id
stringlengths 36
36
| text
stringlengths 1
400
| source
stringclasses 10
values |
|---|---|---|
76258429-3a83-4db6-85f3-63ac8d1e7871
|
. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the affidavit the Department has sup- plied does not provide enough information to determine whether it properly applied Exemption 3. Thus, the Court will deny both parties’ motions for summary judgment without prejudice and per- mit them to file renewed motions consistent with this Memorandum Order
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
32c9f5fa-8d5e-4587-9f22-a4eb3c346b3e
|
. Moreover, in any such renewed motion, in the interests of judicial economy, the Department will be required to assert, in addition to Exemption 3, any other exemption that it relies on to withhold the records
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
f20907ac-9781-4fe0-a663-0151ba265cc2
|
. In FOIA cases in which an agency invokes any FOIA exemption, the “burden is on the agency to justify withholding the requested documents, and the FOIA directs district courts to determine de novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.” EPIC v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
32153e1a-63d0-4a95-8a9f-c9d355ee8a50
|
. When conducting its de novo review, a court may grant summary judgment based on the agency’s declarations if the “affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency's bad faith
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
93303784-5bcf-4bde-a43a-49679bfdba26
|
.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). That is, the agency must provide a “logical” or “plausible” justi- fication for the exemption, Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and may not rely on “conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions,” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As the D.C
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
054eaa8a-444f-44f3-befd-0eab3cfe101f
|
. Circuit explained, agencies must submit sufficiently de- tailed and specific affidavits for at least three purposes: “it forces the government to analyze 3 carefully any material withheld, it enables the trial court to fulfill its duty of ruling on the applica- bility of the exemption, and it enables the adversary system to operate by giving the requester as much information as possible, on the
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
0baa8bf1-419c-4462-9abd-53c6401e7742
|
basis of which he can present his case to the trial court
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
56e037cf-3dbb-4803-bbf8-9a77d9698e4e
|
.” Lykins v. Dep’t of Just., 725 F.2d 1455, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The withholding agency “must describe each document or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the consequences of disclosing the sought-after information.” King v. Dep’t of Just., 830 F.2d 210, 223–24 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
693ab382-099c-4d35-ac24-f3ef56434386
|
. That information “is necessary to ensure meaningful review of an agency’s claim to withhold information subject to a FOIA request.” Id. at 223. The Department invokes Exemption 3, which applies to information that is exempted from disclosure by statute
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
5be1eb6f-044f-43d2-bfc7-04f65ff19a25
|
. Unlike other FOIA exemptions, Exemption 3 “depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within the statute’s coverage.” Morley, 508 F.3d at 1126 (citation omitted). As noted, the Department relies on 10 U.S.C
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
8b87bfad-4d54-43db-a0d0-79d743a7d1a9
|
. § 130e, which permits the withholding of “critical infrastructure security information
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
a37f8f95-284e-4b54-bdb1-23e478f414ac
|
.” The statute defines that information as: sensitive but unclassified information that, if disclosed, would reveal vulnerabilities in Department of Defense critical infrastructure that, if exploited, would likely re- sult in the significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to Department of Defense operations, property, or facilities, including information regarding the se- curing and
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
896a420a-b16b-4fb3-b677-48b97237ab07
|
safeguarding of explosives, hazardous chemicals, or pipelines, related to critical infrastructure or protected systems owned or operated by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, including vulnerability assessments prepared by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, explosives safety information (including stor- age and handling), and other site-specific information on or relating to
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
e012a0d2-408c-4624-ba39-65a092d268b3
|
installation security
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
d7ae7fc4-3fce-4d1c-a80c-e6eef088d4ef
|
. 10 U.S.C. § 130e(f). But the Department’s affidavit is not “furnished with sufficient information” for the Court to decide summary judgment “in a meaningful fashion.” King, 830 F.2d at 223
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
5710cd88-3974-4728-82c9-e348da2a54f3
|
. It has provided 4 almost no specific information about the 5,000 pages it seeks to withhold for the Court to determine whether they are in fact “critical infrastructure security information” and qualify for Exemption 3 withholding. Instead, it supplies a few short paragraphs that rely on generalizations and conclusory statements
