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1.1.1: pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍāhetvābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāmtattvajñānāt niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ || Supreme felicity is attained by the knowledge about the true nature of sixteen categories, viz., means of right knowledge (pramana), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayojana), familiar instance (drstanta), established tenet (siddhanta), members (avayava), confutation (tarka), ascertainment (nirnaya), discussion (vada), wrangling (jalpa), cavil (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhasa), quibble (chala), futility (jati), and occasion for rebuke (nigrahasthana).
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1.1.2: duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarā pāyāt apavargaḥ || Pain, birth, activity, faults and misapprehension — on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release.
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1.1.3: pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni || Perception, inference, comparison and word (verbal testimony)— these are the means of right knowledge.
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1.1.4: indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam || Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is determinate, unnameable and non-erratic.
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1.1.5: atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca || Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz., a priori, a posteriori and ' commonly seen. '
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1.1.6: prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam || Comparison is the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.
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1.1.7: āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ || Word (verbal testimony) is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.
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1.1.8: saḥ dvividhaḥ dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt || It is of two kinds, viz., that which refers to matter which is seen and that which refers to matter which is not seen.
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1.1.9: ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanaḥpravṛttidoṣapretyabhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargāḥ tu prameyam || Soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain and release — are the objects of right knowledge.
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1.1.10: icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāni ātmanaḥ liṅgam iti || Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and intelligence are the marks of the soul.
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1.1.11: ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīram || Body is the site of gesture, senses and sentiments.
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1.1.12: ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvakśrotrāṇi indriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ || Nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the senses produced from elements.
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1.1.13: pṛthivī āpaḥ tejaḥ vāyuḥ ākāśam iti bhūtāni || Earth, water, light, air and ether — these are the elements.
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1.1.14: gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ tadarthāḥ || Smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are objects of the senses and qualities of the earth, etc.
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1.1.15: buddhiḥ upalabdhiḥ jñānam iti anarthāntaram || Intellect, apprehension and knowledge — these are not different from one another.
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1.1.16: yugapat jñānānutpattiḥ manasaḥ liṅgam || The mark of the mind is that there do not arise (in the soul) more acts of knowledge than one at a time.
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1.1.17: pravṛttiḥ vāgbuddhiśarīrārambhaḥ || Activity is that which makes the voice, mind and body begin their action.
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1.1.18: pravarttanālakṣaṇāḥ doṣāḥ || Faults have the characteristic of causing activity.
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1.1.19: punarutpattiḥ pretyabhāvaḥ || Transmigration means re-births.
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1.1.20: pravṛttidoṣajanitaḥ arthaḥ phalam || Fruit is the thing produced by activity and faults.
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1.1.21: bādhanālakṣaṇam duḥkham || Pain has the characteristic of causing uneasiness.
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1.1.22: tadatyantavimokṣaḥ apavargaḥ || Release is the absolute deliverance from pain.
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1.1.23: samānānekadharmopapatteḥ vipratipatteḥ upalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthātaḥ ca viśeṣāpekṣaḥ vimarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ || Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception.
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1.1.24: yam artham adhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam || Purpose is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.
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1.1.25: laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ yasmin arthe buddhisāmyam saḥ dṛṣṭāntaḥ || A familiar instance is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion.
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1.1.26: tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṃsthitiḥ siddhāntaḥ || An established tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.
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1.1.27: saḥ caturvidhaḥ sarvatantrapratitantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṃsthityarthāntarabhāvāt || The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between a dogma of all the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma, and an implied dogma.
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1.1.28: sarvatantrāviruddhaḥ tantre adhikṛtaḥ arthaḥ sarvatantrasiddhāntaḥ || A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not opposed by any school and is claimed by at least one school.
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1.1.29: samānatantrasiddhaḥ paratantrāsiddhaḥ pratitantrasiddhāntaḥ || A dogma peculiar to some school is a tenet which is accepted by similar schools but rejected by opposite schools.
