissioner’s acquiescence in Caulkins and his withdrawal and reinstatement of nonacquiescence were stated in Revenue Rulings. Present practice appears to be to publish acquiescences and nonacquiescences without incorporating them in rulings. See, e. g., 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 3. Petitioners invoke the principle that “The Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax another without some rational basis for the difference. And so, assuming the correctness of the principle of ‘equality,’ it can be an independent ground of decision that the Commissioner has been inconsistent, without much concern for whether we should hold as an original matter that the position the Commissioner now seeks to sustain is wrong.” United States v. Kaiser, 363 U. S. 299, 308 (concurring opinion). See also Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F. 2d 311 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Exchange Parts Co. of Fort Worth v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 538, 279 F. 2d 251; City Loan & Savings Co. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 843, aff’d 287 F. 2d 612 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Brecklein v. Bookwalter, 231 F. Supp. 404; Connecticut Railway & Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907. The opinion of the Court of Appeals stated that § 117 (f) required that all gain realized upon retirement of an obligation to which the section applied be given capital gains treatment; that court’s primary concern, however, was also with the question whether the section applied to the Caulkins certificates. Technically, the Commissioner’s acquiescence in Caulkins was in the Tax Court decision and not in the decision of the Court of Appeals. As a general matter, the Commissioner still follows the practice of noting his acquiescence or nonacquiescence only in Tax Court decisions. Cf. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398,411-419 (1941).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 06-1322. Argued November 6, 2007 Decided February 27, 2008 Connie Lewis Lensing argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were R. Jeffery Kelsey, Edward J. Efkeman, Robert K. Spotswood, Walter E. Dellinger, Pamela Harris, and Jonathan Hacker. David L. Rose argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joshua N. Rose. Toby J. Heytens argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney General Comisac, Dennis J. Dimsey, Lisa J. Stark, Ronald S. Cooper, and Anne Noel Occhialino Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Lawrence Z. Lorber, James F. Segroves, Robin S. Conrad, and Shane Brennan; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Rae T. Vann, Laura Anne Giantris, and Karen R. Harned. Paul W. Mollica filed a brief for AARP et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. This case arises under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. When an employee files “a charge alleging unlawful [age] discrimination” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the charge sets the Act’s enforcement mechanisms in motion, commencing a waiting period during which the employee cannot file suit. The phrase, “a charge alleging unlawful discrimination,” is used in the statute, § 626(d), and “charge” appears in the agency’s implementing regulations; but it has no statutory definition. In deciding what constitutes a charge under the Act the Courts of Appeals have adopted different definitions. As a result, difficulties have arisen in determining when employees may seek relief under the ADE A in courts of competent jurisdiction. As a cautionary preface, we note that the EEOC enforcement mechanisms and statutory waiting periods for ADEA claims differ in some respects from those pertaining to other statutes the EEOC enforces, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. While there may be areas of common definition, employees and their counsel must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination. Cf. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 586-587 (2004). This is so even if the EEOC forms and the same definition of charge apply in more than one type of discrimination case. I Petitioner, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx), provides mail pickup and delivery services to customers worldwide. In 1994 and 1995, FedEx initiated two programs, designed, it says, to make its 45,000-strong courier network more productive. The programs, “Best Practice Pays” (BPP) and “Minimum Acceptable Performance Standards” (MAPS), tied the couriers’ compensation and continued employment to certain performance benchmarks, for instance the number of stops a courier makes per day. Respondents are 14 current and former FedEx couriers over the age of 40. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on April 30,2002, claiming, inter alia, that BPP and MAPS violate the ADEA. Asserting that their claims were typical of many couriers nationwide, respondents sought to represent a plaintiffs’ class of all couriers over the age of 40 who were subject to alleged acts of age discrimination by FedEx. The suit maintains that BPP and MAPS were veiled attempts to force older workers out of the company before they would be entitled to receive retirement benefits. FedEx, it is alleged, used the initiatives as a pretext for harassing and discriminating against older couriers in favor of younger ones. The immediate question before us is the timeliness of the suit filed by one of the plaintiffs below, Patricia Kennedy, referred to here as “respondent.” Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent’s action, contending respondent had not filed her charge with the EEOC at least 60 days before filing suit, as required by 29 U. S. C. § 626(d). Respondent countered that she filed a valid charge on December 11, 2001, by submitting EEOC Form 283. The agency labels Form 283 an “Intake Questionnaire.” Respondent attached to the questionnaire a signed affidavit describing the alleged discriminatory employment practices in greater detail. The District Court determined these documents were not a charge and granted the motion to dismiss. No. 02 Civ. 3355(LMM) (SDNY, Oct. 9, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. An appeal followed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. See 440 F. 3d 558, 570 (2006). We granted certiorari to consider whether respondent’s filing was a charge, 551 U. S. 1102 (2007), and we now affirm. II This case presents two distinct questions: What is a charge as the ADEA uses that term? And were the documents respondent filed in December 2001 a charge? A The relevant statutory provision states: “No civil action may be commenced by an individual under [the ADEA] until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.... “Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” 29 U. S. C. § 626(d). The Act does not define charge. While EEOC regulations give some content to the term, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. The agency has statutory authority to issue regulations, see § 628; and when an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then interpret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-845 (1984). The regulations the agency has adopted — so far as they go — are reasonable constructions of the term charge. There is little dispute about this. The issue is the guidance the regulations give. One of the regulations, 29 CFR § 1626.3 (2007), is entitled “Other definitions.” It says: “charge shall mean a statement filed with the Commission by or on behalf of an aggrieved person which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in actions in violation of the Act.” Section 1626.8(a) identifies five pieces of information a “charge should contain”: (l)-(2) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the person making the charge and the charged entity; (3) a statement of facts describing the alleged discriminatory act; (4) the number of employees of the charged employer; and (5) a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. The next subsection, § 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is “sufficient” if it meets the requirements of § 1626.6 — i. e., if it is “in writing and... name[s] the prospective respondent and... generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s).” Even with the aid of the regulations the meaning of charge remains unclear, as is evident from the differing positions of the parties now before us and in the Courts of Appeals. Petitioner contends an Intake Questionnaire cannot be a charge unless the EEOC acts upon it. On the other hand some Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, take a position similar to the Government’s in this case, that an Intake Questionnaire can constitute a charge if it expresses the filer’s intent to activate the EEOC’s enforcement processes. See, e. g., Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F. 2d 534, 542 (CA7 1988). A third view, which seems to accord with respondent’s position, is that all completed Intake Questionnaires are charges. See, e. g., Casavantes v. California State Univ., Sacramento, 732 F. 2d 1441, 1443 (CA9 1984). B In support of her position that the Intake Questionnaire she filed, taken together with the attached six-page affidavit, meets the regulatory definition of a charge, respondent places considerable emphasis on what might be described as the regulations’ catchall or saving provision, 29 CFR § 1626.8(b). This seems to require only a written document with a general allegation of discriminatory conduct by a named employer. Respondent points out that, when read together, §§ 1626.8(b) and 1626.6 say that a “charge is sufficient when the Commission receives... a written statement” that “name[s] the [employer] and... generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s).” Respondent views this language as unequivocal and sees no basis for requiring that a charge contain any additional information. The EEOC’s view, as expressed in the Government’s amicus brief, however, is that the regulations identify certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an exhaustive definition. As such, not all documents that meet the minimal requirements of § 1626.6 are charges. The question, then, becomes how to interpret the scope of the regulations. Just as we defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues regulations in the first instance, see Chevron, swpra, the agency is entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has put in force. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997). Under Auer, we accept the agency’s position unless it is “ ‘ “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” ’ ” Id., at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 359 (1989)). In accord with this standard we accept the agency’s position that the regulations do not identify all necessary components of a charge; and it follows that a document meeting the requirements of § 1626.6 is not a charge in every instance. The language in §§1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the regulations. True, the structure of the regulations is less than clear. But the relevant provisions are grouped under the title, “Procedures — Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” A permissible reading is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing a charge but do not state the full contents a charge document must contain. This is the agency’s position, and we defer to it under Auer. c This does not resolve the case. While we agree with the Government that the regulations do not state all the elements a charge must contain, the question of what additional elements are required remains. On this point the regulations are silent. The EEOC submits that the proper test for determining whether a filing is a charge is whether the filing, taken as a whole, should be construed as a request by the employee for the agency to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate her rights. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15. The EEOC has adopted this position in the Government’s amicus brief and in various internal directives it has issued to its field offices over the years. See 1 EEOC Compliance Manual § 2.2(b), p. 2:0001 (Aug. 2002); Memorandum from Elizabeth M. Thornton, Director, Office of Field Programs, EEOC, to All District, Area, and Local Office Directors et al. (Feb. 21, 2002), online at http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/memo2-21-02.html (hereinafter Thornton Memo) (all Internet materials as visited Feb. 21, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); Memorandum from Nicholas M. Inzeo, Director, Office of Field Programs, EEOC, to All District, Field, Area, and Local Office Directors et al. (Aug. 13, 2007), online at http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/memo-8-13-07.html. The Government asserts that this request-to-act requirement is a reasonable extrapolation of the agency’s regulations and that, as a result, the agency’s position is dispositive under Auer. The Government acknowledges the regulations do not, on their face, speak to the filer’s intent. To the extent the request-to-act requirement can be derived from the text of the regulations, it must spring from the term charge. But, in this context, the term charge is not a construct of the agency’s regulations. It is a term Congress used in the underlying statute that has been incorporated in the regulations by the agency. Thus, insofar as they speak to the filer’s intent, the regulations do so by repeating language from the underlying statute. It could be argued, then, that this case can be distinguished from Auer. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 257 (2006) (the “near equivalence of the statute and regulation belies [the case for] Auer deference”); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 588 (2000) (an agency cannot “under the guise of interpreting a regulation... create de facto a new regulation”). It is not necessary to hold that Auer deference applies to the agency’s construction of the term charge as it is used in the regulations, however. For even if Auer deference is inapplicable, we would accept the agency’s proposed construction of the statutory term, and we turn next to the reasons for this conclusion. D In our view the agency’s policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, interpret not only the regulations but also the statute itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not entitled to full Chevron deference, they do reflect ‘“a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’ ” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944)). As such, they are entitled to a “measure of respect” under the less deferential Skidmore standard. Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461, 487, 488 (2004); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 227-239 (2001). Under Skidmore, we consider whether the agency has applied its position with consistency. Mead Corp., supra, at 228; Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417 (1993). Here, the relevant interpretive statement, embodied in the compliance manual and memoranda, has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years. See Thornton Memo, supra. True, as the Government concedes, the agency’s implementation of this policy has been uneven. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. In the very case before us the EEOC’s Tampa field office did not treat respondent’s filing as a charge, as the Government now maintains it should have done. And, as a result, respondent filed suit before the agency could initiate a conciliation process with the employer. These undoubted deficiencies in. the agency’s administration of the statute and its regulatory scheme are not enough, however, to deprive the agency of all judicial deference. Some degree of inconsistent treatment is unavoidable when the agency processes over 175,000 inquiries a year. Id., at 19, n. 10. And although one of the policy memoranda the Government relies upon was circulated after we granted certiorari, the position the document takes is consistent with the EEOC’s previous directives. We see no reason to assume the agency’s position — that a charge is filed when the employee requests some action — was framed for the specific purpose of aiding a party in this litigation. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212-213 (1988). The EEOC, moreover, has drawn our attention to the need to define charge in a way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws and disseminating information about those laws to the public. Cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 225 (2002) (noting that deference is appropriate in “matters of detail related to [an agency’s] administration” of a statute). The agency’s duty to initiate informal dispute resolution processes upon receipt of a charge is mandatory in the ADEA context. See 29 U. S. C. § 626(d) (“[T]he Commission... shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion”); Cf. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U. S. 230,241 (2001) (noting that Congress’ use of the term “ ‘shall’ ” indicates an intent to “impose discretionless obligations”). Yet, at the same time, Congress intended the agency to serve an “educational” function. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 705(i), 78 Stat. 259; id., § 705(g)(3) (noting that the Commission shall have the power to “furnish to persons subject to this title such technical assistance as they may request”). Providing answers to the public’s questions is a critical part of the EEOC’s mission; and it accounts for a substantial part of the agency’s work. Of about 175,000 inquiries the agency receives each year, it dockets around 76,000 of these as charges. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 10. Even allowing for errors in the classification of charges and noncharges, it is evident that many filings come from individuals who have questions about their rights and simply want information. For efficient operations, and to effect congressional intent, the agency requires some mechanism to separate information requests from enforcement requests. Respondent’s proposed standard, that a charge need contain only an allegation of discrimination and the name of the employer, falls short in this regard. Were that stripped-down standard to prevail, individuals who approach the agency with questions could end up divulging enough information to create a charge. This likely would be the case for anyone who completes an Intake Questionnaire — which provides space to indicate the name and address of the offending employer and asks the individual to answer the question, “What action was taken against you that you believe to be discrimination?” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a. If an individual knows that reporting this minimal information to the agency will mandate the agency to notify her employer, she may be discouraged from consulting the agency or wait until her employment situation has become so untenable that conciliation efforts would be futile. The result would be contrary to Congress’ expressed desire that the EEOC act as an information provider and try to settle employment disputes through informal means. For these reasons, the definition of charge respondent advocates — i. e., that it need conform only to 29 CFR § 1626.6— is in considerable tension with the structure and purposes of the ADEA. The agency’s interpretive position — the request-to-act requirement — provides a reasonable alternative that is consistent with the statutory framework. No clearer alternatives are within our authority or expertise to adopt; and so deference to the agency is appropriate under Skidmore. We conclude as follows: In addition to the information required by the regulations, i. e., an allegation and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Some Courts of Appeals have referred to a “ ‘manifest intent’ ” test, under which, in order to be deemed a charge, the filing must demonstrate “an individual’s intent to have the agency initiate its investigatory and conciliatory processes.” 440 F. 3d, at 566 (case below); see also Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F. 3d 1314, 1319 (CA11 2001); Steffen, 859 F. 2d, at 543; Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F. 2d 96, 99 (CA3 1983). If this formulation suggests the filer’s state of mind is somehow determinative, it misses the point. If, however, it means the filing must be examined from the standpoint of an objective observer to determine whether, by a reasonable construction of its terms, the filer requests the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes, that would be in accord with our conclusion. It is true that under this permissive standard a wide range of documents might be classified as charges. But this result is consistent with the design and purpose of the ADEA. Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se pleadings are to be “liberally construed”). In the administrative context now before us it appears pro se filings may be the rule, not the exception. The ADEA, like Title VII, sets up a “remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process.” EEOC v. Commercial Of fice Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 124 (1988); see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 756 (1979) (noting the “common purpose” of Title VII and the ADEA). The system must be accessible to individuals who have no detailed knowledge of the relevant statutory mechanisms and agency processes. It thus is consistent with the purposes of the Act that a charge can be a form, easy to complete, or an informal document, easy to draft. The agency’s proposed test implements these purposes. Reasonable arguments can be made that the agency should adopt a standard giving more guidance to filers, making it clear that the request to act must be stated in quite explicit terms. A rule of that sort might yield more consistent results. This, however, is a matter for the agency to decide in light of its experience and expertise in protecting the rights of those who are covered by the Act. For its decisions in this regard the agency is subject to the oversight of the political branches. Cf. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 980 (2005) (“Filling these gaps [in ambiguous statutes] involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than courts”). We find no reason in this case to depart from our usual rule: Where ambiguities in statutory analysis and application are presented, the agency may choose among reasonable alternatives. E Asserting its interest as an employer, petitioner urges us to condition the definition of charge, and hence an employee’s ability to sue, upon the EEOC’s fulfilling its mandatory duty to notify the charged party and initiate a conciliation process. In petitioner’s view, because the Commission must act “[u]pon receiving such a charge,” 29 U. S. C. § 626(d), its failure to do so means the filing is not a charge. The agency rejects this view, as do we. As a textual matter, the proposal is too artificial a reading of the statute to accept. The statute requires the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual’s right to sue upon the agency taking any action. Ibid. (“No civil action may be commenced by an individual under [the ADEA] until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission”); Cf. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106, 112-113 (2002) (rejecting the argument that a charge is not a charge until the filer satisfies Title VII’s oath or affirmation requirement). The filing of a charge, moreover, determines when the Act’s time limits and procedural mechanisms commence. It would be illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties have no control. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 444 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Ill Having determined that the agency acted within its authority in formulating the rule that a filing is deemed a charge if the document reasonably can be construed to request agency action and appropriate relief on the employee’s behalf, the question is whether the filing here meets this test. The agency says it does, and we agree. The agency’s determination is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces. Respondent’s completed intake form contained all of the information outlined in 29 CFR § 1626.8, including: the employee’s name, address, and telephone number, as well as those of her employer; an allegation that she and other employees had been the victims of “age discrimination”; the number of employees who worked at the Dunedin, Florida, facility where she was stationed; and a statement indicating she had not sought the assistance of any government agency regarding this matter. See App. 265. Petitioner maintains the filing was still deficient because it contained no request for the agency to act. Were the Intake Questionnaire the only document before us we might agree its handwritten statements do not request action. The design of the form in use in 2001, moreover, does not give rise to the inference that the employee requests action against the employer. Unlike EEOC Form 5, the Intake Questionnaire is not labeled a “Charge of Discrimination,” see id., at 275. In fact the wording of the questionnaire suggests the opposite: that the form’s purpose is to facilitate “pre-charge filing counseling” and to enable the agency to determine whether it has jurisdiction over “potential charges.” Id., at 265. There might be instances where the indicated discrimination is so clear or pervasive that the agency could infer from the allegations themselves that action is requested and required, but the agency is not required to treat every completed Intake Questionnaire as a charge. In this case, however, the completed questionnaire filed in December 2001 was supplemented with a detailed six-page affidavit. At the end of the last page, respondent asked the agency to “[pjlease force Federal Express to end their age discrimination plan so we can finish out our careers absent the unfairness and hostile work environment created within their application of Best Practice/High-Velocity Culture Change.” Id., at 273. This is properly construed as a request for the agency to act. Petitioner says that, in context, the statement is ambiguous. It points to respondent’s accompanying statement that “I have been given assurances by an Agent of the U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that this Affidavit will be considered confidential by the United States Government and will not be disclosed as long as the case remains open unless it becomes necessary for the Government to produce the affidavit in a formal proceeding.” Id., at 266. Petitioner argues that if respondent intended the affidavit to be kept confidential, she could not have expected the agency to treat it as a charge. This reads too much into the assurance of nondisclosure. Respondent did not request the agency to avoid contacting her employer. She stated only her understanding that the affidavit itself would be kept confidential. Even then, she gave consent for the agency to disclose the affidavit in a “formal proceeding.” Furthermore, respondent checked a box on the Intake Questionnaire giving consent for the agency to disclose her identity to the employer. Id., at 265. Here the combination of the waiver and respondent’s request in the affidavit that the agency “force” the employer to stop discriminating against her were enough to bring the entire filing within the definition of charge we adopt here.' Petitioner notes that respondent did file a Form 5 (a formal charge) with the EEOC but only after she filed her complaint in the District Court. This shows, petitioner argues, that respondent did not intend the earlier December 2001 filing to be a charge; otherwise, there would have been no reason for the later filing. What matters, however, is whether the documents filed in December 2001 should be interpreted as a request for the agency to act. Postfiling conduct does not nullify an earlier, proper charge. Documents filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the employee’s rights and statutory remedies. Construing ambiguities against the drafter may be the more efficient rule to encourage precise expression in other contexts; here, however, the rule would undermine the remedial scheme Congress adopted. It would encourage individuals to avoid filing errors by retaining counsel, increasing both the cost and likelihood of litigation. IV The Federal Government interacts with individual citizens through all but countless forms, schedules, manuals, and worksheets. Congress, in most cases, delegates the format and design of these instruments to the agencies that administer the relevant laws and processes. An assumption underlying the congressional decision to delegate rulemaking and enforcement authority to the agency, and the consequent judicial rule of deference to the agency’s determinations, is that the agency will take all efforts to ensure that affected parties will receive the full benefits and protections of the law. Here, because the agency failed to treat respondent’s filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA’s informal dispute resolution process. The employer’s interests, in particular, were given short shrift, for it was not notified of respondent’s complaint until she filed suit. The court that hears the merits of this litigation	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 31 ]	sc_adminaction
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF LOUISVILLE, INC. No. 79. Argued January 17, 1956. Decided February 27, 1956. David P. Findling argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Theophil C. Kammholz, Dominick L. Manoli and Samuel M. Singer. John K. Skaggs, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James E. Fahey. Arthur J. Goldberg argued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were J. Albert Woll and Thomas E. Harris. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. Charging respondent with coercion of its employees and discrimination against pro-union employees, Local 20 of the United Brewery Workers, CIO, instituted proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board for violation of §§ 8 (a)(1) and 8 (a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat: 136, 140, 65 Stat. 601, 602, which outlaw such unfair labor practices. Pursuant to this charge, a complaint was issued; at the hearing which followed, respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Board upon the ground that the union had not satisfied the requirements of § 9 (h) of the Act. Section 9 (h) provides that “no complaint shall be issued pursuant to [an unfair labor practice] charge made by a labor organization . . . unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.” Respondent offered to prove, by evidence of his duties and functions, that Taylor, the Regional Director of the CIO for Kentucky, who admittedly had not filed a non-Communist affidavit, was an “officer” within the meaning of § 9 (h). The Board rejected this contention on two grounds: First, “the compliance status of a union ... is a matter for administrative determination, and not one to be litigated in complaint or representation proceedings.” 108 N. L. R. B. 490, 491. Second, “had the Respondent established in a collateral proceeding what it had offered to prove at the hearing herein, we are satisfied, and find, that under the Board’s present ‘constitutional’ test, such proof would fall short of substantiating the Respondent’s contention that Taylor was an officer of the CIO.” 108 N. L. R. B. 490, 492-493. On the merits, the Board found that respondent had committed the unfair practices charged. When the Board sought enforcement of its decree, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, without passing upon the unfair practices, remanded the case to the Board for determination of the issue tendered by respondent in its claim that Taylor’s functions constituted him an “officer.” 219 F. 2d 441. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions raised in the administration of the statute. 350 U. S. 819. These questions are two in number: (1) May an employer, during the course of an unfair labor practice hearing, show that a labor organization has not complied with § 9 (h) and thereby establish the Board’s want of jurisdiction? (2) Assuming the answer to this question is “yes,” is the Board’s construction of “officer” in § 9 (h)—viz., “any person occupying a position identified as an office in the constitution of the labor organization”— proper? 29 CFR, 1955 Supp., § 102.13. The Court of Appeals answered the first question in the affirmative upon the authority of Labor Board v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co., 341 U. S. 322. In that case an employer, defendant in an unfair labor practice suit, challenged the Board’s interpretation of “national or international labor organization” in §9(h). The agency had read this language as not including labor federations, i. e., the AFL or CIO. Therefore, it had not required affidavits from officers of these federations. Highland Park’s challenge was rejected by the Board under its then settled policy that the employer could not raise noncompliance with § 9 (h) as a bar to a proceeding-on an unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals held to the contrary, 184 F. 2d 98, and we affirmed its decision. The Board distinguishes Highland Park by suggesting that here the “employer seeks to question only the fact of compliance, as distinguished from the necessity of compliance.” The genesis of this distinction comes from the following in Highland Park: “If there were dispute as to whether the C. I. O. had filed the required affidavits or whether documents filed met the statutory requirements and the Board had resolved that question in favor of the labor organizations, a different question would be presented.” 341 U. S. 322, 325. The Board misconceives the significance of the passage. Both Highland Park and this case involve the scope of § 9 (h), the meaning to be derived from its language; neither case involves an inquiry into disputed facts, the situation referred to in Highland Park. Acceptance of a differentiation between these cases upon any such theory as that suggested by the Board would make of law too thin a dialectic enterprise. But if the Board’s distinction is overly subtle, its reason for attempting a distinction has force, namely, a concern with “the need to expedite the hearing of cases and the resolution of issues on their merits ... .” 108 N. L. R. B. 490, 491. Much may be said for the claim that an employer should not be permitted to disrupt or delay complaint or representation cases by raising questions respecting § 9 (h). But after Highland Park the argument comes too late. In any event, whether the impediment to the effectiveness of the administrative process in determining the merits of a charge of unfair labor practice may be serious or negligible by injecting into it the subsidiary issue of compliance with § 9 (h), depends upon the scope of the inquiry opened up by the latter issue. This brings us to that question. Our concern specifically is with the appropriate construction of “officers” in §9(h). The Court of Appeals rejected the Board’s “constitutional” rule for determining who is a union “officer” in favor of a so-called “functional” test. Presumably this test would require those members of a union who are effective instruments of its policies to file affidavits as “officers,” regardless of the fact that they do not fill the offices designated by their organization’s constitution. Neither § 9 (h) itself nor its legislative history attempts a definition of “officers.” “Officers” is a word of familiar usage and'“[a]fter all, legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of men and is therefore to be understood according to the sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed to him.” Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U. S. 607, 618. “Officers” normally means those who hold defined offices. It does not mean the boys in the back room or other agencies of invisible government, whether in politics or in the trade-union movement. A definition of officer as “any person occupying a position identified as an office in the constitution of the labor organization” accords with this lay understanding. 29 CFR, 1955 Supp., § 102.13. But if the word be deemed to have a peculiar connotation for those intimate with trade-union affairs, it is incumbent upon us to give the word its technical meaning, Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48, for § 9 (h) is an integral part of a statute whose sponsors were familiar with labor organization and labor problems and which was doubtless drawn by specialists in labor relations. If such be the case, then of course the Board’s expertness comes into play. We should affirm its definition if that definition does not appear too farfetched, Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 130. The statute provides some evidence to support the Board, for § 9 (f), which requires unions to report specific information to the Secretary of Labor, differentiates between “officers” and “agents” of labor organizations. We conclude that the Board’s criterion for determining who are officers both accords with the lay definition of the word and is a reasonable, if indeed not a compelling, construction of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The only qualification to this practically automatic definition of who is or is not an officer is the following provision of § 102.13 (b) (3) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations: “. . . where the Board has reasonable cause to believe that a labor organization has omitted from its constitution the designation of any position as an office for the purpose of evading or circumventing the filing requirements of section 9 (h) of the act, the Board may, upon appropriate notice, conduct an investigation to determine the facts in that regard, and where the facts appear to warrant such action the Board may require affidavits from persons other than incumbents of positions identified by the constitution as offices before the labor organization will be recognized as having complied with section 9 (h) of the act.” 29 CFR, 1955 Supp., § 102.13 (b)(3). We interpret this to mean that the application of this exception is wholly within the Board’s control and cannot be litigated in an unfair labor practice proceeding.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 81 ]	sc_adminaction
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. FLOTILL PRODUCTS, INC. No. 20. Argued October 16, 1967. Decided December 4, 1967. Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner and James Mcl. Henderson. William Simon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John Bodner, Jr., and Jefferson E. Peyser. Me. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether an enforceable cease-and-desist order of the Federal Trade Commission requires the concurrence of a majority of the full Commission, or only of a majority of the quorum that participated in the decision to issue the order. The Commission has five Commissioners, 15 U. S. C. § 41. A full Commission heard oral argument in this case involving a complaint that respondent made payments in lieu of brokerage in violation of § 2 (c) of the Robinson-Patman Act and granted promotional allowances in violation of § 2 (d) of that Act. 15 U. S. C. §§ 13 (c) and (d). Two Commissioners retired before the Commission rendered its decision. Although one vacancy was filled in the interim, only three Commissioners participated in the decision because the new Commissioner, not having heard the oral argument, declined to participate. All three participating Commissioners concurred that respondent granted promotional allowances in violation of § 2 (d). However, only two of the three concurred that respondent also made payments in lieu of brokerage in violation of §2(c). On petition for review under 15 IT. S. C. §§ 21 (c) and 45 (c), a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Commission’s cease-and-desist order as it related to the § 2 (d) violation but refused to enforce the order, one judge dissenting, as it related to the § 2 (c) violation. In refusing to enforce the § 2 (c) part of the order, the Court of Appeals held that “absent statutory authority or instruction to the contrary, three members of a five member commission must concur in order to enter a binding order on behalf of the commission.” 358 F. 2d 224, 228. On rehearing en banc the full court sustained the panel decision five to four. 358 F. 2d, at 234. Because of a conflict with decisions of other courts of appeals, see Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 344 F. 2d 599 (C. A. 6th Cir.), LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F. 2d 117 (C. A. 5th Cir.), we granted certiorari, 386 U. S. 1003. We reverse. The Fedeial Trade Commission Act does not specify the number of Commissioners who may constitute a quorum. A quorum of three Commissioners is provided for by a rule of the Commission first promulgated in 1915; in its current version it is Rule 1.7. No challenge to the authority of FTC to promulgate Rule 1.7 is made in this case; indeed, the Court of Appeals expressly disclaimed any “. . . doubt as to the validity of the Commission’s practice of conducting hearings before less than the full membership,” 368 F. 2d, at 230. Before us for review, therefore, is only the holding of the Court of Appeals which follows that disclaimer: “We say only that an order of the Commission must be supported by three members in order to constitute an enforceable order of the FTC. Two of five is too few.” Ibid. The rationale of the Court of Appeals was that the FTC could act only on the concurrence of a majority of the full Commission “absent statutory authority or instruction to the contrary.” 358 F. 2d, at 228. The court cited no authority affirmatively supporting that proposition; the court simply rejected — on the ground that it is inapplicable to “a statutorily created administrative tribunal like the Federal Trade Commission,” 358 F. 2d, at 229—the rule stated by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. 2d 247, 255, that “. . . in collective bodies other than courts, even though they may exercise judicial authority, a majority of a quorum is sufficient to perform the function of the body.” Further, the court rejected as “a bare conclusion” the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, supra, that a majority of a panel of three Commissioners could act for the Commission. Insofar as the Court of Appeals’ holding implies that the proposition stated by it is the common-law rule, the court was manifestly in error. The almost universally accepted common-law rule is the precise converse — that is, in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, a majority of a quorum constituted of a simple majority of a collective body is empowered to act for the body. Where the enabling statute is silent on the question, the body is justified in adhering to that common-law rule. Respondent does not undertake to support the Court of Appeals' proposition as stated. Rather respondent concedes that the common-law rule is as we have stated it to be but argues that an exception allegedly recognized at common law in the case of courts should be applied to an agency like the FTC exercising quasi-judicial functions; respondent cites the statement in Frischer, supra, at 255, that “[w]here courts are concerned, it has been uniformly held, so far as we can ascertain, that a clear majority of all the legally constituted members thereof shall concur or no valid judgment may be entered except such as may follow no decision.” But even on the doubtful premise that there is an exception in the case of courts, Frischer itself recognized, as we have seen, that the exception does not apply to administrative agencies with quasi-judicial functions. Ibid. It follows that the FTC is not inhibited from following the common-law rule unless Congress has declared otherwise. Since that declaration is not expressed in the Trade Commission Act, our task is narrowed to determining whether it may be read in 'by implication. The Court of Appeals’ opinion may be read as having found an implicit contrary declaration because Congress wrote the common-law rule into later statutes creating other agencies: “ . . . when Congress wanted to authorize the exercise of the powers of an administrative body by less than the full body in other situations, it did not lack the words to do so expressly. Cf. National Labor Relations Board, 29 U. S. C. § 153 (b); Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (1) [sic]; Federal Power Commission, 16 U. S. C. § 792,” 358 F. 2d, at 229. However, in another statute, reorganizing the Federal Maritime Commission, Congress enacted not the common-law rule but a unanimous concurrence provision, Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, 75 Stat. 840; the reasoning of the Court of Appeals thus would equally justify an inference that Congress sanctioned the FTC’s adherence to the common-law rule, since Congress has not lacked the words to abrogate such a practice expressly. This diversity in congressional treatment of the problem clearly forecloses reliance upon a particular choice in one statute as the basis for an inference of a contrary choice in another which says nothing on the matter. The Court of Appeals seems also to have been of the view that there is a basis for inferring a contrary declaration from within the four corners of the Trade Commission Act itself. íí [I] t is difficult to believe that Congress conceived of the five-member FTC with its politically balanced make-up, permitting two of its members to speak for the Commission, and failed to specifically provide enabling legislation.” 358 F. 2d, at 229. This argument stresses the structural characteristics of the Commission — that it is a multi-membered body whose members serve long, staggered terms, and no more than three of whom may belong to the same political party. But the argument fails to take into account the fact that these features are common to almost all federal regulatory agencies, whose enabling acts, where they deal at all with the question of how many of a quorum may act for the agency, deal with it diversely. Nothing in the structure of the FTC, therefore, commands the inference that Congress intended to restrict the Commission to voting requirements not normally imposed on or adhered to by similarly structured agencies. Respondent’s final argument is that there is a basis for the inference in the action of Congress in 1961 in not disapproving the Reorganization Plan for the Commission submitted by President Kennedy. Under this plan the FTC was granted “authority to delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions to a division of the Commission, an individual Commissioner, a hearing examiner, or an employee or employee board, including functions with respect to hearing, determining, ordering, certifying, reporting or otherwise acting as to any work, business, or matter . . . .” The plan further provided that “the Commission shall retain a discretionary right to review the action of any such division of the Commission, individual Commissioner . . .” and that “the vote of a majority of the Commission less one member thereof shall be sufficient to bring any such action before the Commission for review.” Reorganization Plan No. 4, §§ 1 (a), (b). The Commission did not purport to act pursuant to Plan No. 4 in this proceeding. Nevertheless, respondent argues that the provision assuring a minority of the Commission a means to compel review by the full Commission is a congressional expression that Commission action shall be valid only when concurred in by a majority of the full membership. This argument is not persuasive, however. The provisions of Plan No. 4 were common to most of the reorganization plans submitted for other agencies at or about the same time. As we have noted, the enabling acts creating those agencies treat differently the problem of the number of a quorum authorized to act for the agency, which makes it highly improbable that the similarly phrased review procedures set forth in c the plans manifest the implicit principle for which respondent contends. Indeed, it is quite clear — both from the language of the plans and the discussions in Congress — that Plan No. 4 and those like it were concerned with establishing the authority and procedure for delegation of functions so as to enable the respective agencies to operate more efficiently. There can be little question of the desirability of the FTC’s judicious use of this authority, but the case before us is not one in which there was a delegation. This was a proceeding originally heard by a full Commission and the problem of a quorum decision arose only when fortuitous circumstances reduced to three the number of Commissioners available to render a decision. Clearly, it is not a decision covered by the 1961 Plan. The inconsistency in congressional treatment of quorum voting — sometimes allowing agency action on the concurrence of a majority of the quorum, in other cases requiring unanimous concurrence, and in several statutes saying nothing at all — refutes any suggestion that Congress has regarded the problem to be such as to justify a single rule for federal regulatory agencies. Surely, if Congress at any time has regarded the case of the FTC as specially calling for unanimity in quorum voting, we might expect that Congress would have at some time addressed itself to the question during the more than half century of the Commission’s existence. Thus, if any conclusion is to be drawn, it is that Congress has been and is content to acquiesce in the Commission's practice of following the long-established common-law rule. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as the matter of the Commission’s § 2 (c) order was “remanded to the FTC for further proceedings to determine whether a majority of the Commission join in the section 2 (c) findings,” and remand to that court with direction to proceed to judgment on the merits of respondent’s petition to review and set aside that order. It is so ordered. . Mb. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. he FTC is one of the oldest federal regulatory agencies. Act of September 26, 1914, c. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §41. See generally Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 177-228 (1941); Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission (1924). The FTC had denied a petition for reconsideration filed by respondent urging, among other things, the invalidity of the § 2 (e) order on this ground. See 1963-1965 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder ¶ 17,046. We do not regard the provision in 15 U. S. C. § 41 for the exercise of powers by “the remaining commissioners” in the case of “a vacancy” as regulating the matter of a quorum. In contrast, except for the 1934 Act creating the Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 U. S. C. § 78d, which is also silent, the acts creating other major federal regulatory agencies expressly provide how many members shall constitute a quorum. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2031 (Atomic Energy Commission); 49 U. S. C. § 1321 (c) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 47 U. S. C. § 154 (h) (Federal Communications Commission) ; 16 U. S. C. § 792 (Federal Power Commission); 46 U. S. C. § 1111, as amended (Federal Maritime Commission); 49 U. S. C. § 17 (3) (Interstate Commerce Commission); 29 U. S. C. § 153 (b) (National Labor Relations Board); 50 U. S. C. App. § 1217 (b) (Renegotiation Board); 19 U. S. C. § 1330 (e) (United States Tariff Commission). “A majority of the members of the Commission constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.” Rule 1.7, Procedures and Rules of Practice for the Federal Trade Commission, as amended, 16 CFR § 1.7 (1967) (now § 6 of Statement of Organization of the FTC, 32 Fed. Reg. 8442). Although §6 superseded Rule 1.7 as of July 1, 1967, it is identical in wording; we shall refer to the ruling as Rule 1.7, as it was cited in the proceedings to date. In its original version the quorum provision was stated: “Three members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.” 1 F. T. C. 595 (Rule adopted June 17, 1915). See also Henderson, supra, n. 1, at 71: “The case is then set for oral argument before the full Commission (or at least a quorum of three members) . . . .” Three courts of appeals have expressed approval of the rule. See Drath v. FTC, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 289, 239 F. 2d 452; Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 344 F. 2d 599 (C. A. 6th Cir.); LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F. 2d 117 (C. A. 5th Cir.). However, both the Fifth and Sixth Circuit decisions erroneously read the rule as providing, of itself, “for decision by the majority of panels of three members.” 366 F. 2d, at 122; 344 F. 2d, at 607. The question in Frischer was whether the United States Tariff Commission might act on majority vote of a quorum. The enabling act contained nothing on the subject of a quorum. 39 Stat. 795-798. The present statute provides that a majority of the Commissioners constitutes a quorum. 19 U. S. C. § 1330 (c). See, e. g., Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276 (1919); United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1 (1892); Brown v. District of Columbia, 127 U. S. 579 (1888); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. People ex rel., 68 Colo. 487, 499-500, 190 P. 513, 517-518 (1920); Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn. 192 (1857); Kaiser v. Real Estate Comm’n, 155 A. 2d 715 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959); Davidson v. State, - Ind. -, 221 N. E. 2d 814 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm’n v. Ogden, 307 Ky. 362, 210 S. W. 2d 771 (1948); Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177 (1909); Oakland v. Board of Conservation & Dev., 98 N. J. L. 806, 122 A. 311 (1923); Hill v. Ponder, 221 N. C. 58, 62, 19 S. E. 2d 5, 8 (1942); Slavens v. State Bd. of Real Estate Examiners, 166 Ohio St. 285, 141 N. E. 2d 887 (1957); Green v. Edmondson, 23 Ohio Dec. 85 (Common Pleas 1912); Bray v. Barry, 91 R. I. 34, 41-42, 160 A. 2d 577, 581 (1960); E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 109 Utah 563, 570-571, 168 P. 2d 324, 328 (1946); 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1589-1590 (1967); 42 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 135, 136-138 (1967). See also Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18, 23-24, 31 P. 716, 718 (1892); Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, H. R. Doc. No. 529, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 52-57, 409, 508-510. The authorities cited in Frischer as supporting the exception fail with one exception to do so. Four of the decisions cited dealt simply with the rule in cases where a court is equally divided in its vote. Madlem’s Appeal, 103 Pa. 584 (1883); Putnam v. Rees, 12 Ohio 21 (1843); Northern R. Co. v. Concord R. Co., 50 N. H. 166 (1870); Ayres v. Bensley, 32 Cal. 632 (1867). Another, in addition to dealing with the question of an equally divided court, involved a constitutional provision for the concurrence of a majority of the judges sitting. Mugge v. Tate, Jones & Co., 51 Fla. 255, 41 So. 603 (1906). The others are likewise not in point. Deglow v. Kruse, 57 Ohio St. 434, 49 N. E. 477 (1898) (two of three constitutes quorum, both must concur); Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Burchard, 35 Colo. 539, 558, 86 P. 749, 755 (1906) (constitutional requirement that three of seven judges concur). The whole of the court's discussion in the only decision in point, Johnson v. State, 1 Ga. 271 (1846), was “ft]he law, organizing the Inferior Court, constitutes five justices the court. We hold the concurrence of a majority of the whole number necessary to the validity of their action.” Id., at 274. No authority was cited for this holding. In addition, respondent cites Paine v. Foster, 9 Okla. 213, 53 P. 109 (1896), 9 Okla. 257, 59 P. 252 (1899). Its holding was, however, predicated on a statutory requirement that three judges of a five-judge court must concur in order to reverse a lower court judgment. See 9 Okla. 257, 259, 260, 60 P. 24 (dissenting opinion). Congress has prescribed a quorum of six Justices for this Court but has not provided how many of the quorum can act for the Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1. Congress has, however, dealt expressly with the latter matter in the statutes concerning the courts of appeals, 28 U. S. C. § 46 (d); the Court of Claims, 28 U. S. C. § 175 (f) (1964 ed., Supp. II); and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 28 U. S. C. § 215. Accord, Martin v. Lemon; Kaiser v. Real Estate Comm’n; Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm’n v. Ogden; Oakland v. Board of Conservation & Dev.; Slavens v. State Bd. of Real Estate Examiners; Bray v. Barry; E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, all supra, n. 6. In fact, of the three agencies cited only the ICC and NLRB have express authority to act through a majority of a quorum; the FPC statute simply stipulates that three of five commissioners constitute a quorum, a statutory equivalent of the FTC rule sanctioned by the Court of Appeals. The Atomic Energy Commission, 42 U. S. C. §2031, and the Renegotiation Board, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1217 (b), also are expressly authorized to act on the majority vote of a quorum. The Federal Maritime Commission, 46 U. S. C. § 1111, as amended by Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, on the other hand may act only on the unanimous vote of a quorum. Like the act creating the FTC, the acts creating the Civil Aeronautics Board, 49 U. S. C. § 1321 (c), the Federal Communications Commission, 47 U. S. C. § 154 (h), the Federal Power Commission, 16 U. S. C. § 792, the Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 U. S. C. § 78d, and the Tariff Commission, 19 U. S. C. § 1330 (c), say nothing on the subject. These latter agencies nonetheless act on the majority vote of a quorum and in the cases of the CAB, the FCC, the SEC, and the Tariff Commission, the practice has been judicially approved. Branifi Airways, Inc. v. CAB, - U. S. App. D. C. -, -, 379 F. 2d 453, 460 (dictum); WIBC, Inc. v. FCC, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 126, 128, 259 F. 2d 941, 943 (dictum); Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 186, 189, 348 F. 2d 798, 801 (dictum); Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., supra (Tariff Commission). In the case of the FTC, the practice has been judicially approved in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, supra, and LaPeyre v. FTC, supra. The earliest FTC decision noting the practice is apparently Luria Bros., 62 F. T. C. 243, 646, 655, decided in 1963. The first court challenge to the practice seems to have been that in 1965 in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, supra. Cf. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 361 F. 2d 340 (C. A. 1st Cir.). See generally 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 398 (1966); 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1589 (1967). Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961, 75 Stat. 837, 15 U. S. C. § 41. Under the Reorganization Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 133z-l to 133z-15, the plan became operative when not disapproved by Congress within 60 days of its submission by the President. Resolutions to disapprove Plan No. 4 failed to pass in both the House and the Senate. 107 Cong. Rec. 10844-10856 (House); id., at 11721-11740 (Senate). See Plan No. 1, H. R. Doe. No. 146, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (SEC); Plan No. 2, H. R. Doc. No. 147 (FCC); Plan No. 3, H. R. Doc. No. 152 (CAB); Plan No. 4, H. R. Doc. No. 159 (FTC); Plan No. 5, H. R. Doc. No. 172 (NLRB); Plan No. 7, H. R. Doc. No. 187 (FMC). Plans 1, 2, and 5 were disapproved by Congress, 107 Cong. Rec. 10463 (No. 2); id., at 11003 (No. 1); id., at 13078 (No. 5). Plans 3, 4, and 7 became effective. See 75 Stat. 837, 840. See nn. 10-11, supra. It is true that the Commission’s first “official” acknowledgment of its practice of rendering two-to-one decisions apparently did not come until 1963. See Luria Bros., supra, n. 9. Nevertheless, from the beginning the Commission has periodically had unfilled vacancies for significant lengths of time, vacancies which Congress of course had to know about. Thus between June 1, 1918, and January 16, 1919, there were two simultaneous vacancies; and there have been several single vacancies of some duration — e. g., September 1921 to June 1922, July 1934 to August 1935, October 1949 to October 1950. If, as respondent suggests, the prospect of the Commission acting through the split decision of three Commissioners should be so inconsistent with the nature of the Commission, it is indeed strange that Congressmen conversant with rules of parliamentary procedure governing voting, see Jefferson’s Manual, supra, n. 6, as well as the methodology of judicial decision making should not in all these years have taken steps to prevent a Commission — reduced to three by a double vacancy or by a single vacancy plus an abstention — from rendering such a decision.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 56 ]	sc_adminaction
CHAO, SECRETARY OF LABOR v. MALLARD BAY DRILLING, INC. No. 00-927. Argued October 31, 2001 Decided January 9, 2002 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Scalia, J., who took no part in the decision of the case. Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Judith E. Kramer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, Ellen L. Beard, Edward D. Sieger, James S. Carmichael, and Robert F. Duncan. Patrick J. Veters argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John L. Duvieilh. Jeffrey Robert White and Frederick M. Baron filed a brief for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Waterways Operators by Barbara L. Holland and Alan P. Sherbrooke; for the Associated General Contractors of America et al. by Charles T Carroll, Jr., and Carl Larsen Taylor; and for the Transportation Institute by John Longstreth. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent operates a fleet of barges used for oil and gas exploration. On April 9,1997, one of those barges, “Rig 52,” was towed to a location in the territorial waters of Louisiana, where it drilled a well over two miles deep. On June 16, 1997, when the crew had nearly completed drilling, an explosion occurred, killing four members of the crew and injuring two others. Under United States Coast Guard regulations, the incident qualified as a “marine casualty” because it involved a commercial vessel operating “upon the navigable waters of the United States.” 46 CFR §4.03-1 (2000). Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Coast Guard conducted an investigation of the casualty. See 46 U. S. C. §§6101-6104, 6301-6308 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The resulting report was limited in scope to what the Coast Guard described as “purely vessel issues,” and noted that the Coast Guard “does not regulate mineral drilling operations in state waters, and does not have the expertise to adequately analyze all issues relating to the failure of an oil/natural gas well.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. The Coast Guard determined that natural gas had leaked from the well, spread throughout the barge, and was likely ignited by sparks in the pump room. The report made factual findings concerning the crew’s actions, but did not accuse respondent of violating any Coast Guard regulations. Indeed, the report noted the limits of the Coast Guard’s regulation of vessels such as Rig 52: The report explained that, although Rig 52 held a Coast Guard Certificate of Documentation, it had “never been inspected by the Coast Guard and is not required to hold a Certificate of Inspection or be inspected by the Coast Guard.” Id., at 27a. In Coast Guard terminology, Rig 52 was an “uninspected vessel,” see 46 U. S. C. §2101(43), as opposed to one of the 14 varieties of “inspected vessels” subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation, see 46 U. S. C. §3301 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Based largely on information obtained from the Coast Guard concerning this incident, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSH A) cited respondent for three violations of the Occupational Safety-and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act or Act), 84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and the Act’s implementing regulations. The citations alleged that respondent failed promptly to evacuate employees on board the drilling rig; failed to develop and implement an emergency response plan to handle anticipated emergencies; and failed to train employees in emergency response. No. 97-1973, 1998 WL 917067, 1 (OSHRC, Dec. 28, 1998). Respondent did not deny the charges, but challenged OSHA’s jurisdiction to issue the citations on two grounds: that Rig 52 was not a “workplace” within the meaning of §4(a) of the Act; and that § 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce standards concerning occupational safety and health on vessels in navigable waters. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected both jurisdictional challenges. Finding that respondent’s “employees were not performing navigational-related activities” and that Rig 52 “was stationary and within the territorial boundaries of the State of Louisiana/’ he concluded that Rig 52 was a “workplace” within the meaning of the Act. Id., at 3. The ALJ then held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA’s jurisdiction under § 4(b)(1), explaining that respondent had identified no basis for an “industry-wide exemption from OSHA regulations” for uninspected vessels, and had failed to identify any Coast Guard regulation “specifically regulating]” the subject matter of the citations. Id., at 4. In the ALJ’s view, another federal agency cannot pre-empt OSHA’s jurisdiction under § 4(b)(1) unless that agency exercises its statutory authority to regulate a particular working condition: Mere possession of the power to regulate is not enough. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined review of the ALJ’s decision and issued a final order assessing a penalty against respondent of $4,410 per citation. Id., at 1. Without reaching the question whether Rig 52 was a “workplace” under §4(a) of the OSH Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It held that the Coast Guard “has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of working conditions of seamen aboard vessels such as [Rig 52], thus precluding OSHA’s regulation under Section 4(b)(1) of the OSH Act.” 212 F. 3d 898, 900 (2000). The Court of Appeals determined that this pre-emption encompassed uninspected vessels such as Rig 52, as well as inspected ones, explaining that the Coast Guard “has in fact exercised” its “authority to issue safety regulations for unin-spected vessels” — as § 4(b)(1) requires for pre-emption. Id., at 901 (stating, with respect to uninspected vessels, that the Coast Guard has issued regulations concerning “life preservers and other lifesaving equipment; emergency alerting and locating equipment; fire extinguishing equipment; backfire flame control; ventilation of tanks and engine spaces; cooking, heating, and lighting systems; safety orientation and emergency instructions; action required after an accident; and signaling lights”). However, the court conceded that “[b]ecause a drilling barge is not self-propelled, some of these regulations, by their nature, do not apply to [Rig 52].” Id., at 901, n. 6. Because other Courts of Appeals have construed the preemptive force of § 4(b)(1) more narrowly than did the Fifth Circuit, akin to the interpretation adopted by the ALJ in this case, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 531 U. S. 1143 (2001). We reverse, as the statute requires us to do. The OSH Act imposes on covered employers a duty to provide working conditions that “are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm” to their employees, as well as an obligation to comply with safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 29 U. S. C. §§ 654(a)(1), (2). The coverage of the Act does not, however, extend to working conditions that are regulated by other federal agencies. To avoid overlapping regulation, § 4(b)(1) of the Act, as codified in 29 U. S. C. § 653(b)(1), provides: “Nothing in this [Act] shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect to which other Federal agencies ... exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety and health.” (Emphasis added.) Congress’ use of the word “exercise” makes clear that, contrary to respondent’s position, see, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, mere possession by another federal agency of unexercised authority to regulate certain working conditions is insufficient to displace OSHA’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, another federal agency’s minimal exercise of some authority over certain conditions on vessels such as Rig 52 does not result in complete pre-emption of OSHA jurisdiction, because the statute also makes clear that OSHA is only preempted if the working conditions at issue are the particular ones “with respect to which” another federal agency has regulated, and if such regulations “affec[t] occupational safety or health.” § 653(b)(1). To determine whether Coast Guard regulations have pre-empted OSHA’s jurisdiction over the working conditions on Rig 52, it is thus necessary to examine the contours of the Coast Guard’s exercise of its statutory authority, not merely the existence of such authority. Congress has assigned a broad and important mission to the Coast Guard. Its governing statute provides, in part: “The Coast Guard ... shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters not specifically delegated by law to some other executive department. ...” 14 U. S. C. §2 (2000 ed.). Under this provision, the Coast Guard possesses authority to promulgate and enforce regulations promoting the safety of vessels anchored in state navigable waters, such as Rig 52. As mentioned above, however, in defining the Coast Guard’s regulatory authority, Congress has divided the universe of vessels into two broad classes: “inspected vessels” and “unin-spected vessels.” In 46 U. S. C. § 3301 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), Congress has listed 14 types of vessels that are “subject to inspection” by the Coast Guard pursuant to a substantial body of rules mandated by Congress. In contrast, 46 U. S. C. § 2101(43) defines an “uninspected vessel” as “a vessel not subject to inspection under section 3301 . . . that is not a recreational vessel.” The parties do not dispute that OSHA’s regulations have been pre-empted with respect to inspected vessels, because the Coast Guard has broad statutory authority to regulate the occupational health and safety of seamen aboard inspected vessels, 46 U. S. C. § 3306 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and it has exercised that authority. Indeed, the Coast Guard and OSHA signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) on March 17, 1983, evidencing their agreement that, as a result of the Coast Guard’s exercise of comprehensive authority over inspected vessels, OSHA “may not enforce the OSH Act with respect to the working conditions of seamen aboard inspected vessels.” 48 Fed. Reg. 11365. The MOU recognizes that the exercise of the Coast Guard’s authority — and hence the displacement of OSHA jurisdiction— extends not only to those working conditions on inspected vessels specifically discussed by Coast Guard regulations, but to all working conditions on inspected vessels, including those “not addressed by the specific regulations.” Ibid. Thus, as OSHA recognized in the MOU, another agency may “exercise” its authority within the meaning of § 4(b)(1) of the OSH Act either by promulgating specific regulations or by asserting comprehensive regulatory authority over a certain category of vessels. Uninspected vessels such as Rig 52, however, present an entirely different regulatory situation. Nearly all of the Coast Guard regulations responsible for displacing OSHA’s jurisdiction over inspected vessels, as described in the MOU, do not apply to uninspected vessels like Rig 52. See 46 U. S. C. § 2101(43). Rather, in the context of uninspected vessels, the Coast Guard’s regulatory authority — and exercise thereof — is more limited. With respect to uninspected vessels, the Coast Guard regulates matters related to marine safety, such as fire extinguishers, life preservers, engine flame arrestors, engine ventilation, and emergency locating equipment. See 46 U. S. C. §4102 (1994 ed. and Supp. V); 46 CFR pts. 24-26 (2000). Because these general marine safety regulations do not address the occupational safety and health concerns faced by inland drilling operations on unin-spected vessels, they do not pre-empt OSHA’s authority under § 4(b)(1) in this case. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, many of these general Coast Guard regulations for uninspected vessels do not even apply to stationary barges like Rig 52. See 212 F. 3d, at 901, n. 6. In addition to issuing these general marine safety regulations, the Coast Guard has exercised its statutory authority to regulate a number of specific working conditions on certain types of uninspected vessels. For example, the Coast Guard regulates drilling operations that take place on the outer continental shelf. See 43 U. S. C. § 1333(a)(1); 33 CFR pt. 142 (2000). And it is true that some of these more specific regulations would, pursuant to § 4(b)(1), pre-empt OSHA regulations covering those particular working conditions and vessels. But respondent has not identified any specific Coast Guard regulations that address the types of risk and vessel at issue in this case: namely, dangers from oil-drilling operations on uninspected barges in inland waters. Simply because the Coast Guard has engaged in a limited exercise of its authority to address certain working conditions pertaining to certain classes of uninspected vessels does not mean that all OSHA regulation of all uninspected vessels has been pre-empted. See 29 U. S. C. § 653(b)(1) (preemption only extends to working conditions “with respect to which” other federal agencies have exercised their authority (emphasis added)). Because the Coast Guard has neither affirmatively regulated the working conditions at issue in this case, nor asserted comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction over working conditions on uninspected vessels, the Coast Guard has not “exercise[d]” its authority under § 4(b)(1). We think it equally clear that Rig 52 was a “workplace” as that term is defined in §4(a) of the Act. The vessel was located within the geographic area described in the definition: “a State,” 29 U. S. C. § 653(a), namely, Louisiana. Nothing in the text of § 4(a) attaches any significance to the fact that the barge was anchored in navigable waters. Rather, the other geographic areas described in § 4(a) support a reading of that provision that includes a State’s navigable waters: for example, §4(a) covers the Outer Continental Shelf, and sensibly extends to drilling operations attached thereto. Cf. 43 U. S. C. § 1333(a)(1). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia took no part in the decision of this case. Unless otherwise noted, all United States Code references in this opinion are to the 1994 edition. Section 4(a) of the Act, as codified in 29 U. S. C. § 653(a), provides in part: “This chapter shall apply with respect to employment performed in a workplace in a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Wake Island, Outer Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Johnston Island, and the Canal Zone” (citation omitted). Section 4(b)(1) of the Act, as codified in 29 U. S. C. § 653(b)(1), provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect to which other Federal agencies, and State agencies acting under [§ 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954], exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety and health.” According to the AU: “The term ‘exercise,’ as used in § 4(b)(1), requires an actual assertion of regulatory authority as opposed to a mere possession of authority. OSHA jurisdiction will be preempted only as to those working conditions actually covered by the agency regulations. . .. The OSHA citation alleges that [respondent] failed to evacuate employees and failed to have an emergency response plan. [Respondent] does not argue or identify any similar requirement enforced by the U. S. Coast Guard.” No. 97-1973, 1998 WL 917067, *3-4 (OSHRC, Dec. 28, 1998). See Herman v. Tidewater Pacific, Inc., 160 F. 3d 1239 (CA9 1998); In re Inspection of Norfolk Dredging Co., 783 F. 2d 1526 (CA11), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 883 (1986); Donovan v. Red Star Marine Services, Inc., 739 F. 2d 774 (CA2 1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1003 (1985). The Secretary of Labor has delegated her authority under the Act to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, who heads OSHA. See 65 Fed. Reg. 50017 (2000). The Circuits have recognized at least two approaches for defining “working conditions” under § 4(b)(1). A “hazard-based” approach, which the Secretary of Labor endorses, focuses on “the particular physical and environmental hazards encountered by an employee” on the job. Brief for Petitioner 24; see, e. g., Donovan v. Red Star Marine Services, Inc., 739 F. 2d, at 779-780. In contrast, an “area-based” approach defines “working conditions” as the “area in which an employee customarily goes about his daily tasks.” Southern R. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 539 F. 2d 335, 339 (CA4), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 999 (1976). We need not choose between these interpretations, however, because the Coast Guard did not regulate the “working conditions” at issue in this case under either definition of the term. “The following categories of vessels are subject to inspection under this part: (1) freight vessels. (2) nautical school vessels. (3) offshore supply vessels. (4) passenger vessels. (5) sailing school vessels. (6) seagoing barges. (7) seagoing motor vessels. (8) small passenger vessels. (9) steam vessels. (10) tank vessels. (11) fish processing vessels. (12) fish tender vessels. (13) Great Lakes barges. (14) oil spill response vessels.” The statutory provisions themselves resolve this case, because the Coast Guard has not “exercise[d'J” authority under § 4(b)(1) with respect to the working conditions at issue here. It is worth noting, however, that this interpretation of §4(b)(l)’s pre-emptive scope comports with the OSH Act’s fundamental purpose: “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.” 29 U. S. C. § 651(b). As respondent declared at oral argument, its interpretation of § 4(b)(1) would mean that if the Coast Guard regulated marine toilets on Rig 52 and nothing more, any OSHA regulation of the vessel would be pre-empted. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Such large gaps in the regulation of occupational health and safety would be plainly inconsistent with the purpose of the OSH Act.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 90 ]	sc_adminaction
VORIS, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, v. EIKEL et al., doing business as SOUTHERN STEVEDORING & CONTRACTING CO., et al. No. 20. Argued October 14, 1953. Decided November 9, 1953. Murray L. Schwartz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Burger and Samuel D. Slade. John R. Brown argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was E. D. Vickery. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the proper application of the notice provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.) by a Deputy Commissioner to the claim of an employee admittedly subject to the provisions of the Act. Section 12 of the Act provides: “(a) Notice of an injury or death in respect of which compensation is payable under this chapter shall be given within thirty days after the date of such injury or death (1) to the deputy commissioner in the compensation district in which such injury occurred and (2) to the employer. “(b) Such notice shall be in writing, shall contain the name and address of the employee and a statement of the time, place, nature, and cause of the injury or death, and shall be signed by the employee or by some person on his behalf, or in case of death, by any person claiming to be entitled to compensation for such death or by a person on his behalf. “(d) Failure to give such notice shall not bar any claim under this chapter (1) if the employer (or his agent in charge of the business in the place where the injury occurred) or the carrier had knowledge of the injury or death and the deputy commissioner determines that the employer or carrier has not been prejudiced by failure to give such notice, or (2) if the deputy commissioner excuses such failure on the ground that for some satisfactory reason such notice could not be given . . . .” 44 Stat. 1431, 33 U. S. C. §912. The Deputy Commissioner found in favor of the claimant, and awarded compensation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reversed his decision and enjoined further payments, 101 F. Supp. 963. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed by a divided court, 200 F. 2d 724. This Court granted certiorari to review the interpretation of the statute. 345 U. S. 955. The facts as disclosed by the record and found by the Deputy Commissioner are as follows: The claimant, Earl Porter, was a stevedore employed by the Southern Stevedoring and Contracting Company. On December 19, 1949, while he was working in the hold of the S. S. Southern States, the loading equipment struck an electric fixture which, in breaking, ignited some sul-phur and created a flash fire. The men fled in terror from the hold, and, while claimant was on the ladder, he was struck by a beam and knocked to the floor, with resulting injuries to his back and shoulder. The Deputy Commissioner found that the injuries were permanent. No written notice was given to the employer until six months after the accident. • Several workmen in the stevedoring gang saw the claimant injured. Others, including Leslie Lovely, foreman of the gang in which claimant worked, saw him on the deck immediately after the injury, unable to walk. Some of claimant’s fellow workers carried him to a nearby automobile. The walking foreman, Ernest Wisby, who supervised the work of both stevedoring gangs on the vessel, was immediately notified by the claimant of his injury, and it was Wisby who drove the claimant to his home. The claimant testified that he asked Wisby to take him to a doctor, but that the latter told him he could not reach one until 7:00 a. m. This was at 4:15 a. m. Claimant testified that he crawled into the house instead of walking because of the pain he was suffering. Wisby did not return to take him to the doctor. Claimant further testified that later on the morning of the accident he sent his wife to the home of Wisby in order to have the latter arrange for a doctor but was told he was asleep, and that two or three days later he went to Wisby’s house and demanded that he be taken to a doctor. Wisby admitted this, but denied that he ever agreed to take the claimant to a doctor. He testified that he told claimant that the timekeeper was the only one who had authority to send him to a doctor. Wisby testified that he reported the injury to the timekeeper on the day of the accident. The record establishes that the usual method of reporting accidents on this job and similar jobs is for the injured employee to report to his immediate supervisor. The immediate supervisors of the stevedores are the gang and walking foremen. When there is a timekeeper on the job, the supervisor sends or takes the employee to the timekeeper who sends the employee to a doctor. Both the supervisor and the timekeeper are instructed to report the injury to the employer or the agent in charge. Wisby was the man who hired the claimant, directed his work, and paid him his wages for the respondent. The only other person claimed by respondent to be in authority for it on the ship at the time of the accident was A. P. David, whose regular status was that of gear-man. He testified that he was left in charge of the job when B. D. Harris, a partner in the stevedoring firm, left the ship that day to make a trip to Houston. There is nothing in the record to indicate, and there is evidence to the contrary, that the authority claimed for David as representative of the company was known to the foremen or workmen. David had no headquarters on the job; there was no notice given of his change in status from “gearman” to agent in charge; and, during the loading operation at the time of the accident, he was in the galley talking and having coffee with the timekeeper. It is under these circumstances that the respondent contends, and the courts below held, that the Deputy Commissioner could not find that the employer had the notice required by § 12 (d) of the Act. This conclusion was not justified. The flash fire was a matter of common knowledge and even terror on the ship. Many witnesses saw the claimant injured or on the deck unable to walk immediately thereafter. His gang foreman knew of the injury. The walking foreman, who hired him and paid his wages, not only knew of it, but had him carried to his car and drove him home, promising, according to claimant’s testimony, to later take him to a doctor. This same foreman informed the timekeeper of the injury. Exactly what the timekeeper and Mr. David were doing throughout this exciting and dangerous period does not appear in the record, but certainly they were sufficiently close to be aware of the occurrence. The respondents would have us hold that unless the claimant can demonstrate that the employer, or the person he selects to be in charge, even another workman selected without notice to the workmen or foremen, has actual personal knowledge of the injury, the requirements of § 12 (d) are not satisfied. Such an interpretation would be indefensible. The accepted practice on the job was for personal injuries to be reported by the injured party or his foreman to the timekeeper. It then became the duty of the latter to procure a doctor. When Wisby reported the injury to the timekeeper, the established practice of notice to the employer was substantially complied with. Both Wisby and the timekeeper were under a duty to report the injury to the employer or his agent in charge. The Deputy Commissioner found that the claimant received a crippling injury, that he was illiterate and without instruction or knowledge as to whom to report his injury, and that the practice on the job of reporting injuries for medical assistance as recognized by the employer was followed in his case, and that the failure to supply medical assistance was due to the negligence of the employer or his agents, and that the employer was not prejudiced by the failure to give written notice. These findings are supported by the evidence in the record. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Deputy Commissioner was justified in finding that the employer had notice of the injury within the meaning of § 12 (d). The burden of any failure of these agents to report must fall on the employer, and not on a longshoreman who follows the routine the employer prescribes. Particularly is it true in this case where the claimant, who was totally illiterate and only worked as a stevedore for two days, suffered a painful and crippling injury that necessitated removing him from the job to his home. This Act must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results. Baltimore & P. S. B. Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 414. The Deputy Commissioner is empowered to hear and determine all questions in respect of claims under the Act. 44 Stat. 1435, 33 U. S. C. § 919 (a). The federal district courts have power to enjoin awards only if they are not “in accordance with law.” 44 Stat. 1436, 33 U. S. C. § 921 (b); and see Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. The findings of the Deputy Commissioner are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U. S. 504. Otherwise, reversal must rest on an error of law, such as a misconstruction of the Act. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565. The Deputy Commissioner properly construed the law, and his findings are supported by evidence. The Act was designed to provide compensation for the included workers, regardless of whether written notice was given, where the employer has knowledge of the injury, or the employee cannot give the required written notice. Because of our conclusion, it is not necessary to determine whether the claimant could have given written notice to the employer. The District Court also held that it would have been required to refer the case back to the Deputy Commissioner for further findings on the question of the permanence of the injury and the determination of the compensation rate. These questions, however, are not before the Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for such further proceedings as it deems necessary, not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 30 ]	sc_adminaction
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION et al. v. INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS CO. et al. NO. 109. Argued January 11, 1949. Decided April 18, 1949. Bradford Ross argued the cause for petitioner in No. 109. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perl-man, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Stanley M. Silverberg, Paul A. Sweeney, Melvin Richter and Howard E. Wahrenbrock. John P. Randolph argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 188. William C. Wines argued the cause for the Illinois Commerce Commission, petitioner in No. 212. George F. Barrett, Attorney General of Illinois, and Albert E. Hallett, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief. Charles C. Crabtree submitted on brief for petitioner in No. 209. William A. Dougherty argued the cause for the Interstate Natural Gas Co. et al., respondents. With him on the brief for the Interstate Natural Gas Co. were Henry P. Dart, Jr. and James Lawrence White. Mr. Dougherty and Mr. White also filed a brief for the Mississippi River Fuel Corp., respondent. John T. Cahill argued the cause for the Memphis Natural Gas Co., respondent. With him on the brief were Edward P. Russell, Thurlow M. Gordon and Harold F. Reindel. Forney Johnston argued the cause for the Southern Natural Gas Co., respondent. With him on the brief was Jos. F. Johnston. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, here on certiorari, involves the proper disposition of a fund accumulated under a stay order issued by the Court of Appeals pending review of a rate order issued by petitioner. That order reduced the rates for natural gas on sales by Interstate Natural Gas Co. to Mississippi River Fuel Corp., Southern Natural Gas Co., and United Gas Pipe Line Co. for resale to Memphis Natural Gas Co., and on sales by Interstate to Memphis. The Court of Appeals sustained the order, 156 F. 2d 949, and we affirmed its judgment, 331 U. S. 682. Interstate deposited in the registry of the court pending review the monthly difference between payments under existing rates and those required under the order of the commission. Interstate has now moved in the Court of Appeals for a distribution of the fund. The pipe-line companies — Mississippi, Southern, United, and Memphis — claimed the fund and asked that it be distributed to them. Petitioner and certain state and municipal agencies also intervened, opposing distribution to the pipe-line companies and claiming that it should be made to the ultimate consumers of the gas or to such others as may be equitably entitled to it. The Court of Appeals, relying on Central States Co. v. Muscatine, 324 U. S. 138, ordered the fund to be paid to those from whom Interstate wrongfully exacted the payments, viz., the pipe-line companies, without prejudice to such rights as others may have to hold those companies accountable for the amounts involved. 166 F. 2d 796. First. Here, unlike Central States Co. v. Muscatine, supra, the distributing companies that seek return of the fund created from their payments of the excessive rates are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, since they are natural gas companies engaged in the transportation or sale at wholesale of natural gas in interstate commerce. See Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498. The claims of these pipeline companies to the fund are therefore determinable solely with reference to federal law, since the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717, is designed to regulate the segment of the industry occupied by such distributors. See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U. S. 682, 689-690; Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 610. We may not therefore sustain the action of the Court of Appeals unless it is clear as a matter of federal law that the pipe-line companies are entitled to the fund. The basis of the claim stated in their petitions for intervention is that they are entitled to the fund as of right, since it was created by their payments. But we would be unmindful of the purpose of the Act and the responsibility of the federal courts under it, if we so ruled. The aim of the Act was to protect ultimate consumers of natural gas from excessive charges. See Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 610, 612. They were the intended beneficiaries of rate reductions ordered by the federal commission, though state machinery might have to be invoked to obtain lower rates at the consumer level. The rates charged a wholesaler are part of its costs, reflected in its rate base. Reduction of those costs normally will lead in due course to reduction in its resale rates, unless we are to assume that the passage of the Natural Gas Act was an exercise in futility. It is of course conceivable that a wholesaler might be warranted in keeping all or a part of the rate reduction under the standards of reasonableness prescribed by the Act. But a court would not be warranted in assuming that the rates which have been charged are so low as to be unreasonable. No such presumption attends rates which have been fixed pursuant to rate orders of the commission. Nor can we make any such presumption as respects rates fixed by the utilities themselves without the compulsion of a rate order. For experience does not indicate that utilities are wont to charge themselves out of business. The pipe-line companies in their petitions for intervention make no claim that their rates have been so low that they are entitled to these refunds as a matter of law. Were that issue tendered, the court would need to resolve it and could call upon the Federal Power Commission for information relevant to it. Moreover, if the pipeline companies passed on to their customers the rate reductions from the date of the commission’s order (as Mississippi alleges it did), they would be entitled to a return of the payments they made into the fund. They would then have done all that was in their power to effectuate the policy of the Act in this regard. But apart from those exceptions, it is the duty of the court to look beyond those companies for the rightful claimants of the fund. It is the responsibility of the court which distributes the fund accumulated under its stay order “to correct that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of its process.” United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 197. That responsibility plainly cannot be discharged by payment of the fund to those who show no loss by reason of the court’s action. It is said that the federal court could not by-pass the pipe-line companies without undertaking to pass on the reasonableness of the rates which they have charged— a matter beyond its competence except on review of orders of the commission. But it is not rate-making to determine the equity of the claim of the pipe-line companies to the fund. The federal court, through exercise of its power under § 19 of the Act, issued the stay order under which the fund was accumulated. When a federal court of equity grants relief by way of injunction it has a responsibility to protect all the interests whom its injunction may affect. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153. It assumes the duty to make disposition of the fund in accord with equitable principles. United States v. Morgan, supra, at 191. If in a particular case the court reaches the question of reasonableness of rates, it does so only for purposes of distributing the fund for whose creation it alone was responsible. It does not fix or prescribe rates for the past or the future. The reasonableness of rates charged by the companies who claim the fund is wholly ancillary to the problem of determining what claimants are equitably entitled to share in it. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301; United States v. Morgan, supra. Second. The problem is somewhat more complicated if distribution of the fund is to be made to claimants other than the pipe-line companies. The latter sell gas to at least two types of customers — industrial users over whose rates the Federal Power Commission has no jurisdiction and over which state regulatory bodies may or may not, depending on local law; and numerous distributing companies selling to customers in eight states. If the pipe-line companies had passed the rate reductions on to the distributing companies, those reductions may or may not have reached the ultimate consumers. We likewise do not know whether the reductions would have reached the industrial users either by terms of the contracts or by virtue of the assertion of regulatory authority. If in this situation local law provides a standard for determining which of two or more claimants would have been entitled to the benefits of the rate reduction, the federal court should apply it. If clear and speedy state remedies are available, the federal court might hold the fund until those having the final say on the state law questions have spoken. Cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478, 483; Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101. But in absence of such a showing the federal court in the interest of dispatch should proceed to determine the questions, relying on such sources of local law as may be available, including information from state regulatory agencies. The federal court may in its discretion disburse the funds directly to either the local distributing companies or the ultimate consumers or work out an administrative scheme whereby the distribution is made pursuant to directives of state agencies. In conclusion, the task of the federal court in distributing the fund accumulated by virtue of its stay order is to undo the wrong which its process caused. The basic problem, therefore, is not to fix rates but to determine who suffered a loss as a result of the court’s action in granting the stay. What in fact would have happened as a consequence of federal or state law if the stay had not been issued, no one can know for a certainty. But the federal court must make its prognostication, whether an excursion into federal or state law questions is entailed. Distribution of the fund should not involve prolonged litigation. It is an administrative matter involving the exercise of an informed judgment by the federal court and should have the flexibility and dispatch which characterize the administrative process. Reversed. United claimed an allocable share on behalf of Memphis to which it had resold the gas which it had purchased from Interstate. § 1 (b).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 51 ]	sc_adminaction