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
07904551-e6f9-42ad-bc09-a2b62d106596
|
. One specific shortcoming with the Department’s affidavit worth highlighting is that it does not explain to what “critical infrastructure” the withheld records relate. To qualify as “critical infrastructure security information,” the information at issue must, “if disclosed . . . reveal vulner- abilities in Department of Defense critical infrastructure.” 10 U.S.C. § 130e(f)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
4a3dc85b-13f9-43ea-9133-3f8aecc31644
|
. The closest the Department comes is asserting that the information “individually or in the aggregate, would enable an adversary to identify capabilities and vulnerabilities in the Department’s approach to artificial intelligence development and implementation.” ECF No. 14-1 at 4
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
4cacbdfb-fb31-4458-a67c-975078f2ac1e
|
. The Court is left to wonder how “the Department’s approach to artificial intelligence development and implementation” qual- ifies as “critical infrastructure” under the statute. Indeed, an “approach” is not usually considered “infrastructure.” In addition, revealing “capabilities”—rather than “vulnerabilities”—does not ap- pear to move the needle under the statute
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
5a399683-266b-4d3d-823e-02421ba07f74
|
. In any event, the Department offers no “specific infor- mation” on this point “sufficient to place the documents within th[is] exemption category.” Hay- den v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
4eb61620-2bbe-458d-93b4-498e23a1ec9d
|
. All it provides are “broad and vague descriptions” of the information that make it impossible for the Court to conduct its requisite de novo review over the Department’s decision to withhold this information as “critical infrastructure security information.” See Prop. of the People, Inc. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 330 F. Supp. 3d 373, 388 (D.D.C. 2018)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
8edd560a-d8a5-4b15-9c14-098f49c3864e
|
. Aside from whether the Department’s “approach to artificial intelligence development and implementation” should be considered “critical infrastructure,” the Department’s affidavit is 5 deficient in showing that its withholdings qualify as “critical infrastructure security information” in other ways
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
79a27aea-060c-47b6-ac59-3b11087d7e4d
|
. For example, the affidavit fails to explain how the disclosure of the withheld infor- mation would reveal any alleged “vulnerabilities” in the critical infrastructure. See 10 U.S.C. § 130e(f) (requiring that the information must, “if disclosed . . . reveal vulnerabilities in Depart- ment of Defense critical infrastructure.”)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
e8406aca-3e85-40a0-bcdf-98c798844e64
|
.1 In many cases, such a connection would be self-evident —for example, the statute provides the case of a “vulnerability assessment” of a military base. Id. Not so here. On this point too then, the Court has insufficient information to decide whether the Department has “demonstrate[d] that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 862
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
cdeae866-8f9e-4cb7-8cb8-16e1817f5d32
|
.2 In short, the overly brief, generalized, and technical (in part) affidavit supplied by the De- partment does not enable the Court to fulfill its duty and rule on the applicability of the asserted FOIA exemption. See Prop. of the People, Inc., 330 F. Supp
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
8478bddc-72bb-4725-8b14-19534447580c
|
. 3d at 377 (finding the agency’s declarations “insufficiently detailed and conclusory, and thus, do not permit the Court to determine 1 To be sure, the affidavit describes a long list of the types of information in the Depart- ment’s withholdings. See ECF No. 14-1 at 4. But those descriptions do not make up for the defi- ciencies described above
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
2b03a5b5-81a7-4ac9-a5bb-49f8bf502104
|
. “Time and again, courts in this Circuit have stressed that the government cannot justify its withholdings on the basis of summary statements that merely reiterate legal stand- ards or offer far-ranging category definitions for information.” Am. Immigr. Council, 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 235 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotations and citation omitted)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
aac968b5-262b-4f79-9c1f-c495fa670e27
|
. Moreover, the “heavy use of technical jargon” in these paragraphs lacks context that would help the Court eval- uate whether the information meets the standard under the statute. Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 235 F. Supp. 3d 207, 216 (D.D.C. 2017); see also King, 830 F
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
f832d72e-b9b0-4b36-b5f8-fa86739bed8b
|
.2d at 221 (explaining that agency affidavits must have “adequate representation of context which, when combined with descriptions of deletions, enables de novo review of the propriety of withholding”). 2 The Court could go on to describe additional deficiencies
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
dcdf141a-b37d-4c76-9040-1d51e10fff98
|