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1.1.30: yatsiddhau anyaprakaraṇasiddhiḥ saḥ adhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ || A hypothetical dogma is a tenet which if accepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet.
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1.1.31: aparīkṣitābhyupagamāt tadviśeṣaparīkṣaṇam abhyupagamasiddhāntaḥ || All implied dogma is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it.
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1.1.32: pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni avayavāḥ || The members (of a syllogism) are proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.
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1.1.33: sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā || A proposition is the declaration of what is to be established.
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1.1.34: udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṃ hetuḥ || The reason is the means for establishing what is to be established through the homogeneous or affirmative character of the example.
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1.1.35: tathā vaidharmyāt || Likewise through heterogeneous or negative character.
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1.1.36: sādhyasādharmyāt taddharmabhāvī dṛṣṭāntaḥ udāharaṇam || A homogeneous (or affirmative) example is a familiar instance which is known to possess the property to be established and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given.
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1.1.37: tadviparyayāt vā viparītam || A heterogeneous (or negative) example is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of the property to be established and which implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.
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1.1.38: udāharaṇāpekṣaḥ tathā iti upasaṃhāraḥ na tathā iti vā sādhyasya upanayaḥ || Application is a winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be established as being so or not so.
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1.1.39: hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanam nigamanam || Conclusion is the re-stating of the proposition after the reason has been mentioned.
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1.1.40: avijñātatatve arthe kāraṇopapattitaḥ tattvajñānārtham uhaḥ tarkaḥ || Confutation is reasoning which reveals error in the opponent's argument by showing absurdity in his premises.
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1.1.41: vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇam nirṇayaḥ || Ascertainment is the removal of doubts, and the resolution of a dispute, by hearing two opposite sides.
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1.2.1: pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigrahaḥ vādaḥ || Discussion (vada) is the adoption of one of two opposing sides. What is adopted is analysed in the form of five members and defended by the aid of any of the means of right knowledge, while the opposite side is attacked by means of confutation, without deviation from the established tenets.
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1.2.2: yathoktopapannaḥ chalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambhaḥ jalpaḥ || Wrangling, aiming at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by means of quibbles, futilities, and other processes which deserve rebuke.
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1.2.3: saḥ pratipakṣasthāpanāhīnaḥ vitaṇḍā || A cavil is a kind of wrangling which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side.
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1.2.4: savyabhicāra-viruddha-prakaraṇasama-sādhyasama-kālātītāḥ hetvābhāsāḥ || Fallacies of a reason are the erratic, the contradictory, the controversial, the reciprocal, and the mistimed.
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1.2.5: anaikāntikaḥ savyabhicāraḥ || The erratic is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one.
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1.2.6: siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ || The contradictory is the reason which is opposed to an accepted tenet.
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1.2.7: yasmāt prakaraṇacintā saḥ nirṇayārthamapadiṣṭaḥ prakaraṇasamaḥ || The controversial is the reason which is adduced to establish a thesis, while it is itself a subject of controversy just like the thesis.
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1.2.8: sādhyāviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyatvāt sādhyasamaḥ || The reciprocal is the reason which is not different from the thesis, inasmuch as it requires to be proved just like the thesis.
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1.2.9: kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ kālātītaḥ || The mistimed is the reason which as adduced in a wrong order of time is vitiated by a lapse of time.
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1.2.10: vacanavighātaḥ arthavikalpopapattyā chalam || A quibble is the opposition offered to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning.
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1.2.11: tat trividham - vākchalam sāmānyacchalam upacāracchalam ca iti || It is of three kinds, viz., quibble in respect of a term, quibble in respect of a genus, and quibble in respect of a metaphor.
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1.2.12: aviśeṣābhihite arthe vaktuḥ abhiprāyāt arthāntarakalpanā vākchalam || A quibble in respect of a term consists in wilfully assuming a meaning other than that intended by a speaker who has used a word in a particular sense.