IN RE PRIMUS No. 77-56. Argued January 16, 1978 Decided May 30, 1978 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGEr, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, and SteveNS, JJ., joined, and in all but the first paragraph of Part VI of which Marshall, J., joined. Black-mtjn, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 439. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 468. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 440. BreNNAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Bay P. McClain argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Joel M. Com, Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, and H. Christopher Coates. Richard B. Kale, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General. Briefs of amid curiae were filed by Herbert M. Rosenthal and Stuart A. Forsyth for the State Bar of California, and by Girardeau A. Spann and Alan B. Morrison for Public Citizen et al. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider on this appeal whether a State may punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, advises a lay person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available from a nonprofit organization with which the lawyer and her associates are affiliated. Appellant, a member of the Bar of South Carolina, received a public reprimand for writing such a letter. The appeal is opposed by the State Attorney General, on behalf of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. As this appeal presents a substantial question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as interpreted in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), we noted probable jurisdiction. I Appellant, Edna Smith Primus, is a lawyer practicing in Columbia, S. C. During the period in question, she was associated with the “Carolina Community Law Firm,”. and was an officer of and cooperating lawyer with the Columbia branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). She received no compensation for her work on behalf of the ACLU, but was paid a retainer as a legal consultant for the South Carolina Council on Human Relations (Council), a nonprofit organization with offices in Columbia. During the summer of 1973, local and national newspapers reported that pregnant mothers on public assistance in Aiken County, S. G., were being sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a condition of the continued receipt of medical assistance under the Medicaid program. Concerned by this development, Gary Allen, an Aiken businessman and officer of a local organization serving indigents, called the Council requesting that one of its representatives come to Aiken to address some of the women who had been sterilized. At the Council’s behest, appellant, who had not known Allen previously, called him and arranged a meeting in his office in July 1973. Among those attending was Mary Etta Williams, who had been sterilized by Dr. Clovis H. Pierce after the birth of her third child. Williams and her grandmother attended the meeting because Allen, an old family friend, had invited them and because Williams wanted “[t]o see what it was all about... App. 41-^42. At the meeting, appellant advised those present, including Williams and the other women who had been sterilized by Dr. Pierce, of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. Early in August 1973 the ACLU informed appellant that it was willing to provide representation for Aiken mothers who had been sterilized. Appellant testified that after being advised by Allen that Williams wished to institute suit against Dr. Pierce, she decided to inform Williams of the ACLU’s offer of free legal representation. Shortly after receiving appellant’s letter, dated August 30, 1973 — the centerpiece of this litigation — Williams visited Dr. Pierce to discuss the progress of her third child who was ill. At the doctor’s office, she encountered his lawyer and at the latter’s request signed a release of liability in the doctor’s favor. Williams showed appellant’s letter to the doctor and his- lawyer, and they retained a copy. She then called appellant from the doctor’s office and announced her intention not to sue. There was no further communication between appellant and Williams. On October 9, 1974, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a formal complaint with the Board, charging that appellant had engaged in “solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics” by sending the August 30, 1973, letter to Williams. App. 1-2. Appellant denied any unethical solicitation and asserted, inter alia, that her conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and by Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association (ABA). The complaint was heard by a panel of the Board on March 20, 1975. The State’s evidence consisted of the letter, the testimony of Williams, and a copy of the summons and complaint in the action instituted against Dr. Pierce and various state officials, Walker v. Pierce, Civ. No. 74-475 (SC, July 28, 1975), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 560 F. 2d 609 (CA4 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1075 (1978). Following denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss, App. 77-82, she testified in her own behalf and called Allen, a number of ACLU representatives, and several character witnesses. The panel filed a report recommending that appellant be found guilty of soliciting a client on behalf of the ACLU, in violation of Disciplinary Rules (DR) 2-103 (D) (5) (a) and (c) and 2-104 (A) (5) of the Supreme Court of South Carolina/ and that a private reprimand be issued. It noted that “[t]he evidence is inconclusive as to whether [appellant] solicited Mrs. Williams on her own behalf, but she did solicit Mrs. Williams on behalf of the ACLU, which would benefit financially in the event of successful prosecution of the suit for money damages.” The panel determined that appellant violated DR 2-103 (D) (5) “by attempting to solicit a client for a non-profit organization which, as its primary purpose, renders legal services, where respondent’s associate is a staff counsel for the non-profit organization.” Appellant also was found to have violated DR 2-104 (A) (5) because she solicited Williams, after providing unsolicited legal advice, to join in a prospective class action for damages and other relief that was to be brought by the ACLU. After a hearing on January 9, 1976, the full Board approved the panel report and administered a private reprimand. On March 17, 1977, the Supreme Court of South Carolina entered an order which adopted verbatim the findings and conclusions of the panel report and increased the sanction, sua sponte, to a public reprimand. 268 S. C. 259, 233 S. E. 2d 301. On July 9, 1977, appellant filed a jurisdictional statement and this appeal was docketed. We noted probable jurisdiction on October 3, 1977, sub nom. In re Smith, 434 U. S. 814. We now reverse. II This appeal concerns the tension between contending values of considerable moment to the legal profession and to society. Relying upon NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), and its progeny, appellant maintains that her activity involved constitutionally protected expression and association. In her view, South Carolina has not shown that the discipline meted out to her advances a subordinating state interest in a manner that avoids unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms. Appellee counters that appellant’s letter to Williams falls outside of the protection of Button, and that South Carolina acted lawfully in punishing a member of its Bar for solicitation. The States enjoy broad power to regulate “the practice of professions within their boundaries,” and “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.’ ” Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 792 (1975). For example, we decide today in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., post, p. 447, that the States may vindicate legitimate regulatory interests through proscription, in certain circumstances, of in-person solicitation by lawyers who seek to communicate purely commercial offers of legal assistance to lay persons. Unlike the situation in Ohralik, however, appellant’s act of solicitation took the form of a letter to a woman with whom appellant had discussed the possibility of seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional sterilization. This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an offer of free assistance by attorneys associated with the ACLU, not an offer predicated on entitlement to a share of any monetary recovery. And her actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain. The question presented in this case is whether, in light of the values protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, these differences materially affect the scope of state regulation of the conduct of lawyers. Ill In NAACP v. Button, supra, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had held that the activities of members and. staff attorneys of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and its affiliate, the Virginia State Conference of NAACP Branches (Conference), constituted “solicitation of legal business” in violation of state law. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S. E. 2d 55 (1960). Although the NAACP representatives and staff attorneys had “a right to peaceably assemble with the members of the branches and other groups to discuss with them and advise them relative to their legal rights in matters concerning racial segregation,” the court found no constitutional protection for efforts to “solicit prospective litigants to authorize the filing of suits” by NAACP-compensated attorneys. Id., at 159, 116 S. E. 2d, at 68-69. This Court reversed: “We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of [state law] and the Canons of Professional Ethics.” 371 U. S., at 428-429. The solicitation of prospective litigants, many of whom were not members of the NAACP or the Conference, for the purpose of furthering the civil-rights objectives of the organization and its members was held to come within the right “ ho engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.’ ” Id., at 430, quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958). Since the Virginia statute sought to regulate expressive and associational conduct at the core of the First Amendment’s protective ambit, the Button Court insisted that “government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” 371 U. S., at 433. The Attorney General of Virginia had argued that the law merely (i) proscribed control of the actual litigation by the NAACP after it was instituted, ibid., and (ii) sought to prevent the evils traditionally associated with common-law maintenance, champerty, and barratry, id., at 438. The Court found inadequate the first justification because of an absence of evidence of NAACP interference with the actual conduct of litigation, or neglect or harassment of clients, and because the statute, as construed, was not drawn narrowly to advance the asserted goal. It rejected the analogy to the common-law offenses because of an absence of proof that malicious intent or the prospect of pecuniary gain inspired the NAACP-sponsored litigation. It also found a lack of proof that a serious danger of conflict of interest marked the relationship between the NAACP and its member and nonmember Negro litigants. The Court concluded that “although the [NAACP] has amply shown that its activities fall within the First Amendment’s protections, the State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from [the NAACP’s] activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed.” Id., at 444. Subsequent decisions have interpreted Button as establishing the principle that “collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.” United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U. S. 576, 585 (1971). See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 376 n. 32 (1977). The Court has held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent state proscription of a range of solicitation activities by labor unions seeking to provide low-cost, effective legal representation to their members. See Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U. S. 1 (1964); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217 (1967); United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, supra. And “lawyers accepting employment under [such plans] have a like protection which the State cannot abridge.” Railroad Trainmen, supra, at 8. Without denying the power of the State to take measures to correct the substantive evils of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, and lay interference that potentially are present in solicitation of prospective clients by lawyers, this Court has required that “broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice” must not work a significant impairment of “the value of associational freedoms.” Mine Workers, supra, at 222. IV We turn now to the question whether appellant’s conduct implicates interests of free expression and association sufficient to justify the level of protection recognized in Button and subsequent cases. The Supreme Court of South Carolina found appellant to have engaged in unethical conduct because she “'solicit[ed] a client for a non-profit organization, which, as its primary purpose, renders legal services, where respondent’s associate is a staff counsel for the non-profit organization.’ ” 268 S. C., at 269, 233 S. E. 2d, at 306. It rejected appellant’s First Amendment defenses by distinguishing Button from the case before it. Whereas the NAACP in that case was primarily a " 'political’ ” organization that used “ 'litigation as an adjunct to the overriding political aims of the organization,’ ” the ACLU “ 'has as- one of its primary purposes the rendition of legal services.’ ” Id., at 268, 269, 233 S. E. 2d, at 305, 306. The court also intimated that the ACLU’s policy of requesting an award of counsel fees indicated that the organization might " 'benefit financially in the event of successful prosecution of the suit for money damages.’ ” Id., at 263, 233 S. E. 2d, at 303. Although the disciplinary panel did not permit full factual development of the aims and practices of the ACLU, see n. 9, su-pra, the record does not support the state' court’s effort to draw a meaningful distinction between the ACLU and the NAACP. From all that appears, the ACLU and its local chapters, much like the NAACP and its local affiliates in Button, “[engage] in extensive educational and lobbying activities” and “also [devote] much of [their] funds and energies to an extensive program of assisting certain kinds of litigation on behalf of [their] declared purposes.” 371 U. S., at 419-420. See App. 177-178; n. 2, supra. The court below acknowledged that “ 'the ACLU has only entered cases in which substantial civil liberties questions are involved....’” 268 S. C., at 263, 233 S. E. 2d, at 303. See Button, 371 U. S., at 440 n. 19. It has engaged in the defense of unpopular causes and unpopular defendants and has represented individuals in litigation that has defined the scope of constitutional protection in areas such as political dissent, juvenile rights, prisoners’ rights, military law, amnesty, and privacy. See generally Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 207, 210-214 (1976). For the ACLU, as for the NAACP, “litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences”; it is “a form of political expression” and “political association.” 371 U. S., at 429, 431. We find equally unpersuasive any suggestion that the level of constitutional scrutiny in this case should be lowered because of a possible benefit to the ACLU. The discipline administered to appellant was premised solely on the possibility of financial benefit to the organization, rather than any possibility of pecuniary gain to herself, her associates, or the lawyers representing the plaintiffs in the Walker v. Pierce litigation. It is conceded that appellant received no compensation for any of the activities in question. It is also undisputed that neither the ACLU nor any lawyer associated with it would have shared in any monetary recovery by the plaintiffs in Walker v. Pierce. If Williams had elected to bring suit, and had been represented by staff lawyers for the ACLU, the situation would have been similar to that in Button, where the lawyers for the NAACP were “organized as a staff and paid by” that organization. 371 U. S., at 434; see id., at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S., at 222-223; n. 16, supra. Contrary to appellee’s suggestion, the ACLU’s policy of requesting an award of counsel fees does not take this case outside of the protection of Button. Although the Court in Button did not consider whether the NAACP seeks counsel fees, such requests are often made both by that organization, see, e. g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 622 (CA5 1974); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507, 523 (Mass.), aff’d, 504 F. 2d 1017 (CA1 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 910 (1975), and by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., see, e. g., Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696 (1974); Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F. 2d 1166, 1167 (CA1 1978). In any event, in a case of this kind there are differences between counsel fees awarded by a court and traditional fee-paying arrangements which militate against a presumption that ACLU sponsorship of litigation is motivated by considerations of pecuniary gain rather than by its widely recognized goal of vindicating civil liberties. Counsel fees are awarded in 'the discretion of the court; awards are not drawn from the plaintiff's recovery, and are usually premised on a successful outcome; and the amounts awarded often may not correspond to fees generally obtainable in private litigation. Moreover, under prevailing law during the events in question, an award of counsel fees in federal litigation was available only in limited circumstances. And even if there had been an award during the period in question, it would have gone to the central fund of the ACLU. Although such benefit to the organization may increase with the maintenance of successful litigation, the same situation obtains with voluntary contributions and foundation support, which also may rise with ACLU victories in important areas of the law. That possibility, standing alone, offers no basis for equating the work of lawyers associated with the ACLU or the NAACP with that of a group that exists for the primary purpose of financial gain through the recovery of counsel fees. See n. 20, supra. Appellant's letter of August 30, 1973, to Mrs. Williams thus comes within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms. The ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public. See n. 32, infra; cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S., at 364; Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 779-780 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). As Button indicates, and as appellant offered to prove at the disciplinary hearing, see n. 9, supra, the efficacy of litigation as a means of advancing the cause of civil liberties often depends on the ability to make legal assistance available to suitable litigants. “ 'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 537 (1945). The First and Fourteenth Amendments require a measure of protection for “advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights,” Button, 371 U. S., at 437, including “advis[ing] another that his legal rights have been infringed and referring] him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys... for assistance,” id., at 434. Y South Carolina's action in punishing appellant for soliciting a prospective litigant by mail, on behalf of the ACLU, must withstand the “exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights....” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 44-45 (1976). South Carolina must demonstrate “a subordinating interest which is compelling,” Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960), and that the means employed in furtherance of that interest are “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Buckley, supra, at 25. Appellee contends that the disciplinary action taken in this case is part of a regulatory program aimed at the prevention of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, • invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, lay interference, and other evils that are thought to inhere generally in solicitation by lawyers of prospective clients, and to be present on the record before us. Brief for Appellee 37-49. We do not dispute the importance of these interests. This Court’s decision in Button makes clear, however, that “[bjroad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect,” and that “ [precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” 371 U. S., at 438; see Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S., at 222-223. Because of the danger of censorship through selective enforcement of broad prohibitions, and “[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in [this] area only with narrow specificity.” Button, supra, at 433. A The Disciplinary Rules in question sweep broadly. Under DR 2-103 (D) (5), a lawyer employed by the ACLU or a similar organization may never give unsolicited advice to a lay person that he retain the organization’s free services, and it would seem that one who merely assists or maintains a cooperative relationship with the organization also must suppress the giving of such advice if he or anyone associated with the organization will be involved in the ultimate litigation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-34. Notwithstanding appel-lee’s concession in this Court, it is far from clear that a lawyer may communicate the organization’s offer of legal assistance at an informational gathering such as the July 1973 meeting in Aiken without breaching the literal terms of the Rule. Cf. Memorandum of Complainant, Apr. 8, 1975, p. 9. Moreover, the Disciplinary Rules in question permit punishment for mere solicitation unaccompanied by proof of any of the substantive evils that appellee maintains were present in this case. In sum, the Rules in their present form have a distinct potential for dampening the kind of “cooperative activity that would make advocacy of litigation meaningful,” Button, supra, at 438, as well as for permitting discretionary enforcement against unpopular causes. B Even if we ignore the breadth of the Disciplinary Rules and the absence of findings in the decision below that support the justifications advanced by appellee in this Court, we think it clear from the record — which appellee does not suggest is inadequately developed — that findings compatible with the First Amendment could not have been made in this case. As in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 284-285 (1964), “considerations of effective judicial administration require us to review the evidence in the present record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment [against appellant]. This Court’s duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles [can be] constitutionally applied.” See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153, 160-161 (1974); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 574-575, 578-582, and n. 2 (1968); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235-236 (1963). Where political expression or association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of imprecision that often characterizes government; regulation of the conduct of commercial affairs. The approach we adopt today in Ohralik, post, p. 447, that the State may proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to appellant’s activity on behalf of the ACLU. Although a showing of potential danger may suffice in the former context, appellant may not be disciplined unless her activity in fact involved the type of misconduct at which South Carolina’s broad prohibition is said to be directed. The record does not support appellee’s contention that undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy actually occurred in this case. Appellant’s letter of August 30, 1973, followed up the earlier meeting — one con-cededly protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments — ■ by notifying Williams that the ACLU would be interested in supporting possible litigation. The letter imparted additional information material to making an informed decision about whether to authorize litigation, and permitted Williams an opportunity, which she exercised, for arriving at a deliberate decision. The letter was not facially misleading; indeed, it offered “to explain what is involved so you can understand what is going on.” The transmittal of this letter — as contrasted with in-person solicitation — involved no appreciable invasion of privacy; nor did it afford any significant opportunity for overreaching or coercion. Moreover, the fact that there was a written communication lessens substantially the difficulty of policing solicitation practices that do offend valid rules of professional conduct. See Ohralik, post, at 466-467. The manner of solicitation in this case certainly was no more likely to cause harmful consequences than the activity considered in Button, see n. 14, supra. Nor does the record permit a finding of a serious likelihood of conflict of interest or injurious lay interference with the attorney-client relationship. Admittedly, there is some potential for such conflict or interference whenever a lay organization supports any litigation. That potential was present in Button, in the NAACP’s solicitation of nonmembers and its disavowal of any relief short of full integration, see 371 U. S., at 420; id., at 460, 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But the Court found that potential insufficient in the absence of proof of a “serious danger” of conflict of interest, id., at 443, or of organizational interference with the actual conduct of the litigation, id., at 433, 444. As in Button, “[n]othing that this record shows as to the nature and purpose of [ACLU] activities permits an inference of any injurious intervention in or control of litigation which would constitutionally authorize the application,” id., at 444, of the Disciplinary Rules to appellant’s activity. A “very distant possibility of harm,” Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S., at 223, cannot justify proscription of the activity of appellant revealed by this record. See id., at 223-224. The State’s interests in preventing the “stirring up” of frivolous or vexatious litigation and minimizing commercialization of the legal profession offer no further justification for the discipline administered in this case. The Button Court declined to accept the proffered analogy to the common-law offenses of maintenance, champerty, and barratry, where the record would not support a finding that the litigant was solicited for a malicious purpose or “for private gain, serving no public interest,” 371 U. S., at 440; see id., at 439-444. The same result follows from the facts of this case. And considerations of undue commercialization of the legal profession are of marginal force where, as here, a nonprofit organization offers its services free of charge to individuals who may be in need of legal assistance and may lack the financial means and sophistication necessary to tap alternative sources of such aid. At bottom, the case against appellant rests on the proposition that a State may regulate in a prophylactic fashion all solicitation activities of lawyers because there may be some potential for overreaching, conflict of interest, or other substantive evils whenever a lawyer gives unsolicited advice and communicates an offer of representation to a layman. Under certain circumstances, that approach is appropriate in the case of speech that simply “propose [s] a commercial transaction,” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S. 376, 385 (1973). See Ohralik, post, at 455-459. In the context of political expression and association, however, a State must regulate with significantly greater precision. VI The State is free to fashion reasonable restrictions with respect to the time, place, and manner of solicitation by	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES et al. v. EUGE No. 78-1453. Argued November 26, 1979 Decided February 20, 1980 RehNquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burgee, C. J., and Stewart, White, BlacicmuN, and Powell, JJ., joined. BreN-NAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and SteveNS, JJ., joined, post, p. 719. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 720. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Robert E. Lindsay, and Carleton D. Powell. James W. Erwin, by appointment of the Court, 442 U. S. 915, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William L. Hungate and Charles A. Newman. Me. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States sued in the District Court seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue Service summons requiring respondent to appear and provide handwriting exemplars. Enforcement was denied by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 587 F. 2d 25 (1978) (en banc), and we granted certiorari. 441 U. S. 942. We now hold that Congress has empowered the IRS to compel handwriting exemplars under its summons authority conferred by 26 U. S. C. § 7602. I The facts are not in dispute. In October 1977, an agent in the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service was assigned to investigate respondent’s income tax liability for the years 1973 through 1976. Respondent had not filed any tax returns for those years. The Service sought to employ the "bank deposits method” of reconstructing respondent’s income for those years, as a means of calculating his tax liability. Under this method of proof, the sums deposited in the taxpayer’s bank accounts are scrutinized to determine whether they represent taxable income. During the course of the investigation, the agent found only two bank accounts registered in respondent’s name. Twenty other bank accounts were discovered, however, which the agent had reason to believe were being maintained by respondent under aliases to conceal taxable income. The statements for these accounts were sent to post office boxes held in respondent’s name; the signature cards for the accounts listed addresses of properties owned by respondent; and the agent had documented frequent transfers of funds between the accounts. In an effort to determine whether the sums deposited in these accounts represented income attributable to respondent, the agent issued a summons on October 7, 1977, requiring respondent to appear and execute handwriting exemplars of the various signatures appearing on the bank signature cards. Respondent declined to comply with the summons. The United States commenced this action under 26 U. S. C. § 7604 (a). The District Court held that the summons should be enforced, ordering respondent to provide 10 handwriting exemplars of 8 different signatures. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the summons authority vested in the Internal Revenue Service under 26 U. S. C. § 7602 does not authorize the IRS to compel the execution of handwriting exemplars. II The structure and history of the statutory authority of the Internal Revenue Service to summon witnesses to produce evidence necessary for tax investigations has been repeatedly reviewed by this Court in recent years. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964); United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141 (1975); Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 (1976); United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298 (1978). Under § 7602, the Secretary of the Treasury, and therefore the IRS as his designate, is authorized to summon individuals to “appear before the Secretary . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry. ...” The question presented here is whether this power to compel a witness to “appear,” to produce “other data,” and to “give testimony,” includes the power to compel the execution of handwriting exemplars. We conclude that it does, for several reasons. While the language may not be explicit in its authorization of handwriting exemplars, the duty to appear and give testimony, a duty imposed by § 7602, has traditionally encompassed a duty to provide some forms of nontestimonial, physical evidence, including handwriting exemplars. Further, this Court has consistently construed congressional intent to require that if the summons authority claimed is necessary for the effective performance of congressionally imposed responsibilities to enforce the tax Code, that authority should be upheld absent express statutory prohibition or substantial countervailing policies. The authority claimed here is necessary for the effective exercise of the Service’s enforcement responsibilities; it is entirely consistent with the statutory language; and it is not in derogation of any constitutional rights or countervailing policies enunciated by Congress. A Through § 7602, Congress has imposed a duty on persons possessing information “relevant or material” to an investigation of federal tax liability to produce that information at the request of the Secretary or his delegate. That duty to provide relevant information expressly obligates the person summoned to produce documentary evidence and to “appear” and “give testimony.” Imposition of such an evidentiary obligation is, of course, not a novel innovation attributable to § 7602. The common law has been the source of a comparable eviden-tiary obligation for centuries. In determining the scope of the obligation Congress intended to impose by use of this language, we have previously analogized, as an interpretive guide, to the common-law duties attaching to the issuance of a testimonial summons. See United States v. Bisceglia, supra, at 147-148; United States v. Powell, supra, at 57. Congress, through legislation, may expand or contract the duty imposed, but absent some contrary expression, there is a wealth of history helpful in defining the duties imposed by the issuance of a summons. The scope of the “testimonial” or evidentiary duty imposed by common law or statute has traditionally been interpreted as an expansive duty limited principally by relevance and privilege. As this Court described the contours of the duty in United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 331 (1950): “[P]er-sons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery.... We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned.” While the Court recognized that certain exemptions would be upheld, the “primary assumption” was that a summoned party must “give what testimony one is capable of giving” absent an exemption “grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth.” Ibid. One application of this broad duty to provide relevant evidence has been the recognition, since early times, of an obligation to provide certain forms of nontestimonial physical evidence. In Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252-253 (1910) (Holmes, J.), the Court found that the common-law evidentiary duty permitted the compulsion of various forms of physical evidence. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 764 (1966), this Court observed that traditionally witnesses could be compelled, in both state and federal courts, to submit to “fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). In Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 266-267 (1967), handwriting was held, “like the . . . body itself” to be an “identifying physical characteristic,” subject to production. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973), and United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19 (1973), this Court again confirmed that handwriting is in the nature of physical evidence which can be compelled by a grand jury in the exercise of its subpoena power. See also United States v. Mullaney, 32 F. 370 (CC Mo. 1887). This broad duty to provide most relevant, nonprivileged evidence has not been considered to exist only in the common law. The Court has recognized that by statute “Congress may provide for the performance of this duty.” Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932). By imposing an obligation to produce documents as well as to appear and give testimony, we believe the language of § 7602 suggests an intention to codify a broad testimonial obligation, including an obligation to provide some physical evidence relevant and material to a tax investigation, subject to the traditional privileges and limitations. This conclusion seems inherent in the imposition of an obligation to “appear,” since an obligation to appear necessarily entails an obligation to display physical features to the summoning authority. Congress thereby authorized the Service to compel the production of some physical evidence, and it is certainly possible to conclude that this authorization extended to the execution of handwriting exemplars, one variety of relevant physical evidence. This construction of the language conforms with the historical notions of the testimonial duty attaching to the issuance of a summons. B Congress certainly could have narrowed the common-law testimonial duty in enacting § 7602, and thus we do not rely solely on the common-law meaning of the statutory language. Section 7602 does not, by its terms, compel the production of handwriting exemplars, and therefore, a narrower interpretation of the duty imposed is not precluded by the actual language of the statute. A narrower interpretation is precluded, however, by the precedents of this Court construing that statute. As early as 1911, this Court established the benchmarks for interpreting the authority of the Internal Revenue Service to enforce tax obligations in holding that “the administration of the statute may well be taken to embrace all appropriate measures for its enforcement, [unless] there is . . . substantial reason for assigning to the phrase [s] ... a narrower interpretation.” United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250, 269. This precise mode of construction has consistently been applied by this Court in construing the breadth of the summons authority Congress intended to confer in § 7602. In United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964), the Court declined to construe § 7605 (b), prohibiting the Secretary from conducting “unnecessary examination [s],” to require probable cause for the issuance of a § 7602 summons. The Court found that “[ajlthough a more stringent interpretation is possible, one which would require some showing of cause for suspecting fraud, we reject such an interpretation because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks warranted. . . .” 379 U. S., at 53-54. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971), the Court refused to hold that the summons authority could not be used whenever there was a potential that the civil investigation might later lead to criminal prosecution. In construing the scope of the summons authority, the Court emphasized that it refused to draw the line in a manner that would “stultify enforcement of federal law.” Id., at 536. Finally, in United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141 (1975), the Court upheld the Service’s authority to issue a John Doe summons to a bank in order to discover the identity of an individual unknown to the Service. The Court reasoned that absent that construction, “no meaningful investigation of such events could be conducted” and thus 'Ts]ettled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress.” Id., at 150. There is thus a formidable line of precedent construing congressional intent to uphold the claimed enforcement authority of the Service if authority is necessary for the effective enforcement of the revenue laws and is not undercut by contrary legislative purposes. Applying these principles, we conclude that Congress empowered the Service to seek, and obliged the witness to provide, handwriting exemplars relevant to the investigation. First, there is no question that handwriting exemplars will often be an important evidentiary component in establishing tax liability. The statutory framework, as reviewed in the numerous precedents recited supra, imposes on the Secretary of the Treasury, and the IRS as his designate, a broad duty to enforce the tax laws. 26 U. S. C. § 7601 (a). Congress has legislated that the Secretary is “required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by this title. . . ” 26 U. S. C. § 6201 (a). Under § 6301 the Secretary “shall collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws.” In order to fulfill these duties, the Service will often need to determine whether a particular name is an alias of a taxpayer. One effective method for resolving that issue is through the use of handwriting exemplars. As we recognized in Bisceglia, the IRS does have a need for investigative devices which assist them in ascertaining the identity of tax evaders. In Bisceglia, we held, in language relevant to this case: “Whether or not the method of collecting any tax imposed ... is specifically provided for by this title, any such tax may ... be collected by . . . other reasonable devices or methods as may be necessary or helpful in securing a complete and proper collection of the tax.” “[I]f criminal activity is afoot the persons involved may well have used aliases or taken other measures to cover their tracks. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service is unable to issue a summons to determine the identity of such persons, the broad inquiry authorized by § 7601 will be frustrated in this class of cases. Settled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress.” 420 U. S., at 150. There is certainly nothing in the statutory language, or in the legislative history, precluding the interpretation asserted by the Service. Nor is there any constitutional privilege of the taxpayer or other parties that is violated by this construction. Compulsion of handwriting exemplars is neither a search or seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protections, United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19 (1973), nor testimonial evidence protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967). The compulsion of handwriting exemplars has been the subject of far less protection than the compulsion of testimony and documents. Since Congress has explicitly established an obligation to provide the more protected forms of evidence, it would seem curious had it chosen not to impose an obligation to produce a form of evidence tradition has found it less important to protect. As we have emphasized in other cases dealing with § 7602 proceedings, the summoned party is entitled to challenge the issuance of the summons in an adversary proceeding in federal court prior to enforcement, and may assert appropriate defenses. See Bisceglia, 420 U. S., at 151. The Service must also establish compliance with the good-faith requirements recognized by this Court, United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S., at 318, and with the requirement of § 7605 (b) that “[n]o taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigation. . . .” These protections are quite sufficient to lead us to refuse to strain to imply additional ones from the neutral language Congress has used in § 7602. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals refusing enforcement of the summons. Reversed. The Fourth Circuit reached a contrary result in United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F. 2d 249 (1977). The Sixth Circuit decided this issue in accord with the Eighth Circuit. United States v. Brown, 536 F. 2d 117 (1976). The precise reasons for the court’s holding are not clear. In the opinion, the court suggests that the statute does not authorize the IRS to compel a taxpayer to create evidence “out of thin air.” 587 F. 2d 25, 27, n. 3 (1978). The opinion also states, however, that it adopts the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in United States v. Campbell, 524 F. 2d 604, 608 (CA8 1975). The principal reason forwarded in that decision for declining to construe § 7602 to authorize production of handwriting exemplars was the conclusion that such an order would constitute a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As discussed infra, neither rationale supports the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. Responsibility for administration and enforcement of the revenue laws is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury. 26 U. S. C. § 7801 (a). The Internal Revenue Service, however, is organized to carry out those responsibilities for the Secretary. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 534; 35. Fed. Reg. 2417 et seq. (1970). For the purposes of this opinion, we refer ito the authority and responsibilities of the Secretary and the Service interchangeably. “Sec. 7602. Examination of Books and Witnesses. “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized— “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” Legislative efforts to expand the scope of the testimonial obligation would, of course, be limited by the applicable constitutional guarantees. The word “testimony” has been used loosely in this context to refer to physical and documentary, as well as oral, evidence. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2194, p. 76 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). Wigmore has identified the testimonial duty as including an obligation “to disclose for the purpose of justice all that is in his control which can serve the ascertainment of the truth, [and] this duty includes not only mental impressions preserved in his brain and the documents preserved in his hands, but also the corporal facts existing on his body.” Ibid. As indicated elsewhere, we do not suggest that the evidentiary obligation codified in § 7602 in all respects conforms to the common law. We rely on the analogy only as one interpretive guide. Supra, at 712. Congressional intent to provide the Secretary with broad latitude to adopt enforcement techniques helpful in the performance of his tax collection and assessment responsibilities is expressed throughout the Code. In § 6302, for example, Congress has conferred the Secretary with discretion to devise methods of tax collection not specifically provided by statute: The United States suggests there are numerous uses of handwriting exemplars helpful to the Service. Not only are they useful in identifying the holder of a bank account, but they are also said to be useful for identifying persons who file multiple tax returns under false names claiming income tax refunds, purchase of money orders under false names, and forgery of joint returns to take advantage of lower joint rates. Respondent argues that the language of § 7602 suggests that it only requires the production of documents already in existence. Since handwriting exemplars must be created by the witness, it is argued that the statute is inapplicable. First, we do not view the exhibition of physical characteristics to be equivalent to the creation of documentary evidence. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 6 (1973). Further, the statute obviously contemplates the transformation of some evidence not formerly tangible, since it obligates the summoned individual to provide testimony. The testimony, of course, creates evidence not previously in existence. We see no difference between the nature of the evidence created when the witness is ordered to talk and that created when he is ordered to write. We express no opinion on the scope of the Service’s authority to otherwise order the witness to generate previously nonexistent documentation under § 7602. The Service in fact has expressly disclaimed any intention to order the creation of documents. The Internal Revenue Manual § 4022.64 (4) (CCH 1977) provides that an administrative summons “should not require the witness to do anything other than to appear on a given date to give testimony and to bring with him/her existing books, papers and records. A witness cannot be required to prepare or create documents.” The section states, however, that “[t]he giving of exemplars, for example,, handwriting exemplars, at an appearance pursuant to a summons is not 'creating a document.’” The legislative history is simply unilluminating. The only conclusion which that history supports is that Congress did not intend to change the expanse of the §7602 summons authority by its amendments in 1954. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). Since there are no pre-1954 interpretations of the statute precluding the issuance of handwriting exemplars, the legislative history sheds no light on the construction intended by Congress. Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967), demonstrates the minimal level of protection afforded handwriting exemplars, and the reasons why such protection is unnecessary. The Court found that production of the exemplars was not subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege, and that their creation did not represent a critical stage requiring counsel. The Court found only a “minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from [a] right to a fair trial.’' Id., at 267. The Court concluded that “[ijf, for some reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is taken, this can be brought out and corrected through the adversary process at trial since the accused can make an unlimited number of additional exemplars for analysis and comparison by government and defense handwriting experts.” Ibid. Palmer v. United States, 530 F. 2d 787 (CA8 1976), similarly construed 28 U. S. C. § 1826 (a). That statute authorizes the imposition of contempt on witnesses who refuse to “testify or provide other information.” The statute does not explicitly authorize contempt sanctions for refusal to execute handwriting exemplars. The court found that the legislative history indicated that Congress had intended, through the use of the language employed in the statute, to “codify present civil contempt practice.” Since that practice had included the power to punish a witness for refusing to create a handwriting exemplar, the court reasoned that Congress must have thought this phrasing adequate to cover production of handwriting samples.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
NEW JERSEY REALTY TITLE INSURANCE CO. v. DIVISION OF TAX APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY et al. No. 147. Argued December 13, 1949. Decided February 6, 1950. Walter Gordon Merritt argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were H. Gardner Ingraham and Charles B. Niebling. Vincent J. Casale argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for the City of Newark, appellee, was Charles Handler. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. A taxing district of New Jersey has levied against the intangible personal property of a domestic corporation an assessment for the taxable year 1945 in the amount of 15 per cent of the taxpayer’s paid-up capital and surplus, computed without deducting the principal amount of certain United States bonds and accrued interest thereon. This appeal challenges the validity of the assessment and of the tax statute under which it was levied, on the ground of conflict with Art. I, § 8 of the Federal Constitution, by which Congress is authorized “To borrow Money on the credit of the United States,” and with § 3701 of the Revised Statutes (1875), 31 U. S. C. § 742, which generally exempts interest-bearing obligations of the United States from state and local taxation. The assessment in question was levied under § 54:4-22 of the Revised Statutes of New Jersey (1937), as amended by Laws of 1938, c. 245. N. J. Rev. Stat. Cum. Supp., Laws of 1938, 1939, 1940, § 54:4-22. That section provided as follows: “Every stock insurance company organized under the laws of this state, other than a life insurance company, shall be assessed and taxed in the taxing district where its office is situated, upon the full amount or value of its property (exclusive of real estate and tangible personal property, which shall be separately assessed and taxed where the same is located, and exclusive of all shares of stock owned by such insurance company and exclusive of nontaxable property and of property exempt from taxation), deducting from such amount or value all debts and liabilities certain and definite as to obligation and amount, and the full amount of all reserves for taxes, and such proportion of the reserves for unearned premiums, losses and other liabilities as the full amount or value of its taxable intangible property bears to the full amount or value of all its intangible property; provided, however, the assessment against the intangible personal property of any stock insurance company subject to the provisions of this section shall in no event be less than fifteen per centum of the sum of the paid-up capital and the surplus in excess of the total of all liabilities of such company, as the same are stated in the annual statement of such company for the calendar year next preceding the date of such assessment and filed with the department of banking and insurance of the state of New Jersey, after deducting from such total of capital and surplus the amount of all tax assessments against any and all real estate, title to which stands in the name of such company. “The capital stock in any such company shall not be regarded for the purposes of this act [section] as a liability and no part of the amount thereof shall be deducted, and the person or persons or corporations holding the capital stock of such company shall not be assessed or taxed therefor. No franchise tax shall be imposed upon any insurance company included in this section.” (Italics added.) A corporation subject to this section was taxable at the rate of the local taxing district. Appellant is New Jersey Realty Title Insurance Company, a stock insurance company of New Jersey with its office in the City and taxing district of Newark, County of Essex, New Jersey. Eor the year 1945 the City of Newark levied an assessment of $75,700 on appellant’s intangible personal property and collected from it a tax of $3,906.12 computed thereon. Appellant had filed a return based on its balance sheet at the close of business September 30, 1944, showing total assets of $774,972.98, the entirety of which was declared to be intangibles. In calculating its “total taxable intangibles” appellant deducted the following from its total assets: United States Treasury Bonds of the face amount of $450,000; accrued interest thereon in the amount of $1,682.25; and other nontaxable or exempt property valued at $318,771.95. The aggregate amount of the property thus excluded was $770,454.20. The remainder, $4,518.78, was entered on the return as the total taxable intangibles. From this amount appellant deducted: $25,756.63 as “debts and liabilities certain”; $28,175.46 as “reserves for taxes”; and $758.13 as “proportion of loss and premium.” There is no disagreement with these computations. As observed by the highest court below, these deductions “left no balance of assessable property subject to tax.” The taxing district therefore assessed appellant’s property under the proviso in § 54:4-22 which directed an assessment of not less than 15 per cent of “the sum of the paid-up capital and the surplus in excess of the total of all liabilities” of appellant as shown by its annual statement for the preceding calendar year filed with the state department of banking and insurance. The manner of computation of the assessment is not explicit in the record. Moreover, the opinion of the highest court of New Jersey is subject to several interpretations as to the proper method of computing the assessment. The court stated that the assessment “may not be less in amount than 15 percent of the paid-up capital and surplus as defined by the statute.” (Italics added.) If by the phrase “as defined by the statute,” the court referred to the language of the proviso in § 54:4—22, “paid-up capital and the surplus in excess of the total of all liabilities” (italics added), it would seem necessary to deduct liabilities from capital and surplus in determining the basis for the 15 per cent computation. The basis of computation would then be $496,999.70, and the 15 per cent sum, $74,549.95. The court subsequently stated that “The assessment may equal or exceed 15 percent of the paid-up capital and surplus, and does not necessarily have to be precisely the same, but . . . can not be less in amount than 15 percent of the paid-up capital and surplus.” Such references to “paid-up capital and surplus,” together with the court’s characterization of the tax as laid on net worth, suggest that the assessment is computed against appellant’s net worth of $547,462.93. On this basis, however, the 15 per cent sum would have been not less than $82,119.43, and the present assessment of less amount would not satisfy the court’s interpretation of the statute as requiring a levy of not less than 15 per cent. For our disposition of this case, however, it is unnecessary to choose between these conflicting interpretations of the opinion of the court below. Clearly the State of New Jersey has negatived any purpose to authorize a tax assessment against the appellant’s United States bonds. The court below conceded that the securities involved were, at the time of the assessment, exempt from state, municipal or local taxation. It is equally clear, however, that in the computation of the assessment the face value of appellant’s government bonds, together with the interest thereon, was in fact included. Contending that § 54:4-22 as thus applied contravenes paramount federal provisions, appellant sought cancellation of the assessment on appeal to the Division of Tax Appeals in the Department of Taxation and Finance of New Jersey. The Division’s opinion recommending dismissal referred to the proceeding as “a personal property appeal.” Its order of dismissal was reversed by the former New Jersey Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. 137 N. J. L. 444, 60 A. 2d 265. That court viewed the levy as an ad valorem tax on personalty; after concluding that the tax would be valid only if the bonds and interest were excluded from the computation, the court construed the tax statute as requiring such exclusion. This ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as established under the present Constitution of the State. 1 N. J. 496, 64 A. 2d 341. The highest court of the state declared that the assessment was “against the intangible property” but “concluded that the tax levied ... is not an ad valorem tax or property tax but rather is a . . . tax upon the net worth of the company.” It held that such a tax, having been imposed without discrimination, was constitutionally permissible. From this decision the present appeal was taken. We noted probable jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). The assessment must fall as in conflict with § 3701 of the Revised Statutes, providing that “All stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.” If we consider the assessment as a 15 per cent levy either against capital and surplus less liabilities or against entire net worth, we take as guides to our application of § 3701 the decisions of this Court on the related constitutional question of immunity in Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black 620 (1863), and the Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200 (1865), which considered assessments under state taxing provisions not substantially distinguishable from New Jersey’s § 54:4-22 as thus applied. The Bank of Commerce case involved an assessment levied upon the actual value of the capital stock, less the value of real estate, of a corporate taxpayer which had invested in United States securities all of its assets other than its realty. In holding the tax invalid as an interference with the federal borrowing power, the Court rejected the contention that the assessment should be sustained as a levy upon corporate capital represented by federal securities. In the Bank Tax Case this Court considered assessments levied against “the amount of . . . capital stock paid in or secured to be paid in, and . . . surplus earnings” of banking corporations which had invested all or a large part of their capital in government securities. As against the contention that this Court should regard as conclusive the state court’s characterization of the tax as one laid on capital and surplus, it was held that the assessments were unconstitutional. The Court observed that “when the capital . . . thus invested is made the basis of taxation of the institutions, there is great difficulty in saying that it is not the stock thus constituting the corpus or body of the capital that is taxed. It is not easy to separate the property in which the capital is invested from the capital itself. . . . The legislature . . . when providing for a tax on . . . capital at a valuation . . . could not but have intended a tax upon the property in which the capital had been invested. . . . such is the practical effect of the tax . . . .” 2 Wall. at 208-209. And in Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26 (1869), it was held that certain issues of United States notes were exempt from assessment under the statute considered in the Bank Tax Case, supra, in view of a congressional provision, which foreshadowed § 3701, that United States securities “shall be exempt from taxation by or under State authority.” 12 Stat. 346. And see Farmers Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 528 (1914); Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 512-513 (1907). It matters not whether the tax is, as appellee contends, an indirect or excise levy on net worth measured by corporate capital and surplus or is, as appellant urges, a tax on personal property based on a valuation gauged by capital and surplus. Our inquiry is narrowed to whether in practical operation and effect the tax is in part a tax upon federal bonds. We can only conclude that the tax authorized by § 54:4-22, whether levied against capital and surplus less liabilities or against entire net worth, is imposed on such securities regardless of the accounting label employed in describing it. The court below, describing the tax as levied on net worth and indirectly on capital and surplus measured in part by tax-exempt property, held it valid on the authority of Tradesmens Nat. Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 309 U. S. 560 (1940), and Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (1931). The decision in the Tradesmens Bank case does not bear upon the present controversy. There the Court upheld a state tax statute adopted pursuant to an act of Congress authorizing state taxation of national banks. Moreover, the tax there considered, as well as that under scrutiny in the Educational Films Corp. case, was not measured in effect by the amount of the taxpayer’s federal securities or interest but was a franchise tax measured by net income. The section here in question was not considered as imposing a tax on privilege or franchise by either the New Jersey Legislature or the taxing officials or by any of the courts below. While we are not limited by the State’s characterization of its tax, cf. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 443 (1940), we likewise do not think the assessment can be sustained as one levied on a corporate franchise. In considering the similar tax on capital and earned surplus under review in the Bank Tax Case, supra, this Court declared that the levy was “imposed on the property of the institutions, as contradistinguished from a tax upon their privileges or franchises.” 2 Wall, at 209. If the assessment is considered to be 15 per cent of capital and surplus less liabilities or of entire net worth, we agree with the court below that the tax levied under § 54:4^22 does not impose a discriminatory burden on federal issues as did the tax statute against which § 3701 was invoked in Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313 (1930). But since the decision in Bank of Commerce v. New York City, supra, it has been understood that a tax on corporate capital measured by federal securities may be invalid even though imposed without discrimination against federal obligations. If, however, the assessment of $75,700 is viewed as if it were levied exclusively upon appellant’s net worth remaining after deduction of government bonds and interest, the assessment would be discriminatory since it would be levied at the rate of over 79 per cent of appellant’s assessable valuation of $94,936.87 rather than at the rate of 15 per cent prescribed by § 54:4-22. Such increased rate of assessment would result solely from appellant’s ownership of federal issues. In the Gehner case, supra, this Court held that § 3701 was offended by a computation which allowed deduction of the full amount of the taxpayer’s federal bonds yet at the same time pared down the net value of other allowable exemptions, to the taxpayer’s disadvantage, solely because of such ownership of federal bonds. Consistently with the Gehner decision, we can only hold that § 3701 is violated by an automatic increase in the rate of assessment applied to appellant’s valuation after deduction of federal bonds. The result which is thus indicated is also required by the legislative purpose, which we have found in § 3701, “to prevent taxes which diminish in the slightest degree the market value or the investment attractiveness of obligations issued by the United States in an effort to secure necessary credit.” Smith v. Davis, 323 U. S. 111, 117 (1944). The legislative purpose of § 3701 also required the exemption from assessment under § 54:4-22 of interest on federal securities which had accrued but was not yet paid. Cf. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society v. San Francisco, 200 U. S. 310 (1906). Congress on occasion has expressly declared an exemption from state taxation of interest on federal securities, and we do not find a contrary purpose disclosed by the omission from § 3701 of the phrase “and interest thereon.” The assessment for tax under § 54:4-22 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes as levied is in conflict with the paramount provision of § 3701 of the Revised Statutes. The decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section. 54:4-22 is included under “Title 54. Subtitle 2. Taxation of Real and Personal Property in General.” By an amendment adopted in 1945, but not operative on the assessment date here involved, the last sentence of § 54:4-22 as quoted above was deleted. N. J. Rev. Stat. Cum. Supp., Laws of 1945, 1946, 1947, § 54:4-22. The return was on a form furnished by the taxing district and entitled “Personal Property Return of Stock Insurance Company for Year 1945 Under Section 54:4-22 of Revised Statutes.” The financial statement for 1943 reflected the following items: paid-up capital $250,000; paid-in surplus $250,000; earned surplus $47,462.93; liabilities $50,463.23; United States Treasury Bonds and accrued interest of $452,526.06. Reserves amounted to $161,-047.74, not including reserves for federal income tax which are not shown in the record. It seems probable that if the New Jersey court did approve the construction of § 54:4-22 suggested above, it meant to authorize the deduction of nonreserve liabilities only. Both appellant and appellee have assumed in their briefs that if any deduction of liabilities from capital and surplus was authorized under the statute, only nonreserve liabilities were deductible. If under the proviso of § 54:4-22 “the total of all liabilities” of appellant is deductible from “the paid-up capital and the surplus,” and the 15 per cent must be computed against the figure of $496,999.70, deduction therefrom of appellant’s United States bonds and interest leaves only $44,473.64. If, however, the basis of computation is appellant’s net worth of $547,462.93, then there is a remainder of $94,936.87 after deducting the government bonds and interest. But neither the appellee nor any of the courts below has sought to uphold the assessment of $75,700 as having been computed solely against this excess over bonds and interest. In fact it may be implied from appellee’s brief that if the amount of federal bonds and interest must be deducted from net worth, the excess of net worth after such deduction is subject to assessment' at the 15 per cent rate. In all other decisions in which a state tax has been upheld, against the contention that it was in effect levied on a corporate taxpayer’s federal bonds or interest, the tax was a franchise levy, measured either by amount of bank deposits, Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (1868); Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611 (1868), or by the market value of the taxpayer’s shares, Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632 (1868), or by dividends declared or paid, Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594 (1890). See notes 1 and 2 supra. See note 3 supra. The highest court of New Jersey declared that its decision was required “whether the taxing statute is a franchise tax or a tax upon the net worth of the company, which latter we hold the tax under the statute before us to be.” 1 N. J. 502, 64 A. 2d 344. (Italics added.) See 16 Stat. 272; 39 Stat. 1000, 1003; 40 Stat. 288, 291.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
CARCIERI, GOVERNOR OF RHODE ISLAND, et al. v. SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. No. 07-526. Argued November 3, 2008 Decided February 24, 2009 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 396. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 400. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 401. Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs for petitioner Carcieri, Governor of Rhode Island, were Matthew D. McGill, Amir C. Tayrani, and Claire J. Richards. Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Neil F. X. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, filed briefs for petitioner State of Rhode Island. Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., filed briefs for petitioner Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island. Deanne E. Maynard argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William B. Lazarus, and Elizabeth Ann Peterson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Robert J. Deichert, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, Bill McCollum of Florida, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, Stephen N. Six of Kansas, James D. Caldwell of Louisiana, Martha Coakley of Massachusetts, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Jon C. Bruning of Nebraska, Anne Milgram of New Jersey, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Nancy H. Rogers of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah; for the Citizens Equal Rights Foundation et al. by John Benjamin Carroll and Bruce N. Goodsell; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Dan M. Kahan. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Law Professors Specializing in Federal Indian Law by Richard A. Guest, Colette Routel, and Robert T. Anderson, pro se; for the Narragansett Indian Tribe by Thomas C. Goldstein, Patricia A. Millett, and John F. Killoy, Jr.; for the National Congress of American Indians by Ian Heath Gershengorn, Sam Hirsch, and Riyaz A. Kanji; for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe et al. by Douglas B. L. Endreson and William R. Perry; and for Frederick E. Hoxie et al. by David T. Goldberg and Sean H. Donahue. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA or Act) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, a respondent in this case, to acquire land and hold it in trust “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” §5, 48 Stat. 985, 25 U. S. C. §465. The IRA defines the term “Indian” to “include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” §479. The Secretary notified petitioners — the State of Rhode Island, its Governor, and the town of Charlestown, Rhode Island — that he intended to accept in trust a parcel of land for use by the Narragansett Indian Tribe in accordance with his claimed authority under the statute. In proceedings before the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA), the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the Secretary’s authority to take the parcel into trust. In reviewing the determination of the Court of Appeals, we are asked to interpret the statutory phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” in §479. Petitioners contend that the term “now” refers to the time of the statute’s enactment, and permits the Secretary to take land into trust for members of recognized tribes that were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. Respondents argue that the word “now” is an ambiguous term that can reasonably be construed to authorize the Secretary to take land into trust for members of tribes that are “under Federal jurisdiction” at the time that the land is accepted into trust. We agree with petitioners and hold that, for purposes of § 479, the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute’s enactment. As a result, §479 limits the Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934. Because the record in this case establishes that the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted, the Secretary does not have the authority to take the parcel at issue into trust. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I At the time of colonial settlement, the Narragansett Indian Tribe was the indigenous occupant of much of what is now the State of Rhode Island. See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (1983) (hereinafter Final Determination). Initial relations between colonial settlers, the Narragansett Tribe, and the other Indian tribes in the region were peaceful, but relations deteriorated in the late 17th century. The hostilities peaked in 1675 and 1676 during the 2-year armed conflict known as King Philip’s War. Hundreds of colonists and thousands of Indians died. See E. Schultz & M. Tougias, King Philip’s War 5 (1999). The Narragansett Tribe, having been decimated, was placed under formal guardianship by the Colony of Rhode Island in 1709. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177, 6178. Not quite two centuries later, in 1880, the State of Rhode Island convinced the Narragansett Tribe to relinquish its tribal authority as part of an effort to assimilate tribal members into the local population. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. National Indian Gaming Comm’n, 158 F. 3d 1335, 1336 (CADC 1998). The Tribe also agreed to sell all but two acres of its remaining reservation land for $5,000. Ibid. Almost immediately, the Tribe regretted its decisions and embarked on a campaign to regain its land and tribal status. Ibid. In the early 20th century, members of the Tribe sought economic support and other assistance from the Federal Government. But, in correspondence spanning a 10-year period from 1927 to 1937, federal officials declined their request, noting that the Tribe was, and always had been, under the jurisdiction of the New England States, rather than the Federal Government. Having failed to gain recognition or assistance from the United States or from the State of Rhode Island, the Tribe filed suit in the 1970’s to recover its ancestral land, claiming that the State had misappropriated its territory in violation of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U. S. C. § 177. The claims were resolved in 1978 by enactment of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 92 Stat. 813, 25 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. Under the agreement codified by the Settlement Act, the Tribe received title to 1,800 acres of land in Charlestown, Rhode Island, in exchange for relinquishing its past and future claims to land based on aboriginal title. The Tribe also agreed that the 1,800 acres of land received under the Settlement Act “shall be subject to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.” § 1708(a); see also § 1712(a). The Narragansett Tribe’s ongoing efforts to gain recognition from the United States Government finally succeeded in 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177. In granting formal recognition, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) determined that “the Narragansett community and its predecessors have existed autonomously since first contact, despite undergoing many modifications.” Id., at 6178. The BIA referred to the Tribe’s “documented history dating from 1614” and noted that “all of the current membership are believed to be able to trace to at least one ancestor on the membership lists of the Narragansett community prepared after the 1880 Rhode Island ‘detribalization’ act.” Ibid. After obtaining federal recognition, the Tribe began urging the Secretary to accept a deed of trust to the 1,800 acres conveyed to it under the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act. 25 CFR § 83.2 (2008) (providing that federal recognition is needed before an Indian tribe may seek “the protection, services, and benefits of the Federal government”). The Secretary acceded to the Tribe’s request in 1988. See Charlestown v. Eastern Area Director, Bur. of Indian Affairs, 18 IBIA 67,69 (1989). In 1991, the Tribe’s housing authority purchased an additional 31 acres of land in the town of Charlestown adjacent to the Tribe’s 1,800 acres of settlement lands. Soon thereafter, a dispute arose about whether the Tribe’s planned construction of housing on that parcel had to comply with local regulations. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F. 3d 908, 911-912 (CA1 1996). The Tribe’s primary argument for noncompliance — that its ownership of the parcel made it a “dependent Indian community” and thus “Indian country” under 18 U. S. C. § 1151 — ultimately failed. 89 F. 3d, at 913-922. But, while the litigation was pending, the Tribe sought an alternative solution to free itself from compliance with local regulations: It asked the Secretary to accept the 31-acre parcel into trust for the Tribe pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 465. By letter dated March 6, 1998, the Secretary notified petitioners of his acceptance of the Tribe’s land into trust. Petitioners appealed the Secretary’s decision to the IBIA, which upheld the Secretary’s decision. See Charlestown v. Eastern Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35 IBIA 93 (2000). Petitioners sought review of the IBIA decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary and other Department of Interior officials. As relevant here, the District Court determined that the plain language of 25 U. S. C. § 479 defines “Indian” to include members of all tribes in existence in 1934, but does not require a tribe to have been federally recognized on that date. Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179-181 (RI 2003). According to the District Court, because it is currently “federally-recognized” and “existed at the time of the enactment of the IRA,” the Narragansett Tribe qualifies “as an ‘Indian tribe’ within the meaning of §479.” Id., at 181. As a result, “the secretary possesses authority under § 465 to accept lands into trust for the benefit of the Narragansetts.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, first in a panel decision, Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F. 3d 45 (2005), and then sitting en banc, 497 F. 3d 15 (2007). Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[o]ne might have an initial instinct to read the word ‘now’ [in § 479]... to mean the date of [the] enactment of the statute, June 18,1934,” the court concluded that there was “ambiguity as to whether to view the term... as operating at the moment Congress enacted it or at the moment the Secretary invokes it.” Id., at 26. The Court of Appeals noted that Congress has used the word “now” in other statutes to refer to the time of the statute’s application, not its enactment. Id., at 26-27. The Court of Appeals also found that the particular statutory context of §479 did not clarify the meaning of “now.” On one hand, the Court of Appeals noted that another provision within the IRA, 25 U. S. C. § 472, uses the term “now or hereafter,” which supports petitioners’ argument that “now,” by itself, does not refer to future events. But on the other hand, §479 contains the particular application date of “June 18, 1934,” suggesting that if Congress had wanted to refer to the date of enactment, it could have done so more specifically. 497 F. 3d, at 27. The Court of Appeals further reasoned that both interpretations of “now” are supported by reasonable policy explanations, id., at 27-28, and it found that the legislative history failed to “clearly resolve the issue,” id., at 28. Having found the statute ambiguous, the Court of Appeals applied the principles set forth in Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984), and deferred to the Secretary’s construction of the provision. 497 F. 3d, at 30. The court rejected petitioners’ arguments that the Secretary’s interpretation was an impermissible construction of the statute. Id., at 30-34. It also held that petitioners had failed to demonstrate that the Secretary’s interpretation was inconsistent with earlier practices of the Department of the Interior. Furthermore, the court determined that even if the interpretation were a departure from the Department’s prior practices, the decision should be affirmed based on the Secretary’s “reasoned explanation for his interpretation.” Id., at 34. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1229 (2008), and now reverse. II This case requires us to apply settled principles of statutory construction under which we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 4 (1997). If it is, we must apply the statute according to its terms. See, e. g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 359 (2005); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 534 (2004); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917). The Secretary may accept land into trust only for “the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U. S. C. §465. “Indian” is defined by statute as follows: “The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.... The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation....” § 479 (emphasis added). The parties are in agreement, as are we, that the Secretary’s authority to take the parcel in question into trust depends on whether the Narragansetts are members of a “recognized Indian Tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” Ibid. That question, in turn, requires us to decide whether the word “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to 1998, when the Secretary accepted the 31-acre parcel into trust, or 1934, when Congress enacted the IRA. We begin with the ordinary meaning of the word “now,” as understood when the IRA was enacted. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267, 272 (1994); Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108-109 (1990). At that time, the primary definition of “now” was “[a]t the present time; at this moment; at the time of speaking.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1671 (2d ed. 1934); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1262 (3d ed. 1933) (defining “now” to mean “[a]t this time, or at the present moment,” and noting that “ ‘[n]ow’ as used in a statute ordinarily refers to the date of its taking effect... ” (emphasis added)). This definition is consistent with interpretations given to the word “now” by this Court, both before and after passage of the IRA, with respect to its use in other statutes. See, e. g., Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 568-569 (1910) (interpreting a federal criminal statute to have “adopted such punishment as the laws of the State in which such place is situated now provide for the like offense” (citing United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (1832); internal quotation marks omitted)); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1961) (interpreting a statute granting citizenship status to foreign-born “children of persons who now are, or have been, citizens of the United States” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added and deleted)). It also aligns with the natural reading of the word within the context of the IRA. For example, in the original version of 25 U. S. C. § 465, which provided the same authority to the Secretary to accept land into trust for “the purpose of providing land for Indians,” Congress explicitly referred to current events, stating “[tjhat no part of such funds shall be used to acquire additional land outside of the exterior boundaries of [the] Navajo Indian Reservation... in the event that the proposed Navajo boundary extension measures now pending in Congress... become law.” IRA, §5, 48 Stat. 985 (emphasis added). In addition, elsewhere in the IRA, Congress expressly drew into the statute contemporaneous and future events by using the phrase “now or hereafter.” See 25 U. S. C. §468 (referring to “the geographic boundaries of any Indian reservation now existing or established hereafter”); §472 (referring to “Indians who may be appointed... to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office”). Congress’ use of the word “now” in this provision, without the accompanying phrase “or hereafter,” thus provides further textual support for the conclusion that the term refers solely to events contemporaneous with the Act’s enactment. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 452 (2002) (“[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, the Secretary’s current interpretation is at odds with the Executive Branch’s construction of this provision at the time of enactment. In correspondence with those who would assist him in implementing the IRA, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, explained: “Section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. L., 988), provides, in effect, that the term ‘Indian’ as used therein shall include — (1) all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized tribe that was under Federal jurisdiction at the date of the Act....” Letter from John Collier, Commissioner, to Superintendents (Mar. 7,1936), Lodging of Respondents (emphasis added). Thus, although we do not defer to Commissioner Collier’s interpretation of this unambiguous statute, see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992), we agree with his conclusion that the word “now” in § 479 limits the definition of “Indian,” and therefore limits the exercise of the Secretary’s trust authority under § 465 to those members of tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the time the IRA was enacted. The Secretary makes two other arguments in support of his contention that the term “now” as used in § 479 is ambiguous. We reject them both. First, the Secretary argues that although the “use of ‘now’ can refer to the time of enactment” in the abstract, “it can also refer to the time of the statute’s application.” Brief for Respondents 18. But the susceptibility of the word “now” to alternative meanings “does not render the word... whenever it is used, ambiguous,” particularly where “all but one of the meanings is ordinarily eliminated by context.” Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 131-132 (1993). Here, the statutory context makes clear that “now” does not mean “now or hereafter” or “at the time of application.” Had Congress intended to legislate such a definition, it could have done so explicitly, as it did in §§468 and 472, or it could have omitted the word “now” altogether. Instead, Congress limited the statute by the word “now” and “we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979). Second, the Secretary argues that § 479 left a gap for the agency to fill by using the phrase “shall include” in its introductory clause. Brief for Respondents 26-27. The Secretary, in turn, claims to have permissibly filled that gap by defining “‘Tribe’” and “‘Individual Indian’” without reference to the date of the statute’s enactment. Id., at 28 (citing 25 CFR §§ 151.2(b), (c)(1) (2008)). But, as explained above, Congress left no gap in 25 U. S. C. § 479 for the agency to fill. Rather, it explicitly and comprehensively defined the term by including only three discrete definitions: “[1] members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and [2] all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and... [3] all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.” Ibid. In other statutory provisions, Congress chose to expand the Secretary’s authority to particular Indian tribes not necessarily encompassed within the definitions of “Indian” set forth in § 479. Had it understood the word “include” in § 479 to encompass tribes other than those satisfying one of the three §479 definitions, Congress would have not needed to enact these additional statutory references to specific Tribes. The Secretary and his amici also go beyond the statutory text to argue that Congress had no policy justification for limiting the Secretary’s trust authority to those tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, because the IRA was intended to strengthen Indian communities as a whole, regardless of their status in 1934. Petitioners counter that the main purpose of § 465 was to reverse the loss of lands that Indians sustained under the General Allotment Act, see Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U. S. 645, 650, n. 1 (2001), so the statute was limited to tribes under federal jurisdiction at that time because they were the tribes who lost their lands. We need not consider these competing policy views, because Congress’ use of the word “now” in §479 speaks for itself and “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992). Ill The Secretary and his supporting amici also offer two alternative arguments that rely on statutory provisions other than the definition of “Indian” in § 479 to support the Secretary’s decision to take this parcel into trust for the Narragansett Tribe. We reject both arguments. First, the Secretary and several amici argue that the definition of “Indian” in § 479 is rendered irrelevant by the broader definition of “tribe” in §479 and by the fact that the statute authorizes the Secretary to take title to lands “in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired.” §465 (emphasis added); Brief for Respondents 12-14. But the definition of “tribe” in §479 itself refers to “any Indian tribe” (emphasis added), and therefore is limited by the temporal restrictions that apply to §479’s definition of “Indian.” See § 479 (“The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation” (emphasis added)). And, although §465 authorizes the United States to take land in trust for an Indian tribe, § 465 limits the Secretary’s exercise of that authority “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” There simply is no legitimate way to circumvent the definition of “Indian” in delineating the Secretary’s authority under §§465 and 479. Second, amicus National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) argues that 25 U. S. C. § 2202, which was enacted as part of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), Title II, 96 Stat. 2517, overcomes the limitations set forth in §479 and, in turn, authorizes the Secretary’s action. Section 2202 provides: “The provisions of section 465 of this title shall apply to all tribes notwithstanding the provisions of section 478 of this title: Provided, That nothing in this section is intended to supersede any other provision of Federal law which authorizes, prohibits, or restricts the acquisition of land for Indians with respect to any specific tribe, reservation, or state(s).” NCAI argues that the “ILCA independently grants authority under Section 465 for the Secretary to execute the challenged trust acquisition.” NCAI Brief 8. We do not agree. The plain language of §2202 does not expand the power set forth in § 465, which requires that the Secretary take land into trust only “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” Nor does §2202 alter the definition of “Indian” in § 479, which is limited to members of tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934. See supra, at 387-393. Rather, §2202 by its terms simply ensures that tribes may benefit from §465 even if they opted out of the IRA pursuant to §478, which allowed tribal members to reject the application of the IRA to their tribe. § 478 (“This Act shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians... shall vote against its application”). As a result, there is no conflict between §2202 and the limitation on the Secretary’s authority to take lands contained in §465. Rather, § 2202 provides additional protections to those who satisfied the definition of “Indian” in § 479 at the time of the statute’s enactment, but opted out of the IRA shortly thereafter. NCAI’s reading of §2202 also would nullify the plain meaning of the definition of “Indian” set forth in § 479 and incorporated into §465. Consistent with our obligation to give effect to every provision of the statute, Reiter, 442 U. S., at 339, we will not assume that Congress repealed the plain and unambiguous restrictions on the Secretary’s exercise of trust authority in §§465 and 479 when it enacted §2202. “We have repeatedly stated... that absent ‘a clearly expressed congressional intention,’... [a]n implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’ ” Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974), and Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936)). IV We hold that the term “now under Federal jurisdiction” in §479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States when the IRA was enacted in 1934. None of the parties or amici, including the Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. And the evidence in the record is to the contrary. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177. Moreover, the petition for writ of certiorari filed in this case specifically represented that “[i]n 1934, the Narragansett Indian Tribe... was neither federally recognized nor under the jurisdiction of the federal government.” Pet. for Cert. 6. Respondents’ brief in opposition declined to contest this assertion. See Brief in Opposition 2-7. Under our rules, that alone is reason to accept this as fact for purposes of our decision in this case. See this Court’s Rule 15.2. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. The Narragansett Tribe recognized today is the successor to two tribes, the Narragansett and the Niantic Tribes. The two predecessor Tribes shared territory and cultural traditions at the time of European settlement and effectively merged in the aftermath of King Philip’s War. See Final Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 6178. Title 25 U. S. C. §	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 7 ]	sc_adminaction
MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. WEBER No. 74-850. Argued November 4, 1975 Decided January 14, 1976 BuRger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except SteveNS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Michael Kimmel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, -Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Gerald P. Norton, and Morton Hollander. On the reply brief was Solicitor General Bork. Peter D. Ehrenhaft, by invitation of the Court, 421 U. S. 985, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. § 631 et seq., permits a United States district court to refer all Social Security benefit cases to United States magistrates for preliminary review of the administrative record, oral argument, and preparation of a recommended decision as to whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the administrative determination — all subject to an independent decision, on the record, by the district judge who may, in his discretion, hear the whole matter anew. (1) Respondent Weber brought this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California to challenge the final determination of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that he was not entitled to reimbursement under the Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat. 291, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq., for medical payments he made on behalf of his wife. Such a suit for judicial review is authorized by § 205 (g) of the Federal Magistrates Act, as added, 53 Stat. 1370, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), and governed by its standards. The court may consider only the pleadings and administrative record, and must accept the Secretary’s findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. When respondent’s complaint was filed, the Clerk of the court pursuant to court rule assigned the case to a named District Judge, and simultaneously referred it to a United States Magistrate with directions “to notice and conduct such factual hearings and legal argument as may be appropriate” and to “prepare a proposed written order or decision, together with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law where necessary or appropriate” for consideration by the District Judge. The Clerk took these steps pursuant to General Order No. 10dr-D of the District Court, which requires initial reference to a magistrate in seven categories of review of administrative cases, including actions filed under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). The parties may object to the magistrate’s recommendations. After acting on any objections the magistrate is to forward the entire file to the district judge to whom the case is assigned for decision; the district judge “will calendar the matter for oral argument before him if he deems it necessary or appropriate.” The Secretary moved to vacate the order of reference, arguing (1) that referral under a general order of this type violated Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b) and (2) that such referral was not authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act. The Secretary also argued that the reference was of doubtful constitutionality and in contravention of the judicial review provisions of the Social Security Act, arguments that he has expressly declined to make in this Court. The District Court refused to vacate the order of reference, but certified the reference question for appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 503 F. 2d 1049 (CA9 1974). That court stressed the limited and preliminary nature of the inquiry in review actions brought under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), the limited scope of the Magistrate’s role on reference, and the fact that final authority for decision remained with the District Judge. “Were the broad provisions of General Order No. 104MD . . . before us, the' Secretary might have grounds to complain. As applied, the rule is not vulnerable to the attack here mounted.” 503 F. 2d, at 1051. The Court of Appeals thus reached a decision squarely in conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F. 2d 1268 (1972). We granted certiorari, 420 U. S. 989 (1975), and we affirm. (2) After several years of study, the Congress in 1968 enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. § 631 et seg. The Act abolished the office of United States commissioner, and sought to “reform the first echelon of the Federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern scheme of justice by establishing a system of U. S. magistrates.” S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1967) (hereafter Senate Report). In order to improve the former system and to attract the most competent men and women to the office, the Act in essence made the position analogous to the career service, replacing the fee system of compensation with substantial salaries; the Act also gave both full- and part-time magistrates a definite term of office, and required that wherever possible the district courts appoint only members of the bar to serve as magistrates. Magistrates took over most of the duties of the commissioners, and the Act gave them new authority to try a broad range of misdemeanors with the consent of the parties. Title 28 U. S. “C. § 636 (b) outlines a procedure by which the district courts may call upon magistrates to perform other functions, in both civil and criminal cases. It provides: “Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time United States magistrate, or, where there is no full-time magistrate reasonably available, any part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to— “(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts; “(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and “(3) preliminary review of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing.” The three examples § 636 (b) sets out are, as the statute itself states, not exclusive. The Senate sponsor of the legislation, Senator Tydings, testified in the House hearings: “The Magistrate[s] Act specifies these three areas because they came up in our hearings and we thought they were areas in which the district courts might be able to benefit from the magistrate's services. We did not limit the courts to the areas mentioned. Nor did we require that they use the magistrates for additional functions at all. “We hope and think that innovative, imaginative judges who want to clean up their caseload backlog will utilize the U. S. magistrates in these areas and perhaps even come up with new areas to increase the efficiency of their courts.” Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 81 (1968) (hereafter House Hearings). See also Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., and 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 14, 27 (1966 and 1967) (hereafter Senate Hearings). Section 636 (b) was included to “permit . . . the U. S. district courts to assign magistrates, as officers of the courts, a variety of functions . . . presently performable only by the judges themselves.” Senate Report 12. In enacting this section and in expanding the criminal jurisdiction conferred upon magistrates, Congress hoped by “increasing the scope of the responsibilities that can be discharged by that office, ... to establish a system capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal judiciary . . . .” Id., at 11. The Act grew from Congress’ recognition that a multitude of new statutes and regulations had created an avalanche of additional work for the district courts which could be performed only by multiplying the number of judges or giving judges additional assistance. The Secretary argues that Congress intended the transfer to magistrates of simply the irksome, ministerial tasks; respondent urges that Congress intended magistrates to take on a wide range of substantive judicial duties and advisory functions. We need not accept the characterization of the federal magistrate as either a “para-judge,” as respondent would have it, or a “super-notary,” as the Secretary argues, in order to resolve this case; finding the best analogy to this new office is not particularly important. Congress had a number of precedents for this new officer before it: British masters, justices of peace, and magistrates; our own traditional special masters in equity; and pretrial examiners. The office Congress created drew on all prior experience. What is important is that the congressional anticipation is becoming a reality; in fiscal 1975, for example, the 500 full- or part-time United States magistrates disposed of 255,061 matters, most of which would otherwise have occupied district judges. These included 36,766 civil proceedings, 537 of which were Social Security review cases. Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts VIII-4 (1975). See also Sussman, The Fourth Tier in the Federal Judicial System: The United States Magistrate, 56 Chicago Bar Record 134 (1974); Geffen, Practice Before the United States Magistrate, 47 L. A. Bar Bull. 462 (1972); Doyle, Implementing the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J: Kan. Bar Assn. 25 (1970). Congress manifested concern as well as enthusiasm, however, in considering the Act. Several witnesses, including the Director of the Administrative Office and representatives of the Justice Department, expressed some fear that Congress might improperly delegate to magistrates duties reserved by the Constitution to Article III judges. Senate Hearings 107-128, 241n; House Hearings 123-128. The hearings and committee reports indicate that in § 636 (b) Congress met this problem in two ways. First, Congress restricted the range of matters that may be referred to a magistrate to those where referral is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . Second, Congress limited the magistrate’s role in cases referred to him under § 636 (b). The Act’s sponsors made it quite clear that the magistrate acts “under the supervision of the district judges” when he accepts a referral, and that authority for making final decisions remains at all times with the district judge. Senate Report 12. “[A] district judge would retain ultimate responsibility for decision making in every instance in which a magistrate might exercise additional duties jurisdiction.” House Hearings 73 (testimony of Sen. Tydings). See also id., at 127 (testimony of Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen. Finley). (3) We need not define the full reach of a magistrate’s authority under the Act, or reach the broad provisions of General Order No. 10A-D, in order to decide this case. Under the part of the order at issue the magistrates perform a limited function which falls well within the range of duties Congress empowered the district courts to assign to them. The magistrate is directed to conduct a preliminary review of a closed administrative record— closed because under § 206 (g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), neither party may put any additional evidence before the district court. The magistrate gives only a recommendation to the judge, and only on the single, narrow issue: is there in the record substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s decision? The magistrate may do no more than propose a recommendation, and neither § 636 (b) nor the General Order gives such recommendation presumptive weight. The district judge is free to follow it or wholly to ignore it, or, if he is not satisfied, he may conduct the review in whole or in part anew. The authority — and the responsibility — to make an informed, final determination, we emphasize, remains with the judge. The magistrate’s limited role in this type of case nonetheless substantially assists the district judge in the performance of his judicial function, and benefits both him and the parties. A magistrate’s review helps focus the court’s attention on the relevant portions of what may be a voluminous record, from a point of view as neutral as that of an Article III judge. Review also helps the court move directly to those legal arguments made by the parties that find some support in the record. Finally, the magistrate’s report puts before the district judge a preliminary evaluation of the cumulative effect of the evidence in the record, to which the parties may address argument, and in this way narrows the dispute. Each step of the process takes place with the full participation of the parties. They know precisely what recommendations the judge is receiving and may frame their arguments accordingly. We conclude that in the context of this case the preliminary-review function assigned to the magistrate, and at issue here, is one of the “additional duties” that the statute contemplates magistrates are to perform. (4) The Secretary argues that the magistrate, in taking this reference, functions as a special master. From this premise, the Secretary asks us to hold that a general rule requiring automatic reference in a category of cases does not comply with the mandate of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b) that “reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule,” made in nonjury cases “only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.” He also argues that, for similar reasons, the reference here is not permissible under our decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U. S. 249 (1957). Section 636 (b) expressly provides that a district court may, in an appropriate case and in accordance with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53, call upon a magistrate to act as a special master. But the statute also is clear that not every reference, for whatever purpose, is to be characterized as a reference to a special master. It treats references to the magistrate acting as master quite separately in subsection (1), indicating by its structure that other references are of a different sort. Moreover, Rule 53 (e) provides that, in non jury cases referred to a master, the court shall accept any finding of fact that is not clearly erroneous. Under the reference in this case, however, the judge remains free to give the magistrate's recommendation whatever weight the judge decides it merits. It cannot be said, therefore, that the magistrate acts as a special master in the sense that either Rule 53 or the Federal Magistrates Act uses that term. The order of reference at issue does not constitute the magistrate a special master. The Secretary argues that the magistrate will be a master in fact because the judge will accept automatically the recommendation made in every case. Nothing in the record or within the scope of permissible judicial notice supports this argument; nor does common observation of the performance of United States judges remotely lend the slightest credence to such an extravagant assertion. We express no opinion with respect to either the wisdom or the validity of automatic referral in other types of cases; only the narrow portion of General Order No. 10T-D that led to reference of this particular case is before us today. In this narrow range of cases, reference promotes more focused, and so more careful, decisionmaking by the district judge. We categorically reject the suggestion that judges will accept, uncritically, recommendations of magistrates. Our decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., supra, does not call for a different result. In La Buy, the District Judge on his own motion referred to a special master two complex, protracted antitrust cases on the eve of trial. The cases had been pending before him for several years, he had heard pretrial motions, and he was familiar with the issues involved. The master, a member of the bar, was to hear and decide the entire case, subject to review by the District Judge under the “clearly erroneous” test. The judge cited the problems attendant to docket congestion to satisfy Rule 53’s requirement that a reference to a special master be justified by “exceptional circumstances.” The Court held that on these facts reference was not permissible and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ supervisory prohibition. La Buy, although nearly two decades past, is the most recent of our cases dealing with special masters, and our decision today does not erode it. The Magistrate here acted in his capacity as magistrate, not as a special master, under a reference authorized by an Act passed 10 years after La Buy was decided. Other factors distinguish this case from La Buy as well. The issues here are as simple as they were complex in La Buy, and the District Judge had not yet invested any time in familiarizing himself with the case. The reference in this case will result in a recommendation that carries only such weight as its merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants. We are persuaded that the important premises from which the La Buy decision proceeded are not threatened here. Finally, our decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U. S. 461 (1974), does not bear on this case. The Secretary has abandoned any claim that the statute giving the District Court jurisdiction of the case in the first instance, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), precludes reference to a magistrate. It was the Court’s reading of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2243, that formed the basis for the holding in Wingo v. Wedding. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. General Order No. 104^-D provides for reference in the following types of review of administrative cases: “(A) Actions to review administrative determinations re entitlement to benefits under the Social Security Act and related statutes, including but not limited to actions filed under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). “(B) Actions filed by the United States or a carrier to review, implement or restrain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission re freight overcharges, including but not limited to actions under 28 U. S. C. § 1336 and 49 U. S. C. § 304a. “(C) Actions, whether in the form of judicial review, habeas corpus or otherwise, for review of orders and other actions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Included, but not by way of limitation, are actions involving deportation orders, denial of preference classification visas and denial of petitions to adjust status. “(D) Actions for review of adjudications by the Civil Service Commission, or the various departments or agencies, involving personnel actions such as wrongful discharge, reductions in force, transfers, retirements, etc. “(E) Actions for review of an order of any branch or establishment of the military service denying discharge of petitioner from the military, whether such actions are brought in the form of petitions for judicial review, habeas corpus or actions for declaratory relief and injunction. “(F) Actions filed pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §923 (f)(3) to review administrative decisions denying applications for licenses to engage in business as a firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer or dealer. “(G) Actions to review administrative decisions by the Department of Labor denying applications for alien employment certification required pursuant to the provisions of 8 U. S. C. §1182 (a) (14).” The petition for certiorari raises only the issue of the propriety of the part of subsection (A) of the General Order that authorizes reference of cases brought under 42 U. S. C. §405 (g), and we intimate no opinion on the validity of its other provisions. Because respondent has declined to appear, we invited an amicus curiae to support the decision of the Court of Appeals. 421 U. S. 985 (1975). For convenience, the position taken by amicus in support of the Court of Appeals’ judgment will be referred to as the position of respondent. The administration of the Act also profits from the British analogy. See Institute of Judicial Administration, Report of the Committee to Study the Role of Masters in the English Judicial System (Federal Judicial Center 1974). Some courts have manifested a like concern. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F. 2d 348 (CA7 1972); Reed v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 459 F. 2d 121 (CA1 1972). But of, Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973). See also Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 779 (1975); Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 584 (1973). Because we limit our consideration of the Act and General Order No. 10A-D to the particular reference presented by this case, we need not deal with these broad constitutional issues. Petitioner expressly declines to rely on any constitutional argument. Ordinarily, the parties will agree as to the legal standard, leaving as the sole issue whether the Secretary’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. In some cases, the magistrate may preliminarily resolve issues of law before making a recommendation; in some few cases, the recommendation may turn wholly upon an issue of law. The parties have not suggested that cases in either of these sub categories raise issues of statutory interpretation that require separate treatment, and we do not reach them on this record. Experience with the magistrate’s role under the Act may well lead to the conclusion that sound judicial administration calls for sending directly to the district judge those cases that turn solely upon issues of law. Though we do not rely upon subsequently expressed congressional views, the Congress plainly considers claims such as respondent brought in the District Court as matters that could appropriately be referred for preliminary review to a magistrate. In considering magistrates’ salaries in 1972, a Senate subcommittee noted: “Magistrates are judicial officers of the Federal district courts. . . . They may also be authorized to screen prisoner petitions, hold pretrial conferences in civil and criminal cases, hear certain preliminary motions, review social security appeals, review Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act matters, and serve as special masters. In short, they render valuable assistance to the judges of the district courts, thereby freeing the time of those judges for the actual trial of cases.” S. Rep. No. 92-1065, p. 3 (1972) (emphasis added). The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the statutory body that supervises the administrative aspects of the Act pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 604 (d) (1), reads the Act in the same way. It has distributed a “checklist” of magistrate duties that includes review of Social Security appeals brought under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on the Administration of the Federal Magistrates System, Duties Which Might Be Assigned to U. S. Magistrates (Mar. 14, 1975). The Administrative Office first noted in its 1972 report that district courts were assigning Social Security appeals to magistrates under the 1968 Act. Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director VI-8 (1972). These arguments persuaded the Court of Appeals in Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F. 2d 1268 (CA6 1972). Other federal courts to consider the issue reached a contrary result. Yascavage v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 1297 (MD Pa. 1974); Bell v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 198 (ND Ga. 1974); Murphy v. Weinberger [Oct. 1966-Dec. 1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Unempl. Ins. Rep. ¶ 17,608 (Conn. 1974). Several courts have relied upon these arguments to one extent or another in disapproving references that involved a broader grant of authority to the magistrate. See, e. g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F. 2d 1378 (CA7 1974); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F. 2d 348 (CA7 1972); Reed v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 459 F. 2d 121 (CA1 1972). See generally Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Col. L. Rev. 452 (1958); CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F. 2d 375 (CA2 1975).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 61 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. SOTELO et ux. No. 76-1800. Argued February 22, 1978 Decided May 22, 1978 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and White, BlackmuN, and Powell, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Stewart, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 282. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Crombie J. D. Garrett, and Wynette J. Hewett. Bruce L. Balch argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Me. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the interaction of sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Bankruptcy Act. Respondent Onofre J. Sotelo was found personally liable to the Government for his failure to- pay over taxes withheld from employees of the corporation in which he was the principal officer. The question presented is whether this liability is dischargeable in bankruptcy. I In mid-1973, respondents Onofre J. and Naomi Sotelo were adjudicated bankrupts, as was their corporation, O. J. Sotelo & Sons Masonry, Inc. The individual bankruptcy proceedings of the two Sotelos were consolidated. In November 1973, the Internal Revenue Service filed against respondents’ estate a claim in the amount of $40,751.16 “for internal revenue taxes” that had been collected from the corporation’s employees but not paid over to the Government. Respondents were alleged to be personally liable for these taxes under Internal Revenue Code § 6672, 26 U. S. C. § 6672, as corporate officers who had a duty “to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over” the taxes and who had “willfully fail[ed]” to make the requisite payments. Respondents objected to the Government’s claim, arguing that they should not be held personally liable for “taxes of the corporation.” Memorandum Opinion of Bankruptcy Court (Nov. 29, 1974). In upholding the Government’s claim to the extent of $32,840.71, the bankruptcy court found that Onofre Sotelo had. formerly operated the masonry business as a sole proprietorship and that, since the formation of the corporation, he had been its president, director, majority stockholder, and chief executive officer. Naomi Sotelo-, on the other hand, though named the corporation’s secretary, “did not take an active part in the business.” Id., at 1. The court concluded that Onofre Sotelo was personally liable to the Government under Internal Revenue Code § 6672, since he “was charged with the duty and responsibility to see that the [withheld] taxes were paid.” Memorandum Opinion, supra, at 3. The record does not reflect any appeal of this ruling. In October 1975 the Government, seeking to collect part of the money owed by Onofre Sotelo under § 6672, served a notice of levy on respondents’ trustee with regard to- $10,000 that belonged to respondents and was not available for general distribution to creditors in bankruptcy. Respondents objected to the levy, in part on the ground that the liability is described in § 6672 itself as a “penalty” and as such had been discharged in bankruptcy. The Government argued that, to the contrary, the liability was for “taxes,” which § 17a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 550, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 35 (a)(1) (1976 ed.), makes nondischargeable. The bankruptcy judge agreed with the Government, reasoning that, “[t]hough denominated a 'penalty,’ [the § 6672 liability] is in substance a tax.” 76-1 USTC ¶ 9435, p. 84,157 (SD Ill. 1976). The judge also noted, ibid., that subdivision (e) of Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) makes specifically nondischargeable “taxes... which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others... but has not paid over.” 11 U. S. C. § 35 (a)(1)(e) (1976 ed.). Respondents appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, which affirmed on the opinion of the bankruptcy court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. In re Sotelo, 551 F. 2d 1090 (1977). It first noted that “Sotelo does not challenge his liability under 26 U. S. C. § 6672... [but] only argues that the liability should have been discharged by his personal bankruptcy petition.” Id., at 1091. The court then held that the liability had been discharged, finding persuasive the fact that § 6672 terms the liability a “penalty” and rejecting the Government’s argument with respect to the specific language referring to withholding taxes in Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1)(e). 551 F. 2d, at 1092. The court recognized that its ruling was in conflict with “an uncontroverted line of cases.” Id., at 1091. We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 816 (1977), and we now reverse. II Section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, 80 Stat. 270, provides in pertinent part: “A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,... except such as “(1) are taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State... within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided, however, That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes... (e) which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or any State... but has not paid over....” 11 U. S. C. § 35 (a) (1976 ed.). Relying on this statutory language, the Government presents what it views as two independent grounds for holding the § 6672 liability of Onofre Sotelo (hereinafter respondent) to be nondischargeable. The Government’s primary argument is based on the specific language relating to withholding in § 17a (1)(e); alternatively, it argues that respondent’s liability, although called a “penalty,” IRC § 6672, is in fact a “tax” as that term is used in § 17a (1). Regardless of whether these two grounds are in fact independent, § 17a (1) (e) leaves no doubt as to the nondischarge-ability of “taxes... which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or any State... but has not paid over.” The Court of Appeals viewed this provision as inapplicable here for two reasons: first, because “it was not Sotelo himself, but his employer-corporation, that was obligated by law to collect and withhold the taxes”; and second, because in any event the money involved constituted a “penalty,” whereas § 17a (1)(e) “renders only 'taxes’ nondischargeable.” 551 F. 2d, at 1092. We believe that the first reason is inconsistent with the Court of Appeals’ recognition of respondent’s undisputed liability under Internal Revenue Code § 6672, and that the second is inconsistent with the language of § 17a (1) (e). The fact that respondent was found liable under § 6672 necessarily means that he was “required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over” the withholding taxes, and that he willfully failed to meet one or more of these obligations. IRC §6672; see n. 1, supra, Since the §6672 “require[ment]” of collection presumably derives from federal or state law, both of which are referred to in Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) (e), it is difficult to understand how the court below could have recognized respondent’s § 6672 liability, see supra, at 272, and nonetheless have concluded that he was not “obligated by law to collect... the taxes,” 551 F. 2d, at 1092. It is undisputed here, moreover, that the taxes in question were “collected or withheld” from the corporation’s employees and that the taxes, though collected, have not been “paid over” to the Government. It is therefore clear that the § 6672 liability was not imposed for a failure on the part of respondent to collect taxes, but was rather imposed for his failure to pay over taxes that he was required both to collect and to pay over. Under these circumstances, the most natural reading of the statutory language leads to the conclusion that respondent “collected or withheld” the taxes within the meaning of Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) (e). We also cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the “penalty” language of Internal Revenue Code § 6672 is dis-positive of the status of respondent’s debt under Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) (e). The funds here involved were unquestionably “taxes” at the time they were “collected or withheld from others.” § 17a (1) (e); see IRC §§ 3102 (a), 3402 (a). It is this time period that § 17a (1)(e), with its modification of “taxes” by the phrase “collected or withheld,” treats as the relevant one. That the funds due are referred to as a “penalty” when the Government later seeks to recover them does not alter their essential character as taxes for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, at least in a case in which, as here, the § 6672 liability is predicated on a failure to pay over, rather than a failure initially to collect, the taxes. Ill The legislative history of Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) provides additional support for the view that respondent’s liability should be held nondischargeable. A principal purpose of the legislation, enacted in 1966 after several years of congressional consideration, was to establish a three-year limitation on the taxes that would be nondischargeable in bankruptcy; under former law, there was no such temporal limitation. See H. R. Rep. No. 372, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1963) (hereafter H. R. Rep. No. 372); S. Rep. No. 114, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1965) (hereafter S. Rep. No. 114). The new section ensured the discharge of most taxes “which became legally due and owing” more than three years preceding bankruptcy. With regard to unpaid withholding taxes, however, the three-year limitation was made inapplicable by the addition of the provision that is today § 17a (1) (e). This provision was added to the bill to respond to the Treasury Department’s position that any discharge of liability for collected withholding taxes was undesirable. The Department’s views were expressed in a letter to the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Stanley S. Surrey, who indicated that persons other than employer-bankrupts were included within the scope of the Department’s “concer[n] with the inequity of granting a taxpayer a discharge of his liability for payment of trust fund taxes which he has collected from his employees and the public in general.... The Department does not believe that it is equitable or administratively desirable to permit employers and other persons who have collected money from third parties to be relieved of their obligation to account for an[d] pay over such money to the Government....” Quoted in H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 6 (emphasis added). Treasury’s position was further explained in a letter from the same Department official to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee; the letter emphasized that it was “most undesirable to permit persons who are charged with the responsibility of paying over to the Federal Government moneys collected from third persons to be relieved of their obligations in bankruptcy when they have converted such moneys for their own use.” Quoted in S. Rep. No. 114, p. 10. In response to the Treasury Department’s concern, the House Judiciary Committee added an amendment that became § 17a (1)(e). H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 1. According to the House Report, the amendment was specifically intended to® meet “the objection of Treasury to the discharge of so-called trust fund taxes.” Id., at 5. In agreeing to the House amendment, the Senate Committee noted that Treasury’s “opposition” to the bill, to the extent it was based on the fact that responsible persons would have been “relieved of their obligations” for unpaid withholding taxes, was eliminated by the provision that became §17a(1)(e). S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 6,10. There is no reason to believe that Congress did not intend to meet Treasury’s concerns in their entirety. While the Department may not have focused on the specific question presented here, it left no doubt as to its objection to the discharge of “persons... charged with the responsibility of paying over... moneys collected from third persons.” Letter from Assistant Secretary Surrey to Chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee, supra. Respondent without question is such a person, a point essentially conceded here by virtue of the recognition of respondent’s liability under Internal Revenue Code § 6672, see supra, at 274-275, and n. 9. Because Congress specifically contemplated that those with withholding-tax-payment obligations would remain liable after bankruptcy for their “conver[sion]” of the tax funds to private use, S. Rep. No. 114, p. 10, we must conclude that the liability here involved is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Even without these indications of an intent to make nondischargeable the withholding tax obligations of persons in respondent’s situation, moreover, Congress’ perception of the consequences of corporate bankruptcy makes it most unlikely that the legislature intended § 17a (1)(e) to apply only to the corporation’s liability for unpaid withholding taxes. Both the Committee reports and the floor debates contain repeated references to the fact that a corporation "normally ceases to exist upon bankruptcy,” H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; see S. Rep. No. 114, p. 2, thereby rendering “uncollectable” the corporation’s tax liabilities, 112 Cong. Rec. 13818 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin). As one of the bill’s principal sponsors observed, corporate dissolution has “the practical effect of discharging all debts including taxes,” regardless of statutory declarations of nondischargeability. Id., at 13821 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). In view of this congressional assumption, the interpretation of § 17a (1)(e) adopted by the Court of Appeals is untenable, for the combination of corporate dissolution with the personal bankruptcies of those found liable under Internal Revenue Code § 6672 would leave no person within the corporation obligated to the Government for unpaid withholding taxes. Such a result would be directly inconsistent with Congress’ declarations that the amendment which became § 17a(1)(e) met the Treasury Department’s concern about ensuring post-bankruptcy liability for these taxes. IV In light of this legislative history, little doubt remains as to the nondischargeability of respondent’s liability under § 17a (l)(e). The Court of Appeals did not consider this history, but instead relied on more general policy factors. The court observed that an “inequit[y]” could arise from holding an individual “liable for a tax owed by a corporation” in cases where, because “[t]he corporate liability... vastly exceed [s] the individual’s present or future resources,” his “entire future earnings could be confiscated to compensate for the corporate liability.” Such a result, in the court’s view, “would contravene the Bankruptcy Act’s basic policy of settling a bankrupt’s past debts and providing a fresh economic start.” 551 F. 2d, at 1092-1093. However persuasive these considerations might be in a legislative forum, we as judges cannot override the specific policy judgments made by Congress in enacting the statutory provisions with which we are here concerned. The decision to hold an individual “liable for a tax owed by a corporation,” even if there is a wide disparity between the corporation’s liability and the individual’s resources, was made when Internal Revenue Code § 6672 was passed, since it is that section which imposes the liability without regard for the individual’s ability to pay. And while it is true that a finding of nondischargeability prevents a bankrupt from getting an entirely “fresh start,” this observation provides little assistance in construing a section expressly designed to make some debts nondischargeable. We are not here concerned with the entire Act’s policy, but rather with what Congress intended in § 17a (1) and its subdivision (e). The statutory language and legislative history discussed in Parts II and III, supra, demonstrate an intention to make a liability like respondent’s nondischargeable. The Court of Appeals’ approach, moreover, would have the effect of allowing a corporation and its officers to- escape all liability for unpaid withholding taxes, see supra, at 278-279, while leaving liable for such taxes after bankruptcy those individuals who do business in the sole proprietorship or partnership, rather than the corporate, form. In passing § 17a (1), however, Congress was expressly concerned about the fact that the operation of prior law was “unfairly discriminatory against the private individual or the unincorporated small businessman.” H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; see S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 2-3. As discussed above, Congress recognized that a bankrupt corporation “dissolves and goes out of business,” 112 Cong. Rec. 13817 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), thereby avoiding IRS tax claims; it was thought inequitable that a sole proprietor or other individual would remain liable after bankruptcy for the same type of claims. See generally sources cited at 278, and n. 11, supra. This inequity between a corporate officer and an individual entrepreneur, both of whom have a similar liability to the Government, frequently would turn on nothing more than whether the individual was “sophisticated” enough “to, in effect, incorporate himself.” 112 Cong. Rec. 13817 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). Were we to adopt the Court of Appeals’ approach, we would be instituting precisely the kind of “arbitrary discrimination” that § 17a (1) was designed to alleviate. 112 Cong. Rec. 13818 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin). In terms of statutory language and legislative history, then, the liability of respondent under Internal Revenue Code § 6672 must be held nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) (e). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, Reversed and remanded. Internal Revenue Code § 6672, 26 U. S. C. § 6672, provides: “Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.” Section 6671 (b) of the Code makes clear that “[t]he term 'person,' as used in [§6672], includes an officer or employee of a corporation... who... is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.” Section 6671 (a) states that the § 6672 penalty “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes.” Naomi Sotelo was found not to be liable, but the bankruptcy judge noted that this finding was “immaterial” in view of the merger of the estates. Memorandum Opinion of Bankruptcy Court 3 (Nov. 29, 1974). This $10,000 was derived from the trustee’s sale of real estate held by respondents as joint tenants, and would have been payable to one or both of respondents had it not been for the Government’s claim. The trustee set aside the $10,000 as a “homestead exemption” for Onofre Sotelo only, apparently pursuant to Illinois law. Respondents argued below that the entire $10,000 belonged to Naomi Sotelo, who did not have any § 6672 liability, see n. 2, supra. In response to this contention, the bankruptcy court stated: “[T]he law is clearly established in Illinois that where a husband and wife own property as joint tenants and reside together on the premises... the husband... alone is entitled to the Homestead Exemption.” 76-1 USTC ¶ 9435, p. 84,156 (SD Ill. 1976). The bankruptcy court upheld this Illinois rule against respondents’ constitutional attack. Id., at 84,157-84,158. Respondents’ theory apparently was that the § 6672 penalty is compensatory in nature. The Government does not here dispute that a compensatory penalty is generally dischargeable. See Brief for United States 26-27, and n. 16. See generally Bankruptcy Act § 57j, 11 U. S. C. § 93 (j); 8 H. Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States § 3304 (6th ed. J. Henderson 1955). Respondents raised their homestead exemption argument, see n. 3, supra, in the Court of Appeals, but that court believed that it did not have to reach the issue in view of its holding that the entire § 6672 liability was dischargeable, 551 F. 2d, at 1093 n. 3. The Government contends here that the issue should have been reached regardless of the discharge-ability holding, because Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) makes a discharge irrelevant to the Government's right to proceed “against the exemption of the bankrupt allowed by law and duly set apart to him,” 11 U. S. C. § 35 (a) (1) (1976 ed.). Brief for United States 33-34, n. 23. In view of our holding that the § 6672 liability is not dischargeable, we need not address this contention. On remand, of course, the Court of Appeals may consider respondents’ argument that some or all of the homestead exemption belongs to Naomi Sotelo. In addition to several District Court cases, the Court of Appeals cited the conflicting holding of the Fifth Circuit in Murphy v. U. S. Internal Revenue Service, 533 F. 2d 941 (1976). The Murphy decision was followed by the Fourth Circuit in Lackey v. United States, 538 F. 2d 592 (1976). The Government contends, and respondent does not disagree, that the three-year limitation in Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) would not bar any part of the Government’s claim in this case. Brief for United States 25-26, n. 15. The specific language of Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) (e) is contained within a proviso that modifies the more general approach of § 17a (1). Both the general language and the proviso are aimed at making “taxes” nondischargeable, and there is no reason to believe that any “taxes” made nondischargeable by the specific terms of § 17a (1) (e) would not also be “taxes” as that word is used more generally in § 17a (1). As in the Court of Appeals, see supra, at 272, respondent does not here question his liability under Internal Revenue Code § 6672. Brief for Respondents 4. See also Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 681, 694 11967): “It is a common phenomenon of business failure that even an ‘honest’ businessman, in attempting to salvage -a.business which appears headed for insolvency, will frequently ‘borrow’ money of other people without their consent if he can get his hands on it. The one fund which he is almost always able to lay his hands on is the taxes he has withheld and is currently withholding from his employees for the Government.” A recent statement to the same effect can be found in an opinion of the Comptroller General of the United States: “IRS considers delinquencies in the payment of these employment taxes a serious problem. In 1976 [congressional] testimony..., IRS officials expressed concern that employers use withheld taxes as low interest loans from the Federal Government.” Opinion B-137762 (May 3, 1977), reprinted in 9 CCH 1977 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ¶ 6614, p. 71,438. See also, e. g., 112 Cong. Rec. 13817 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Ervin) ; id., at 13821 (letter to Senators from Sens. Ervin and Hruska); id., at 13822 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); letter from Under Secretary of Commerce Edward Gudeman, reprinted in S. Rep. No. 114, p. 12; memorandum from W. Randolph Montgomery, Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference, reprinted id., at 16; S. Rep. No. 1134, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1964); H. R. Rep. No. 735, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959). Rather than predicating liability on ability to pay, § 6672 is based on the premise that liability should follow responsibility. See n. 13, infra. In a recent survey of IRS practices with regard to § 6672, the Comptroller General of the United States wrote: “IRS uses the 100-percent penalty only when all other means of securing the delinquent taxes have been exhausted. It is generally used against responsible officials of corporations that have gone out of business.... [I]t is IRS policy that the amount of the tax will be collected only once. After the tax liability is satisfied, no collection action is taken on the remaining 100-percent penalties.” Opinion B-137762, supra, n. 10, at 71,438. Our dissenting Brethren appear uncomfortable with this legislative policy choice, expressing concern about “lifelong liability” being imposed on “a comptroller, accountant, or bookkeeper who reaped none of the fruits of entrepreneurial success.” Post, at 290, 291. While we should not in any event be led by our sympathy to a result contrary to that intended by Congress, there is here little reason for concern. No corporate officer, regardless of title, can be held liable under Internal Revenue Code § 672 unless his position was sufficiently important that he was “required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over” withholding taxes and unless he “willfully fail[ed]” to meet one or more of these obligations. In this case, for example, Onofre Sotelo, the chief executive officer exercising actual authority over the corporation’s day-to-day affairs, was found liable under the section, while Naomi Sotelo was not, despite the fact that she held the position of corporate secretary. See supra, at 270-271, and n. 2. The dissenting opinion as much as concedes, moreover, that there is no responsible corporate officer who can be said to reap “none of the fruits of entrepreneurial success,” since all employees are dependent on the corporation for their “continued employment.” Post, at 291 (emphasis added); see post, at 291-292, n. 3. The “continued employment” of a corporate officer is obviously a benefit of considerable significance to that officer and is generally dependent upon the success of the corporate enterprise. Hence an officer has a stake in “the fruits of entrepreneurial success” and, like a shareholder, may be tempted illegally to divert to the corporation those funds withheld from corporate employees for tax purposes. Such individuals would be liable after bankruptcy for “taxes” which they, as employers, “collected or withheld from others... but [did] not pa[y] over.” Bankruptcy Act § 17a (1) (e), 11 U. S. C. § 35 (a) (1) (e) (1976 ed.). Indeed, respondent’s business was operated as a sole proprietorship prior to September 1970. See supra, at 270-271; Memorandum Opinion of Bankruptcy Court, supra, n. 2, at 1. The dissenting opinion recognizes, post, at 285 n. 1, Congress’ unquestioned concern about eliminating corporations’ “unfair” advantage over individual entrepreneurs. H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 2-3, Elsewhere our Brother Rehnquist appears to concede that Congress meant “to ameliorate the lot” of only “some bankrupts” when it passed the 1966 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. Post, at 282; see post, at 285. There is every indication that the 1966 amendment was not intended “to ameliorate the lot” of corporations and their principal officers, at least with regard to taxes collected from employees. And the dissenting opinion has not even attempted to explain how a Congress concerned about “discriminat[ion] against the private individual or the unincorporated small businessman,” H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 2-3, could have thought it just to relieve corporate officers of § 6672 liability in bankruptcy, as the dissent’s approach would do, while leaving other owners of “small family businesses],” post, at 291 —	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
LAWRENCE, guardian and next friend on behalf of LAWRENCE, a minor v. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY No. 94-9323. Decided January 8, 1996 Per Curiam. Under the Social Security Act, the unmarried minor “child” of a deceased individual who was insured under the Act may receive survivors’ benefits if she was “dependent upon such individual” prior to his death. 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402(d)(1)(C) (1988 ed.). In order to determine whether a claimant is, for these purposes, the “child” of the deceased, and, as such, eligible to receive benefits, the Commissioner of Social Security “shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which [the] insured individual. . . was domiciled at the time of his death.” 42 U. S. C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1988 ed.). The petitioner in this case, Lawrence, asserts an entitlement to benefits under these provisions. In so doing, she acknowledges that the relevant state law, that of North Carolina, appears on its face to defeat her claim by imposing procedural requirements on proof of paternity (which it requires as a prerequisite for intestate succession) that she cannot meet. She contends, however, that these difficulties can be overcome in her case as they were in Handley v. Schweiker, 697 F. 2d 999 (1983). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that state-law requirements of proof of paternity can only be applied against a claimant for benefits under § 416(h)(2)(A) insofar as they are constitutional, and that an Alabama law similar to the North Carolina law involved here was unconstitutional. In contrast, in the case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council’s denial of benefits to Lawrence. The Court of Appeals expressly adopted the rationale for rejecting her claim that the Government advanced in its brief to that court: that the constitutionality of a state paternity law need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to benefits under the federal statutory scheme. Lawrence petitioned for certiorari to review that decision. In his response, the Solicitor General advises us that the “Social Security Administration has re-examined” the role of state paternity and intestacy laws in the federal benefits scheme, and now interprets the Social Security Act as “requiring] a determination, at least in some circumstances, of whether the state intestacy statute is constitutional.” Brief for Respondent 8. He also correctly notes that the Act directs the Commissioner of Social Security — not, in the first instance, the courts — to “apply such law as would be applied . . . by the courts of the State” concerned. § 416(h)(2)(A). Without conceding Lawrence’s ultimate entitlement to benefits, he invites us to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) so that the Court of Appeals may either decide it in light of the Commissioner’s new statutory interpretation or remand the case to the Commissioner for reconsideration in light of that interpretation. We conclude both that we have the power to issue a GVR order, and that such an order is an appropriate exercise of our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2106 appears on its face to confer upon this Court a broad power to GVR: “The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may . . . vacate . . . any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and ... require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” In his dissent issued today in this case and in Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193, another case in which we issue a GVR order, Justice Scalia contends that “traditional practice” and “the Constitution and laws of the United States” impose “implicit limitations” on this power. Post, at 178. We respectfully disagree. We perceive no textual basis for such limitations. The Constitution limits our “appellate Jurisdiction” to issues of “[federal] Law and Fact,” see Art. Ill, § 2, but leaves to Congress the power to “ordain and establish ... inferior Courts,” Art. Ill, § 1, and to make “Exceptions” and “Regulations” limiting and controlling our appellate jurisdiction. Insofar as Congress appears to have authorized such action, we believe that this Court has the power to remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal issue that is properly before us in our appellate capacity. Our past practice affirms this conclusion. Although, as Justice Scalia’s dissent explains, post, at 179-183, the exercise of our GVR power was, until recent times, rare, its infrequent early use may be explained in large part by the smaller size of our certiorari docket in earlier times. Regardless of its earlier history, however, the GVR order has, over the past 50 years, become an integral part of this Court’s practice, accepted and employed by all sitting and recent Justices. We have GVR’d in light of a wide range of developments, including our own decisions, see post, at 180 (Scalia, J., dissenting), State Supreme Court decisions, see, e. g., Conner v. Simler, 367 U. S. 486 (1961), new federal statutes, see, e. g., Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 329 U. S. 685 (1946), administrative reinterpretations of federal statutes, see, e. g., Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U. S. 801 (1994), new state statutes, see, e. g., Louisiana v. Hays, 512 U. S. 1230 (1994), changed factual circumstances, see, e.g., NLRB v. Federal Motor Truck Co., 325 U. S. 838 (1945) (demilitarization of employees), and confessions of error or other positions newly taken by the Solicitor General, see, e.g., Wells v. United States, 511 U. S. 1050 (1994); Reed v. United States, 510 U. S. 1188 (1994); Ramirez v. United States, 510 U. S. 1103 (1994); Chappell v. United States, 494 U. S. 1075 (1990); Polsky v. Wetherill, 403 U. S. 916 (1971), and state attorneys general, see, e. g., Cuffle v. Avenenti, 498 U. S. 996 (1990); Nicholson v. Boles, 375 U. S. 25 (1963). This practice has some virtues. In an appropriate case, a GVR order conserves the scarce resources of this Court that might otherwise be expended on plenary consideration, assists the court below by flagging a particular issue that it does not appear to have fully considered, assists this Court by procuring the benefit of the lower court’s insight before we rule on the merits, and alleviates the “[potential for unequal treatment” that is inherent in our inability to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues, see United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 556, n. 16 (1982); cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 323 (1987) (“[W]e fulfill our judicial responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final”). Where intervening developments, or recent developments that we have reason to believe the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation, a GVR order is, we believe, potentially appropriate. Whether a GVR order is ultimately appropriate depends further on the equities of the case: If it appears that the intervening development, such as a confession of error in some, but not all, aspects of the decision below, is part of an unfair or manipulative litigation strategy, or if the delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the lower court, a GVR order is inappropriate. This approach is similar in its flexibility to this Court’s longstanding approach to applications for stays and other summary remedies granted without determining the merits of the case under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. §1651. See, e. g., Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U. S. 1328 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (staying a District Court order pending the decision on the merits of the Court of Appeals). (Naturally, because GVR orders are premised on matters that we have reason to believe the court below did not fully consider, and because they require only further consideration, the standard that we apply in deciding whether to GVR is somewhat more liberal than the All Writs Act standard, under which relief is granted only upon a showing that a grant of certio-rari and eventual reversal are probable, see id., at 1330.) Used in accordance with this approach, the GVR order can improve the fairness and accuracy of judicial outcomes while at the same time serving as a cautious and deferential alternative to summary reversal in cases whose precedential significance does not merit our plenary review. Justice Scalia’s dissent would confine GVR’s to three categories of cases: “(1) where an intervening factor has arisen that has a legal bearing upon the decision, (2) where, in a context not governed by Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), clarification of the opinion below is needed to assure our jurisdiction, and (3) . . . where the respondent or appel-lee confesses error in the judgment below.” Post, at 191-192. While a large proportion of this Court’s GVR orders fall within these categories, we find that, especially as the dissent construes them, they are too narrow to account for the full extent of our actual practice. We find two aspects in particular of the dissent’s approach too restrictive. First, the dissent would insist that only matters that the lower court had no “opportunity” to consider can be the basis for GVR orders. Second, it would impose special restrictions as to when the Court may GVR in light of changes of position by litigants. Justice Scalia’s dissent concedes — correctly, we believe — that its first category — “intervening factor[s]”— must be extended to include at least Supreme Court decisions rendered so shortly before the lower court’s decision that the lower court had no “opportunity” to apply them. Post, at 181. The dissent does not explain, however, why what the lower court had an “opportunity” to consider should be decisive, or how its “opportunity” is to be assessed. In Robinson v. Story, 469 U. S. 1081 (1984), we GVR’d for further consideration in light of a Supreme Court decision rendered almost three months before the summary affirmance by the Court of Appeals that was the subject of the petition for certiorari. Were those three months sufficient “opportunity” for the court to apprise itself (or be apprised by the parties) of the new, potentially relevant Supreme Court decision? If Robinson was properly GVR’d, we have difficulty understanding the dissent’s objection to our GVR order today in Stutson, where, as in Robinson, the Court of Appeals wrote no opinion to show whether or how it considered a precedent of ours that the District Court had had no opportunity to consider. In both cases, the Court of Appeals “might (or might not) have relied on a standard [nonapplication of the prior Supreme Court decision] that might (or might not) be wrong [and] that might (or might not) have affected the outcome.” Post, at 185 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only pertinent difference that we can discern between the two eases is that the recent Supreme Court precedent was briefed to the Court of Appeals in Stutson, but we have never held lower court briefing to bar our review and vacatur where the lower court’s order shows no sign of having applied the precedents that were briefed. Compare post, at 185-186 (asserting that “we have no power” to vacate and remand in Stutson after relevant briefing and a summary-order below), with, e. g., Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. 951 (1995) (per curiam) (vacating Court of Appeals’ summary order staying execution for probable failure to apply a 12-year-old Supreme Court precedent that the parties briefed to the Court of Appeals; this Court itself granted a stay a week later, applying that precedent, see Tuggle v. Netherland, 515 U. S. 1188 (1995)). As the prevalence of summary dispositions by the Courts of Appeals continues to increase with the burgeoning federal docket — in 1994, over 11% of Court of Appeals decisions on the merits, and many more procedural decisions, were summary — such cases will, no doubt, arise more frequently. In this context, it is important that the meaningful exercise of this Court’s appellate powers not be precluded by uncertainty as to what the court below “might. . . have relied on.” And we are well aware, as are Supreme Court practitioners and lower courts, that while not immune from our plenary review, ambiguous summary dispositions below tend, by their very nature, to lack the precedential significance that we generally look for in deciding whether to exercise our discretion to grant plenary review. We are therefore more ready than the dissent to issue a GVR order in cases in which recent events have cast substantial doubt on the correctness of the lower court’s summary disposition. With regard to confessions of error and other changes of position by litigants, we agree on several points. All Members of the Court are agreed that we “should [not] mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of Appeals was in error,” Mariscal v. United States, 449 U. S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). And the dissent acknowledges as “well entrenched,” post, at 183 (opinion of Scalia, J.), our practice of GVR’ing in light of plausible confessions of error without determining their merits. Moreover, the dissent is ready in principle to GVR in light of a new agency interpretation of a statute that is entitled to deference under the rule of Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Post, at 186-187. In other respects, however, our approaches to changes of position by litigants diverge. Justice Scalia’s dissent disapproves (although it acknowledges) this Court’s well-established practice of GVR’ing based on confessions of error that do not purport to concede the whole case. Post, at 183, 184-185; cf., e. g., Moore v. United States, 429 U. S. 20 (1976) (GVR’ing based on the Solicitor General’s confession of error, notwithstanding the Solicitor General’s unresolved claim that the error was harmless). The dissent would apparently insist that such GVR’s be confined to cases in which the confession of error concerns a “legal point on which the lower court explicitly relied,” or on which we otherwise “know” for certain that the lower court’s judgment rested. Post, at 185. But, given the legitimacy of GVR’s on the basis of confessions of error without determining the merits, we do not understand why a reasonable probability that the lower court relied on the point at issue should not suffice. As we have explained, supra, at 167, we have GVR’d on the basis of a reasonable probability of a change in result in nonconfession of error cases, see, e. g., Robinson v. Story, supra. We see no special reason why, in a confession of error case, a certainty that the lower court relied on the point in question should be necessary before we may GVR on the basis of a reasonable probability that giving the lower court the opportunity to consider that point anew will alter the result. Similarly, we reject Justice Scalia’s dissent’s other requirement of certainty for GVR’s founded on a change of position by the Government. The dissent accepts in principle that a new interpretation of a statute adopted by the agency charged with implementing it may be entitled to deference in the context of litigation to which the Government is a party. But the dissent would require that before such new interpretation may be the basis for a GVR order, we must be “certain that the change in position is legally cognizable,” post, at 187 (emphasis added), in the sense that it is “entitled to deference,” post, at 188, despite its timing, in that particular case. This requirement, too, appears to be confined to cases in which the event on which the GVR is based is a change of position by the Government, see post, at 187; we do not, for example, understand the dissent to contend that a similar requirement of “lega[l] cognizab[ility]” should apply to GVR’s in habeas corpus cases in which the procedural bar that we recognized in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), might apply. Again, we do not understand the rationale for imposing such special requirements on GVR’s based on a change of position. If it appears reasonably probable that a confession of error reveals a genuine and potentially determinative error by the court below, a GVR may be appropriate; similarly, we believe that if an agency interpretation is reasonably probably entitled to deference and potentially determinative, we may GVR in light of it. It is precisely because of uncertainty that we GVR. We do not see why uncertainty as to the “lega[l] cognizab[ility]” of an agency interpretation in a particular case should be treated differently from uncertainty as to its application in that case. Indeed, to determine on the merits whether deference is owed to the agency interpretation, based on a circumstance — i. e., its timing with respect to the case at hand — that will not be present in any other case brought under the statute at issue, when the Court of Appeals has had no “opportunity” to consider the new agency interpretation, appears to us to defeat the purpose of GVR’ing. Rather, we think it appropriate to apply our normal “reasonable probability” test, and to defer any special concerns about strategic litigating behavior that are raised by changes in the Government’s position to consideration of the equities. Under our approach, neither uncertainty as to whether the Government’s change of position, if accepted, would be outcome determinative, nor uncertainty as to the “lega[l] cog-nizab[ility]” of an administrative interpretation, preclude a GVR if the overall probabilities and equities support the GVR order. Indeed, we issued just such a GVR order last Term, without recorded dissent. See Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U. S. 801 (1994) (GVR on the basis of the Solicitor General’s representation that “[ajfter further examination of the regulation and its application in the present case,... the Department of Agriculture has determined that petitioners’ lease-baek/buybaek application should be reconsidered without respect to the good faith requirement,” Brief for Respondent in Schmidt v. Espy, O. T. 1994, No. 93-1707, p. 7; see also id., at 10, n. 5 (maintaining that other obstacles to petitioners’ application might remain)). Our differences with Justice Scalia’s dissent should not overshadow the substantial level of agreement shared by all Members of this Court. On the one hand, all are agreed that a wide range of intervening developments, including confessions of error, may justify a GVR order. On the other hand, all are agreed that our GVR power should be exercised sparingly. This Court should not just GVR a case “because it finds the opinion, though arguably correct, incomplete and unworkmanlike; or because it observes that there has been a postjudgment change in the personnel of the state supreme court, and wishes to give the new state justices a shot at the case.” Post, at 189 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord, Alvarado v. United States, 497 U. S. 543, 545 (1990) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). Respect for lower courts, the public interest in finality of judgments, and concern about our own expanding certiorari docket all counsel against undisciplined GVR’ing. It remains to apply these principles to the facts of this case. The feature of this case that, in our view, makes a GVR order appropriate is the new interpretation of the Social Security Act that the Solicitor General informs us that the Social Security Administration, the agency charged with implementing that Act, has adopted. As Justice Scalia’s dissent notes, post, at 187, we have not settled whether and to what extent deference is due to an administrative interpre-ation — its “lega[l] cognizab[ility]” — in a case that has already reached the appeal or certiorari stage when that interpretation is adopted. But in our view, see supra, at 172-173, such uncertainty does not preclude a GVR. Indeed, it is precisely because we are uncertain, without undertaking plenary analysis, of the legal impact of a new development, especially one, such as the present, which the lower court has had no opportunity to consider, that we GVR. Here, as in Schmidt, supra, the Solicitor General has recommended judicial reconsideration of the merits, while not conceding the petitioner’s ultimate entitlement to statutory benefits, based on a new statutory interpretation that will apparently be applied, and will probably be entitled to deference, in future cases nationwide. Here, as in Schmidt, our summary review leads us to the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the Court of Appeals would conclude that the timing of the agency’s interpretation does not preclude the deference that it would otherwise receive, and that it may be outcome determinative in this case. A GVR order is, therefore, appropriate, subject to the equities. As to the equities, it seems clear that they favor a GVR order here. That disposition has the Government’s express support, notwithstanding that its purpose is to give the Court of Appeals the opportunity to consider an administrative interpretation that appears contrary to the Government’s narrow self-interest. And the Government has informed us that it intends to apply that interpretation to future cases nationwide. Giving Lawrence a chance to benefit from it furthers fairness by treating Lawrence like other future benefits applicants. We acknowledge the dissent’s concern that postlitigation interpretations may be the product of unfair or manipulative Government litigating strategies, see post, at 187, and we therefore view late changes of position by the Government with some skepticism. That general concern does not, however, appear to us to require that we deprive Lawrence of the benefit of a favorable administrative reinterpretation in these particular circumstances. We believe, therefore, that the equities and legal uncertainties of this case together merit a GVR order. Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pau-peris and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of the position taken in the brief for respondent filed by the Solicitor General, August 17,1995. See Administrative Office of United States Courts, Reports of Proceedings of Judicial Conference of the United States, 1994, table S-3 (3,080 out of 27,219 decisions on the merits). In a letter filed on October 24,1995, the Solicitor General advised this Court of a July 1995 amendment to the North Carolina paternity statute, N. C. Gen. Stat. §49-14(c). We find it unnecessary to decide whether this development independently justifies our GVR order. The Court of Appeals is free to consider its significance on remand.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 105 ]	sc_adminaction
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. MORTON SALT CO. No. 464. Argued March 10, 1948. Decided May 3, 1948. Robert L. Stern argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett and W. T. Kelley. Lloyd M. McBride argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Trade Commission, after a hearing, found that the respondent, which manufactures and sells table salt in interstate commerce, had discriminated in price between different purchasers of like grades and qualities, and concluded that such discriminations were in violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526,15 U. S. C. § 13. It accordingly issued a cease and desist order. 39 F. T. C. 35. Upon petition of the respondent the Circuit Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, set aside the Commission’s findings and order, directed the Commission to dismiss its complaint against respondent, and denied a cross petition of the Commission for enforcement of its order. 162 F. 2d 949. The Court’s judgment rested on its construction of the Act, its holding that crucial findings of the Commission were either not supported by evidence or were contrary to the evidence, and its conclusion that the Commission’s order was too broad. Since questions of importance in the construction and administration of the Act were presented, we granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 850. Disposition of these questions requires only a brief narration of the facts. Respondent manufactures several different brands of table salt and sells them directly to (1) wholesalers or jobbers, who in turn resell to the retail trade, and (2) large retailers, including chain store retailers. Respondent sells its finest brand of table salt, known as Blue Label, on what it terms a standard quantity discount system available to all customers. Under this system the purchasers pay a delivered price and the cost to both wholesale and retail purchasers of this brand differs according to the quantities bought. These prices are as follows, after making allowance for rebates and discounts: Per case Less-than-carload purchases. $1. 60 Carload purchases. 1.50 5,000-case purchases in any consecutive 12 months... 1.40 50,000-case purchases in any consecutive 12 months.. 1.35 Only five companies have ever bought sufficient quantities of respondent’s salt to obtain the $1.35 per case price. These companies could buy in such quantities because they operate large chains of retail stores in various parts of the country. As a result of this low price these five companies have been able to sell Blue Label salt at retail cheaper than wholesale purchasers from respondent could reasonably sell the same brand of salt to independently operated retail stores, many of whom competed with the local outlets of the five chain stores. Respondent’s table salts, other than Blue Label, are also sold under a quantity discount system differing slightly from that used in selling Blue Label. Sales of these other brands in less-than-carload lots are made at list price plus freight from plant to destination. Carload purchasers are granted approximately a 5 per cent discount; approximately a 10 per cent discount is granted to purchasers who buy as much as $50,000 worth of all brands of salt in any consecutive twelve-month period. Respondent’s quantity discounts on Blue Label and on other table salts were enjoyed by certain wholesalers and retailers who competed with other wholesalers and retailers to whom these discounts were refused. In addition to these standard quantity discounts, special allowances were granted certain favored customers who competed with other customers to whom they were denied. First. Respondent’s basic contention, which it argues this case hinges upon, is that its “standard quantity discounts, available to all on equal terms, as contrasted, for example, to hidden or special rebates, allowances, prices or discounts, are not discriminatory within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.” Theoretically, these discounts are equally available to all, but functionally they are not. For as the record indicates (if reference to it on this point were necessary) no single independent retail grocery store', and probably no single wholesaler, bought as many as 50,000 cases or as much as $50,000 worth of table salt in one year. Furthermore, the record shows that, while certain purchasers were enjoying one or more of respondent’s standard quantity discounts, some of their competitors made purchases in such small quantities that they could not qualify for any of respondent’s discounts, even those based on carload shipments. The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer’s quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer of such advantages except to the extent that a lower price could be justified by reason of a seller’s diminished costs due to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale, or by reason of the seller’s good faith effort to meet a competitor’s equally low price. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act had included a proviso that nothing contained in it should prevent “discrimination in price ... on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation . . . .” That section has been construed as permitting quantity discounts, such as those here, without regard to the amount of the seller’s actual savings in cost attributable to quantity sales or quantity deliveries. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 101 F. 2d 620. The House Committee Report on the Robinson-Patman Act considered that the Clayton Act’s proviso allowing quantity discounts so weakened § 2 “as to render it inadequate, if not almost a nullity.” The Committee considered the present Robinson-Patman amendment to § 2 “of great importance.” Its purpose was to limit “the use of quantity price differentials to the sphere of actual cost differences. Otherwise,” the report continued, “such differentials would become instruments of favor and privilege and weapons of competitive oppression.” The Senate Committee reporting the bill emphasized the same purpose, as did the Congressman in charge of the Conference Report when explaining it to the House just before final passage. And it was in furtherance of this avowed purpose — to protect competition from all price differentials except those based in full on cost savings — that § 2 (a) of the amendment provided “That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.” The foregoing references, without regard to others which could be mentioned, establish that respondent’s standard quantity discounts are discriminatory within, the meaning of the Act, and are prohibited by it whenever they have the defined effect on competition. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Staley Co., 324 U. S. 746, 751. Second. The Government interprets the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals as having held that in order to establish “discrimination in price” under the Act the burden rested on the Commission to prove that respondent’s quantity discount differentials were not justified by its cost savings. Respondent does not so understand the Court of Appeals decision, and furthermore admits that no such burden rests on the Commission. We agree that it does not. First, the general rule of statutory construction that the burden of proving justification or exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits, requires that respondent undertake this proof under the proviso of § 2 (a). Secondly, § 2 (b) of the Act specifically imposes the burden of showing justification upon one who is shown to have discriminated in prices. And the Senate committee report on the bill explained that the provisos of § 2 (a) throw “upon any who claim the benefit of those exceptions the burden of showing that their case falls within them.” We think that the language of the Act, and the legislative history just cited, show that Congress meant by using the words “discrimination in price” in § 2 that in a case involving competitive injury between a seller’s customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser’s competitors. This construction is consistent with the first sentence of § 2 (a) in which it is made unlawful “to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . . and where the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: . . .” Third. It is argued that the findings fail to show that respondent’s discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury to competition. There are specific findings that such injuries had resulted from respondent’s discounts, although the statute does not require the Commission to find that injury has actually resulted. The statute requires no more than that the effect of the prohibited price discriminations “may be substantially to lessen competition ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition.” After a careful consideration of this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, we have said that “the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable possibility that they ‘may’ have such an effect.” Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 742. Here the Commission found what would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate. Fourth. It is urged that the evidence is inadequate to support the Commission’s findings of injury to competition. As we have pointed out, however, the Commission is authorized by the Act to bar discriminatory prices upon the “reasonable possibility” that different prices for like goods to competing purchasers may have the defined effect on competition. That respondent’s quantity discounts did result in price differentials between competing purchasers sufficient in amount to influence their resale prices of salt was shown by evidence. This showing in itself is adequate to support the Commission’s appropriate findings that the effect of such price discrim-inations “may be substantially to lessen competition . . . and to injure, destroy, and prevent competition.” The adequacy of the evidence to support the Commission’s findings of reasonably possible injury to competition from respondent’s price differentials between competing carload and less-than-carload purchasers is singled out for special attacks here. It is suggested that in considering the adequacy of the evidence to show injury to competition respondent’s carload discounts and its other quantity discounts should not be treated alike. The argument is that there is an obvious saving to a seller who delivers goods in carload lots. Assuming this to be true, that fact would not tend to disprove injury to the merchant compelled to pay the less-than-carload price. For a ten-cent carload price differential against a merchant would injure him competitively just as much as a ten-cent differential under any other name. However relevant the separate carload argument might be to the question of justifying a differential by cost savings, it has no relevancy in determining whether the differential works an injury to a competitor. Since Congress has not seen fit to give carload discounts any favored classification we cannot do so. Such discounts, like all others, can be justified by a seller who proves that the full amount of the discount is based on his actual savings in cost. The trouble with this phase of respondent’s case is that it has thus far failed to make such proof. It is also argued that respondent’s less-than-carload sales are very small in comparison with the total volume of its business and for that reason we should reject the Commission’s finding that the effect of the carload discrimination may substantially lessen competition and may injure competition between purchasers who are granted and those who are denied this discriminatory discount. To support this argument, reference is made to the fact that salt is a small item in most wholesale and retail businesses and in consumers’ budgets. For several reasons we cannot accept this contention. There are many articles in a grocery store that, considered separately, are comparatively small parts of a merchant’s stock. Congress intended to protect a merchant from competitive injury attributable to discriminatory prices on any or all goods sold in interstate commerce, whether the particular goods constituted a major or minor portion of his stock. Since a grocery store consists of many comparatively small articles, there is no possible way effectively to protect a grocer from discriminatory prices except by applying the prohibitions of the Act to each individual article in the store. Furthermore, in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress was especially concerned with protecting small businesses which were unable to buy in quantities, such as the merchants here who purchased in less-than-carload lots. To this end it undertook to strengthen this very phase of the old Clayton Act. The committee reports on the Robinson-Patman Act emphasized a belief that § 2 of the Clayton Act had “been too restrictive, in requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions . . . .” The new provision, here controlling, was intended to justify a finding of injury to competition by a showing of “injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination.” Since there was evidence sufficient to show that the less-than-carload purchasers might have been handicapped in competing with the more favored carload purchasers by the differential in price established by respondent, the Commission was justified in finding that competition might have thereby been substantially lessened or have been injured within the meaning of the Act. Apprehension is expressed in this Court that enforcement of the Commission’s order against respondent’s continued violations of the Robinson-Patman Act might lead respondent to raise table salt prices to its carload purchasers. Such a conceivable, though, we think, highly improbable, contingency, could afford us no reason for upsetting the Commission’s findings and declining to direct compliance with a statute passed by Congress. The Commission here went much further in receiving evidence than the statute requires. It heard testimony from many witnesses in various parts of the country to show that they had suffered actual financial losses on account of respondent’s discriminatory prices. Experts were offered to prove the tendency of injury from such prices. The evidence covers about two thousand pages, largely devoted to this single issue — injury to competition. It would greatly handicap effective enforcement of the Act to require testimony to show that which we believe to be self-evident, namely, that there is a “reasonable possibility” that competition may be adversely affected by a practice under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers substantially cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers. This showing in itself is sufficient to justify our conclusion that the Commission’s findings of injury to competition were adequately supported by evidence. Fifth. The Circuit Court of Appeals held, and respondent here contends, that the order was too sweeping, that it required the respondent to “conduct its business generally at its peril,” and that the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction in entering such an order. Reliance for this contention chiefly rests on Labor Board v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426. That case held that the Labor Board could not broadly enjoin violations of all the provisions of the statute merely because a single violation of one of the Act’s many provisions had been found. Id. at 435-436. But it also pointed out that the Labor Board, “Having found the acts which constitute the unfair labor practice ... is free to restrain the practice and other like or related unlawful acts.” It there pointed out that this Court had applied a similar rule to a Federal Trade Commission order in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441, 455. In the latter case the Court not only approved restraint of the unlawful price-fixing practices found, but “any other equivalent cooperative means of accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company.” See also May Dep’t Stores Co. v. Labor Board, 326 U. S. 376, 392-393. We think the Commission’s order here, save for the provisos in (a) and (b) later considered, is specifically aimed at the pricing practices found unlawful, and therefore does not run counter to the holding in the Express Publishing Co. case. Certainly the order in its relation to the circumstances of this case is only designed “to prevent violations, the threat of which in the future is indicated because of their similarity or relation to those unlawful acts which the Board [Commission] has found to have been committed by the . . . [respondent] in the past.” Labor Board v. Express Publishing Co., supra, 436-437. The specific restraints of paragraphs (a) and (b) of the order are identical, except that one applies to prices respondent charges wholesalers and the other to prices charged retailers. It is seen that the first part of these paragraphs, preceding the provisos, would absolutely bar respondent from selling its table salt, regardless of quantities, to some wholesalers and retailers at prices different from that which it charged competing wholesalers and retailers for the same grade of salt. The Commission had found that respondent had been continuously engaged in such discriminations through the use of discounts, rebates and allowances. It had further found that respondent had failed to show justification for these differences by reason of a corresponding difference in its costs. Thus the restraints imposed by the Commission upon respondent are concerned with the precise unlawful practices in which it was found to have engaged for a number of years. True, the Commission did not merely prohibit future discounts, rebates, and allowances in the exact mathematical percentages previously utilized by respondent. Had the order done no more than that, respondent could have continued substantially the same unlawful practices despite the order by simply altering the discount percentages and the quantities of salt to which the percentages applied. Paragraphs (a) and (b) up to the language of the provisos are approved. The provisos in (a) and (b) present a more difficult problem. They read: “provided, however, that this shall not prevent price differences of less than five cents per case which do not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition among such wholesalers [retailers].” The first clause of the provisos, but for the second qualifying clause, would unequivocally permit respondent to maintain price differentials of less than five cents as between competing wholesalers and as between competing retailers. This clause would appear to benefit respondent, and no challenge to it, standing alone, is here raised. ■ But respondent seriously objects to the second clause of the proviso which qualifies the permissive less-than-five-cent differentials provided in the first clause. That qualification permits such differentials only if they do “not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition.” Respondent points out that where a differential tends in no way to injure competition, the Act permits it. “The Commission,” so respondent urges, “must either find and rule that a given differential injures competition, and then prohibit it, or it must leave that differential entirely alone.” Whether, and under what circumstances, if any, the Commission might prohibit differentials which do not of themselves tend to injure competition, we need not decide, for the Commission has not in either (a) or (b) taken action which forbids such noninjurious differentials. But other objections raised to the qualifying clauses require consideration. One of the reasons for entrusting enforcement of this Act primarily to the Commission, a body of experts, was to authorize it to hear evidence as to given differential practices and to make findings concerning possible injury to competition. Such findings are to form the basis for cease and desist orders definitely restraining the particular discriminatory practices which may tend to injure competition without justification. The effective administration of the Act, insofar as the Act entrusts administration to the Commission, would be greatly impaired if, without compelling reasons not here present, the Commission’s cease and desist orders did no more than shift to the courts in subsequent contempt proceedings for their violation the very fact questions of injury to competition, etc., which the Act requires the Commission to determine as the basis for its order. The enforcement responsibility of the courts, once a Commission order has become final either by lapse of time or by court approval, 15 U. S. C. §§ 21, 45, is to adjudicate questions concerning the order’s violation, not questions of fact which support that valid order. Whether on this record the Commission was compelled to exempt certain differentials of less than five cents we do not decide. But once the Commission exempted the differentials in question from its order, we are constrained to hold that as to those differentials it could not then shift to the courts a responsibility in enforcement proceedings of trying issues of possible injury to competition, issues which Congress has primarily entrusted to the Commission. This leaves for consideration the objection to paragraph (c) of the order which reads: “By selling such products to any retailer at prices lower than prices charged wholesalers whose customers compete with such retailer.” The only criticism here urged to (c) is that it bars respondent from selling to a retailer at a price lower than that charged a wholesaler whose customers compete with the retailer. Section 2 (a) of the Act specifically authorizes the Commission to bar discriminatory prices which tend to lessen or injure competition with “any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” This provision plainly supports paragraph (c) of the order. We sustain the Commission’s order with the exception of the provisos in paragraphs (a) and (b) previously set out. Since the qualifying clauses constitute an important limitation to the provisos, we think the Commission should have an opportunity to reconsider the entire provisos in light of our rejection of the qualifying clauses, and to refashion these provisos as may be deemed necessary. This the Commission may do upon the present evidence and findings or it may hear other evidence and make other findings on this phase of the case, should it conclude to do so. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212, 218. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the proceedings are remanded to that court to be disposed of in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. Section 2 (a) provides in part: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .” The original findings and order were modified by the Commission on its own motion. The controversy here deals only with the findings and order as modified. Respondent also produces and sells other kinds of salt, but the trade practices here involved only relate to table salt. These chain stores are American Stores Company, National Tea Company, Kroger Grocery Co., Safeway Stores, Inc., and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. One such customer, a wholesaler, received a special discount of 7% cents per case on purchases of carload lots of Blue Label Salt. Respondent sold to this wholesaler at $1.42% per case, although competing wholesalers were required to pay $1.50 per case on carload lots. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that findings of the Commission on these special allowances were supported by substantial evidence, that they were not maintained to meet lower prices of respondent’s competitors, and that the allowances were discriminatory. It nevertheless set the findings aside on the ground that the Commission’s finding of injury to competition from the discriminations engaged in by respondent was too general and had little evidence to support it. We think the finding and supporting evidence of injury to competition on account of these special allowances are similar to the finding and evidence with reference to the quantity discount system and need not be separately treated. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7. Id. at 9. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6. 80 Cong. Rec. 9417. See 42 III. L. Rev. 556-561; 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 384-391, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1167-1169. Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U. S. 502, 507-508 and cases cited. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3. See also 80 Cong. Rec. 3599,8241,9418. See Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 148 F. 2d 378, 379, holding that proof of a price differential in itself constituted “discrimination in price,” where the competitive injury in question was between sellers. See also Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 721-726. This language is to be read also in the light of the following statement in the same case, discussing the meaning of § 2 (a), as contained in the Robinson-Patman Act, in relation to § 3 of the Clayton Act: "It is to be observed that § 2 (a) does not require a finding that the discriminations in price have in fact had an adverse effect on competition. The statute is designed to reach such discriminations ‘in their incipiency/ before the harm to competition is effected. It is enough that they ‘may’ have the prescribed effect. Cf. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 356-357. But as was held in the Standard Fashion case, supra, with respect to the like provisions of § 3 of the Clayton Act, prohibiting tying clause agreements, the effect of which 'may be to substantially lessen competition/ the use of the word ‘may’ was not to prohibit discrimina-tions having ‘the mere possibility’ of those consequences, but to reach those which would probably have the defined effect on competition.” 324 U. S. at 738; see also United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411. The Committee Reports and Congressional debate on this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act indicate that it was intended to have a broader scope than the corresponding provision of the old Clayton Act. See note 18 infra. After discussing all of respondent’s discriminations, the Commission stated: “The Commission finds that the effect of the dis-criminations in price, including discounts, rebates, and allowances, generally and specifically described herein may be substantially to lessen competition in the line of commerce in which the purchaser receiving the benefit of said discriminatory price is engaged and to injure, destroy, and prevent competition between those purchasers receiving the benefit of said discriminatory prices, discounts, rebates, and allowances and those to whom they are denied.” The statute outlaws any discrimination the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition ... or to injure . . . competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: . . .” Respondent introduced testimony and exhibits intended to show that only one-tenth of one per cent of its sales were made at less-than-carload prices. It appears that this figure relates only to a single one-year period and was obtained by lumping together statistics on respondent's sales of table salt along with those on sales of its other products, such as salt tablets, coarse rock salt, and sal soda. Since this proceeding is concerned only with discounts on table salts, these figures are of dubious value. Furthermore, they are limited to sales in respondent’s Chicago area, whereas respondent carried on a nation-wide business. In explaining this clause of the proposed Robinson-Patman Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee said: “This clause represents a recommended addition to the bill as referred to your committee. It tends to exclude from the bill otherwise harmless violations of its letter, but accomplishes a substantial broadening of a similar clause now contained in section 2 of the Clayton Act. The latter has in practice been too restrictive, in requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions in the line of commerce concerned; whereas the more immediately important concern is in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination. Only through such injuries, in fact, can the larger general injury result, and to catch the weed in the seed will keep it from coming to flower.” S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4. See also H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8; 80 Cong. Rec. 9417. The prohibiting paragraphs of the order were: “ (a) By selling such products to some wholesalers thereof at prices different from the prices charged other wholesalers who in fact compete in the sale and distribution of such products; provided, however, that this shall not prevent price differences of less than five cents per case which do not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition among such wholesalers. “(b) By selling such products to some retailers thereof at prices different from the prices charged other retailers who in fact compete in the sale and distribution of such products; provided, however, that this shall not prevent price differences of less than five cents per case which do not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition among such retailers. “(c) By selling such products to any retailer at prices lower than prices charged wholesalers whose customers compete with such retailer. “For the purposes of comparison, the term ‘puce’ as used in this order takes into account discounts, rebates, allowances, and other terms and conditions of sale.” The only finding of the Commission specifically relating to five-cent differentials was: “Salt is a staple commodity with a medium turnover and is generally sold by wholesalers to their retail customers on a lower margin of profit than that received on other commodities. Consequently, the price at which the wholesaler offers his table salt is usually controlling, and a difference of five cents per case may result in the loss of a sale to a customer, not only of the salt involved but of other commodities as well, the order for which might be placed with the salt purchase.”	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 56 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. ALLEN-BRADLEY CO. No. 78. Argued December 13, 1956. Decided January 22, 1957. Hilbert P. Zarky argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Philip Elman and Joseph F. Goetten. Harvey W. Peters argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1940 this country embarked on the greatest program of defense preparedness in its history. Such an undertaking called for a vast expansion of the nation’s industrial capacity. New and improved facilities were desperately needed, not only for the production of guns, planes and the other obvious weapons of war, but also for the innumerable items that are essential to the prosecution of large-scale conflict. This unprecedented program of expansion demanded the full and immediate cooperation of everyone who could lend assistance. While the Government attempted to secure the necessary facilities by building them itself or by extending emergency construction loans to private business, it soon appeared that these methods would not be adequate to meet the needs of defense. Private capital was called on for assistance in the task. However business exhibited a reluctance to build new war plants because of widespread fears that such facilities would become wholly useless when the emergency had passed. In response to these fears, Congress acted to lessen the financial risks involved in the private construction of emergency facilities. Among other things it amended the 1939 Internal Revenue Code by adding §§23 (t) and 124, which allowed business to write off the cost of new facilities as a deduction against taxable income within a period of five years or less, regardless of the actual economic life of the facilities, provided they had been certified by the proper executive agency as “necessary in the interest of national defense.” This accelerated amortization privilege generally enabled those businesses receiving it to reduce their federal income taxes with the net result that a large part of the construction costs was, at least temporarily, borne by the Federal Government through a reduction in its tax receipts. This case involves a question of the proper interpretation of § 124 (f), a vital part of these accelerated amortization provisions. The essential facts are not in dispute. During the Second World War the respondent Allen-Bradley Company produced radio parts and other materials needed by the Government to carry on the war. These products were in critically short supply and at the request of government procurement officers respondent repeatedly increased and improved its facilities in order to boost its output. In connection with such expansions it applied to the War Production Board, which was then the certifying authority, for certificates that the improvements were necessary to the national defense. The Board issued nine different certificates of necessity to respondent but the dispute here involves only three of these certificates. Each of these three stated that the facilities covered by it were necessary in the interest of national defense but only up to a specified percentage of their total cost. This “partial certification” was made pursuant to a policy adopted by the Board in 1943 that it would certify essential facilities, which could reasonably be expected to have peacetime utility, only to the extent that their costs were attributable to the wartime increase in prices. Respondent accepted these partial certifications, proceeded with the expansion and in its tax returns for 1944 and 1945 deducted an amount based on the accelerated amortization of that part of the total cost which had been certified by the Board. In 1953 respondent first raised the claim which is the basis of this suit that the Board had no authority to certify only part of the cost of a necessary emergency facility. Respondent concedes that the Board had discretion to refuse to issue any certificate at all, but contends that once it decided that a facility was necessary to the national defense its function was at an end and that any attempt by it to limit the certification to a part of the cost of such facility was a nullity. Therefore, respondent contends, it was entitled to accelerate the amortization of the full cost of those facilities covered by the three partial certificates and not just that part of the full cost which had been certified by the Board. On the basis of these contentions respondent filed the present action in the Court of Claims to recover an alleged overpayment of its 1944 and 1945 income taxes. The Court of Claims accepted respondent’s arguments and rendered judgment for it. 134 Ct. Cl. 800. We granted certiorari, 351 U. S. 981, because of the conflict between this decision and that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. National Lead Co., 230 F. 2d 161. The language of the crucial section 124 (f) is ambiguous. It specifies that in determining the amount of the wartime construction costs which are to be available for the special amortization privilege: “(1) There shall be included only so much of the amount ... as is properly attributable to such construction . . . after December 31, 1939, as [the War Production Board] has certified as necessary in the interest of national defense during the emergency period . . . Respondent argues that the phrase “only so much of the amount” in this section refers simply to that part of the cost of facilities that is attributable to construction after 1939. On the other hand the Government contends that this qualifying phrase refers not only to those costs incurred after 1939, but also to that portion of those costs which the War Production Board has certified is necessary to the national defense. We believe that either interpretation is possible; that neither is compelled. But those who were responsible for the administration of the Act consistently interpreted § 124 (f) as authorizing them to certify that only a part of the costs of construction after 1939 was necessary to the national defense. The legislative history shows that Congress intended that the administrators of the certification program were to have broad discretion in exercising their power. These administrators were faced with extremely complicated problems in attempting to accomplish the desired objective of Congress in the face of constant and drastic changes in conditions. And as the nation’s industrial capacity became more adequate they carefully balanced the need for the proposed expansion against the loss of revenue to the Government caused by accelerated amortization before issuing a certificate. The power to certify only a portion of the cost gave them a more flexible instrument to balance these conflicting objectives. It appears that Congress kept close supervision over the certification program and the special amortization privilege. For example, § 124 was amended five times during the war; two of these amendments altered § 124 (f) itself in a manner which did not affect the language decisive of the present controversy. But no attempt was made to restrain the administrators from issuing certificates covering only a part of the cost of necessary facilities, although it seems apparent that responsible committees of Congress were aware that § 124 (f) had been consistently interpreted and applied by the certifying authorities as permitting them to issue such certifications. In fact a special Senate “watch-dog” committee was established to continually study and investigate the program for construction of war plants and facilities including the “. . . benefits accruing to contractors with respect to amortization for the purposes of taxation or otherwise . . . ." Perhaps § 124 (f) could have been construed differently. But it was not. Construed as it was, it served its purpose. It contributed materially to the phenomenal expansion of our industrial plants which was so necessary for successful prosecution of the war. Certificates issued for only a portion of the cost of necessary facilities were accepted by business in general, and respondent in particular — apparently without substantial objection. The technique employed in § 124 (f) was a new one and those who drafted that section could not be certain how it would work in practice. They could not foresee the many problems that would arise in the administration of this sweeping power which could be used to encourage expansion of any industry producing materials useful in the all-out war effort. Therefore it is not strange that the provision was loosely drawn and, in some respects, imprecise. However it would have been strange in these circumstances if Congress had embarked on this new course without leaving wide discretion for flexible administration in the light of the day-to-day grind of experience. The language of § 124 (f) lends itself to such flexibility. We hold that the Board had authority under § 124 (f) to issue certificates, as in this case, certifying that only a part of the cost of essential wartime improvements was necessary to the national defense. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be reversed. It is so ordered. 54 Stat. 998-1003, as amended, 26 U. S. C. §§ 23 (t), 124. See War Department Regulations, Issuance of Necessity Certificates, 7 Fed. Reg. 4233 (1942); War Production Board Regulations, Issuance of Necessity Certificates, 8 Fed. Reg. 16964 (1943). And compare Treas. Reg. Ill, § 29.124-6. 55 Stat. 4, 55 Stat. 757, 56 Stat. 50, 56 Stat. 850 and 59 Stat. 525. S. Res. 71, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (87 Cong. Rec. 1615), and S. Res. 6, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (89 Cong. Rec. 331).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 114 ]	sc_adminaction
SIMMONS v. UNITED STATES. No. 251. Argued February 2, 1955. Decided March 14, 1955. Hayden C. Covington argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and Carl H. Imlay. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents another question concerning the processing of conscientious objector claims under the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Petitioner contends that the failure of the Department of Justice to furnish him with a fair résumé of all adverse information in the Federal Bureau of Investigation report deprived him of the “hearing” provided by § 6 (j) of the Act, 62 Stat. 612, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j), and thereby invalidated his I-A classification. In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that a fair résumé, as contemplated in United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S. 1 (1953), was not furnished petitioner, and that this deprived him of a fair hearing within the terms of the Act. Petitioner registered under the selective service laws in 1948. He was then employed as a chauffeur at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center, having had 8 years of grade school and 2y2 years of high school. At that time, he did not claim to be a minister or a conscientious objector, but stated that he believed his classification should be I-A. The local Board so classified him. In 1949, petitioner was married, and on June 4, 1951, he was given a dependency deferment, which was terminated on October 22, 1951. Within a week of his restoration to I-A, petitioner filed the special form for conscientious objectors, claiming exemption from combatant and noncombatant service. In this and in subsequent statements to the selective service authoritiés, petitioner revealed that he had first been contacted by a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in November 1949; that he had started a Bible study course at that time and had progressed gradually toward the status of minister; that he had become an unordained minister in December 1950, and an ordained minister in October 1951; that he preached from house to house and on the streets, giving public expression to his conscientious objections to war; that the demands of his “ministry” and the commands of the Bible, admonishing him not to kill and to follow God rather than men, precluded his participation in the military ; and that he would not use force “ [u] nless it be under the supervision of Jehovah God.” After a personal appearance, in which petitioner sought exemption as a minister rather than as a conscientious objector, the local Board continued him in I-A. Petitioner filed an appeal. The Appeal Board tentatively found against him, and referred the case to the Department of Justice. Following an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, petitioner was notified to appear for a hearing. No copy of the notice appears in the record, but it appears that the form sent to registrants during the period in question stated that the hearing officer would advise the registrant “as to the general nature and character” of adverse evidence in the FBI report if he requested such information “at any time after receipt by him of the notice of hearing and before the date set for the hearing.” There is no evidence that petitioner made such a request prior to the hearing. He did, however, make a request at the hearing. According to petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony, the hearing officer told him that the FBI report disclosed that he had been hanging around poolrooms, and the hearing officer asked him if he did that now. Petitioner replied that he did not, and asked what else was in the report. The hearing officer changed the subject. He subsequently asked petitioner’s wife how she was feeling and how petitioner was treating her. Her reply was “fine.” The hearing officer reported that petitioner impressed him as sincere, but recommended that he be classified I-A because his religious activities coincided with pressure from the Draft Board. In its report to the Appeal Board, the Department of Justice adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation, relying on the timing of petitioner’s religious activities and “his abusiveness and the exercise of physical violence towards his wife.” The latter reason rested on data presumably gathered by the FBI. According to the Department’s report, police records showed that petitioner was arrested and fined in May 1950 for hitting his wife; that the police were called upon to settle a “hot argument” in June 1950; and that petitioner’s wife claimed in January 1952 that he was “abusive” towards her. Also narrated in the report, although not specifically relied on in making the recommendation, is the statement of a “confidential informant” that prior to his recent religious activity petitioner had been “a rather heavy drinker and crap shooter in and around local taverns and pool halls.” Petitioner was continued in I-A by the Appeal Board. He refused to submit to induction and this prosecution followed. On trial, petitioner claimed that he had not been afforded a fair summary of the FBI report and secured the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of the original report. On motion of the Government, and over objection of petitioner, the subpoena was quashed. Thereafter petitioner was convicted, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 213 F. 2d 901. Section 6 (j) of the Act provides that “[t]he Department of Justice, after appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and good faith” of the claimed conscientious objections. In United States v. Nugent, supra, we held that this “hearing” did not entail disclosure of the secret FBI reports. In reaching this conclusion, however, we relied on the availability to the registrant of a fair résumé of these reports: “. . . We think the Department of Justice satisfies its duties under § 6 (j) when it accords a fair opportunity to the registrant to speak his piece before an impartial hearing officer; when it permits him to produce all relevant evidence in his own behalf and at the same time supplies him with a fair résumé of any adverse evidence in the investigator’s report.” 346 U. S., at 6. We did not view this provision for a fair summary as a matter of grace within the Department’s discretion, but rather as an essential element in the processing of conscientious objector claims. United States v. Nugent represented a balancing between the demands of an effective system for mobilizing'the Nation’s manpower in times of crisis and the demands of fairness toward the individual registrant. We permitted the FBI report to remain secret because we were of the view that other safeguards in the proceeding, particularly the furnishing of a fair résumé, maintained the basic elements of fair play. If the balance struck in Nugent is to be preserved, the registrant must receive the fair summary to which he is entitled. The Department expressly recognizes this and, since Nugent, has furnished each registrant, at the time he is notified of the hearing, with a written resume of the information developed in the FBI report, a copy of which is also placed in his file for use by the Appeal Board. The Government assumes that the Department of Justice is required to furnish the registrant with a fair résumé upon request. But it contends that petitioner failed to make a timely request for the summary; that the remarks of the hearing officer gave him adequate notice of the unfavorable evidence in the FBI report; and, finally, that the lack of notice, if there was such, was harmless. As to the request for the summary, the Government must rely on a document which is not in the record and which was not open to attack or explanation in the trial court. Indeed, had the Government produced the form notice in the lower courts, petitioner might have been able to show that he had made a request prior to the hearing. But leaving these difficulties aside, the notice reproduced in the Government’s brief does not, in our view, convey clearly to the layman the idea that he must make a request for the résumé prior to the hearing or forever waive his rights in this respect. There is nothing in either the statute or the regulations authorizing such a waiver. And the discussion of this point in Nugent, 346 U. S., at 6, n. 10, was riot directed at the time or method of requesting the résumé, but only at its availability. That petitioner never received a fair résumé of the unfavorable evidence gleaned by the FBI seems hardly arguable on this record. As to his alleged gambling and drinking, the hearing officer merely told petitioner that he was reported to have been hanging around pool rooms. And as to the reported incidents of violence and abuse towards his wife, the hearing officer, in an apparent aside, advanced only the general query to petitioner’s wife, asking her how petitioner was treating her now. A fair résumé is one which will permit the registrant to defend against the adverse evidence — to explain it, rebut it, or otherwise detract from its damaging force. The remarks of the hearing officer at most amounted to vague hints, and these apparently failed to alert petitioner to the dangers ahead. Certainly they afforded him no fair notice of the adverse charges in the report. The Congress, in providing for a hearing, did not intend for it to be conducted on the level of a game of blindman’s buff. The summary was inadequate and the hearing in the Department was therefore lacking in basic fairness. The Government’s argument that no prejudice was shown and none resulted can be readily disposed of. Relying on a case concerned with constitutional restrictions on the States in regulating public utilities, Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of California, 324 U. S. 548, it contends that the petitioner must specifically show prejudice in order to question the fairness of the résumé. The holding of the Market Street Railway case was that the Due Process Clause was “not to be trivialized by formal objections that have no substantial bearing on the ultimate rights of parties,” that the Commission could make “incidental reference” to the railroad’s own reports to verify its judgment, formulated on the basis of the entire record, without introducing the reports in evidence. Id., at 562. We are not now dealing with constitutional limitations. We are endeavoring to apply a procedure, set forth by Congress, in accordance with the statutory plan and the concepts of basic fairness which underlie all our legislation. We have held that to meet its duty under § 6 (j) the Department must furnish the registrant with a fair résumé of the FBI report. It is clear in the circumstances of this case that it has failed to do so, and that petitioner has thereby been deprived of an opportunity to answer the charges against him. This is not an incidental infringement of technical rights. Petitioner has been deprived of the fair hearing required by the Act, a fundamental safeguard, and he need not specify the precise manner in which he would have used this right— and how such use would have aided his cause — in order to complain of the deprivation. It being evident from the record before the Court that the Department of Justice has failed to provide petitioner with a fair resume of the FBI report, it is unnecessary for us to pass on petitioner’s further contention that the trial court erred in quashing his subpoena duces tecum. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, adhering to their dissent in Nugent v. United States, 346 U. S. 1, 13, join in this opinion and judgment. Mr. Justice Reed would affirm on the ground that, as no summary was requested, it was not necessary to furnish more to the registrant than was given by the hearing officer. See Gonzales v. United States, decided today, post, p. 407. The form notice appears as an appendix to the Government’s brief, p. 55. The pertinent paragraph follows: “2. Upon request therefor by the registrant at any time after receipt by him of the notice of hearing and before the date set for the hearing, the hearing officer will advise the registrant as to the general nature and character of any evidence in his possession which is unfavorable to, and tends to defeat, the claim of the registrant such request being granted to enable the registrant more fully to prepare to answer and refute at the hearing such unfavorable evidence.” The complete text of the report is as follows: “Registrant is twenty-five years of age, married, born in Illinois and has completed approximately two years of high school. At the present time he is employed as a chauffeur. He was first contacted by a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses Sect in November 1949, although the exact date of membership is not reflected. “The registrant believes in a Supreme Being and describes the nature of his belief by citing various parts of the Scriptures, in part, as follows: “ ‘Romans 13:1 — . . . that Jehovah God and Christ Jesus are the higher powers, and I recognize them as the supreme powers. Peter at Acts 5:29 admonishing all footstep followers of Christ Jesus that “We must obey God rather than men.” Also Paul at 2 Cor. 4:4. . . Satan the Devil is the God of this system of things. Showing that we show (sic) obey the Creator rather than the Creation of God. Jehovah God in one of his Ten Commandments at Ex. 20:13 “Thou shall not kill.” ’ “Registrant relates that in November 1949, at the suggestion of one Clarence Howze, he started a Bible book study and as he progressed wanted more and more to become a minister of truth. At the present time he is receiving training from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society. As to the question regarding use of force he states ‘None whatsoever. Unless it be under the supervision of Jehovah God.’ He claims to engage in the work of his religion by preaching from house to house and on the streets. “At his present place of employment he has been seen reading the Bible during lunch hour and discussing same with a few co-workers. References, all of whom are members of the same sect, believe registrant is sincere, as do his neighbors. A confidential informant, of known reliability, reports that during the last seven or eight months registrant was actively engaged in distributing pamphlets; that prior to that time registrant was personally known to him as a rather heavy drinker and crap shooter in and around local taverns and pool halls. This informant believes registrant is now sincere. Registrant states he has changed his ways and now prays many times during the day. His wife also states he has changed. It is to be noted that registrant is reported to have had a very poor home life. “Police records reflect that registrant was arrested May 29, 1950 on a complaint by his wife that he pulled her out of a car and hit her in the face — fined $13.60; on June 12, 1950 police were called to settle a ‘hot argument’ and on January 6, 1952, wife claimed registrant was abusive. Police settled last two matters so no charges were filed. “The file also reflects that registrant was mailed his questionnaire on December 6, 1948 and did not sign that part (series XIV) reserved for a conscientious objection. He was classified I-A on December 23, 1948 and married his present wife on March 5, 1949. “The Hearing Officer reports registrant impressed him as sincere but notes that his religious activities are coincident with pressing draft activities by officials and, therefore, recommends a I-A classification. “From the available information it appears that registrant had little, if any, religious training prior to November 1949 and it was not until after his 3-A classification was changed to I-A that he evidenced any conscientious objection. From the time he first attended a Bible study class until approximately October 1951, registrant had a little less than two years of Jehovah’s Witness religious training. In addition to the fact that his religious activities coincide with pressing induction possibilities, registrant’s absorption and sincerity as to his newly found religion is rendered more questionable by his abusiveness and the exercise of physical violence towards his wife. In this connection police records reflect a complaint by his wife as late as January 6,1952. “After consideration of the entire file and record, the Department of Justice finds that the registrant’s objections to combatant and noncombatant service are not sustained. It is, therefore, recommended to your Board that registrant’s claim for exemption from both combatant and noncombatant training and service be not sustained.” This informant had also stated that petitioner had changed his ways and now seemed sincere. While the statement as a whole may therefore be favorable to petitioner’s claim, the disclosure of petitioner’s gambling and drinking activities was certainly adverse. This procedure was not in effect at the time petitioner was notified to appear for his hearing. Registrants are not to be treated as though they were engaged in formal litigation assisted by counsel. United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F. 2d 888; Smith v. United States, 157 F. 2d 176.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 106 ]	sc_adminaction
MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. ELDRIDGE No. 74-204. Argued October 6, 1975 Decided February 24, 1976 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, BlackmuN, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 349. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Deputy Solicitor General Jones, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Gerald P. Norton, William Ranter, and David M. Cohen. Donald E. Earls argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was Carl E. McAfee. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Stephen P. Berzon filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. David A. Webster filed a brief for Caroline Williams as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. I Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70 Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423. Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying the medical sources, including physicians, from whom he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After considering these reports and other information in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition. In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that the agency already had enough evidence to establish his disability. The state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. This determination was accepted by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate after that month. The notification also advised him of his right to seek reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months. Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing on the issue of his disability. 361 F. Supp. 520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that Eldridge’s benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available remedies. In support of his contention that due process requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an “evidentiary hearing” prior to termination of welfare benefits. The Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence. The District Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge’s benefits abridged his right to procedural due process. The court viewed the interest of the disability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistinguishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg demonstrated that the due process requirement of pretermination hearings is not limited to situations involving the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 635, 539 (1971). Reasoning that disability determinations may involve subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge had to be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act. 361 F. Supp., at 528. Relying entirely upon the District Court’s opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge’s benefits prior to an evidentiary hearing. 493 F. 2d 1230 (1974). We reverse. II At the outset we are confronted by a question as to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars the District Court from considering Eldridge’s action. Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act’s duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) precludes federal-question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review is 42 U. S. C. §405 (g), which requires exhaustion of the administrative remedies provided under the Act as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Section 405 (g) in part provides: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of. such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.” On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any denial of a claim of disability benefits until after a “final decision” by the Secretary after a “hearing.” It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained full administrative review of the termination of his benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the initial determination. Since the Secretary has not “waived” the finality requirement as he had in Salfi, supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot properly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We disagree. Salfi identified several conditions which must be satisfied in order to obtain judicial review under §405 (g). Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as “central to the requisite grant of subject-matter jurisdiction_” 422 U. S., at 764. Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle that this condition consists of two elements, only one of which is purely “jurisdictional” in the sense that it cannot be “waived” by the Secretary in a particular casé. The waivable element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no “decision” of any type. And some decision by the Secretary is clearly required by the statute. That this second requirement is an essential and distinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed members of the class. As to the latter the complaint was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it “contain [ed] no allegations that they have even filed an application with the Secretary... 422 U. S., at 764. With respect to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had “fully presented their claims for benefits ‘to their district Social Security Office and, upon denial, to the Regional Office for reconsideration.’ ” Id., at 764-765. Eldridge has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his answers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in response to the tentative determination that his disability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim that his benefits should not be terminated because he was still disabled. This claim was denied by the state agency and its decision was accepted by the SSA. The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination hearing is not controlling. As construed in Salfi, § 405 (g) requires only that there be a “final decision” by the Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not present their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Wein-berger v. Salfi, O. T. 1974, No. 74-214, App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, he does have authority to determine the timing and content of the procedures challenged here. 42 U. S. C. §405 (a). We do not, however, regard this difference as significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary would consider substantial changes in the current administrative review system at the behest óf a single aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be required even to consider such a challenge. As the non waivable jurisdictional element was satisfied, we next consider the waivable element. The question is whether the denial of Eldridge’s claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently “final” decision with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust the full set of internal-review procedures provided by the Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940 (1975). As Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the administrative process, that no further review is warranted either because the internal needs of the agency are fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his power to confer. Salfi suggested that under §405 (g) the power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for the integrity of the administrative program is his. But cases may arise where a claimant’s interest in having a particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency’s judgment is inappropriate. This is such a case. Eldridge’s constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there is a crucial distinction between the nature of the constitutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief cannot be obtained at a postdeprivation hearing. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 156 (1974). In light of the Court’s prior decisions, see, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because of his physical, condition and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage him in a way not recompensable through retroactive payments. Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying Eldridge’s substantive claim “for other reasons” or upholding it “under other provisions” at the post-termination stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his constitutional challenge. We conclude that the denial of Eldridge’s request for benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405 (g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now proceed to the merits of that claim. III A Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary does not contend that procedural due process is inapplicable to terminations of Social Security disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 401—402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created “property” interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 261-262. Rather, the Secretary contends that the existing administrative procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of that interest. This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125 (1889). The “right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.” Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge agrees that the review procedures available to a claimant before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes final would be adequate if disability benefits were not terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of the administrative process. The dispute centers upon what process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending review. In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some type of property interest even if such a hearing is provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 266-271, has the Court held that a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right the Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Snia- dach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S., at 96-97, the Court said only that in a replevin suit between two private parties the initial determination required something more than an ex parte proceeding before a court clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, supra, at 540, held, in the context of the revocation of a state-granted- driver’s license, that due process required only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probable-cause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting that the hearing “need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability.” See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, we sustained the validity of procedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed for cause. They included notice of the action sought, a copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance. Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was provided. 416 U. S., at 142-146. These decisions underscore the truism that “ ‘[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168 (Powell, J., concurring in part); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-266; Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271. We turn first to a description of the procedures for the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the constitutional adequacy of these procedures. B The disability insurance program is administered jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies make the initial determination whether a disability exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C. §421 (a). The standards applied and the procedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b), who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. 4473 (1975). In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months_” 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden of showing, by means of “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” § 423 (d)(3), that he has a physical or mental impairment of such severity that “he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” §423 (d)(2)(A). The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work. As Eldridge’s benefits were terminated because he was determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases. The continuing-eligibility investigation is made by a state agency acting through a “team” consisting of a physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with the disabled worker, usually by mail — in which case he is sent a detailed questionnaire — or by telephone, and requests information concerning his present condition, including current medical restrictions and sources of treatment, and any additional information that he considers relevant to his continued entitlement to benefits. CM §6705.1; Disability Insurance State Manual (DISM) §353.3 (TL No. 137, Mar. 5, 1975). Information regarding the recipient’s current condition is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment. DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the information provided by the beneficiary and that obtained from medical sources such as his physician, or between two sources of treatment, the agency may arrange for an examination by an independent consulting physician. Ibid. Whenever the agency’s tentative assessment of the beneficiary’s condition differs from his own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence upon which the proposed determination to terminate is based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical reports and other evidence in his ease file. He also may respond in writing and submit additional evidence. Id., § 353.6. The state agency then makes its final determination, which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM §§ 6701 (b), (c). If, as is usually the case, the SSA accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the state agency. 20 CFR §§404.907, 404.909 (1975). Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective two months after the month in which medical recovery is found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. § 423 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. III). If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipient of the decision. He then has a right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. 20 CFR §§404.917, 404.927 (1975). The hearing is non-adversary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process, however, the claimant may be represented by counsel or other spokesmen. §404.934. If this hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is entitled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals Council, §404.945, and finally may obtain judicial review. 42 U. S. C. §405 (g); 20 CFR §404.951 (1975). Should it be determined at any point after termination of benefits, that the claimant’s disability extended beyond the date of cessation initially established, the worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C. §404. Cf. §423 (b); 20 CFR §§404.501, 404.503, 404.504 (1975). If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives any payments to which he is later determined not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 42 U. S. C. §404. C Despite the elaborate character of the administrative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, concluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to termination. In light of the private and governmental interests at stake here and the nature of the existing procedures, we think this was error. Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this source of income pending final administrative decision on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in nature to that.of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342. Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence: “The crucial factor in this context — a factor not present in the case of... virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended — is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.” 397 U. S., at 264 (emphasis in original). Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the worker’s income or support from many other sources, such as earnings of other family members, workmen’s compensation awards, tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans’ benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the “many other important programs, both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force... Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Staff of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 9-10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report). As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process. Cf. Mor-rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be “unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.” 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F. Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that the terminated recipient will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss. As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975), “the possible length of wrongful deprivation of... benefits [also] is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests.” The Secretary concedes that the delay between a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge and a decision on the claim is currently between 10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the delay between the actual cutoff of benefits and final decision after a hearing exceeds one year. In view of the torpidity of this administrative review process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest resources of the family unit of the physically disabled worker, the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant. Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to private resources, other forms of government assistance will become available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence level. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., at 169 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id., at 201-202 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view of these potential sources of temporary income, there is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. D An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any administrative process is the nature of the relevant inquiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 617 (1974); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate by means of “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” 42 U. S. C. §423 (d)(3), that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment....” § 423 (d)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). In short, a medical assessment of the worker’s physical or mental condition is required. This is a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted that in such circumstances “written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.” 397 U. S., at 269. By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404, concerning a subject whom they have personally examined. In Richardson the Court recognized the “reliability and probative worth of written medical reports,” emphasizing that while there may be “professional disagreement with the medical conclusions” the “specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not present.” Id., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions. The potential value of an eviden-tiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision-maker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg. The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court’s conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate substitute for oral presentation because they did not provide an effective means for the recipient to communicate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients lacked the “educational attainment necessary to write effectively” and could not afford professional assistance. In addition, such submissions would not provide the “flexibility of oral presentations” or “permit	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 61 ]	sc_adminaction
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA v. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 86-935. Argued January 12, 1988 Decided April 20, 1988 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, and Scalia, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 603. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 604. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. James N. Odie argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were James E. Holst, Susan M. Thomas, and Kingsley R. Browne. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Charles D. Hawley. Andrea L. Biren argued the cause for appellees and filed a brief for appellee California Public Employment Relations Board. Andrew Thomas Sinclair filed a brief for appellee Wilson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, by Richard Kirschner; for the American Federation of Teachers by Lawrence A. Poltrock and Gregory N. Freerksen; for the California Faculty Association by Julius Reich and Glenn Rothnerand for the National Educational Association et al. by Robert H. Chanin and Kirsten Zerger. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a state university’s delivery of unstamped letters from a labor union to university employees violates the Private Express Statutes, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1693-1699, 39 U. S. C. §§ 601-606. These statutes establish the postal monopoly and generally prohibit the private carriage of letters over postal routes without the payment of postage to the United States Postal Service. I Appellant Regents govern a large state-owned university with over 100,000 employees. The university (hereafter referred to as appellant) operates an internal mail system to facilitate the delivery of mail to the various sites on its campuses. Appellant’s employees collect mail originating on the campuses from many mail depositories and take it to a central location for sorting. The mail is separated into three groups: (1) mail already bearing United States postage; (2) unstamped internal university mail; and (3) other unstamped mail. Group (1) is delivered to the Postal Service without further handling by appellant. Group (2) is monitored to ensure that it includes only official university mail. Group (3) is examined for any letters addressed to university destinations that come within an exception to the Private Express Statutes and can therefore be delivered by the appellant without postage. Appellant affixes United States postage to the remainder of mail in group (3) and delivers it to the Postal Service, then charges the senders for the costs involved. In late 1979, appellee William H. Wilson, president of appellee Local 371 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (Union), attempted to use appellant’s internal mail system to send unstamped letters from the Union to certain employees of appellant. The Union represented these employees and had filed a request for recognition of a bargaining unit. A subsequent unit determination, however, placed these employees in a different bargaining unit. Brief for Appellee Wilson 2, n. 2. Appellant refused to carry the letters in its internal mail system on the ground that the Private Express Statutes prohibited such carriage. Believing that this refusal violated a state law, the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA), Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§3560-3599 (West 1980), Wilson and the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with appellee California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), the state agency charged with interpretation and enforcement of HEERA. Before PERB, appellant argued that the carriage of the Union letters would violate the Private Express Statutes; it relied on an advisory opinion from the United States Postal Service to that effect. Advisory Op., PES No. 82-9 (July 2, 1982), App. to Juris. Statement A66. Wilson and the Union in turn argued that refusal to carry the letters violated HEERA’s requirement that employers grant unions access to their “means of communication.” PERB initially declined to consider the federal law issues pressed by appellant and held that HEERA required delivery of the letters. The California Court of Appeal agreed with PERB’s determination that denial of access violated HEERA, but noted that the HEERA right of access was expressly subject to “reasonable regulations.” 139 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1041, 189 Cal. Rptr. 298, 300-301 (1983). The court found an unresolved factual issue, namely, whether appellant’s denial of access was a “reasonable regulation” in light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the Private Express Statutes. It therefore remanded the case back to PERB for consideration of this issue. Id., at 1042, 189 Cal. Rptr., at 301. On remand, PERB found this HEERA requirement to be consistent with federal law because it determined that the carriage involved was within two different exceptions to the Private Express Statutes, namely the “letters-of-the-carrier” exception, 18 U. S. C. § 1694; 39 CFR § 310.3(b) (1987), and the “private-hands” exception, 18 U. S. C. § 1696(c); 39 CFR § 310.3(c) (1987). The California Court of Appeal affirmed. 182 Cal. App. 3d 71, 227 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1986). The court concluded that the “letters-of-the-carrier” exception permitted the delivery of the Union’s letters through appellant’s internal mail system. In light of this conclusion, the court declined to address the “private-hands” exception. Id., at 77, 227 Cal. Rptr., at 60. The California Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition for review. App. to Juris. Statement A-13. We noted probable jurisdiction, 483 U. S. 1004 (1987), and now reverse. II Congress enacted the Private Express Statutes pursuant to its constitutional authority to establish “Post Offices and post roads,” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 7. In general these statutes establish the United States Postal Service as a monopoly by prohibiting others from carrying letters over postal routes. A postal monopoly has prevailed in this country since the Articles of Confederation, see Act of Oct. 18, 1782, 23 J. Continental Cong. 672-673 (G. Hunt ed. 1914), and Congress embraced the concept in its first postal law, see Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 14, 1 Stat. 236. Because Congress desires “prompt, reliable, and efficient services to [postal] patrons in all areas,” 39 U. S. C. § 101(a) (emphasis added), it has enacted the Private Express Statutes and has provided for nationwide delivery of mail at uniform rates. There is no doubt that the general prohibition would apply to the carriage involved here, see 18 U. S. C. §§ 1693, 1694, so the central issue is whether such carriage is within one of the numerous exceptions to the Private Express Statutes. Appellees urge that both the “letters-of-the-carrier” and “private-hands” exceptions apply. We consider each in turn. A The letters-of-the-carrier exception is founded on the portion of 18 U. S. C. § 1694 italicized below: “Whoever . . . carries, otherwise than in the mail, any letters or packets, except such as relate . . .'to the current business of the carrier . . . shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be fined not more than $50.” (Emphasis added.) It is this exception that allows appellant to operate an internal mail system at all. To fall within the exception, the face of the statute requires that the letters “relate” to the “current business” of the carrier. Precisely what constitutes a carrier’s “current business” is not further described. The ordinary sweep of the term, however, falls far short of encompassing the letters involved in this case. The letters relate to the Union’s efforts to organize certain of appellant’s employees into a bargaining unit. This is a subject in which appellant certainly is interested, but it is also a subject which can be accurately described only as the Union’s current business, not appellant’s. It strains the statutory language to contend that the phrase “current business” includes such activity. Appellees argue that California has through HEERA made harmonious labor relations the business of its state universities, and thus in a sense the Union’s business is the university’s business. Cf. Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 3560(a) (West 1980) (“fundamental interest in the development of harmonious and cooperative labor relations”). To be sure, a State generally is free to define the nature of its institutions and the scope of their activities as it sees fit. But this principle must have some limits in this context for, otherwise, a State could define delivery of mail to all its citizens as the “current business” of some state agency and thereby defeat the postal monopoly. Appellees are urging far too expansive a reading of the statute. We rely on the normal meaning of the language chosen by Congress and conclude that the letters-of-the-carrier exception does not permit appellant to carry the Union’s letters. The legislative history confirms our reading of the statutory language, making clear that the exception is a narrow one. Congress added the letters-of-the-carrier exception to the Private Express Statutes in 1909. Until that time, the prohibition on private carriage was unqualified. The new exception responded to an Opinion of the Attorney General rendered in 1896. 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 394, 397-399. That opinion concerned a Postal Department regulation that allowed railroads to carry their own mail. The Attorney General said that the regulation was valid because two conditions were present. First, the letters were related to the carrier’s business. Second, the letters were “letters sent by or addressed to the carrying company, or on its behalf.” Id., at 400. The Attorney General concluded that without the second condition, the implied exception would be too broad. Congress generally approved of the Attorney General’s decision, but some Members found the exception difficult to square with the express, unqualified language of the statute. See 42 Cong. Rec. 1901-1905 (1908). Therefore a movement began to amend the statute to include the present exception for letters that relate to “the current business of the carrier.” Id., at 1976. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 184, 35 Stat. 1124. Senator Sutherland, the sponsor of the specific amendment, explained its intent: “I move that amendment because I think that it puts in express language precisely what the section means as it stands without it ... . I think the opinion of the Attorney-General . . . gives the correct construction to this section. The section is dealing with the carrying of mail for others. It is not dealing with the question of the carrying of the mail for the carrier itself.” 42 Cong. Rec. 1976 (1908). The House Report reflected a similar intent that the amendment put the statute “in exact conformity with the construction placed upon existing law.” 43 Cong. Rec. 3790 (1909) (referring to 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 394 (1896)). This history suggests an intention to codify the Attorney General’s construction. That construction includes a requirement that the letters be “sent by or addressed to the carrying company, or on its behalf,” to qualify for the letters-of-the-carrier exception. 21 Op. Atty. Gen., at 400. See also 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 418, 419 (1912) (“Congress has imposed two conditions upon the free transportation of letters outside the mail: First, that the letters should be the letters of the carrier itself; and second, that they should relate to its own current business”); 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 537 (1910). Our only previous decision concerning the letters-of-the-carrier exception, United States v. Erie R. Co., 235 U. S. 513 (1915), is consistent with a narrow view of the statutory language. Erie involved carriage by a railroad of letters concerning a joint venture between the railroad and a telegraph company. The Court simply held that the “business of the carrier” included the business of the joint enterprise. Erie therefore sheds no light on the proper construction of the statute in this quite different context. Moreover, the specific letters involved in Erie fall within our view of the proper scope of the statute. They were written by an employee of the railroad in his official capacity and addressed to other employees in their capacities as representatives of the railroad. Particularly in light of the clarifying legislative history, we conclude that the letters-of-the-carrier exception is far narrower than appellees would have it. Cf. Tanner v. United States, 483 U. S. 107, 125 (1987); Dixson v. United States, 465 U. S. 482, 491-496 (1984). Whether or not it can be read to include a requirement that the letters be written by or addressed to the carrier, a question we need not reach, it is at least limited to “business of the carrier” that is closer to the carrier’s own affairs than the letters involved here. The alleged “business” in this case is not close enough to appellant’s affairs to be the natural subject of letters concerning appellant’s “current business.” Accordingly, we hold that the letters-of-the-carrier exception does not permit appellant to carry the Union’s letters. B The private-hands exception derives from 18 U. S. C. § 1696(c): “This chapter shall not prohibit the conveyance or transmission of letters or packets by private hands without compensation.” From its inception, the monopoly granted the Postal Service had always been limited to the carriage of mail “for hire.” See Act of Oct. 18, 1782, 23 J. Continental Cong. 670, 672-673 (G. Hunt ed. 1914); Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 14, 1 Stat. 236. The private-hands exception is a reflection of the limited nature of the monopoly; it was designed to ensure that private carriage is not undertaken “for hire or reward.” Ibid. While the limited nature of the postal monopoly always implied that private, gratuitous carriage was excepted from the prohibitions of the Private Express Statutes, Congress made the exception express in 1845, at a time when it was greatly concerned with the dwindling revenues of the Postal Service. See S. Rep. No. 137, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 10 (1844); H. R. Rep. No. 477, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1844). To increase postal revenues, Congress lowered prices and limited franking privileges. Congress also sought to boost revenues by eliminating competition. Therefore, it strengthened the general prohibition on private carriage, intending to “put an end to all interference with the revenues of the department” from that source. S. Rep. No. 137, supra, at 10. Against this backdrop, Congress developed a narrow exception for carriage by “private hands,” crafting the exception in such a way as to permit only gratuitous carriage undertaken out of friendship, not pursuant to a business relationship. H. R. Rep. No. 477, supra, at 4 (“Penalties are provided . . . with exceptions in favor of the party . . . who conveys the letter out of neighborly kindness, without fee or reward”). Congress used unambiguous language to accomplish its goals. Persons or entities other than the United States Postal Service — i. e., “private hands” — may carry letters without violating the Private Express Statutes only so long as they do not receive any form of benefit from the sender— i. e., “without compensation.” While the pivotal term, “compensation,” is not further defined, Congress in no way qualified its reach. We therefore give effect to congressional intent by giving the language its normal meaning. A dictionary from the period during which the private-hands exception was enacted illustrates the general nature of the term; it defines compensation to include “that which supplies the place of something else” and “that which is given or received as an equivalent for services, debt, want, loss, or suffering.” N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 235 (C. Goodrich ed. 1849). Accordingly, we hold that the private-hands exception is available only when there is no compensation of any kind flowing from the sender to the carrier. A business relationship between the two parties may render the exception unavailable, because acts undertaken in the course of such a relationship may involve an exchange of benefits or a quid pro quo. Congress understood this point. Early in the debates on the 1909 amendments to the Private Express Statutes, which added the letters-of-the-carrier exception, Senator Sutherland expressed concern that adding such an exception would permit railroads to agree to carry mail for each other. He was concerned that by undertaking such carriage pursuant to “some common understanding,” the railroads “would not be carrying for compensation.” Senator McLaurin, one of the supporters of amendment, responded: “[A]n arrangement of that kind . . . would itself be for compensation. It would be a quid pro quo and it would violate the law.” Senator Sutherland evidently accepted this view for, as noted above, he sponsored the actual amendment that became the letters-of-the-carrier exception. The construction Congress placed on the private-hands exception is perhaps best summarized through Senator McLaurin’s statement that an exception for carriage without compensation was intended solely to permit “an innocent man ... to do a favor to some[one].” 42 Cong. Rec. 1905 (1908). A business relationship ordinarily converts such “favors” at the very least into implicit attempts to further the business relationship. The private-hands exception consistently has been interpreted as not authorizing carriage pursuant to a business relationship. Thus, “compensation” has been read to encompass the nonmonetary consideration that is implicit in a business relationship. United States v. Thompson, 28 F. Cas. 97 (No. 16,489) (DC Mass. 1846). Thompson involved the prosecution of the proprietor of a delivery service for carrying letters along with other merchandise. The defendant argued that he carried letters only in connection with delivery of other merchandise and that he received no additional compensation for carrying the letters with the merchandise. In essence, the defendant contended that he carried the letters only as a gesture of good will. The court rejected this argument, holding that the statute did not permit the carriage of letters “as a part of his business of a merchandise express, although no charge was made for letters as such. ” Id., at 98. The Attorney General took a similar view of the exception’s scope when he opined that railroads could not agree to carry each other’s mail, because the “express or implied obligation of railroads to carry letters for each other . . . would amount to ‘compensation’ within the meaning of the statute.” 21 Op. Atty. Gen., at 401. Applying this well-established construction to the situation at hand, we conclude that appellant’s carriage of the Union’s letters would not be “without compensation.” Appellees initially argue that there would be no compensation because the Union would not pay appellant specifically to carry the letters. This obviously gives far too restrictive a reading to the term “compensation.” That term includes indirect as well as direct compensation. If we read the exception to include any private carriage so long as no direct payment is made, it quickly would swallow the rule; senders and carriers could manipulate their relationships to avoid direct compensation and thereby evade the Private Express Statutes. Appellees also argue that compensation would be lacking because appellant merely would perform a mandatory duty imposed by state law. This lack of legal consideration, appellees argue, demonstrates that the carriage is not part of any business relationship. As a matter of general contract law, it may be true that performance of a legal duty cannot constitute legal consideration. Common-law notions of consideration, however, do not control the interpretation of this statute. Congress, after all, used the generic term “compensation,” which can include less direct exchanges of benefits. Here there is an arm’s-length business relationship between the Union and the employees on the one side and appellant on the other. By delivering the Union’s letters, appellant would perform a service for its employees that they would otherwise pay for themselves, through their union dues. This service would become part of the package of monetary and nonmonetary benefits that appellant provides to its employees in exchange for their services. In our view, carriage of the Union’s letters pursuant to such an exchange of benefits necessarily means that the carriage is not “without compensation.” Accordingly, it does not fall within the private-hands exception. C The parties and the United States as amicus curiae have focused their arguments largely on Postal Service regulations construing the letters-of-the-carrier and the private-hands exceptions. With respect to the letters-of-the-carrier exception, the Postal Service has consistently read the'statute to require that the letters be written by or addressed to the carrier. Even before the Service issued formal regulations, it espoused this view in periodic pamphlets it published describing the reach of the Private Express Statutes. See, e. g., United States Post Office Dept., Restrictions on Transportation of Letters 16-17 (4th ed. 1952). When it issued formal regulations, the Postal Service included the requirement that the letters be the carrier’s own: “The sending or carrying of letters is permissible if they are sent by or addressed to the person carrying them. If the individual actually carrying the letters is not the person sending the letters or to whom the letters are addressed, then such individual must be an officer or employee of such person (see [39 CFR] § 310.3(b)(2)) and the letters must relate to the current business of such person.” 39 CFR § 310.3(b) (1987). The Postal Service’s regulations also read “compensation” for purposes of the private-hands exception in a way consistent with our evaluation of the term. They describe the exception’s scope as follows: “The sending or carrying of letters without compensation is permitted. Compensation generally consists of a monetary payment for services rendered. Compensation may also consist, however, of non-monetary valuable consideration and of good will. Thus, for example, when a business relationship exists or is sought between the carrier and its user, carriage by the carrier of the user’s letter will ordinarily not fall under this exception.” § 310.3(c). Appellant and the United States have urged us to defer to these agency constructions of the statute. While they reach a different conclusion as to the proper application, appellees specifically indicated at oral argument that they were not challenging the validity of the regulations. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. Because we have been able to ascertain Congress’ clear intent based on our analysis of the statutes and their legislative history, we need not address the issue of deference to the agency. Ill The California Court of Appeal incorrectly concluded that the carriage of letters involved in this case was within an exception to the Private Express Statutes. Properly construed, neither of the statutory exceptions proffered by appellees —the letters-of-the-carrier exception and the private-hands exception — permits appellant to carry the Union’s letters in its internal mail system. Accordingly, the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is Reversed. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. - The Postal Service is authorized to suspend the operation of the Private Express Statutes when required by the “public interest,” 39 U. S. C. § 601(b). In this case, PERB also found that the Postal Service’s “suspension” for letters of “bona fide student or faculty organizations,” 39 CFR § 320.4 (1987), applied to the letters involved here and therefore permitted their carriage by appellant. The California Court of Appeal did not address this ground and PERB has expressly declined to press it before this Court. Brief for Appellee PERB 16, n. 9. Accordingly, we do not consider the applicability of the suspension. Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 611-612, n. 5, this qualified statement obviously does not purport to render the private-hands exception automatically inapplicable whenever a business relationship exists. Rather, it simply indicates that a business relationship ordinarily suggests that the carriage is not without compensation. Cf. 39 CFR § 310.3(e) (1987).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF WICHITA v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KIOWA COUNTY, KANSAS, et al. No. 25. Argued October 16, 1961. Decided December 11, 1961. J. William Doolittle argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, I. Henry Kutz, Paul 0. Ritter, William G. Plested, Jr. and Edward H. Jamison. Robert C. Londerholm, Special Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were William M. Ferguson, Attorney General, and A. K. Stavely, Assistant Attorney General. MR. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. A political subdivision of a State has levied a personal property tax on a federal instrumentality despite a claim of immunity by virtue of a federal statute. Petitioner, the Federal Land Bank of Wichita, acquired a mortgage on realty in Kiowa County, Kansas, in the course of its business as a federal instrumentality duly organized under the Federal Farm Loan Act. Upon default, foreclosure, purchase at a sheriff’s sale, and confirmation, petitioner became the owner of the land. Subsequently the land was conveyed to a third party, the deed reserving an undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate. By the time of this conveyance petitioner had recovered the entire loss occasioned by the default on the mortgage. Petitioner executed an oil and gas lease on the reserved mineral estate, and the discovery of a gas pool in the area ultimately led to the payment of royalties. A Kansas statute declared that oil and gas leases and the royalties derived therefrom were personal property and were subject to taxation by the counties. Pursuant to this statute, Kiowa County levied a personal property tax on petitioner’s interest in the oil and gas lease and on the royalties for the year 1967. By the time the tax was levied, petitioner had owned the mineral estate some 14 years. The statute which authorized federal land banks to acquire mortgaged lands limited the period of ownership to five years unless special permission could be obtained from the Farm Credit Administration. That agency had promulgated a regulation granting blanket permission to all land banks to hold mineral rights longer than five years. Petitioner sought an injunction against collection of the personal property tax in the state court, claiming an exemption under 12 U. S. C. § 931, which provides, in part, that federal land banks “shall be exempt from . . . State, municipal, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate held . . . under the provisions of [section] . . . 781.” The injunction was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed, holding that Congress did not intend § 931 to exempt this personal property from taxation because the mineral estate was being held longer than the express time limit established by Congress and because the holding of the mineral estate after the loss had been recouped did not serve the governmental function assigned to the Federal Land Bank. The Court also held that no immunity could be implied. Certiorari was granted in order to determine whether the State had exacted a tax forbidden by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 365 U. S. 841. The Supreme Court of Kansas correctly concedes that a federal instrumentality is not subject to the plenary power of the States to tax, that the Congress has the power to determine, within the limits of the Constitution, the extent that its instrumentalities shall enjoy immunity from state taxation, that the federal land bank is a constitutionally created federal instrumentality, and that Congress has immunized it from personal property taxes on activities in furtherance of its lending functions. The controversy arises over the holding by the Supreme Court of Kansas on alternative grounds that Congress did not intend § 931 to apply to oil and gas leases in the circumstances of this case. I. The Court found that the retention of the mineral estate by the petitioner after the loss incurred upon the default on the mortgage had been recovered did not serve the governmental function assigned to the land bank and, as Congress intended immunity to apply only to protect this function, § 931 did not apply here. The Court did not define the type of function that petitioner did perform. Legitimate activities of governments are sometimes classified as "governmental” or “proprietary”; however, our decisions have made it clear that the Federal Government performs no “proprietary” functions. If the enabling Act is constitutional and if the instrumentality’s activity is within the authority granted by the Act, a governmental function is being performed. Since the Act establishing the federal land banks has been held to be constitutional, Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255 U. S. 180, we need only to determine whether the challenged ownership comes within the purview of the statute. The purpose of the Federal Farm Loan Act and its subsequent amendments was to provide loans for agricultural purposes at the lowest possible interest rates. One method of keeping the interest rate low was to authorize the federal land bank to make a profit to be distributed to the shareholders in the form of dividends. Because the associations of farmer-borrowers were required by law to be shareholders, the distribution of dividends effectively reduced the interest rates. This profit could be earned in two ways: interest from the loans on mortgaged lands and gains on the sale of lands acquired under the provisions of § 781 Fourth. The Kansas Court construes § 781 Fourth (b) to grant the limited power to sell land acquired in satisfaction of a debt only to recoup the loss incurred upon the default. We find no such limitation expressed or implied. The loans on the mortgages are limited to a percentage of the current value of the lands that is considerably less than full value, but there is no limit on the amount of the sale price. The banks are therefore authorized to sell lands acquired after default at the best possible price, absorbing the losses in the reserve accounts and distributing the profits in dividends. It follows that the land banks are not restricted to a sale price merely sufficient to recoup any losses. The retention of a mineral interest might well be a method of increasing the recovery from lands acquired through mortgage defaults. Consequently, we find that the holding of the mineral estate involved here is in furtherance of the bank’s governmental function. II. The alternative ground relied upon by the Supreme Court of Kansas for concluding that Congress did not intend to confer immunity here relates to the asserted illegality of petitioner’s ownership of the mineral estate. Section 781 Fourth (b) limits the time that a federal land bank may own realty acquired after default on the mortgage to five years unless special permission can be obtained from the Farm Credit Administration. Mineral estates are realty under the state law, and at the time of the tax levy petitioner had owned the mineral estate longer than five years, relying upon the following regulation promulgated by the Farm Credit Administration to supply the requisite special permission: “Holding mineral rights for more than 5 years. In cases where, in connection with a sale of bank-owned real estate, the bank has retained royalty or other rights in or to minerals, and desires to hold such rights for a period in excess of 5 years, it is not considered that the bank has both ‘title and possession’ of real estate within the meaning of section 13 Fourth (b) of the Federal Farm Loan Act (12 U. S. C. 781 Fourth (b)). However, retention of such minerals and mineral rights for periods in excess of 5 years, when in the bank’s opinion it is in the bank’s interest to do so, has the approval of the Administration.” Although the reasons are not altogether clear, the Court found this special permission invalid, concluding that petitioner is, therefore, owning the land without authority. First, the Court found “much to be said” for the trial court’s holding that the regulation was not effective because the Farm Credit Administration could not delegate the power to determine when mineral interests might be retained longer than five years to the federal land banks, so that no “special permission” had been given. Assuming that this is a holding by the highest state court, we are of the opinion that no delegation problem has been presented. Analytically, the power given to the Farm Credit Administration by § 781 Fourth (b) is a licensing power, not a rule-making, an adjudicating, or an investigating power. The regulation states that federal land banks have permission to retain mineral interests longer than five years. This is an exercise of the power to license, not a delegation of it. The second ground for invalidating the permission given by the Farm Credit Administration was that permission could not be given unless the holding of the land was necessary to recoup the loss on the defaulted mortgage. As we have indicated, the holding of a mineral estate after the bank has recouped its loss is within the authority granted by Congress, and thus the Administration had the power to grant this permission. While the court below did challenge the power of the Farm Credit Administration to give the permission required by §781 Fourth (b), it did not challenge the interpretation placed on that statute when blanket permission was given. The Administration interpreted § 781 Fourth (b) to exclude mineral estates. We, therefore, are not required to review that interpretation or to examine the jurisdiction, if any, of a state court to review the statutory construction made by a federal administrative agency in a collateral attack on the issuance of a license. While it is not necessary to this decision, it is at least of interest that there have been efforts in successive sessions of Congress to amend the Act to accomplish the result achieved by the Supreme Court of Kansas and that these efforts have failed. The extent of the mineral estates owned by federal land banks is considerable: petitioner owns an interest in approximately 283,000 acres; all land banks own an interest in 9,900,000 acres. III. Since there are no infirmities in the holding of the mineral estate by the petitioner, there is no basis for implying that Congress did not intend § 931 to provide immunity in this case. As an express immunity has been conferred, there is no need to consider whether the doctrine of implied immunity applies. We conclude that the state personal property tax imposed on petitioner’s oil and gas lease and upon the royalties derived therefrom must fall as being unconstitutional by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. The Act of July 17, 1916, 39 Stat. 360, as amended, currently codified at 12 U. S. C. § 641 et seq. General Statutes of Kansas, 1949, §§ 79-329 to 79-334. Section 79-329 reads as follows: “Oil and gas property as personalty. That for the purpose of valuation and taxation, all oil and gas leases and all oil and gas wells, producing or capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities, together with all easing, tubing or other material therein, and all other equipment and material used in operating the oil or gas wells are hereby declared to be personal property and shall be assessed and taxed as such.” “Fourth. Acquiring and disposing of property. — To acquire and dispose of— “ (a) Such property, real or personal, as may be necessary or convenient for the transaction of its business, which, however, may be in part leased to others for revenue purposes. “(b) Parcels of land acquired in satisfaction of debts or purchased at sales under judgments, decrees, or mortgages held by it. But no such bank shall hold title and possession of any real estate purchased or acquired to secure any debt due to it, for a longer period than five years, except with the special approval of the Farm Credit Administration in writing.” 12 U. S. C. § 781 Fourth, 39 Stat. 372, § 13. 6 CFR § 10.64. See text p. 153, infra. “Every Federal land bank . . . including the capital and reserve or surplus therein and the income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate held, purchased, or taken by said bank . . . under the provisions of [section] . . . 781 of this title. . . .” See note 3, supra. 187 Kan. 148, 354 P. 2d 679. Article VI, cl. 2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U. S. 232; Cleveland v. United States, 323 U. S. 329; Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank, 318 U. S. 357; Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95; Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21; Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466; Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103; First National Bank v. Adams, 258 U. S. 362; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664. Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255 U. S. 180. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95. See also Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374. Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229. Oil and gas leases are personal property under the law of Kansas, a characterization accepted by the Court and all parties below. We do not need to consider the situation when oil and gas leases are characterized as real property under state law. See, e. g., Stokely v. State, 149 Miss. 435, 115 So. 563; Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N. M. 564, 203 P. 539; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290. Other jurisdictions classify oil and gas leases as profits á prendre or incorporeal interests. See generally 1A Summers, Oil & Gas, §§ 151-170. Cf. Concepts of the nature of mineral interests discussed in footnote 21, infra. These general terms serve as a basis for determining, inter alia, whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects a municipality from liability for a tort committed by one of its servants, see, e. g., Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S. W. 2d 39 (Mo.); Clark v. Scheld, 253 N. C. 732, 117 S. E. 2d 838; Osborn v. City of Akron, 171 Ohio St. 361, 171 N. E. 2d 492; Wade v. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 374, 353 P. 2d 914; Francke v. City of West Bend, 12 Wis. 2d 574, 107 N. W. 2d 500; 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §§ 53.01, 53.23, 53.24 (3d ed. 1950). But cf. New Fork v. United States, 326 U. S. 572. “The argument that the lending functions of the federal land banks are proprietary rather than governmental misconceives the nature of the federal government with respect to every function which it performs. The federal government is one of delegated powers, and from that it necessarily follows that any constitutional exercise of its delegated powers is governmental. ... It also follows that, when Congress constitutionally creates a corporation through which the federal government lawfully acts, the activities of such corporation are governmental [citing cases].” Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 102. See Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 32; Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 477. S. Rep. No. 144, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2, 4, 7-9; H. R. Rep. No. 630, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5; H. Doc. No. 494, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 8; 53 Cong. Rec. 6696, 7021, 7023, 7024. Nothing in the subsequent amendments has been called to our attention which modifies this purpose. See Faulkner, American Economic History, 388-390 (6th ed. 1949); Bogart and Kemmerer, Economic History of the American People, 698 (1944). Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 233. The Act of July 17, 1916, 39 Stat. 360, §23, now 12 U. S. C. §901 et seq.; S. Rep. No. 144, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 5. H. R. Rep. No. 630, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 10. Persons engaged in agriculture are the only class authorized to borrow from the federal land banks. To obtain a loan, application is made for membership in an association comprised solely of other borrowers. The prospective borrower is required to subscribe to stock in the association in proportion to the loan he desires to obtain. The association approaches the federal land bank, obtains the loan, and subscribes to stock in the federal land bank in proportion to the loan. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 721, 733. Cf. 12 U. S. C. § 723. See note 3, supra. 12 U. S. C. § 901. We take this statement from the opinion below. We note that petitioner has paid real estate taxes on the mineral estate. Mineral interests receive varying characterizations among the States. Some jurisdictions recognize a . horizontal severance of the freehold into surface and mineral estates; others treat the mineral interests as incorporeal hereditaments. Compare Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, with Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 166, 254 S. W. 290, 291. Cf. Wilson v. Holm, 164 Kan. 229, 188 P. 2d 899. See Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw. L. J. 1; Walker, Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 Tex. L. Rev. 125. 6 CFR § 10.64. “The word ‘license,’ means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the license.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 213-214; see, e. g., Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 240; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Olympian Dredging Co., 260 U. S. 205; Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp. v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 353 U. S. 436; Administrative Procedure Act, § 2 (e), 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (e). 6 CFR § 10.64 quoted in text at p. 153, supra. See, e. g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140; Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153; Administrative Procedure Act, § 10 (e), 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (e); see also, e. g, Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: “The High Road,” 35 Tex. L. Rev. 63; ibid., “The Low Road,” 38 Tex. L. Rev. 392, 572; Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470. See H. R. 9290, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.; H. R. 667, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 583, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. See also H. R. 1721 and H. R. 2358, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 1264, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 2904, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., and H. R. 428, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 75, H. R. 102 and H. R. 1313, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 538, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. Petition for writ of certiorari, pp. 8, 9.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL v. THOMAS et al. No. 05-552. Decided April 17, 2006 Per Curiam. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Attorney General to grant an alien asylum if the alien cannot return to another country because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” § 101(a)(42)(A), as added, §201, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The respondents, Michelle Thomas and her immediate family, applied for asylum. They checked boxes on the application form that indicated their claim rested upon fear of persecution in their native South Africa because of (1) their “political opinion[s],” and (2) their “membership in a particular social group.” In proceedings before the Immigration Judge, they emphasized their fear of persecution because of their race (they are white) and their kinship with Michelle’s father-in-law, “Boss Ronnie,” a white South African who allegedly held racist views and mistreated black workers at the company at which he was a foreman. The Immigration Judge, focusing upon questions of race and political views, rejected their claim. And the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), responding to the Thomases’ primarily race-related arguments, summarily affirmed that decision. On review, a Ninth Circuit panel held by a 2-to-l vote that the BIA had not adequately considered the Thomases’ claim of persecution because of “membership in a particular social group, as relatives of Boss Ronnie.” Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F. 3d 1169, 1177 (2004). The Ninth Circuit took the matter en banc. The en banc court, overruling what it considered aberrant contrary Circuit precedent, unanimously held that in principle “a family may constitute a social group for the purposes of the refugee statutes.” 409 F. 3d 1177, 1187 (2005) (emphasis added) (overruling, inter alia, Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F. 2d 916 (CA9 1991)). In so doing, the court relied on earlier BIA opinions holding that certain “kinship ties” fall within the statutory term. See 409 F. 3d, at 1180, 1184-1186. The court then went on to hold, over the dissent of four judges, that the particular family at issue, namely “ ‘persons related to Boss Ronnie/ ” fell within the scope of the statutory term “particular social group” and that the “Thomases were attacked and threatened because they belong to the particular social group of ‘persons related to Boss Ronnie’ . . . Id., at 1189. The dissenting judges argued that the question “whether the Thomases are a ‘particular social group’ ” should first be considered by the relevant administrative agency. Id., at 1193 (opinion of Rymer, J.) (emphasis in original). And they said that the majority’s contrary decision was inconsistent with this Court’s holding in INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U. S. 12, 18 (2002) (per curiam). The Solicitor General now asks us to grant certiorari to consider whether the Ninth Circuit “erred in holding, in the first instance and without prior resolution of the questions by the” relevant administrative agency, “that members of a family can and do constitute a ‘particular social group,’ within the meaning of” the Act.. Pet. for Cert. I. He argues that a court’s role in an immigration case is typically one of “‘review, not of first view.’” Id., at 29 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005)). He adds that the decision clearly violates what this Court described in Ventura as the “‘ordinary “remand” rule.’” Pet. for Cert. 15 (quoting Ventura, supra, at 18). And he concludes that “the Ninth Circuit’s error is so obvious in light of Ventura that summary reversal would be appropriate.” Pet. for Cert. 29. We agree with the Solicitor General. The Ninth Circuit’s failure to remand is legally erroneous, and that error is “obvious in light of Ventura,” itself a summary reversal. The alien in Ventura sought asylum on grounds of a reasonable fear of “persecution” in Guatemala “‘on account of... [a] political opinion.’ ” 537 U. S., at 13. The BIA held that the alien did not qualify for asylum because whatever persecution he faced when he left Guatemala in 1993 was not on account of a “ ‘political opinion.’ ” Ibid. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the record showed that in 1993 the alien did indeed face politically based persecution in Guatemala. The Circuit then went on to consider the Government’s alternative argument — that, in any event, conditions within Guatemala had improved to the point that political persecution was no longer likely. Ibid. And the Circuit rejected this “‘changed circumstances’” claim without first giving the agency an opportunity to consider the matter. Id., at 14. We reversed the Ninth Circuit summarily. We pointed out that “[wjithin broad limits the law entrusts the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility decision.” Id., at 16. “In such circumstances,” we added, a “‘judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.’” Ibid. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943)). “A court of appeals ‘is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.’” Ventura, supra, at 16 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 744 (1985)). “Rather, ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.’” Ventura, supra, at 16 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., supra, at 744; citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947)). Applying these “basic legal principles,” we concluded that “every consideration that classically supports the law’s ordinary remand requirement does so here.” Ventura, 537 U. S., at 16, 17. We must reach the same conclusion in the present case. The agency has not yet considered whether Boss Ronnie’s family presents the kind of “kinship ties” that constitute a “particular social group.” The matter requires determining the facts and deciding whether the facts as found fall within a statutory term. And as we said in Ventura: “The agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.” Id., at 17. We can find no special circumstance here that might have justified the Ninth Circuit’s determination of the matter in the first instance. Thus, as in Ventura, the Court of Appeals should have applied the “ordinary ‘remand’ rule.” Id., at 18. We grant the petition for certiorari. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 6 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE v. GREGORY No. 00-758. Argued October 9, 2001 Decided November 13, 2001 O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 11. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 14. Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, former Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, David M. Cohen, Todd M. Hughes, David B. Stinson, Mary Anne Gibbons, Lori J. Dym, and Stephan J. Boardman. Henk Brands argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, by Mark D. Roth and Charles A Hobbie; for the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, by Keith E. Secular; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Edward H. Passman and Paula A Brantner; and for the National Treasury Employees Union by Gregory O’Duden, Barbara A. Atkin, and Kerry L. Adams. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 allows eligible employees to appeal termination and other serious disciplinary actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 5 U. S. C. §§7512-7513. The Federal Circuit ruled that, when assessing the reasonableness of these actions, the Board may not consider prior disciplinary actions that are pending in collectively bargained grievance proceedings. 212 F. 3d 1296, 1298 (2000). Because the Board has broad discretion in determining how to review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal Circuit’s rule, we now vacate and remand for further proceedings. I Respondent Maria Gregory worked for petitioner United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes, and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-15. On April 7,1997, respondent left work early to take her daughter to the doctor, ignoring her supervisor’s instructions to sort the mail for her route before leaving. She received a letter of warning for insubordination. App. 47-48. Respondent filed a grievance under the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement between her union and her employer, see generally 1998-2001 Agreement Between National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO and U. S. Postal Service, Art. 15. App. 43. Later that same month respondent was cited for delaying the mail, after mail from another route was found in her truck at the end of the day. Id., at 45-46. The Postal Service suspended her for seven days, and respondent filed a second grievance. Id., at 41-42. In August 1997, respondent was again disciplined for various violations, including failing to deliver certified mail and attempting to receive unauthorized or unnecessary overtime. Id., at 38-40. She received a 14-day suspension, and again filed a grievance. While these three disciplinary actions were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, respondent was disciplined one final time. On September 13, 1997, respondent filed a form requesting assistance in completing her route or, alternatively, SVfe hours of overtime. Considering this request excessive, respondent’s supervisor accompanied her on her route and determined that she had overestimated the necessary overtime by more than an hour. Id., at 31-33. In light of this violation and respondent’s previous violations, her supervisor recommended that she be removed from her employment at the Postal Service. Ibid. On November 17, 1997, the Postal Service ordered respondent’s termination effective nine days later. Id., at 24-29. Because respondent previously served in the Army, she falls into the category of “preference eligible” Postal Service employees covered by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). 5 U. S. C. §7511(a)(l)(B)(ii). The CSRA provides covered employees the opportunity to appeal removals and other serious disciplinary actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). §§7512-7513. Under the CSRA, respondent could appeal her termination to the Board or seek relief , through the negotiated grievance procedure, but could not do both. § 7121(e)(1). Respondent chose to appeal to the Board. When an employing agency’s disciplinary action is challenged before the Board, the agency bears the burden of proving its charge by a preponderance of the evidence. § 7701(c)(1)(B). Under the Board’s settled procedures, this requires proving not only that the misconduct actually occurred, but also that the penalty assessed was reasonable in relation to it. Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M. S. P. B. 313, 333-334 (1981). Following these guidelines, a Board Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld respondent’s termination, concluding that the Postal Service had shown that respondent overestimated her overtime beyond permissible limits on September 13, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-29, and that her termination was reasonable in light of this violation and her prior violations. Id., at A-36 to A-40. Although the three prior disciplinary actions were the subject of pending grievances, the ALJ analyzed them independently, following the approach set forth in Bolling v. Department of Air Force, 8 M. S. P. B. 658 (1981). Bolling provides for de novo review of prior disciplinary actions unless: “(1) [the employee] was informed of the action in writing; (2) the action is a matter of record; and (3) [the employee] was given the opportunity to dispute the charges to a higher level than the authority that imposed the discipline.” Id., at 660-661. If these conditions are met, Board review of prior disciplinary action is limited to determining whether the action is clearly erroneous. Id., at 660. After finding that respondent’s three prior disciplinary actions met Bolling’s three conditions, the ALJ concluded that there was no clear evidence of error. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-37. Respondent petitioned the Board for review of the ALJ’s decision. While this appeal was pending, an arbitrator resolved respondent’s first grievance (relating to the April 7 incident) in her favor, and ordered that the letter of warning be expunged. App. 3-16. Respondent did not advise the Board of that ruling. The Board then denied her request for' review of the ALJ’s determination. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-9 to A-10. Respondent petitioned for review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5 U. S. C. § 7703(a). That court affirmed the Board’s decision to uphold the ALJ’s factual findings with respect to the September 13 incident. 212 F. 3d, at 1299. Taking judicial notice of the fact that one of the three disciplinary actions underlying respondent’s termination had been overturned in arbitration, and noting that respondent’s two remaining grievances were still pending, it reversed the Board’s determination that the penalty was reasonable. Ibid. While recognizing that disciplinary history is an “important factor” in assessing any penalty, id., at 1300, the Federal Circuit held that “prior disciplinary actions that are subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support” a penalty’s reasonableness, id., at 1298. It therefore vacated the Board’s decision in part and remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 1300. We granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 1143 (2001). II The Federal Circuit’s statutory review of the substance of Board decisions is limited to determining whether they are unsupported by substantial evidence or are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. § 7703(c). Like its counterpart in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2), the arbitrary and capricious standard is extremely narrow, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971), and allows the Board wide latitude in fulfilling its obligation to review agency disciplinary actions. It is not for the Federal Circuit to substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). The role of judicial review is only to ascertain if the Board has met the minimum standards set forth in the statute. We conclude that the Board need not adopt the Federal Circuit’s rule in order to meet these standards. The Postal Service argues that the Board’s independent review of prior disciplinary actions is sufficient to meet its statutory obligations. The adequacy of the Board’s particular review mechanism — Bolling review, see Bolling v. Department of Air Force, supra—is not before us. The Federal Circuit said nothing about Bolling, instead adopting a sweeping rule that the Board may never rely on prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing grievance procedures, regardless of the sort of independent review the Board provides. Respondent likewise asks this Court only to uphold the Federal Circuit’s rule forbidding independent Board review. She does not seek a ruling requiring a different Board review mechanism, nor did she do so before the Federal Circuit. Her brief in that court mentioned neither Bolling nor its standard, arguing only that the Board should hold off its review altogether pending the outcome of collectively bargained grievance proceedings. Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-3123 (CA Fed.), p. 2. Moreover, even if the adequacy of Bolling review were before us, we lack sufficient briefing on its specific functioning in this case. We thus consider only whether the Board may permissibly review prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing grievance procedures independently, not whether the particular way in which it does so meets the statutory standard. There is certainly nothing arbitrary about the Board’s decision to independently review prior disciplinary violations. Neither the Federal Circuit nor respondent has suggested that the Board has applied this policy inconsistently — indeed, the Board has taken this same approach for 19 years. See Carr v. Department of Air Force, 9 M. S. P. B. 714 (1982). Nor have they argued that the Board lacks reasons for its approach. Following the Federal Circuit’s rule would require the Board either to wait until challenges to disciplinary actions pending in grievance proceedings are completed before rendering its decision, or to ignore altogether the violations being challenged in grievance in determining the reasonableness of the penalty. The former may cause undue delay. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 6-7. The latter would, in many cases, effectively preclude agencies from relying on an employee’s disciplinary history, which the Federal Circuit itself acknowledged to be an “important factor” in any disciplinary decision. 212 F. 3d, at 1300. Nor is independent review by the Board contrary to any law. The Federal Circuit cited no provision of the CSRA or any other statute to justify its new rule. Id., at 1299-1300. At oral argument in this Court, respondent’s counsel pointed to the Federal Circuit’s statement that, if pending grievances were later overturned in arbitration, “the foundation of the Board’s Douglas analysis would be compromised.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; 212 F. 3d, at 1300 (citing Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M. S. P. B. 313 (1981)). The Board’s Douglas decision set out a general framework for reviewing agency disciplinary actions. Because Douglas at one point specifically discussed 5 U. S. C. § 7701(c)(1)(B), the CSRA provision placing the burden of proof on the employing agency to justify its disciplinary action, counsel claimed, the Federal Circuit must have thought the Board’s policy violates that section. Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. We do not read the Federal Circuit’s citation of Douglas as an implicit reference to § 7701(c)(1)(B), particularly given that the Federal Circuit’s opinion nowhere mentions that section’s standard. Rather, we interpret the Federal Circuit’s reference to Douglas as a way of describing the entire process of Board review of disciplinary actions. More importantly, any suggestion that the Board’s decision to independently review prior disciplinary actions violates § 7701(c)(l)(B)’s preponderance of the evidence standard would be incorrect. To the extent that that standard places the burden upon employing agencies to justify all of the violations — including those dealt with in prior disciplinary actions — that are the'basis for the penalty, the Board has its own mechanism for allowing agencies to meet that burden. Insofar as Bolling review is adequate to meet this burden of proof, an employing agency may meet its statutory burden to justify prior actions by prevailing either in grievance or before the Board. Amicus National Treasury' Employees Union (NTEU) argues that independent Board review of prior disciplinary actions pending in grievance violates the CSRA’s general statutory scheme. Brief for National Treasury Employees Union as Amicus Curiae 8-12. Employees covered by the CSRA may elect Board review only for disciplinary actions of a certain seriousness, such as termination, suspension for more than 14 days, or a reduction in grade or pay. 5 U. S. C. §§7512-7513. For more minor actions, workers may only seek review through negotiated grievance procedures, if they exist. §7121. According to NTEU, this scheme deprives the Board of the statutory authority to review minor disciplinary actions like the three that were pending in this case. It is true that the CSRA contemplates that at least some eligible employees (those represented by unions) will have two different forums for challenging disciplinary actions, depending in part on their seriousness. If the Board had attempted to review respondent’s first disciplinary action before she was terminated, it would have exceeded its statutory authority. In this case, however, the Board was asked to review respondent’s termination, something it clearly has authority to do. §§7512-7513. Because this termination was based on a series of disciplinary actions, some of which are minor, the Board’s authority to review the termination must also include the authority to review each of the prior disciplinary actions to establish the reasonableness of the penalty as a whole. Independent Board review of disciplinary actions pending in grievance proceedings may at times result in the Board reaching a different conclusion than the arbitrator. It may also result in a terminated employee never reaching a resolution of her grievance at all, because some collective bargaining agreements require unions to withdraw grievances when an employee’s termination becomes final before the Board. Brief for Respondent 10-11, 37; Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. Rather than being inconsistent with the statutory scheme, however, these possibilities are the result of the parallel structures of review set forth in the CSRA. Such results are not necessarily unfair. Any employee who appeals a disciplinary action to the Board receives independent Board review. If the Board’s mechanism for reviewing prior disciplinary actions is itself adequate, the review such an employee receives is fair. Although the fairness of the Board’s oWn procedure is not before us, we note that a presumption of regularity attaches to the actions of Government agencies, United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 14—15 (1926), and that some deference to agency disciplinary actions is appropriate. II Although the Board independently reviews prior disciplinary actions pending in grievance, it also has a policy of not relying upon disciplinary actions that have already been overturned in grievance proceedings at the time of Board review. See Jones v. Department of Air Force, 24 MSPR 429, 431 (1984). As one of respondent’s disciplinary actions was overturned in arbitration before the Board rendered its decision, the Postal Service concedes that a remand to the Federal Circuit is necessary to determine the effect of this reversal on respondent’s termination. Reply Brief for Petitioner 15-16. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 73 ]	sc_adminaction
NORTH DAKOTA STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY v. SNYDER’S DRUG STORES, INC. No. 72-1176. Argued November 6, 1973 Decided December 5, 1973 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. A. William Lucas argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Mart R. Vogel argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Arthur B. Hanson, Ralph N. Albright, Jr., and Sidney Waller filed a brief for the American Pharmaceutical Assn, et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Thomas D. Quinn, Jr., and Harold Rosenwald filed a brief for the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the • Court. North Dakota passed a statute that requires that the applicant for a permit to operate a pharmacy be “a registered pharmacist in good standing” or “a corporation or association, the majority stock in which is' owned by registered pharmacists in good standing, actively and regularly employed in and responsible for the management, supervision, and operation of such pharmacy.” Petitioner Board denied a permit to Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., because it did not comply with the stock-ownership requirements of the statute, it appearing that all the common stock of Snyder’s was owned by Red Owl Stores and it not being shown if any Red Owl shareholders were pharmacists registered and in good standing in North Dakota. On appeal to the state district court, summary judgment was granted Snyder’s. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, that court held that the North Dakota statute was unconstitutional by reason of our decision in 1928 in Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105. That case involved a Pennsylvania statute that required that 100% of the stock of the corporation be owned by pharmacists. The North Dakota statute, however, requires only that a majority of the stock be owned by pharmacists. But the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the difference did not take this case out from under the Liggett case because under both statutes control of the corporation having a pharmacy license had to be in the hands of pharmacists responsible for the management and operation of the pharmacy. That court therefore remanded the case, so that the Board could conduct “an administrative hearing on the application, sans the constitutional issue, pursuant to our Administrative Agencies Practice Act,” 202 N. W. 2d 140, 145 (italics added). The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted, 411 U. S. 947. I We are met at the outset with a suggestion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Dakota is not “final” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257 which restricts our jurisdiction to review state court decisions. The finality requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which limits our review of state court judgments, serves several ends: (1) it avoids piecemeal review of state court decisions; (2) it avoids giving advisory opinions in cases where there may be no real “case” or “controversy” in the sense of Art. Ill; (3) it limits review of state court determinations of federal constitutional issues to leave at a minimum federal intrusion in state affairs. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124, summarized the requirement by Congress that in appeals from federal district courts as well as in review of state court decisions the judgments be “final”: “This requirement has the support of considerations generally applicable to good judicial administration. It avoids the mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice. Only in very few situations, where intermediate rulings may carry serious public consequences, has there been a departure from this requirement of finality for federal appellate jurisdiction. This prerequisite to review derives added force when the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked to upset the decision of a State court. Here we are in the realm of potential conflict between the courts of two different governments. And so, ever since 1789, Congress has granted this Court the power to intervene in State litigation only after 'the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had’ has rendered a 'final judgment or decree.’ § 237 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. §344 (a). This requirement is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our federal system.” But, as he pointed out, this concept of “finality” has a “penumbral area.” Ibid. Speaking for the Court in that case, he held that Nebraska’s ruling on the legality of a radio license issued by the Federal Communications Commission could be reviewed even though the state court had not yet determined the final accounting. He stated: “Of course, where the remaining litigation may raise other federal questions that may later come here ... to allow review of an mtermediate adjudication would offend the decisive objection to fragmentary reviews.” Id., at 127. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, involved the constitutionality of a state statute in effect making it a crime for a newspaper editor on election day to urge people to vote a certain way on the issues being submitted. The state court held the act did not violate the Federal Constitution and remanded the case for trial. It was argued that the judgment was not “final” for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. We noted that the point had “a surface plausibility, since it is true the judgment of the State Supreme Court did not literally end the case.” 384 U. S., at 217. We held it “final,” however, because if the Act were constitutional the editor wbuld in reality have no defense. Since conviction seemed likely, we concluded that to deny review at that stage would “result in a completely unnecessary waste of time and energy in judicial systems already troubled by delays due to congested dockets.” Id., at 217-218. In Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U. S. 386, the question on the merits was whether the requirement of a state act setting minimum retail prices was consonant with federal law. The state court held the state act constitutional under both the State and the Federal Constitutions and remanded the case for further proceedings. In reliance on Curry and on Langdeau we held that the fact that there were to be further proceedings in the state court did not render the state judgment “nonfinal or unappealable within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257.” Id., at 389 n. 4. The exceptions noted have a long lineage dating back to Mr. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, where the Court held “final” an interlocutory decree requiring a litigant “to deliver up property which he claims,” even though a final accounting has yet to be made. Id., at 205. Unless that interlocutory order was deemed “final,” Mr. Chief Justice Taney pointed out, the “right of appeal is of very little value to him and he may be ruined before he is permitted to avail himself of the right.” Ibid. It is equally important that we treat the judgment in the instant case as “final,” for we have discovered no way which the licensing authority in North Dakota has of preserving the constitutional question now ripe for decision. The Board here denied respondent’s application without an evidentiary hearing since the application showed that under the North Dakota Act respondent could in no way qualify for a license. The State Supreme Court held that Act unconstitutional and that thus an applicant failing to meet the requirements of the state statute is nevertheless entitled to consideration for a license. As previously noted, the State Supreme Court, indeed, directed the Board on remand to reconsider the application “sans” the constitutional question. There were state law questions to be considered on the remand, for the state board had also rested its denial of a permit on the failure of Snyder’s to meet certain structural and safety standards. The Supreme Court remanded for an administrative hearing on those other issues. If we deny review at this point, respondent has no constitutional barrier to the grant of a license. The state licensing authority might, of course, after an administrative hearing reinstate its earlier findings that the respondent does not meet the necessary structural and safety standards. If' respondent is denied a license for that reason, the denial will obviously be on a state ground. If respondent is granted a license, the battle over the constitutionality of the new Act will be lost as far as this case is concerned. There is no suggestion that “the remaining litigation may raise other federal questions,” Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S., at 127, “such as is true of eminent domain cases.” Ibid. For in those cases the federal constitutional question embraces not only a taking, but a taking on payment of just compensation. A state judgment is not final unless it covers both aspects of that integral problem. See Grays Harbor Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 U. S. 251, 256. It would appear that, as & matter of North Dakota procedure, the only way in which the Board could preserve the constitutional issue would be to defy its own State Supreme Court and deny the application on the ground of failure to meet the ownership requirement. The state Administrative Agencies Practice Act provides that: “Any party to any proceeding heard by an administrative agency” may appeal from the decision of the agency. N. D. Cent. Code § 28-32-15. The statute appears to treat the agency as a tribunal and not as a “party” able to appeal its own order. If the Board thus grants the license in accordance with the State Supreme Court decision and then seeks to appeal its own grant on the basis of the validity of the state ownership requirement, the appeal may well be dismissed and the dismissal would rest on the independent state ground that state procedural law does not provide the agency the right to appeal. II Liggett, decided in 1928, belongs to that vintage of decisions which exalted substantive due process by striking down state legislation which a majority of the Court deemed unwise. Liggett has to date not been expressly overruled. We commented on it disparagingly, however, in Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220, which concerned the constitutionality of a state statute providing that life insurance companies and their agents may not operate an undertaking business and undertakers may not serve as agents for life insurance companies. We noted that Liggett held that it was “clear” that “mere stock ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can have no real or substantial relation to the public health; and that the act in question creates an unreasonable and unnecessary restriction upon private business,” 278 U. S., at 113. In Daniel, however, we stated that “a pronounced shift of emphasis since the Liggett case,” 336 U. S., at 225, had deprived the words “unreasonable” and “arbitrary” of the meaning which Liggett ascribed to them. We had indeed held in Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525, that a State had power, so far as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was concerned, to legislate that no person should be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain employment because he was or was not a member of a labor union. After reviewing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, we said: “This Court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case was decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law. . . . Under this constitutional doctrine the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to the public welfare.” 335 U. S., at 536-537. We reached the same result in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, where we sustained the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting persons other than lawyers from engaging in the business of debt adjusting and debt pooling. We said: "We conclude that the Kansas Legislature was free to decide for itself that legislation was needed to deal with the business of debt adjusting. Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us. We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation/ and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.’ Nor are we able or willing to draw lines by calling a law 'prohibitory’ or 'regulatory.’ Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours. The Kansas debt adjusting statute may be wise or unwise. But relief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the body constituted to pass laws for the State of Kansas.” Id., at 731-732 (footnotes omitted). The majority of the Court in Liggett for which Mr. Justice Sutherland spoke held that business or property rights could be regulated under the Fourteenth Amendment only if the “legislation bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare,” 278 U. S., at 111-112. The majority held the Act governing pharmacies “creates an unreasonable and unnecessary restriction upon private business.” Id., at 113. The opposed view stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, and concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandéis, was: “A standing criticism of the use of corporations in business is that it causes such business to be owned by people who. do not know anything about it. Argument has not been supposed to be necessary in order to show that the divorce between the power of control and knowledge is an evil. The selling of drugs and poisons calls for knowledge in a high degree, and Pennsylvania after enacting a series of other safeguards has provided that in that matter the divorce shall not be allowed. Of course, notwithstanding the requirement that in corporations hereafter formed all the stockholders shall be licensed pharmacists, it still would be possible for a stockholder to content himself with drawing dividends and to take no hand in the company’s affairs. But obviously he would be more likely to observe the business with an intelligent eye than a casual investor who looked only to the standing of the stock in the market. The Constitution does not make it a condition of preventive legislation that it should work a perfect cure. It is enough if the questioned act has a manifest tendency to cure or at least to make the evil less.” Id., at 114-115. Those two opposed views of public policy are considerations for the legislative choice. The Liggett case was a creation at war with the earlier constitutional view of legislative power, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 132, 134, and opposed to our more recent decisions. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 241; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, as well as the Daniel, Lincoln Union, and Ferguson cases already discussed. The Liggett case, being a derelict in the stream of the law, is hereby overruled. We reverse and remand the judgment below and free the courts and agencies of North Dakota from what the State Supreme Court deemed to be the mandate of Liggett. So ordered. N. D. Cent. Code §43-15-35 (5) (Supp. 1973) provides: “Requirements for permit to operate pharmacy. — The board shall issue a permit to operate a pharmacy, or a renewal permit, upon satisfactory proof that: “5. The applicant for such permit is qualified to conduct the pharmacy, and is a registered pharmacist in good standing or is a partnership, each active member of which is a registered pharmacist in good standing, or a corporation or association, the majority stock in which is owned by registered pharmacists in good standing, actively and regularly employed in and responsible for the management, supervision, and operation of such pharmacy . . . “The provision of subsection 5 of this section shall not apply to the holder of a permit on July 1, 1963, if otherwise qualified to conduct the pharmacy, provided that any such permit holder who shall discontinue operations under such permit or fail to renew such permit upon expiration shall not thereafter be exempt from the provisions of such subsection as to such discontinued or lapsed permit. The provisions of subsection 5 of this section shall not apply to hospital pharmacies furnishing service only to patients in such hospital.” 202 N. W. 2d 140. “Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . .” 28 U. S. C. § 1257. We held in Local No. 438 v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, that a state court judgment which authorized a temporary injunction against picketing because in the court's view the National Labor Relations Board did not have exclusive jurisdiction was "final” for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. We did not wait until the litigation had been resolved in the state court, as the state court had finally determined its jurisdiction and erroneously so. 371 U. S., at 548. In Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, a receiver for a Texas insurance company sued two national banks, and the only question tendered on appeal from the state court concerned the question of venue, viz., in what state court a national bank could be sued. It was argued that the state court judgment was not “final” for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. We rejected that view, holding the judgment “final” and saying: “[W]e believe that it serves the policy underlying the requirement of finality in 28 U. S. C. § 1257 to determine now in which state court appellants may be tried rather than to subject them, and appellee, to long and complex litigation which may all be for naught if consideration of the preliminary question of venue is postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings.” 371 U. S., at 558. In California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498-499, in a capital case the State Supreme Court set aside the verdict on a federal constitutional ground and directed that the defendant (respondent) be retried. He moved that we dismiss the State's petition, which we had granted, for lack of a “final” judgment. We noted, however, that if on a retrial he were acquitted, there was no appeal available to the State. We therefore held that the judgment under review was “final” for our purposes. Id., at 498 n. 71. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, the state court had given a defendant post-conviction relief and remanded the case for retrial on the question of punishment. We took the case to determine whether the suppression of evidence by the prosecution entitled the defendant to a retrial on the issue of guilt as well as punishment. We held that the issue of guilt was quite independent of the issue of punishment and that it was time to decide the due process and/or equal protection questions presented by the state decision.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. v. EVATT, TAX COMMISSIONER. No. 75. Argued December 12, 1946. Decided January 6, 1947. Edward R. Lewis and Joseph J. Daniels argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief was Paul N. Rowe. Aubrey A. Wendt argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed a decision of that State’s Board of Tax Appeals fixing the amount owed by appellant for its state corporation franchise tax for the years 1935 to 1940, inclusive. 146 Ohio State 58, 64 N. E. 2d 53. In affirming, the Ohio court rejected appellant’s contention that the controlling tax act, §§ 5495-5499, Ohio Gen. Code, as applied to appellant, was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The case is here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 344. Appellant repeats its arguments as to invalidity of the tax, but only as to the years 1937 to 1940, inclusive. Section 5495 of the Ohio Gen. Code provides that each foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State müst pay a tax or fee for the “privilege of doing business” or “owning or using a part or all of its capital or property” or “holding a certificate . . . authorizing it to do business in this state.” It is not denied that appellant owed a franchise tax under this section, for it held a certificate to do business in Ohio during all the years in question. It also owned and operated two large factories at Springfield, Ohio, which produced millions of dollars worth of goods. And it operated four branch selling establishments associated with four warehouses, and fourteen retail stores, all located at various places in Ohio, which stored and sold goods produced at the Ohio factory. But appellant also owns and operates sixteen factories, nearly a hundred selling agencies, and numerous retail stores in other states. Goods produced at its Ohio factories are not only sold in Ohio, but in addition, are shipped for storage to out-of-Ohio warehouses to be sold by out-of-Ohio selling agencies to out-of-Ohio customers. Some are shipped directly to out-of-Ohio customers on orders from out-of-Ohio selling agencies. Conversely, goods manufactured by appellant out-of-Ohio are shipped to its Ohio warehouses, and sold by its Ohio selling agencies to Ohio customers. Appellant’s claim is that the amount of the tax assessed against it has been determined in such manner that a part of it is for sales made outside Ohio and another part for interstate sales. These consequences result, appellant argues, from the formula used by Ohio in determining the amount and value of Ohio manufacturing and sales, as distinguished from interstate and out-of-state sales. The tax is computed under the Ohio statute in the following manner: Section 5498 prescribes the formula used in determining what part of a taxpayer’s total capital stock represents business and property conducted and located in Ohio. To determine this, the total value of issued capital stock is divided in half. One half is then multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the value of all the taxpayer’s Ohio property, and the denominator of which is the total value of all its property wherever owned. The other half is multiplied by another fraction whose numerator is the total value of the “business done” in the State and whose denominator is country-wide business. Addition of these two products gives the tax base, which, when multiplied by the tax rate of 1/10 of 1%, produces the amount of the franchise tax. In the “business done” numerator, the State included as a part of Ohio business an amount equal to the sales proceeds of a large part of the goods manufactured at appellant’s Ohio plants, no matter where the goods had been sold or delivered. A part of the measure of the tax is consequently an amount equal to the sales price of Ohio-manufactured goods sold and delivered to customers in other states. Appellant contends that the State has thus taxed sales made outside of Ohio in violation of the Due Process Clause. A complete answer to this due process contention is that Ohio did not tax these sales. Its statute imposed the franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in Ohio for profit. The state supreme court construed the statute as imposing the tax on corporations for engaging in business such as that in which taxpayer engaged. One branch of that business was manufacturing. It has long been established that a state can tax the business of manufacturing. The fact that it chose to measure the amount of such a tax by the value of the goods the factory has produced, whether of the current or a past year, does not transform the tax on manufacturing to something else. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 288-289; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 189-190; Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69; Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 255. See also Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 313-314, and cases cited in notes 14 and 15. In the Ohio “business done” numerator, we assume the State also included sales made by Ohio branches to Ohio customers of goods manufactured and delivered to these Ohio customers from out-of-Ohio factories. Appellant’s business practice was to conduct and account for its sales agencies’ activities separately and distinctly from its factory operations. The State followed this distinction. It treated the sales agencies as conducting one type of business and the factories another. Thus it measured the value of the Ohio sales agencies’ business by the total amount of the preceding year’s Ohio sales of goods manufactured outside of Ohio as well as those manufactured in Ohio. Here again, appellant’s contention that this resulted in taxing out-of-state or interstate transactions or sales in violation of the Due Process Clause is wholly without substance. The Ohio sales agencies’ business and their sales to Ohio customers were intrastate activities. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340. What effect inclusion of this element in the “business done” numerator would have were these transactions not intrastate is a question we need not now decide. What we have said disposes of the only grounds urged to support the due process contention. It also answers most of the argument made against the Ohio statute on the ground that its application to appellant unduly burdens interstate commerce and therefore violates the Commerce Clause. Of course, the Commerce Clause does not bar a state from imposing a tax based on the value of the privilege to do an intrastate business merely because it also does an interstate business. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331, 336. Nor does the fact that a computation such as that under Ohio’s law includes receipts from interstate sales affect the validity of a fair apportionment. See e. g., Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, supra; International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429, 433; Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U. S. 511. And here, it clearly appears from the background of Ohio’s tax legislation that the whole purpose of the state formula was to arrive, without undue complication, at a fair conclusion as to what was the value of the intrastate business for which its franchise was granted. In October, 1924, this Court struck down Ohio’s then corporation franchise tax on the ground that it did not make an apportionment between local and interstate business so as to confine its tax to local business only. The tax was also held to be in violation of the Equal Protection clause. Air-Way Electric Appliance Corporation v. Day, 266 U. S. 71. In April 1925, the legislature of Ohio passed a new act expressly to cure the defects this Court had found in the old law. Ill Ohio Laws 471. That 1925 Act, as slightly amended, is the law under which the present apportionment was made. Plainly Ohio sought to tax only what she was entitled to tax, and there is nothing about application of the formula in this case that indicates a potentially unfair result under any circumstances. It is not even contended here that the amount of these taxes could be considered to bear an unjust or improper relation to the value of the privilege of doing business in Ohio if the legislature had imposed a flat franchise tax of the same amounts for the respective years which application of this formula has produced. See Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, supra at 296. Furthermore, this Court has long realized the practical impossibility of a state’s achieving a perfect apportionment of expansive, complex business activities such as those of appellant, and has declared that “rough approximation rather than precision” is sufficient. Illinois Central Ry. v. Minnesota, 309 U. S. 157, 161. Unless a palpably disproportionate result comes from an apportionment, a result which makes it patent that the tax is levied upon interstate commerce rather than upon an intrastate privilege, this Court has not been willing to nullify honest state efforts to make apportionments. See cases collected in opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 325. A state’s tax law is not to be nullified merely because the result is achieved through a formula which includes consideration of interstate and out-of-state transactions in their relation to the intrastate privilege. Since it has not been demonstrated that the apportionment here achieves an unfair result, cf. Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 134, 135, and since it is assessed only against the privilege of doing local Ohio business of manufacturing and selling, we do not come to the question, argued by appellant, of possible multiplication of this tax by reason of its imposition by other states. None of them can tax the privilege of operating factories and sales agencies in Ohio. Affirmed. Section 5498 also sets out in some detail the factors to be considered, and those not to be considered, in calculating the total value of a taxpayer’s issued and outstanding stock. These provisions are not here at issue. Rule 275, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, Oct. 13, 1939, exempted from the computation all goods manufactured by appellant in Ohio, but shipped to appellant’s out-of-Ohio warehouses before sale. The State contends here that it did not include in the “business-done” numerator an amount equal to the proceeds from sales by Ohio branches to Ohio customers of goods which were shipped to the Ohio customers from factories outside Ohio. Appellant insists that it did. We need not resolve this controversy, for we think the result is the same whichever view is taken. In vetoing the bill which became the law, on grounds not here relevant, the Governor of Ohio said: “The supreme court decision, of course, made it necessary for you to devise a basis for the levy of the tax other than on the authorized capitalization of foreign corporations. You have seen fit to embody in the pending measure an asset value or total net worth basis for the assessment of the tax on domestic corporations as well.” Ohio House Journal 1925, Vol. 111, 874. The bill was passed over his veto. 112 Ohio Laws 410 (1927); 113 Ohio Laws 637 (1929); 114 Ohio Laws 714 (1931); 115 Ohio Laws 589 (1933).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, NEW YORK CITY REGION OF NEW YORK CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES, et al. v. NEW YORK et al. No. 72-129. Argued February 27-28, 1973 — Decided June 21, 1973 BlacKmüN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., post, p. 369, and BreNNAN, J., post, p. 372, filed dissenting opinions. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Jack Greenberg argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were James M. Nabrit III, Eric Schnap-per, Nathaniel R. Jones, and Wiley Branton. A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold and Assistant Attorney General Norman. George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee the State of New York. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefko-witz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, John G. Proudfit, Assistant Attorney General, and Judith T. Kramer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal from a three-judge district court for the District of Columbia comes to us pursuant to the direct-review provisions of § 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). The appellants seek review of an order dated April 13, 1972, unaccompanied by any opinion, denying their motion to intervene in a suit that had been instituted against the United States by the State of New York, on behalf of its counties of New York, Bronx, and Kings. New York’s action was one for a judgment declaring that, during the 10 years preceding the filing of the suit, voter qualifications prescribed by the State had not been used by the three named counties “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” within the language and meaning of § 4 (a), and that the provisions of §§ 4 and 5 of the Act, as amended, 42 TJ. S. C. §§ 1973b and 1973c, are, therefore, inapplicable to the three counties. In addition to denying the appellants’ motion to intervene, the District Court, by the same order, granted New York’s motion for summary judgment. This was based upon a formal consent by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, on behalf of the United States, consistent with the Government’s answer theretofore filed, “to the entry of a declaratory judgment under Section 4 (a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U. S. C. 1973b (a)),” App. 39a. The consent was supported by an accompanying affidavit reciting, “I conclude, on behalf of the Acting Attorney General that there is no reason to believe that a literacy test has been used in the past 10 years in the counties of New York, Kings and Bronx with the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, except for isolated instances which have been substantially corrected and which, under present practice cannot reoccur.” App. 42a — 43a. Appellants contend here that their motion to intervene should have been granted because (1) the United States unjustifiably declined to oppose New York’s motion for summary judgment; (2) the appellants had initiated other litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to compel compliance with §§4 and 5 of the Act; and (3) the appellants possessed “substantial documentary evidence,” Jurisdictional Statement 7, to offer in opposition to the entry of the declaratory judgment. Faced with the initial question whether this Court has jurisdiction, on direct appeal, to review the denial of the appellants’ motion to intervene, we postponed determination of that issue to the hearing of the case on the merits. 409 U. S. 978. I Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, clearly indicates that the purpose of the Act is to assist in the effectuation of the Fifteenth Amendment, even though that Amendment is self-executing, and to insure that no citizen’s right to vote is denied or abridged on account of race or color. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966); Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (DC 1966). Sections 4 and 5, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b and 1973c, are designed to prohibit the use of tests or devices, or the alteration of voting qualifications or procedures, when the effect is to deprive a citizen of his right to vote. Section 4 (c) defines the phrase “test or device” to mean “any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (c). Section 4 (b), as amended, now applies in any State or in any political subdivision of a State which the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, or November 1, 1968, any “test or device,” and with respect to which the Director of the Bureau of the Census determines that less than half the residents of voting age there were registered on the specified date, or that less than half of such persons voted in the presidential election of that November. These determinations are effective upon publication in the Federal Register and are not reviewable in any court. 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b). The prescribed publication in the Federal Register suspends the effectiveness of the test or device, and it may not then be utilized unless a three-judge district court for the District of Columbia determines, by declaratory judgment, that no such test or device has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of the action “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” § 4 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a). The same section states that “any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.” And the District Court “shall retain jurisdiction of any action pursuant to this subsection for five years after judgment and shall reopen the action upon motion of the Attorney General alleging that a test or device has been used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” Section 5, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, applies whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which a determination has been made under § 4 (b) “shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect” on November 1, 1964, or November 1, 1968. The State or political subdivision may then institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that what was done “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” Unless and until the court enters such judgment “no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.” The statute contains a proviso, however, that the change may be enforced without the court proceeding if it has been submitted to the Attorney General of the United States and he “has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission.” Neither the Attorney General’s failure to object nor a declaratory judgment entered under § 5 shall bar a subsequent action by a private party to enjoin enforcement of the change. Here again, the action shall be determined by a three-judge court “and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.” II On July 31, 1970, the Attorney General filed with the Federal Register his determination that New York on November 1, 1968, maintained a test or device as defined in § 4 (c) of the Act. This was published the following day. 35 Fed. Reg. 12354. On March 27, 1971, there was published in the Federal Register the determination by the Director of the Bureau of the Census that in the counties of Bronx, Kings, and New York, in the State of New York, “less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein voted in the presidential election of November 1968.” 36 Fed. Reg. 5809. The present action was instituted by the State of New York with the filing of its original complaint on December 3, 1971, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The appellants contend that the District Court’s order denying them intervention in that action is directly appealable to this Court under § 4 (a) of the Act. The United States “substantially” agrees that this Court has jurisdiction to review on direct appeal the denial of intervention in an action of this kind. Brief for United States 21 n. 15. New York suggests that the appeal should be dismissed because the appellants have not established intervention as of right and have not demonstrated an abuse of discretion by the District Court in denying permissive intervention. Brief for Appellee 22-23. We must determine for ourselves, of course, the scope of our jurisdiction, since “jurisdiction of the federal courts — their power to adjudicate — is a grant of authority to them by Congress and thus beyond the scope of litigants to confer.” Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem, Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 167 (1939); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934). The jurisdictional issue is simply phrased: whether “any appeal,” within the language of the second paragraph of § 4 (a), includes an appeal by a would-be, but unsuccessful, intervenor. Certainly, the words “any appeal” are subject to broad construction; they could be said to include review of any meaningful judicial determination made in the progress of the § 4 lawsuit. That Congress intended a broad meaning is apparent from its expressed concern that voting restraints on account of race or color should be removed as quickly as possible in order to “open the door to the exercise of constitutional rights conferred almost a century ago.” H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1965). See S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7 (1965). Indeed, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an addition to, and buttressed, § 2004 of the Revised Statutes, as that section had been amended by the respective Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, 71 Stat. 637, 74 Stat. 90, and 78 Stat. 241, codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1971. When the 1965 Act was under consideration by the Congress, § 1971 (c) already empowered the Attorney General to institute a civil action to protect the right to vote from deprivation because of race or color or from interference by threat, coercion, or intimidation. Section 1971 (g) further provided that, in such a suit, the Attorney General could request a three-judge court, and “it shall be the duty of the judges so designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date... and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.” Further, an appeal from the final judgment of that court was to the Supreme Court. Despite this existing statutory provision designed to hasten the removal of barriers to the right to vote, the Congress determined, in 1965, that the enforcement of the voting rights statutes “has encountered serious obstacles in various regions of the country,” and progress “has been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of State and local officials and repeated delays in the judicial process.” H. R. Rep. No. 439, supra, at 9. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 309-315, and Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 556 n. 21 (1969). Congress thus produced the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in response to this recognized problem and provided in that Act that “any appeal” in a § 4 (a) three-judge proceeding shall lie to this Court. This contrasts with the language in the earlier theretofore existing statute providing for an appeal here only “from the final judgment” of the three-judge court. § 1971 (g). The broader language of §4 (a), when viewed in the light of Congress’ concern about hastening the resolution of suits involving voting rights, see Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp., at 907, prompts us to conclude that the unsuccessful intervenor’s § 4 (a) appeal is directly here and not to the Court of Appeals. This conclusion is not without other relevant statutory precedent. It has long been settled that an unsuccessful intervenor in a government-initiated civil antitrust action may appeal directly to this Court under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29. United States v. California Canneries, 279 U. S. 553, 559 (1929); Sutphen Estates v. United States, 342 U. S. 19, 20 (1951); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132 (1967). Earlier this Term, in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 151 (1972), we held that § 2 of the Expediting Act lodged in this Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory, as well as final, orders in Government civil antitrust cases. In so holding, we emphasized Congress’ determination “to speed appellate review.” Id., at 155. As we have noted above, Congress has expressed a similar need for speed in adjudicating voting rights cases. We could not justify dissimilar treatment to an unsuccessful intervenor under the parallel § 4 (a) of the Civil Rights Act. Further support for this result is supplied when one contrasts the specific appeal provision of § 4 (a) with 28 U. S. C. § 1253, allowing for a direct appeal to this Court from an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction “in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” That section provides that “any party” may appeal here except “as otherwise provided by law.” Section 4 (a) does not incorporate or refer to § 1253. The former relates to “any appeal”; the latter speaks only of “any party.” The difference is obvious, and the broader purport of Congress under § 4 (a) is manifest. We conclude, therefore, that this Court has jurisdiction, on direct appeal by one denied intervention in a § 4 (a) action, to determine whether the District Court erred in denying the motion to intervene. Ill As originally enacted, §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Nights Act of 1965 related only to a period of five preceding years, to a test or device in effect on November 1, 1964, to a paucity of persons registered on that date, and to a paucity of voters in the presidential election of 1964. 79 Stat. 438, 439. In 1970, however, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314. This new legislation, among other things, related §§4 and 5 to ten, rather than five, preceding years and, in addition to the November 1, 1964, date and the presidential election of that year, to November 1, 1968, and the 1968 election. Also, the 1970 Act suspended the use of any test or device “in any Federal, State, or local election” prior to August 6, 1975, without regard to whether a determination has been made that § 4 covered a particular State or political subdivision. 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 131-132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.). The three New York counties that the present litigation concerns were not covered by §§ 4 and 5 of the original 1965 Act. They became subject thereto because of the provisions of the 1970 Act and the respective published determinations, hereinabove described, of the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of the Census. Indeed, it is clear that the three counties were a definite target of the 1970 amendments. See, e. g., 116 Cong. Rec. 6659 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Cooper), id., at 20161 and 20165 (remarks of Congs. Celler and Albert, respectively). It was in December 1971, during the pendency of state legislative proceedings for the redrafting of congressional and state senate and assembly district lines, that the State of New York filed its complaint in the present action. The amended complaint, filed 13 days later, alleged that certain of the State’s qualifications for registration and voting, prescribed by New York’s Constitution, Art. II, § 1, and by its Election Law, §§ 150 and 168, as amended (the ability to read and write English, the administration of a literacy test, and the presentation of evidence of literacy in lieu of the test), had not been used during the preceding 10 years “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” App. 6a; that the State’s literacy requirements were suspended in 1970 and remained suspended; that after enactment of the 1965 Act, the New York City Board of Elections provided English-Spanish affidavits to be executed in lieu of a diploma or certificate in conformity with the requirements of the Act; and that, beginning in 1964 and continuing through 1971, with the exception of 1967, there were voter registration drives every summer designed to increase the number of registered voters in the three named counties. New York and the United States stipulated that the Government could file its answer or other pleading by March 10,1972. The answer was filed on that day. The Government therein admitted that English-Spanish affidavits were provided by the City Board of Elections but averred, on information and belief, that such affidavits were not so provided prior to 1967. The answer also alleged that the United States was without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the plaintiff's allegation that the literacy tests were administered with no intention or effect to abridge or deny the right to vote on the basis of race or color. On March 17 New York filed its motion for summary judgment. This was supported by affidavits from the Administrator for the Board of Elections in the City of New York “which includes the counties of New York, Bronx and Kings,” the Chief of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Educational Testing of the New York State Education Department, and the respective Chief Clerks of the New York, Bronx, and Brooklyn Borough Offices of the New York City Board of Elections. App. 15a-32a. These affidavits stated that those instances where the suspension of literary tests had been ignored or overlooked by election officials were isolated and that steps had been taken to resolve that problem. The affidavits also stated that since 1964, with the exception of 1967, the Board of Elections had conducted summer voter-registration drives directed particularly to high-density black population areas. In its memorandum, filed with the District Court, in support of its motion, New York presented a history of its use of literacy tests and concluded, “[sjince it was never the practice of administering the tests to discriminate against any person on account of race or color, and since the filing requirements of the Voting Rights Act are leading to delays which may well disrupt the political process in New York, this action for declaratory judgment has been brought.” Memorandum 4-5. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 332. Two and one-half weeks later, on April 3, the United States filed its formal consent, hereinabove described, to the entry of the declaratory judgment for which New York had moved. The accompanying affidavit of the Assistant Attorney General stated that the Department of Justice had conducted “an investigation which consisted of examination of registration records in selected precincts in each covered county, interviews of certain election and registration officials and interviews of persons familiar with registration activity in black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods in those counties.” App. 40a. The Assistant Attorney General then reached the conclusion, App. 42a-43a, quoted supra, at 349. Appellants’ motion to intervene was filed April 7. Appellants asserted that if New York were successful in the present action, the appellants would be deprived of the protections afforded by §§ 4 and 5; that they “would be legally bound” thereby in their simultaneously filed § 5 action in the Southern District of New York; and that the latter action “would necessarily fail.” App. 45a. The appellants also alleged that the § 5 suit asserted that New York “has gerrymandered Assembly, Senatorial and Congressional districts in Kings, Bronx and New York counties so that, on purpose and in effect, the right to vote will be denied on account of race or color.” Ibid. Thus, it was said, the disposition of the present suit might impair or impede the appellants’ ability to protect their interests in registering to vote, voting, and seeking public office. App. 46a. It was further claimed that during the preceding three weeks attorneys in the Department of Justice thrice had represented to appellants’ counsel that the United States would oppose New York’s motion for summary judgment. “At no time did any of the three Justice Department attorneys... inquire of counsel for [appellants] whether he or any of the [appellants] had information or evidence which would support the government’s alleged position that sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act should continue to be applied to Kings, Bronx and New York counties.” Ibid. There was also filed an affidavit of Eric Schnapper, one of the attorneys for the appellants. This repeated the allegations contained in the motion to intervene and also asserted that on March 21 the affiant advised a Department of Justice attorney that when the New York redistricting laws were submitted to the Department, he wished to submit material and arguments in opposition to their approval; that on March 23 he was advised by another Department attorney that papers were being prepared in opposition to New York’s motion for summary judgment; that he informed the attorney that the appellants were considering the institution of an action in the Southern District of New York; that on April 3 he was advised by the Department of Justice that it would have no objection to the institution of the New York suit; and that in the afternoon of April 5 he was informed by telephone for the first time that two days earlier the United States had consented to New York’s motion for summary judgment. App. 48ar-51a. With the motion to intervene the appellants filed a proposed answer to appellees' amended complaint and a brief memorandum of points and authorities. The latter suggested the failure of the Attorney General “to investigate the relevant facts,” namely, “whether there are differences in the literacy rates of whites and nonwhites, particularly if they are do [sic] to unequal or discriminatory public education. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969).” This suggestion was also made in the proposed answer. App. 65a-66a. The United States took no position with respect to the appellants’ motion to intervene. New York opposed the motion on six grounds. The first was untimeliness in that the suit had been pending for more than four months, an article about it had appeared in early February in the New York Times, and the appellants did not deny that they had knowledge of the pendency of the action. The second was failure to allege appropriate supporting facts. The third was the lack of a requisite interest in that none of the appellants asserted he was a victim of discriminatory application of the literacy test; rather, the motion to intervene was subordinate to the appellants’ real interest in invalidating New York’s reapportionment of its assembly, senate, and congressional districts, as evidenced by the institution of their action in the Southern District of New York. The fourth was adequate representation of the appellants’ interest by the United States. The fifth was that delay in the granting of the motion for summary judgment would prejudice New York and jeopardize the impending primary elections for offices of Assembly, Senate, and Congress, as well as for delegates to the upcoming Democratic National Convention. The sixth was that the appellants and others who claimed discrimination still could raise those issues in the state and federal courts of New York. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion to Intervene 1-8. Like reasons were asserted in a supporting affidavit of an Assistant New York Attorney General. App. 67a-70a. On April 13 the three-judge court entered its order denying the appellants’ motion to intervene and granting summary judgment for New York. App. 71a-72a. On April 24 the appellants filed a motion to alter judgment on the ground, among others, that their motion to intervene was timely since neither the appellants nor their counsel knew of the § 4 (a) action until March 21. The appellants now asserted that evidence was available to demonstrate that in the three counties education afforded nonwhite children by New York was substantially inferior to that afforded white children and that “this difference resulted in disparities in white and non-white illiteracy rates among persons otherwise eligible to vote in those counties during the 10 years prior to the filing of the instant action.” App. 73a-74a. Thus “a full evidentiary hearing is required before making any finding of fact as to whether plaintiff’s literacy tests discriminated on the basis of race.” Finally, the appellants asserted that the District Court “should not have approved the consent judgment desired by plaintiff and defendant without first soliciting the intervention of responsible interested parties and requiring the United States to undertake a more thorough investigation of the relevant facts.” Ibid. The District Court promptly denied the Motion to Alter Judgment. App. 117a. Subsequently, while the appeal was pending in this Court, two additional facts came to light and are authorized by the parties for our consideration. The first is that Mr. Schnapper, who executed the above-described affidavits, did not begin his employment as an attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., until March 9, 1972. The second is that “Justice Department attorneys met with appellants Stewart and Fortune in January 1972 during the course of their investigation; although the Justice Department attorneys recall informing Stewart and Fortune that this case was pending, neither Stewart nor Fortune can remember being so informed.” Reply Brief for Appellants 3 n. 1; Brief for United States 36. IV The foregoing detailed recital of the facts and of the history of the case is necessary because of the discretionary nature of the District Court’s order we are called upon to review. Our task is to determine whether, upon the facts available to it at that time, the court erred in denying the appellants’ motion to intervene. Intervention in a federal court suit is governed by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24. Whether intervention be claimed of right or as permissive, it is at once apparent, from the initial words of both Rule 24 (a) and Rule 24 (b), that the application must be “timely.” If it is untimely, intervention must be denied. Thus, the court where the action is pending must first be satisfied as to timeliness. Although the point to which the suit has progressed is one factor in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely dispositive. Timeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances. And it is to be determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed on review. With these accepted principles in mind, we readily conclude that the District Court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to intervene was proper because of the motion’s untimeliness, and that the denial was not an abuse of the court’s discretion: 1. The court could reasonably have concluded that appellants knew or should have known of the pendency of the § 4 (a) action because of an informative February article in the New York Times discussing the controversial aspect of the suit; public comment by community leaders; the size and astuteness of the membership and staff of the organizational appellant; and the questioning of two of the individual appellants themselves by Department of Justice attorneys investigating the use of literacy tests in New York. 2. We, however, need not confine our evaluation of abuse of discretion to the facts just mentioned, for the record amply demonstrates that appellants failed to protect their interest in a timely fashion after March 21, 1972, the date they allegedly were first informed of the pendency of the action. At that point, the suit was over three months old and had reached a critical stage. The United States had answered New York’s complaint on March 10 and in that answer had clearly indicated that it was without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of New York’s allegation that the State’s literacy tests were administered without regard	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 26 ]	sc_adminaction