. For example, the affidavit does not sufficiently explain how disclosure of the vulnerabilities at issue, if exploited, “would likely result in the significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to Department of Defense operations, property, or facilities.” 10 U.S.C. § 130e(f) (emphasis added)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
6827772e-36e2-4277-9df7-698731e46831
|
. A “[c]ategorical de- scription of redacted material coupled with categorical indication of anticipated consequences of disclosure is clearly inadequate.” King, 830 F.2d at 224. 6 whether the agency may properly withhold” the disputed information)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
0c976f0b-36dd-43dd-8d0f-98c3757c93e2
|
.3 Finally, the Court notes that the Department invokes other FOIA exemptions, including Exemptions 4, 5, and 6, but does not attempt to justify its withholdings under them, instead reserv- ing the right to do so at another other time, presumably through another motion. See ECF No. 14 at 3 n.2
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
dfbe9f7f-4c63-4d89-bf31-eec61d288d7d
|
. While the Court appreciates the Department’s desire to avoid the administrative burden of reviewing documents for more exemptions, the piecemeal assertion of different exemptions “undermines FOIA’s purpose to promote efficient, prompt, and full disclosure of information and the interest of judicial economy.” Woodward v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 18-cv-1249 (RC), 2022 WL 17961289, at *8 (D.D.C
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
21afe22d-2513-4367-b0ea-edc4bb5f8eb6
|
. Dec. 27, 2022) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, district courts retain the discretion to find a defendant’s invocation of FOIA exemptions forfeited if they are not raised timely. See Shapiro v. Dep’t of Just., No. 13-cv-555 (RDM), 2016 WL 3023980, at *4 (D.D.C. May 25, 2016)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
5c467a3a-2975-421d-a7c5-d329540da785
|
. The Court will not exercise its discretion to do so here, given the potentially important national security interests at stake. Still, the Court advises the 3 The Court also questions whether the Department has sufficiently shown that it conducted an adequate segregability analysis
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
0e117100-6fcc-4700-a555-f202fb25b447
|
. FOIA requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
5f829b41-e001-464c-8685-ea116506a1f5
|
. And while the agency is “entitled to a presumption that [it] complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material,” it must still “identify the exempt material and provide descriptions of excerpts deemed to be non-segregable, with explana- tions as to these decisions.” Greenpeace, Inc. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 311 F. Supp. 3d 110, 132 (D.D.C
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
e7b7ef3b-23b4-4cbc-84a4-97d86a3b5aaa
|
. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “This rule of segregation applies to all FOIA exemptions.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
4687f27b-cfa9-47d5-b2fe-11c1d8d9b19c
|
. The Department submitted only two sentences in support of its segregability analysis in which it simply asserts that it “conducted a page-by-page, line-by-line review of each document and deter- mined that no segregation of meaningful information in the withheld documents can be made.” ECF No. 14-1 at 6
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
59078720-c5b6-4581-90b1-856ee964e1b9
|
. Courts have found that such conclusory statements, especially without any- thing more—for example, a Vaughn index—are insufficient for the Department to meet its obli- gations. See Am. Immigr. Council, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (holding that defendant’s “conclusory assertion” that it “reviewed each record line-by-line to identify information exempt from disclo- sure . .
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
11186430-5ab3-4262-a861-6130bdf81b01
|
. will not suffice to discharge this burden”). 7 Department that when it files its renewed motion, it must address any additional FOIA exemptions it wishes to invoke. Cf. Shapiro v. Dep’t of Just., 177 F. Supp. 3d 467 (D.D.C
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
eded849c-fd96-451c-9111-9259a2b91a3e
|
. 2016) (permitting the FBI “to assert untimely exemptions to the extent that it can show that the disclosure of such records will compromise national security or sensitive, personal, private information” (cleaned up)).4 For all the above reasons, the Court finds that the Department has failed to provide a suf- ficient basis to justify it withholdings under FOIA’s Exemption 3
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
6e463ed2-ba90-42b8-b496-926142e81634
|
. Thus, it will deny the Depart- ment’s motion without prejudice and permit it to file a renewed motion, which must include all exemptions it seeks to invoke, including Exemption 3. See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., 185 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., No. 17-cv-0832 (CKK), 2019 WL 4644029, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
29dc6f29-972e-4e91-9335-3a73ab96dd0a
|
. 24, 2019) (denying agency’s motion without prejudice because it did not explain in sufficient detail how a FOIA exemption applied but permitting the agency to file a second motion due to “the importance of the exemptions at issue”). And because the Court will permit the Department to file a renewed motion, it will similarly deny Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice and permit him to do the same