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1.2.13: sambhavataḥ arthasya atisāmānyayogāt asambhūtārthakalpanā sāmānyacchalam || A quibble in respect of a genus consists in asserting the impossibility of a thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certain genus which is very wide.
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1.2.14: dharmavikalpanirdeśe arthsadbhāvapratiṣedhaḥ upacāracchalam || A quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally, while it was used metaphorically.
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1.2.15: vākchalam eva upacāracchalam tat aviśeṣāt || A quibble in respect of a metaphor is not different from a quibble in respect of a term, there being no distinction between them.
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1.2.16: na tat arthāntarabhāvāt || It is not so, for there is a distinction.
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1.2.17: aviśeṣe vā kiñcitsādharmyāt ekacchalaprasaṅgaḥ || If there were no distinction, a quibble would be of one kind only, there being some sort of similarity in all cases.
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1.2.18: sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ || A futility is an objection taken on the ground of mere similarity or dissimilarity.
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1.2.19: vipratipattiḥ apratipattiḥ ca nigrahasthānam || An occasion for rebuke arises when one misunderstands or does not understand at all.
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1.2.20: tadvikalpāt jātinigrahasthānabahutvam || From the varieties of these two, there is a multiplicity of futilities and occasions for rebuke.
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2.1.1: samānānekadharmādhyavasāyāt anyataradharmādhyavasāyāt vā na saṃśayaḥ || Doubt is not removed by the mere recognition of properties common to many objects, or by the recognition of a property which belongs to only one of them.
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2.1.2: viprattipattyavyavasthādhyavasāyāt ca || Nor is it removed by the recognition of conflicting testimony and irregularity of perception.
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2.1.3: viprattipattau ca saṃprattipatteḥ || And because conflicting testimony may sometimes be reconciled.
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2.1.4: avyavasthā ātmani vyavasthitatvāt ca avyavasthāyāḥ || And because irregularity itself is not irregular inasmuch as it is found to be regular in our own self.
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2.1.5: tathā atyantasaṃśayaḥ taddharmasātatyopapatteḥ || There would thus be an eternal doubt owing to the continuance of the cause of doubt.
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2.1.6: yathoktādhyavasāyāt eva tadviśeṣāpekṣāt saṃśaye na asaṃśayaḥ na atyantasaṃśayaḥ vā || Doubt must arise from the recognition of the properties as aforesaid, provided that there is a quest for the particular character of the object; but there will be no doubt or an eternal doubt if there is no such quest.
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2.1.7: yatra saṃśayaḥ tatra evam uttarottaraprasaṅgaḥ || Wherever there is a doubt there will arise a series of other doubts.
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2.1.8: pratyakṣādīnām aprāmāṇyaṃ traikālyāsiddheḥ || Perception and other means of right knowledge are not valid, as they are impossible in the three divisions of time.
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2.1.9: pūrvaṃ hi pramāṇasiddhau na indriyārthasannikarṣāt pratyakṣotpattiḥ || If the means of right knowledge were established before, perception would not arise from the contact of a sense with its object.
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2.1.10: paścātsiddhau na pramāṇebhyaḥ prameyasiddhiḥ || If the means of right knowledge were established after, the objects of right knowledge would not be established by them.
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2.1.11: yugapatsiddhau pratyarthaniyatatvāt kramavṛttitvābhāvaḥ buddhīnām || If they were established simultaneously, there would be no successive operation of the acts of knowledge, each being confined to its own object.
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2.1.12: traikālyāsiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ || The refutation of the three divisions of time being impossible.
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2.1.13: sarvapramāṇapratiṣedhāt ca pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ || And from the refutation of all the means of right knowledge, the refutation itself is impossible.
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2.1.14: tatprāmāṇye vā na sarvapramāṇavipratiṣedhaḥ || Or if that be valid, there is no refutation of all the means of right knowledge.