CALIFANO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. AZNAVORIAN No. 77-991. Argued November 6, 1978 Decided December 11, 1978 StewaRT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, BlackmuN, Powell, RehNquist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. Marshall and BreNNAN, JJ., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 178. Peter Buscemi argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioner in No. 77-991 and respondent in No. 77-5999. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, and William Kanter. Peter Anthony Schey argued the cause for respondent in No. 77-991 and petitioner in No. 77-5999. With him on the brief were Victor Benjamin Harris, Ralph Santiago Abascal, Charles Wolfinger, Phillip M. Cassel, and Richard Paez. Together with No. 77-5999, Aznavorian v. CaMfano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, also on appeal from the same court. Mb. Justice Stewakt delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1972 Congress enacted the Supplemental Security Income program to aid the needy aged, blind, and disabled. The legislation creating the program provides that benefits are not to be paid for any month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the United States. The primary issue in the present litigation is whether this restriction is a constitutionally impermissible burden on the asserted right of international travel. I The 1972 Social Security Act Amendments repealed Titles I, X, and XIV of the Act, which had provided federal aid for state programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. The amendments replaced those programs with a new Title XVI, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. This program is administered by the Federal Government through the Social Security Administration. To be eligible to receive benefits under the program, a person must be a resident of the United States, 42 U. S. C. § 1382c (a)(1) (B); be either over 65 years old or meet statutory definitions of blindness and disability, § 1382c (a); and be poor, §§ 1382a (income), 1382b (resources). Section 1611 (f) of the Social Security Act, as added in 1972, provides that no person shall receive SSI benefits “for any month during all of which such individual is outside the United States . . . .” The section further provides that “after an individual has been outside the United States for any period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be treated as remaining outside the United States until he has been in the United States for a period of 30 consecutive days.” Thus, if a recipient were to leave the country on May 5 and return on July 10, he would receive his entire payment for May. He would, however, lose his benefits for June and July. He would have been actually away the entire month of June, and, because he had been gone for more than 30 days, he would be treated as having remained outside the country until August 9. In August his payments would automatically resume. Grace Aznavorian is an American citizen. In 1974 she was a resident of California and an eligible recipient of SSI benefits. On July 21, 1974, she left the United States and traveled to Guadalajara, Mexico. Because of an unexpected illness, she remained in Mexico until September 1, 1974. Accordingly, she did not receive benefits for August or September. Aznavorian pursued her administrative remedies without success. She then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, seeking judicial review of the Secretary’s decision. Asserting that the suspension of her benefits denied her due process, equal protection, and the right of international travel, all as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, she sought declaratory relief and the benefits which had been denied because of her visit to Mexico. She moved for certification of a plaintiff class including all persons denied SSI benefits because of international travel. The Secretary moved for summary judgment. The District Court first considered the motion for class certification. It concluded that a class action was not barred by the Social Security Act because the class would be limited to those who had presented unsuccessful claims to the Secretary. Because the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 were otherwise satisfied, it certified the class. 440 F. Supp. 788, 792-794. The court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class. Because international travel is “a basic constitutional right,” the District Court held that the statute must bear “a fair and substantial relationship in fact to the governmental purposes that it seeks to achieve.” Id., at 795, 797. The court concluded that the limitation on benefits was not sufficiently related to the Government’s interest in making payments only to bona fide residents of the United States to be constitutionally valid. The District Court ordered the Secretary to provide notice of its decision to all class members who were receiving benefits at the time of the order or would have been receiving benefits except for § 1611 (f). It also ordered the Secretary to pay benefits to those members of the class whose benefits had been suspended because of § 1611 (f), but who in fact continued to be actual residents of the United States. Because its order was limited to persons who were still needy within the meaning of the SSI program, the court believed that its order did not violate the sovereign immunity of the United States. 440 P. Supp., at 802-803. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court, and Azna-vorian filed a cross-appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252. We noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals and consolidated the cases. 435 U. S. 921. II The Secretary raises two questions on his appeal. First, he contends that § 1611 (f) does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Second, he urges that in any event the District Court’s award of retroactive monetary relief is barred by sovereign immunity. Aznavorian’s cross-appeal takes the position that the District Court erred in awarding monetary relief only to those class members who were eligible for SSI benefits on the date of its order. Because we conclude that § 1611 (f) does not violate the Constitution, there is no occasion to consider the remedial issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal. Social welfare legislation, by its very nature, involves drawing lines among categories of people, lines that necessarily are sometimes arbitrary. This Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of such classifications in federal welfare legislation where a rational basis existed for Congress’ choice. “The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. ... In enacting legislation of this kind a government does not deny equal protection 'merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some “reasonable basis,” it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” ’ Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485. “To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged 'is not a toothless one,’ Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510. But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.” Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185. See, e. g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78. Aznavorian argues that, even though § 1611 (f) may under this standard be valid as against an equal protection or due process attack, a more stringent standard must be applied in a constitutional appraisal of § 1611 (f) because this statutory provision limits the freedom of international travel. We have concluded, however, that § 1611 (f), fortified by its presumption of constitutionality, readily withstands attack from that quarter as well. The freedom to travel abroad has found recognition in at least three decisions of this Court. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, the Secretary of State had refused to issue a passport to a person because of his links with leftwing political groups. The Court held that Congress had not given the Secretary discretion to deny passports on such grounds. Although the holding was one of statutory construction, the Court recognized that freedom of international travel is “basic in our scheme of values” and an “important aspect of the citizen’s ‘liberty.’ ” Id., at 126, 127. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, dealt with § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U. S. C. § 785, which made it a criminal offense for a member of the Communist Party to apply for a passport. The Court again recognized that the freedom of international travel is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Congress had legislated too broadly by restricting this liberty for all members of the party. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, the Court upheld the Secretary’s decision not to validate passports for travel to Cuba. The Court pointed out that “the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.” Id., at 14. Aznavorian urges that the freedom of international travel is basically equivalent to the constitutional right to interstate travel, recognized by this Court for over 100 years. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (Taney, C. J., dissenting). But this Court has often pointed out the crucial difference between the freedom to travel internationally and the right of interstate travel. “The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified, United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-758 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 105-106 (1971). By contrast the ‘right’ of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As such this ‘right,’ the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due process.” (Citations omitted.) Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, 4 n. 6. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 643 n. 1 (concurring opinion). Thus, legislation which is said to infringe the freedom to travel abroad is not .to be judged by the same standard applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, such as durational residency requirements imposed by the States. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 254-262; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 338-342; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 634. Unlike cases involving the right of interstate travel, this case involves legislation providing governmental payments of monetary benefits that has an incidental effect on a protected liberty, similar to the legislation considered in Califano v. Jobst, supra. There, another section of the Social Security Act was challenged because it “penalized” some beneficiaries upon their marriage. The Court recognized that the statutory provisions “may have an impact on a secondary beneficiary’s desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others,” 434 U. S., at 58, but nonetheless upheld the constitutional validity of the challenged legislation. The statutory provision in issue here does not have nearly so direct an impact on the freedom to travel internationally as occurred in the Kent, Aptheker, or Zemel cases. It does not limit the availability or validity of passports. It does not limit the right to travel on grounds that may be in tension with the First Amendment. It merely withdraws a governmental benefit during and shortly after an extended absence from this country. Unless the limitation imposed by Congress is wholly irrational, it is constitutional in spite of its incidental effect on international travel. It is to be noted that Aznavorian does not question the constitutional validity of the basic decision of Congress to limit SSI payments to residents of the United States, as provided in § 1614 (a) (1) (B) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1382c (a)(1)(B). The statutory provision in issue, § 1611 (f), clearly effectuates this basic congressional decision. Certainly, the longer a person is out of the country, the greater the possibility that he is no longer a resident. The 30-day period provided in § 1611 (f) is no more arbitrary than any similar time period would be. The additional provision of § 1611 (f) that, once a person has been outside the country for 30 consecutive days or more, he will not be eligible for SSI payments until he has spent 30 consecutive days in the United States, simply adds assurance that the beneficiary’s residency here is genuine. Moreover, as the Secretary argues, Congress may simply have decided to limit payments to those who need them in the United States. The needs to which this program responds might vary dramatically in foreign countries. The Social Security Administration would be hard pressed to monitor the continuing eligibility of persons outside the country. And, indeed, Congress may only have wanted to increase the likelihood that these funds would be spent inside the United States. These justifications for the legislation in question are not, perhaps, compelling. But its constitutionality does not depend on compelling justifications. It is enough if the provision is rationally based. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 487. Section 1611 (f) meets that test. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed. It is so ordered. The section reads in full: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no individual shall be considered an eligible individual for purposes of this title for any month during all of which such individual is outside the United States (and no person shall be considered the eligible spouse of an individual for purposes of this title with respect to any month during all of which such person is outside the United States). For purposes of the preceding sentence, after an individual has been outside the United States for any period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be treated as remaining outside the United States until he has been in the United States for a period of 30 consecutive days.” 86 Stat. 1468, 42 U. S. C. § 1382 (f). Jurisdiction was based on two provisions of the Social Security Act: §§205 (g) and 1631 (c)(3), 42 U. S. C. §§405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). Her original complaint requested injunctive relief and moved that a three-judge court be convened. The motion for a three-judge court was later withdrawn along with the request for an injunction. The certified class' was defined as: “All individuals otherwise eligible for Supplemental Security Income, who have had such SSI denied, suspended, terminated, or interrupted pursuant to an initial written determination, an administration reconsideration, an administrative hearing, or an Appeals Council review, based solely on 42 U. S. C. § 1382 (f) and regulations promulgated thereunder, from September 26, 1975 until the entry of this Order.” The Secretary’s jurisdictional statement also claimed that a class action could not be maintained under § 205 (g) of the Social Security Act: That question was raised but not decided in Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524. While not abandoning his position, the Secretary has chosen not to argue the question in this case. The question is pending in Califano v. Elliott, No. 77-1511, cert. granted, post, p. 816. It is conceded that Aznavorian, as an individual, met the jurisdictional requirements of § 205 (g). In contrast to the monetary-benefits legislation upheld in the Jobst case, a state law that burdened the freedom to marry was held constitutionally invalid later the same Term in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 61 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. WEBER AIRCRAFT CORP. et al. No. 82-1616. Argued January 11, 1984 Decided March 20, 1984 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Leonard Schaitman, and Wendy M. Keats. Jacques E. Soiret argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Weber Aircraft Corp. were Marshall Silberberg and Robert M. Churella. Lawrence J. Galardi and Dean F. Cochran filed a brief for respondent Mills Manufacturing Corp. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Karen Syma Shinberg Cza-panskiy; for United States Forgecraft Corp. by Donald A. Way; and for Inderjit Badhwar et al. by Raymond D. Battocchi and Alfred F. Belcuore. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552 (1982 ed.), requires federal agencies to disclose records that do not fall into one of nine exempt categories. The question presented is whether confidential statements obtained during an Air Force investigation of an air crash are protected from disclosure by Exemption 5, which exempts “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” I On October 9, 1973, the engine of an Air Force F-106B aircraft failed in flight. Captain Richard Hoover, the pilot, was severely injured when he ejected from the plane. Under Air Force regulations, the incident was a significant air crash that required two separate investigations: a “collateral investigation” and a “safety investigation.” The collateral investigation is conducted “to preserve available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, administrative proceedings, and all other purposes.” Witnesses in a collateral investigation testify under oath and generally are protected by the procedural safeguards that are applicable in other formal hearings. The record of the collateral investigation is public. The safety investigation is quite different. It is conducted by a specially appointed tribunal which prepares a report that is intended for “the sole purpose of taking corrective action in the interest of accident prevention.” To encourage witnesses to speak fully and frankly, they are not sworn and receive an assurance that their statements will not be used for any purpose other than accident prevention. Air Force regulations contain a general prohibition against the release of safety investigation reports and their attachments, subject to an exception which allows the Judge Advocate General to release specified categories of “factual material” and “nonpersonal evidence.” After the collateral and safety investigations had been completed, Captain Hoover filed a damages action against various entities responsible for the design and manufacture of his plane’s ejection equipment. During pretrial discovery in that litigation, two of the parties (respondents Weber and Mills) sought discovery of all Air Force investigative reports pertaining to the accident. The Air Force released the entire record of the collateral investigation, as well as certain factual portions of the safety investigation, but it refused to release the confidential portions of the safety investigation. Confidential statements made to air crash safety investigators were held to be privileged with respect to pretrial discovery over 20 years ago. Machin v. Zukert, 114 U. S. App. D. C. 335, 316 F. 2d 336, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 896 (1963). That holding effectively prevented respondents from obtaining the pretrial discovery they sought — specifically the unsworn statements given by Captain Hoover and by the airman who had rigged and maintained his parachute equipment. Respondents therefore filed requests for those statements under the FOIA, and when the Air Force refused production, they commenced this action. In the District Court the Government filed an affidavit executed by the General responsible for Air Force safety investigations, explaining that the material that had been withheld contained “conclusions, speculations, findings and recommendations made by the Aircraft Mishap Investigators” as well as “testimony provided by witnesses under a pledge of confidentiality.” App. 38. The affidavit explained why the General believed that the national security would be adversely affected by the disclosure of such material. The District Court held that the material at issue would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with an agency, and hence need not be disclosed by virtue of Exemption 5. The Court of Appeals reversed. 688 F. 2d 638 (CA9 1982). It agreed that the requested documents were “intra-agency memorandums” within the meaning of Exemption 5, and that they were protected from civil discovery under the Machín privilege. It held, however, that the statutory phrase “would not be available by law” did not encompass every civil discovery privilege but rather reached only those privileges explicitly recognized in the legislative history of the FOIA. It read that history as accepting an executive privilege for predecisional documents containing advice, opinions, or recommendations of Government agents, but as not extending to the Machín civil discovery privilege for official Government information. It accordingly remanded the case with directions to disclose the factual portions of the witnesses’ statements. ► — I l-H The plain language of the statute itself, as construed by our prior decisions, is sufficient to resolve the question presented. The statements of the two witnesses are unquestionably “intra-agency memorandums or letters” and, since the Machín privilege normally protects them from discovery in civil litigation, they “would not be available by law to a party other than [the Air Force] in litigation with [the Air Force].” Last Term, in FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U. S. 19 (1983), we held that Exemption 5 simply incorporates civil discovery privileges: “The test under Exemption 5 is whether the documents would be ‘routinely’ or ‘normally’ disclosed upon a showing of relevance. ” Id., at 26. Thus, since the Machín privilege is well recognized in the case law as precluding routine disclosure of the statements, the statements are covered by Exemption 5. Grolier was consistent with our prior cases. For example, Grolier itself relied on Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U. S. 168 (1975), which Grolier quoted on the scope of Exemption 5: “ ‘Exemption 5 incorporates the privileges which the Government enjoys under the relevant statutory and case law in the pretrial discovery context.’” 462 U. S., at 26-27 (emphasis added in Grolier) (quoting 421 U. S., at 184). Similarly, in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132 (1975), we wrote: “Exemption 5 withholds from a member of the public documents which a private party could not discover in litigation with the agency.” Id., at 148. In Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill, 443 U. S. 340 (1979), we wrote: “The House Report [on the FOIA] states that Exemption 5 was intended to allow an agency to withhold intra-agency memoranda which would not 'routinely be disclosed to a private party through the discovery process in litigation "with the agency . . . Id., at 353 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966)). And in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973), the Court observed: “This language clearly contemplates that the public is entitled to all such memoranda or letters that a private party could discover in litigation with the agency.” Id., at 86. Respondents read Merrill as limiting the scope of Exemption 5 to privileges explicitly identified by Congress in the legislative history of the FOIA. But in Merrill we were confronted with a claimed exemption that was not clearly covered by a recognized pretrial discovery privilege. We held that Exemption 5 protected the Federal Open Market Committee’s Domestic Policy Directives although it was not entirely clear that they fell within any recognized civil discovery privilege because statements in the legislative history supported an inference that Congress intended to recognize such a privilege. See 443 U. S., at 357-360. Thus, the holding of Merrill was that a privilege that was mentioned in the legislative history of Exemption 5 is incorporated by the Exemption — not that all privileges not mentioned are ex-eluded. Moreover, the Merrill dictum upon which respondents rely merely indicates “that it is not clear that Exemption 5 was intended to incorporate every privilege known to civil discovery.” Id., at 354. It is one thing to say that recognition under Exemption 5 of a novel privilege, or one that has found less than universal acceptance, might not fall within Exemption 5 if not discussed in its legislative history. It is quite another to say that the Machín privilege, which has been well settled for some two decades, need be viewed with the same degree of skepticism. In any event, the Merrill dictum concludes only that “a claim that a privilege other than executive privilege or the attorney privilege is covered by Exemption 5 must be viewed with caution.” 443 U. S., at 355. The claim of privilege sustained in Machín was denominated as one of executive privilege. See 114 U. S. App. D. C., at 337, 316 F. 2d, at 338. Hence the dictum is of little aid to respondents. Moreover, respondents’ contention that they can obtain through the FOIA material that is normally privileged would create an anomaly in that the FOIA could be used to supplement civil discovery. We have consistently rejected such a construction of the FOIA. See Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 360, n. 14 (1982); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S., at 143, n. 10; Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 24 (1974). We do not think that Congress could have intended that the weighty policies underlying discovery privileges could be so easily circumvented. Finally, the legislative history of Exemption 5 does not contain the kind of compelling evidence of congressional intent that would be necessary to persuade us to look beyond the plain statutory language. Because of the difficulty inherent in compiling an exhaustive list of evidentiary privileges, it would be impractical to treat the legislative history of Exemption 5 as containing a comprehensive list of all privileges Congress intended to adopt. Rather, the history of Exemption 5 can be understood by means of “rough analogies.” EPA v. Mink, supra, at 86. The legislative history of Exemption 5 indicates that Congress intended to incorporate governmental privileges analogous to the Machín privilege. That history recognizes a need for claims of privilege when confidentiality is necessary to ensure frank and open discussion and hence efficient governmental operations. See Grolier, 462 U. S., at 27-28; Merrill, 443 U. S., at 359; Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U. S., at 186, 189-190; NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, at 150-152; Mink, supra, at 86-89; H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966); S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1965). The Machín privilege was recognized for precisely this reason. Thus, the Machín privilege is sufficiently related to the concerns expressed in the legislative history that we cannot say that the legislative history demonstrates that the statute should not be construed to mean what it says with respect to the Machín privilege. We therefore simply interpret Exemption 5 to mean what it says. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. “On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982 ed.). “This section does not apply to matters that are— “(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; “(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; “(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; “(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; “(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; “(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; “(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel; “(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or “(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b) (1982 ed.). Air Force Regulations 110-14, ¶ 1(a) (July 18, 1977). Air Force Regulations 127-4, ¶ 19(a)(1) (Jan. 1, 1973). Id., ¶3-8(d) (Jan. 18, 1980). Id., ¶ 19(a)(3) (Jan. 1, 1973); id., ¶¶2-4, 2-5 (Jan. 18, 1980). Id., ¶ 19(a)(4) (Jan. 1, 1973) states: “Notwithstanding the restrictions on use of these reports and their attachments and the prohibitions in this regulation against their release, factual material included in accident/incident reports, covering examination of wreckage, photographs, plotting charts, wreckage diagrams, maps, transcripts of air traffic communications, weather reports, maintenance records, crew qualifications, and like nonpersonal evidence may be released as required by law or pursuant to court order or upon specific authorization of The Judge Advocate General after consultation with The Inspector General. Also, Federal law requires that an accused in a trial by court-martial will, upon proper court order, be furnished all statements sworn or unsworn in any form which have been given to any Federal agent, employee, investigating officer, or board by any witness who testifies against the accused.” Hoover v. Weber Aircraft Corp., No. CV 74-1064-WPG (CD Cal.). Weber Aircraft Corp. Mills Manufacturing Corp. “[T];he release of the withheld portions of the Aircraft Mishap Investigation for litigation purposes would be harmful to our national security. The strength of the United States Air Force, upon which our national security is greatly dependent, is seriously affected by the number of major aircraft accidents which occur. The successful flight safety program of the United States Air Force has contributed greatly to the continuously decreasing rate of such accidents. The effectiveness of this program depends to a large extent upon our ability to obtain full and candid information on the cause of each aircraft accident. Much of the information received from persons giving testimony in the course of an aircraft mishap investigation is conjecture, speculation and opinion. Such full and frank disclosure is not only encouraged but is imperative to a successful flight safety program. Open and candid testimony is received because witnesses are promised that for the particular investigation their testimony will be used solely for the purpose of flight safety and will not be disclosed outside of the Air Force. Lacking authority to subpoena witnesses, accident investigators must rely on such assurances in order to obtain full and frank discussion concerning all the circumstances surrounding an accident. Witnesses are encouraged to express personal criticisms concerning the accident. “If aircraft mishap investigators were unable to give such assurances, or if it were felt that such promises were hollow, testimony and input from witnesses and from manufacturers; in many instances would be less than factual and a determination of the exact cause factors of accidents would be jeopardized. This would seriously hinder the accomplishment of prompt corrective action designed to preclude the occurrence of a similar accident. This privilege, properly accorded to the described portions of an United States Air Force Mishap Report of Investigation, including those portions reflecting the deliberations of the Investigating Board, is the very foundation of a successful Air Force flight safety program.” App. 38-39. The District Court also held that a medical report sought by respondents was covered by Exemption 5, and that disclosure of both the report and the statements was inappropriate because in its view the public interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighed respondents’ interests in obtaining the material. The Court of Appeals rejected both of these holdings, and the Government does not seek review on either. Weber contends that “intra-agency memorandums or letters” cannot include statements made by civilians to Air Force personnel. Whatever the merits of this assertion, it is irrelevant to this case since the material at issue here includes only statements made by Air Force personnel. Weber contends that the material at issue is not privileged because it was not obtained pursuant to a promise of confidentiality. However, the District Court found otherwise, and since that finding is supported by an uncontroverted affidavit submitted by the Government to the District Court, see id., at 38, there is no basis for setting it aside. In all other respects, respondents concede that the requested material is covered by the Machín privilege, and did not file a cross-petition for certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the requested material was privileged. Thus, we assume without deciding that the material respondents seek is privileged, and do not consider the arguments of amici that no privilege is applicable here. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 531-532, n. 13 (1979); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U. S. 361, 370 (1960). See also 462 U. S., at 28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also 421 U. S., at 149 (footnote omitted) (“[I]t is reasonable to construe Exemption 5 to exempt those documents, and only those documents, normally privileged in the civil discovery context”). Respondents contend that Mink stands for the proposition that purely factual material can never qualify for protection under Exemption 5. However, the relevant portion of Mink merely states that otherwise nonprivileged factual material cannot be withheld under Exemption 5 merely because it appears in the same document as privileged material, and that Congress intended to adopt the relevant case law on privilege. Moreover, Mink cited Machín with approval as part of that case law. See 410 U. S., at 87-91, and n. 14. This reading of Mink is confirmed by the 1974 amendment to the FOIA which provides: “Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b) (1982 ed.). This amendment constituted Congress’ codification of this aspect of Mink. See S. Rep. No. 93-854, p. 32 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 17021 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). Moreover, in the Merrill dictum we added: “We hesitate to construe Exemption 5 to incorporate a civil discovery privilege that would substantially duplicate another exemption.” 443 U. S., at 355. Respondents do not explain how incorporation of the Machín privilege into Exemption 5 would substantially duplicate another exemption. The relevance of the Merrill dictum is further reduced by the fact that in Merrill the Court explicitly reserved the question whether the Machin privilege falls within Exemption 5. See 443 U. S., at 355-356, n. 17. Thus Merrill could hardly control the question we face today. The regulation governing the Machín privilege also describes it as executive privilege. Air Force Regulations 127-4, ¶ 2-5 (Jan. 18, 1980). Respondents also argue that their need for the requested material is great and that it would be unfair to expect them to defend the litigation brought against them by Captain Hoover without access to it. We answered this argument in Grolier, noting that the fact that in particular litigation a party’s particularized showing of need may on occasion justify discovery of privileged material in order to avoid unfairness does not mean that such material is routinely discoverable and hence outside the scope of Exemption 5. See 462 U. S., at 27-28. Respondents must make their claim of particularized need in their litigation with Captain Hoover, since it is not a claim under the FOIA. This difficulty is illustrated by the controversy surrounding the proposed provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing privileges, which were rejected by Congress. See generally 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 501[01] (1982). Moreover, the Senate Report stated that Exemption 5 had been drafted in response to comments of federal agencies made in the course of Committee hearings, S. Rep. No. 813, at 4, 9. During those hearings, the Government submitted material indicating that the Machín privilege should be incorporated into the FOIA. See Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 196, 206, 366-367, 418 (1966). “We agree with the Government that when disclosure of investigative reports obtained in large part through promises of confidentiality would hamper the efficient operation of an important Government program and perhaps even, as the Secretary here claims, impair the national security by weakening a branch of the military, the reports should be considered privileged.” 114 U. S. App. D. C., at 338, 316 F. 2d, at 339. It follows that recognition of the Machín privilege would not be inconsistent with the fundamental goals of the FOIA since it does not necessarily reduce the amount of information available to the public. The privilege is recognized because the Government would not be able to obtain the information but for its assurance of confidentiality. Thus, much if not all of the information covered by the Machín privilege would not find its way into the public realm even if we refused to recognize the privilege, since under those circumstances the information would not be obtained by the Government in the first place. Cf. Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill, 443 U. S. 340, 367-360 (1979) (privilege for Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee’s policy directives sufficiently analogous to privilege for confidential information concerning Government contracts mentioned in Exemption 5’s legislative history to merit incorporation into Exemption 5). Respondents rely on the fact that in recent years Congress has several times failed to act on proposed legislation which would have codified the Machín privilege. However, this does not represent a rejection of the privilege. To the contrary, Congress has enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which recognizes the power of the courts to fashion common-law rules of privilege. Congressional refusal to codify the Machín privilege hardly limits the power of courts to recognize the privilege under Rule 501. Indeed, Rule 501 was adopted precisely because Congress wished to leave privilege questions to the courts rather than attempt to codify them. See H. R. Rep. No. 93-650, p. 8 (1973); S. Rep. No. 93-1277, pp. 11,13 (1974); supra, at 802-803, and n. 21. Congressional failure to codify this privilege is therefore irrelevant to our inquiry. Respondents also rely on legislation enacted after Exemption 5 concerning the scope of Exemption 3 and various other statutes. This legislation obviously sheds no light on the scope of Exemption 5.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 2 ]	sc_adminaction
FRANK LYON CO. v. UNITED STATES No. 76-624. Argued November 2, 1977 Decided April 18, 1978 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 584. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 584. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was /. Gaston Williamson. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, and John A. Dudeck, Jr. George G. Gallantz filed a brief for the National Realty Committee as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the federal income tax consequences of a sale-and-leaseback in which petitioner Frank Lyon Company (Lyon) took title to a building under construction by Worthen Bank & Trust Company (Worthen) of Little Rock, Ark., and simultaneously leased the building back to Worthen for long-term use as its headquarters and principal banking facility. I The underlying pertinent facts are undisputed. They are established by stipulations, App. 9, 14, the trial testimony, and the documentary evidence, and are reflected in the District Court’s findings. A ■ Lyon is a closely held Arkansas corporation engaged in the distribution of home furnishings, primarily Whirlpool and RCA electrical products. Worthen in 1965 was an Arkansas-chartered bank and a member of the Federal Reserve System. Frank Lyon was Lyon’s majority shareholder and board chairman; he also served on Worthen’s board. Worthen at that time began to plan the construction of a multistory bank and office building to replace its existing facility in Little Rock. About the same time Worthen’s competitor, Union National Bank of Little Rock, also began to plan a new bank and office building. Adjacent sites on Capitol Avenue, separated only by Spring Street, were acquired by the two banks. It became a matter of competition, for both banking business and tenants, and prestige as to which bank would start and complete its building first. Worthen initially hoped to finance, to build, and to own the proposed facility at a total cost of $9 million for the site, building, and adjoining parking deck. This was to be accomplished by selling $4 million in debentures and using the proceeds in the acquisition of the capital stock of a wholly owned real estate subsidiary. This subsidiary would have formal title and would raise the remaining $5 million by a conventional mortgage loan on the new premises. Worthen’s plan, however, had to be abandoned for two significant reasons: 1. As a bank chartered under Arkansas law, Worthen legally could not pay more interest on any debentures it might issue than that then specified by Arkansas law. But the proposed obligations would not be marketable at that rate. 2. Applicable statutes or regulations of the Arkansas State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System required Worthen, as a state bank subject to their supervision, to obtain prior permission for the investment in banking premises of any amount (including that placed in a real estate subsidiary) in excess of the bank’s capital stock or of 40% of its capital stock and surplus. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-547.1 (Supp. 1977) ; 12 U. S. C. § 371d (1976 ed.); 12 CFR § 265.2 (f) (7) (1977). Worthen, accordingly, was advised by staff employees of the Federal Reserve System that they would not recommend approval of the plan by the System’s Board of Governors. Worthen therefore was forced to seek an alternative solution that would provide it with the use of the building, satisfy the state and federal regulators, and attract the necessary capital. In September 1967 it proposed a sale-and-leaseback arrangement. The State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System approved this approach, but the Department required that Worthen possess an option to purchase the leased property at the end of the 15th year of the lease at a set price, and the federal regulator required that the building be owned by an independent third party. Detailed negotiations ensued with investors that had indicated interest, namely, Goldman, Sachs & Company; White, Weld & Co.; Eastman Dillon, Union Securities & Company; and Stephens, Inc. Certain of these firms made specific proposals. Worthen then obtained a commitment from New York Life Insurance Company to provide $7,140,000 in permanent mortgage financing on the building, conditioned upon its approval of the titleholder. At this point Lyon entered the negotiations and it, too, made a proposal. Worthen submitted a counterproposal that incorporated the best features, from its point of view, of the several offers. Lyon accepted the counterproposal, suggesting, by way of further inducement, a $21,000 reduction in the annual rent for the first five years of the building lease. Worthen selected Lyon as the investor. After further negotiations, resulting in the elimination of that rent reduction (offset, however, by higher interest Lyon was to pay Worthen on a subsequent unrelated loan), Lyon in November 1967 was approved as an acceptable borrower by First National City Bank for the construction financing, and by New York Life, as the permanent lender. In April 1968 the approvals of the state and federal regulators were received. In the meantime, on September 15, before Lyon was selected, Worthen itself began construction. B In May 1968 Worthen, Lyon, City Bank, and New York Life executed complementary and interlocking agreements under which the building was sold by Worthen to Lyon as it was constructed, and Worthen leased the completed building back from Lyon. 1. Agreements between Worthen and Lyon. Worthen and Lyon executed a ground lease, a sales agreement, and a building lease. Under the ground lease dated May 1, 1968, App. 366, Worthen leased the site to Lyon for 76 years and 7 months through November 30, 2044. The first 19 months were the estimated construction period. The ground rents payable by Lyon to Worthen were $50 for the first 26 years and 7 months and thereafter in quarterly payments: 12/1/94 through 11/30/99 (5 years) — $100,000 annually 12/1/99 through 11/30/04 (5 years) — $150,000 annually 12/1/04 through 11/30/09 (5 years) — $200,000 annually 12/1/09 through 11/30/34 (25 years) — $250,000 annually 12/1/34 through 11/30/44 (10 years) — $10,000 annually. Under the sales agreement dated May 19, 1968, id., at 508, Worthen agreed to sell the building to Lyon, and Lyon agreed to buy it, piece by piece as it was constructed, for a total price not to exceed $7,640,000, in reimbursements to Worthen for its expenditures for the construction of the building. Under the building lease dated May 1, 1968, id., at 376, Lyon leased the building back to Worthen for a primary term of 25 years from December 1, 1969, with options in Worthen to extend the lease for eight additional 5-year terms, a total of 65 years. During the period between the expiration of the building lease (at the latest, November 30, 2034, if fully extended) and the end of the ground lease on November 30, 2044, full ownership, use, and control of the building were Lyon’s, unless, of course, the building had been repurchased by Worthen. Id., at 369. Worthen was not obligated to pay rent under the building lease until completion of the building. For the first 11 years of the lease, that is, until November 30, 1980, the stated quarterly rent was $145,581.03 ($582,324.12 for the year). For the next 14 years, the quarterly rent was $153,289.32 ($613,157.28 for the year), and for the option periods the rent was $300,000 a year, payable quarterly. Id., at 378-379. The total rent for the building over the 25-year primary term of the lease thus was $14,989,767.24. That rent equaled the principal and interest payments that would amortize the $7,140,000 New York Life mortgage loan over the same period. When the mortgage was paid off at the end of the primary term, the annual building rent, if Worthen extended the lease, came down to the stated $300,000. Lyon’s net rentals from the building would be further reduced by the increase in ground rent Worthen would receive from Lyon during the extension. The building lease was a “net lease,” under which Worthen was responsible for all expenses usually associated with the maintenance of an office building, including repairs, taxes, utility charges, and insurance, and was to keep the premises in good condition, excluding, however, reasonable wear and tear. Finally, under the lease, Worthen had the option to repurchase the building at the following times and prices: 11/30/80 (after 11 years) — $6,325,169.85 11/30/84 (after 15 years) — $5,432,607.32 11/30/89 (after 20 years) — $4,187,328.04 11/30/94 (after 25 years) — $2,145,935.00 These repurchase option prices were the sum of the unpaid balance of the New York Life mortgage, Lyon’s $500,000 investment, and 6% interest compounded on that investment. 2. Construction financing agreement. By agreement dated May 14, 1968, id., at 462, City Bank agreed to lend Lyon $7,000,000 for the construction of the building. This loan was secured by a mortgage on the building and the parking deck, executed by Worthen as well as by Lyon, and an assignment by Lyon of its interests in the building lease and in the ground lease. 3. Permanent financing agreement. By Note Purchase Agreement dated May 1, 1968, id., at 443, New York Life agreed' to purchase Lyon’s $7,140,000 6%% 25-year secured note to be issued upon completion of the building. Under this agreement Lyon warranted that it would lease the building to Worthen for a noncancelable term of at least 25 years under a net lease at a rent at least equal to the mortgage payments on the note. Lyon agreed to make quarterly payments of principal and interest equal to the rentals payable by Worthen during the corresponding primary term of the lease. Id., at 523. The security for the note was a first deed of trust and Lyon’s assignment of its interests in the building lease and in the ground lease. Id., at 527, 571. Worthen joined in the deed of trust as the owner of the fee and the parking deck. In December 1969 the building was completed and Worthen took possession. At that time Lyon received the permanent loan from New York Life, and it discharged the interim loan from City Bank. The actual cost of constructing the office building and parking complex (excluding the cost of the land) exceeded $10,000,000. C Lyon filed its federal income tax returns on the accrual and calendar year basis. On its 1969 return, Lyon accrued rent from Worthen for December. It asserted as deductions one month’s interest to New York Life; one month’s depreciation on the building; interest on the construction loan from City Bank; and sums for legal and other expenses incurred in connection with the transaction. On audit of Lyon’s 1969 return, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that Lyon was “not the owner for tax purposes of any portion of the Worthen Building,” and ruled that “the income and expenses related to this building are not allowable... for Federal income tax purposes.” App. 304-305, 299. He also added $2,298.15 to Lyon’s 1969 income as “accrued interest income.” This was the computed 1969 portion of a gain, considered the equivalent of interest income, the realization of which was based on the assumption that Worthen would exercise its option to buy the building after 11 years, on November 30, 1980, at the price stated in the lease, and on the additional determination that Lyon had “loaned” $500,000 to Worthen. In other words, the Commissioner determined that the sale-and-leaseback arrangement was a financing transaction in which Lyon loaned Worthen $500,000 and acted as a conduit for the transmission of principal and interest from Worthen to New York Life. All this resulted in a total increase of $497,219.18 over Lyon’s reported income for 1969, and a deficiency in Lyon’s federal income tax for that year in the amount of $236,596.36. The Commissioner assessed that amount, together with interest of $43,790.84, for a total of $280,387.20 Lyon paid the assessment and filed a timely claim for its refund. The claim was denied, and this suit, to recover the amount so paid, was instituted in the United States District Court, for the Eastern District of Arkansas within the time allowed by 26 U. S. C. § 6532 (a) (1). After trial without a jury, the District Court, in a memorandum letter-opinion setting forth findings and conclusions, ruled in Lyon’s favor and held that its claimed deductions were allowable. 75-2 USTC ¶[ 9545 (1975), 36 AFTR 2d ¶ 75-5059 (1975); App. 296-311. It concluded that the legal intent of the parties had been to create a bona fide sale- and-leaseback in accordance with the form and language of the documents evidencing the transactions. It rejected the argument that Worthen was acquiring an equity in the building through its rental payments. It found that the rents were unchallenged and were reasonable throughout the period of the lease, and that the option prices, negotiated at arm’s length between the parties, represented fair estimates of market value on the applicable dates. It rejected any negative inference from the fact that the rentals, combined with the options, were sufficient to amortize the New York Life loan and to pay Lyon a 6% return on its equity investment. It found that Worthen would acquire an equity in the building only if it exercised one of its options to purchase, and that it was highly unlikely, as a practical matter, that any purchase option would ever be exercised. It rejected any inference to be drawn from the fact that the lease was a “net lease.” It found that Lyon had mixed motivations for entering into the transaction, including the need to diversify as well as the desire to have the benefits of a “tax shelter.” App. 296, 299. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 536 F. 2d 746 (1976). It held that the Commissioner correctly determined that Lyon was not the true owner of the building and therefore was not entitled to the claimed deductions. It likened ownership for tax purposes to a “bundle of sticks” and undertook its own evaluation of the facts. It concluded, in agreement with the Government’s contention, that Lyon “totes an empty bundle” of ownership sticks. Id., at 751. It stressed the following: (a) The lease agreements circumscribed Lyon’s right to profit from its investment in the building by giving Worthen the option to purchase for an amount equal to Lyon’s $500,000 equity plus 6% compound interest and the assumption of the unpaid balance of the New York Life mortgage. (b) The option prices did not take into account possible appreciation of the value of the building or inflation. (c) Any award realized as a result of destruction or condemnation of the building in excess of the mortgage balance and the $500,000 would be paid to Worthen and not Lyon. (d) The building rental payments during the primary term were exactly equal to the mortgage payments. (e) Worthen retained control over the ultimate disposition of the building through its various options to repurchase and to renew the lease plus its ownership of the site. (f) Worthen enjoyed all benefits and bore all burdens incident to the operation and ownership of the building so that, in the Court of Appeals’ view, the only economic advantages accruing to Lyon, in the event it were considered to be the true owner of the property, were income tax savings of approximately $1.5 million during the first 11 years of the arrangement. Id., at 752-753. The court concluded, id., at 753, that the transaction was “closely akin” to that in Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252 (1939). “In sum, the benefits, risks, and burdens which [Lyon] has incurred with respect to the Worthen building are simply too insubstantial to establish a claim to the status of owner for tax purposes.... The vice of the present lease is that all of [its] features have been employed in the same transaction with the cumulative effect of depriving [Lyon] of any significant ownership interest.” 536 F. 2d, at 754. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 1089 (1977), because of an indicated conflict with American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F. 2d 1194 (CA4 1974). II This Court, almost 50 years ago, observed that “taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed- — the actual benefit for which the tax is paid.” Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930). In a number of cases, the Court has refused to permit the transfer of formal legal title to shift the incidence of taxation attributable to ownership- of property where the transferor continues to retain significant control over the property transferred. E. g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). In applying this doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed. The Court has never regarded “the simple expedient of drawing up papers,” Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280, 291 (1946), as controlling for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are to the contrary. “In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding.” Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S., at 255. See also Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U. S. 260, 266-267 (1958); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331, 334 (1945). Nor is the parties’ desire to achieve a particular tax result necessarily relevant. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278, 286 (1960). In the light of these general and established principles, the Government takes the position that the Worthen-Lyon transaction in its entirety should be regarded as a sham. The agreement as a whole, it is said, was only an elaborate financing scheme designed to provide economic benefits to Worthen and a guaranteed return to Lyon. The latter was but a conduit used to forward the mortgage payments, made under the guise of rent paid by Worthen to Lyon, on to- New York Life as mortgagee. This, the Government claims, is the true substance of the transaction as viewed under the microscope of the tax laws. Although the arrangement was cast in sale-and-leaseback form, in substance it was only a financing transaction, and the terms of the repurchase options and lease renewals so indicate. It is said that Worthen co-uld reacquire the building simply by satisfying the mortgage debt and paying Lyon its $500,000 advance plus interest, regardless of the fair market value of the building at the time; similarly, when the mortgage was paid off, Worthen could extend the- lease at drastically reduced bargain rentals that likewise bore relation to fair rental value but were simply calculated to pay Lyon its $500,000 plus interest over the extended term. Lyon’s return on the arrangement in no' event could exceed 6% compound interest (although the Government conceded it might well be less, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32). Furthermore, the favorable option and lease renewal ternls made it highly unlikely that Worthen would abandon the building after it in effect had “paid off” the mortgage. The Government implies that the arrangement was one of convenience which, if accepted on its face, would enable Worthen to deduct its payments to Lyon as rent and would allow Lyon to claim a deduction for depreciation, based on the cost of construction ultimately borne by Worthen, which Lyon could offset against other income, and to deduct mortgage interest that roughly would offset the inclusion of Worthen’s rental payments in Lyon’s income. If, however, the Government argues, the arrangement was only a financing transaction under which Worthen was the owner of the building, Worthen’s payments would be deductible only to the extent that they represented mortgage interest, and Worthen would be entitled to’ claim depreciation; Lyon would not be entitled to deductions for either mortgage interest or depreciation and it would not have to include Worthen’s “rent” payments in its income because its function with respect to those payments was that of a conduit between Worthen and New York Life. The Government places great reliance on Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., supra, and claims it to' be precedent that controls this case. The taxpayer there was a department store. The legal title of its three buildings was in a bank as trustee for land-trust certificate holders. When the transfer to the trustee was made, the trustee at the same time leased the buildings back to the taxpayer for 99 years, with option to renew and purchase. The Commissioner, in stark contrast to his posture in the present case, took the position that the statutory right to depreciation followed legal title. The Board of Tax Appeals, however, concluded that the transaction between the taxpayer and the bank in reality was a mortgage loan and allowed the taxpayer depreciation on the buildings. This Court, as had the Court of Appeals, agreed with that conclusion and affirmed. It regarded the “rent” stipulated in the leaseback as a promise to pay interest on the loan, and a “depreciation fund” required by the lease as an amortization fund designed to pay off the loan in the stated period. Thus, said the Court, the Board justifiably concluded that the transaction, although in written form a transfer of ownership with a leaseback, was actually a loan secured by the property involved. The Lazarus case, we feel, is to be distinguished from the present one and is not controlling here. Its transaction was one involving only two (and not multiple) parties, the taxpayer-department store and the trustee-bank. The Court looked closely at the substance of the agreement between those two parties and rightly concluded that depreciation was deductible by the taxpayer despite the nomenclature of the instrument of conveyance and the leaseback. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F. 2d 258 (CA3 1977) (a two-party case with the added feature that the second party was a tax-exempt pension trust). The present case, in contrast, involves three parties, Worthen, Lyon, and the finance agency. The usual simple two-party arrangement was legally unavailable to Worthen. Independent investors were interested in participating in the alternative available to Worthen, and Lyon itself (also independent from Worthen) won the privilege. Despite Frank Lyon’s presence on Worthen’s board of directors, the transaction, as it ultimately developed, was not a familial one arranged by Worthen, but one compelled by the realities of the restrictions imposed upon the bank. Had Lyon not appeared, another interested investor would have been selected. The ultimate solution would have been essentially the same. Thus, the presence of the third party, in our view, significantly distinguishes this case from Lazarus and removes the latter as controlling authority. Ill It is true, of course, that the transaction took shape according to Worthen’s needs. As the Government points out, Worthen throughout the negotiations regarded the respective proposals of the independent investors in terms of its own cost of funds. B. g., App. 355. It is also true that both Worthen and the prospective investors compared the various proposals in terms of the return anticipated on the investor’s equity. But all this is natural for parties contemplating entering into a transaction of this kind. Worthen needed a building for its banking operations and other purposes and necessarily had to know what its cost would be. The investors were in business to employ their funds in the most remunerative way possible. And, as the Court has said in the past, a transaction must be given its effect in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U. S. 134, 148-149 (1974); Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U. S. 673, 690 (1974). There is no simple device available to' peel away the form of this transaction and to reveal its substance. The effects of the transaction on all the parties were obviously different from those that would have resulted had Worthen been able simply to make a mortgage agreement with New York Life and to receive a $500,000 loan from Lyon. Then Lazarus would apply. Here, however, and most significantly, it was Lyon alone, and not Worthen, who was liable on the notes, first to City Bank, and then to New York Life. Despite the facts that Worthen had agreed to pay rent and that this rent equaled the amounts due from Lyon to New York Life, should anything go awry in the later years of the lease, Lyon was primarily liable. No matter how the transaction could have been devised otherwise, it remains a fact that as the agreements were placed in final form, the obligation on the notes fell squarely on Lyon. Lyon, an ongoing enterprise, exposed its very business well-being to this real and substantial risk. The effect of this liability on Lyon is not just the abstract possibility that something will go wrong and that Worthen will not be able to make its payments. Lyon has disclosed this liability on its balance sheet for all the world to- see. Its financial position was affected substantially by the presence of this long-term debt, despite the offsetting presence of the building as an asset. To the extent that Lyon has used its capital in this transaction, it is less able to obtain financing for other business needs. In concluding that there is this distinct element of economic reality in Lyon’s assumption of liability, we are mindful that the characterization of a transaction for financial accounting purposes, on the one hand, and for tax purposes, on the other, need not necessarily be the same. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn., 403 U. S. 345, 355 (1971); Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 562 (1932). Accounting methods or descriptions, without more, do not lend substance to that which has no substance. But in this case accepted accounting methods, as understood by the several parties to the respective agreements and as applied to the transaction by others, gave the transaction a meaningful character consonant with the form it was given. Worthen was not allowed to enter into the type of transaction which the Government now urges to be the true substance of the arrangement. Lyon and Worthen cannot be said to have entered into the transaction intending that the interests involved were allocated in a way other than that associated with a sale-and-leaseback. Other factors also reveal that the transaction cannot be viewed as anything more than a mortgage agreement between Worthen and New York Life and a loan from Lyon to Worthen. There is no legal obligation between Lyon and Worthen representing the $500,000 “loan” extended under the Government’s theory. And the assumed 6% return on this putative loan — required by the audit to be recognized in the taxable year in question — will be realized only when and if Worthen exercises its options. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the rents alone, due after the primary term of the lease and after the mortgage has been paid, do not provide the simple 6% return which, the Government urges, Lyon is guaranteed, 536 F. 2d, at 752. Thus, if Worthen chooses not to exercise its options, Lyon is gambling that the rental value of the building during the last 10 years of the ground lease, during which the ground rent is minimal, will be sufficient to recoup its investment before it must negotiate again with Worthen regarding the ground lease. There are simply too many contingencies, including variations in the value of real estate, in the cost of money, and in the capital structure of Worthen, to permit the conclusion that the parties intended to enter into the transaction as structured in, the audit and according to- which the Government now urges they be taxed. It is not inappropriate to note that the Government is likely to lose little revenue, if any, as a result of the shape given the transaction by the parties. No deduction was created that is not either matched by an item of income or that would not have been available to one of the parties if the transaction had been arranged differently. While it is true that Worthen paid Lyon less to induce it to enter into the transaction because Lyon anticipated the benefit of the' depreciation deductions it would have as the owner of the building, those deductions would have been equally available to Worthen had it retained title to the building. The Government so concedes. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-23. The fact that favorable tax consequences were taken into account by Lyon on entering into the transaction is no reason for disallowing those consequences. We cannot ignore the reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every business transaction. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 579-580 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Lyon is not a corporation with no-purpose other than to hold title to the bank building. It was not created by Worthen or even financed to any degree by Worthen. The conclusion that the transaction is not a simple sham to-be ignored does not, of course, automatically compel the further conclusion that Lyon is entitled to the items claimed as deductions. Nevertheless, on the facts,	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK. No. 59. Argued November 16, 1964. Decided January 18, 1965. Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox and' Harold C. Wilkenfeld. Henry Harfield argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William Harvey Beeves and John E. Hoffman, Jr. Boy C. Haberkern, Jr., and Edward J. Boss filed a brief for the Chase. Manhattan Bank et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance. Theodore Tannenwald and A. 'Chauncey Newlin filed a memorandum for Omar, S. A. Me.. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a collateral phase of litigation involving jeopardy assessments of some $19,000,000 made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against Omar; S. A., a Uruguayan corporation. The assessments charged that income had been realized within the United States on which a tax was due. On the same day respondent was served with notice, of levy and notice of'the federal tax lien. At the same time petitioner commenced ¡an action in the New York District Court naming Omar, as well as respondent and others, as defendants. Personal jurisdiction over respondent was acquired; but as of the date of argument of the case here, Omar had not yet been served. That action requested, inter alia, foreclosure of the tax lien upon all of Omar’s property, including sums held for the account or credit of Omar in foreign branch offices of respondent. It also requested that, pending determination of the action, respondent be enjoined from transferring any property or rights to property held for the account of Omar; and affidavits filed with the complaint averred that Omar was removing its assets from the United States. The District Court, on the basis of the affidavits, issued a temporary injunction enjoining respondent from transferring any property or rights to property of Omar now held by it or by any branch offices within or without the United States, indicating it would modify the order should compliance be shown to violate foreign law. 210 F. Supp. 773. The Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote both by a panel of three, 321 F. 2d 14, and en banc, 325 F. 2d 1020. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 377 U. S. 951. Title 26 U. S. C. § 7402 (a) gives the District Court power to grant injunctions “necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” Since it has personal jurisdiction over respondent, has it power to grant the interim relief requested? We are advised that respondent’s only debt to Omar is payable at respondent’s branch in Montevideo. It is said that the United States, the creditor, can assert against respondent in New York only those rights that Omar, the debtor, has against respondent in New York and that under New York law a depositor in a foreign branch has an action against the head office only where there has been a demand and wrongful refusal at the foreign branch. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917, 250 N. Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745. The point is emphasized by the argument that any obligation of respondent to Omar is due only in Montevideo — an obligation apparently dis-chargeable in Uruguayan currency, not in dollars. Therefore, the argument runs, there is no claim of the debtor (Omar) in New York which the creditor can reach. We need not consider at this juncture all the refinements of that reasoning. For the narrow issue for us is whether the creditor (the United States) may by injunction pendente lite protect whatever rights the debtor (Omar) may have against respondent who is before the court on personal service. If it were clear that the debtor (Omar) were beyond reach of the District Court so far as personal service is concerned, we would have quite a different case — one on which we intimate no opinion. But under § 302 (a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, 7B McKinney’s Consol. Laws Ann., § 302, personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a “non-domiciliary” who “transacts-any business within the state” as to a cause of action arising out of such transaction, in which event out-of-state personal service may be made as provided in § 313. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Rule 4 (e) and Rule 4 (f) allow a party not an inhabitant of the State or found therein to be served with a summons in a federal court in the manner and under the circumstances prescribed by a state statute. See United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F. R. D. 216. To be sure, this cause of action arose, the complaint was filed, and the temporary injunction was issued before the New York statute became effective. The New York Court of Appeals has, however,'indicated that where the suit is instituted after the effective date of the statute, the statute will normally apply to transactions occurring before the effective date. Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N. Y. 2d 281, 290, 200 N. E. 2d 427, 432. That court has further indicated that where, as in the instant case, the suit based on the prior transaction was pending on the effective date of the statute, “the new act shall— except where it ‘would not be feasible or would work injustice’ — apply ‘to all further proceedings’ in such actions . ...” Ibid. It seems obvious that a future attempt by the Government to serve process on Omar would be considered a “further proceeding” in the instant litigation. Accordingly, we judge the temporary injunction, which has only a prospective application, as of now and in light of the present remedy which § 302 (a) affords. And our review of the injunction as an exercise of the equity power granted by 26 U. S. C. § 7402 (a) must be in light of the public interest involved: “Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to. go when only private interests are involved.” Virginian R. Co. v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 552. And see United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 194; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 330. If personal jurisdiction over Omar is acquired, the creditor (the United States) will be able to collect from respondent what the debtor (Omar) could collect. The opportunity to make that collection should not be lost in limine merely because the debtor (Omar) has not made the agreed-upon demand on respondent at the time and place and in the manner provided in their contract. Whether the Montevideo branch is a “separate entity,” as the Court of Appeals thought, is not germane to the present narrow issue. It is not a separate entity in the sense that it is insulated from respondent’s managerial prerogatives. Respondent has actual, practical control over its branches; it is organized under a federal statute, 12 U. S. C. § 24, which authorizes it “To sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law and equity, as fully as natural persons” — as one entity, not branch by bratich. The branch bank’s affairs are, therefore, as much within the reach of the in personam order entered by the District Court as are those of the home office. Once personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to “freeze” property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United States. See New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U. S. 473, 482. That is not to say that a federal court in this country should treat all the affairs of a branch bank the same as it would those of the home office. For overseas transactions are often caught in a web of extraterritorial activities and foreign law beyond the ken of our federal courts or their competence. We have, however, no such involvement here, for there is no showing that the mere “freezing”' of the Montevideo accounts, pending service on Omar, would violate foreign law, cf. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U. S. 197, 211, or place respondent under any risk of double liability. Cf. Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U. S. 71. The District Court reserved power-to enter any protective order of that character. 210 F. Supp. 773, 775. And if, as'is argúed in dissent, the litigation might in time be embarrassing to United States diplomacy, the District Court remains open to the Executive Branch, which, it must be remembered, is the moving party in the present proceeding. The’temporary injunction issued by the District Court seems to us to be eminently appropriate to prevent further dissipation of assets. See United States v. Morris & Essex R. Co., 135 F. 2d 711, 713-714. If such relief were beyond the authority of the District Court, foreign taxpayers facing jeopardy assessments might either transfer assets abroad or dissipate those in foreign accounts under control of American institutions before personal service on the foreign taxpayer could be made. Such a scheme was underfoot here, the affidavits aver. Unlike De Beers Mines v. United States, 325 U. S. 212, there is here property which would be “the subject of the provisions of any final decree in the cause.” Id., 220. We conclude that this temporary injunction is “a reasonable measure to preserve the status quo” (Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 282, 290) pending service of process on Omar and an adjudication of the merits. Reversed. These branches are not separate corporations but parts of respondent’s single, federally chartered corporation. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 601-604; First National City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F. 2d 616. There is also of course the possibility that Omar might enter a-general appearance as it apparently did in the Tax Court when it filed its petition of May 20, 1963, for a redetermination of the deficiencies on the basis of which the present jeopardy assessments were made. Rule 4 (e), effective July 1, 1963, reads in relevant part: “Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to Kim to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.” Rule 4 (f), also effective-July 1, 1963, reads in relevant part: “All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of'that state.” The Court of Appeals reached these conclusions on the basis of Civil Practice Law and Rules, § 10003, 7B McKinney’s Consol. Laws Aim., § 10003: “This act shall apply to all actions hereafter commenced. This act shall also apply to all further proceedings in pending actions, except to the extent that the court determines that application in a particular pending action would not be féasibje or would work injustice,-in which event the former procedure applies. Proceedings pursuant to law in an action taken prior to the time this act takes effect shall not be rendered'ineffectual or impaired by this act.” That the Government has not yet attempted to obtain personal jurisdiction over Omar is not significant in light of the fact that until now the Government’s primary contention has been that the ■District Court’s personal jurisdiction over the respondent bank was by itself an adequate basis for the issuance of the temporary injunction. As the Government said in its petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeals: “The jurisdictional basis, then, for the injunction issued by the District Court was personal jurisdiction over the Bank. Certainly, at this stage of the proceeding, it is inconsequential whether the District Court has jurisdiction over a res of over the taxpayer.” The Government went on to say that if this contention was rejected, then it wished tó argue that the tax lien had attached to Omar’s deposits and that these deposits “constitute rights to property which were within the jurisdiction of the District, Court.” Finally the Government stated: “It is only in the event that the Court concludes that the lien does not attach to such deposits that personal jurisdiction over Omar becomes relevant. In such event'the Government should be afforded an opportunity to obtain personal jurisdiction over Omar and the injunction should stand pending such efforts.” Even before this Court the Government argues alternatively that “the District Court had authority to enter the temporary injunction to preserve funds over which it had jurisdiction quad in rem,” a contention upon which, as noted previously, we do not pass.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. RODGERS et al. No. 81-1476. Argued December 6, 1982 Decided May 31, 1983 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, and Powell, J.J., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 713. George W. Jones argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Stuart A. Smith, William S. Estabrook, and Wynette J. Hewett. Wm. D. Elliott argued the cause for respondents Rodgers et al. With him on the brief was J. Michael Wylie. L. Lynn Elliott argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Ingram et al. Together with United States v. Ingram et al., also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule 19.4). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated cases involve the relationship between the imperatives of federal tax collection and rights accorded by state property laws. Section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §7403 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), authorizes the judicial sale of certain properties to satisfy the tax indebtedness of delinquent taxpayers. The issue in both cases is whether § 7403 empowers a federal district court to order the sale of a family home in which a delinquent taxpayer had an interest at the time he incurred his indebtedness, but in which the taxpayer’s spouse, who does not owe any of that indebtedness, also has a separate “homestead” right as defined by Texas law. We hold that the statute does grant power to order the sale, but that its exercise is limited to some degree by equitable discretion. We also hold that, if the home is sold, the nondelinquent spouse is entitled, as part of the distribution of proceeds required under § 7403, to so much of the proceeds as represents complete compensation for the loss of the homestead estate. I A Section 7403 provides in full as follows: “(a) Filing. — In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy has been made, the Attorney General or his delegate, at the request of the Secretary [of the Treasury], may direct a civil action to be filed in a district court of the United States to enforce the lien of the United States under this title with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence, any acceleration of payment under section 6166(g) shall be treated as a neglect to pay tax. “(b) Parties. — All persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property involved in such action shall be made parties thereto. “(c) Adjudication and decree. — The court shall, after the parties have been duly notified of the action, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved therein and finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property, and, in all cases where a claim or interest of the United States therein is established, may decree a sale of such property, by the proper officer of the court, and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States. If the property is sold to satisfy a first lien held by the United States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not exceeding the amount of such lien with expenses of sale, as the Secretary directs. “(d) Receivership. — In any such proceeding, at the instance of the United States, the court may appoint a receiver to enforce the lien, or, upon certification by the Secretary during the pendency of such proceedings that it is in the public interest, may appoint a receiver with all the powers of a receiver in equity.” As a general matter, the “lien of the United States” referred to in § 7403(a) is that created by 26 U. S. C. § 6321, which provides: “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” Section 7403, whose basic elements go back to revenue legislation passed in 1868 (§ 106 of the Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186,15 Stat. 167) is one of a number of distinct enforcement tools available to the United States for the collection of delinquent taxes. The Government may, for example, simply sue for the unpaid amount, and, on getting a judgment, exercise the usual rights of a judgment creditor. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6502(a), 7401, 7402(a). Yet a third route is administrative levy under 26 U. S. C. § 6331(a), which provides: “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary [or his delegate] to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a hen provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax....” Administrative levy, unlike an. ordinary lawsuit, and unlike the procedure described in § 7403, does not require any judicial intervention, and it is up to the taxpayer, if he so chooses, to go to court if he claims that the assessed amount was not legally owing. See generally Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 260 (1935). The common purpose of this formidable arsenal of collection tools is to ensure the prompt and certain enforcement of the tax laws in a system relying primarily on self-reporting. See G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 350 (1977); United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47, 51 (1950); Bull v. United States, supra, at 259-260. Moreover, it has long been an axiom of our tax collection scheme that, although the definition of underlying property interests is left to state law, the consequences that attach to those interests is a matter left to federal law. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U. S. 190, 205 (1971) (state law determines income attributable to wife as community property, but state law allowing wife to renounce community rights and obligations not effective as to liability for federal tax); United States v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 368 U. S. 291, 293-295 (1961) (federal tax lien not subject, even as against good-faith purchaser, to state filing requirements); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U. S. 509, 513-515 (1960), and cases cited (attachment of federal lien depends on whether “property” or “rights to property” exist under state law; priority of federal lien depends on federal law); United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 56-57 (1958) (once it has been determined that state law has created property interests sufficient for federal tax lien to attach, state law “is inoperative to prevent the attachment” of such liens); Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 594 (1881) (federal tax sale not subject to state requirement that independent lots be sold separately). B The substance of Texas law related to the homestead right may usefully be divided into two categories. Cf. Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 590, 19 S. W. 2d 35, 35 (1929). First, in common with a large number of States, Texas establishes the family home or place of business as an enclave exempted from the reach of most creditors. Thus, under Tex. Const., Art. 16, § 50: “The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for [certain exceptions not relevant here].... No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid, except for [certain exceptions not relevant here].” Second, in common with a somewhat smaller number of States, Texas gives members of the family unit additional rights in the homestead property itself. Thus, in a clause not included in the above quotation, Tex. Const., Art 16, § 50, also provides that “the owner or claimant of the property claimed as homestead [may not], if married, sell or abandon the homestead without the consent of the other spouse, given in such manner as may be prescribed by law. ” Equally important, Art. 16, § 52, provides: “On the death of the husband or wife, or both, the homestead shall descend and vest in like manner as other real property of the deceased, and shall be governed by the same laws of descent and distribution, but it shall not be partitioned among the heirs of the deceased during the lifetime of the surviving husband or wife, or so long as the survivor may elect to use or occupy the same as a homestead, or so long as the guardian of the minor children of the deceased may be permitted, under the order of the proper court having the jurisdiction, to use and occupy the same.” The effect of these provisions in the Texas Constitution is to give each spouse in a marriage a separate and undivided possessory interest in the homestead, which is only lost by death or abandonment, and which may not be compromised either by the other spouse or by his or her heirs. It bears emphasis that the rights accorded by the homestead laws vest independently in each spouse regardless of whether one spouse, or both, actually owns the fee interest in the homestead. Thus, although analogy is somewhat hazardous in this area, it may be said that the homestead laws have the effect of reducing the underlying ownership rights in a homestead property to something akin to remainder interests and vesting in each, spouse an interest akin to an undivided life estate in the property. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S. W. 2d 867, 869 (Tex. 1978), and cases cited; Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 585, 218 S. W. 2d 428, 436 (1949), and cases cited; Hill v. Hill, 623 S. W. 2d 779, 780 (Tex. App. 1981), and cases cited. This analogy, although it does some injustice to the nuances present in the Texas homestead statute, also serves to bring to the fore something that has been repeatedly emphasized by the Texas courts, and that was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals in these cases: that the Texas homestead right is not a mere statutory entitlement, but a vested property right. As the Supreme Court of Texas has put it, a spouse “has a vested estate in the land of which she cannot be divested during her life except by abandonment or a voluntary conveyance in the manner prescribed by law.” Paddock v. Siemoneit, supra, at 585, 218 S. W. 2d, at 436; see United States v. Rogers, 649 F. 2d 1117, 1127 (CA5 1981), and cases cited. II The two cases before us were consolidated for oral argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and resulted in opinions issued on the same day. United States v. Rogers, supra; Ingram v. Dallas Dept. of Housing & Urban Rehabilitation, 649 F. 2d 1128 (1981). They arise out of legally comparable, but quite distinct, sets of facts. A Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers is the widow of Philip S. Bosco, whom she married in 1937. She and Mr. Bosco acquired, as community property, a residence in Dallas, Texas, and occupied it as their homestead. Subsequently, in 1971 and 1972, the Internal Revenue Service issued assessments totaling more than $900,000 for federal wagering taxes, penalties, and interest, against Philip for the taxable years 1966 through 1971. These taxes remained unpaid at the time of Philip’s death in 1974. Since Philip’s death, Lucille has continued to occupy the property as her homestead, and now lives there with her present husband. On September 23,1977, the Government filed suit under 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 and 7403 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against Mrs. Rodgers and Philip’s son, daughter, and executor. The suit sought to reduce to judgment the assessments against Philip, to enforce the Government’s tax liens, including the one that had attached to Philip’s interest in the residence, and to obtain a deficiency judgment in the amount of any unsatisfied part of the liability. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted partial summary judgment on, among other things, the defendants’ claim that the federal tax liens could not defeat Mrs. Rodgers’ state-created right not to have her homestead subjected to a forced sale. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the homestead issue, holding that if “a homestead interest is, under state law, a property right, possessed by the nontaxpayer spouse at the time the lien attaches to the taxpayer spouse’s interest, then the federal tax lien may not be foreclosed against the homestead property for as long as the nontaxpayer spouse maintains his or her homestead interest under state law.” 649 F. 2d, at 1125 (footnotes omitted). The court implied that the Government had the choice of either waiting until Mrs. Rodgers’ homestead interest lapsed, or satisfying itself with a forced sale of only Philip Bosco’s interest in the property. B Joerene Ingram is the divorced wife of Donald Ingram. During their marriage, Joerene and Donald acquired, as community property, a residence in Dallas, Texas, and occupied it as their homestead. Subsequently, in 1972 and 1973, the Internal Revenue Service issued assessments against Donald Ingram relating to unpaid taxes withheld from wages of employees of a company of which he was president. Deducting payments made on account of these liabilities, there remains unpaid approximately $9,000, plus interest. In addition, in 1973, the Service made an assessment against both Donald and Joerene in the amount of $283.33, plus interest, relating to their joint income tax liability for 1971. These amounts also remain unpaid. In March 1975, at about the time the Ingrams were seeking a divorce, their residence was destroyed by fire. In September 1975, the Ingrams obtained a divorce. In connection with the divorce, they entered into a property settlement agreement, one provision of which was that Donald would convey to Joerene his interest in the real property involved in this case in exchange for $1,500, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the property. Joerene tried to sell the property, through a trustee, but was unsuccessful in those efforts, apparently because of the federal tax hens encumbering the property. To make matters worse, she then received notice from the City of Dallas Department of Housing and Urban Rehabilitation (Department) that unless she complied with local ordinances, the remains of the fire-damaged residence would be demolished. Following a hearing, the Department issued a final notice and a work order to demolish. Joerene Ingram and the trustee then filed suit in Texas state court to quiet title to the property, to remove the federal tax liens, and to enjoin demolition. The defendants were the United States, the Department, and several creditors claiming an interest in the property. The United States removed the suit to the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. It then filed a counterclaim against Joerene Ingram and Donald Ingram (who was added as a defendant on the counterclaim) for both the unpaid withholding taxes and the joint liability for unpaid income taxes. In its prayer for relief, the Government sought, among other things, judicial sale of the property under § 7403. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the property was sold unencumbered and the proceeds (approximately $16,250) were deposited into the registry of the District Court pending the outcome of the suit. The parties agreed that their rights, claims, and priorities would be determined as if the sale had not taken place, and that the proceeds would be divided according to their respective interests. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted summary judgment on the Government’s counterclaims. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. It agreed that the Government could foreclose its lien on the proceeds from the sale of the property to collect the $283.33, plus interest, for the unpaid income tax owed by Joerene and Donald Ingram jointly. Applying its decision in Rodgers, however, it also held that the Government could not reach the proceeds of the sale of the property to collect the individual liability of Donald Ingram, assuming Joerene Ingram had maintained her homestead interest in the property. The court remanded, however, for a factual determination of whether Joerene had “abandoned” the homestead by dividing the insurance proceeds with Donald and by attempting — even before the stipulation entered into with the Government — to sell the property and divide the proceeds of that sale with Donald. C The Government filed a single petition for certiorari in both these cases. See this Court’s Rule 19.4. We granted certiorari, 456 U. S. 904 (1982), in order to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to the proper interpretation of §7403. Ill A The basic holding underlying the Court of Appeals’ view that the Government was not authorized to seek a sale of the homes in which respondents held a homestead interest is that “when a delinquent taxpayer shares his ownership interest in property jointly with other persons rather than being the sole owner, his ‘property’ and ‘rights to property’ to which the federal tax lien attaches under 26 U. S. C. § 6321, and on which federal levy may be had under 26 U. S. C. § 7403(a), involve only his interest in the property, and not the entire property.” 649 F. 2d, at 1125 (emphasis in original). According to the Court of Appeals, this principle applies, not only in the homestead context, but in any cotenancy in which unindebted third parties share an ownership interest with a delinquent taxpayer. See Folsom v. United States, 306 F. 2d 361 (CA5 1962). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Government’s lien under § 6321 cannot extend beyond the property interests held by the delinquent taxpayer. We also agree that the Government may not ultimately collect, as satisfaction for the indebtedness owed to it, more than the value of the property interests that are actually liable for that debt. But, in this context at least, the right to collect and the right to seek a forced sale are two quite different things. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that it was the only Court of Appeals that had adopted the view that the Government could seek the sale, under §7403, of only the delinquent taxpayer’s “interest in the property, and not the entire property.” 649 F. 2d, at 1125, and n. 12. We agree with the prevailing view that such a restrictive reading of § 7403 flies in the face of the plain meaning of the statute. See, e. g., United States v. Trilling, 328 F. 2d 699, 702-703 (CA7 1964); Washington v. United States, 402 F. 2d 3, 6-7 (CA4 1968); United States v. Overman, 424 F. 2d 1142, 1146 (CA9 1970); United States v. Kocher, 468 F. 2d 503, 506-507 (CA2 1972); see also Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U. S. 326, 339-341 (1890). Section 7403(a) provides, not only that the Government may “enforce [its] lien,” but also that it may seek to “subject any 'property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability” (emphasis added). This clause in and of itself defeats the reading proposed by the Court of Appeals. Section 7403(b) then provides that “[a]ll persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property involved in such action shall be made parties thereto” (emphasis added). Obviously, no joinder of persons claiming independent interests in the property would be necessary, if the Government were only authorized to seek the sale of the delinquent taxpayer’s own interests. Finally, § 7403(c) provides that the district court should “determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property, and, in all cases where a claim or interest of the United States therein is established, may decree a sale of such property... and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States” (emphasis added). Again, we must read the statute to contemplate, not merely the sale of the delinquent taxpayer’s own interest, but the sale of the entire property (as long as the United States has any “claim or interest” in it), and the recognition of third-party interests through the mechanism of judicial valuation and distribution. Our reading of § 7403 is consistent with the policy inherent in the tax statutes in favor of the prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes. See supra, at 683. It requires no citation to point out that interests in property, when sold separately, may be worth either significantly more or significantly less than the sum of their parts. When the latter is the case, it makes considerable sense to allow the Government to seek the sale of the whole, and obtain its fair share of the proceeds, rather than satisfy itself with a mere sale of the part. Our reading is also supported by an examination of the historical background against which the predecessor statute to § 7403 was enacted. In 1868, as today, state taxation consisted in large part of ad valorem taxation on real property. In enforcing such taxes against delinquent taxpayers, one usual remedy was a sale by the State of the assessed property. The prevailing — although admittedly not universal— view was that such sales were in rem proceedings, and that the title that was created in the sale extinguished not only the interests of the person liable to pay the tax, but also any other interests that had attached to the property, even if the owners of such interests could not otherwise be held liable for the tax. See generally H. Black, Law of Tax Titles §§231-236 (1888); W. Burroughs, Law of Taxation §122 (1877). Where in rem proceedings were the rule, they were generally held to cut off as well dower or homestead rights possessed by the delinquent taxpayer’s spouse. See Lucas v. Purdy, 142 Iowa 359, 120 N. W. 1063 (1909); Robbins v. Barron, 32 Mich. 36 (1875); Jones v. Devore, 8 Ohio St. 430 (1858); Black 299; Burroughs 348. But cf. R. Blackwell, Power to Sell Land for the Non-Payment of Taxes 550 (3d ed. 1869). One evident purpose of the federal judicial sale provision enacted in 1868 was to obtain for the federal tax collector some of the advantages that many States enjoyed through in rem tax enforcement. As one commentator has put it, echoing almost exactly the usual description of state in rem proceedings, the § 7403 proceeding “from its very nature, is a proceeding in rem. The purchaser receives a complete new title and not just somebody’s interest. The court finds the state of the title to the real estate in question, orders it sold if the United States has a lien on it, and divides the proceeds accordingly. All prior interests are cut off and the title starts over again in the new purchaser.” Rogge, The Tax Lien of the United States, 13 A. B. A. J. 576, 577 (1927). See also G. Holmes, Federal Income Tax 546-547 (1920). Even as it gave the Government the right to seek an undivided sale in an in rem proceeding, however, the predecessor to § 7403 departed quite sharply from the model provided by the States by guaranteeing that third parties with an interest in the property receive a share of the proceeds commensurate with the value of their interests. This apparently unique provision was prompted, we can assume, by the sense that, precisely because the federal taxes involved were not taxes on the real property being sold, simple justice required significantly greater solicitude for third parties than was generally available in state in rem proceedings. Finally, our reading of the statute is significantly bolstered by a comparison with the statutory language setting out the administrative levy remedy also available to the Government. Under 26 U. S. C. § 6331(a), the Government may sell for the collection of unpaid taxes all nonexempt “property and rights to property... belonging to such person [i. e., the delinquent taxpayer] or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax” (emphasis added). This language clearly embodies the limitation that the Court of Appeals thought was present in § 7403, and it has been so interpreted by the courts. Section 6331, unlike § 7403, does not require notice and hearing for third parties, because no rights of third parties are intended to be implicated by §6331. Indeed, third parties whose property or interests in property have been seized inadvertently are entitled to claim that the property has been “wrongfully levied upon,” and may apply for its return either through administrative channels, 26 U. S. C. § 6343(b), or through a civil action filed in a federal district court, § 7426(a)(1); see §§ 7426(b)(1), 7426(b)(2)(A). In the absence of such “wrongful levy,” the entire proceeds of a sale conducted pursuant to administrative levy may be applied, without any prior distribution of the sort required by § 7403, to the expenses of the levy and sale, the specific tax liability on the seized property, and the general tax liability of the delinquent taxpayer. 26 U. S. C. §6342. We are not entirely unmoved by the force of the basic intuition underlying the Court of Appeals’ view of § 7403 — that the Government, though it has the “right to pursue the property of the [delinquent] taxpayer with all the force and fury at its command,” should not have any right, superior to that of other creditors, to disturb the settled expectations of innocent third parties. Folsom v. United States, 306 F. 2d, at 367-368. In fact, however, the Government’s right to seek a forced sale of the entire property in which a delinquent taxpayer had an interest does not arise out of its privileges as an ordinary creditor, but out of the express terms of §7403. Moreover, the use of the power granted by § 7403 is not the act of an ordinary creditor, but the exercise of a sovereign prerogative, incident to the power to enforce the obligations of the delinquent taxpayer himself, and ultimately grounded in the constitutional mandate to “lay and collect taxes.” Cf. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S., at 259-260; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 595-597 (1931); United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210, 214-215 (1893). Admittedly, if §7403 allowed for the gratuitous confiscation of one person’s property interests in order to satisfy another person’s tax indebtedness, such a provision might pose significant difficulties under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. But, as we have already indicated, § 7403 makes no further use of third-party property interests than to facilitate the extraction of value from those concurrent property interests that are properly liable for the taxpayer’s debt. To the extent that third-party property interests are “taken” in the process, § 7403 provides compensation for that “taking” by requiring that the court distribute the proceeds of the sale “according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States.” Cf. United States v. Overman, 424 F. 2d, at 1146. Moreover, we hold, on the basis of what we are informed about the nature of the homestead estate in Texas, that it is the sort of property interest for whose loss an innocent third party must be compensated under § 7403. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377-378 (1945). We therefore see no contradiction, at least at the level of basic principle, between the enforcement powers granted to the Government under § 7403 and the recognition of vested property interests granted to innocent third parties under state law. The exact method for the distribution required by § 7403 is not before us at this time. But we can get a rough idea of the practical consequences of the principles we have just set out. For example, if we assume, only for the sake of illustration, that a homestead	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 68 ]	sc_adminaction