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
cfb21487-8b1a-4a90-b280-e509341a6c13
|
. See Prop. of the People, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 3d at 390 (denying the parties’ motions without prejudice because the agency failed to submit sufficient information justifying its FOIA withholdings and permitting both parties to file renewed motions). Thus, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14, and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
3030d1a7-9d00-407a-868e-574ed62c6db7
|
. 17, are DENIED 4 In addition, if necessary to justify its withholdings, the Department may seek to provide affidavits or other materials to the Court for ex parte, in camera review. See Am. Immigr. Council, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 235; see also Lykins, 725 F.2d at 1463–64. 8 WITHOUT PREJUDICE
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
899378c7-8a96-412e-bfe6-eadd893794e4
|
. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall meet, confer, and sub- mit a joint schedule for briefing renewed motions for summary judgment by October 15, 2024. SO ORDERED. /s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: September 13, 2024
|
Biddle_v_US_2024-09-13.txt
|
65318dc3-551e-4cca-86f9-689654e2f53e
|
Illinois Official Reports Appellate Court Doe v. Readey, 2023 IL App (1st) 230867 Appellate Court Caption JANE DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD READEY, Defendant- Appellant. District & No. First District, Sixth Division No. 1-23-0867 Filed October 27, 2023 Decision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2022-L-011495; the Hon. Israel A. Desierto, Judge, presiding
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
fb0965cd-564c-4e56-9316-e326636f9bf0
|
. Judgment Affirmed. Counsel on Appeal Victor P. Henderson and Colin Quinn Commito, of Henderson Parks, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant. Tamara N. Holder, Law Firm of Tamara N. Holder LLC, of Chicago, for appellee. Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hyman and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
28cfa04a-0640-46a5-be43-77781bbfdc9a
|
. Justice Hyman also specially concurred, with opinion. Digitally signed by Reporter of Decisions Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2024.08
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
a08587b6-7395-4fce-9df7-596e91c659dc
|
.29 14:44:07 -05'00' - 2 - OPINION In this interlocutory appeal, defendant Chad Readey appeals a trial judge’s order denying defendant’s motion to reconsider and, in the alternative, vacate another judge’s order, which permitted plaintiff to proceed under a fictitious name. For the following reasons, we affirm the second judge’s1 denial of said motion
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
7c89b3e9-3f2b-437b-b406-fde4079ee5c0
|
. BACKGROUND On December 29, 2022, plaintiff filed a one-page, three-paragraph “Petition to File a Lawsuit Using a Fictitious Name.” The petition stated in full: “Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-401 [(West 2022)], plaintiff Jane Doe, by and through her attorney, seeks leave to file a complaint under a fictitious name. In support of this motion, plaintiff states: 1
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
a24a50a3-62c9-48d4-9800-65fd77d1acfd
|
. Under 735 ILCS 5/2-401 [(West 2022)], a party may appear under a fictitious name ‘for good cause shown.’ 2. Plaintiff here has good cause: Plaintiff was sexually assaulted, as a minor, by defendant, which is a matter that is highly personal, private and sensitive. It is a source of humiliation and shame that she did not bring on herself
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
ffac9002-e081-426b-b11d-a890ca2ee273
|
. Plaintiff does not wish to be publicly branded as a victim of sexual abuse. 3. Given all this, plaintiff’s interest in protecting her identity outweighs any interest the public may have in knowing it. WHEREFORE plaintiff respectfully requests the Court permit her to file her lawsuit under a fictitious name
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
0e71ebba-538a-4fca-9f0f-31076769ed66
|
.” Section 2-401(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) provides: “Upon application and for good cause shown the parties may appear under fictitious names.” 735 ILCS 5/2-401(e) (West 2022)
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
7f501975-dc08-4228-a3c3-45e6cbefc3df
|
. On December 29, 2022, the trial court issued a one-page, five-paragraph order that stated in full: “This matter coming to be heard on Plaintiff’s Petition to Proceed Under a Fictitious Name, the Court being fully advised and having heard argument, the Court finds as follows: Pursuant to In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1068 (4th Dist
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
6168c77b-9305-4a1c-9551-d942f3e3e0f3
|
. 1992), the Court has balanced Plaintiff’s right to privacy against the public’s right of access to open court proceedings. Plaintiff contends she has a compelling interest because she was a victim of sexual abuse, which is highly personal, private and sensitive
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
adb70810-1f2d-4acb-b376-e6188f4012e3
|
. The Court finds there is a compelling interest that favors Plaintiff’s right to privacy in keeping her name from the public and such right is superior to the public’s right of access to an open proceeding. See Doe v. Doe, 282 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1088 (1st Dist. 1996). 1The Honorable Israel Desierto