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2.1.15: traikālyāpratiṣedhaḥ ca śabdāt ātodyasiddhivat tatsiddheḥ || And there is no refutation of the three divisions of time, for they are established like the establishment of a musical instrument from sound.
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2.1.16: prameyā ca tulāprāmāṇyavat || And the object of right knowledge is like the validity of a balance.
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2.1.17: pramāṇataḥ siddheḥ pramāṇānām pramāṇāntarasiddhiprasaṅgaḥ || The establishment of the means of right knowledge being through a means of right knowledge, there would be the occasion for the establishment of another means of right knowledge.
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2.1.18: tadvinivṛtteḥ vā pramāṇasiddhivat prameyasiddhiḥ || Or from the cessation of that, the establishment of the objects of right knowledge is like the establishment of the means of right knowledge.
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2.1.19: na, pradīpaprakāśasiddhivat tatsiddheḥ || No, their establishment is like the establishment of the light of a lamp.
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2.1.20: kvacit nivṛttidarśanāt anivṛttidarśanāt ca kvacit anekāntaḥ || There is some uncertainty, as we notice in some cases the cessation and in other cases non-cessation.
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2.2.1: na catuṣṭvam, aitihyārthāpattisambhavābhāvaprāmāṇyāt || The fourfold division is not right, for rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence are also means of right knowledge.
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2.2.2: śabde aitihyānarthāntarabhāvāt anumāne arthāpattisambhavābhāvānarthāntara bhāvāt ca apratiṣedhaḥ || There is no refutation, for rumour is included in word, and presumption, probability and non-existence are included in inference.
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2.2.3: arthāpattiḥ apramāṇam anaikāntikatvāt || Presumption is not a means of right knowledge, as it is erratic.
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2.2.4: anarthāpattau arthāpattyabhimānāt || From the supposition of presumption in a case which is not presumption.
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2.2.5: pratiṣedhāprāmāṇyaṃ ca anaikāntikatvāt || And the invalidity of the refutation from its being erratic.
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2.2.6: tatprāmāṇye vā na arthāpattyaprāmāṇyam || Or if that be valid, there is no invalidity of presumption.
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2.2.7: na abhāvaprāmāṇyaṃ prameyāsiddheḥ || Non-existence is not a means of right knowledge, for the object of right knowledge is not established.
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2.2.8: lakṣiteṣvalakṣaṇalakṣitatvāt alakṣitānāṃ tatprameyasiddheḥ || The object of that (non-existence) is established from the fact that things which are not marked are marked by the mark of things which are marked.
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2.2.9: asati arthe na abhāvaḥ iti cet na, anyalakṣaṇopapatteḥ || If it be said that in the absence of a thing there is no non-existence, no, from the possibility of another mark.
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2.2.10: tatsiddheḥ alakṣiteṣu ahetuḥ || From its establishment, it is no reason in things which are not marked.
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2.2.11: na, lakṣaṇāvasthitāpekṣasiddheḥ || No, from the establishment which is dependent on the remaining of the mark.
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2.2.12: prāk utpatteḥ abhāvopapatteḥ ca || And from the possibility of non-existence before production.
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3.1.1: darśanasparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt || From the recognition of one and the same object by sight and touch.
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3.1.2: na, viṣayavyavasthānāt || No, from the distinction of objects.
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3.1.3: tadvyavasthānāt eva ātmasadbhāvāt apratiṣedhaḥ || From that very distinction, there is no refutation of the existence of soul.
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3.1.4: śarīradāhe pātakābhāvāt || From the absence of sin in the burning of a body.
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3.1.5: tadabhāvaḥ sātmakapradāhe api, tannityatvāt || The absence of that is also in the burning of a living body, from its being eternal.
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3.1.6: na, kāryāśrayakartṛvadhāt || No, from the killing of the site of effects and of the agent.
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3.1.7: savyadṛṣṭasya itareṇa pratyabhijñānāt || From the recognition by the other of what is seen by the left eye.
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