BURNETT et al. v. GRATTAN et al. No. 83-264. Argued March 26, 1984 Decided June 27, 1984 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 56. Rehnquist, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J., and O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 56. Paul F. Strain, Deputy Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, and Diana Gribbon Motz, Christine Steiner, and Robert A. Zamoch, Assistant Attorneys General. Sheldon H. Laskin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Laura Metcoff Klaus and Joseph M. Sellers. Neil R. Shortlidge filed a brief for the League of Kansas Municipalities as amicus curiae urging reversal. Leon Friedman, Charles S. Sims, and Burt Neubome filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a state law, establishing a procedure for administrative resolution of employment discrimination complaints, provides an appropriate statute of limitations for actions brought under the Reconstruction-Era Civil Rights Acts, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 et seq. We hold that it does not. h — I Respondents James Grattan and Adrienne Hedman were employees of Coppin State College, a predominantly Negro college in Maryland. Their primary responsibility was to recruit students of diverse ethnic backgrounds to attend the school. App. 34-39. Respondents received notice in June 1976 that their contracts would not be renewed because the college “was not satisfied with the recruitment efforts of the Minority Affairs office.” Id., at 34, 38. In response, respondents, who are white, filed complaints of racial discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. While those claims were pending, they filed suit in state court in February 1977, naming as defendants the petitioners in the present action — the president of the College, the vice president of student affairs, and the chairman and executive director of the board of trustees. In October 1981, on leave of the court, respondents filed an amended complaint, specifically alleging that they were victims of racial discrimination, and, in Hedman’s case, gender discrimination, in violation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 1986 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that their discharge also violated the First Amendment and various provisions of the Maryland Constitution. App. 11-33. Petitioners removed the action from state to federal court. Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondents’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id., at 39-40. Because the federal statutes under which respondents sued do not themselves contain a statute of limitations, the District Court borrowed a limitations period from a state statute prohibiting discriminatory practices in employment. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B, §9(a) (1979); see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23, 34. The District Court identified a “commonality of purpose” between the federal rights asserted and the rights defined in the state statute, and concluded that it was reasonable to subject the federal claims to the 6-month statute of limitations on filing employment discrimination complaints with an administrative body, the Maryland Human Affairs Commission. Id., at 34-36. Because respondents’ complaint had been filed more than six months after their cause of action accrued, the District Court dismissed the suit as time-barred. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying on its previous decision in McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental and Orthodontic Laboratories, Inc., 698 F. 2d 676 (1983), found the 6-month period selected by the District Court inappropriate for suits brought under the Civil Rights Acts because the state law “governed the limitation of administrative proceedings which were informal, investigatory and conciliatory in nature.” 710 F. 2d 160, 162 (1983). The Court of Appeals applied Maryland’s 3-year statute of limitations for all civil actions for which the Code does not otherwise provide a limitations period. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101 (1984). Finding that Grattan’s and Hedman’s amended complaint stated claims that related back to the action originally filed in the Maryland court some eight months after their cause of action arose, the Court of Appeals held that the action was not time-barred, and remanded to the District Court. We granted certiorari to resolve confusion in the Circuits regarding reliance upon a state administrative statute of limitations in a federal civil rights suit. 464 U. S. 981 (1983). We now affirm. II The century-old Civil Rights Acts do not contain every rule of decision required to adjudicate claims asserted under them. In the absence of specific guidance, Congress has directed federal courts to follow a three-step process to borrow an appropriate rule. 42 U. S. C. § 1988. First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States “so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.” Ibid. If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application of state “common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes” of the forum State. Ibid. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest:, courts are to apply state law only if it is not “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Ibid. A The task before the courts in the present case was to identify a limitations period governing respondents’ claims under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. The Civil Rights Acts do not provide the rule. Only 42 U. S. C. § 1986 contains a statute of limitations. Other sources of federal law are no more helpful. On several occasions, this Court has rejected arguments that a particular federal statute of limitations applied, O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318, 324-325 (1914) (rejecting federal statute of limitations for suits for a penalty, because civil actions under Civil Rights Act are remedial), or has implicitly rejected linkage with other federal statutes, emphasizing the independence of the remedial scheme established by the Reconstruction-Era Acts. See, e. g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 459-461 (1975) (§ 1981 and Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide independent rights and remedies); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 416-417, and n. 20 (1968) (enactment of Title VIII (Fair Housing) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 “had no effect upon § 1982”). It is now settled that federal courts will turn to state law for statutes of limitations in actions brought under these civil rights statutes. See, e. g., Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U. S. 650, 655-656 (1983). B We have described in a variety of ways the task of a court when determining which of a set of arguably relevant state statutes of limitations should govern a suit brought under the Civil Rights Acts. For example, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 462, an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1981, we described the goal as that of identifying the “most appropriate” state statute of limitations. In Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 483-484 (1980), an action under § 1983, we suggested that the court should select “the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action.” See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 469 (“that [period of limitations] which the State would apply if the action had been brought in a state court”) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court’s selection of Art. 49B of the Maryland Code was erroneous under this approach. The functional differences between the federal causes of action and the state administrative law make Art. 49B an inappropriate analog from which to borrow to effectuate Congress’ purpose in enacting the Civil Rights Acts. In the Civil Rights Acts, Congress established causes of action arising out of rights and duties under the Constitution and federal statutes. These causes of action exist independent of any other legal or administrative relief that may be available as a matter of federal or state law. They are judicially enforceable in the first instance. The statutes are characterized by broadly inclusive language. They do not limit who may bring suit, do not limit the cause of action to a circumscribed set of facts, nor do they preclude money damages or injunctive relief. An appropriate limitations period must be responsive to these characteristics of litigation under the federal statutes. A state law is not “appropriate” if it fails to take into account practicalities that are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies that are analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts. Applying these criteria for disqualifying a particular state law, we begin with the observation that borrowing an administrative statute of limitations ignores the dominant characteristic of civil rights actions: they belong in court. McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U. S. 284, 290 (1984). Assuring the full availability of a judicial forum necessitates attention to the practicalities of litigation. Litigating a civil rights claim requires considerable preparation. An injured person must recognize the constitutional dimensions of his injury. He must obtain counsel, or prepare to proceed pro se. He must conduct enough investigation to draft pleadings that meet the requirements of federal rules; he must also establish the amount of his damages, prepare legal documents, pay a substantial filing fee or prepare additional papers to support a request to proceed in forma pauperis, and file and serve his complaint. At the same time, the litigant must look ahead to the responsibilities that immediately follow filing of a complaint. He must be prepared to withstand various responses, such as a motion to dismiss, as well as to undertake additional discovery. The practical difficulties facing an aggrieved person who invokes administrative remedies are strikingly different. Maryland’s scheme is modeled on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and is typical of statutes in some 30 States. See Pet. for Cert. 10, and n. 7. A person’s sole responsibility under this scheme is to “make, sign and file with the Human Relations Commission... a complaint in writing under oath.” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B, § 9(a) (1979). The complaint need contain no more than the name and address of the person or entity alleged to have committed the discriminatory act, “the particulars thereof,” and “other information as may be required from time to time by the Commission.” Ibid. Although the complainant is potentially liable for a malicious filing, § 12(b), he has no obligation to investigate his allegations more fully. The entire burden of investigating and developing the case rests on the Human Rights Commission, which is empowered to issue subpoenas, conduct hearings, and seek judicial enforcement of its orders. §§ 11-12. When a legislature selects a statute of limitations to govern a particular cause of action, it takes into account the burdens borne by the parties to a suit of that sort. Article 49B, § 9(a), tells a person when he must act if he wishes to request the aid of the Human Rights Commission in resolving an employment discrimination dispute.. The time limit established by the Maryland Legislature reflects in part the minimal burden state law places on the administrative complainant, which does not correspond in any significant way to the substantial burden federal law places on a civil rights litigant. Indeed, Maryland’s administrative procedure acknowledges these different burdens. Where a complainant has only six months to initiate a grievance, the Human Affairs Commission — which after receiving notice of the complaint essentially assumes the role of “litigant” — may engage in investigation and negotiations toward settlement for at least two years before bringing formal charges against an employer. Code of Maryland Regulations 14.03.01.01-14.03.01.03.A (1983). A legislative definition of a statute of limitations also reflects a policy assessment of the state causes of action to which it applies. Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 367 (1977) (“State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies”). For instance, the length of a limitations period will be influenced by the legislature’s determination of the importance of the underlying state claims, the need for repose for potential defendants, considerations of judicial or administrative economy, and the relationship to other state policy goals. To the extent that particular state concerns are inconsistent with, or of marginal relevance to, the policies informing the Civil Rights Acts, the resulting state statute of limitations may be inappropriate for civil rights claims. The divergence between the goals of the federal civil rights statutes and of the state employment discrimination administrative statute is clear in the present case. The goals of the federal statutes are compensation of persons whose civil rights have been violated, and prevention of the abuse of state power. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S., at 488; Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584, 590-591 (1978). That these are not. the goals of the statute empowering Maryland’s administrative agency to resolve employment discrimination complaints is apparent both because the remedial authority of the agency is limited, and because the state scheme does not create a private right of action. The stated goal of the state administrative procedure is the prompt identification and resolution of employment disputes. The administrative scheme, including a short statute of limitations, encourages conciliation and private settlement through the agency’s intervention in live disputes. Petitioners urge the prompt assertion and resolution of public employee disputes in particular, noting that this important policy “is clearly mirrored in... an abbreviated period for the filing of claims of employment discrimination with the state fair employment practices agency,” enacted in Maryland and most other States. Brief for Petitioners 30, and n. 19. That policy, keyed to a classification of plaintiffs, cannot pre-empt the broadly remedial purposes of the Civil Rights Acts, which make no distinction among persons who may look to the court to vindicate their federal constitutional rights. If the statute of limitations in Art. 49B is “abbreviated” precisely because it effectuates the narrower state goal, a federal court should look elsewhere in state law for an appropriate limitations period. Similarly, the state petitioners argue that the short limitations period in Art. 49B should be applied here because it affords public officers “some reasonable protection from the seemingly endless stream of unfounded, and often stale, lawsuits brought against them.” Brief for Petitioners 30. This contention undercuts rather than buttresses the case for applying the limitations period embodied in Art. 49B to federal civil rights actions. The statement suggests that the legislative choice of a restrictive 6-month limitations period reflects in part a judgment that factors such as minimizing the diversion of state officials’ attention from their duties outweigh the interest in providing employees ready access to a forum to resolve valid claims. That policy is manifestly inconsistent with the central objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes, which is to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive relief. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 239 (1972); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 97 (1971); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-672 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173 (1961). III In sum, the Court of Appeals properly applied the tests established by our prior cases for determining whether a particular state statute of limitations should control a suit brought under the Civil Rights Acts. Both the practical differences between the administrative proceeding contemplated by the Maryland statute and a civil action in a federal court, and the divergence in the objectives of the state administrative procedure to resolve employment discrimination suits and a federal cause of action to vindicate constitutional rights, lead us to conclude that borrowing the limitations period from Maryland’s Art. 49B was inappropriate. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. Respondents’ original state-court action sought a declaratory judgment that their dismissals were arbitrary and without basis in law or fact, and constituted a deprivation of property without due process and a denial of equal protection. App. 6-7. The state court sustained petitioners’ supplemental demurrer on the ground that the facts set forth in the complaint did not state a case appropriate for declaratory relief, but granted leave to amend. Id,., at 11. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1981 guarantees the right to be free from racial discrimination in specific activities, such as making contracts and bringing suit. Title 42 U. S. C. §1983 confers a private federal right of action for damages and injunctive relief against state actors who deprive any citizen or person within the jurisdiction of the United States of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) (constitutional deprivations); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980) (statutory violations). Title 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3) creates a private right of action for damages for injury or deprivation caused by a conspirator to deprive “any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” Title 42 U. S. C. § 1986 creates a right to recover damages “in an action on the case” brought within one year after the cause of action has accrued against every person who has knowledge of, and power to prevent, a § 1985 conspiracy, but neglects or refuses to act. Maryland assures “all persons equal opportunity in receiving employment and in all labor management-union relations regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, sex, age, marital status, or physical or mental handicap unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of the employment.” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B, § 14 (1979). Article 49B prohibits discrimination in public accommodations and in housing, as well as in employment. §§ 5, 8, 16, 20-22 (1979 and Supp. 1983). “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” Petitioners do not contest here that this is the appropriate state-law statute of limitations for federal civil rights actions if Art. 49B, §9(a), does not apply. The District Court held that the First Amendment claim was governed by Maryland’s 3-year statute of limitations, but that it, too, was time-barred because it did not relate back, under the analysis required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, to the action filed in state court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37-38. That ruling was not appealed. 710 F. 2d, at 162. The Court of Appeals’ holding that respondents’ other claims relate back to the action filed in state court is not at issue in the present case. “Several Circuits have adopted positions similar to that taken by the Court of Appeals in this case. See, e. g., Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Bryan County, 676 F. 2d 1338, 1342-1343 (CA10 1982) (rejecting applicability of Oklahoma’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 120-day limitation on filing administrative claims to public employee’s claim of discrimination infringing First Amendment rights, brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983); Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F. 2d 380, 384, n. 5 (CA10 1978) (rejecting Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act 6-month period in § 1981 action because “limitations periods for state statutory nonjudicial proceedings are inapplicable to civil rights actions in courts of law”), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F. 2d 640 (CA10 1984) (en banc) (holding that all § 1983 claims in the Circuit will be characterized uniformly as actions for injuries to personal rights for statute of limitations purposes, rather than in terms of the specific facts generating a particular suit); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F. 2d 222, 225-228 (CA8 1976) (rejecting applicability of Nebraska’s Fair Employment Practices Act 180-day administrative statute of limitations to public employee’s action under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations in nonrenewal of contract); Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F. 2d 520, 521-522 (CA6 1975) (rejecting applicability of Ohio’s 1-year Civil Rights Act administrative statute of limitations to private employee’s claim of racial discrimination in promotion and discharge, brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1981); Garner v. Stephens, 460 F. 2d 1144, 1147-1148, and n. 1 (CA6 1972) (Kentucky Civil Rights Commission’s 90-day statute of limitations); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int’l Harvester Co., 427 F. 2d 476, 488-489 (CA7) (rejecting applicability of Illinois’ 120-day Fair Employment Practices Act administrative claim statute of limitations to private employee’s § 1981 action), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 911 (1970). But see Warner v. Perrina, 585 F. 2d 171, 173-175 (CA6 1978) (applying Ohio’s 180-day fair housing law limitations period to § 1982 action); Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA8 1978) (Missouri’s 180-day fair housing law barred §§ 1981, 1982 claims, but not § 1983 claim against state officials); Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F. 2d 730, 733-735 (CA8) (applying Nebraska’s Civil Rights Act 180-day limitation to housing discrimination claim filed under §§ 1981, 1982, where state law specifically creates a civil action for-private litigants as'alternative to administrative relief), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 855 (1975). The First Circuit has upheld reliance upon administrative statutes of limitations. See, e. g., Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F. 2d 99 (applying Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 6-month limitation on filing administrative complaints in public employee’s action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 893 (1980). The First Circuit has followed Bums in Carter v. Supermarkets General Corp., 684 F. 2d 187, 189 (1982) (private employee, § 1981 action); Holden v. Commission Against Discrimination of Massachusetts, 671 F. 2d 30 (claim of racially motivated discharge brought under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983,1985), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 843 (1982); Hussey v. Sullivan, 651 F. 2d 74 (1981) (per curiam) (claim of political discrimination under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1985(3)). Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part: “The jurisdiction... conferred on the district courts by the [civil and criminal Civil Rights Titles] for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause... For discussion of the history of 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and its complementary role in the scheme of federal civil rights legislation, see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 702, and n. 13, 703-706, and nn. 18-19 (1973). Neither the District Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the parties have suggested that the statute of limitations inquiry would vary depending on the particular federal civil rights statute under which a person claimed relief. That issue is not presented to us. “Because our affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment reinstates respondents’ claims (with the exception of the First Amendment claim, n. 8, supra), we have no occasion to discuss the District Court’s conclusion that the explicit 1-year statute of limitations in § 1986 did not control that claim because the related § 1985 claim was time-barred by the state-law 6 months’ limitations period. Although the pleading and amendment of pleadings rules in federal court are to be liberally construed, the administration of justice is not well served by the filing of premature, hastily drawn complaints. The recent revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 emphasizes that an attorney or pro se litigant certifies that “to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [a complaint] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” It is true that we have “borrowed” a 6-month administrative statute of limitations in the labor context, DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 (1983), but we do not find that decision relevant to the civil rights issue before us. In DelCostello, we held that the limitations period fixed by § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act for filing unfair labor practice claims with the National Labor Relations Board offered the most analogous limitations period for suits alleging breaches of the collective-bargaining agreement. The importance of uniformity in the labor law field, and “the realities of labor relations and litigation,” id., at 167, informed our decision not to adopt a state statute of limitations that would be at odds with the purpose of the substantive federal law. Congress, for whatever reason, sees no need for national uniformity in all aspects of civil rights cases. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584, 594, n. 11 (1978). Moreover, the state administrative statute here, unlike the federal statute we relied on in DelCostello, is not functionally related to Congress’ policy enacted in the relevant substantive law. To this degree the second and third steps of the § 1988 inquiry shade into each other. The step three inquiry — whether a state rule of decision is inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law — is not necessary to resolve this case, but must be made, for example, when a state legislature has enacted a statute of limitations specifically applicable to actions brought under one or all of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. See, e. g., Johnson v. Davis, 582 F. 2d 1316 (CA4 1978) (rejecting Virginia’s express 1-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions as discriminating against federal cause of action). See also Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610, 615 (1895) (patent action) (state statute of limitations must operate uniformly on state and federal rights, and “must give a party a reasonable time to sue”). If the Human Affairs Commission concludes that an employer has violated the statute, it has authority to issue a cease-and-desist order, which may include reinstatement or hiring, with or without backpay limited to a 2-year period, and other equitable relief. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B, § 11(e) (1979). At the time of the District Court’s decision, monetary damages were not available to public employees. § 7(b) (1979). Maryland has since amended the law. 1980 Md. Laws, ch. 568. Maryland’s administrative procedure provides for judicial review on the record of a final administrative decision. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 49B, § 12 (Supp. 1983). The statute does not create a private right of action, nor provide for de novo judicial consideration of an employment discrimination complaint. § 12(a). These restrictions limit the state procedure in deterring employment discrimination. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, “[i]t would be anomalous for a federal court to apply a state policy restricting remedies against public officials to a federal statute that is designed to augment remedies against those officials, especially a federal statute that affords remedies for the protection of constitutional rights.” Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City University of New York, 654 F.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
CUYAHOGA VALLEY RAILWAY CO. v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION et al. No. 84-1634. Decided November 4, 1985 Together with No. 86-170, Brock, Secretary of Labor v. United Transportation Union et al., also on petition for certiorari to the same court. Per Curiam. The Secretary of Labor is authorized to inspect work sites to uncover noncompliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 29 U. S. C. § 657(a). If, as a result of such an inspection, the Secretary discovers a violation of the Act, he is authorized to issue a citation to the employer fixing a reasonable time for the abatement of the violation, § 658(a), and assessing a penalty for the violation. § 666. The employer then has 15 days in which to contest the citation. § 659(a). Similarly, employees have 15 days in which to challenge as unreasonable “the period of time fixed in the citation for the abatement of the violation.” § 659(c). See generally Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U. S. 1, 9, n. 11 (1980). The statute and rules of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission also permit affected employees to participate as parties in any hearing in which the employer contests the citation. 29 U. S. C. § 659(c); 29 CFR § 2200.20(a) (1985). If an employer contests the citation, and the Secretary intends to seek its enforcement, the Secretary must file a complaint with the Commission within 20 days, and the employer must file an answer within 15 days. 29 CFR § 2200.33 (1985). Once these pleadings are filed, a hearing to determine the validity of the citation will be held before an administrative law judge (ALJ), with discretionary review by the Commission. 29 U. S. C. §§ 659(c), 661(j). In the present cases, the Secretary cited Cuyahoga Valley Railway Company for a violation of the Act. Cuyahoga contested the citation, the Secretary filed a complaint with the Commission, and Cuyahoga filed an answer. Respondent United Transportation Union, which represents Cuyahoga employees, properly moved to intervene in the proceedings. At the hearing, however, the Secretary moved to vacate the citation on the ground that the Federal Railway Administration, not the Secretary, had jurisdiction over the relevant safety conditions. Despite the Union’s objection, the ALJ granted the Secretary’s motion and vacated the citation. Thereafter, the Commission directed review of the ALJ’s order. The Secretary promptly objected to this action, asserting that part of the citation involved matters beyond the reach of the Act and that additional portions of the citation did not warrant litigation because of the state of the evidence. He also stated that the record before the Commission was inadequate to resolve the issue posed. Some six years later, the Commission rejected this submission and remanded the case to the ALJ for consideration of the Union’s objections. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Commission’s holding that it could review the Secretary’s decision to withdraw a citation. Donovan v. United Transportation Union, 748 F. 2d 340 (1984). The court recognized that the Secretary “has the sole authority to determine whether to prosecute” a violation of the Act. Id., at 343. Here, however, the court found that the Secretary “had already made the decision to prosecute by filing a complaint and that complaint had been answered at the time the Secretary attempted to withdraw the citation.” Ibid. Because the “adversarial process was well-advanced at the time the Secretary attempted to withdraw the citation,” the court reasoned that the Commission, “as the adjudicative body, had control of the case and the authority to review the Secretary’s withdrawal of the citation.” Ibid. Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s decision, eight other Courts of Appeals have held that the Secretary has unreviewable discretion to withdraw a citation charging an employer with violating the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Donovan v. Allied Industrial Workers (Midland), 760 F. 2d 783, 785 (CA7 1985); Donovan v. Local 962, International Chemical Workers Union (Englehard), 748 F. 2d 1470, 1473 (CA11, 1984); Donovan v. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers (Whirlpool), 722 F. 2d 1415, 1422 (CA8 1983); Donovan v. United Steelworkers of America (Monsanto), 722 F. 2d 1158, 1160 (CA4 1983); Donovan v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International (American Petrofina), 718 F. 2d 1341, 1352-1353 (CA5 1983), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 971 (1984); Donovan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n (Mobil Oil), 713 F. 2d 918, 926-927 (CA2 1983); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International v. Occupational Safety and Health Comm’n (American Cynamid), 217 U. S. App. D. C. 137, 144-145, 671 F. 2d 643, 650-651, cert. denied, 459 U. S. 905 (1982); Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co., 622 F. 2d 1176, 1187 (CA3), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1061 (1980). We agree with the decisions of these courts. It is apparent that the Court of Appeals’ decision is inconsistent with the detailed statutory scheme which contemplates that the rights created by the Act are to be protected by the Secretary. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442, 444-447 (1977); Mobil Oil, supra, at 927; Sun Petroleum Products, supra, at 1187. It is also clear that enforcement of the Act is the sole responsibility of the Secretary. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International v. Occupational Safety and Health Comm’n, supra, at 143, 671 F. 2d, at 649. It is the Secretary, not the Commission, who sets the substantive standards for the workplace, and only the Secretary has the authority to determine if a citation should be issued to an employer for unsafe working conditions, 29 U. S. C. §658. A necessary adjunct of that power is the authority to withdraw a citation and enter into settlement discussions with the employer. Whirlpool, supra, at 1420; Mobil Oil, supra, at 927. The Commission’s function is to act as a neutral arbiter and determine whether the Secretary’s citations should be enforced over employee or union objections. Its authority plainly does not extend to overturning the Secretary’s decision not to issue or to withdraw a citation. The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the Commission can review the Secretary’s decision to withdraw a citation would discourage the Secretary from seeking voluntary settlements with employers in violation of the Act, thus unduly hampering the enforcement of the Act. Whirlpool, supra, at 1420; Mobil Oil, supra, at 927. Such a procedure would also allow the Commission to make both prosecutorial decisions and to serve as the adjudicator of the dispute, a commingling of roles that Congress did not intend. Whirlpool, supra, at 1419; Mobil Oil, supra, at 930-931; Sun Petroleum Products, supra, at 1187. Indeed, the Commission itself was created to avoid giving the Secretary both prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers. See generally Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (S. 2193, Pub. L. 91-596) (Comm. Print 1971). Accord, Whirlpool, supra, at 1419; Mobil Oil, supra, at 930-931, and n. 21. The other Courts of Appeals to address this problem have recognized the distinct roles of the Secretary and the Commission and accordingly have acknowledged that the Secretary’s decision to withdraw a citation against an employer under the Act is not reviewable by the Commission. Based on these considerations, the petitions for certiorari are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun dissent from summary disposition. They would grant certiorari and set the cases for oral argument. Justice Marshall dissents from this summary disposition, which has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to file briefs on the merits. See Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 120-121 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U. S. 42, 51-52 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Vacating the citation thus did not rest solely on jurisdictional grounds. Nor did the Court of Appeals’ decision sustaining the Commission’s order focus on jurisdiction. Its holding would permit review by the Commission of the Secretary’s withdrawal of any citation, whatever the reason, provided the adversarial process was sufficiently advanced to vest control in the Commission. For these reasons and because the issue relates to the statutory division of authority between the Secretary and the Commission, rather than the question of judicial review of administrative action, the cases do not pose the question whether an agency’s decision, resting on jurisdictional concerns, not to take enforcement action is presumptively immune from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2). See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 833, n. 4 (1985). The Court of Appeals also relied to some extent on the position of the Commission as to the scope of its powers. The Commission, however, has since revised its view and now declines to review the Secretary’s dismissal of a citation. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 1984 OSHD ¶26,920; American Bakeries Co., 1984 OSHD ¶26,951; Copperweld Steel Co., 1984 OSHD ¶ 26,956.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 91 ]	sc_adminaction
BURNS, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF IOWA, et al. v. ALCALA et al. No. 73-1708. Argued January 22, 1975 Decided March 18, 1975 Richard C. Turner, Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Loma Lawhead Williams, Special Assistant Attorney General. Robert Bartels argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Bork, Keith A. Jones, and John B. Rhinelander for the United States; by Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, Eva Dunkerley Peck, and Chester G. Senf for the State of Florida; by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General of Virginia, and Stuart H. Dunn and Karen C. Kincannon, Assistant Attorneys General, for Lukhard, Director of the Department of Welfare, Commonwealth of Virginia; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley for the Pacific Legal Foundation. George R. Moscone filed a brief for the American Association for Maternal and Child Health et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether States receiving federal financial aid under the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) must offer welfare benefits to pregnant women for their unborn children. As the case comes to this Court, the issue is solely one of statutory interpretation. I Respondents, residents of Iowa, were pregnant at the time they filed this action. Their circumstances were such that their children would be eligible for AFDC benefits upon birth. They applied for welfare assistance but were refused on the ground that they had no “dependent children” eligible for the AFDC program. Respondents then filed this action against petitioners, Iowa welfare officials. On behalf of themselves and other women similarly situated, respondents contended that the Iowa policy of denying benefits to unborn children conflicted with the federal standard of eligibility under § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a), and resulted in a denial of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court certified the class and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. The court held that unborn children are “dependent children” within the meaning of § 406 (a) and that by denying them AFDC benefits Iowa had departed impermissibly from the federal standard of eligibility. The District Court did not reach respondents’ constitutional claims. 362 F. Supp. 180 (SD Iowa 1973). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 494 F. 2d 743 (1974). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the federal courts that have considered the question. 419 U. S. 823. We conclude that the statutory term “dependent child” does not include unborn children, and we reverse. II The Court has held that under §402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (10), federal participation in state AFDC programs is conditioned on the State’s offering benefits to all persons who are eligible under federal standards. The State must provide benefits to all individuals who meet the federal definition of “dependent child” and who are “needy” under state standards, unless they are excluded or aid is made optional by another provision of the Act. New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 421-422 (1973); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968). The definition of “dependent child” appears in § 406 (a) of the Act: “The term 'dependent child’ means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a). The section makes no mention of pregnant women or unborn children as such. Respondents contend, citing dictionary definitions, that the word “child” can be used to include unborn children. This is enough, they say, to make the statute ambiguous and to justify construing the term “dependent child” in light of legislative purposes and administrative interpretation. They argue that both factors support their position in this case. First, paying benefits to needy pregnant women would further the purpose of the AFDC program because it would enable them to safeguard the health of their children through prenatal care and adequate nutrition. Second, for over 30 years the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) has offered States an option to claim federal matching funds for AFDC payments to pregnant women. A Several of the courts that have faced this issue have read King, Townsend, and Carleson, supra, to establish a special rule of construction applicable to Social Security Act provisions governing AFDC eligibility. They have held that persons who are arguably included in the federal eligibility standard must be deemed eligible unless the Act or its legislative history clearly exhibits an intent to exclude them from coverage, in effect creating a presumption of coverage when the statute is ambiguous. See Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 210-215 (NH 1973), aff’d, 501 F. 2d 1244 (CA1 1974); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (ND Ohio 1973); Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123, 125-126 (ND Ind. 1973), aff’d sub nom. Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F. 2d 155 (CA7 1974). But see Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 55 (MD Fla. 1974). This departure from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation is not supported by the Court’s prior decisions. King, Townsend, and Carle-son establish only that once the federal standard of eligibility is defined, a participating State may not deny aid to persons who come within it in the absence of a clear indication that Congress meant the coverage to be optional. The method of analysis used to define the federal standard of eligibility is no different from that used in solving any other problem of statutory construction. Our analysis of the Social Security Act does not support a conclusion that the legislative definition of “dependent child” includes unborn children. Following the axiom that words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary, Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, 390 U. S. 459, 465 (1968); Minor v. Mechanics Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46, 64 (1828), and reading the definition of “dependent child” in its statutory context, we conclude that Congress used the word “child” to refer to an individual already born, with an existence separate from its mother. As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act made no provision for the needs of the adult taking care of a “dependent child.” It authorized aid only for the child and offered none to support the mother. C. 531, § 406, 49 Stat. 629. The Act expressly contemplated that the first eligible child in a family would receive greater benefits than succeeding children, recognizing the lower per capita cost of support in families with more than one child, §403 (a), but the Act included no similar provision recognizing the incremental cost to a pregnant woman of supporting her “child.” The Act also spoke of children “living with” designated relatives, §406 (a), and referred to residency requirements dependent on the child’s place of birth. §402 (b). These provisions would apply awkwardly, if at all, to pregnant women and unborn children. The failure to provide explicitly for the special circumstances of pregnant women strongly suggests that Congress had no thought of providing AFDC benefits to “dependent children” before birth. The purposes of the Act also are persuasive. The AFDC program was originally conceived to substitute for the practice of removing needy children from their homes and placing them in institutions, and to free widowed and divorced mothers from the necessity of working, so that they could remain home to supervise their children. This purpose is expressed clearly in President Roosevelt's message to Congress recommending the legislation, H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 29-30 (1935), and in committee reports in both Houses of Congress, S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). See Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F. 2d 750, 754-755 (CA2 1974); Note, Eligibility of the Unborn for AFDC Benefits: The Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 945, 955-958 (1974). The restricted purpose of the AFDC program is evidenced in the Act itself by the limitations on aid. The Act originally authorized aid only for children living with designated relatives. The list of relatives has grown, supra, at 578, but there is still no general provision for AFDC payments to needy children living with distant relatives or unrelated-persons, or in institutions. Congress did not ignore the needs of pregnant women or the desirability of adequate prenatal care. In Title V of the Social Security Act, now codified as 42 U. S. C. §§ 701-708 (1970 ed. and Supp. Ill), Congress provided federal funding for prenatal and postnatal health services to mothers and infants, explicitly designed to reduce infant and maternal mortality. See S. Rep. No. 628, supra, at 20. In selecting this form of aid for pregnant women, Congress had before it proposals to follow the lead of some European countries that provided “maternity benefits” to support expectant mothers for a specified period before and after childbirth. Hearings on S. 1130 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 182, 965-971 (1935). If Congress had intended to include a similar program in the Social Security Act, it very likely would have done so explicitly rather than by relying on the term “dependent child,” at best a highly ambiguous way to refer to unborn children. B Respondents have also relied on HEW’s regulation allowing payment of AFDC benefits on behalf of unborn children. They ask us to defer to the agency’s longstanding interpretation of the statute it administers. Respondents have provided the Court with copies of letters and interoffice memoranda that preceded adoption of this policy in 1941 by HEW’s predecessor, the Bureau of Public Assistance. These papers suggest that the agency initially may have taken the position that the statutory phrase “dependent children” included unborn children. A brief filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of HEW in this case disavows respondents’ interpretation of the Act. HEW contends that unborn children are not included in the federal eligibility standard and that the regulation authorizing federal participation in AFDC payments to pregnant women is based on the agency’s general authority to make rules for efficient administration of the Act. 42 U. S. C. § 1302. The regulation is consistent with this explanation. It appears in a subsection with other rules authorizing temporary aid, at the option of the States, to individuals in the process of gaining or losing eligibility for the AFDC program. For example, one of the accompanying rules authorizes States to pay AFDC benefits to a relative 30 days before the eligible child comes to live in his home. 45 CFR § 233.90 (c)(2). HEW’s current explanation of the regulation deprives respondents’ argument of any significant support from the principle that accords persuasive weight to a consistent, longstanding interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration. See FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 499-500 (1958); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932). Nor can respondents make a convincing claim of congressional acquiescence in HEW’s prior policy. In 1972, in the context of major Social Security legislation, both Houses of Congress passed bills to revise the AFDC system. One section of the bill passed in the Senate would have amended the definition of “dependent child” expressly to exclude unborn children. H. R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972) (as amended by Senate); 118 Cong. Rec. 33990, 33995 (1972); see S. Rep. No. 92-1230, pp. 108, 467 (1972). The House bill would have substituted an entirely new definition of eligibility under the Administration’s “Family Assistance Plan.” H. R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972); 117 Cong. Rec. 21450, 21463 (1971). The accompanying committee report specified that under the new definition unborn children would not be eligible for aid. H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 184 (1971). Both bills passed the respective Houses of Congress, but none of the AFDC amendments appeared in the final legislation, Pub. L. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, because the House and Senate conferees were unable to agree on the underlying principle of welfare reform. All efforts to amend AFDC were postponed for another session of Congress. See 118 Cong. Rec. 36813-36825, 36926-36936 (1972); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp., at 55. Under the circumstances, failure to enact the relatively minor provision relating to unborn children cannot be regarded as approval of HEW’s practice of allowing optional benefits. To the extent this legislative history sheds any fight on congressional intent, it tends to rebut the claim that Congress by silence has acquiesced in the former HEW view that unborn children are eligible for AFDC payments. C In this case respondents did not, and perhaps could not, challenge HEW's policy of allowing States the option of paying AFDC benefits to pregnant women. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether HEW has statutory authority to approve federal participation in state programs ancillary to those expressly provided in the Social Security Act, see Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F. 2d, at 756, or whether 42 U. S. C. § 1302 authorizes HEW to fund benefits for unborn children as a form of temporary aid to individuals who are in the process of qualifying under federal standards. See Parks v. Harden, 504 F. 2d 861, 875-877 (CA5 1974) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). III Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered respondents’ constitutional arguments. Rather than decide those questions here, where they have not been briefed and argued, we remand the case for consideration of the equal protection and due process issues that were raised but not decided below. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974). The cases are cited in Parks v. Harden, 504 F. 2d 861, 863 n. 4 (CA5 1974). E. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961), which includes as one definition of “child,” “an unborn or recently born human being: fetus, infaNT, baby.” This, of course, is only one of many definitions for the word “child,” and its use with reference to unborn children is not the most frequent. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1957) qualified the definition quoted above by adding: “now chiefly in phrases. Cf. with child, childbiRth.” Respondents have candidly furnished citations to other current dictionaries that do not indicate that the word “child” is used to refer to unborn children. Respondents acknowledge that reliance on dictionaries cannot solve the question presented in this case. At most, the dictionaries demonstrate the possible ambiguity in the term “dependent child.” See United States v. Southern Ute Indians, 402 U. S. 159, 173 n. 8 (1971); Studebaker v. Perry, 184 U. S. 258, 269 (1902); Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694, 702-703 (1882). The current regulation provides that “[fjederal financial participation is available in . . . [p]ayments with respect to an unborn child when the fact of pregnancy has been determined by medical diagnosis.” 45 CFR § 233.90 (c) (2) (ii). Although the regulation itself does not say expressly that aid to unborn children is optional with the States, HEW’s administrative practice makes clear that this regulation allows States to exclude unborn children from their AFDC programs. As of 1971 HEW had approved 34 state plans, including Iowa’s, that furnished no aid to unborn children. 494 F. 2d 743, 745 (CA8 1974). The Act was amended in 1950 to authorize payment for the needs of the child’s caretaker. Act of Aug. 28, 1950, § 323, 64 Stat. 551. A number of other provisions of the Act would be similarly inapplicable to unborn children. See Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F. 2d 1066, 1075-1076 (CA3 1974) (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting). The original definition of “dependent child” was: “a child under the age of sixteen who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, or aunt, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home ....” § 406 (a), 49 Stat. 629. The Act now authorizes, in addition to payments for children in the homes of designated relatives, foster care payments for children who have been removed from the homes of relatives. 42 U. S. C. § 608. It also provides financial support for child-welfare services, in a form different from the direct payments in the general AFDC program, for “homeless, dependent, or neglected children.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 622, 625. The statement of purposes in the Act, amended several times since 1935, still indicates that Congress has not undertaken to provide support for all needy children: “For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §601. As Judge Weinfeld’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F. 2d 750, 755 (1974), points out, one of the major reasons for making welfare payments on behalf of an unborn child would be to enable its mother to purchase adequate prenatal care. The fact that Congress explicitly provided medical care for expectant mothers in Title V is evidence “of a congressional intent not to include unborn children under AFDC but to provide for maternity care in a different section of the statute.” Id., at 755 n. 27. At oral argument petitioners’ counsel objected to the inclusion of these materials in respondents’ brief, noting that they were not in the record and had not been authenticated. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43-45. Respondents suggested that at least some of the materials are proper subjects for judicial notice. In the view we take of the case these materials are not dispositive, and it is unnecessary to resolve their status. Several of the courts that have adopted the position urged here by respondents have interpreted the action of the 92d Congress as evidence of a "belief that unborn children are currently eligible under the Act ‘and that only by amending its language can their status as eligible individuals be altered.’ ” Parks v. Harden, 504 F. 2d, at 872. See also Carver v. Hooker, 501 F. 2d 1244, 1247 (CA1 1974); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1155 (ND Ill. 1973), aff’d, 499 F. 2d 155 (CA7 1974). The House bill does not lend itself to this interpretation because it was not designed to amend the existing AFDC structure but to create an entirely different system. The Senate bill was framed as an amendment to the eligibility provisions in § 406 (a), but there is no evidence that its drafters believed unborn children were included in the existing definition of dependent children. It would be equally plausible to suppose that they thought HEW had misinterpreted the Act, and wanted to make the original intent clear. See Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F. 2d, at 161 (Pell, J., dissenting).	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 81-1664. Argued January 11, 1983 Decided April 4, 1983 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Donald F. Sileo argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Anthony A. DeSabato. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Robert E. Allen, Linda Sher, and Elinor Had-ley Stillman. Laurence J. Cohen argued the cause for respondent Local Union 563, IBEW. With him on the brief were Richard Kirschner, Marsha Berzon, and Laurence Gold Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Peter D. Walther, Mark M. Wilcox, and Stephen A. Bokat for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Lawrence T. Zimmerman, Steven R. Semler, and Robert L. Baum for the Edison Electric Institute; and by Mallory Erie Phillips, Jr., and Mark E. Edwards for Miller Brewing Co. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue is whether an employer may discipline union officials more severely than other union employees for participating in an unlawful work stoppage. Metropolitan Edison Company began construction of a two-unit nuclear generating station at Three Mile Island in 1968. Over half of its employees were represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Article XI of the collective-bargaining agreement between the company and the union provided: “The Brotherhood and its members agree that during the term of this agreement there shall be no strikes or walkouts by the Brotherhood or its members, and the Company agrees that there shall be no lockouts of the Brotherhood or its members, it being the desire of both parties to provide uninterrupted and continuous service to the public.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-32. Despite this no-strike clause, union members participated in four unlawful work stoppages between 1970 and 1974. On each occasion the company disciplined the local union officials more severely than the other participants. Twice the union filed a grievance because of the disparate treatment accorded its officials, and in both cases the arbitrators upheld the company’s actions. They found that union officials have an affirmative duty to uphold the bargaining agreement. The breach of that duty justified the company’s imposition of more severe sanctions. On August 30, 1977, an unrelated union, the Operating Engineers, set up an informational picket line at the entrance to the Three Mile Island construction site. When members of the Electrical Workers union refused to cross the picket line, company officials spoke to David Lang, the local union president. They told him that he had a duty as a union official to ensure that the Electrical Workers’ members complied with the no-strike clause. It was the company’s view that Lang could fulfill this duty only by crossing the picket line and thereby inducing other employees to follow. Although instructed repeatedly to cross the line, Lang declined to do so. He was aware that the other employees were unlikely to follow him and sought instead to learn the cause of the picket line. On being told that the line would not be removed unless the Operating Engineers’ business agent ordered it, Lang attempted to reach him. He also directed Gene Light, the Electrical Workers’ vice president, to continue his efforts to persuade the pickets to remove their line. After approximately four hours, Light and Lang were able to negotiate a settlement between the Operating Engineers and Metropolitan Edison. The settlement required the company to establish a separate entrance to the construction site. When this was done, the picket line came down and the union’s members returned to work. Metropolitan Edison disciplined all of its employees who refused to cross the picket line by imposing 5- to 10-day suspensions. Light and Lang, however, each received 25-day suspensions and were warned that future participation in any unlawful work stoppage would result in their immediate discharge. The company explained that the additional penalty was imposed because of their failure as union officials to make “every bona fide effort to prevent the unlawful work stoppage,” specifically their failure to attempt to end the strike by crossing the picket line. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge, and the Regional Director for the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against the company. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that under Precision Castings Co., 233 N. L. R. B. 183 (1977), selective discipline of union officials violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3). The Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions and findings. Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N. L. R. B. 1030 (1980). On petition for review and cross-petition for enforcement, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced the Board’s order. 663 F. 2d 478, 484 (1981). It held that an employer may impose greater discipline on union officials only when the collective-bargaining agreement specifies that the officials have an affirmative duty to prevent illegal work stoppages. Id., at 482. If the agreement does not provide for such a duty, any disparate treatment of union officials violates § 8(a)(3). The court reasoned that in the absence of a clear contractual duty, requiring a union official to take affirmative steps to end an illegal work stoppage would place him in an intolerable position. If he failed to follow the company’s directions, he would place his job in jeopardy. If he complied with the company’s demands and crossed the picket line, he would lose the respect and support of the union members. Id., at 482-483. The Court of Appeals rejected the company’s argument that the two earlier arbitration awards were sufficient to impose a contractual duty on the union officials to cross the picket line. The court held that it was not bound by these arbitration decisions in determining the extent of the officials’ contractual obligations. Id., at 483. It noted that a previous arbitration decision normally would not bind an arbitrator later construing the same collective-bargaining agreement. Absent an express contractual provision making earlier arbitration decisions binding, the court declined to give these decisions any greater effect than an arbitrator would. Id., at 483-484. We granted certiorari to consider these recurring questions of federal labor law. 457 U. S. 1116 (1982). We now affirm. This case does not present the question whether an employer may impose stricter penalties on union officials who take a leadership role in an unlawful strike. The Administrative Law Judge found that neither Light nor Lang acted as a strike leader. Nor does this case question the employer’s right to discipline union officials who engage in unprotected activity. Neither the union nor the Board has argued that union officials who fail to honor a no-strike clause are immunized from being disciplined in the same manner as other strike participants. The narrow question presented is whether an employer unilaterally may define the actions a union official is required to take to enforce a no-strike clause and penalize him for his failure to comply. Metropolitan Edison advances two arguments to justify the additional sanctions it imposed on Light and Lang. It contends first that its actions did not violate § 8(a)(3) because a union official has a duty to ensure compliance with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Breach of this duty justifies the imposition of an additional penalty on union officials. Alternatively, the company contends that a union in effect may waive any statutory protection that otherwise would be accorded its officials by agreeing that they will undertake specific action to assure compliance with the no-strike clause. In this case, the arbitration awards and the union’s acquiescence in the harsher sanctions imposed on its officials are sufficient to establish a clear contractual duty. We examine these arguments in turn. A Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3). By its terms, the statute requires proof that disparate treatment has been accorded union members and that the employer’s action is likely to discourage participation in union activities. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 286 (1965). Congress, howqver, did not intend to make unlawful all acts that might have the effect of discouraging union membership. See American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 311 (1965). Rather, the intention was to forbid only those acts that are motivated by an anti-union animus. See, e. g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U. S. 26, 33 (1967); NLRB v. Brown, supra, at 286-287. In determining whether Metropolitan Edison’s conduct constitutes a § 8(a)(3) violation, we are guided by well-established precedent. Where there is direct evidence of an employer’s antiunion motive, the Court has recognized that otherwise legitimate actions may constitute unfair labor practices. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 227 (1963). Where, as here, there is only circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate, identification of a § 8(a)(3) violation involves a more difficult inquiry. Intent must be inferred from conduct. But an employer may take actions in the course of a labor dispute that present a possible complex of motives, see id., at 228, and it is often difficult to identify the true motive. In these situations, the Court has divided an employer’s conduct into two classes. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U. S., at 33-34. Some conduct is so “‘inherently destructive of employee interests’ ” that it carries with it a strong inference of impermissible motive. See id., at 33 (quoting NLRB v. Brown, supra, at 287). In such a situation, even if an employer comes forward with a nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions, the Board “may nevertheless draw an inference of improper motive from the conduct itself and exercise its duty to strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in light of the Act and its policy.” 388 U. S., at 33-34. On the other hand, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is “ ‘comparatively slight,’ an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.” Id., at 34 (emphasis in original). Congress has entrusted this determination in the first instance to the Board, see NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 236, and we turn now to its decisions. B The Board has found that disciplining union officials more severely than other employees for participating in an unlawful work stoppage “is contrary to the plain meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and would frustrate the policies of the Act if allowed to stand.” Precision Castings Co., 233 N. L. R. B., at 184. This conduct, in the Board’s view, is “inherently destructive” of protected individual rights because it discriminates solely on the basis of union status. See Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N. L. R. B. 1306 (1982); Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 237 N. L. R. B. 226 (1978), enf. denied, 599 F. 2d 227 (CA7 1979). The Board has concluded that an employer’s contractual right to be free of unauthorized strikes does not counterbalance the “discriminatory effects of singling out union officers for especially harsh treatment. ” Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N. L. R. B., at 1309. Disciplining union officials discriminatorily may have only an indirect effect on the rank and file’s decision to strike, but it may well deter qualified employees from seeking union office. See ibid. We defer to the Board’s conclusion that conduct such as Metropolitan Edison’s adversely affects protected employee interests. Section 8(a)(3) not only proscribes discrimination that affects union membership, it also makes unlawful discrimination against employees who participate in concerted activities protected by §7 of the Act. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 39-40 (1954). Holding union office clearly falls within the activities protected by § 7, see General Motors Corp., 218 N. L. R. B. 472, 477 (1975), and there can be little doubt that an employer’s unilateral imposition of discipline on union officials inhibits qualified employees from holding office, see Szewczuga v. NLRB, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 347, 686 F. 2d 962, 973 (1982). Determining that such conduct adversely affects protected employee interests does not conclude the inquiry. If the employer comes forward with a legitimate explanation for its conduct, the Board must “strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights.” NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., supra, at 33-34. In this case the company has argued that its actions were justified because there is an implied duty on the part of the union officials to uphold the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Unquestionably there is support for the proposition that union officials, as leaders of the rank and file, have a legal obligation to support the terms of the contract and to set a responsible example for their members. See Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F. 2d, at 230-232. And in view of the disruptive effects of wildcat strikes, the importance of ensuring compliance with no-strike clauses is self-evident. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235, 248-249, and n. 17 (1970); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S. 401, 418-419 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But it does not follow that an employer may assume that a union official is required to attempt to enforce a no-strike clause by complying with the employer’s directions and impose a penalty on the official for declining to comply. As the Board has concluded, the imposition of such a penalty would violate § 8(a)(3). We think the Board’s view is consistent with the policies served by the Act. “The entire process of collective bargaining is structured and regulated on the assumption that ‘[t]he parties... proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.’” General Building Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 394 (1982) (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361U. S. 477, 488 (I960)). Congress has sought to ensure the integrity of this process by preventing both management and labor’s representatives from being coerced in the performance of their official duties. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 810-811 (1974); id., at 814 (White, J., dissenting). Cf. 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(2) (specifying employer domination of unions as an unfair labor practice). If, as the company urges, an employer could define unilaterally the actions that a union official is required to take, it would give the employer considerable leverage over the manner in which the official performs his union duties. Failure to comply with the employer’s directions would place the official’s job in jeopardy. But compliance might cause him to take actions that would diminish the respect and authority necessary to perform his job as a union official. This is the dilemma Congress sought to avoid. We believe the Board’s decision furthers these policies and uphold its determination. HH 1 — \ The company argues that even if § 8(a)(3) would prohibit it from imposing a more severe penalty on union officials than on other employees, the union in effect has waived the protection afforded by the statute. The substance of this contention is that, in this case, the prior arbitration awards and the union’s acquiescence in the harsher sanctions imposed on its officials are sufficient to establish a corresponding contractual duty. We are met at the outset, however, by the union’s response that the statutory right to be free from discrimination may never be waived. We examine first the union’s argument. A This Court long has recognized that a union may waive a member’s statutorily protected rights, including “his right to strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line.” NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U. S. 175, 180 (1967) (footnotes omitted). Such waivers are valid because they “rest on ‘the premise of fair representation’ and presuppose that the selection of the bargaining representative ‘remains free.’” NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U. S. 322, 325 (1974) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 280 (1956)); cf. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., supra, at 180-181. Waiver should not undermine these premises. Thus a union may bargain away its members’ economic rights, but it may not surrender rights that impair the employees’ choice of their bargaining representative. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., supra, at 325. We think a union’s decision to bind its officials to take affirmative steps to end an unlawful work stoppage is consistent with “the premise of fair representation.” Such a waiver imposes no constraints on the employees’ ability to choose which union will represent them. Imposition of this duty is more closely related to the economic decision a union makes when it waives its members’ right to strike. It merely requires union officials to take steps that are ancillary to the union’s promise not to strike and provides the employer with an additional means of enforcing this promise. The union argues that while a union may waive rights that are collective in nature, such as the right to strike, it may not waive individual rights, such as the right to hold union office. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953), however, the Court recognized that in securing the good of the entire bargaining unit, some differences in the treatment of individual union members might occur: “Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Id., at 338. No-strike provisions, central to national labor policy, often have proved difficult to enforce. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S., at 248-249, and n. 17; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S., at 423-424 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). A union and an employer reasonably could choose to secure the integrity of a no-strike clause by requiring union officials to take affirmative steps to end unlawful work stoppages. Indeed, a union could choose to bargain away this statutory protection to secure gains it considers of more value to its members. Its decision to undertake such contractual obligations promotes labor peace and clearly falls within the range of reasonableness accorded bargaining representatives. B We consider finally whether the union waived its officials’ rights. In Mastro Plastics Corp., supra, the question was whether a general no-strike provision waived the specific right to strike over an unfair labor practice. While reserving the question whether a union might waive this right if it were “explicitly stated,” the Court determined that “there is no adequate basis for implying [the] existence [of waiver] without a more compelling expression of it than appears in... this contract.” 350 U. S., at 283. Thus, we will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is “explicitly stated.” More succinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistakable. In this case, Metropolitan Edison does not contend that the general no-strike clause included in the bargaining agreement imposed any explicit duty on the union officials. Rather it argues that the union’s failure to change the relevant contractual language in the face of two prior arbitration decisions constitutes an implicit contractual waiver. Not to give these decisions any effect, the company argues, would impair the effectiveness of the dispute resolution process for which the parties bargained. We agree that the grievance-arbitration procedure forms an integral part of the collective-bargaining process. See Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U. S. 679, 686-687 (1981); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574, 578 (1960). And we do not doubt that prior arbitration decisions may be relevant — both to other arbitrators and to the Board — in interpreting bargaining agreements. But to waive a statutory right the duty must be established clearly and unmistakably. Where prior arbitration decisions have been inconsistent, sporadic, or ambiguous, there would be little basis for determining that the parties intended to incorporate them in subsequent agreements. Assessing the clarity with which a party’s duties have been defined of course will require consideration of the specific circumstances of each case. Cf. Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U. S. 212, 221-222 (1979). As noted above, the company argues that when the prior bargaining agreement was renegotiated, the union’s silence manifested a clear acceptance of the earlier arbitration decisions. During the history of collective bargaining between these two parties, however, there were only two arbitration decisions that imposed a higher duty on union officials. We do not think that two arbitration awards establish a pattern of decisions clear enough to convert the union’s silence into binding waiver. This is especially so in light of the provision in the bargaining agreement that “[a] decision [by an arbitrator] shall be binding... for the term of this agreement.” See n. 5, supra (emphasis added). We conclude that there is no showing that the parties intended to incorporate the two prior arbitration decisions into the subsequent agreement. > HH We accept the Board s conclusion that the imposition of more severe sanctions on union officials for participating in an unlawful work stoppage violates § 8(a)(3). While a union may waive this protection by clearly imposing contractual duties on its officials to ensure the integrity of no-strike clauses, we find that no waiver occurred here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Although the collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the incident in this case took effect on May 1, 1976, the no-strike clause has remained unchanged at all relevant times. In 1972, Metropolitan Edison disciplined union officials more severely than the other employees for not instructing striking employees to return to work. The company’s actions were upheld by the arbitrator, who found “that Union officials have an affirmative duty to protect the authority of the Union leadership from illegitimate action on the part of employees, and to uphold the sanctity of the Agreement and its established grievance procedures.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-60 (emphasis in original). Two years later the company again determined that a senior shop steward was not taking sufficient corrective action during an unlawful work stoppage and imposed a greater penalty on him than on the other participants. This action also was upheld on arbitration. See id., at A-62, A-71. Once in 1970 and again in 1973, the company imposed a more severe penalty on union officials who participated in an unlawful work stoppage. The officials were suspended for one and five days respectively, but the union chose not to take these cases to arbitration. See App. 29, 32. The company stated that the employees were being disciplined for “failure to report to work as scheduled and participation in an unlawful work stoppage.” Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N. L. R. B. 1030, 1333 (1980). It specified that Light and Lang were being disciplined for the same reason but added: “In addition, you are being disciplined for your failure as an elected official of Local Union 563 IBEW to demonstrate to the Company, in an objective manner, your affirmative duty as an elected officer to: “(c) Make every effort, including returning to work yourself, to end the unlawful work stoppage. “Your participation in any unlawful work stoppage in the future will result in your immediate discharge.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). Sections 8(a)(1) and (3), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3), provide in relevant part: “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” Although §§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) are not coterminous, a violation of § 8(a)(3) constitutes a derivative violation of § 8(a)(1). See Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F. 2d 227, 229, n. 2 (CA7 1979); cf. R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 137 (1976). Because the Board has not suggested that there is an independent violation of § 8(a)(1), we consider only the § 8(a)(3) charge. The bargaining agreement provided that arbitration decisions would be binding only for the term of the agreement. See 663 F. 2d 478, 484 (CA3 1981) (citing Article IX, §9.2, ¶ 4, of the collective-bargaining agreement). The Board has held that employees who instigate or provide leadership for unprotected strikes may be subject to more severe discipline than other employees. See Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244 N. L. R. B. 597, 598 (1979); Chrysler Corp., 232 N. L. R. B. 466, 474 (1977). In making this factual determination the Board has recognized that a remark made by a union official may have greater significance than one made by a rank-and-file member. See Midwest Precision Castings, supra, at 599. In this case the Board accepted the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that Light and Lang were not strike leaders, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that finding. See 663 F. 2d, at 484. We note also that the disciplinary notices issued to both Light and Lang made clear that the additional penalties imposed on them were not based on any perceived leadership role in initiating or maintaining the strike. See n. 3, supra. This case does not present the issue of the proper allocation of burdens and order of proof in a “mixed motive” case, or in cases where an employee contends that an employer’s otherwise legitimate act masks an impermissible purpose. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F. 2d 130 (CA1), cert. granted, 459 U. S. 1014 (1982). The Board’s position on this question has not always been entirely clear. Some early Board opinions noted, as alternative rationales, that union officials have a greater duty than the rank and file to uphold a no-strike clause. Compare University Overland Express, Inc., 129 N. L. R. B. 82, 92 (1960); Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N. L. R. B. 629, (1949), with Chrysler Corp., 232 N. L. R. B., at 476; Pontiac Motors Division, 132 N. L. R. B. 413, 415 (1961). See also Note, Discriminatory Discipline of Union Representatives for Breach of their “Higher Duty” in Illegal Strikes, 1982 Duke L. J. 900, 904-912 (reviewing Board’s treatment of status-based responsibility). Precision Castings has eliminated any ambiguity, however, and the Board’s position has been upheld by almost every Court of Appeals that has considered this question. See NLRB v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 688 F. 2d 345, 355 (CA5 1982); Szewczuga v. NLRB, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 347, 686 F. 2d 962, 973 (1982); C. H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F. 2d 178, 182-183 (CA7 1981) (distinguishing Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F. 2d 227 (CA7 1979)). But cf. NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F. 2d 51, 55-56 (CA8 1981) (upholding harsher penalties only because officials “fomented” illegal work stoppage). For example, when this Court upheld the Board’s decision that foremen could constitute an appropriate unit for collective bargaining, see Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 485 (1947), Congress responded by excluding supervisors from the coverage of the Act. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 279-284 (1974); 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). Congress was concerned that if supervisors were included in a bargaining unit, ‘“management will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen.’” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 809-810 (1974) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105,	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 81 ]	sc_adminaction
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. BELL AEROSPACE COMPANY, DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INC. No. 72-1598. Argued January 14, 1974 Decided April 23, 1974 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 295. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Patrick Hardin, and Linda Sher. Richard E. Moot argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. John Fillion, Stephen Schlossberg, Abe F. Levy, Victor Van Bourg, Charles K. Hackler, and Jack Levine filed a brief for the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and. Agricultural Implement Workers of America as amicus curiae urging reversal. Milton Smith, Gerard C. Smetana, and Jerry Kronenberg filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents two questions: -first, whether the National Labor Relations Board properly determined that all “managerial employees/’ except those whose participation in a labor organization would create a conflict of interest with their job responsibilities, are covered by the National Labor Relations Act; and second, whether the Board must proceed by rulemaking rather than by adjudication in determining whether certain buyers are “managerial employees.” We answer both questions in the negative. I Respondent Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc. (company), operates a plant in Wheatfield, New York, where it is engaged in research and development in the design and fabrication of aerospace products. On July 30, 1970, Amalgamated Local No. 1286 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (union) petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (Board) for a representation election to determine whether the union would be certified as the bargaining representative of the 25 buyers in the purchasing and procurement department at the company’s plant. The company opposed the petition on the ground that the buyers were “managerial’ employees” and thus were not covered by the Act. The relevant facts adduced at the representation hearing are as follows. The purchasing and procurement department receives requisition orders from other departments at the plant and is responsible for purchasing all of the company’s needs from outside suppliers. Some items are standardized and may be purchased “off the' shelf” from various distributors.and suppliers. Other items must be made to the company’s specifications, and the requisition orders may be accompanied by detailed blueprints and other technical plans. Requisitions often designate a particular vendor, and in some instances the buyer must obtain approval before selecting a different one. Where no vendor is specified, the buyer is free to choose-one. Absent specific instructions to the 'contrary, buyers have full- discretion, without any dollar limit, to select' prospective, vendors, draft invitations to bid, evaluate submitted bids, negotiate price and terms, and prepare purchase orders. Buyers execute all purchase orders up to $50,000, They may place or cancel orders of less than $5,000 on their own signature. ’ On commitments in excess of $5,000, buyers must' obtain the approval of a superior, with higher levels of approval required as the purchase cost increases. For the Minute Man missile project, which represents 70% of the company’s sales, purchase decisions are made by a team of personnel from the engineering, quality assurance, finance, and manufacturing departments. The buyer serves as team chairman and signs the purchase order, but a representative from the pricing and negotiation department participates in working out the terms. After the representation hearing, the Regional Director transferred the case to the Board. On. May 20,.1971, the Board issued its decision holding that the company’s buyers constituted an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining and directing an election. 190 N. L. R. B. 431. Relying on its recent decision in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 185 N. L. R. B. 550 (1970), the Board first stated that even though the company’s buyers might be “managerial employees,” they were nevertheless covered by the Act and entitled to its protections^ The Board then rejected the company’s alternative contention that representation should be denied because the buyers’ authority to commit the company’s credit/ select vendors, and negotiate purchase prices would create a potential conflict of interest between the buyers as union members and the company. In essence, the company argued that buyers would be more receptive to bids from union contractors and would klso influence “make or buy” decisions in favor of “make,” thus creating additional work for sister unions in the plant. The Board thought, however, that-any possible conflict was “unsupported conjecture” since the buyérs’ “.discretion and latitude for independent action* must take place within the confines of the general directions which the Employer has established” and that “any possible temptation to allow sympathy for sister unions to influence such decisions could effectively be controlled by the Employer.” 190 N. L. R. B., at 431. On June 16, 1971, a representation election was conducted in which 15 of the buyers voted for the union and nine against. On August 12, the Board certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company’s buyers. That same day, ■ however, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of another Board order in NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 446 F. 2d 602, and held that “managerial employees” were not covered by the Act and were therefore not entitled to its protections. Ia., at 610. Encouraged by the Eighth Circuit’s decision, r,he company moved the Board for reconsideration of its earlier order. The Board denied the motion, 196 N. L. R. B. 827 (1972), stating that it disagreed with the Eighth Circuit and. would adhere to its'own decision in North Arkansas'. In the. Board’s view, Congress intended to excludé from the Act only those “managerial employees” associated with the “formulation and implementation of labor relations policies.” Id., at 828. In each case, the “fundamental touchstone” was “whether the duties and responsibilities of any managerial employee or group of managerial employees do or do not include determinations which should be made free of any conflict of interest which could arise if the person involved was a participating member of a labor organization.” Ibid. Turning to the present case, the Board reiterated,its prior finding that the company had not shown that union organization of its buyers would create a conflict of interest in labor relations. The company stood by its contention that the buyers, as “managerial employees,” were not covered by the Act and refused to bargain.with the union. An unfair labor practice complaint resulted in a Board finding that the company had violated §§ 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(5) and (1), and an order compelling the company to bargain with the union. 197 N. L. R. B. 209 (1972). Subsequently, the company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second.Circuit for review" of the order and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement: The Court of Appeals denied enforcement. 475 F. 2d 485 (1973). After reviewing the legislative history'of the. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, and the Board’s decisions in this area, the court concluded that Congress had intended to exclude all true “managerial employees” from the protection of the Act.. It explained that this “exclusion embraced not only an employee ‘so closely related to or aligned with management as to pla,ce the employee in a position of conflict of interest between his employer on the one hand and his fellow workers on the other’ but also one who is ‘formulating, determining and effectuating his employer’s policies or has discretion, independent of an employer’s established policy, in the performance of his duties,’ Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F. 2d 37, 41 (7 Cir. 1969).” 475 F. 2d, at 494. The court added, however, that “the Board would [not] be precluded, on proper proceedings, from determining that buyers, or some types of buyers, are not true ‘managerial employees’ and consequently come within the protection of § 8 (a)(5) and (1).” Ibid. Turning to the merits of the present case, the court acknowledged that there was substantial evidence that the company’s buyers were not sufficiently high in the managerial hierarchy to constitute true “managerial employees.” Nevertheless, the court denied enforcement for two reasons. First, it was not certain that the Board’s decision rested on a factual determination that these buyers' were not true “managerial employees” rather than.on “its new, and in our view, erroneous holding that it- was free to regard all managerial employees as covered by the Act unless their duties met” the conflict-of-interest touchstone. Id., a.t.494-495. Second, although the Board was not precluded from holding that buyers, or softie types of buyers, were not “managerial employees,” the court thought that, in view of the Board’s long line of cases holding the contrary, it could not accomplish this change of position by adjudication. Rather, the Board should conduct a rulemaking proceeding in, conformity with § 6 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 156. The court therefore remanded the case to the Board for such a proceeding. We granted the. Board’s petition for certiorari. 414 U. S. 816. II We begin with the question whether all “managerial employees,” rather than just those in positions susceptible to. conflicts of interest in labor relations, are excluded from the protections of the Act. The Board’s early decisions, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, and subsequent Board and court decisions provide the necessary guidance for our inquiry. In examining these authorities, we draw on several established principles of statutory construction. In addition to the importance of legislative history, a court may accord great weight to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its administration. This is especially so where Congress has re-enacted the statute without pertinent change. In these circumstances, congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress. We have also recognized that subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier, statute is entitled to significant weight. Application of these principles-leads us to conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to exclude from the protections of the Act all employees properly classified as “managerial.” A The Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449, did not expressly mention the term “managerial employee.” After the Act’s passage, however, the Board developed the concept of “managerial employee” in a series of cases involving the appropriateness'of bargaining units. The first cases established that “managerial employees” were not to be included in a unit with rank-and-file employees. In Freiz & Sons, 47 N. L. R. B. 43, 47 (1943), for example, the Board excluded expediters from a proposed ■ unit of production and maintenance workers because they were “closely related to the management.” Similarly, in Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N. L. R. B. 1491, 1498 (1944), expediters were again excluded from a unit containing office, technical, clerical, and professional employees because “the authority possessed by [the expediters] to exercise their discretion in making commitments on behalf of the Company stamps them as. managerial.” This rationale was soon applied to buyers. See, e. g., Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 509, 512 (1944); Vulcan Corp., 58 N. L. R. B. 733, 736 (1944); Barrett Division, Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N. L. R. B. 903, 905 (1946); Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N L. R. B. 1242, 1245-1246 (1946). The Board summarized its policy on “managerial employees” in Ford Motor Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1317, 1322 (1946): “We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of rank and file workers executive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine and effectuate management policies. These employees we have considered and still deem to be ‘managerial/ in that they express and make operative the decisions of management.” Whether the Board regarded all “managerial employees” as entirely outside the protection of the Act, as well as inappropriate for inclusion in a rank-and-file bargaining unit, is less certain. To be sure, at no time did the Board certify even a separate unit of “managerial employees” or state that such was possible. The Board was cautious, however, in determining which employees were “managerial.” For example, in Dravo Corp., 54 N. L. R. B. 1174, 1177 (1944), the Board excluded buyers and expediters' from a unit of office and clerical employees, but reserved the question whether all such employees were to be considered “managerial”: “This is not to say, however, that buyers and expediters are to be denied the right to self-organization and to collective bargaining under the Act. The precise relationship of the buyers and expediters to management here is not now being determined by us.” - During this period the Board’s policy with respect to the related but narrower category of “supervisory employees” manifested a progressive uncertainty. The Board first excluded supervisors from units of rank-and-file employees, e. g., Mueller Brass Co., 39 N. L. R. B. 167, 171 (1942), but in Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N. L. R. B. 961, supplemental decision, 44 N. L. R. B. 165. (1942), it certified a separate unit composed of supervisors who were to be represented by an independent union. Shortly thereafter, in Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 874 (1942), the Board approved a unit of supervisors whose union was affiliated with a union of rank-and-file employees. This trend was soon halted, however, by Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733 (1943), where the Board held that supervisors, although literally “employees” under the Act, could not be organized in any unit. And in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 60 N. L. R. B. 626, 628-629 (1945), the Board further held that timestudy men, whose “ ‘interests and functions’ ” were “ ‘sufficiently akin to those of management,’ ” should neither be included in a unit with other-employees, nor be established as a separate unit.” Maryland Drydock, supra, was subsequently overruled in Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 4, 64 N. L. R. B. 1212 (1945), where the Board held that foremen could constitute an appropriate unit for collective bargaining. The Board’s position was upheld 5^1 by this Court in Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485 (1947). In view of the subsequent legislative reversal of the Packard decision, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas is especially pertinent. Id., at 493. He stated: “The present decision... tends to obliterate the line between.management and labor. It lends the sanctions of federal law to unionization at all levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are not management and labor but the operating'group, on the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on the other. The industrial problem as so defined comes down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts of industry between these two groups. The struggle for control or. power between ■management and labor becomes secondary to a growing unity in their common demands on ownership. “I do not believe this is an exaggerated statement of the basic policy questions which underlie the present decision. For if foremen are ‘employees’ within-the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents — -indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including the president; all who are commonly• referred to as the management, with the exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do not see how we could deny it and yet allow the present application. But once vice-presidents, managers, superintendents, foremen all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx than separate factions in warring camps. “[I]f Congress, when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in industrial philosophy, it would have left some clear and unmistakable trace of that purpose. But I find none.” Id., at 494-495. Mr. Justice Douglas also noted that the Wagner Act was intended to protect “laborers” and “workers” whose right to organize and bargain collectively had not been recognized by industry, resulting in strikes, strife, and unrest. By contrast, there was no similar history with respect to foremen, managers, superintendents, or vice presidents. Id., at 496-497. Furthermdre, other legislation indicated that where Congress desired to include managerial or supervisory personnel in the category of employees, it did so expressly. See, e. g., Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. § 151; Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, 52 Stat. 953, 46 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq.; Social Security Act, § 1101, 49 Stat. 647. B The Packard decision was a major factor in bringing about the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136. The House bill, H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. ’ (1947), providéd for the exclusion of “supervisors,” a. category broadly defined to include any individual who had authority to hire, transfer, promote, discharge, reward, or discipline other employees or effectively to recommend such action. It also excluded (i) those who had authority to determine or effectively recommend the amount of wages earned by other employees; (ii) those employed in labor relations, personnel, and employment departments, as well as police and time-study personnel; and (iii) confidential employees. The Senate version of the bill, S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), also excluded supervisors, but defined that category more narrowly than the House version, distinguishing between “straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations with respect to such action.