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
b3b0164e-d23f-49dc-a895-550553ea8192
|
. - 3 - The Court further finds that the privacy issue involved shall be protected in the least restrictive way possible. The Court finds that the least restrictive way to protect the privacy of Plaintiff is allowing her to proceed under a fictitious name
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
98ed67ba-8518-4b8c-a2c0-39b76fa81e07
|
. The order may be reconsidered if Plaintiff takes any steps to make her name known to the public and shall be reconsidered by the trial judge at the time of jury selection. Plaintiff shall file a copy of the Complaint with her actual name under seal with the Clerk of the Court and to remain under seal until further order of the Court
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
67621698-938c-4225-99dc-c4c98194de44
|
.” On December 29, 2022, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against defendant, alleging (1) a violation of the Gender Violence Act (740 ILCS 82/1 et seq. (West 2020)) and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleged that defendant sexually harassed and assaulted her while they were both students in high school
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
6172570f-f30c-44c4-9205-23c6e894f92e
|
. The complaint further alleged that, during the 2019-20 school year, six female high-school students reported to the dean’s office that defendant had engaged in sexually abusive conduct toward them; that the high school opened an investigation into “their star-student athlete”; that plaintiff did not report defendant at that time, although she did discuss his conduct with close family and
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
c6807992-fcc2-443c-a486-ff1685a8d2eb
|
friends; that high school officials called her into their office and took a statement from her; that other classmates (but not plaintiff) publicly exposed the allegations against defendant on social media; that, in July 2022, defendant filed a defamation lawsuit against several classmates (but not plaintiff); and that, since filing suit, defendant threatened to add plaintiff to his defamation
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
3c89d4d8-7cdd-45cf-bd08-9576229b4292
|
suit
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
f8d1b341-7e33-4854-a10b-58898ecba3f1
|
.2 In support of the last allegation, plaintiff attached a letter from defendant’s counsel, dated December 14, 2022, which stated that defendant would add her to his defamation suit by December 30, 2022, unless she contacted him before December 21 to discuss “alternatives.” The letter further stated: “You are advised to promptly obtain legal counsel
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
09548b56-013e-4ce9-882e-e3c1787aef5f
|
.” Plaintiff filed her petition on December 29, the day before defendant threatened to name her as a defendant in his suit.3 The timestamps on plaintiff’s petition to proceed anonymously, plaintiff’s complaint, and the trial court’s order permitting the petition indicate that all three documents were filed together at exactly 12:31 p.m. on December 29, 2022
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
1721668d-2b41-4434-958b-750c55ecca37
|
. On January 10, 2023, defendant waived service of process, when his counsel executed a form “Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons and Complaint,” declaring under penalty of perjury that he had received a copy. On January 12, 2023, defendant filed an appearance in this action through his counsel
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
bed3f0e3-70d5-4fbc-9b43-d4e033486b49
|
. On March 29, 2023, defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint,” alleging two separate and independent grounds. First, defendant sought dismissal “because” plaintiff “filed suit under a fictitious name without the Court’s permission” and, thus, violated section 2-401(e)
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
f3426a69-6ed2-4b14-9255-8b150c5e5777
|
. Second, defendant sought dismissal “because” plaintiff “cannot establish good cause after the fact,” where she signed an affidavit in her own name in another case, in which she 2According to the complaint, the counsel who sent her a threatening letter is the same counsel who represents defendant in the case below and on this appeal
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
910afdde-2786-4ada-8aaa-56f7b2db2e1c
|
. 3Plaintiff’s brief alleges that defendant added her on January 6, 2023, as a named defendant to his defamation action, and defendant does not dispute this allegation. - 4 - was not a party, but which contained similar allegations to her complaint here
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
f032aeb6-b56c-47b8-a645-7580bbb94475
|
.4 The seven- paragraph “Argument” section of defendant’s motion was divided equally between the two grounds, with the first paragraph quoting the statute, and the next three paragraphs arguing the first ground, and the following three paragraphs arguing the second ground
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
096c49db-6a9e-4a6f-b8f5-c763f6a060be
|
. With respect to any argument by plaintiff that she had cause to file anonymously, defendant asserted that “[t]his argument is meritless,” and he marshalled case law and attached exhibits in support of this point. The heading of his March 29 motion named a trial judge (the Honorable Daniel A. Trevino), who was different than the judge (the Honorable James P
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
0869ecd8-3655-4ae9-879e-a847498a40b9
|
. Flannery) who had issued the original December 29, 2022, order. His March 29 motion also contains a “Certificate of Service” on the last page stating that defendant’s counsel served a copy on plaintiff’s counsel by e-mail on March 29. Defendant’s motion further alleged that plaintiff’s counsel published “Jane Doe[’s]” allegations on counsel’s website
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
2718c4d3-5256-41da-b3b2-66c628fcd6d4
|
. In support, defendant attached a printout that he alleged was printed from plaintiff’s counsel’s website and that indicates that it was printed on January 23, 2023.5 The text of the printout states that, “[t]oday,” December 29, 2022, “Jane Doe filed a complaint” against defendant, and it describes her allegations against defendant
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
8c1c63c2-ab2e-4d55-87a8-be1ebe7377ea
|
. Defendant’s motion stated that, although the allegations were no longer on her counsel’s website as of March 13, 2023, it had become the source of other Internet articles. In support of his claim that her counsel’s website was the source of other articles, he attached what he alleged was the first page of a Google search for his name, which listed five entries
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
642ab1b9-be50-49fd-96d8-7e717d423808
|
. The first three entries refer favorably to his profile as a baseball player, and the fourth and fifth entries refer to his defamation suit
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
f637a6e7-2d16-42a2-99f6-3938c64997db
|
. While the fourth entry is headlined “Northwestern baseball player sued for intentional infliction of,” the text for that entry states: “For over two years, Chad Readey has been the victim of a vicious, coordinated effort to assassinate his character based on falsehoods
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
53dda1cb-d119-481c-9221-d05139a88522
|
.” Similarly, while the fifth entry is headlined “Gender Violence Lawsuit: HFHS Grad Sues Northwestern’s,” the text for this entry states: “The player—Chad Readey, of Flossmoor—has also filed a defamation lawsuit against several classmates who took to the university’s social
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
d55ea321-d620-4568-9014-a51f97e34af8
|
.” On April 13, 2023, two weeks after his dismissal motion, defendant filed a second and separate motion entitled “Motion to Reconsider and In the Alternative to Vacate,” which named Judge Flannery, the author of the December 29 order
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
95ffd201-9579-42f2-a704-5dfc69a4092b
|
. In his prayer for relief, defendant asked “this Court to reconsider the December 29, 2022[,] order and deny Plaintiff’s petition and, in the alternative, to vacate the order
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
95d5cfd5-5ac7-4582-b886-48a0f323dcad
|
.” Like defendant’s first motion, this second motion also alleged (1) that plaintiff violated section 2-401(e) and (2) that she lacked good cause to file anonymously because she signed an affidavit in her own name in another case with similar allegations. The April 13 motion contains a “Certificate of Service” stating that it was served on plaintiff’s counsel by e-mail on April 13
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
c03eaa2c-1998-4219-af70-48da32773322
|
. 4The affidavit was submitted in support of a motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by defendant against other parties. The affidavit is dated September 6, 2022, which was three months before defendant’s letter on December 14, 2022, telling plaintiff to get an attorney
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
4821d09a-29f1-4435-8e7c-85a9082a45e2
|
. 5Three of the five pages are cut off at the top, and the page numbers in the bottom right-hand corner indicate that the pages are not in sequential order. For example, the first page states “1/9” while the second page states “4/11” and the third page states “2/9
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
5b019280-6b65-4bca-b175-b214acbf4e69
|
.” - 5 - Defendant’s April 13 motion alleged that plaintiff sent defendant a copy of the December 29, 2022, order on April 6, 2023, but the motion did not allege that this was the first he learned of the December 29 order. The motion further alleged that the December 29 order was injunctive but not a temporary restraining order
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
9c447165-9e50-4474-8142-1859ee80ecb5
|
. On April 19, 2023, Judge Trevino issued an order setting forth a briefing schedule on defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay” and required defendant to e-mail a Word or PDF file with all briefs, exhibits, and relevant documents to the court by 11 a.m. on May 24, 2023
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
ccd37ba4-b317-463c-90c5-96e34842a11a
|
. Although the order refers to a motion to stay, the limited supporting records filed in this appeal by both parties do not contain a motion to stay. Additionally, our supporting record does not contain plaintiff’s response brief or other documents showing whether the March 29 motion to dismiss was heard or decided or whether the briefing schedule was adhered to
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