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1947). It was the Senate’s view that employees such as “straw bosses,” who had only minor supervisory duties, should be included within the Act’s protections. Significantly, both the House Report and the Senate Report voiced concern over the Board’s broad reading of the term “employee” to include those clearly within the managerial hierarchy. Focusing on Mr. Justice Douglas’- dissent in Packard, the Senate Report specifically mentioned that even, vice presidents might be unionized under the Board’s decision. Ibid. It also noted that unionization of supervisors had hurt productivity, increased the accident rate, upset the balance of power in collective bargaining, and tended to blur the line between management and labor. Id., at 4^5. The House Report echoed the concern for reduction of industrial output and noted that unionization of supervisors had deprived employers of the loyal representations to which they were entitled. And in criticizing the Board’s expansive reading of the Act’s definition of the term “employees,” the House Report noted that “[w]hferu. Congress passed the Labor Act, we were concerned,' as we said in its preamble, with the welfare of ‘workers’ and ‘wage earners,’ not of the boss.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1947). The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version of' the bill. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1947). The House Managers’ statement in explanation of the Conference, Committee Report stated: “The conference agreement, in the definition of ‘supervisor,’ limits such term to those individuals treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment. In the case of persons working in labor relations, personnel and employment departments, it was not thought necessary to make specific provision, as was done in the House bill, since the Board has treated, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons as outside the scope of the aet. This is the prevailing Board practice with respect to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the intention of the conferees to alter this practice in any respect. The conference agreement does not treat time-study personnel or guards as supervisors, as did the House bill. Since, however, time-study employees may qualify as professional personnel, the special provisions of the Senate amendment... applicable with respect to professional employees will cover many of this category. In the case of guards, the conference agreement does not permit the certification of a labor organization as the bargaining representative of guards if it admits to membership, or is affiliated with any organization that admits to membership, employees other than guards.” Id., at 35-36. The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 may be summarized as follows. The House wanted to include certain persons within the definition of “supervisors,” such as straw bosses, whom the Senate believed should be protected by the Act. As to these persons, the Senate’s view prevailed. There were other persons, however, who both the House and the Senate believed were plainly outside the Act. The House wanted to make the exclusion of certain of these persons explicit. In the conference agreement, representatives from both the House and the Senate agreed that a specific provision was unnecessary since the Board had long regarded such persons as outside the Act. Among those mentioned as impliedly excluded were persons working in “labor relations, personnel and empldyment departments,” and “confidential employees.” But assuredly this did not exhaust the universe of such excluded persons. The legislative history strongly suggests that there also were other employees, much higher in the managerial structure, who were likewise regarded as so clearly outside the" Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary. For example, in its discussion of confidential employees, the House Report noted that “[m]ost of the people who would qualify as ‘confidential’ employees are executives and are excluded from the act in any event.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, p. 23 (emphasis added). We think the inference is plain that “managerial employees” were ■paramount among this impliedly excluded group. The Court of Appeals in the instant case put the issue well: “Congress recognized there were other persons so much more clearly ‘managerial’ that it was inconceivable that the Board would treat them as employees. Surely Congress could not have supposed that, while ‘confidential secretaries’ could not be organized, their bosses could be. In other words, Congress failed to enact the portion of Mr. Justice Douglas’ Packard dissent relating to the organization of executives, not because it disagreed but because it deemed this unnecessary.” 475 F. 2d, at 491-492. (Footnote omitted.) c Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board itself adhered to the view that “managerial employees” were outside the Act. In Denver Dry Goods, 74 N. L. R. B. 1167, 1175 (1947), assistant buyers, who were required to set good sales records as examples to sales employees, to assist buyers in the selection of merchandise, and to assume the buyer’s duties when the latter was not present, were excluded by the Board on the ground that “the. interests of these employees are more closely identified with those of management.” The Board reiterated this reading of the Act in Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N. L. R. B. 320, 323 n. 4 (1947): “The determination of ‘managerial,’ like the determination of ‘supervisory,’ is to some extent necessarily a matter of the degree of authority exercised. We have in the past, and before the passage of the recent amendments to the Act, recognized and defined as' ‘managerial’ employees, executives who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative decisions of their employer, and have excluded such managerial employees from bargaining units. We believe that the Act, as amended, contemplates the continuance of this practice.” (Citations omitted.) Buyers and assistant buyers were again excluded in Denton’s, Inc., 83 N. L. R. B. 35-37 (1949), because their “interests... are more-closely identified, with management.. •..” And in American Locomotive Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 115, 116-117 (1950), the Board held that buyers could neither be included, in a unit of office and clerical employees nor placed in a separate unit, stating-: “The Employer maintains that the buyers are representatives of management. As it appears that the buyers are authorized to make substantial purchases for the Employer, we find that they aie representatives of management, and as such may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act.” Buyers, who were authorized to bind the employer without prior approval, were also excluded from a unit in Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103 N. L. R. B. 458, 464 (1953), Because “they are representatives of management and as such may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act.” Finally, in Swift & Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 752, 753-754 (1956), the Board reaffirmed its long-held understanding of the scope of the Act. In refusing to approve a unit of procurement drivers who were found to be representative of management, the Board declared:. “It was the clear' intent of Congress to" exclude from the coverage of-the Act all individuals allied with management. Such individuals' cannot be deemed to be employees for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, we reaffirm the Board’s position that.representatives of management may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act (Footnotes omitted.) Until its decision in- North Arkansas in 1970, the Board consistently followed this reading of the Act. It never certified any unit of “managerial employees,” separate or otherwise, and repeatedly stated that it was Congress’ intent that such employees not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act. And it was this reading which was permitted to stand when Congress again amended the Act in 1959. 73 Stat. 519. The Board’s exclusion of “managerial employees” defined as those who “formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer,” has also been approved by courts without exception. See, e. g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F. 2d 1151, 1158 (CA7), cert, denied, 400 Ü. S. 831 (1970); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F. 2d 37, 41 (CA7 1969) ; Continental Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 409 F. 2d 727, 730 (CA2), cert, denied, 396 U. S. 902 (1969); Retail Clerks International Assn. v. NLRB, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 63, 65-66, 366 F. 2d 642, 644-645 (1966) (Burger, J.), cert, denied, 386 U. S. 1017 (1967); International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 339 F. 2d 116, 123 (CA2 1964) (Marshall, J.). And in NLRB v. North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc., 446 F. 2d 602 (1971), the Eighth Circuit r ^viewed the history of the Act and specifically disapproved the Board’s departure from its earlier position. D In sum, the Board’s early decisions, the purpose and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act- of 1947, the Board’s subsequent and consistent construction of the Act for more than two decades, and the decisions of the courts of appeals all point unmistakably to the conclusion that “managerial employees” are not covered by the Act. We agree with the Court of Appeals below that the Board “is not now free” to read a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act. 475 F. 2d, at 494. In view of our conclusion, the case must be remanded to permit the Board to apply the proper legal standard in determining the status of these buyers. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 85 (1943); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U. S. 233, 249 (1972). We express no opinion as to whether these buyers fall within the category of “managerial employees.” III The Court of Appeals also held that, although the Board was not precluded from determining that buyers or some types of buyers were not “managerial employees,” it could do so only by invoking its rulemaking procedures under § 6 of the Act, 29 U	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 81 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. CITIZENS & SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK et al. No. 73-1933. Argued March 19, 1976 — Decided June 17, 1975 Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor Gen eral Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Gerald P. Norton, Howard E. Shapiro, and George Edelstein. Daniel B. Hodgson argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs were Michael A. Doyle, Walter M. Grant, Richard A. Posner, and Philip L. Roache, Jr Cubbedge Snow and Charles M. Stapleton filed a brief for the Independent Bankers Association of Georgia, Inc., as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. For many years the State of Georgia restricted banks located in cities from opening branches in suburban areas. To circumvent these restrictions in the Atlanta area, the Citizens & Southern National Bank (C&S National) formed the Citizens & Southern Holding Company (C&S Holding), and the latter company embarked on a program of forming de jacto branch banks in the suburbs of Atlanta. This program involved, among other features, ownership by C&S Holding of 5 percent of the stock of each of the suburban banks (the maximum allowed by state law), ownership of much of the remaining stock by parties friendly to C&S, use by the suburban banks of the C&S logogram and of all of C&S’s banking services, and close C&S oversight of the operation and governance of the suburban banks. The expectation on all sides — by C&S, by the suburban banks, and by state and federal bank regulators — was that C&S would acquire these “5-percent banks” outright, and convert them into de jure branches, as soon as state law, or the Atlanta city limits, were altered so as to permit the accomplishment of this end. In 1970, Georgia amended its banking statutes to allow de jure branching on a countywide basis. Because the city of Atlanta is contained within two counties, DeKalb and Fulton, which encompass the Atlanta suburbs in which the 5-percent banks operated, this change in the law meant that C&S National could now absorb the 5-percent banks as true branches. C&S consequently applied to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 7, 12 U. S. C. § 1828, for permission to acquire all of the stock of six of the 5-percent banks historically operated by C&S as de facto branches. The FDIC authorized all but one of the proposed acquisitions. The Justice Department immediately commenced this litigation in a Federal District Court for injunctive relief, alleging that the five acquisitions authorized by the FDIC would lessen competition in relevant banking markets, and thus violate § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. § 18, and that the historic “de facto branch” relations between C&S and the six 5-percent banks constituted unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. After a trial, the court rendered judgment for C&S on all the issues. 372 F. Supp. 616. The Government appealed under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29, and we noted probable jurisdiction. I. The Background of This Litigation In applying the antitrust laws to banking, careful account must be taken of the pervasive federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry, "particularly the legal restraints on entry unique to this line of commerce.” United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U. S. 602, 606. This admonition has special force in the present case, for the de facto branch arrangements and the proposed acquisitions involved here were a direct response to Georgia’s historic restrictions on branch banking. Before 1927 Georgia permitted statewide branching, and C&S National, then as now headquartered in Savannah, established three branches in the city of Atlanta. In 1927, state law was changed to prohibit all branching. C&S therefore decided to expand through the formation of a bank holding company. C&S Holding was founded in 1928, and between 1946 and 1954 this company purchased two banks, and founded a third, in the Atlanta area. But in 1956 Georgia again altered its statutes to prohibit a bank holding company from acquiring more than 15 percent of a bank’s stock. Georgia Bank Holding Company Act, 1 Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 309-312. A 1960 amendment, still in force, reduced the maximum ownership level to 5 percent. Ga. Code Ann. 13-207 (a)(2) (1967 ed. and Supp. 1974). By the 1950’s, C&S National was interested primarily in suburban expansion. The Atlanta city limits had been frozen since 1952, and the area’s economic and population growth consequently occurred primarily outside the city’s boundaries. Between 1959 and 1969, C&S Holding accordingly established in the Atlanta suburbs (in DeKalb and Fulton Counties) the six 5-per-cent banks at issue in this case. Five of these banks were founded under the sponsorship of C&S; the sixth, the Tucker Bank, had long been an independent suburban bank when, in 1965, C&S converted it into a 5-per-cent bank. Each of these six banks was made a “correspondent associate” bank within the C&S system. This status involved many different relationships between the 5-per-cent bank and C&S: In addition to the 5-percent stock held by C&S Holding, substantial shares were also held by officers, shareholders, and friendly customers of other C&S banks, and by their family members. It was understood from the outset that the 5-percent banks would be acquired outright by C&S as soon as the law permitted. From at least 1965 on, the 5-percent banks used the C&S logogram on their buildings, papers, and correspondence. C&S filed the charter applications of the 5-percent banks and openly assured the banks of full financial support, assurances which were often instrumental in securing regulatory approval of their creation. C&S chose the principal executive officer for each 5-percent bank. The employees of these banks were accorded the same pension and promotion rights in the C&S system as possessed by their colleagues at C&S National and its de jure affiliates. C&S selected the location of, and oversaw the selection of directors for, the suburban banks. A C&S executive served as an “advisory director” to each suburban bank. C&S conducted surprise audits and credit checks at the suburban banks. Each of the suburban banks provided the full panoply of C&S banking services, and customers of any 5-percent bank could avail themselves of these services at any of the other 5-percent banks, or at C&S National and its de jure branches. C&S supplied to each 5-percent bank, through manuals and memoranda, a large quantity of information concerning every conceivable banking procedure and problem. Included were data — stamped “for information only” — concerning interest rates and service charges employed by C&S National and its de jure branches, but each 5-percent bank was cautioned to use its own judgment in setting interest rates and service charges. In sum, it is fair to say — and the parties agree — that in almost every respect save corporate form, each of the 5-percent banks was a de jacto branch of C&S National. Between 1966 and 1968, the Federal Reserve Board investigated C&S’s network of correspondent associate banks. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether C&S was exerting such control over the 5-percent banks as to require special “approval” of the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to § 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended. 12 U. S. C. § 1842. The investigation ended in an “understanding” between the Board’s staff and C&S that the “correspondent associate” program, as the staff understood it, did not require formal approval. The Justice Department participated in this investigation, and took no action of any kind inconsistent with this “understanding.” In 1970 Georgia amended its banking statutes to permit de jure branching within any county in which a bank already had an office. Ga. Code Ann. 13-203.1 (a) (Supp. 1974). This allowed C&S National to branch into those Atlanta suburbs which — like the city of Atlanta — are within the confines of DeKalb and Fulton Counties. C&S decided to convert the six 5-percent banks at issue here into de jure branches. C&S applied to the FDIC for permission to acquire all of the assets, and to assume all of the liabilities, of the 5-per-cent banks. On October 4, 1971, after reviewing reports on the proposed acquisitions from the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Justice Department, the FDIC approved C&S’s acquisition of the five suburban banks which C&S had helped to found, but disapproved acquisition of the Tucker Bank. Because the Tucker Bank had enjoyed an independent existence before being converted into a 5-percent bank, the FDIC concluded that the correspondent associate affiliation there had been “anticompetitive in its origins” and should not be “ratified” by approval of outright acquisition. As for the five banks which C&S had helped to found, however, the FDIC stated: “[T]he opening of these... de novo banks served the convenience and needs of their respective communities and enhanced competition... The FDIC noted that the C&S system was the largest commercial banking institution in Fulton County and in DeKalb County. For this reason, it observed, “new acquisitions of nonaffiliated banks in the same market [by C&S] would raise the most serious competitive problems under the Bank Merger Act as amended and under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.” But the FDIC reasoned that the acquisitions proposed by C&S did not raise such problems because the banks involved in the proposed mergers “do not compete today and never have competed” ; further, there existed “no reasonable probability” that any of the 5-percent banks would break their ties with the C&S system even if the proposed acquisitions were disapproved. Thus, “[s]uch mergers would not alter the existing competitive structure... in any way or add to the concentration of banking resources now held by the C&S system.” II. The Suit in the District Court On November 2, 1971, within the 30-day period prescribed for such suits, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1828 (c) (6) and (7), the United States filed a complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that the five acquisitions approved by the FDIC would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act and that the ongoing correspondent associate relationships between C&S and the six 5-percent banks which it had originally sought to acquire constituted unreasonable restraints of trade, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Government sought injunctive relief prohibiting the proposed acquisitions and terminating the alleged violations of the Sherman Act. On January 24, 1974, after an extensive trial, the District Court entered a judgment for the defendants. 372 F. Supp. 616, 643. As to the Sherman Act allegations, the District Court based its judgment upon two separate and independent grounds. First, it held that the 1968 “understanding” between the staff of the Federal Reserve Board and C&S insulated the correspondent associate relationship between C&S and the 5-percent banks from attack under the antitrust laws. Id., at 627. The court based this conclusion on the following statement in Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U. S. 411, 419: “We believe Congress intended the statutory proceedings before the [Federal Reserve] Board to be the sole means by which questions as to the organization or operation of a new bank by a bank holding company may be tested.” Alternatively, assuming the Sherman Act applied, the District Court found that the United States had failed to prove that the correspondent associate relationships involved “collusive price fixing” or “any agreements not to compete or for market division.” The court held “that the matters complained of are subject to the hule of reason/ [and]... the Government has not sustained its burden of proof as to the unreasonableness of the practices involved or with respect to any adverse impact upon competition.” 372 F. Supp., at 627-628. The Government had conceded that it was no violation of the Sherman Act for a large city bank to arrange a traditional “correspondent” relationship with a smaller, outlying bank — a “'mutually beneficial arrangement whereby the smaller bank receives needed services and the larger bank obtains both the benefit of the correspondent bank balance kept with it and the income from the sale of its services to the smaller bank’s customers.’ ” Id., at 628. Noting this concession, the District Court observed: ''[S]uch assistance to, or sponsorship of, a smaller bank, is desirable and necessary and not anticompetitive. The difference between a pure correspondent relationship and a correspondent associate relationship as set forth in the evidence is merely one of degree, a fine line of demarcation almost impossible for the Court to perceive.... ''... [T]he Court finds as a fact that the relationship between C&S National, C&S Holding, and the five percent defendant banks, and the interchange of information between them, have been reasonable under the circumstances and not in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” Ibid. Turning to the claim under § 7 of the Clayton Act, the court found that the various defendant banks were each ''engaged in commerce” and that the relevant “line of commerce” was “commercial banking.” The court declined, however, to define the appropriate geographic markets, stating that its “disposition of the case is based upon factors which make a precise delineation of the market area unnecessary.” 372 F. Supp., at 629. Simply assuming the correctness of the Government’s position that the appropriate markets were DeKalb County, Fulton County, North Fulton County, or the Atlanta area generally, the court made detailed findings as to the effect of the proposed acquisitions on C&S’s nominal market shares. Id., at 629-633. But, just as had the FDIC before it, the court saw these increases in nominal shares as of no competitive significance because the 5-percent banks had always been de facto branches within the C&S system. Id., at 633-638. III. The Issues Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts It is common ground in this case that the 5-percent banks have been operated from the outset substantially as de facto branches of C&S, even though they are and have always been separate corporate entities. From these agreed-upon facts, the parties draw sharply divergent conclusions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, provides: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States... is declared to be illegal....” The Government contends that the relationships between C&S and the six 5-percent banks constituted unreasonable restraints of trade on two alternative theories: (1) The relationships encompassed an agreement to fix interest rates and service charges among the 5-percent banks, and between these banks and C&S-owned banks, resulting in a “per se” violation of the Sherman Act (2) The programs unreasonably restrained interbank competition, as to prices and services, by extending interbank cooperation far beyond the conventional “correspondent” arrangements which large city banks traditionally make with small banks in outlying markets. C&S denies that its relationships with the 5-percent banks encompassed any agreements to fix prices and contends that the process of de facto branching was a procompetitive response to Georgia’s anticompetitive ban on de jure branching, and thus legal under the Sherman Act’s “rule of reason.” In the alternative, C&S contends that its relationships with the 5-percent banks were subject to the “exclusive primary jurisdiction” of the Federal Reserve Board and thus immune from attack under § 1 of the Sherman Act. \ Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 18, provides: “No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” The Government argues that the acquisitions of the five suburban banks approved by the FDIC would “lessen” competition when compared to what the situation would be if the defendant banks ceased their alleged violations of the Sherman Act. The Government further contends that, even if the present relationships between C&S and the 5-percent banks do not offend the Sherman Act, since the relationships might nevertheless change and the whole situation become more competitive for business or state-law reasons, the proposed acquisitions violate § 7 by foreclosing this possibility. C&S argues that the acquisitions would merely convert de facto into de jure branches, with no perceptible effect on competition compared with the present situation, which is asserted by C&S to be lawful under the Sherman Act. C&S urges that there is no realistic possibility of future competition among the defendant banks. In the alternative, C&S contends that each of the 5-percent banks operates in a distinct and segregable market, so that the proposed acquisitions would not lessen competition in any relevant “section of the country”; and that any anti-competitive effects of the acquisitions are “outweighed in the public interest” because the acquisitions meet “the convenience and needs” of banking customers in the Atlanta area. The District Court did not reach these alternative contentions. A. The Sherman Act Issues 1. The Question of Immunity The District Court thought the correspondent associate programs immune from Sherman Act scrutiny because they were subject to the “exclusive primary jurisdiction” of the Federal Reserve Board under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended. We do not so understand the law. The court relied on Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U. S. 411, but the question in that case was the wholly different one of whether it is the Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal Reserve Board that has jurisdiction to determine whether transactions by a bank holding company conform with applicable state banking law. For guidance as to antitrust immunities, recourse must be had directly to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 et seq. The statutory scheme requires the “prior approval” of the Federal Reserve Board for certain transactions by bank holding companies — including transactions tending to create or enlarge holding company control of independent banks. 12 TJ. S. C. § 1842 (a) The types of transactions requiring Board approval were expanded by amendments to the Act in 1966 and 1970. Prior to 1966, it appeared that Board approval of a transaction provided no immunity from antitrust action, for a note then set out under 12 U. S. C. § 1841 stated that nothing in the Act was to be construed as a “defense” to an antitrust suit. The 1966 amendments to the Act formalized this provision, but also blunted its force by establishing an intricate procedure for accommodating the jurisdictions of the Board and the Justice Department. Under the Act as amended, the Board “shall not approve” an otherwise forbidden transaction unless it meets certain antitrust standards derived from, but not everywhere identical to, the standards of the Sherman Act and of § 7 of the Clayton Act. 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (c). The Board’s order granting or denying an application for prior approval is subject to review in the courts of appeals. 12 U. S. C. § 1848. Furthermore, an approved transaction is stayed automatically for 30 days, during which time an antitrust suit challenging the transaction may be brought in the district court. 12 U. S. C. § 1849 (b). Such a suit is governed by the modified antitrust standards set out in § 1842 (c). If the antitrust suit is not brought within 30 days, and the transaction is consummated, “the transaction may not thereafter be attacked in any judicial proceeding on the ground that it alone and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 of Title 15 [§ 2 of the Sherman Act], but nothing in this chapter shall exempt any bank holding company involved in such a transaction from complying with the antitrust laws after the consummation of such transaction.” 12 IT. S. C. § 1849 (b). C&S can draw no consolation from these provisions. It is true that the staff of the Federal Reserve Board, in 1968, came to an “understanding” with C&S that the correspondent associate programs then in effect did not offend § 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 IT. S. C. § 1842 (a), and thus did not require formal Board “approval.” But this did not give rise to any antitrust immunity. A consummated transaction acquires immunity under § 1849 (b) only when no antitrust action has been commenced within 30 days after the transaction has received the “approval” of the Board, in an order which is subject to judicial review and which reflects application by the Board of the special antitrust standards of § 1842 (c). The immunity applies only to “an acquisition, merger, or consolidation transaction approved under section 1842 of this title in compliance with this chapter.” § 1849 (b). The obvious purpose of the complex machinery in § 1849 (b) is to accord finality to formal actions of the Board not subjected to timely challenge under the antitrust laws. There is no indication that Congress wished to accord a similar finality to the informal views of the Board's staff. We note, however, that the 1966 amendments also added a “grandfather” provision to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1849 (d): “Any acquisition, merger, or consolidation of the kind described in section 1842 (a) of this title which was consummated at any time prior or subsequent to May 9, 1956, and as to which no litigation was initiated by the Attorney General prior to July 1, 1966, shall be conclusively presumed not to have been in violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 of Title 15 [§ 2 of the Sherman Act].” Unlike § 1849 (b), this provision does not state or imply that the covered transactions must have received the formal approval of the Federal Reserve Board. This grandfather provision is not, like § 1849 (b), an attempt to accommodate the competing jurisdictions of the Federal Reserve Board under § 1842 and the Justice Department under the antitrust laws. Rather, the grandfather provision is a simple conferral of legislative amnesty for theretofore unchallenged transactions completed before Congress had clarified the nature of that accommodation. The transactions by which C&S created a correspondent associate relationship with three of the 5-per-cent banks — the Sandy Springs, Chamblee, and Tucker banks — were consummated prior to July 1966, and the Attorney General had taken no action against those transactions by that date. Those transactions thus fall within the terms of the grandfather provision, and the correspondent associate programs in force at those three banks are, therefore, immune from attack under § 1 of the Sherman Act. While the formation by C&S of a de facto branch was a unique type of transaction, it may fairly be characterized as an “acquisition, merger, or consolidation of the kind described in § 1842 (a).” Forming a de facto branch was a multifaceted operation — involving a multiplicity of purchases of stock by a number of parties, the adoption of the C&S logogram by the de facto branch, the connection of the de facto branch with C&S personnel and information programs, the structuring of the bank to receive and administer all C&S banking services, and the establishment of formal C&S influence over the board of directors at the de facto branch. But even before its scope was expanded in 1970, § 1842 (a) was concerned with more than the literal “acquisition” of stock: It took broad account of the “indirect” control of stock, and the control of boards of directors “in any manner,” by bank holding companies. The grandfather provision creates immunity under § 1 of the Sherman Act, not simply under § 7 of the Clayton Act, an indication that its protection extends not merely to literal acquisitions, mergers, and consolidations, but also to “restraints of trade” simultaneous with and functionally integral to such transactions. Though multifaceted, the formation by C&S of a de facto branch was a unitary and cohesive undertaking in the sense that all the facets were closely coordinated, simultaneously instituted, and designed to serve the single purpose of fitting the new bank into the “C&S system.” There is virtually nothing about the present correspondent associate programs that was not fully evident and in place from the moment the programs were launched. There has been no increase in C&S control, nor any change in the way it has been exercised. Whether these programs violated § 1842 (a) — as it applies today or as it applied when the programs began — is not relevant to our inquiry. By its terms, the grandfather provision applies to transactions of the kind described in § 1842 (a). We cannot believe that Congress wished to grant the benefits of the provision only to transactions that plainly transgressed § 1842 (a). Such a construction would make application of the grandfather provision not only cumbersome and time consuming, but also flagrantly inequitable. The formation of a de facto C&S branch involved the direct and indirect acquisition of bank stock, and the direct and indirect assertion of control over the governance and operations of a bank, by a bank holding company. Though unusual in form, such a transaction quite clearly falls within the class of dealings by bank holding companies which Congress intended, in § 1849 (d), to shield from retroactive challenge under the antitrust laws. 2. De Facto Branching Under the Sherman Act Three of the 5-percent banks — the Park National, South DeKalb, and North Fulton banks — were formed after July 1, 1966, and their correspondent associate relationships with C&S are therefore beyond the reach of the grandfather provision of the Bank Holding Company Act and subject to scrutiny under the Sherman Act. Each of these banks was founded ab initio through the sponsorship of C&S. Except for that sponsorship, they would very probably not exist. The record shows that other banking organizations had been unsuccessful in attempting to launch new banks in the area, and C&S affiliation and financial backing were instrumental in convincing state and federal banking authorities to charter these new banks. In short, these banks represented a policy by C&S of de facto branching through the formation of new banking units, rather than through the acquisition, and consequent elimination, of pre-existing, independent banks. Of necessity, the Government's attack on this process is highly technical. Had the new banks been de jure branches of C&S, the whole process would have been beyond reproach. Branching allows established banks to extend their services to new markets, thereby broadening the choices available to consumers in those markets. Having access to parent-bank financial support, expert advice, and proved banking services, branches of several city banks can often enter a market not yet large or developed enough to support a variety of independent, unit banks. Branching thus offers competitive choice to markets where monopoly or oligopoly might otherwise prevail. Furthermore, the branching process gives to outlying customers the benefit of sophisticated services which local unit banks might have little ability or incentive to deliver. The Government denies none of this, nor that C&S’s program of de facto branching was, until 1970, the closest substitute to de jure branching allowed under Georgia law. Yet the Government insists that this de facto branching violated the Sherman Act because the parent bank and its de facto branches were legally distinct corporate entities and were obligated, therefore, to compete vigorously against each other. It is, of course, conceded that C&S’s de facto branches have not behaved as active competitors with respect either to each other or to C&S National and its majority-owned affiliates. But the Government goes further and contends that the correspondent associate programs have actually encompassed at least a tacit agreement to fix interest rates and service charges, see Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 227; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 275-276; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 723; United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U. S. 127, 142-143, so as to make the interrelationships — to that extent at least — illegal “per se.” See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 224-226, n. 59; United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29, 47. C&S vigorously denies the existence of any agreement to fix prices. The evidence in the record is mixed. C&S did regularly notify the 5-percent banks — as it did its de jure branches — of the interest rates and service charges in force at C&S National and its affiliates. But the dissemination of price information is not itself a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See Maple Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563; Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588; United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S. 333, 338 (concurring opinion). A few of the memoranda distributed by C&S could be- construed as advocating price uniformity; on the other hand, the memoranda were almost without exception stamped “for information only,” and the 5-percent banks were admonished by C&S, several times and very clearly, to use their own judgment in setting prices; indeed, the banks were warned that the antitrust laws required no less. The District Court observed that in fact prices did not often vary significantly among the 5-percent banks or between these banks and C&S National, but the court attributed this to the “natural deference of the recipient to information from one with greater expertise or better services.” 372	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 40 ]	sc_adminaction
SKINNER, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION v. MID-AMERICA PIPELINE CO. No. 87-2098. Argued March 1, 1989 Decided April 25, 1989 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Merrill argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Brian J. Martin, and Bruce G. Forrest. Richard McMillan, Jr., argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Clifton S. Elgarten, Luther Zeigler, and Kristen E. Cook. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Richard M. Smith, Robin S. Conrad, John H. Cheatham III, Linda G. Stuntz, Steven G. McKinney, and Richard D. Avil, Jr.; for Florida Power & Light Co. et al. by Jay E. Silberg, Joseph B. Knotts, Jr., Scott M. DuBoff, Harold F. Reis, and Michael F. Healy; and for the National Taxpayers Union et al. by Gale A. Norton. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide today whether § 7005 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish a system of user fees to cover the costs of administering certain federal pipeline safety programs, is an unconstitutional delegation of the taxing power by Congress to the Executive Branch. We hold that it is not. I A In 1986, Congress enacted the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82. Section 7005 of COBRA, codified at 49 U. S. C. App. § 1682a (1982 ed., Supp. IV), and entitled “Pipeline safety user fees,” directs the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to “establish a schedule of fees based on the usage, in reasonable relationship to volume-miles, miles, revenues, or an appropriate combination thereof, of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines.” § 7005(a)(1). These fees are to be collected annually, § 7005(b), from “persons operating — (A) all pipeline facilities subject to the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (49 U. S. C. App. 2001 et seq.); and (B) all pipeline transmission facilities and all liquified natural gas facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U. S. C. App. 1671 et seq.).” § 7005(a)(3). The Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act (HLPSA) regulates interstate and intrastate pipelines carrying petroleum, petroleum products, or anhydrous ammonia. See 49 CFR pt. 195 (1987). The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (NGPSA), in turn, regulates certain liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities, see 49 CFR pt. 193 (1987), as well as interstate and intrastate pipelines carrying natural gas, flammable gas, or gas that is toxic or corrosive, see 49 CFR pts. 191, 192 (1987). The fees collected under §7005 of COBRA are to be used “to the extent provided for in advance in appropriation Acts, only— “(1) in the case of natural gas pipeline safety fees, for activities authorized under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 . . . ; and “(2) in the case of hazardous liquid pipeline safety fees, for activities authorized under the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 . . . .” § 7005(c). These “activities” include Department of Transportation expenses incurred in administering the Pipeline Safety Acts, such as salaries, travel, printing, communication, and supplies, as well as “regulatory, enforcement, training and research costs, and State grants-in-aid.” 51 Fed. Reg. 25783 (1986). The fees assessed and collected are to be “sufficient to meet the costs of [these] activities . . . but at no time shall the aggregate of fees received for any fiscal year . . . exceed 105 percent of the aggregate of appropriations made for such fiscal year for activities to be funded by such fees.” § 7005(d). Section 7005 of COBRA is one of a number of recent congressional enactments designed to make various federal regulatory programs partially or entirely self-financing. E. g., §3401 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 1890, codified at 42 U. S. C. §7178 (1982 ed., Supp. IV) (entire regulatory budget of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); COBRA §7601, codified at 42 U. S. C. §2213 (1982 ed., Supp. IV) (33 percent of regulatory budget of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 45 percent in fiscal years 1988 and 1989). Pursuant to the mandate of § 7005, the Secretary published fee schedules for fiscal year (FY) 1986 on July 16, 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 25782 (1986). Prior to publication, the Secretary consulted the pipeline industry’s major trade associations for assistance in determining the appropriate basis for assessing fees within the range of options permitted by § 7005(a)(1). The consensus of these trade associations — the American Petroleum Institute, the American Gas Association, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, and the Association of Oil Pipe Lines —was that pipeline mileage (referred to simply as “miles” in § 7005) would provide “the most reasonable basis for determining fees . . . .” 51 Fed. Reg. 25782 (1986). The Secretary agreed with this consensus for purposes of the FY 1986 fee schedules. In comments submitted to the Secretary for consideration of possible changes to be made in the fee schedules for FY 1987, about one-third of those commenting objected to pipeline mileage as the basis for assessing fees, arguing that volume-miles would provide a more accurate indicator of the term “usage” in §7005 and that mileage alone did not fairly reflect the Department of Transportation’s enforcement expenditures. The Secretary decided to continue assessing § 7005 fees based on mileage because of the ease of administering such a system and because “long pipelines of small diameter require just as much if not more enforcement effort than shorter pipelines of large diameter.” Id., at 46978. The Secretary also determined that the total pipeline safety program costs, excluding State grants-in-aid, should be allocated at 80 percent for persons regulated by the NGPSA and 20 percent for persons regulated by the HLPSA. The costs of grants were to be allocated at 95 percent for persons regulated by the NGPSA and 5 percent for persons regulated by the HLPSA. Five percent of the total gas program costs were to be borne by LNG facility operators allocated as a function of storage capacity and number of LNG plants. Id., at 25783, 46976. Finally, the Secretary estimated that the administrative costs of assessing fees on the 23 percent of the Nation’s gas operators with less than 10 miles of gas pipeline and the 17 percent of the Nation’s hazardous liquid operators with less than 30 miles of hazardous liquid pipeline would exceed the value of the fees assessed. Accordingly, the Secretary exempted these small mileage operators from assessment of § 7005 fees. Ibid. On the basis of this fee schedule framework, the Secretary set fees of $23.99 per mile for gas pipelines and $6.41 per mile for hazardous liquid pipelines in FY 1986. Operators of LNG facilities were assessed lump sums ranging from $1,250 to $7,500 per plant. Id., at 25783. The total costs for both pipeline safety programs were $7,773 million, $8,523 million, and $8,550 million for FY’s 1986, 1987, and 1988 respectively. Brief for Appellant 4, n. 2. Expenses for FY 1989 are estimated at $9.3 million. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. 100-457, 102 Stat. 2143-2144. B Appellee Mid-America Pipeline Company, based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, owns and operates pipelines that transport hazardous liquids and is, therefore, subject to the regulatory strictures of the HLPSA. On July 28, 1986, pursuant to its recently published fee schedule, the Secretary assessed Mid-America $53,023.52 as its share of the cost of federal administration of the HLPSA. Mid-America paid that sum under protest and filed suit against the Secretary in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States Magistrate assigned to the case recommended that §7005 of COBRA be struck down as an unconstitutional delegation to the Department of Transportation of Congress’ taxing power. Relying primarily on our decisions in National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336 (1974), and FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U. S. 345 (1974), the Magistrate concluded that the assessments made under § 7005 are taxes rather than fees. The Magistrate then determined in light of J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928), and American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90 (1946), that, in enacting §7005, Congress did not give the kind of guidance to the Secretary necessary to avoid the conclusion that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its taxing power to the Executive Branch. The District Court adopted these conclusions and entered judgment for Mid-America on February 9, 1988. Invoking this Court’s appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, the Secretary appealed the decision of the District Court directly to this Court and we noted probable jurisdiction. Sub nom. Burnley v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 488 U. S. 814 (1988). Because the District Court entered its judgment before September 25, 1988, the repeal of 28 U. S. C. § 1252 by Public Law 100-352, §1, 102 Stat. 662, does not affect our jurisdiction in this case. Appeals from district court judgments finding Acts of Congress unconstitutional and entered after the repealer’s effective date, however, must now be taken to the appropriate federal court of appeals, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291. II Earlier this Term, in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361 (1989), we revisited the nondelegation doctrine and reaffirmed our longstanding principle that so long as Congress provides an administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such that a court could “ ‘ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,”’ no delegation of legislative authority trenching on the principle of separation of powers has occurred. Id., at 379, quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 426 (1944). See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, supra, at 105 (It is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. Private rights are protected by access to the courts to test the application of the policy in the light of these legislative declarations”). Appellee Mid-America does not seriously contend that the guidelines provided by Congress to the Secretary in § 7005 do not meet the normal requirements of the nondelegation doctrine as we have applied it. Nor could Mid-America support any such contention. In enacting § 7005, Congress delimited the scope of the Secretary’s discretion with much greater specificity than in delegations that we have upheld in the past. Cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 778-786 (1948) (upholding delegation of authority to War Department to recover “excessive profits” earned on military contracts); Yakus, supra, at 420, 426-427 (upholding delegation of authority to the Price Administrator to fix prices of commodities that “will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes” of the congressional enactment); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 600-601 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine just and reasonable rates); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 194, 225-226 (1943) (upholding delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as “public interest, convenience, or necessity” require). Under § 7005, the Secretary may not collect fees from firms not subject to either of the two Pipeline Safety Acts, § 7005(a)(3); he may not use the funds for purposes other than administering the two Acts, § 7005(c); he may not set fees on a case-by-case basis, § 7005(a); in setting fees, he may not apply any criteria other than volume-miles, miles, or revenues, § 7005(a); he may not establish a fee schedule that does not bear a “reasonable relationship” to these criteria, § 7005(a). Furthermore, the Secretary has no discretion whatsoever to expand the budget for administering the Pipeline Safety Acts because the ceiling on aggregate fees that may be collected in any fiscal year is set at 105 percent of the aggregate appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year. § 7005(d). We have no doubt that these multiple restrictions Congress has placed on the Secretary’s discretion to assess pipeline safety user fees satisfy the constitutional requirements of the nondelegation doctrine as we have previously articulated them. Mid-America contends — and the District Court agreed— that, notwithstanding the constitutional soundness of § 7005 under ordinary nondelegation analysis, the assessment of these pipeline safety user fees must be scrutinized under a more exacting nondelegation lens. When so scrutinized, Mid-America argues, §7005 is revealed to be constitutionally inadequate. In Mid-America’s view, the assessments permitted by §7005, although labeled “user fees,” are actually tax assessments levied by the Secretary on firms regulated by the HLPSA or the NGPSA. Congress’ taxing power, Mid-America further contends, unlike any of Congress’ other enumerated powers, if delegable at all, must be delegated with much stricter guidelines than is required for other congressional delegations of authority. Mid-America purports to derive this two-tiered theory of nondelegation from the text and history of the Constitution, from past congressional practice, and from the decisions of this Court. Article I, § 8, of the Constitution enumerates the powers of Congress. First in place among these enumerated powers is the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . .” We discern nothing in this placement of the Taxing Clause that would distinguish Congress’ power to tax from its other enumerated powers — such as its commerce powers, its power to “raise and support Armies,” its power to borrow money, or its power to “make Rules for the Government” — in terms of the scope and degree of discretionary authority that Congress may delegate to the Executive in order that the President may “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U. S. 394 (1928) (upholding broad delegation of authority to the President under the Taxing Clause and the Commerce Clause to impose duties on foreign imports). It is, of course, true that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue [must] originate in the House of Representatives . . . .” Art. I, §7. But the Origination Clause, while embodying the Framers’ concern that persons elected directly by the people have initial responsibility over taxation (until the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, Senators were chosen by state legislatures, see Art. I, §3), implies nothing about the scope of Congress’ power to delegate discretionary authority under its taxing power once a tax bill has been properly enacted. Mid-America does not contend that § 7005 failed to originate in the House. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce drafted the provision, which was included in H. R. 3500, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-300, p. 492 (1985). From its earliest days to the present, Congress, when enacting tax legislation, has varied the degree of specificity and the consequent degree of discretionary authority delegated to the Executive in such enactments. See, e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §43, 1 Stat. 209 (in the case of fines assessed for nonpayment of liquor taxes, “the secretary of the treasury of the United States [has]. . . power to mitigate or remit such penalty or forfeiture . . . upon such terms and conditions as shall appear to him reasonable”) (First Congress); Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, §2, 1 Stat. 528 (in lieu of collecting stamp duty enacted by Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury may “agree to an annual composition for the amount of such stamp duty, with any of the said banks, of one per centum on the amount of the annual dividend made by such banks”) (Fifth Congress). See generally Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 683-689 (1892) (longstanding practice of Congress delegating authority to the President under the Taxing Clause “is entitled to great weight”). Even when Congress legislates with remarkable specificity, as it has done in the Internal Revenue Code, it has delegated to the Executive the authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Code], including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue” and the authority to determine “the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.” 26 U. S. C. §§ 7805(a), (b). Such rules and regulations, which undoubtedly affect individual taxpayer liability, are equally without doubt the result of entirely appropriate delegations of discretionary authority by Congress. As we observed in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983): “In an area as complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new problems. . . . “Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it considers improper; and courts exercise review over IRS actions. In the first instance, however, the responsibility for construing the [Internal Revenue] Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every conceivable problem that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies on the administrators and on the courts to implement the legislative will.” Id., at 596-597. See also National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 488 (1979) (“The choice among reasonable interpretations [of the Internal Revenue Code] is for the Commissioner, not the courts”). We find no support, then, for Mid-America’s contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of Congress require the application of a different and stricter non-delegation doctrine in cases where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power. In light of this conclusion, we need not concern ourselves with the threshold question that so exercised the District Court whether the pipeline safety users “fees” created by §7005 are more properly thought of as a form of taxation because some of the administrative costs paid by the regulated parties actually inure to the benefit of the public rather than directly to the benefit of those parties. Even if the user fees are a form of taxation, we hold that the delegation of discretionary authority under Congress’ taxing power is subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than that we have applied to other nondelegation challenges. Congress may wisely choose to be more circumspect in delegating authority under the Taxing Clause than under other of its enumerated powers, but this is not a heightened degree of prudence required by the Constitution. Our decisions in National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336 (1974), and FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U. S. 345 (1974), are not to the contrary. In these cases we considered the provision of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act (IOAA), 1952, 65 Stat. 290, re-codified at 31 U. S. C. §9701, that allows agencies to collect fees based on “(A) the costs to the Government; (B) the value of the service or thing to the recipient; (C) public policy or interest served; and (D) other relevant facts.” 31 U. S. C. § 9701(b)(2). The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Power Commission respectively sought to recoup all of their costs in regulating community antenna television systems and in administering the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act by assessing fees on the regulated parties. Recognizing that some of the administrative costs at issue “inured to the benefit of the public,” 415 U. S., at 343, rather than directly to the regulated parties, we expressed doubt whether Congress had clearly intended in the IOAA to delegate authority to Executive agencies to recover the costs of benefits conferred on the public by assessing fees on regulated parties. We observed that, because such fees do not “bestofw] a benefit on the [regulated party], not shared by other members of society,” they might better be thought of as taxes rather than fees. Given at least the possibility of a constitutional difficulty arising from that delegation under the Taxing Clause, we chose to interpret the IOAA “narrowly to avoid constitutional problems.” Id., at 342. Accordingly, we struck down the agencies’ efforts to recover from regulated parties costs for benefits inuring to the public generally. In FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976), we considered a nondelegation challenge to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 872, which permitted the President to raise license “fees” on imports when necessary to protect the national security. In rejecting the challenge, we made clear that National Cable Television and New England Power stand only for the proposition that Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether characterized as “fees” or “taxes,” on those parties. 426 .U. S., at 560, n. 10. Of course, any such delegation must also meet the normal requirements of the nondelegation doctrine. As we have indicated, § 7005 explicitly reflects Congress’ intention that the total costs of administering the HLPSA and the NGPSA be recovered through the assessment of charges on those regulated by the Acts and provides intelligible guidelines for these assessments. Finding no unconstitutional delegation of authority, we reverse the decision of the District Court. It is so ordered.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 28 ]	sc_adminaction
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PARIS UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 95 et al. v. VAIL No. 83-87. Argued February 28, 1984 Decided April 23, 1984 Thomas R. Miller argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Marc J. Ansel argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of University Professors by Ralph S. Brown, Lawrence White, AnnH. Franke, and Victor J. Stone; and for the National Education Association et al. by Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, and Charles S. Sims. Gwendolyn H. Gregory filed a brief for the National School Boards Association as amicus curiae. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of this case.	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 116 ]	sc_adminaction
UNITED STATES v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. No. 28. Argued October 21, 1969 Decided February 2, 1970 Assistant Attorney General McLaren argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Deputy Solicitor General Springer, and Howard E. Shapiro. Louis B. Dailey argued the cause for appellants in No. 38. With him on the briefs was Harry Tyson Carter. Valentine B. Deale argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant in No. 44. Robert L. Wald and Joel E. Hoffman filed a brief for appellant in No. 43. Fritz R. Kahn argued the cause for appellee Interstate Commerce Commission in all cases. With him on the brief were Robert W. Ginnane and Jerome Nelson. Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for appellees Great Northern Railway Co. et al. in all cases. With him on the briefs were Ray Garrett, D. Robert Thomas, Lee B. Mc-Turnan, Michael Boudin, Anthony Kane, Louis E. Torinus, Earl F. Requa, Frank S. Farrell, Eldon Martin, R. T. Cubbage, and Richard J. Flynn. Fred H. Tolan argued the cause for appellees Pacific Northwest Shippers in No. 28. With him on the brief was Alan F. Wohl-stetter. Raymond K. Merrill argued the cause for ap-pellee Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. in No. 28. With him on the brief were Edwin O. Schiewe, Warren H. Ploeger, Thomas H. Ploss, and Edward H. Foley. Lee Johnson, Attorney General of Oregon, and Richard W. Sabin, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for appellee Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon in No. 28. Together with No. 38, Brundage et al. v. United States et al., No. 43, City of Auburn v. United States et al., and No. 44, Livingston Anti-Merger Committee v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al., on appeal from the same court. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission orders that give rise to these appeals grow out of applications seeking approval of a merger plan filed by the Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company (collectively the Northern Lines), and three of their subsidiaries — the Pacific Coast Railroad Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company (Burlington), and the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Company (SP&S). The Commission approved the merger and a three-judge Federal District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the orders of the Commission. We affirm the judgment of the District Court. The factual and historical setting of the merger is important to an understanding of our disposition of these appeals. Great Northern operates some 8,200 miles of road located in 10 States and two Canadian provinces. Northern Pacific has approximately 6,200 miles of track in seven States and one Canadian province. The Northern Lines operate largely in the area west of St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth, running from these points across the Northern Tier of States (Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington) to Spokane, Tacoma, and Portland. The Northern Pacific’s tracks run generally somewhat to the south of the Great Northern’s. The Northern Lines jointly own and control the Burlington and the SP&S, while the Great Northern owns and controls the Pacific Coast Railroad Company. The Burlington’s 8,648 miles of track extend from Chicago to the Twin Cities and generally southwesterly to Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, and Montana. By its subsidiaries the Burlington reaches the Gulf of Mexico at Houston and Galveston. The SP&S has 599 miles of road in Oregon and Washington, of which 515 are mainline. This mainline provides the most direct route from Spokane to Portland and is of strategic importance to the Northern Lines because Spokane lies on their main transcontinental routes and Portland is an important West Coast terminal for both roads. The Pacific Coast has 32 miles of track, all in King County, Washington; its rolling stock and motive power are leased from the Great Northern. Rail competition in the areas served by the Northern Lines is principally between three carriers: the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company (Milwaukee). Because the Burlington’s routes largely complement those of the Northern Lines, there is no substantial competition between the Burlington and its corporate parents. The Great Northern and the Northern Pacific overshadow the Milwaukee and are each the principal competitor of the other. The Northern Lines carry the lion’s share of traffic between the Twin Cities and Duluth and the Pacific Northwest, both roads having good access to the Pacific Northwest through control of certain vital gateways in the area. Although the Milwaukee was designed and constructed to be a competitor of the Northern Lines, it has never accounted for a large percentage of the carriage across the Northern Tier States to the Pacific Northwest; it has never become a rate-making railroad. The explanation for this is that although possessing superior grades and a shorter route west of the Twin Cities, it has never had adequate access to the gateways of the Pacific Northwest, largely because of the Northern Lines’ control of the SP&S. As a result, its role has been that of a short-haul carrier feeding much profitable long-haul traffic to the Northern Lines at St. Paul and Minneapolis. The population of the Northern Tier region traversed by the Northern Lines and the Milwaukee is concentrated largely in its easterly and westerly extremities. The Northern Tier is rich in agricultural and mineral resources, and embraces the country’s richest timber reserves. However, the markets for the products of the Northern Tier are limited in number and distant from the region; the major shipments must move east. Thus, transportation capable of carrying its bulk products at a rate low enough to permit participation in those markets is of extreme importance to the region. Rail transportation well serves this need. There has been historically, however, an imbalance between the low-rated agricultural, mineral, and forest produce traffic flowing out of the region, and high-rated manufactured goods flowing into the region. The former is traffic inherently suited to rail transport, but the latter is subject to incursions from other modes of carriage. Although water traffic in the Northern Tier is virtually nonexistent, truck competition has been present for some time and is growing. Northern Pacific and Great Northern have long sought to merge into a single unified transportation system. In Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 646 (1896), this Court ruled that an attempt to consolidate the operation of the two roads was contrary to a Minnesota statute prohibiting the consolidation of parallel and competing railroads. The next merger attempt was struck down in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904), as contrary to the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. Then the declining fortunes of rail carriers led Congress to enact the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, which charged the Interstate Commerce Commission with the affirmative responsibility to formulate plans for simplifying the Nation’s rail transport “into a limited number of systems.” 41 Stat. 481. This engendered a third effort, under the Commission’s auspices, to merge the Northern Lines. However, this effort foundered on the Commission’s requirement that the Burlington be excluded from the Northern Lines system, and the Northern Lines were unwilling to consolidate without the Burlington. I The Present Merger In 1955 the Northern Lines began investigating anew the possibility of a merger that would combine five roads — the Burlington, the SP&S, the Pacific Coast, and the Northern Lines — to form a New Company. Extensive negotiations dealing with all phases of the proposed merger were commenced. Five years later, in 1960, an agreement was finally reached. It provided that the Northern Lines, the Burlington, and the Pacific Coast be merged into New Company, which was to acquire the subsidiaries of the merged companies as well as all their leasehold, trackage, and joint-use rights in other carriers and the terminals incident thereto. New Company would lease the SP&S, thereby acquiring that road’s subsidiaries and trackage rights. The merger agreement further provided that Northern Pacific shareholders would receive common stock of New Company on a share-for-share basis. Great Northern stockholders would receive one share of New Company common for each share of Great Northern and, in addition, one-half share of New Company $10 par 5%% preferred for each share of Great Northern held at the date of the merger, this preferred stock to be retired over a 25-year period, beginning at the fifth anniversary of the merger, and to be redeemable at the option of New Company any time after the fifth anniversary of the merger. The Burlington stock held by the Northern Lines, amounting to 97.18% of the total shares outstanding, would be canceled and the remaining shareholders given 3.25 shares of New Company common for each share of Burlington. Commission Proceedings First Report. — As a result of these renewed merger negotiations between 1955 and 1960, applications were filed in 1961 under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 5, seeking approval of the merger and authorization for the issuance of stock and securities, the assumption of obligations and other authority necessary to effectuate the merger. Extensive public hearings were held in 1961 and 1962 at which the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, various railway employee groups, nine States or state regulatory agencies, and the Milwaukee and the Chicago & North Western Railway Company (North Western), inter alia, actively opposed the merger as proposed. Shippers and related interest groups appeared in support of the proposal. The Hearing Examiner submitted a report in 1964 recommending approval of the merger and the related transactions, subject to certain protective conditions. The Commission heard oral argument and in a report dated March 31, 1966 (First Report), rejected the Examiner’s recommendation and disapproved the merger by a vote of 6 to 5, The applicants petitioned for a reconsideration, asserting that they were willing to accept all protective conditions sought by the Milwaukee and another affected road, the North Western, that they had entered into attrition agreements with the objecting unions for the protection of the employees, and that the merger would yield dollar savings greater than those estimated in the First Report. While this petition was pending before the Commission, the applicants entered into agreements with the North Western and the Milwaukee which provided that the merger applicants would agree to all the conditions sought by those roads; the Milwaukee and the North Western then agreed to support the merger. Thereafter, these roads withdrew their opposition to the merger and urged the Commission to approve it. Approval was advocated or objections withdrawn by a number of parties who had previously either completely opposed the merger or opposed it absent imposition of adequate protective conditions. These included the Department of Agriculture, the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon, and the States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Second Report. — On January 4, 1967, the Commission granted the application and reopened the proceedings for reconsideration and further hearings. Although the order by its terms reopened the proceedings on all issues, the hearing was limited to taking evidence on the question of the amount of savings the merger would produce in light of the agreement between the applicants and the Milwaukee and the North Western, and the other changes relevant to savings which had occurred after the close of the first hearing. Oral arguments followed. On November 30, 1967, the Commission handed down a report and order (Second Report) approving the proposed merger by a vote of 8 to 2 as consistent with the public interest and imposing certain conditions to protect other carriers. On April 11, 1968, the Commission denied an application for reconsideration. District Court Proceedings The United States, acting through the Department of Justice, filed a complaint on May 9, 1968, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the Commission order approving the merger. Other parties intervened, some as plaintiffs and some as defendants. After preliminary proceedings had resulted in a stay of the Commission’s order pendente lite, the case was submitted on the merits to the three-judge court designated in accordance with 28 U. S. C. §§2325 and 2284. The court, in an opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Charles Fahy, unanimously sustained the Commission, holding that in approving the merger and the related transactions the Commission was guided by the applicable legal principles and that its findings were supported by substantial evidence. The court dismissed the complaints, vacated the stay pendente lite, and then stayed its order pending appeal to this Court. Upon the filing of appeals with this Court, we ordered a further stay pending final disposition. II The Appeals Here Four appeals were taken from the District Court’s judgment; the Department of Justice (No. 28), the Northern Pacific Stockholders’ Protective Committee (No. 38), the City of Auburn, Washington (No. 43), and the Livingston Anti-Merger Committee (No. 44). Each of the four appellants attacks the approval of the merger on different grounds. Because these challenges cover every aspect of the merger, and because of the rather complex expositions of fact necessary to the disposition of each objection, these appeals will be dealt with seriatim. With the cases in this posture the Court must review the proceedings before the Commission to “determine whether the Commission has proceeded in accordance with law and whether its findings and conclusions accord with the statutory standards and are supported by substantial evidence.” Penn-Central Merger and N&W Inclusion Cases, 389 U. S. 486, 499 (1968). It should be emphasized, however, as Mr. Justice For tas noted, speaking for the Court in a similar context, “[w]ith respect to the merits of the merger... our task is limited. We do not inquire whether the merger satisfies our own conception of the public interest. Determination of the factors relevant to the public interest is entrusted by the law primarily to the Commission, subject to the standards of the governing statute.” Id., at 498 — 499. The governing statute here is § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5. The Act provides that the Commission is to approve a proposed merger when it is “consistent with the public interest” and the terms of the proposal are “just and reasonable.” In determining whether this standard is met, the Commission is to “give weight to the following considerations, among others: (1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected.” 49 U.. S. C. § 5 (2)(c). In addition to the four factors listed above, the Commission must also consider the anticompetitive effects of any merger or consolidation, because under § 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act any transaction approved by the Commission is relieved of the operation of the antitrust laws. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 83-87 (1944). In its First Report the Commission found that the merger would result in improved service to shippers in areas served by the Northern Lines because it would enable the roads to make more efficient use of their facilities and would permit the use of the shortest and swiftest internal routes available. In addition, the merger was found to afford estimated savings of approximately $25 million per year by the tenth year after merger. However, the Commission also found that as a consequence of the merger more than 5,200 jobs would be eliminated, this being a significant source of the reduced operating costs. The Commission then analyzed the anticompetitive impact of the proposal and found it would eliminate substantial competition between the Northern Lines in the Northern Tier. The Commission reasoned that even with protective conditions attached to the merger for the benefit of the Milwaukee, it would remain a weak carrier in the Northern Tier when compared with New Company. The Commission, by a vote of 6 to 5, as noted earlier, concluded that the proposed merger plan did not afford benefits of such scope and importance as to outweigh the lessening of rail competition in the Northern Tier; the merger was disapproved. When the Commission reopened the proceedings in 1967, it considered additional evidence including the changed positions of some of the major objectors, and new evidence on the savings to be realized from the merger; the Second Report was then issued. The Commission found that rather than the $25 million previously estimated, in fact more than $40 million per year in savings would be realized by the tenth year after merger. It also noted that agreements entered into by the applicants and their employees had removed objections of various unions to the merger and that no jobs would be eliminated except in the normal course of attrition. Aside from these changes, and the acceptance by the merger applicants of protective conditions sought by the Milwaukee, the record before the Commission was the same as that on which the First Report was based. The Second Report acknowledged that the First Report had failed to give appropriate weight to one of the aims of the national transportation policy and § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, to facilitate rail mergers “consistent with the public interest” in the development of a comprehensive national transport system, and that this had led the Commission to view the merger proposal too stringently. It then went on to re-examine the anti-competitive effects of the merger, weighing them against the savings and benefits to the public, shippers, and the roads, and, accentuating the new and strengthened competitive posture of the Milwaukee, it concluded that the merger proposal should be approved because its benefits outweighed its anticompetitive effects in the Northern Tier region. That this was not an easy problem for the Commission is attested by the lengthy history of attempts to merge these lines which dates back three-quarters of a century. The efforts to establish a more unified rail transportation system in the Northern Tier represent a 20th century phase of the development of the American West; it brackets a period of enormous growth and change, and of new developments in transportation and public needs. Against this background it is not surprising that the members of the Commission were divided 6 to 5 against the merger on the First Report in 1966 and 8 to 2 in favor of the merger on the Second Report in 1967 after changes had been made in the plan to meet many of the objections raised. Nor is it remarkable that two great departments of government, each charged with responsibility to protect the public interest, took opposing positions; vigorous advocacy of divergent views on this difficult problem has narrowed and sharpened the issues and aided the Court in their resolution, ensuring that no factor which ought to be considered would elude our attention. Appellants’ Contentions (a) No. 28, Department of Justice. — The United States, through the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, challenges the Commission’s approval of the merger primarily on the ground that the Commission in the Second Report did not properly apply the standard of §5(2)(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act in determining that the merger is consistent with the public interest. The Department contends that under the statute when a proposed merger will result in a substantial diminution of competition between two financially healthy, competing roads, its anticompetitive effects should preclude the approval of the merger absent a clear showing that a serious transportation need will be met or important public benefits will be provided beyond the savings and efficiencies that normally flow from a merger. The Department urges that the instant case presents a merger between two financially healthy carriers, each of which is the prime competitor of the other in the area served. Admittedly the Commission found in its First Report that the merger would result in a “drastic lessening of competition.” The Department argues that because no benefits are shown to flow from the merger beyond the economies and efficiencies normally resulting from unified operations, the Commission has not satisfied the statutory standard and that the District Court erred in refusing to enjoin the merger. The Department maintains that prior to 1920 the antitrust laws and their underlying policies applied with full force to railroads and that the Transportation Act of 1920, which commanded an affirmative development by the Commission of a nationwide plan “for the consolidation of the railway properties of the continental United States into a limited number of systems,” 41 Stat. 481, was primarily intended to promote the absorption of financially weak by strong carriers. To the extent that the 1920 Act did not intend to encourage rail mergers producing only the usual or “normal” kinds of merger benefits, the Department contends that the policies of the antitrust laws remain the guiding standard by which these consolidations are to be judged. The Transportation Act of 1940, according to the Department, did not alter this policy, but only eliminated the Commission’s duty to formulate a national plan and to confine mergers to the four corners of this plan. The Department suggests that when the Commission is determining whether a merger or consolidation is consistent with the public interest, it must analyze the merger in terms of its anticompetitive impact and, if that impact would be great, then determine whether the merger is required by a serious transportation need or necessary to secure important public benefits. This standard, it urges, is “consistent with both the legislative history of [§ 5] and, more generally, with the goal of substantial simplification of railroad systems that underlay the Transportation Acts of both 1920 and 1940.” The Department of Justice is correct in stating that one focal point of concern throughout the legislative consideration of the problems of railroads has been the weak carrier and its preservation through combination with the strong. Congress saw that as one — but only one — means to promote its objectives. The 1920 statute as a whole also embodied concern for economy and efficiency in rail operations. See Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S. 331, 341 (1924); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 277 (1926); Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522, 530 (1934); United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225, 232 (1939). Thus, a rail merger that furthers the development of a more efficient transportation unit and one that results in the joining of a “sick” with a strong carrier serve equally to promote the long-range objectives of Congress and, upon approval by the Commission, both are immunized from the operation of the antitrust laws. The policy of the 1920 Act has been consistently interpreted in this way. We find no basis for reading the congressional objective as confining these mergers to combinations by which the strong rescue the halt and the lame. In New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932), this Court cautioned that “[t]he fact that the carriers’ lines are parallel and competing cannot be deemed to affect the validity of the authority conferred upon the Commission.... The question whether the acquisition of control in the case of competing carriers will aid in preventing an injurious waste and in securing more efficient transportation service is thus committed to the judgment of the administrative agency upon the facts developed in the particular case.” Id., at 25-26. Although this decision was prior to the passage of the Transportation Act of 1940, that Act in no way altered the basic policy underlying the 1920 enactment. We recognized in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 347 U. S. 298, 319 (1954), that Congress adopted the recommendations of the Committee of Six when it passed the 1940 Transportation Act and relieved the Commission of its duty to promulgate a national railroad consolidation plan. That Committee’s report recognized economies and efficiencies of operation as well as the elimination of circuitous routing to be benefits that could flow to the public through consolidations. As recently as County of Marin v. United States, 356 U. S. 412 (1958), this Court observed: “The congressional purpose in the sweeping revision of § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1940... was to facilitate merger and consolidation in the national transportation system. In the Transportation Act of 1920 the Congress had directed the Commission itself to take the initiative in developing a plan ‘for the consolidation of the railway properties of the continental United States into a limited number of systems/ 41 Stat. 481, but after 20 years of trial the approach appeared inadequate. The Transportation Act of 1940 extended § 5 to motor and water carriers, and relieved the Commission of its responsibility to initiate the unifica-tions. ‘Instead, it authorized approval by the Commission of carrier-initiated, voluntary plans of merger or consolidation if, subject to such terms, conditions and modifications as the Commission might prescribe, the proposed transactions met with certain tests of public interest, justice and reasonableness....’ (Emphasis added.) Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182, 193 (1948)... In short, the result of the Act was a change in the means, while the end remained the same. The very language of the amended ‘unification section’ expresses clearly the desire of the Congress that the industry proceed toward an integrated national transportation system through substantial corporate simplification.” Id., at 416-418. (Emphasis in original.) (Footnotes omitted.) We turn now to consider the appropriate weight to be accorded by the Commission to antitrust policy in proceedings for approval of a merger. The role of antitrust policy under § 5 was discussed comprehensively and dispositively in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944), a case dealing with a merger of several large trucking companies. Since this Court has nowhere else dealt so definitively with this issue, the analysis by Mr. Justice Rutledge in the opinion for the Court merits extended quotation: “The history of the development of the special national transportation policy suggests, quite apart from the explicit provision of § 5 (11), that the policies of the anti-trust laws determine ‘the public interest’ in railroad regulation only in a qualified way. And the altered emphasis in railroad legislation on achieving an adequate, efficient, and economical system of transportation through close supervision of business operations and practices rather than through heavy reliance on the enforcement of free competition in various phases of the business, cf. New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, has its counterpart in motor carrier policy.... “[Tjhere can be little doubt that the Commission is not to measure proposals for all-rail or all-motor consolidations by the standards of the anti-trust laws. Congress authorized such consolidations because it recognized that in some circumstances they were appropriate for effectuation of the national transportation policy. It was informed that this policy would be furthered by ‘encouraging the organization of stronger units’ in the motor carrier industry. And in authorizing those consolidations it did not import the general policies of the anti-trust laws as a measure of their permissibility. It in terms relieved participants in appropriate mergers from the requirements of those laws. § 5 (11). In doing so, it presumably took into account the fact that the business affected is subject to strict regulation and supervision, particularly with respect to rates charged the public — an effective safeguard against the evils attending monopoly, at which the Sherman Act is directed. Against this background, no other inference is possible but that, as a factor in determining the propriety of motor-carrier consolidations the preservation of competition among carriers, although still a value, is significant chiefly as it aids in the attainment of the objectives of the national transportation policy. “Therefore, the Commission is not bound... to accede to the policies of the anti-trust laws.... “Congress however neither has made the anti-trust laws wholly inapplicable to the transportation industry nor has authorized the Commission in passing on a proposed merger to ignore their policy.... Hence, the fact that the carriers participating in a properly authorized consolidation may obtain immunity from prosecution under the anti-trust laws in no sense relieves the Commission of its duty, as an administrative matter, to consider the effect of the merger on competitors and on the general competitive situation in the industry in the light of the objectives of the national transportation policy. “In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from the proposed consolidation and consider them along with the advantages of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation policy. Resolving these considerations is a complex task which requires extensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the transportation industry. Congress left that task to the Commission.... ‘The wisdom and experience of that commission/ not of the courts, must determine whether the proposed consolidation is ‘consistent with the public interest.’ [Citations omitted.] If the Commission did not exceed the statutory limits within which Congress confined its discretion and its findings are adequate and supported by evidence, it is not our function to upset its order.” Id., at 83-88. (Footnotes omitted.) Accord, Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173, 186-188 (1959); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 382 U. S. 154, 156-157 (1965); see Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993 (D. C. M. D. Fla. 1966), aff’d per curiam, 386 U. S. 544 (1967). The Department urges that the Commission failed to give sufficient weight to the diminution of competition between the Northern Lines — in short, that it failed to strike the correct balance between antitrust objectives and the overall transportation needs that concern Congress. This contention tends to isolate individual factors that are to enter into the Commission’s decision and view them as the controlling considerations. “Competition is merely one consideration here,” Penn-Central Merger and N&W Inclusion Cases, 389 U. S. 486, 500 (1968). And, we might add, it is a consideration that is implied and is in addition to the four specifically mentioned in § 5 (2) (c) of the statute. In our view the Commission, in both reports, exhibited a concern and sensitivity to the difficult task of accommodating the regulatory policy based on competition with the long-range policy of achieving carrier consolidations. Indeed, this led the Commission to disapprove the merger by a margin of one vote in 1966 after five years of study because of specified infirmities in the plan. The Commission reached a different conclusion by a decisive vote in 1967 on a supplemental record which reflected substantial	What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.	What is the agency involved in the administrative action?	[ "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bureau of Prisons", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "State Agency", "Unidentifiable", "Office of Thrift Supervision", "Department of Homeland Security", "Board of General Appraisers", "Board of Tax Appeals", "General Land Office or Commissioners", "NO Admin Action", "Processing Tax Board of Review" ]	[ 65 ]	sc_adminaction

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