813411d6-5da4-459e-9017-79f5b956b466
|
. Nevertheless, plaintiff’s appellate brief alleges that she filed her responsive brief, which was due by May 9; that defendant did not file his reply which was due by May 23; and that the March 29 motion is still pending. Defendant does not dispute these allegations
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
b8c7df30-7b0a-4a63-b450-9e6c68465ea6
|
. On April 20, 2023, defendant filed a “Response to Plaintiff’s Request for Admission,” in which he objected to plaintiff’s request for admission “because motions to dismiss and to stay discovery are pending and subject to a briefing schedule set by Court order
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
bc8b6e60-bf5f-410d-9f9c-0256171dea44
|
.” On April 25, 2023, yet a third trial judge, the Honorable Israel Desierto, issued a one- sentence order, which defendant alleges is the basis for jurisdiction of this appeal. Judge Desierto was neither the judge who issued the original December 29 order nor the judge who issued the scheduling order for defendant’s prior motion
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
6dfb3bda-1ba8-480e-91e1-4cdea3133461
|
. While the record before us does not contain a written response to the motion by plaintiff, the order was issued 12 days after defendant’s motion was filed
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
4d02fd9b-9acb-4fd6-b9c9-3491138b10aa
|
. The April 25 order stated in full: “This cause coming to be heard before the court on motion of Defendant to Reconsider the order entered pursuant to Section 2-401(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure on December 29, 2022, both parties present through counsel, with the Court properly advised on the premise[s], IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendant’s motion is denied
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
3754679d-b25a-448b-a699-4cf2295bec29
|
.” Defendant’s counsel drafted the order, which was ostensibly against his interest. The order does not state the reasons for the denial6 or whether the order was in anticipation of the resolution of defendant’s soon-to-be fully briefed dismissal motion. The order also does not mention defendant’s alternate motion to vacate
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
936f1aad-6ac0-4f0c-9c5e-1e8160dbf391
|
. The one-line order was handwritten on a form with defendant’s attorney listed as the drafting attorney.7 On May 15, 2023, defendant filed an interlocutory notice of appeal stating that he was appealing the order entered on April 25, 2023, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017)
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
dd957b8e-48b2-444a-acbe-8295f7389091
|
. 6Typically, a protective order is subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, and a reviewing court considers the trial court’s stated reasons for refusing to vacate when deciding whether the trial court did, or did not, abuse that discretion. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 226 (2000)
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
e87b1472-ecb4-4943-ae7c-937f842f89ac
|
. Here, the losing party apparently drafted the order without any stated reasons, although a lack of stated reasons may itself be a ground for reversal. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 226. 7Plaintiff’s appellate brief states that the order was drafted by defendant’s attorney. - 6 - ANALYSIS I
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
86afa3bc-48e7-4f66-91ec-10305960ac18
|
. Jurisdiction The first issue we must resolve is whether, as plaintiff argues, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. People v. Brindley, 2017 IL App (5th) 160189, (“[t]he first issue we must address is the jurisdiction of this court to hear” the appeal). A
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
3aed9f11-fbcb-4749-8d82-fd91acfe448f
|
. Court of Limited Jurisdiction As an appellate court, our jurisdiction is limited, and those limits are expressly set forth in our state’s constitution. The Illinois Constitution provides appellate courts with the jurisdiction or authority to review final judgments entered by a trial court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
c4f2f366-2892-49d1-95ed-75055f0126ad
|
. Specifically, section 6 provides that “[a]ppeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. As a result, an appeal to this court is generally taken only after a trial court has resolved all claims against all parties in an action. Ely v. Pivar, 2018 IL App (1st) 170626,
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
8decd7f2-6692-4a83-981f-46e9af59253a
|
. However, section 6 of article VI also provides that “[t]he Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. Thus, when we are presented with a nonfinal judgment, our authority to hear that appeal is based solely on what our supreme court has permitted us to hear under its rules
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
1f86d018-ccf6-4ac5-898e-fce2172556fd
|
. EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419, (“absent a supreme court rule, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to review” nonfinal orders). If we lack jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. In re Barion S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113026, (if we determine we lack jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal). B
|
Doe_v_Readey_2023-10-27.txt
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.